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Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Dr. Turley.

Let me start out with a general proposition, and see what the witnesses say. It had been my assumption throughout the period of the Vietnamese war that if the north prevailed or the Liberation Front prevailed, that the likelihood would be that there would be established a Communist regime which would probably be similar to but probably a variant on the regimes that we see in Cuba or Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union or China.

In other words, one's expectation was that it would be—this is my expectation, maybe nobody else's—that it would be like those regimes, highly ideological, highly coercive, professing to deal with problems of distributive justice and equity, forbidding free press, making it a crime to criticize or challenge, in effect, in some fashion the existing government, probably limiting immigration, and having a rather thoroughly controlled one-party state. They, it seems to me, are the common generic characteristics of these regimes.

What would the witnesses say about that? Would that have been your expectation, and whether it was or not, is that what you think in general is what has happened?

Father GELINAS. I do, certainly. This is what I think most of the Vietnamese who fought communism expected, and to me, there is no doubt whatsoever that it is what did happen. Now, as Dr. Turley says, one can study the inner workings of the party dictatorship and distinguish it from the inner working in Cuba and China. They have variations, certainly, but it is, to me, totally obvious that it is a dictatorship of the party, that it is coercive, that it is ideological. I don't think anyone can deny that.

Mr. TURLEY. I certainly wasn't surprised by the outcome, and I never held any delusions about the central direction of the revolution. It was clear from a very early stage in the war that the Vietnamese Communist Party, at that time known as the Vietnamese Workers Party, had a central committee in Hanoi, and various revolutionary organizations in the south were essentially extensions of it, and they themselves have made no bones about this since the spring of 1975.

Of course, institutionally, its structure very definitely is similar to that which we find in the other party rule states, and we should expect it to evolve as an authoritarian state, bearing most of the marks that we find in the Eastern European and Soviet world.

Yes, I guess I would agree. I guess the question that comes to my mind then is, well, OK, so what? Does that really advance our understanding much? I just would make a couple of observations around that that don't really satisfy me, but I think they are important to consider.

First of all is that regardless of what political movement came to power in Vietnam, I think you would find it exhibiting many of the same traits. It would not be ideological in the same fashion. The Vietnamese Communists take ideology seriously, but they have also shown a great deal of flexibility and pragmatism. One could show you examples of this throughout their history, and they are willing to use coercion if that is necessary. Show me a government which is not when it comes to maintaining itself in power, or when it comes to achieving distributive justice that is considered to be necessary for the livelihood of all people, and so forth, these things are true, but this is a society that was much more divided against itself than we can comprehend, living here in a country that has been at peace for so long, basically at health with itself.

We think of the 1960's as a time of trouble. That is nothing by comparison with what Vietnam has been through, and it is very hard to imagine any government, even one ideologically committed to democratic pluralist ideals, which no political movement in Vietnam really was, at least none of them that had a chance of winning, instituting those ideals in the Vietnamese context. I think it would be extraordinarily difficult.

Now, if you are asking what would be a feasible scenario in that kind of complex, conflictual situation, I think that it would be possible to do a better job than the Vietnamese Communists are doing right now, yes, but there will be times, there would be times, regardless of who was in power, when there would have to be a few heads knocked together.

Mr. FRASER. Ms. Forsythe.

Ms. FORSYTHE. Yes; I guess I don't feel capable to compare systems, because I am not a systems analyst, and I have never been anywhere else but Vietnam, so with that kind of an introduction, the one point I might like to pick up on, and again, I can't compare with other systems, is the element of flexibility. There is absolutely no question that the Lao Dong Party is the central party in Vietnam, and is the ideological force that projects long-range plans, and so on and so forth, but for me, living on a street in Saigon, there was also some ability as a grassroots person, and granted, a foreigner, but I felt it among my neighbors as well, to have some input into what happened in our lives on that street.

That is the little picture, and I think that is important, and had a great deal to do with my sense about what is happening in Vietnam today.

Mr. FRASER. Well, in my question, I wasn't trying to make a moral judgment. I was trying to be descriptive at this point.

Once we decided we weren't going to continue in that war, or to support the Saigon Government, I suppose that it was probably inevitable, at least given the circumstances, that the Communist Party, the Lao Dong Party, or—I guess that is the North Vietnamese Party, but anyhow, its counterpart in South Vietnam, would come to power.

It seems to me there are two other basic questions. One would be, I suppose, looking backward, did this have to happen, which to some extent is water over the dam, but it undoubtedly continues to be of interest to many people. Then, the other question is, What policy im-

plications are there for the United States? We have fashioned our foreign policy in a very general way in the last two decades in fearing and being concerned with the so-called Communist world, and we have given very vigorous support to the so-called free world, terms which seem to have been overgenerous when you examine the countries which fall into the free world, but maybe just one last question, and then my colleagues will have some.

Father GELINAS, you itemized in sort of detail some of the things that happened, the abolition of the free press, the shutdowns of the electronic media, the reeducation camps, and so on. I gather that on those particular details—Is there any argument? The one argument I sense may be the question of how many people have been or are in the reeducation camps. What about this question of people disappearing, however, which is a somewhat more ominous one?

