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15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information obtained from enemy documents and concerns two directives. Directive 26/CT/72, with the signature block of Nguyễn Văn Hên, Chief of the Political Staff, ((VC)) MR 3, outlines the political task for the 1971-72 dry season. Directive 23/CT/1-72, with the signature block of Trần Văn Thái of HQ, ((VC)) MR 3, pertains to the intensive motivation of the army and the people to participate in military and enemy proselyting activities to support friendly ((VC/NVA)) combat operations and to disrupt enemy forces.

(C) CDEC COMMENT: These documents were captured on 4 Mar 72 in South Vietnam (WR404718; RVN MR 4) by 1/14th Inf, 9th RVNAF Inf Div, RVNAF IV Corps. The documents were received at CDEC on 17 Jun 72, and were summarized in Bulletin Number 49,345, dated 19 Jun 72, under Items 1 and 2 of 2 Items of CDEC Document Log Number 06-1176-72. Translation was initiated by CDEC for JUSPAO, Vietnam.

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Political Staff, SVNLA ((VC)) MR 3

((VC)) ABSOLUTE SECRET

No. 26/CT/72

DIRECTIVE ON POLITICAL TASKS FOR
THE 1971-1972 DRY SEASON

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION.

1. Enemy ((situation))

The US and Puppet ((RVNAF)) forces have continuously suffered heavy defeats and encountered internal dissension and difficulties in Indochina, the US, and throughout the world. However, they have obstinately used every means to carry out their Vietnamization plan in the Western Nam Bó Region, a lowland area which the enemy considers as a main objective in his pacification program. Therefore, the enemy has devoted every effort in conducting overall and fierce attacks in this region. Although the enemy has obtained some precarious results, he has failed in his attempt to encroach upon the land and expand ((RVN)) control over the population. On the contrary, enemy prestige and power have grown increasingly weaker. His combat potential has been reduced and his troops' morale has deteriorated.

In the coming dry season, the enemy will continue to carry out his pacification program and land encroachment. The enemy will rely on his great strength, numerous systems of military posts and mobility to extend his control over the population in the ((RVN)) occupied areas. No matter how stubborn the enemy is, he cannot correct his basic weaknesses since his troops have low morale and his army is composed of heterogeneous elements. Furthermore, the ((RVN)) pacification program creates indignation among the people, particularly those in the liberated areas. The people have maintained a traditional fighting spirit for years and when they reach the end of their endurance, they will rise up to struggle against the enemy and liberate themselves from the oppressive ((RVN)) control. Therefore, the US and Puppet ((RVN)) forces will sustain greater failures. By taking advantage of coming opportunities, the Party, army, and people will be determined to frustrate the Vietnamization plan and achieve greater successes.

2. Friendly ((situation))

The success gained during the last year has helped to mature our armed forces. Our Main Force units have greatly improved their combat capabilities, political and ideological concepts, technical and tactical skills, and organization and leadership. In some areas our ((Local Force)) units bravely stayed close to their areas of operation and succeeded in acting as a support force for counterpacification activities. Especially the friendly ((VC/NVA)) victories in the U Minh ((area)) and the ((VC)) Cà Mau ((Province)) have an important significance. We destroyed the enemy's major elements with their

equipment and pinned down his forces in the U Minh area, thus creating conditions for counterpacification activities and the development of friendly forces. In combat, our forces have made great progress in applying the tactics of annihilation, massive and maneuvering attacks, and ambushes. Various armed services, especially the sapper branch, have been able to attack important targets and eliminate enemy battalions in their fortifications. As the guerrilla warfare developed, we effectively wiped out enemy forces, encircled military posts, eliminated tyrants, and destroyed **the oppressive ((RVN))** control. The combat efficiency of the climaxing phase initiated in Sep 71 was very high as compared with that of past phases. Many units set good examples in displaying a self-sufficient spirit and overcoming difficulties.

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The above achievements show that the friendly forces have greatly improved their political and ideological **concepts, technical and tactical skills,** and leadership. Furthermore they have thoroughly understood the revolutionary concepts and the guidelines for intensive attacks against the enemy.

However they have still shown the following shortcomings:

In ideology, it is reported that rightist and pessimistic attitudes, overestimation of the enemy, weariness of the protracted war, and fear of sacrifices are prevalent among friendly personnel. Some personnel displayed individualism, poor ethics and revolutionary attitudes, and a poor sense of organization and discipline.

Various armed services (including the sapper branch) do not thoroughly understand the guidelines for annihilation, massive and overall **attacks, nor** take advantage of opportunities to eliminate enemy forces. They have lacked joint command in the massive attacks conducted by battalion or regimental units against the enemy, (they failed to completely destroy enemy forces, collect war booty, and withdraw troops quickly).

Friendly forces do not maintain close coordination in the conduct of three-pronged attacks from mountainous and rural areas. Antiaircraft activities are not expanded, combat efficiency of some units is still low; three forces ((meaning **Main Forces, Local Forces, and guerrilla forces**)) are not equally developed; Local and guerrilla forces are not improved in both quality and quantity. Furthermore some units have not effectively maintained their equipment nor properly implemented the concerned Party policy.

In the coming dry season the weather is favorable for us to establish a combat formation, camouflage fortifications, deploy forces and firepower, and conduct large-scale attacks. However, the transportation of heavy ((strategic)) goods and the irregular change of weather will adversely affect the friendly ((VC)) troops' combat capabilities if we fail to overcome the difficulties.

