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15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document dated 23 May 1969, captured on 23 June 1969, and concerns political indoctrination material prepared by the Propaganda and Training Section, T7 ((Region)), outlining additional instructions on the significance of the 1969 Summer Campaign. The document states that the general offensive and uprising is the culminating stage of the ((VC)) revolutionary movement and that revolutionary committees from village level and above should be completed by May 1969.

THIS DOCUMENT, LESS CAPTURE DATA,
WAS DECLASSIFIED ON 9 July 69
BY James B. Somerville LTC, DIR, US ELM, CDEC.

(C) Following is a full translation of a captured enemy document. This document was captured on 23 June 1969 in South Vietnam (YS351824; III CTZ) by 2nd A/6th RAR Bn, 1st ATF. The document was received at CDEC on 1 July 1969, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 22,851 dated 2 July 1969 under CDEC Document Log Number 07-1083-69.

-----FULL TRANSLATION-----

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ABSOLUTE SECRET

K.10

OUTLINE OF THE ADDITIONAL TRAINING MATERIAL
ON THE SITUATION AND MISSIONS OF THE 1969
SUMMER ((CAMPAIGN))

- * -

To be successful in surging forward to achieve the decisive victory, we must thoroughly understand the significance of the Summer Campaign so as to step up the General Offensive and Uprising.

I. Our great victories and the enemy's failures and weaknesses.-

The development of the General Offensive and Uprising during the past year proves that the following conclusion made by the Central Headquarters is completely correct: "The General Offensive and Uprising is the culmi-^[the fact]nant stage of the Revolution in SVN. The basic ^{context of}factor in this stage is that we ~~must~~ ^{and should} constantly develop our strategy of counteroffensives to achieve a high point, victory, step by step, to pave the way for achieving the decisive victory." The enemy was compelled to shift into the defensive position, de-escalate the war, step by step, and de-Americanize the war. The enemy has sustained defeat after defeat and will finally have to end his war of aggression. These are the great victories achieved by our people and troops which are proven by the following facts:

A. Friendly Side: *definitely*

1/ 1969 is the year in which our people and troops will attain great and over-all victories to mark a turning phase in the history of the resistance against the Americans for national salvation.

a). In SVN, our new strategy of attack adopted in all 3 areas ((mountain, delta, and city)) has succeeded in smashing the enemy's greatest efforts in his counteroffensive strategy. As a result, the enemy had to replace the "search and destroy and pacify" strategy by the "clear and hold" strategy with defensive works established in depth. The enemy was compelled to give up his counteroffensive strategy adopted since the beginning of the limited war to shift into a passive and defensive position on all battlefields.

Evidence: In 1960 ^{sic,} ~~((poss. 1963))~~, the Ngô Đình Diệm's regime was overthrown, and with ~~((Diem's collapse))~~ the neocolonialist regime failed.

- In 1964, the special war failed as ^{typified} proven by the defeats of the enemy in the "Bình Giã" and "Đồng Xoài" Campaigns.

- In 1965-1966, the enemy failed in his first dry season strategic counteroffensive to which as many as 200,000 troops were committed.

Review victory with 1969

- In 1966-1967, the second dry season strategic counteroffensive was launched with 400,000 troops to destroy us with the "pincer" tactic, but the enemy ~~absorbed another failure~~ ^{suffered defeat} as typified by the "Junction City" Campaign.

- In 1967-1968, we attacked the enemy by launching the Lộc Ninh, Bình Phước, Long Hòa Campaigns, and other campaigns in Tri Thiên and Inter-Region 5, achieving great victories in 1967.

- In the early spring of 1968 we started to conduct strategic attacks against the enemy throughout the ~~(I77) Region to frustrate his~~ ^{« miền » [South VN]} "search and destroy and pacify" strategy, and as a result the enemy's ~~search-destroy and~~ ^{totally} strategy was completely foiled and he was driven into a defensive position.

Thanks to these great victories, the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy has been completely changed. Our forces have been strengthened while the enemy has become weaker and weaker.