Father GELINAS. Well, the question of the numbers of people in the reeducation camps that you just mentioned, Dr. Turley said that he is not aware of any official statements of the Government. Tran Van Tra, who was the head of the Government in the south, General Tra, who was the provisional head for the first 6 months or even more, 9 months, said on the day he was replaced, on the 21st of January, 1976, in his speech, *sortant de charge*, his—the speech on the day he was leaving the office, that there were at that time hundreds of thousands of men being reeducated, in reeducation. Now, he was making a list of the problems—

Mr. FRASER. You said hundreds of thousands?

Father GELINAS. Hundreds of thousands. He did not say how many hundreds of thousands. Now, the only other statement which I know of an authority, a Communist authority, was the one made by Mr. Tra, the former spokesman of the south in Paris, who said at the Stockholm TV—he was interviewed in Stockholm, in Sweden, and he talked about 1 million men reeducated, but the context was not clear. He probably meant all processes of reeducation, including camps and also those who were being reeducated at home.

So, in other words, the statement of Tra does not mean much, but to me, it is significant that the only two statements which have dared to publish big figures, which the Government obviously does not publish, the only two statements come from southerners, authorities who were leaving office, being replaced by northerners, who were bitter.

As you know, there is a very strong rivalry between the winning northern group, who is taking over all the important jobs—Madame Binh is about the only person of name which has been left in the new government, and she has been given a small ministrate. So, there is resentment among the southerners, the southern Communists. They felt that they fought the war, that they carried the heaviest part of the burden, and now they are completely neglected.

So, it might be significant that these two statements come from southerners. Maybe it was—they said it intentionally to compromise the Government.

Now, statements from the northern government are few and vague. Francois Mitterand, the head of the French leftist party, the French Socialist Party, published an editorial in *L'Unité*, which is the newspaper of the leftist party in France, where he called upon the Vietnamese to answer these charges.

He says textually, "I must know, you have to answer." There was never any answer.

As you know, here in the United States there was a letter published by Daniel Berrigan, Joan Baez, Bishop Gumbleton, the other Berrigan, and about 20 or 30 important pacifist persons, who, after the Communist takeover, wrote to the man, the observer of the Communist government at the United Nations, asking him to answer these charges, saying: "well, we feel most uncomfortable"—this letter was published in the New York Times. Everyone can see it. "We feel uncomfortable. We fought for you, and now, well, we would like to know what it is all about. We did not fight for that type of punishment and destruction of civil liberties." And there was no answer.

It is because there was no answer, as is stated in the New York Times, that the letter was made public. So, on the one hand, you have silence from the Government, except the few of them who are from the south, who have dared to give figures, embarrassing the Government. Lately, very lately, the Government has finally understood that they had to make some statements, and that is when we began to hear about 30,000 or 40,000. That is the figure which is usually given now.

Where do I get my figure of 300,000? Obviously, I have not counted them, but I have lived with the people for 19 years. I have thousands and thousands of friends through the children, the university students and the families, and in my experience, I can say in Saigon between, oh, let's say, the lowest would be 60 percent and the highest would be 80 percent, or even 85 percent, of the educated people were all taken.

So, if you have roughly 80 percent of the people, educated people, gone, that could hardly be much less than 300,000, 400,000 people.

Now, from the reports that I have from the other priests, the pastors in the different parishes, from the bishops, from the demilitarized zone all the way to the south, I have heard of the location of these reeducation camps. This is secret, but after a while you know, you hear, there is a camp in this place, because the road is blocked, and there is a camp there, you can't go there, and someone has a report because they have managed to contact the people, and I have got word of roughly between 60 and 90, or around that, camps.

None of the reports I have heard from people coming out of camps list a population of prisoners of less than 3,500 per camp. Some say 5,000, some say 3,500. There is a camp where they claim that they have 20,000. I never saw it. It is out north of Hue.

So, if we have camps of roughly 3,000 or 4,000 prisoners, and if we have close to 100 of them, it would come up to the figures which are usually quoted. So, these figures are vague, I admit it, but they come from different computations, and they all come more or less to the same number.

Now, it is interesting to know who is in these camps. A word was said a moment ago that police, former policemen would be there. Every person who has been on the list of officers in the army, and as you know, Vietnam was at war for 20 years, and for 20 years the law has been that everyone who finishes his university studies is officially a student to officer school, to military school.

Now, many of these people have never been to war. They are on the list. They are reserve. These people were all called, people who have never been soldiers. So, since Vietnam is a country where there is a

large proportion of secondary education, it is not surprising that there would be 300,000, 400,000, 500,000 who would be on these lists.

Now, you mentioned those who are being arrested. I have no way of knowing how many have been arrested, except that for 15 months my job all day long was to receive the people who came crying that, my father is gone, my son is gone, my daughter has disappeared, and I have talked to very, very many people that way, and a few who have been arrested have come out, and they have described the conditions in the jails or in the houses of detention, and that is where I learned how crowded they are.

