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(9 Aug 68) 2nd Ind

Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-COFOR-65)

Active files should be continuously updated but hard targets should be retained in the active files. The frequency with which a target is fired should be based on current intelligence information and is not a function of when it was last fired upon.

(1) Reference Section II, para g (2). Engineer Assistance for Base Camps.

(5) Reference Section II, para g (7). Cracked Fuel Cells. Concur with para 2 h of 1st Indorsement.

CHARLES CAMPBELL  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

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Authority: 25 CFR 170.10  
DATE: 11/11/01  
BY: 60322

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9 Aug 65) 2nd Ind  
Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ORS-OSFOR-65)

Target lists should be continuously updated but hard targets should be  
maintained in the active files. The frequency with which a target is fired  
should be based on current intelligence information and is not a function  
of when it was last fired upon.

(3) Reference Section II, para g (2). Engineer Assistance for Base Camps.

(4) Reference Section II, para g (7). Cracked Fuel Cells. Concur  
with para 2 M of 1st Indorsement.

CHARLES CANTRELL  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: 9-1-83  
By: [Signature]  
Date: 11-11-01

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AVHGD-PO (17 Sep 68)

SUBJECT: Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Reports - Lessons Learned  
for 2d Bn 32d Arty

TO ACoS, G3

FROM ACoS, G4

DATE 4 OCT 68 CMT 2  
LTC Cline/ets/4379

Reference item concerning cracked fuel cells, page 18, paragraph 2g(1); paragraph 2k, 1st Indorsement; and paragraph 12, 2nd Indorsement: nonconcur with the recommendation in the basic correspondence. Representatives from the Army Tank and Automotive Command are now studying the problem. ~~any~~ country-wide restriction on firing charge-6 ~~should~~ <sup>will</sup> be based on the evaluation and recommendations from their study.

2 Incl  
nc

*B Flood Col SS*  
J. M. HALES, JR.  
Colonel, GS  
ACoS, G4

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FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: 25 CFR 175.101  
DATE: 11/11/01 BY: GHS



**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVFBC-RE-H (2 Aug 68) 3rd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (UIC-WA2AAA)  
Period Ending 31 July 1968. RGS CSFOR-69

DA, HQ II FPORECV, APO San Francisco 96266 16 SEP 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOD-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.
2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-  
Lessons Learned of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery for the period ending  
31 July 1968, as indorsed, with the exception below:
3. Reference para 2e (2) (g) (page 17). Nonconcur. The expending of  
continual engineer effort in the maintenance of drainage systems in base  
camp areas is neither practical nor desirable. Once an adequate drainage  
system has been constructed it should be maintained by self-help effort  
with assistance by the local post engineer force.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
nc

O. B. FORY  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

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By: [Signature]  
Date: 11/10/00



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## (4) Personnel Management:

1. The Battalion has received replacements in most required MOS's. There remains a need for more rapid replacement of key officers and senior NCO's in the Battalion. During month of August Battery A lost its Battery Commander, 1st SGT and Chief of Firing Battery. The New Battery Commander arrived before old Battery Commander left, but 1st SGT and Chief of Firing Battery did not. This left little continuity in the senior NCO ranks during the transition period.

2. Personnel strength has remained slightly below the authorized level with fluctuation from a low of 84% to a high of 106%.

3. There were no changes in educational opportunities.

4. There were no religious problems. Religious coverage has been excellent for all batteries in both field and base camp locations.

## (5) R & R

### a. Out-of-Country

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
Australia	5	8	10
Bangkok	3	6	6
Hawaii	10	9	9
Hong Kong	0	3	2
Malaysia	0	0	0
Manila	1	0	0
Singapore	1	3	2
Taipei	5	4	4
Tokyo	1	0	2

### b. In-Country

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
Vung Tau	5	5	5

(6) Morale: The Morale of the Battalion continued to be high.