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b). In North (Việt Nam): We have totally defeated the enemy in his war of destruction which was an important component of the U.S. limited war strategy. We succeeded in compelling the Americans to unconditionally end the bombing after 4 years of escalation. All types of U.S. modern aircraft such as "Thunderchief", "Phantom", "F-4", "F-105" ^(sic) ^{"F-111A"} etc., ~~(sic)~~ were destroyed by our troops. All the enemy's sinister schemes such as: to destroy our great rear, to stop reinforcements provided by North (Việt Nam) to South (Việt Nam), to sow demoralization among our people, to strengthen the flagging morale of Puppet troops and Puppet Government etc., ~~(sic)~~ were smashed by our army and people. On the contrary, the more the enemy carried out its war of destruction, the more North Việt Nam was strengthened, the more our people were united, and the more reinforcements were provided to South Việt Nam etc. ~~(sic)~~. Presently the U.S. Government recognizes that carrying out the war of destruction was a mistake and many famous Senators also said that it was foolish to escalate the war of destruction in North Việt Nam.

c). Concurrently with military victories we have also ^{scored} great political and diplomatic victories. We have succeeded in forcing the Americans to fight while negotiating in a passive manner. The enemy was obliged to yield to our decision to hold ~~the peace~~ ^{the peace} conference in Paris, but he still pursued his schemes of destruction. Finally, he was compelled to end, without condition, the war of destruction in North Việt Nam, and to accept the four-sided negotiations with the participation of the Front with its official representative. Nixon, during his first days in power, was ~~attacked by all sides~~ ^{freshly} in the 1969 Spring, he was continuously attacked in the diplomatic field. At the Paris conference, the Front ^{put forth} published the 10-point solution concerning the problem of South Việt Nam. This rendered the U.S. Imperialists embarrassed; therefore the political prestige of the Front in international field was heightened day after day and recognized even by the adversary. Nixon introduced 8 points, but he was still obstinate and proclaimed that the withdrawal ~~(of troops)~~ ^(of troops) was to be carried out by both sides etc. ~~(sic)~~. This was rejected by the.

He 1 more buried in black mud by our army and people.

world's opinion.

Due to our greater and greater military, political, and diplomatic victories, Cambodia has established diplomatic relations at the Ambassadorial level with the Front ~~[[NLF]]~~. The countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe supported us strongly, especially after our ~~statement of the 10-point solution~~ ^{statement}. Therefore the ~~[[U.S.]]~~ clique in power is presently demoralized. The Americans are now absorbed by the thought of withdrawing their troops and none of them has made any statements as to the continuation of the war of aggression. But the conditions for and levels of withdrawal, as viewed by them were different. Therefore, we should conduct stronger attacks to compel them to withdraw their troops (from SVN) according to our conditions and concept intentions.

d). The great victories mentioned above heavily defeated the enemy which is encountering difficulties and is being deadlocked in the military, political, economic, and financial fields in South Viet Nam. In the U.S. as well as in the world the U.S. will of aggression is shaking. They are looking for a solution to get out of this limited war, gradually de-escalate ((the war)) and de-Americanize the SVN war.

It is clearly shown that we have defeated the enemy step by step and are moving more steadily toward the final victory.

2/- In the strategic field, we have scored the greatest achievements we had ever seen. We succeeded in destroying the enemy war potential, gaining the initiative, strongly developing friendly military and political forces, and transforming the balance of force in our favor.

In 1968, we succeeded in destroying a greatest part of the U.S. and Puppet war potential and war facilities, than ever before.

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- The number of U.S. casualties reached over 3/4 of those incurred by them in 1966 and 1967 together and the Puppet losses in life exceeded those of the same two years. We also destroyed 6,000 aircraft, 1,300 vehicles, and 1,700,000 tons of ammunition, bombs, and explosive charges.

The combat efficiency of the Puppet and U.S. troops has seriously decreased; Puppet troops in basic bases have been critically disintegrated and important commanding organizations have become too weak.

There has been a decrease in the combat efficiency of satellite troops especially Thai Troops. Confronted with our massive attacks, they did not dare to move out but shrank, and were incapable of carrying out their missions; therefore, the U.S. had to send his air-cavalry forces to Biên Hòa to stop our fierce attacks. Our military and political forces have strongly developed both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the 3 types of troops have been very strong and have had great combat-efficiency.

For instance, our main-force battalion wiped out 1 enemy battalion (including satellite troops); 1 district company completely destroyed 1 Puppet company (Long Thanh District).

