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person is prohibited by law.		(Classification and Control Markings)	
1. COUNTRY:	SOUTH VIETNAM / CAMBODIA	8. REPORT NUMBER:	6 028 0567 70
2. SUBJECT:	SVNLA Meeting on Situation after the Overthrow of Sihanouk (U)	9. DATE OF REPORT:	25 June 1970
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5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:	CB; 30 May 1970	12. ORIGINATOR:	COMUSMACV (CDEC)
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE	R INFORMATION 3	13. PREPARED BY:	GEORGE A. FISHER, MAJ, MI OPNS OFF, US ELM, CDEC
7. SOURCE:	CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:	ALVIN W. LOTZ, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC
15. SUMMARY:		Leave Blank.	
(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 30 May 1970, and concerns an official letter, dated 20 March 1970, from Ba Thanh ((possibly of the 180th Armed Security Regiment, Security Section, COSVN)), to Sau, which informs the addressee that a meeting was held by Sister Ba Dinh ((possibly Nguyen Thi Dinh, Deputy Commander of SVNLA)) on 19 March 1970 at the Elementary-Intermediate Political Training School ((possibly of COSVN)). The document reveals the purpose of the meeting and those in attendance. <u>The purpose of the meeting was to: (1) Assess the situation in A ((Cambodia)) and get information on the coordination between US-Puppet ((forces)) with A ((Cambodian Royal Army)); and (2) ((Report on)) the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and the evolution of the situation after the coup d'etat. The document also contains conclusions reached at the meeting.</u>			

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Dear Brother Sau,

1. The general situation down here is still relatively calm. At present, A ((possibly Cambodian Royal Army)) is sending its reconnaissance agents, disguised many different ways, to uncover our bases and bivouac sites. They made cuts (in the trees) to mark those places through which they planned to penetrate our bases. The ((A)) troops at Taky are still there, and have not yet been ordered down to our bivouac area. First Lieutenant "Krasang" is still staying at Ta Sua. On 18 Mar ((70)), ((the Cambodian troops)) moved to the B2 Civil Health Section area (Chi ((Sister)) Thuy Ba) to drive us out, but so far they have not conducted any searches. (First Lieutenant Krasang from Ta Sua was also with them with one squad of soldiers). The situation in Z5 ((sic)) area is normal. ((Our men)) have not yet succeeded in transporting the goods down here, but at night, the troops in Ta Sau brought some goods to the area. It is my opinion that they sold goods for profit at the same time they performed night reconnaissance activities in our area).

Particularly at Hai Minh's shop, tradesmen from the Stung area bought about 20 bags of rice, some salt, and other food provisions everyday.

In Area Z7 ((sic)), a number of people had to eat porridge, because it was impossible to buy rice. Some agencies had to borrow rice from one another because they had passed some on to this area (for example, the Communication and Postal Transportation ((Section))). We had no food in stock.

On 18 Mar ((70)), saboteurs burned a number of houses belonging to the Vietnamese residents in Cây Dầu who had trade relations with us.

2. To cope with the current situation, pending a directive from COSVN and the Military Affairs Party Committee, a meeting was held yesterday by Sister Ba Đình ((possibly Nguyễn Thị Đình, Deputy Commander of SVNLA)) (19 Mar ((70))) at the Elementary-Intermediate Political Training School. This meeting was attended by Brother Ba Thu (of the Civil Health Section); members of the board of the Elementary-Intermediate Political Training school; delegates of E94 ((possibly 94th Straggler Recovery and Replacement Regiment, HQ, SVNLA)); Z6 ((sic)); Brother Ut Liem of CT9 ((possibly Công Trường 9, aka 9th VC Division, HQ, SVNLA)); and myself.

The purpose of the meeting was to:

Assess the situation in A ((Cambodia)) and get information on the coordination between the US - Puppet ((forces)) with A ((Cambodian Royal Army)).

((Report on)) the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and the evolution of the situation after the coup d'etat.

The rightists have completely seized power in T ((sic)). In ((press)) comments, they have proclaimed that they have established a pro-American government which opposes the Communists (our side).

There were indications that A ((Royal Cambodian Army)) has coordinated with the US and Puppet troops in some areas to attack us in Area Z ((meaning Cambodia - Vietnam border area)). This coordinated effort is aimed at countering our all-out offensive plan during the current dry season. The new government is presently busy consolidating its internal organization, and does not have sufficient strength to spread out ((forces)) in Area Z to coordinate with the US and Puppet troops to attack us. But it is to concentrate a number of small forces (from one to two battalions) in certain sensitive areas for the purpose of attacking us, especially in lowland areas. A has used intelligence agents and informants to collect information on us and provide it to the US and Puppet troops to enable them to conduct air raids, artillery attacks, and heliborne assaults against our areas. The local officials who were previously loyal to Sihanouk are now confused and do not know which side to follow. This is a favorable opportunity for us to win the non-committed elements in "A" over to our side. While we await the directive from COSVN, we adopted the following decisions at the meeting in order to cope with the current situation:

1. Policy:

Hold our present positions and do not withdraw. If they ((Cambodian Royal forces)) coordinate with the US and Puppet troops to attack our forces, we must be determined to fight and hold our base camps.