(7) Awards and Decorations:

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Authority: 47 CFR 1.121  
By: [illegible]  
Date: [illegible]

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AWARDS

NUMBER

Silver Star	1
Legion of Merit	0
Soldiers Medal	0
Bronze Star Medal "V"	5
Air Medal	3
Army Commendation Medal "V"	11
Army Commendation	15
Purple Heart	27
Air Medal "V"	1
Bronze Star	7
(3) Discipline, Law and Order	
Article 15	27
Summary Court-Martial	1
Special Court-Martial	7
General Court-Martial	0

*"V" = Valor device*

(9) The Battalion has one (1) Rotary and one (1) Fixed Wing Aviator assigned, both are TDY to 23d Artillery Group Aviation Section.

b. Operations

(1) The Battalion provided artillery support for the following major operations: 25th Inf Div Toan Thang Phase II, Special Forces operations AO Snake, AO Rocket, AO Rocket Ext, 1st Bde 25th Inf Div AO Lancer, 1st Div AO Badger, numerous Special Forces and Regional/Popular Forces were also provided artillery support. Forward observer parties were furnished to Special Forces and Regional/Popular Forces.

Activity during the first days of August was light until 18th of the month at which time Viet Cong and NVA forces launched a coordinated attack against the Special Forces outpost at Katum, Tay Ninh Base Camp, and several Fire Support Bases in the Tay Ninh area. At this time Katum received a ground attack that penetrated its perimeter while other Allied facilities were receiving rocket and mortar attacks. Heavy enemy activity continued in Tay Ninh Province until approximately 8 October, at which time main force VC and NVA elements withdrew to the north in War Zone "C" and west across the Cambodian Border.

*Heavy enemy activity in Tay Ninh from 18 Aug. thru about 8 Oct.*

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DATE: 07/15/00  
BY: [illegible]

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During the period 17 August to 19 October 1968 the Tay Ninh Base Camp received 166 107mm mortar rockets. The Battalion Headquarters and three batteries suffered negative casualties and damage during these attacks. On two occasions enemy ground attacks were mounted but in both instances they were dispersed by artillery and 40mm fire before posing a serious threat to the defense of the camp. During the same period Battery C, located at Dau Tieng, received 20 107mm rockets and 95 82mm mortars through enemy attacks. This battery suffered 9 casualties, all WIA.

At 0101 hours 22 August 1968 FSB Rawlins came under mortar and ground attack by an estimated one Viet Cong battalion. At approximately the same time FSB Buell also came under mortar and ground attack. Results of these contacts were: US casualties 4 KIA and 31 WIA, VC casualties 75 KIA and 15 POW. All Tay Ninh artillery participated in the defense of these fire support bases.

By 2 September it was apparent that road convoys to FSB St Barbara would have to cease due to heavy enemy activity along the MSR. During the period 23 August to 2 September the battalion had 4 KIA and 3 WIA on road convoy operations to FSB St Barbara. On 5 September Battery A, located at the FSB received 10 82mm mortar rounds. During the period 5 September thru 5 October the battery received a total of 383 82mm, 120mm mortar rounds in or near its location. It sustained 38 casualties during the same period, all WIA. 4 M107, 3 TKI, 1 Quad 50, 2 bunkers, 1 292 antenna were damaged in these attacks.

*Road closed*

On 10 September the Battalion, participating in a "Duckblind" operation, received credit for 5 enemy KIA and unknown WIA.


At 0150 hours 13 September FSB Buell received between 300-500 rockets and mortars and a ground attack. Contact broken at 0130 hours of the same day. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery fired 8 (Firecracker) rounds in this engagement. An undetermined number of casualties were inflicted upon the enemy although numerous blood trails were found.

Katum Special Forces Camp came under ground attacks on 12 August, 27 August, 8 September, and 25 September, in each contact the 105mm howitzer platoon of Battery C 6th Bn, 15th Artillery employed direct fire in repelling the attacks. Total friendly casualties were 54 KIA and 31 WIA. Enemy casualties amounted to 70 KIA and 1 WIA. Thien Ngon received ground attacks on 1, 2, 15, and 27 September and 2 October, during this period of heavy enemy activity. The 105mm platoon from Battery B 6th Bn, 15th Artillery participated in repelling these attacks. Friendly casualties were 10 KIA and 33 WIA. Enemy casualties were 130 KIA and 2 WIA. Battery A, 2d Bn, 32d Artillery fired in support of Katum and Thien Ngon Special Forces Camps during all major enemy ground and artillery attacks. Battery B 2d Bn, 32d Artillery repeatedly fired in support of the MACV RF/FF outpost at Phouc Tan during the period 24 August to 8 October. This outpost was subjected to numerous enemy ground and mortar attacks during this period.