- The guerrilla forces of Phu Huu Village (Nhan Trach ((District))) wiped out, in 1968, 2 ranger platoons, and My Xuan destroyed 2 enemy platoons and captured a large number of automatic rifles and machine guns.

The tactics of guerrillas ^{attacks} have been improved, and bore the characteristics of ~~sapper and special action~~ ^{forces and special mobile forces operations}.

The forces of the Party, Group, and People's organizations have been considerably developed especially in cities, province capitals, district seats and areas adjacent to important strategic axes of communication. The People's secret organizations have also been developed ^[YOUTH] satisfactorily, and have guided protest activities against enemy pacification ^{leadership in activities} personnel. ^{been adequate}

The uprising movement to ~~seize the power~~ ^{demand} for peace and improvement of living conditions is being developed in the ^{enemies} controlled areas; especially in Saigon, the people's uprising to break the enemy grip, destroy wicked administrative personnel, and demand for "peace and rice" has been widely ^{uncommitted} carried out. It has been participated in by a large number of people. The ^{uncommitted} "intermediary" forces have also assembled a broad number of people for the National Alliance Front for Democracy ((and Peace)). ^{joined in large number in the front of Alliance of national, democratic and peace forces}

The liberated areas have been expanded and consolidated, and many revolutionary authorities have been established at various levels from villages to districts, provinces, and even areas adjacent to cities.

The above-said successes constitute a strong encouragement to the determination to fight and win of our troops and people, and to the struggle movement to oppose the U.S. and support VN in the world. They have enhanced the prestige of the Revolution of Viet Nam in the World and brought back a warm support to Vietnam from the international fronts.

The morale of enemy troops from high to low levels has seriously declined. The spirit of inevitable defeat has been nurtured in the mind of enemy troops. The contradiction between the U.S. and Puppet Governments has been very acute, the anti-war movement of the U.S. people has become more intense and the U.S. has been more isolated than ever. The Thieu-Ky Puppet Government has been increasingly isolated, divided, and too weak ((sic)). In the face of its failures, Thieu has formed opposite political parties; but the true nature of his intention has been unmasked and strongly opposed, and his prestige has obviously decreased.

3/- Along with the 1968 victory, the General Offensive and Uprising in the 1969 Summer Campaign marked a new step of great and overall victory, dealing a heavy blow

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to President Nixon who has just taken over the U.S. presidential office. We succeeded in frustrating the enemy's "clear and hold" strategy and the policy of de-Americanization of the VN war.

- The schemes of consolidating the Puppet troops and government and conducting pacification and relocating the people are smashed.

- The victory gained in the 1969 ^{Spring} ~~Summer~~ Campaign has a special significance and marks a new step of development of the General Offensive and Uprising. ~~It also paves the way for our successive attacks on the enemy in 3 areas and for the strengthening of our forces.~~ ^{It opened new possibilities in the development of our combined forces and the methods of defeating the enemy in the}

- We are capable of strongly and continuously attacking the enemy. The more we fight, the more we win, and finally this will lead us to a decisive victory.

It is a strategic requirement which has been fulfilled thanks to our army and people's confidence in the victory. The U.S. Imperialists and their henchmen have gradually realized that they cannot weaken our forces but on the contrary they are put on the defensive and are extremely demoralized. It indicates that the Party's policy of the General Offensive and Uprising is completely accurate.

4/- The causes of the above victories are as follows:

- The accurate policy lines of the Central Headquarters on the General Offensive and Uprising and the firm determination of the SVN Party Headquarters in implementing the prescribed policy in a creative and flexible manner.

- The brave fighting-spirit of our army and people.

- The great assistance provided by the socialist NVN and the sympathy and support of the socialist camp of the peace loving people over the world.

- To overcome our difficulties and remedy our weak points, step up the General Offensive and Uprising for the gaining of greater victory in the future, we must thoroughly understand the Party's policy line, highly strengthen ~~the~~ revolutionary heroism, and promote the sense of self-sufficiency ^{reliance} of our army and people.

B. Enemy situation:

1/- ^{In} The year 1968 ~~is the one~~ the U.S. Imperialists suffered the heaviest setbacks on the SVN battlefield. They are meeting with difficulties in military, political, economic, and financial fields in SVN and in the world. Their aggressive scheme is shaken to ~~its foundation~~ ^{the point} they have to de-escalate the war step by step because they have maintained the war of aggression for a long period of time. Our Party has realized ~~these 3~~ ^{weaknesses} weaknesses of the enemy and is determined to win ((the final victory)).