Usually, a room—one instance I have in mind—a room 6 meters by 5 held 32 people, which is an average of 1 square meter per person. So, it is very crowded.

Now, most BOQ's and BEQ's are used for that purpose, and it would be easy to get from the Pentagon the number of BOQ's and BEQ's, the houses for the U.S. military personnel that you have in Saigon. These buildings are crowded. So, there is certainly a large number of prisoners.

Now, one should—if we were making a more complete testimony, one would have to distinguish between reeducation camps for one, true prison, two, and detention. They are three different things. From true prison, one rarely comes out. From detention, you do come out. Detention is when you are taken—you are called to the police station and you are taken, and you may come out a few months later. They just wanted to ask questions or they suspected you, but from prison you rarely come out.

Mr. FRASER. Ms. Forsythe.

Ms. FORSYTHE. I knew two people who were detained in Saigon when I was there. One was an American named Bill Cooper, who had worked with the AFSC for a number of years in Quang Ngai, who was held for a number of months, and his own story has been published in the newspaper. The things he described in jail, and I don't know whether I am allowed to talk for someone else, but—

Mr. FRASER. You can repeat what he said, if you think it is deserving of repeating.

Ms. FORSYTHE. The only comment was that jails were holding criminals, and that would include North Vietnamese or soldiers who had in one way or another accepted a bribe, you know, just whatever the range of crime was. Now, I am not sure exactly what Father Gelinas is saying, so I am not quite clear.

The other person was a former worker in our center who came down and put on black pajamas. He came to visit us in Saigon, and borrowed our bicycle and went around the streets pretending to be a bo-doi, and asking people to give him free meals, and he was held for 2 weeks for that kind of an impersonation. They felt that he was wrecking the name of the revolution, and he was not mistreated. He was held, and had hoc-tap every morning, as just about everyone in Vietnam does, including Dr. Tom Hoskins, who worked in a hospital in Da Nang and had education sessions once a week as part of their staff routine.

Hoc-tap is a way of life in Vietnam for everyone who is there. It is a matter of the Government and the vast numbers of cadres communicating to the people what is going on there, and it is also a

method they use with themselves to constantly be remembering what it is all about and why they are there and why they are doing that.

I don't know what else to say. I have, in my 6 months, been living on Yen Do, which was about two blocks away from Alexander-de-Rhodes Study Center, I never heard of any disappearances, and so I don't know what to say.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Turley.

Mr. TURLEY. Let me start by saying that I heard of a lot of disappearances, but they all happened from my classroom in 1973. But I would like to go back to the statement of Father Gelinas, the recounting of the evidence as to the number of people who might be in the camps, and again, I say, I don't know, and I don't think that anyone has a very good idea, but to give you an idea of the kind of problems that are involved in judging the information we have, the statement by General Tra in January 1976, in which he said there were hundreds of thousands of camps, came at about the time they were beginning to release them, and by the spring of that year the figures, the sort of general, vague statements that the people were making, suggested a lower figure, and this was in advance of the national elections in April of 1976.

They said at that time that of all of the people who had gone to the camps, 95 percent had been released and restored to full political rights, which meant, of course, that 5 percent were still in the camps, and at about the same time there were other estimates, both by those—I can't remember the exact source, but it was a Vietnamese source overseas speaking for the SRV, and an American intelligence source, that estimated that perhaps at most half of the over 1 million people who qualified for reeducation had actually gone through the camps.

So, if you extrapolate from those figures, then you would say that the number in camps in June of 1976 was certainly not in the hundreds of thousands. It was something substantially lower. Now, subsequently, who knows? There just doesn't seem to be a rational proposition that they would retain such a large number of people in camps at this time. It is not a very economical proposition.

One other observation. Father Gelinas cited the fact that these observations had been made by outgoing southerners, and that this tells us something about the nature of the regime and that the statements had some sort of special credibility.

We should remember that these people, whether northerners or southerners, have fought the same war for in many cases 45 years, and that the individuals who were the front men, if you will, for the party in the south were loyal party followers, and that was a party that was national in organizational scope and national in designs, national in goals, and it behaved that way in its appointments and in the orientations of its top leadership.

For the lower level leadership, it was a different matter, I would agree, but at the top, the people had basically a national orientation, and certainly these people that he mentions have not been shunted aside or demoted, if you consider that the positions they had during the war as president of the national front or president of the PRG, and so forth, they have done really quite well, if you consider that those organizations were fronts for the party itself. Those positions were essentially without power.

Now, in relation to that fact, Madame Binh's being appointed Minister of Education is a promotion. She probably even has a limousine now that she didn't have before. Huynh Tan Phat and Nguyen Huu Tho are now both—one is a vice president, and one is a vice premier. That is not bad, when you consider that formerly they were the heads of essentially phantom organizations and not leading figures in the party.

General Tra, who was the head of the Saigon Giadinh Military Management Committee in 1975-76, is now a commander of the 7th military region. Being a military officer, he of course had to go back to a standard military command. I think moving back into full command of a region, he was not exactly being demoted or shunted aside.