In such a situation the future missions will require various armed forces to make the utmost efforts to display a high fighting spirit and perseverance in combat. The friendly armed forces must thoroughly understand the ((Party's)) guidelines by taking advantages of opportunities to push back the enemy and achieve partial victories and then complete victories. By doing so they can accomplish the honorable missions assigned by the Party and the people.

II. ADVANTAGES OF THE DRY SEASON AND MISSION REQUIREMENTS

1. In compliance with the resolution adopted by the ((VC)) Region ((3)) and Military Region ((3)) Party Committees, and the Military Region ((3)) Headquarters for the coming dry season, we must coordinate with friendly forces on the common battlefield ((meaning SVN)) to basically frustrate the Vietnamization plan, liberate a great part of the rural areas, intensify guerrilla warfare and movement within the city, and strengthen our forces. Furthermore we must change the balance of forces between the enemy and the friendly side in our favor, achieve great victories in Western Nam Bộ ((VC designation for the southern part of Vietnam, which is the former Cochinchina)), and contribute positive efforts to change of the situation on the common battlefield.

2. To implement the above resolution and meet the requirements of the political task, all Party committee echelons must make various armed forces fully understand their missions for 1972, when we will have the greatest opportunities. Local units must have a high determination to gain greater victories in the first battles because they have an extremely important significance in the beginning of the dry season campaign. Specific ((missions:))

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Main Force units must ensure the conduct of large scale, repeated, and long range attacks in order to destroy a major part the of enemy's vital forces inside and outside their fortifications, destroy his rear bases, storage areas and war facilities, shoot down aircraft, sink warships, and cut off land routes and waterways.

Local Force units must persistently hold onto their areas of operations to constantly attack the enemy and effectively act as a support force for counterpacification activities. This general campaign ((the dry season)) needs a close coordination of activities between military and political forces, among three pronged-attacks and the three types of troops. It is aimed at partially breaking the oppressive enemy control, expanding liberated areas, and controlling the population in larger areas.

In the course of preparing activities for this dry season campaign, we should plan to improve the political viewpoint of our armed forces who are required to be highly determined under all combat circumstances and ready to carry out every mission in order to gain greater victories.

III. REQUIREMENTS OF THE POLITICAL TASK IN THE DRY SEASON CAMPAIGN

1. When conducting political and ideological indoctrination in compliance with the 1972 requirements, efforts are to be made to carry out the following tasks:

a. Provide sound indoctrination for cadre and personnel. Make them master the importance of the position and significance of the battlefield in the Western Nam Bộ Lowlands which is the targeted area in the enemy Vietnamization plan. From there, they will realize their heavy but glorious mission and will strengthen and maintain their high determination to fight through the length of the campaign.

Political indoctrination is not only given to friendly combatants during the campaign at a regular time but also presented with special emphasis in combat.

b. Implement the five do's and five don'ts policy, improve the personnel's concept of the use of violence, strengthen their revolutionary spirit to aggressively attack the enemy and perform assigned tasks, and increase their sense of discipline, people's viewpoint and realistic attitude. In addition, counter their rightist and negative attitude, fear of a protracted war, sacrifice and combat fierceness, liberalism and loose observance of orders and field discipline. Focus attention on the ((improvement of)) cadre and concurrently promote good examples set by cadre and Party members.

c. In fighting and developing **forces**, friendly troops must have full knowledge of all forms of combat tactics such as the problems, concerning the conduct of hit-and-run attacks, raids, and large scale attacks. They are to attack the predetermined targets and master **their roles**, responsibilities, and the mission of completely annihilating enemy troops (seize control of the battlefield, and capture weapons and PWs). **Increase** our troops' knowledge of conducting massive, continuous and repeated attacks against main objectives. However, a combat plan must always include a specific military proselyting plan. Make personnel of the sapper branch thoroughly understand primary subjects concerning the annihilation attack, large-scale attack, and combined attacks ((among military branches)).

Increase their sense of organization, leadership, and coordination prior to, during and after combat.

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During the Dry Season Campaign develop our force **in quantity and quality**, eliminate all harmful tendencies in the measures to be taken **to shoot down aircraft and attack enemy communication lines and war facilities.**

d. **Increase** revolutionary ethics designed to develop our army's good nature and tradition concerning its contact with the Party, internal organizations, people and enemy. **Energetically** counter all individualist attitudes, personal ambitions, pacifism, epicurean conceit, corruption, licentious behavior and violation of discipline towards the civilian people ... ((sic)).

e. Organize personnel to learn the heroic examples of Le Ma Luong and Lê Thi Hồng Gấm and the glorious tradition of their unit and local area in order to develop the revolutionary heroism and determination to outstandingly accomplish all assigned tasks. Increase hatred of the enemy and initiate a campaign to denounce crimes committed by the US imperialists and their lackeys against our people over the past ten years.

f. Develop the spirit of self-sufficiency for self-improvement, the energy to surpass difficulties encountered during both combat and peace time, and oppose the reliance on higher echelon. Service units and agencies ((meaning rear service elements)) must also correctly develop their role to decrease difficulties for our troops to accomplish their ((combat)) missions.

g. Maintain regular political indoctrination, especially for guerrillas and district- and province Local Force troops. Indoctrinate secret guerrillas while concentrating on subjects pertaining to the current situation missions ((of the guerrilla force)), guidelines for operating procedures, and propaganda themes to motivate the people.

h. Place emphasis on the dissemination of all victorious news for propaganda purposes. ~~Emphasize~~ good examples during the combat and development of forces to exhort the personnel's morale, motivate ((all units)) to gain achievements in counterpacification, complete annihilation of enemy troops, downing of aircraft and intensification of three-pronged attacks, and initiate an emulation movement titled "Emulation to raise high the determined-to-fight and determined-to-win flag of Chairman Hồ" (the determined-to-fight and to-win flag bears Chairman Hồ's photo). Complete the citation and awards for individuals' and units' achievements ~~achieved from 1968 to date~~ and encourage unit personnel to determinedly sacrifice for the survival of the Fatherland and encourage cadre and personnel to exert great efforts to outstandingly accomplish all assigned missions.