^{possibilities} ^{at its present level} [has?] The determination ^{has been} to win. ^{original} ^{unintelligible}

However, with a stubborn nature and a strong potential, and still able to hold their strategic positions in important areas, the U.S. Imperialists still wish to stabilize their position. ^{hope} On the one hand they ^{hope} ~~want to~~ ^{hope} ~~strengthen~~ ^{hope} ~~the~~ ^{hope} ~~Puppet troops~~ ^{hope} ~~and government,~~ ^{hope} ~~hoping to carry out their present policy aiming at de-Americanizing and de-escalating the SVN war.~~ ^{hope} ~~The following are typical examples:~~ ^{hope}

^{decisively in order to end the war in a strong position.} Make greatest efforts to consolidate the Puppet army, to strengthen and maintain the U.S. troops at a limited number and as long as they are necessary for the carrying on of the "sweep and hold" strategy, to step up the "immediate pacification plan", to hold the strategic positions in SVN,

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and to wear down our people's military and political forces in order to cause difficulties to us. In this attempt, they ^{respect} ~~are~~ ^{respect} ~~trying~~ ^{respect} ~~their~~ ^{respect} ~~best to have replacements of (RVN) troops at all levels, increase their equipment and intensify their training so that they can gradually replace the U.S. troops. At the same time, the Americans intensify the activities of their B52 bombers, their Special Forces, etc., so as to enable the plan of gradual withdrawal and find a political solution which may put an end to the war without harm to the plan of maintaining their neo-colonialism at a certain level in SVN.~~ ^{respect}

^{in an active position} It is obvious that the Americans ^{want to} ~~are~~ ^{want to} ~~actively~~ ^{want to} ~~de-escalating~~ ^{want to} ~~the war,~~ ^{want to} ~~but the de-escalation only means that they are de-Americanizing the war, not surrendering or ending the war. They withdraw only when the condition~~ ^{want to} ~~the Puppet army and Puppet Government have been strengthened. An evidence of~~ ^{want to} ~~this is that they are acting fiercely against us during their de-escalation.~~ ^{want to}

2/- Though the Americans must de-escalate the war, they do not give up: They are still struggling for a favorable position. This proves that they are persistently holding on to SVN. However, we must be fully aware that this only means that they are seeking a favorable position in their failure and declination and dilemma. Anyhow, their plans are impractical and characterized by such contradictions as:

- Though ~~practically~~ ^{practically} ~~defeated, declined and forced to de-escalate the war, the Americans still intend to de-escalate the war in their~~ ^{practically} ~~favor.~~ ^{practically} ~~This intention is obviously subjective and contradictory to the rule: "The more they de-escalate, the more their prestige and strength declines, and thus, they can obtain nothing but greater defeats and failures."~~ ^{practically}

- The Americans want to withdraw their troops but they also want to strengthen the Puppet army and Puppet government. At this, they are once again contradicting themselves. ^{collapsed} How can they prevent the Puppet army and Puppet Government from being ruined and disintegrated once they cannot increase, but have to decrease, their own troops in SVN?

- Though the situation forces the Americans to withdraw their troops the sooner the better so that they can solve their many serious problems, they have to prolong the war so as to have enough time to consolidate the Puppet army and Puppet Government. But ~~we suspect~~ ^{collapse} that this would only lead to greater losses for the Americans and the ~~ruin~~ ^{collapse} of the Puppet troops, and it would only aggravate ~~the~~ ^[U.S.] problems in the United States and in the world.

- The Americans' ^{confusion} ~~hesitation~~ and failure in withdrawing their troops from SVN are leading to greater contradictions in the U.S. Government and in the governments of other satellite countries, and contradictions between the U.S. Government and the ~~((antiwar))~~ U.S. People. In addition, any withdrawal of the U.S. troops would aggravate the present decaying situation of the Puppet troops and Puppet Government, and aggravate the contradictions between the U.S. and ~~RVN~~ ^{puppet}, and among the various factions and groups in the Puppet Government.