*MSR = Main Supply Route*

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*Fire Cracker rounds:  
a shell that contains many small  
hand grenade size Bomblets They shower down  
over the target and then explode. It sounds  
like firecrackers, thus the nickname.*



**CONFIDENTIAL** MSR = Main Supply Route

On 5 October the 1st Bde 25th Inf Div initiated an operation to open the MSR to FSB St Barbara. The objective of the operation was to allow elements of 548th Engineer Battalion to expand the fire support base site in order to permanently locate an Inf company and a 105mm howitzer battery there. The operation lasted approximately nine days and was successful. This operation effectively secured the area around FSB St Barbara and ended the mortar and rocket attacks that had significantly restricted the fires of Battery A during the period cited above.

*Real  
oper  
for  
the  
548th Engineer*

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Authority: 68 CFR 1.5  
DATE: 11/19/2001

(2) During this period the Battalion received credit for 99 VC Killed by Artillery fire. It destroyed two sampans, 26 bunkers, one truck, and about 156 meters trench line, and had five observed secondary explosions.

(3) The following missions were fired with the amounts of ammunition expended:

UNIT	MISSIONS FIRED	AMMUNITION EXPENDED	
		8 inch	175mm
Battery A	4383		7595
Battery B	6649	6738	5752
Battery C	4753	5250	5625
TOTAL	15,785	11,988	18,972

(4) The Battalion fired its 250,000th round in support of ground operations in RVN on 11 October 1968, a total of 255,919 rounds have been fired by the Battalion in RVN.

c. Training

(1) Accident prevention training continues to be a matter of command emphasis.

(2) In-Country orientation was conducted for all newly arrived replacement personnel.

(3) On the job training and cross training continued in all units.

(4) 3 EM attended out of country training courses.

(5) All company grade officers were given proficiency tests on FOC procedures.

(6) 3 EM attended 3 day courses on PLL at II Field Force V G-4 office.

d. Intelligence

(1) No significant security or counterintelligence information was received or developed during the reporting period.

(2) Visual reconnaissance of the assigned area decreased during the reporting period due to unfavorable weather conditions. However, an increase in significant sightings occurred due to increased enemy activity.

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e. Logistics

Adequate quantities of all classes of supply were generally available to all elements of the Battalion, however a critical shortage of metrological supplies is currently being experienced. Calcium Hydride and Hydrogen are considered to be critically short in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Efforts to obtain the supplies have resulted in the Battalion transporting 109 (one-hundred nine) empty hydrogen cylinders from Long Binh to Tay Ninh, a situation that was indicative of unsatisfactory supply procedures. The solution to the critical shortage has not been determined at the present time. All higher headquarters elements are aware of the shortage and are working toward obtaining the supplies.

f. Organization

(1) During the reporting period the Battalion remained assigned to the 23d Arty Gp.

(2) Headquarters Battery, Service Battery, and Battery B were stationed at Tay Ninh, Battery A at FSB St Barbara, and Battery C was stationed at Dau Tieng.

(3) Present firing battery configuration is as follows:

- Battery A - 4 - 175mm Guns
- Battery B - 2 - 175mm Guns
- 2 - 8 inch Howitzers
- Battery C - 2 - 175mm Guns
- 2 - 8 inch Howitzers

g. Other

(1) On 10 August 1968 Battery A held change of command ceremony. CPT Donald N. Babb assumed command of Battery A from CPT Richard D. Ranc.


(2) On 17 September 1968 CPT Donald N. Babb was wounded in action on 18 September 1968 CPT Neil Springborn took intermediate command of Battery A.

(3) On 24 September 1968 CPT Wardell Hollis Jr. assumed command of Battery A from CPT Neil Springborn.

(4) On 3 October 1968 Battery C held a change of command ceremony. CPT Charles L. Hellier assumed command of Battery C from CPT James R. Jinks.

(5) There were no vehicles or aircraft accidents effecting combat operations.