2. Successfully develop the Party along with the selection of Four-Good-Quality-Party Chapters.

a. Improve the leadership capability of Party committee echelons and Party civil affairs committees. Specifically; conduct indoctrination on the responsibility of Party committees. Party committee members and higher must learn the operational procedures of Party civil affairs committees to master the collective leadership, individual accountability, and democratic centralism. To strengthen the leadership, Party committees should anticipate upcoming advantages and disadvantages of the situation and the key principles of leadership. The activity plan must be detailed including the control of the plan of execution and correction of errors before, during and after combat.

After all Party meetings, the ((local)) Party committees must organize the training courses for Party members to understand the adopted resolution and ensure that it will be disseminated down to the lowest ((village and hamlet)) Party chapters.

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b. Provide guidance for Party chapters (especially district Party chapters) to successfully make preliminary reports on activity phases, rapidly improve leadership capabilities, and ensure the success of task performance. According to the general requirements prescribed for 1972, the following tasks are to be accomplished:

Party chapters should fully understand the combat mission and requirements of the campaign to determine their leadership and responsibility. In combat, they should concentrate on providing ideological guidance "to be determined to fight and win", and successfully adopt effective combat tactics and completely destroy the enemy. Particularly, Party chapters should provide sound leadership for troops in encirclements, large scale attacks, and attacks to intercept enemy reinforcements.

To strengthen the ((Party)) leadership, Party members must be assigned to each three man cell, squad, and platoon, and especially to reinforce key detachments, which are designated to act as the main spearhead elements in an operation. ((Party chapters)) must urge Party members to set good examples and voluntarily receive the most difficult task.

In addition, pay attention to regularly improving the capabilities of Party chapter secretaries, chapter Party committee members, and Party cell ((leaders)), and increasing the number of Party members, and Party caucuses for Party cell and Party chapters.

3. Pay attention to the improvement of cadre by all forms, and increase the quantity and quality of political cadre at battalion, company and district unit levels.

The training and improvement of cadre must be conducted in accordance with the resolution of the Military Region ((3)) Party Committee and the guidance previously prescribed by the Political Staff.

In order to meet the requirements of the current situation, we should gain practical experiences learned from preliminary and recapulative reports and strive to improve low level cadre so that they can successfully accomplish their mission.

4. Consider the civilian proselyting task as important as the combat mission.

a. The motivation of the people is an urgent and most important task of the armed forces in the frustration of the enemy pacification program, intensification of guerrilla warfare, establishment of combat villages and hamlets, and development of ((political)) movements in cities and towns. Only when we perform well the civilian proselyting task can we closely coordinate our activities in three-pronged attacks and effectively provide support for political and guerrilla warfare in the local areas.

b. The civilian proselyting network must be consolidated and friendly ((VC/NVA)) cadre and soldiers must be indoctrinated in such a way that they will understand their role and responsibility, and know how to perform this task. The important thing is that they should believe in the people and stay close to them, and maintain the armed force activities in conjunction with keeping and winning control over the people. To achieve this cadre and soldiers must properly implement discipline toward the civilian population especially in ethnic minority and religious resettlement areas, and newly liberated areas.

Party committees and Party chapters should provide close leadership for their units, and make them learn how to keep abreast of the situation, propagandize and motivate the people to break the enemy's oppressive control, frustrate the enemy's pacification program, seize control for the people along with the local areas to positively participate in the development of a revolutionary structure,

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motivate enlistments and help the people protect their property and crops.

5. Increase military proselyting activities to disintegrate the enemy ranks

a. Make cadre and soldiers fully aware of opportunities to conduct political and military offensives and military proselyting activities against the enemy aimed at rapidly weakening and demoralizing the Puppet troops.

b. Train military proselyting cadre of various echelons who are to stay close to important areas of operation, make plans for the military proselyting activities and widely propagandize the ten-point policy of the PRG dealing with the Puppet troops and administrative officials.

c. During the combat campaign, the destruction of the enemy force should be made and coordinated with the military proselyting activities. Responsible cadre should know how to call the Puppet troops to surrender. Properly implement the policy concerning the handling of PWs and defectors, make the best use of fifth-columnist agents to destroy, encircle, menace and force as many enemy posts as possible to surrender or withdraw. Specifically, military proselyting cadre should rapidly disrupt the People's Self-Defense Force or motivate it to become our revolutionary force and by all means paralyze the ((RVN)) Regional and Popular Forces which are playing a key role in the enemy pacification program in hamlets and villages. Regarding the ((RVN)) Regular Force, military proselyting cadre should instigate collective desertion and defection and wage a wide antiwar movement under various forms.

6. Increase vigilance to carry out the security maintenance tasks

a. It is necessary to initiate a broad movement among the people to motivate them to participate in the task of defending and attacking the enemy, and protecting our armed forces.

b. Regularly indoctrinate ((friendly cadre and soldiers)) to promote their revolutionary awareness, improve security cadre, consolidate the security maintenance network, and make everyone understand friendly and

enemy frontiers. Counter enemy psywar activities and his depraved culture, unmask and destroy all enemy schemes and secret activities, strictly maintain management in organization and ideology, control and investigate the political attitude of friendly personnel, and recruit additional personnel.

c. Strictly observe disciplinary regulations concerning the missions during campaigns or combat phases, resolutely maintain secrecy of our intentions, plans, messing and billeting facilities, movement, and bivouacking sites, and protect our command posts... ((sic)).

d. Step up the campaign to improve the quality of progressive units, increase vigilance against the enemy, carry out the security maintenance task, establish "Four-Good-Quality" Party chapters and make a preliminary report on the security maintenance campaign.