Generally speaking, the number of U.S. troops must reduce instead of increasing, and they must be demoralized instead of being encouraged. With the ever-intensified attacks and uprisings of our troops and people, the American plan to struggle for a favorable position becomes more and more. →

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contradictory to their practical capability on the battlefield, and it would only bring them to unbearable failures and difficulties which lead them to ~~surrender~~ ^{accept defeat with} after an acceptable solution. ^A The above contradictions of the US aggressors are developed largely. That is the natural evolution of things and the US cannot ~~avoid~~ an escape from complete failure. On that basis we must fight and understand those ~~conflictions~~ ^{contradictions} to make every effort to deepen ~~his~~ ^{the enemy's} contradiction and put him into a bigger confused state and advance toward ~~complete~~ ^{decisive} the victory.

With the above contradictions, the enemy is displaying his main weaknesses such as: the serious deadlock in strategy.

In ~~this~~ ^{a situation where the} limited war which has been led to highest degree but ~~and the~~ ^{brought the} US still has suffered failure, there must be great difficulties unbearable to the US, ~~and they~~ reflected clearly the deadlock and weaknesses of the Americans. This is the most important point at present: demoralization and the state of being isolated politically.

^{a situation where the war is being deescalated and} In the de-escalation of the war, of the US and his heavy failure, the demoralization and political supremacy will be clearly exposed and will come to the inevitable collapse. ^{weakness of the Americans} This is the second most ^{is suffering} basic weakness of the enemy.

Indeed, ^{stems} in fact, the condition to win the war is coming from many factors which are the basic factors of strategy, morale of troops, and the support of the people. ^{especially the people at home} Without the support of the people in the country we cannot win the war. ^{particularly as concerns} Especially, with the US Imperialist at present, the strategy comes to a halt and failure, which made their US troops and his henchmen become demoralized and confused. Their people ^{and the world people are} inside and outside the country will strongly protest against them and the US Imperialist will surely be defeated in the war of aggression in South VN. ^{opposed to}

The above ^{weaknesses cause} shortcomings show many vulnerabilities in the enemy's defensive strategy that cannot be ^{overcome} remedied. ^{despite the fact that} Even though his defensive system is established in many lines and layers, his strength is still large and he still has enough military and mobile capabilities.

Large strength, strong fire power, and great mobility are his strong points. However, his great internal contradiction and the above basic weaknesses are great difficulties and shortcomings which limit the other strong points in this decisive and fierce phase of combat activities. We must clearly understand the insurmountable difficulties and weaknesses of the US and recognize our favorable conditions to concentrate more efforts, and add more subjectivism to

further

our subjective

~~our side.~~ We must be determined to defeat their will of aggression and force them to reduce the war they are waging. They must be prevented to take the initiative in de-escalating the war while still occupying an advantageous position, but must suffer defeats and must end the war of aggression by withdrawing all their troops and restoring sovereignty to our country.

II- Our strategic significance and accomplishment of missions in the summer phase: ~~Study the documents concerning:~~

The enemy capability and schemes, our advantageous and difficult conditions, characteristics, positions, and missions in the summer phase of 1969. The subjects are the same as the ones we have learned in Directive 81. However, we must have a better assessment and realize the following points:

1- We must clearly understand that the General Offensive and General Uprising ~~Phase~~ is a fierce and complicated phase of struggle. During this phase, we have continuously developed our ~~defensive~~ *offensive* position and gained great and overall victories. This phase has brought successive achievements and a ~~gradual development~~ *and general* to the South Vietnam Revolution. The more we fight, the stronger our forces grow, and the stronger they grow, the more developed our general strength becomes, and we can push the phase towards our objectives, *which is a decisive victory.*

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But the US Imperialists still have a great force with strong firepower and great mobility and they are always stubborn and cunning. So we must thoroughly understand the "Three First's" principle of the General Offensive and Uprising phase as prescribed in Directive 71. Though they are struggling for a favorable position during their de-escalation, they cannot avoid a declination which makes them weaker each day. They encounter greater and greater difficulties in all aspects and they go from one defeat to another. This is a rule that the US Imperialists cannot resist. This rule forces them to accept their failure step by step and finally they will be forced to end the war of aggression.