(6) Battalion Surgeon and Battalion Medical Section conducted 43 MEDCAPS and treated 1007 Vietnamese Civilians.



*10 Aug. 68*  
*Cpt. Babb*

*how*  
*Cpt. Ranc*

*17-Sept. 68*  
*Babb was*  
*wounded*

*24 Sept. 68*  
*Cpt. Hollis*  
*took*  
*Command*

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2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders Observation, Evaluation, and Recommendation

a. Personnel

(1) Assignment and DEROS of Key Personnel

(a) OBSERVATION - Units must carefully monitor the assignment and DEROS of key personnel within the Battalion due to the short duration of the tour in the Republic of Vietnam.

(b) EVALUATION - To effectively continue the operations of a unit under this situation, combat or otherwise, the timely assignment of key personnel is imperative. This is not possible unless key personnel slots are continually being filled. In addition, a period of a week to ten days should overlap the date that the individual currently occupying a position is scheduled to DEROS.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None.

b. Operation

(1) FADAC

(a) OBSERVATION - Battalion has about a 25% deadline rate for FADAC. FADAC's that are submitted to direct support maintenance are often released and returned to unit as repaired but when the unit tries to compute data the FADAC does not compute correctly. Repair parts that can be installed by organizational maintenance are often not available. Consequently, FADAC must be submitted to direct support maintenance.

(b) EVALUATION - Experience has shown that a FADAC which is transported from one place to another may not operate. This is an indication that rough handling or movement adversely affects the computers. Computers can often be repaired on the spot by organizational repairman if they had parts that are authorized to be replaced by 2d echelon maintenance repairman.

*DEROS = Date of Expected Return from Overseas*  
*FADAC = Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer*

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DATE: 10/10/2001

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(c) RECOMMENDATION - That the containers lined with foam rubber in which the FADAC can be transported in be issued to using units or that FADAC's to be transported by vehicles be cushioned by blankets or mattresses, etc., to prevent unnecessary vibrations; that a PLL be established at organizational level.

(2) TOC Operations

(a) OBSERVATION - The Battalion FDC is charged with the responsibility of clearing fires in its TAOR, operating on AWCC, coordinating base camp defense, and controlling the operations of its organic units. At peak work load conditions the simultaneous operation of these functions can become hectic and confused because of the noise level of radios, voices, and personnel moving from their stations to check No Fire Zones, grid clearances and other data on operational maps and charts.

(b) EVALUATION - This adverse condition reduces the ability of supervisory personnel to closely monitor the actions of their operators and the general operation of the TOC. An operational system that will allow all TOC personnel to remain at their stations (in or near their seats) and also reduce the noise level is needed to correct this condition. The system should preclude the problem of supervisory personnel having to raise their voices in order to communicate directions to their operators. The TOC should be designed in such a manner that the supervisory personnel are located behind and slightly above the RTO personnel. Each RTO should have an individual, properly posted operations map to his front, located above his radio and work table. These maps will be exact duplicates of the TOC operations map, except that the scale would be 1:100,000 instead of 1:50,000. The exactness of the maps is critical, in order that the Duty Officer can ~~obtain~~ necessary data on the TOC operations map to that posted on RTO maps. The Duty Officer, Duty NCO, and each RTO should wear a telephone headset of the type issued with the SB 22 switchboard. All telephones should be patched into a console located within reach of the Duty Officer and Duty NCO. This intercom system will allow the supervisory personnel to communicate with the RTO's in a normal voice and also allow them to monitor RTO telephone transmissions. This intercom system will further allow all personnel to take calls on any phone without a ringback to the switchboard. This system, properly designed and executed, will provide an extremely efficient and highly organized operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None.

c. Training

(a) OBSERVATION - Military personnel are not reporting intelligence information.

(b) EVALUATION - At 1930 hours one evening during August 1968 a section chief noticed three Vietnamese loitering on the edge of a tree-line 2000 meters to the battery front. Their behavior was not suspicious (though the area was "off limits" after 1900 hours) and therefore, he did not report this sighting. At 2400 hours the battery received 12, 107/122mm rockets from the same area where the Vietnamese were first sighted. All personnel should be constantly reminded to report all sightings, incidents, etc. immediately to their superiors. Further, that incidents as mentioned above be brought to the attention of all unit personnel as a "Lessons Learned" teaching point.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None.