These people I don't think had any particular motivation to protest some presumptive northern victory. This simply is not the case.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Well, Mr. Chairman, I find the testimony very interesting, just the diversity, the fact that Ms. Forsythe, for instance, was only there 6 months at the end of the war—

Ms. FORSYTHE. I was there for 3 years.

Mr. GOODLING [continuing]. A time, until today, listening to the Doctor speak, I had heard nothing other than the fact that it was a time when the victors were trying to get their own camp in order and had very little time to worry about anything else, and the Viet Cong were trying to establish their influence, which again until today I had never heard amounted to any more in 1977, in fact, 100 percent less, than the Republican influence in the Congress of the United States, so I am certainly surprised all of a sudden to find out that that is not true.

Second, we find Father Gelinis, who was there much longer, long beyond the time when they were only establishing their own camp, and then were looking at the rest of the situation, and how they would control the situation, now that primarily the north got the control and the power that they were seeking, and then, of course, Dr. Turley, from his testimony, I would understand, has no onsite observations to report since the war whatsoever.

I found the 10,000 to 20,000 figure quite surprising. Reading from Henry Bradshaw in the Washington Star in June of 1976, he said over 50,000. George MacArthur, in the Los Angeles Times, in 1976, said over 200,000. Terzani in Der Spiegel said 150,000 to 200,000. New York Times Magazine said 70,000, and the Far Eastern Economic Review—these are all recent—said over 200,000.

Am I to believe—where did the 10,000 to 20,000 come from? Was it the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or how do we come up with that figure when all of these other figures seem to be so different?

So, I really don't have any questions. It is just an observation, you know. Those of us who listen to the testimony have to judge the people who are testifying, and unless we have a golden opportunity ourselves to go and look into the situation, which I am sure we would not be allowed to do, I guess we just have to make our own decisions from what we have heard, so I really have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Turley wants to respond. We have a vote. You wanted to comment?

Mr. TURLEY. Very briefly.

Mr. FRASER. Why don't you comment, and then perhaps we can go vote.

Mr. TURLEY. I have only got one or two points.

Mr. FRASER. Well, let's go ahead, then.

Mr. TURLEY. I sympathize very much with your puzzlement over the contradictory nature of the information, and if I have any point to make, it is that all the information is going to stay contradictory, and therefore it is difficult to make reasoned and final judgments as to what the real situation is, and all this is a good argument for establishing relations with the SRV relatively soon so we can have somebody on-site looking around.

Mr. GOODLING. Or to some extent on our terms.

Mr. TURLEY. Oh, yes, absolutely.

Mr. GOODLING. Or to some extent on our terms.

Mr. TURLEY. We don't want them locked up in the Hotel Hanoi.

Ms. FORSYTHE. I would like to say that there are others, Mennonites, who were in Vietnam longer than Father Gelinus, and Dick Hughes, who worked for the Shoeshine Boys, and I find that their opinions are very much like my own. I have submitted some of their material in addition to my own testimony. I agree that is a weakness, and would hope that you would consider that, and would invite them to speak if that is appropriate.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Like Mr. Goodling, I have to make the point that we are dependent to a degree on your prepared testimony, but we have to take into account the sources, if any, that you acknowledge, and also take into account the history of your personal experience in Vietnam as well as the group that you may represent.

Ms. FORSYTHE. That's right.

Mr. DERWINSKI. It would come as a surprise to me that the American Friends Service Committee would not look with a quizzical eye at developments in Vietnam, given their attitude all through the war period.

Ms. FORSYTHE. We are very concerned about Vietnam.

Mr. DERWINSKI. So, there is nothing inconsistent in your statement, Miss, that wouldn't be typical of their material for the last 20-some years. But Professor Hurley, I just want to be sure that I don't misunderstand your prepared testimony, because there are a few things that threw me off.

One is that I would like to be sure I understood, you were a student in Vietnam in 1967 and 1968?

Mr. TURLEY. That's correct.

Mr. DERWINSKI. And you have not been back since then?

Mr. TURLEY. In 1972-73.

Mr. DERWINSKI. And both times that would be, of course, South Vietnam?

Mr. TURLEY. Right.

Mr. DERWINSKI. This point I would like to question. On pages 7 and 8 of your printed testimony, you make the point that the sources of information are not always reliable, and they could be contradictory, and then you go on and point out the reasons why various sources

might be—might have information which one would have to take with a grain of salt, let's say, but then you go on and specifically, starting on page 8, make a number of very flat statements, such as the number of people remaining in camps, the fact that people—

Mr. TURLEY. I said, if you will read the sentence, that if it is true that less than half of the more than 1 million persons slated for reeducation, et cetera, have passed through the camps, and then the other follows. If you accept certain things as true, then that follows. I am not saying that those things are true. I am frankly not too confident of it.

Mr. DERWINSKI. All right. Are you saying, that if the figure of the people slated for reeducation would double, then the number held would be doubled?

Mr. TURLEY. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, would there be a mathematical relationship?