We are having a golden opportunity, we should rely on our victories to push forward continuous and general attacks. We must move forward to frustrate the US Imperialist's schemes of attaining a favorable position and smash their aggressive intention. We will attack violently so that the Americans must withdraw their troops and the Puppet Government will collapse. We must gain the decisive victory and create favorable conditions to attain the basic objectives of the Revolution: independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality,

which lead to peace and reunification of the country.

With such opportunities, in the spring of 1969 our people and army inflicted a heavy blow upon the US and Puppet troops, pushing them to new failures and making them more and more confused in their ~~strategem~~. At the same time we have developed our ~~general~~ ^{combined} strength. The more we fight, the stronger we become. Therefore in the summer phase, we will make an all-out effort to promote the spring victories. We will conduct an all-out attack and uprising throughout the three areas with a higher intensity to exterminate more enemy strength and materiels, and disintegrate the Puppet troops and government. We will conduct violent attacks on the enemy key agencies and frustrate the ^{aggression} pacification plan in rural areas. We will motivate the people in rural areas and cities to kill tyrants, break the enemy administrative control and ~~rise to power~~, struggle for peace, and ~~put~~ an end to the war of aggression. At the same time we ^{must} will consolidate and expand liberated areas, motivate the people to support the front line and immediately develop political and military forces, thus creating a great prestige in all the three areas and making the enemy more and more confused in his "sweep and hold" strategy. We will make him lose his hope of gaining a favorable position and we will have more favorable conditions to gain a decisive victory.

2- In order to seize this advantageous opportunity and accomplish our summer missions, we should, at any cost, fulfill the following requirements:

a- Military activities: Coordinate the stepping up of guerrilla warfare ^{in the three areas} with the attacks of higher level main force units conducted against the enemy to destroy his combat potential and to develop our movements. At present, we should pay particular attention to the following requirements.

- Attack the enemy's key agencies and command posts at all levels, annihilate as many ~~Puppet~~ officers as possible of all ranks, and technicians of various types.

- Attack US storage systems, bases, and rear installations, seriously wear down their material and technological installations and storage facilities.

- Inflict heavy casualties on US troops primarily destroy a division or brigade size unit to demoralize the US troops.

- Strongly attack the Puppet forces until they completely collapse.

For this purpose, we ^{must} annihilate the most obstinate element in the Puppet army to disintegrate and paralyze the remaining

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ones, deny the Puppet a source of reinforcement and prevent them from conducting "clear and hold" operations, supporting pacification activities, and replacing US troop on battlefields. To attain the goals we should do as follows:

- Launch annihilating attacks on the enemy key agencies where the ~~RVN~~ Puppet reactionary elements assemble.

- Exterminate the enemy mobile forces especially the 18th Puppet Division and Strategic Reserve Force.

- Wipe out the ~~((RVN))~~ Puppet oppressive forces such as: Biet Kich ~~((GVN Special Force))~~, Regional Force, Popular Force, Pacification Groups, Civil Defense force, tyrants, local administrative personnel, and spies to prevent the enemy from implementing the plan for ~~urgent~~ ^{accelerated} pacification, holding ground, and winning over the people.

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Conduct attacks and carry on troop proselyting tasks to disintegrate the enemy army. Conduct attacks against recruit training Centers and Officer's training schools. Motivate the people to oppose the ~~((RVN))~~ conscription and the enemy soldiers to desert.

- Attack storages and technical installations of the Puppet Government.

Each local area and each unit must base on the specific missions assigned by the command committee to draft a specific and careful plan for attack against objectives in accordance with the above requirements.

b. Political activities: Before the very urgent revolutionary situation, the momentous and urgent problem of the political attack is to stimulate the revolutionary pride of the people, urge the people to rise up, seize the controlling power, drive the Puppet Government and army to disintegration, heighten the role and prestige of the Front inside and outside the country to create conditions for overthrowing Thieu-Ky-Huong ^{and establishing a} ~~in preparation for~~ the formation of peace cabinet. ~~Es-~~ ^{To this aim, we} ~~establish the~~ ^{bring into full} ~~revolutionary government everywhere from village to province level, from large cities to the central ((sic)), develop the function~~ ^{of the government} ~~of the government~~ and by the end of May 1969 the governmental personnel at all levels must be publicly named to prove that our revolutionary government does exist and does functions.