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## d. Intelligence

### (1) Interdiction Targets

(a) OBSERVATION - Visual reconnaissance by aerial observers indicates numerous trails that are constantly used by the enemy.

(b) EVALUATION - Due to terrain features and vegetation there are many points at which these trails converge. These areas present an ideal point for artillery interdiction fire. When locating such points the aerial observer should adjust artillery fire to develop replot data and target numbers. This information should be reported to the S2, with unit fired, for unobserved interdiction fire during periods of suspected enemy movement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None.

## e. Logistics

### (1) Use of A Frames

(a) OBSERVATION - Many times it becomes necessary to use field expedients to carry out a mission and accomplish a task. We were given the job of changing 175mm gun tubes, but no wreckers could get to the tube change site because of the tactical situation. It was decided to use A frames to hoist the tubes from the guns and to install them on the guns.

(b) EVALUATION - The A frames were constructed 14 feet high, 12 feet wide, with casters, and heavy enough to support 6 tons each and equipped with 5 ton chain hoists. A tube change can be completed using the gun to tow the old and new tubes into place and change the breech. The A frames can also be used to remove the pack from the gun when it becomes necessary. The unit is then self sufficient for all heavy lift capabilities.

(c) RECOMMENDATION - That similar 175mm units be issued two A frames as TOE item for the purpose of changing tubes.

## f. Organization

NONE

## g. Others

### (1) Generators

(a) OBSERVATION - Electrical requirements for the battery area were placing a heavy strain on available generators causing overload and early break down.

(b) EVALUATION - Both generators supplying power to the battery were of the 3 phase type. The battery was rewired on two separate, equally loaded wire circuits. Each circuit was then wired to a separate phase on the generator. The result was more power output from the generator with less effort expended. Prior to this, the generators were pulling between 85 and 100% load. After rewiring the electrical load had dropped to 60 to 65%.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: None.

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Authority: 25 CFR 17.104  
Date: 11/11/01  
By: [illegible]

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3. (C) Section 3. Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information

a. Escape and Evasion

NCME

  
BILLY A. McDONALD  
LTC, Artillery  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION

- 2-Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific
- 3-Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam
- 6-Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group

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DATE 11/19/01  
BY 1043  
1043

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AVFB-PAC (6 Nov 68) 21 Lines

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Bn, 32d Art, (VIC-VAZAAA) Period Ending 31 October, 1968 RCS-CSP000000

TO: HEADQUARTERS, 11th AVIATION BRIGADE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266

FROM: Commanding General, 11th AVIATION BRIGADE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266

1. The quarterly report of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

2. Reference Section 2, para 2c(1), FADAC. Concur with para 2a of 1st Indorsement. The following actions have been taken to reduce the downtime of FADAC:

a. This headquarters reports twice monthly to the 1st Logistical Command (1st Log Cdm) a Commander's Critical Items List (CCIL). FADAC equipment has been an item of concern on each CCIL since the inception of the program on 15 September 1968.

b. On 12 November 1968 a meeting was held at this headquarters with representatives of the 33d and 54th Artillery Groups and the 1st Log Cdm. The primary purpose of this meeting was to discuss the problem of excessive FADAC downtime. At this time the groups were advised to coordinate with the direct support units the formation of contact teams to visit the batteries for the purpose of providing on-site assistance in the repair of these items.

c. Also discussed at the 12 November meeting was the subject of providing to the units the packing material for use in transporting the FADAC during battery moves. Subsequently, on 21 November this headquarters dispatched to the two groups a message providing specific guidance on how to requisition and account for this packing equipment.


3. Reference Section 2, para 2c(1), Use of A Frames. Concur with para 2b of 1st Indorsement. On 15 October 1968 a modification to TOAE 6-4730 was submitted requesting that the 175mm/4inch Batteries be authorized a wrecker for acceptance of these changes as well as handling ammunition and changing engines in the field. Recommend that approval of this TOAE be expedited.