Mr. TURLEY. If the SRV's statements that over 95 percent of the people slated for reeducation have gone through the camps and have graduated out, yes, that is correct.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now, how about the point you made, and I am now looking at page 10 of your testimony, where you say—I am reading the specific sentence: "Based on precedents in the north"—I assume this means when they came into power after the French left—

Mr. TURLEY. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI [continuing].

We can expect the government to permit religious observance and not to discriminate against Catholics as a group, but at the same time to curtail the autonomy of some of the educational and other social services.

What you are really saying is that they would leave them with nothing but the sort of tolerated situation where church services could be conducted, but none of the traditional social services which, in the case of the Catholic Church, their heavy emphasis is on education, that none of these services would be tolerated any longer. Is that the point?

Mr. TURLEY. Father Gelin, I am sure, will want to add something to what I have to say on that. I wouldn't put it quite that far. The Government's concern was above all to undercut the means the church had to remain partly politically autonomous. There were some areas where its political power was quite substantial.

Now, in our pluralist system, that would be fine by us, perhaps, but in Vietnam they don't operate that way, and regardless of what we think of it, that is the way they operate, and yes, they did undertake steps to limit the ability of the church to maintain constituent support, to evoke the kind of disciplined response that they would find useful for political purposes. This is true.

Now, I have run across, rather by accident, some other information which I cite there in a parenthesis about a young fellow I interviewed. As you will see, there is a blank spot as to where he was from, because he is still in Vietnam. He is one of the few people from that particular Catholic village, in a particular district of a particular province, who said that the Government frankly left them alone, and they ran affairs pretty much as they saw fit, but I understand in less remote areas the Government's restrictions are more noticeable.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I find Dr. Turley's statement quite interesting, and if you don't mind, I do have a few more questions.

Mr. FRASER. We will take a short recess. It will be about 10 minutes, and we will be back.

[Whereupon, from 3:21 p.m. to 3:36 p.m., a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will resume its sitting.

Mr. Derwinski will be here shortly, but I thought until he comes perhaps I could ask a question or two.

Father GELINAS, in the New York Review of Books article which you wrote, which appeared last May, you indicated that a systematic elimination of PRG, the old revolutionaries, that there was sort of a coup d'etat against them in July of 1975.

Does that appear to be a fairly—Is that something that is clearly evident, or one that you have inferred from a number of circumstances, or what?

Father GELINAS. That there was something very significant on the 19th and 20th of July 1975, is a fact. The meaning of this thing is, of course, deduced from a certain number of evidence. If you want me to give you the facts so that the deduction can be made by everyone, on this weekend, the entire city was frozen. That is, all of a sudden people woke up on Saturday morning to find that there were soldiers all over, that soldiers were wearing the bulletproof vests, the "casques," the helmets, guns and bayonets, that there were machinegun nests at street corners with sandbags, that there were antiaircraft guns, and there were tanks at many places.

No one knew what was coming. I was there, and many people were saying, this is the beginning of the Third World War. Others were saying, the Americans are going to land, to send parachutes. Something big. The whole city found itself all of a sudden in a state of war, and it lasted Saturday and Sunday. Not one bullet was fired, and by Monday morning things went back to normal, and it took some time before we could understand what had happened.

Little by little, the informations came in. A student came in and said he noticed there was a tank in such a place, right in front of that house, where a prominent PRG man lives. Someone else from another area of the city would say, that house also was surrounded by troops. That is another place where PRG people lived.

The Vo Tang Street, the former seat of the national police, which had become the headquarters of the PRG, was completely surrounded by tanks. There was no firing. There was no violence, but getting all the information, it seemed impossible not to conclude that the coup was against the PRG.

Now, if you add to this the fact that there had been more and more grumbling, especially among the lower cadre, because the higher cadre, we don't talk with them, we don't know what they think or say, but among the PRG people there has been a lot of grumbling about the fact that they had fought the war, what they thought was a war of liberation for South Vietnam, and now South Vietnam was becoming a colony of North Vietnam. So, all of a sudden this was finished. Madame Binh finally did come back from all of her errands. She was always outside of the country representing the country somewhere or another. It seemed that they were sending away the persons of name or of influence of the PRG because they were afraid of them.

After that, after this show of force, things were quiet, and the PRG never said anything. The grumbling was ended.

So, it is a consequence of trying to interpret something big that did happen.

Now, what else could have happened, obviously no Third World War started. I don't think that they could have captured secret documents revealing that someone wanted to start a Third War on the 19th of July. Later on, the Government did bring out the clumsy explanation that they were afraid of a revolution from the Catholics, which was completely impossible to believe. I mean, who could rebel? No one has a gun, and there were 200,000 troops occupying Saigon, 20 divisions. So, obviously there was no question of rebellion.

So, it is the consequence of deduction, but I have some testimony from one person in particular who was an important man in the PRG, an undercover agent. He was—I think he can be identified. He was the right hand man of Caritas. Caritas is the agency of the Catholic Church which distributes all the money they receive from international sources, which was extremely substantial during the war, so all the money going to orphanages, leper camps, and everywhere passed through his hand. This man was a man 60 years old, a convert, and completely trusted. He had all the files.