7. Expeditiously consolidate and improve the chain of command; especially concentrate all of our efforts on strengthening leadership at village and hamlet levels:

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a. To ensure sound and effective leadership, more qualified cadre must be assigned to agencies at district and village levels. Improve these command cadre both in quality and quantity and pay attention to strengthening political agencies at all levels and organizing political activities at low levels i.e. Youth Group Chapter, Company Political Section, Military Council and the three man cell. Train political officers at all ((military)) levels, especially in district and village units.

b. In strengthening the organization, special attention must be paid to training cadre in specialized skills and in their responsibilities and making recapitulation of past activities to gain practical experiences for more effective working procedures and professional training. This is a very important and regular task for political agencies and political officers at all levels to carry out.

c. Regulations on the submission of reports from low level up to ((VC)) Military Region ((3)) must be strictly observed.

8. Political task and troop management in the rear area

a. Regularly and closely carry out troop management and pay needed attention to leadership over troop messing and disease prevention. Ensure that combat personnel are always in good health and that friendly personnel uphold a self-sufficiency spirit to overcome difficulties and endure hardships. Due attention should be paid to carefully burying war dead, and improving troop messing, and medical treatment of wounded soldiers so that the latter can quickly regain their health and return to their units for combat missions.

b. All echelons should successfully teach their personnel how to maintain, use, and economize weapons and ammunition and capture as much war booty as possible and deliver to higher echelons or use it themselves. Movements for manufacturing weapons should be widely initiated in various local areas.

c. Consolidate base areas and protect storage facilities and transportation corridors. Under all circumstances, make sure of communication and transportation, and the protection of depots and hospitals.

d. Intensify political activities in the rear, uphold a sense of responsibility towards the front line among friendly cadre ((in the rear)) so that they will fully understand combat conditions of operational units and thus meet requirements of combat forces, especially in the problems concerning the supply of food, ammunition, and other means. Pay much attention to improving capabilities of secretaries, political officers, and political agencies of units in the rear so as to boost their output.

The above are some main points in the political task for ((1971-1972)) dry season. Local Forces must apply them in accordance with characteristics of the local situation .

IV. GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION

To ensure successful implementation of the political task for the 1971-72 dry season of the ((VC)) Military Region ((3)) Party Committee, the following points must be carried out:

Upon receiving this directive, Party committees of Es ((possibly regiments)) Staffs, and Doans ((groups)) and province unit coordination and operations committees should convene a Party committee conference (if they fail to do this, a conference will be held by the current affairs Party committees or coordination and operations committees) to study, discuss, and understand contents of directives. They should also assess the situation of their own units to work out requirements for each activity phase for political agencies of lower levels to implement them.

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Regiments, staffs, and Doans ((Groups)) should convene a conference concerning implementation of the political task with the participation of the field grade regimental political officer, cadre of the staff, political section, and delegates of the subordinate Ds ((possibly battalions)) and C's ((possibly companies)) which are required to thoroughly understand contents of the political task, assess the unit's situation, and formulate activity plans.

Remark: At the conference, cadre should display a high determination to set good examples and to successfully respond to the requirements.

Particularly, after the province unit coordination and operations committee conferences, province units should assign cadre who fully understand the contents of this directive to disseminate it to district coordination and operations committees. Afterwards, conferences will be held by district coordination and operations committees to work out appropriate measures and guidance for every village ((district)); competent cadre will accordingly be assigned to village units for guidance ((on the conduct of political tasks)).

In order to perform the most important mission of the Party for the time being, all friendly units are to seize opportunities to score the greatest victories. The Political Staff reminds units and localities of the appeal of TWC ((COSVN)) as follows: Our Party, Army, and people must make maximum efforts, and develop strong points, and overcome weaknesses in order to give the most valuable contributions ((to the war)). Everyone must always display unshakeable determination even though we are faced with many hardships and difficulties. We will gain the final and glorious victory for our people and our area.

After implementation ((of this directive)), all ((units)) and areas must report the results to the Political Staff ((VC)) Military Region ((3)).

10 Feb 72

Chief of the Political Staff, ((VC))
Military Region 3

/Signed/ Nguyen Van Hen

Reproduced copy

Đoan 6 ((possibly the Arty Section, Military Staff, VC Military Region 3))

25 Mar 72

(BB) ((sic))

Liberation Army, ((VC)) Military Region 3
Headquarters

No. 23/CT/1-72

DIRECTIVE

((This directive is)) on the intensive motivation of the friendly ((VC/NVA)) Army to participate in military and enemy proselyting activities to support combat operations and quickly disorganize the enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)).

1. Characteristics of the situation and friendly capabilities and advantages in the conduct of coming military and enemy proselyting activities.

Enemy ((situation)): The more the enemy tries to carry out his Vietnamization plan and his pacification plan, the more serious failures he has suffered throughout the Indochina battlefields, and the greater his internal dissensions have become. As the US continues withdrawing its troops the Saigon Puppet troops are incapable of winning the Indochina War. As the Puppet ((RVNAF)) troops suffer increasingly heavy casualties they must conscript youths for replacements and upgrade ((RVN)) Popular Force and People's Self-Defense Force troops to ((RVN)) Regular Force troops. As a result, the ((RVN)) units are poorly organized, unruly, and weak. Their troops are confused, demoralized, and afraid of death. They dare not go to fight in the Khmer Republic, Laos, or the U Minh area. The number of deserters is increasing daily.