4. Errors in the report have been corrected with pen and ink.

JERRY J. SCHROEDER, JR.  
Colonel, USA  
Commanding

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FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

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AVPB-PAC (6 Nov 68) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Bn, 32d Arty  
(ULO-WA2AAA) Period Ending 31 October, 1968 RCB-USFOR-65 (U)

TO: HEADQUARTERS, II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96266

FROM: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, AFIN: AVFBC-RM,  
APO 96266

1. The quarterly report of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

2. Reference Section 2, para 2a(1), FADAC. Concur with para 2a of 1st Indorsement. The following actions have been taken to reduce the downtime of FADAC:

a. This headquarters submits twice monthly to the 1st Logistical Command (1st Log Cnd) a Commanders Critical Issues List (CCIL). FADAC equipment has been an item of concern on each CCIL since the inception of the program on 15 September 1968.

b. On 12 November 1968 a meeting was held at this headquarters with representatives of the 23d and 54th Artillery Groups and the 1st Log Cnd. The primary purpose of this meeting was to discuss the problem of excessive FADAC downtime. At this time the groups were advised to coordinate with the direct support units the formation of contact teams to visit the batteries for the purpose of providing on-site assistance in the repair of these items.

c. Also discussed at the 12 November meeting was the subject of providing to the units the packing material for use in transporting the FADAC during battery moves. Subsequently, on 21 November this headquarters dispatched to the two groups a message providing specific guidance on how to requisition and account for this packing equipment.

3. Reference Section 2, para 2a(1), Use of A Frame. Concur with para 2a of 1st Indorsement. On 15 October 1968 a modification to TO&E 5-4730 was submitted requesting that the 175mm/8inch batteries be authorized a wrecker for accomplishing tube changes as well as handling ammunition and changing engines in the M107/10 Chassis. Recommend that approval of this MTO&E be expedited.

4. Errors in the report have been corrected with pen and ink.

HENRY J. SCHROEDER JR.  
Colonel, FA  
Commanding

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Authority: 93-104  
DATE: 11/11/01  
BY: SP4 BTJ/MLD

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AVRB-8 (6 November 1968) 1st Lt  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery for Period ending 31  
October 1968, ROS-ORP-24 (R1)

Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, AF 9629, 6 December 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Proc Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AVRB-840,  
APO 96266

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for the period ending 31  
October 1968 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2b. General. The deadline time for FADAC could  
be reduced significantly by implementation of the corrective measures recommended.  
Packaging materials have been developed for utilization in shipping of FADAC's. These  
materials should be distributed to Battalion level for use when shipping by road.  
Further, to reduce the amount of down time of FADAC's and to reduce the exposure to  
shock and rough handling it is recommended that contact teams be organized to trouble  
shoot and to conduct repairs at the unit if possible.

b. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2a. Non-contents. While there are suitable "A"  
frames available in the Army inventory it is felt that a 5-ton wrecker due to its  
greater mobility and flexibility would better satisfy the needs of the firing battery.  
For this reason I concurred on 14 Oct with a proposed modification to MGS which  
would authorize the addition of a 5-ton wrecker to the ESB of the Firing Battery.

*Harold G. De Arment*  
HAROLD G. DE ARMENT  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

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DATE 09-11-2001  
BY 3042/UC/STP

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AVR-3 (6 Revoked) (1962) (1) (1)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery for Period  
October 1968, RUC-3-2000 (1)

Headquarters, 230 Artillery Group, APO 96299, 6 December 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, AFM: AVR-3-2000  
APO 96266

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report for the period ending 31  
October 1968 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery.

2. Paragraph comments follow:

a. Reference Section 3, paragraph 2b. Concur. The deadline time for PARAG could  
be reduced significantly by implementation of the corrective measures recommended.  
Packaging materials have been developed for utilization in shipping of PARAG's. These  
materials should be distributed to Battalion level for use when shipping by road.  
Further, to reduce the amount of down time of PARAG's and to reduce the exposure to  
noise and rough handling it is recommended that contact teams be organized to trouble-  
shoot and to conduct repairs at the unit if possible.

b. Reference Section 2, paragraph 2a. Non-concur. While there are suitable "A"  
Cranes available in the Army inventory it is felt that a 5-ton wrecker due to its  
greater mobility and flexibility would better satisfy the needs of the firing battery.  
For this reason I concurred on 14 Oct with a proposed modification to MIVE which  
would authorize the addition of a 5-ton wrecker to the RUC of the Firing Battery.