Well, after the Communist takeover, he told the Mother Superior of the convent where his daughter was that he had been a Communist all along, and he told his wife and daughter, who did not know it, it was all secret: "I have been a Communist for 45 years, since I was 15 years old."

"All the documents have been given to the Communists. They know all the money that came in and where it went, and all that." And at that period, around July, he went back to see the same sister, and he said: "I have given 45 years of my life to the party, and I have been cheated. They used us, and now they are the masters. We don't count. If I was 10 years younger, I would join the guerrillas," and he said: "many of my friends feel the same way."

Now, there is one man, of course, but it is significant, I think, of the state of mind that did exist.

Ms. FORSYTHE. Mr. Fraser, may I say something, please?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Ms. FORSYTHE. It is very hard for me in listening to Father Gelinat to square what he says with my own experiences, and so I am kind of at a loss to even know where to begin. The first thing I would like to say, however, is that it is important for us to remember that Dinh Ba Thi, who is the observer now, today, at the United Nations, is from Da Nang. He is a southerner and he has been a southerner all along. He was part of the PRG, and so on and so forth.

In my experience in Saigon, the people I met who were cadre, and that was local people, a young student who worked on a student newspaper, who turned out to be a cadre, his mother-in-law, who was a cadre, were all people who had jobs in Saigon. They continued to have those jobs. They did not change places, that in July there were rumors of some kind of a coup or something or other—it was kind of a rue contentant, street gossip about what was going to happen included rumors about some kind of a coup. That never took place. National Day, which is in July, is the day that there was the thought that there

might be some unrest. There was no unrest, and I think this may be the occasion that Father Gelinas is talking about, but in my experience, there was never a purging of the PRG from any level in Saigon, and I just need to make that statement for the record.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski. I was in the process of questioning.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Fine. Well, let me say, Professor Turley, that especially with respect to your academic background and the fact that you hopefully can look at the situation with total objectivity and scholarship, I detect, again looking at your prepared statement, a feeling of almost—or a position of almost passive support for whatever steps the Government of Vietnam is now taking toward Catholic Church organizations; your theme seems to be, since there is obviously some political potential there, that whatever steps they take to put down this opposition political force seems to be, if not approved, at least a practical thing.

Now, am I misinterpreting your position?

Mr. TURLEY. That is not what I meant to say, and it is unfortunate if that is the impression that I have left. My point is that when we receive reports about what the Government is doing toward certain groups, we should entertain certain possibilities that may not seem obvious at the outset. With respect to the Catholics, we should consider for a moment that there is considerable potential for conflict between the Catholics and the Government in which the Catholics may and will from time to time initiate acts that any state would consider insupportable, and take actions that are repressive, as all states do. We don't accept street crime in our own country.

In other words, you have to entertain that as a possible cause of the incident that is reported. It may not be the cause, but before leaping to the conclusion that so-and-so has been put in jail, or that such-and-such a demonstration was brutally suppressed, that the incident may have been initiated against the laws of the state by the Catholics themselves, or the Hoa Hao, or Cao Dai, the ethnic minorities, or something of that nature. That's all. It is a hedge. That is all I mean by it.

Let me add that I don't think there is any such thing as total objectivity. I am aware of traps there, and for that reason, I am simply recommending that we be very cautious about the way we interpret the information we do have.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Well, of course, I am trying to credit you with total objectivity with respect to—

Mr. TURLEY. Well, I am admitting I don't have it.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You are a professor from a distinguished university in my home State. Keeping in mind, then, the fact that one of the few comparisons we do have to make of what the Reds may now be doing in the entire country is the steps that were taken in the north by the Communist regime when they acquired their power there after the French left, and there have been reports that during the fifties in the procedure which involved reemphasizing agriculture and readjusting the economy of their country, that as many as 500,000 people may have been killed in one way or another.

Now, isn't that an experience on which one would draw to look at what might be happening in the south?

Mr. TURLEY. If anything like that had happened, that certainly would be true. This is an area about which there has been considerable

debate over recent years, and it is the reason I cite in my written testimony the study which I feel is perhaps the most dispassionate on this very point.

A figure of a half million, I assure you, is completely out of line. There have been some opposite figures, incidentally, too, of a few hundred, also out of line. No one probably will ever have a perfectly accurate count, but I think the figures that I have cited here for you are the best ones we have at this time.

The individual who wrote that article is a recent Ph. D. from the University of Michigan, and his dissertation was on land reform in Vietnam. He has done probably the most systematic study of any person I know. I think that we can take his judgment as the best reasoned estimate we have.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In trying to analyze this situation, and looking at it from a historical standpoint, starting in 1918, in Russia, when it became the Soviet Union, and looking at what happened in Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, analyzing the reports from Cambodia and Laos, looking at the situation in North Korea, there is similarity, regardless of any emphasis that might be placed on regional or local differences of structure or, personality cults.