Under the pacification policy, the people in cities as well as in the countryside are demoralized and oppressed. The enemy soldiers' families, the Puppet Government functionaries, and officers of lower ranks are also ill-treated. For this reason, they have become resentful and indignant, and enemy ((RVNAF)) internal dissensions grow deeper and deeper. As a result of their ever increasing opposition, the Puppet soldiers' families, in unison with the people, are rising to struggle for human rights, peace and independence, thus badly affecting the Puppet troops' morale.

Friendly situation: The force engaging in the military and enemy proselyting activities is developing everyday. These forces include enemy troops, Local Force troops, guerrillas, and the people in enemy controlled areas. They are capable of disorganizing the enemy ranks, planting fifth columnists, and conducting combat activities. In 1971, 700 enemy troops in San Gach, 200 others in Cha Va and 200 others in Nong Can were reportedly disorganized. In addition, friendly forces attacked 55 enemy outposts with the support of ((VC)) fifth columnists. (Out of 55 outposts, 33 were attacked by guerrillas).

Our policy toward PWs and defectors was more effectively carried out.

A great number of enemy soldiers were captured by friendly forces. Even guerrillas captured some PWs. Some other tyrants or ((GVN)) Special Force soldiers defected to friendly forces.

The capabilities of specialized cadre in provincial units and regiments were improved ((in the military proselyting field)).

However, the training was not sufficient and regular. Furthermore, battalions and district units did not have sufficient military proselyting forces nor use qualified cadre for this mission.

The command of military and enemy proselyting activities from the Region Party Committee, and Military Region Party Committee to lowest echelon was thorough. There was also close coordination in enemy proselyting activities between military forces and the local Party committees.

However, as compared with prescribed requirements of immediate activities, the following deficiencies still exist:

In various localities the armed forces did not proceed regularly and steadily with their military and enemy proselyting operations.

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There are shortcomings in the implementation of the ((Party's)) policy concerning PWs and defectors. PWs and defectors are not effectively used to attack the enemy and strengthen the friendly side.

The number of enemy proselyting cadre especially those at battalion, district and village unit levels is still insufficient. Their qualifications are still poor.

The leadership provided by military Party committees and political commanders is not very effective. ((The command)) cadre did not successfully motivate the youths to join friendly armed forces nor properly apply tactics ((in military proselyting activities)).

They also failed to collaborate with ((military)) staff officers, military proselyting ((sections)) or other Party committees in the military proselyting activities.

Causes of shortcomings

All echelons still do not properly assess the ((favorable conditions)) and the effect of the enemy and military proselyting task, nor fully master problems of attacking enemy forces and the employment of civilians for enemy and military proselyting missions. They do not realize that combat operations must be coordinated with ((the people's)) uprisings to disorganize the enemy, nor do they realize all the enemy's basic weaknesses such as low morale, heterogeneous composition, and the majority of draftees in the Puppet Army. ((Considering)) these weaknesses, they will successfully proselyte enemy servicemen.

((All echelons)) do not fully understand the primary goals of the enemy and military proselyting mission of the armed forces, nor do they adopt specific places and practical actions ((in enemy and military proselyting task)). The local military ((affairs committees)) still rely on military proselyting sections of Party committees.

II. FORTHCOMING MISSIONS

((We must)) effectively motivate friendly cadre and soldiers of the three types of forces ((Main Force, Local Force, and guerrilla force)) to effectively carry out the enemy and military proselyting task, support combat operations, and desintegrate a great portion of the Puppet Army, particularly enemy fundamental forces as the ((RVN)) Popular Force and the People's Self-Defense Forces. The local guerrilla forces must be familiar with the enemy and military proselyting task.

Requirements

We should make cadre and soldiers of the three types of forces realize all the favorable conditions to carry out the enemy and military proselyting task in the immediate future, make them aware of their responsibilities and make them fully understand the primary goals of the enemy and military proselyting task of the armed forces so that our cadre and soldiers will eagerly participate in enemy and military proselyting activities.

We must closely coordinate with military proselyting sections of Party committees and ((popular)) organizations to launch enemy and military proselyting attacks on various types of enemy forces, step up the disorganization of the Puppet Army, urge enemy troops to surrender to the revolution, or to join antiwar movements and create favorable conditions for combat operations. We must pay attention to doing so in areas of emphasis.

Along with military proselyting sections of Party committees we must rapidly develop fifth columnists in the ((RVNAF)) People's Self-Defense Force and Regional Force by recruiting targeted individuals from low level up to higher and introducing ((VC)) underground agents into important ((RVN)) organizations.

We must expeditiously strengthen the enemy proselyting machinery in province ((units)) and Es ((regiments)). At the same time, we must try to activate enemy proselyting machinery in battalions, district units and village units and take into consideration the importance of the enemy and military proselyting task.

III. SPECIFIC TASKS

1. Study the enemy and attack him ideologically

Before attacking an enemy unit, the force in charge must study

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the enemy defenders' morale; for instance, it is to examine the following points:

What is the principal cause of the enemy's demoralization and confusion? For example, are they afraid of being sent on combat operations in the Khmer Republic or the U-Minh area? Are they newly drafted soldiers, low level and high level officers or tyrants? How many tyrants and uncommitted persons may side with the Revolution? How many sympathizers are there? How many ((RVNAF)) troops are ready to participate in military revolts, surrender to the Revolution, stage antiwar demonstrations, and desert their units?