*Harold G. De Arment*

HAROLD G. DE ARMENT  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

Copy furnished  
HQ, 230 AG, 32d Arty

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FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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Authority: 25 USC 552  
by: [illegible]  
DATE: [illegible]

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Authority: 101  
DATE: 10/10/2001

AVHGO-RE-H (6 Nov 68) 3rd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery  
(VIC: W42AAA) Period Ending 31 October 1968 HCS-CONFUR-64 (U)

TO: HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 15 DEC 68


THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGO(OUT), APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOB-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report is forwarded.
2. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery for the period ending 31 October 1968, as indexed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
O. A. FORY  
1LT, ATRC  
Asst AG

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*ZK*

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Authority: 25 USC 552  
DATE: 11/11/03  
BY: [signature]

AVHQC-DST (6 Nov 68) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, 2d Bn, 32d Arty (UIC-WA2AAA)  
Period Ending 31 October 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 27 DEC 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1968 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning use of A Frames, page 9, paragraph 2e(1) and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 3. Action is pending to include a 5 ton wrecker in the update of the standard MTOE 6-4350. The update will take place during the 3d Quarter FY 69.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

cy furn:  
HQ II FFV  
HQ 2/32 Arty

W. C. ARNIZ  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

MFR: ORLL was staffed through:  
G3 Opns: LTC Crocker/4636  
G3 FD: MAJ Deasy/4283

ACTION OFFICER: MAJ KLINGMAN/4433

COL CURTIS, ACOFS, G3  
206-022 206-022

*DISP*  
*27*

CH DST DIV	<i>A</i>
CH MG BR	
CH ECC BR	<i>B</i>
CH ENG BR	<i>B</i>
A/O	<i>K</i>

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AVHGC-DST (2 Aug 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of HQ, 31st Engineer Battalion (C)(A) for the Period Ending 31 July 1969 RCS CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 12 SEP 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1969 from Headquarters, 31st Engineer Battalion (C)(A).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "M&A Matting Removal", section II, page 7, paragraph a(3); concur. This method appears satisfactory when it is necessary to remove large areas of matting. When areas requiring repair are relatively small, the method described in DA Pam 525-3-1, page 44, is applicable.

b. Reference item concerning "Field Expedient - 'O' rings for International 3414 backhoes", section II, page 7, paragraph a(4); concur. Ordinary rubber bands or rings cut from old inner tubes can be used as field expedient replacements for "O" rings to keep a job moving. If field expedient repair parts are used, they should be installed by an appropriate level of maintenance and should be replaced as soon as the authorized repair part becomes available. Rubber bands and inner tube rubber will not seal as good as the authorized "O" rings and will deteriorate rapidly because the rubber is not treated to withstand the chemical deterioration effect of the hydraulic oil. The use of any field expedient should be authorized by a unit commander only after the replacement part or item has been requested. A continuing requirement for field expedient repair parts of this nature should be investigated because PLL and A&L stockage levels should be sufficient to support requirements.

c. Reference item concerning "Field Expedient-Tubes for Grader Tires", section II, page 8, paragraph a(5); concur. The most acceptable substitute is the tube from an M-39 bridge truck.

d. Reference item concerning "Communications", section II, page 8, paragraph b; concur. The unit is advised that operator training is the critical factor. If all currently approved procedures, such as proper presets, were followed, the problem would not exist.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*20 Sept 20 88 69*

Cy furn:  
HQ, 31st Engr Bn  
HQ, 20th Engr Bde

B. A. GOODWIN  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

CH DST DIV	<i>A</i>
CH ME BR	
CH DOC BR	<i>AB</i>
CH TNG BR	<i>R</i>
A/O	

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Authority: GPOF-65  
DATE: 11/10/01  
BY: [signature]

COL READ, ACOFS, G3  
RETURN TO AVHGC-DST  
*20 Sept 20 88 69*

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