If the US and RVN troops move to our base area in A, we must fight them and destroy them on the spot. If A conducts sweep operations to drive us out, we must try to avoid them, but if they purposely use force

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to steal property and kill the people, we must be determined to fight them so we can hold our bases. We should advance and not withdraw.

When the situation returns back to normal, we must win over the local officials, convince them to reduce their searching activities, and prevent them from expelling us from their area. We should conduct political attacks to divide the sentiment of the local officials in order to persuade them to follow Sihanouk's policy (B.F ((sic)) will perform this task).

Consolidate air and artillery shelters, set up fences, and "alter" terrain features in each area ((to make them favorable for our concealment)). Limit movement and forbid penetration into ((Cambodian highlanders')) villages and hamlets by single individuals, etc.. ((sic)).

Z ((sic)) must activate cells to motivate the people not to participate in activities against us, separate them from the local saboteurs, and make them serve as informants for us in villages and hamlets.

Make every agency and unit fully understand the situation in order to increase their vigilance, always be ready for combat, and dig combat trenches in compliance with the general plan.

Organization: We must establish a district unit command committee composed of ((cadre)) from E94, ((Elementary-Intermediate Political Training)) School, the Civil Health Section, the Finance and Economy Section, and C23 ((possibly, element of Rear Service Group 82, Rear Service Staff Department, HQ, SVNLA)). We should break ((our forces)) into village and hamlet units which will fight in their own local areas.

Responsibility and capability of the district unit:

Receive directives from higher echelons and make the troops in the area of responsibility fully understand them.

Take command of the village units and control their implementation of the policy of the higher echelons in order to successfully cope with the ((military and political)) situation.

Maneuver forces into a position so as to provide mutual support when necessary.

Report the situation ((to the higher echelons)) and establish a liaison system between district and village units.

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In the Z7 and Z5 areas down here, various Z units will hold a meeting to discuss the questions of applying the same ((organization of forces as mentioned above)), taking immediate defense measures, and increasing vigilance to protect our bases. I am anxious to receive the specific directives and plans from the higher echelons so that I can cope with the current situation in A.

I recommend that Hai Sang be sent to meet Major ((name unspecified)) to seek an understanding of his political viewpoint, "attack him politically," and persuade him not to force his men to execute the orders of his higher echelons ((concerning our expulsion)) in a stringent manner.

If the situation becomes critical and if fighting takes place, I request that the leadership committee authorize us to liquidate the "white-hat" elements who operate as intelligence agents in villages and hamlets.

This task must be performed skillfully and secretly and carried out under the close supervision of the cadre in charge so as to reduce the potential danger in Area Z in the future.

The suspected Vietnamese residents and people in our area must be arrested immediately in order to clean up the areas of Z that we occupy and to defend our bases in case the US, Puppet, or "A" troops attack us.

Please contribute your opinions on this plan.

Respectfully,

Morning, 20 Mar 70

/S/ Ba Thanh ((Possibly of
the 180th Armed Security Regiment, Security
Section, COSVN)).

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(C) Item 2: (1 page, typewritten; B-3) Directive, number 64/TB, classified ((VC)) "Secret," dated 20 Mar 70, signed by Hai Ty for the Command Committee of an unspecified province ((possibly Tay Ninh Province Unit)), instructs all subordinate units and agencies to carry out the following:

- No units and agencies may deploy to the "base area" ((unspecified)) without the approval of Đoàn 180 ((possibly Base Security Section, COSVN)). Any infraction of this regulation should be reported to Đoàn 180 immediately;

- No units should attempt to move along lines of communication other than those prescribed by Đoàn 180. Neither should they move into the province ((Tay Ninh)) area during daytime. Movements between Đồi 1 and Đồi 7 should only be made between 1800 and 0500 hours;

- Đoàn 180 was to prepare new routes for "large units" to conduct military operations during the period ahead ((no further information)).

(C) Item 3: (2 pages, handwritten; B-3) Message, dated 21 Mar ((70)), addressed by 10 Khanh to Tu Mai ((neither further identified)), contains the reproduction of a message, dated 18 Mar ((70)) and originated by the Current Affairs Committee ((possibly of COSVN)).

The contents of this message is similar to the directive shown in Item 2.