How are ((RVNAF)) troops organized? To what social class do they belong? What are the related percentages?

What are the dissensions in the enemy's internal organization at each echelon— between higher and lower echelons and between the enemy and the people?

Based on the study of each objective, we must coordinate with military intelligence elements and the people's military proselyting network to make conclusions. By doing so, we can assist Party Committees and command committees in evaluating objectives and enemy units and posts to work out combat plans, uprising plans and plans to disorganize the enemy.

2. Correctly implement the ((Party's)) policy concerning PWs by properly indoctrinating and using PWs

The policy concerning PWs is an important policy for our army and is proof of the just cause of our army. If we correctly implement this policy we will exert a great effect on enemy soldiers. During combat activities, captured enemy soldiers are generally influenced by enemy psywar themes in advance, therefore they do not understand the ((Party)) policy concerning PWs, and they oppose and doubt this policy. If we correctly implement this policy we can reduce this opposition and avoid bloodshed. If not we will certainly increase enemy soldiers' skepticism towards this policy, and increase their stubbornness. At present 80 percent of the enemy troops have been forced to join the Puppet Army. Many of them have relations with the revolution. Some of them are friendly underground agents. If we correctly implement the ((Party)) policy concerning PWs, we can create favorable conditions for these agents to initiate military revolts and influence the people in enemy controlled areas where more than 70 percent of the families have relatives conscripted by the enemy.

We must indoctrinate our cadre and soldiers on the PW policy so that they fully understand this policy and are able to correctly implement it. However, we must eliminate the following erroneous thought: "Due to the present difficulties and combat fierceness, it is difficult to correctly implement the policy concerning PWs and violations of this policy will result in no serious effects". In addition, during combat activities as well as in normal operations, if conditions permit, we must strive to indoctrinate enemy soldiers and civilians on the policy concerning PWs.

We must grant citations and reward individuals or units that have correctly implemented the policy concerning PWs. At the same time, we must take disciplinary measures against units and individuals that have violated this policy. All units and individuals especially command cadre

must review the past strong points and shortcomings in the implementation of this policy in order to provide more effective guidance for the correct implementation of this policy.

Indoctrination and use of PWs

During combat actions if enemy soldiers defect to friendly forces or are captured... ((sic)) they become our PWs. Then, we must classify them into categories such as draftees, officers, enlisted men, tyrants, stubborn elements etc... ((sic)). We must make investigations to know biographical data of each PW. Thus, we can set forth appropriate measures and the contents and the duration of indoctrination for each category of PWs.

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The enemy has frequently distorted the Party policy concerning PWs and the just cause of the revolution, and oppressed his troops. Therefore those who were previously forced to join the RVNAF do not understand ((the Party's)) policies. Even those who previously lived in ((VC)) liberated areas and were forced to enlist in the RVNAF do not fully understand our revolutionary policies. For this reason, the indoctrination of PWs is a very important mission and is based on our evaluation and understanding of PWs. We should realize that most of the PWs are the "good" individuals who are compelled to work for the enemy and oppose us. If our indoctrination makes them understand the just cause of the revolution, they will consciously take sides with the revolution to oppose the enemy.

Indoctrination subjects must enumerate the oppression, cruel suppression, and flagrant exploitation of the enemy, and emphasize our nationalist and proletarian viewpoint. In addition, we must make PWs know that their present enemy is the US imperialists and their henchmen. We must indoctrinate them on ((the Party)) clemency policies and the revolution's just cause to conclude that joining the revolution is the unique way to escape enemy oppression and exploitation. Furthermore, we must make them realize their responsibilities of fighting the enemy to save the country.

Indoctrination should be performed many times according to each category of PWs. To insure effective results on enemy PWs, our actions ((in treating PWs)) must correspond with theoretical policies.

Methods of indoctrination

The indoctrination must enumerate their past hardships, revolutionary spirit, and sense of responsibilities.

After indoctrination, we should select those who are completely aware of the revolution to fill up friendly units. (However, the recruitment of selected individuals must be approved by Party committee echelons and their biographies must be carefully examined by security ((sections)).)

Employment of PWs

One-fifth of the PWs should be employed to replenish combat units, serve in combat support units or carry out ((rear service)) missions in localities. Those who have reformed their thoughts but refused their assignment to the friendly units will be allowed to return to the local areas to live as civilians. Particular attention should be paid to the indoctrination and employment of ((RVN)) Popular Force and People's Self-Defense Force personnel.

Management of PWs

PW management must be well carried out. It requires us to distinguish ((the revolutionary)) policies from the principles of organization and to avoid possible confusion. ((Specifically)) PW management is organized as follows:

In each province there is a detention camp for the PWs ranking from private to ((possibly corporal)). Generally, the PWs ranking privates are detained for a period of time no longer than 15 days before they are employed for missions or are released. Tyrants, corporals, intelligence agents and officers are sent to ((VC)) military regions after being exploited for information. The use of PWs must be decided by province unit command committee.

In the province which is divided into the different sections, we establish inter-district detention camps which are placed under the command of province ((unit command committee)).

In districts or sensitive areas of combat activities we establish ((mobile)) forward detention stations. When receiving a PW from the front line, the province ((unit command committee)) must exploit him for information on the spot.