^{must} ^{role} ^{many} ^{to carry out its} The mission of our armed forces is to strongly attack the enemy, liberate ~~various~~ ^{many} areas, and create favorable conditions for our government ~~in its execution of~~ ^{to carry out its} missions.

c. Diplomatic activities: In order to ~~reach~~ ^{win} greater victories

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^{at} in the conference, ^{table} our mission is to intensively conduct attacks on the battlefield to aggravate the contradictions of the enemy, isolate him so as to push up the ~~antiwar~~ struggle movements of American people and other people in the world in support of Viet Nam against the US aggressors.

To attain that, we must fully understand and accurately evaluate our recent diplomatic victories, ^{and drive} and incessantly attack the enemy to obtain repeated victories ^{and drive} ~~embogging~~ him into a more passive position. We must ^{believe} unmask, in both arguments and reality, the aggressive scheme, and the ~~combative~~ and stubborn nature of the enemy. ~~in the country and on the world.~~

to the people at home and abroad,

^{personnel at all levels} d. Dealing with the strengthening of the revolutionary force, ~~echelons~~ must realize the connection between attacking and building up a force in all respects.

- The leadership must learn step by step the task of building up the ^{"4 good"} ~~4 excellent~~ Party Chapters, and the ^{"4 good"} ~~4 excellent~~ Group Chapters. At first, ~~echelons~~ must make a detailed recapitulative report on the ^{building} ~~selection~~ of ^{"4 good"} ~~4 excellent~~ Party Chapters during the first 6 months, and continue to ^{build} ~~select~~ other ^{"4 good"} ~~4 excellent~~ Party Chapters in the remaining units.

- Devise specific plans and make initial ^{review} ~~reports~~ on the improvement of the troops' ~~degree of~~ technical and tactical skills in the Summer Phase, achieve the program of heightening the sense of organization, leadership, and command of cadre as defined, and perfectly complete the management of troops and material facilities.

- Depending on the specific characteristics of each mission, echelons, in coordination with the local forces, ~~should the engineer's effective plan to~~ motivate the people to activate groups, and intensify the local movement to break up the enemy's oppressive control ~~of the populace~~ and gain political power.

d. Concerning the ideological and leadership tasks:

Party Committee authorities

In the present violent and complex fight, to guarantee victory for our attacks during the Summer Phase, ~~echelons~~ must devote all their energy to providing ideological leadership and proper guidance to subordinate units in the performance of tasks.

e. Make all troop personnel and cadre clearly realize and exactly evaluate our victories through the past year of the General Offensive and Uprising, particularly our victories in spring 1969 and in ~~the last early Summer.~~

On that basis, ~~try to~~ ^{strongly} show them that we are developing and that the enemy is weakening, and they may continue using the Party's strategic policy ^{seriously, and make them agree unanimously with the Party's strategic policy, especially have them to make outstanding subjective efforts and} Explain them that the strategic determination of the 1969 Summer Campaign covers an utmost effort, self-confidence, and a high determination to fulfill our missions beyond the requirement. ^{resolutely fulfill the Summer mission beyond requirement.} ((Page 9 of O.T.))

To reach that degree, we should counter a simple ideological concept and a simple plan lacking specific details which may be drafted in haste with the purpose of winning over the enemy. [sic]

^{ing} - We should also struggle against the unstable and perplex ideology, and the lack of confidence in the capability of the Summer Campaign and its strategic determination to gain a great victory in order to attain a decisive victory. Due to the above state of mind, many cadre and personnel become hesitant before the sacrifice. They fear danger and hardships, always relying on ^{gets out} [the higher echelon] to draw back instead of rushing forward together with the entire army and people to realize the appeal of our Uncle [Ho Chi Minh]. "Fighting until the US withdraws, until the overthrow of the Puppet Government" during the most sacred historic minutes of our Fatherland. ^{collapse}

g. The ^{ing} Learning of the situation and additional mission of this phase will give various echelons much help in the assessment of our overall situation, making them clearly realize the requirements and contents of the Summer Campaign and the ^{exact} just capability of their units in order to review and accurately evaluate the evolution of the Summer Campaign. Efforts should be made to work out an additional plan with specific measures to develop the potential of our units. Moreover, initiative should be taken to struggle for obtaining victory after victory, contributing a part to the greater common victory.

23 May 1969

T7 Propaganda and Training Section

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