One of the things that always shows up is that a Communist government, when it takes control, immediately works to crush the strongest historic nationalistic and intellectual force. For example, in the Soviet Union they started off with wiping out the independence of the Orthodox Church. In some of the Eastern European countries, it started with the Catholic Church or the Reformed Church or the Lutheran Church or the Orthodox Church, depending on circumstances, and the same is true, evidently, in Asia, where, for example, to the Chinese Communist Confucius is now a traitor, and the philosophy of Confucius is wiped out.

My question then is, is it not logical that the new rulers of all Vietnam would not follow a policy similar to that we see historically in attempting to eradicate the intellectual and—let's call it the inspirational sources that they might interpret as being contrary to their philosophy of long-term goals.

Mr. TURLEY. Well, I dislike words like "total" and "absolute," because there is no such thing. No government has total control. There is no such thing as absolute rule. There are degrees. Of course, Communist governments do strive more than most to exert the maximum degree of control over people's lives. This is true, and Vietnam is such a government, and therefore can be expected to limit, box in, put lines around alternative sources of power and perhaps over time squeeze them out. But I think your question has a second element.

In doing so, do they repress something unique and special about their own national heritages? This, I think, was the drift of your question with respect to China and the anti-Confucius campaign, the general will to forget the past in China, and you see somewhat the same kind of thing in Russia. Certain aspects of history, writers, historical incidents, and so forth, are simply forgotten and repressed or whatever.

This is not the case in Vietnam, and it is one of the respects in which they should be most clearly distinguished from other Communist revolutions. That is not just that they are willing to permit the traditional

aspects of the Vietnamese culture to survive, but they in fact in some respects cherish them, nourish them, and seek to promote them.

One of the striking things—there is a well-known article by a Vietnamese intellectual, Nguyen Khac Vien, in which he shows the parallels between Confucianism and Marxism, and shows how Marxism can be adapted to a Vietnamese context because it is continuous with certain traditions in Vietnamese culture. Now, whether his analysis is true is a matter of dispute, but he has made the effort.

The idea that a Chinese would do this is unthinkable, you see. The Vietnamese are different on that particular score, and you will find them doing things of that nature in many respects.

I think that there is generally more tolerance for schools of thought, traditions, and so forth emanating from the past, so long as they do not conflict with the regime's goal of restructuring social relationships, redistributing wealth and power.

Mr. DERWINSKI. One thing that strikes me in looking through the statements is that everyone recognizes that given the closed society that now exists and inability to get on-the-spot information from objective observers, that one is at the mercy of rumors, having to draw conclusions, some of which might not be accurate, based on scanty information.

It reminds me of the old story which I first heard as applied to Armenia, but I am certain it could be applied to Vietnam today. It was the period just after World War II when the Soviets started a campaign among free-world Armenians to convince them to return to Soviet Armenia and help build the fatherland, this one American-Armenian was intrigued, and decided he would return, but he was a little skeptical as to what he might find, so he prepared a communication system with his family in the United States.

It consisted of this. That after he traveled back to Soviet Armenia and established himself, that he would write a letter in which he would report on conditions, and operating on the assumption that there might be some form of censorship or surveillance, he said, don't pay attention to what I say, but I will enclose a photograph, and if in the photograph I am standing, you know that things are well for me. If in the photograph I am seated, you will know that things are not well.

Three or four months later, his family in Boston received a letter in which he wrote in glowing terms of the situation in Soviet Armenia, and he enclosed a photograph in which he was lying down.

Now, we will have to devise that kind of system, I believe, to find out what is really happening in Vietnam. I have one other point. Let me switch for a moment to Father Gelinis. You mentioned in your testimony that prior to the takeover of Saigon, there were 27 daily newspapers published, of which 1 was French, 1 English, 3 Chinese, and 22 Vietnamese.

Now, I could understand closing the English publication. I could even understand limiting 22, you know, consolidating 22 others, because that seems to be counterproductive, but this leads me to the question, has there been any different treatment of the Chinese population in Saigon by the conquerors? Are any of you three willing to address that question?

Father GELINAS. Not so far as freedom of information, certainly. There was no different treatment. All Chinese publications were suppressed, purely and simply.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What about their economic activities?

Father GELINAS. Well, the economic activity is different. They fought the most to keep their hospitals, because it is well known that the Chinese have the best hospital system. They lost. All their hospitals were taken away from them. Their property, since most Chinese were businessmen, since a good many Chinese were not much educated—Chinese were not schoolgoers; they believed in running the store—they were less hit by the reeducation campaign. Less Chinese leaders went to reeducation camps than certainly the Vietnamese counterparts, so more Chinese remained capable of going on and working.

Now, some stores were confiscated by the Government. A few Chinese were shot publicly, because they were accused of being hoarders, but not to a very, very large extent. As a result, since the Chinese had stocks of goods, and since bank accounts were all frozen, the stocks of goods remained the best wealth, and the price of things went up tremendously. Everything became tremendously expensive, so the Chinese live better than the rest of the population.