In PW detention camps we should strictly observe the internal regulations to maintain order. The good organization of the detention camp will make PWs realize the difference between the revolution and ((RVN)) army. The detention camps must be well guarded and run by good cadre and soldiers who have a high sense of responsibility, properly implemented ((the Party)) policies, firm viewpoints, and ethical conduct.

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We should stop forcing PWs to work for the detention camp or ourselves, and employ them in labor activities.

The trial of tyrannical and stubborn PWs on the frontline and in detention camps requires the following three conditions:

Available tangible proof of their tyrannical acts

Competence (at battalion and district unit levels and above).

Absence ((of the criminals)) cannot be discovered by the personnel in the unit and other PWs.

We are allowed to try the cases which do not meet these three conditions. The conclusions of trials must be reported to higher echelons, and disciplinary actions will be taken against cadre and soldiers who violate the above regulations.

Furthermore, we could release the PWs who have effectively reformed their thoughts on important holidays, for enemy proselyting purposes.

(There is a separate directive concerning this task)

3. Motivate the three forces to plant fifth columnists in enemy ranks

It is very easy to recruit fifth columnists by taking advantage of the relations between ((targeted individuals)) and friendly combatants. All units of the three forces, especially guerrilla and Local Forces should widely motivate their personnel to recruit ((underground)) agents from enemy ranks.

We should fully understand the possible targeted individuals. If conditions permit, we should recruit them during a short time ((as VC fifth columnists)). The recruitment of important individuals must be reported to sub-sectors ((should read regions or sub-regions)).

The fifth columnists can be used to provide support for attacks conducted by friendly forces, ((right after the recruitment)).

Regulations concerning the employment of fifth columnists

The use of fifth columnists in attacking enemy platoon-size units is to be decided by village ((units))

The use of fifth columnists in attacking enemy company-size units is to be decided by province or district ((units)).

The use of fifth columnists in attacking enemy forces larger than company-size units is to be decided by the concerned region.

Units and localities should again disseminate the directives dated 3 Jul 70 and list the relatives of subordinate personnel in order to find out targeted individuals who could be recruited by the friendly side and used as fifth columnists in enemy ((RVNAF)) ranks. Results of this task must be completed and reported ((to higher echelons)) in late Mar 72.

We must frequently motivate the personnel in ((possibly the Local Force)) companies and guerrilla units to carry out the mission.

In motivation particular attention should be paid to correct erroneous thoughts.

Examples

Units have placed more emphasis on combat mission than on civilian, enemy ((FWMAF)), and military ((RVNAF)) proselyting activities.

Units failed to order subordinate personnel to "follow up" their relatives ((who are subject to admission to our forces as fifth columnists)).

Units have balked at hardships and difficulties, and displayed self-complacency and impatience on missions.

Furthermore armed forces must proselyte ((RVN)) troops' dependents and plant agents in enemy areas in accordance with Party committee echelons' activity plan. Therefore cadre and soldiers should be indoctrinated on these two missions.

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4. Guidance for enemy military proselyting activities during combat actions

Prior to combat operations, we must properly assess enemy strengths, weaknesses, morale etc ... ((sic)) and work out military proselyting plans to be implemented prior to, during and after combat in accordance with the enemy situation.

The military proselyting activities must be conducted in coordination with military operations and combat requirements of every unit and local area. To obtain satisfactory results in military proselyting activities, we must try to learn lessons, widely disseminate experiences gained by proselyting activities)) within counterraid; attacks against the enemy etc ... ((sic)). We must try to create favorable conditions to influence enemy troops and seize every opportunity to proselyte them.

In campaigns or long range combat operations, we must coordinate with various ((military)) branches and ((people's)) associations, and step up three pronged attacks in order to expedite the collapse of enemy organizations. From now to the end of Mar 72, with the assistance of military proselyting sections, each village must recruit from two to five fifth columnists; each district, ten to 15, and each province, five to seven from enemy units especially units operating in sensitive areas.

Improvement and assignment of ((military proselyting)) cadre in accordance with the prescribed requirements

Reorganization

a. Province ((units)), regiments and units at the same level must have three to five ((military proselyting)) cadre. Some comrades are responsible for keeping abreast of the common situation and establishing recapitulative reports. Some others are to provide guidance on the military proselyting tasks for their troops; and the remainder will be assigned to Us ((province units)) and Es ((regiments)) to coordinate with the local areas in the recruitment of fifth columnists.

b. Battalions and district units which have two or three coordination and cooperation committee ((members)) must activate a military proselyting cell headed by the political officer or assistant political officer of the battalion or district unit. Among these ((military proselyting)) cell members one cadre is in charge of providing guidance on the military proselyting tasks for guerrillas, and the others are sent to villages to assist guerrillas and the military proselyting sections to launch ((military proselyting)) attacks against the enemy.

c. Companies must select members of their political sections to activate military proselyting cells which will be directly commanded by their political officers or assistant political officers.

d. Village units must assign their assistant village unit leaders to provide guidance on the military proselyting tasks for two or three cadre who are also in charge of recruiting fifth columnists in support of the guerrillas' attacks against the enemy. In addition, political officers of village units are to provide direct leadership for guerrillas ((to carry out military proselyting activities)). Various echelons must select needed personnel and send them to refresher training courses. Provinces and regiments must organize training courses for ((military proselyting cadre of)) battalions and district units. District units are to organize training courses for ((military proselyting cadre of)) village units.

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The military region should conduct training courses for staff officers of regiments and province units and ensure that each cadre in charge of enemy proselyting activities is well trained.

Province units should hold conferences to review enemy proselyting activities every three to six months, or after each activity campaign in order to gain experiences and conduct activities on a regular basis.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION

1. Dissemination of this directive

Regiment Current Affairs Committee, Province Coordination and Operations Committee, and Party Committees of other units at the same level should convene a meeting to discuss this directive, review ((past)) strong and weak points, study their uses, set forth a plan for implementation of this directive, and report to the political staff in late Feb 72.

a. Requirements: ((Personnel are required)) to realize the importance of the enemy proselyting task at this juncture, low combat spirit of enemy soldiers, and friendly favorable opportunities and capabilities in the performance of the enemy proselyting task in the near future. They must fully understand the capabilities, conditions, and responsibilities of the friendly armed forces (including the three types of troops) in the implementation of the enemy proselyting task, and clearly understand the main purpose of this task to be carried out by the armed forces.

b. Ideological requirements

((Cadre should)) deeply and thoroughly understand the political and military policies and lines of the Party. They are to place emphasis on the relationship between annihilation and disruption of the enemy, clearly realize the responsibility of the armed forces, so they will eliminate the tendencies to disregard enemy and military proselyting activities, and entirely entrust this task to the Party committee military proselyting section.

Furthermore they must properly assess the enemy situation and see that since the enemy has been defeated, he has indiscriminately drafted youths. As a result, enemy ((RVNAF)) military ranks are heterogeneous. Indeed, at present, over 80 percent of the enemy troops are draftees. Most of them previously lived in our areas and had a knowledge of the Revolution. Thus we have enjoyed favorable conditions to proselyte these elements. We should make our personnel clearly realize their responsibility to the civilian people who are drafted by the enemy.

The military and enemy proselyting ((movement)) encompasses a large commitment of the masses. Therefore, we should set forth a proper plan and strictly observe regulations on handling Fws. We should prevent our personnel from irresponsibly killing captured enemy personnel (it is due to low political awareness and sense of organization).

c. A plan for military and enemy proselyting activities should be prepared as soon as contents of this directive are discussed. Province units and regiments should prepare activity plans for one year and for six months of the dry season. Battalions and district units should work out plans for six months of the dry season. Village units and companies should prepare plans for six months or for the entire year. Combat plans should include the military and enemy proselyting plan. Both combat plans and military and enemy proselyting plans of units from company to regiment or province unit levels should be approved at the same time. Specific combat plans for each battle are also to be prepared in conjunction with the military and enemy proselyting plan.

Immediately, all echelons should work out appropriate plans for military and enemy proselyting activities for the dry season.

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Afterwards, we must hold conferences on specialized subjects to disseminate this directive or assign cadre to low echelons for guidance on ((military and enemy proselyting task)) (assigned cadre must fully understand this directive).

While awaiting documents from the enemy proselyting section, the Political Staff, ((VC MR 3)), is required to instruct soldiers on the following subjects:

Current enemy situation and his weaknesses.

Significance and roles of the enemy and military proselyting task.

Reasons why the policy towards Fws be strictly executed. Influence produced by the perfect execution of this policy and consequences of the violation of the policy.

The responsibility of troops in implementing the policy towards Fws.

Past strong points and deficiencies in theory and practice during the implementation of policy towards Fws.

The enemy and military proselyting mission of the armed forces.

2. Leadership and plan ((for military and proselyting activities)):

Each E ((regiment)) must select and guide one company to effectively perform the enemy proselyting task, and each province unit must select and provide guidance for one village and one Local Force company which are outstanding in enemy and military proselyting activities.

Experiences learned from typical units must be disseminated regularly and an emulation movement of performing the military and enemy proselyting task among companies and villages must be initiated.

3. Organization of coordination

Units should coordinate with the military proselyting sections and military intelligence sections to regularly observe enemy activities.

Units should combine with military proselyting sections in assigning, transferring, and receiving agents for areas of emphasis, asking for training documents for troops, proselyting enemy troops, and penetrating cadre into enemy organization as fifth columnists.

Units should also make coordination with concerned organizations such as propaganda and training, civilian proselyting, and ((military)) staffs.

4. Leadership over the immediate military and enemy proselyting mission

The leadership over the enemy proselyting task must be exercised well during Nhâm Tý Têt ((1972)) Lunar New Year days to create favorable conditions for activities in 1972.

Requirements

Enemy side: We must undermine the morale of enemy troops a further step, loosen enemy organizations, and spread propaganda on our policy among his troops.

Friendly side: We must heighten the sense of responsibility of our men in implementing the policy towards PWs and defectors, and perfect the plan for the indoctrination and employment of PWs.

We must re-establish contact with agents and improve their capabilities in areas of emphasis, and select qualified cadre for **all echelons**.

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5. Preliminary report

Regiments and province units are requested to make recapitulatory reports on their military and enemy proselyting activities during 1971. **the successes and experiences from strengths and weaknesses will be acquired and serve as guidance for strengthening leadership.**

Whenever an after-action report is made, it must include a summary of results of the military and enemy proselyting activities.

Recapitulative reports on the selection of **Four-Good Quality Party Chapters** in Party committees, must include military and enemy proselyting activities conducted by individuals and units, (because this is a means to frustrate the enemy pacification program.)

Upon receipt of this directive, all regiments and province units have to forward reports to the military region on the implementation (of this directive)). In addition, monthly reports must be submitted to ((VC)) Military Region ((3)) by radio. messages which are to be followed by detailed written reports.

25 Jan 1972

For the HQ, ((VC)) MR 3

Signed: Trañ Vãn Thài

Notification

To Group 6 ((possibly the Arty Section,
Military Staff, VC MR 3))

Two copies to be forwarded to all units
1 Mar 72

-----END OF TRANSLATION-----