Even today I keep receiving letters from Vietnam, and whenever they describe the situation in Saigon, the only place where you have a semblance of normal life is Cho Lon, the Chinese quarter. In Cho Lon, people eat. In Cho Lon, you still have restaurants. Actually, they eat, I would say, a lot, because the Chinese are selling their goods little by little. They are selling at very, very high prices. They are making tremendous profits, and they are not allowed to reinvest these profits. They can't put the money in the bank. It is going to be seized by the Government. They cannot import. They cannot produce. Factories have all been seized, so the only thing they can do with their money is eat it, and they are eating.

So, there is a very different picture for the visitor between Cho Lon, the Chinese area, and the rest of the country.

Now, of course, quite a few Chinese, because they are still making money, have managed to buy the officials and many have escaped. If you have gold leaves, you can escape. There is a price for escape. You buy a fisherman's boat and you buy the police alongside the beaches, and you buy the coast guards, and you escape.

Lately I had a conversation 2 weeks ago with Le Kim Ngan, who is not a Chinese, but who did escape with Chinese. He was the director of the Buddhist University in Saigon, and he described minutely how his escape went on.

So, there is a difference of treatment with the Chinese population, but it is due to the fact that they have money. I don't think it is due to the fact that they are afraid of mainland China. My impression is that mainland China does not exert any pressure to protect these Chinese.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Did you have a comment, Ms. Forsythe?

Ms. FORSYTHE. Yes: I did. I guess—this is real interesting. The one thing I do know about the Chinese in Cho Lon is that the Chinese schools, of which there were a great number, where Chinese was taught

as the first language and not Vietnamese, were ordered to change languages, which was not received well within the Chinese community, and in looking at Dr. Turley's information, it is again that same very curious relationship with minorities.

The Chinese population is very large in Saigon. It is about a million people, I think. I don't know that it has decreased a lot by now. The Vietnamese are always in a very interesting relation with those people. That is all I know.

Mr. TURLEY. I will add just one thing. I also found your testimony very interesting in that regard. They are details I had not heard of, but they conform perfectly with everything that I heard and understand and know about the Chinese in Saigon. They have constituted a problem from the perspective of Vietnamese Governments since there was one, virtually, largely because of the proportion of control they have over the market in Saigon. The Government clearly, when it came to power in the spring of 1975, wanted to get better control over the entire national market structure, and this required getting better control over the market in Cho Lon, and it was in—let me give you the precise date. Beginning in the fall of 1975, they had a campaign against the Compadore bourgeoisie as they were called, very wealthy businessmen who were held to have gained their vast riches by illicit traffic with the American imperialists, and the striking thing is that almost every single Compadore bourgeoisie that was tried and punished, usually by sentence to prison of 10 or 20 years, was a Chinese, almost every single one, not only in Saigon but in the smaller market towns as well. Knowing the traditional antipathy of the Vietnamese toward the Chinese, and the desire of a series of Saigon government to gain greater control over the economy through Cho Lon, it is not impossible that the policy toward the Chinese may over time evolve in a way that would suggest discrimination against an ethnic minority.

Ms. FORSYTHE. There is one other comment I would like to make, and that is about the press. When I left in October of 1975, there were 11 papers being produced, and Ngo Cong Duc, who is someone you have met when he was here in the United States in the early seventies, he was not allowed to live in Vietnam under Chou, who had been an opposition candidate but was run out of the country, is the editor of the one paper that is not a Government organ, and that is the Tin Sang Magazine, or the Morning News.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Ms. Forsythe, there is one thing I am curious about. In looking through your statement, you basically paint a rosy picture of developments in Vietnam. Any problems that exist you blame on either American military action or the days of American presence, but you did indicate that you had requested to return, and I was just curious, there you were seeing utopia evolve, and why did you select to leave at that point?

Ms. FORSYTHE. I think, on the contrary, I paint a very grim picture of Vietnam. I think I paint a picture in this testimony of a Vietnam that is suffering at this point from a lack of food, a lot of that because of what has happened physically to the land in Vietnam, so the people aren't able to produce rice in the way that they would like to, to earn a living, to live.

I produce a picture or paint a picture of a country that is littered with munitions, where people have their arms and legs blown off as they try and get back to the land. I paint a picture of a country where there is a lot of unemployment, where prostitution and drug addiction are enormous problems. I think it is not a very rosy picture at all.

As to why I asked to come back to the United States, I was on assignment in Vietnam for 2 years. I stayed 1 year longer than I had intended initially, and it was time for me to get back to my other work and my own life here. I was not there on a life mission, but for 2 years' service for AFSC.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You were there just long enough to see the Government change.

Ms. FORSYTHE. Well, that happened to happen while I was there, yes. If I had been there 2 years earlier, I suppose it wouldn't have, would it?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now, one last point, Mr. Chairman, back to my Illinois friend, Professor Turley. In your analysis of the problems which the conquering forces automatically face, you also touched on the Catholic groups, the ethnic and religious minorities. Now, if I recall, those minority groups were fundamentally Buddhist, or at least uniquely Vietnamese, weren't they?

Mr. TURLEY. You mean, the sects in the South?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Right.

Mr. TURLEY. The Hoa Hao are essentially Buddhist. Cao Dai I would describe as a syncretic religious movement. Other descriptions have been applied to them, but they are peculiarly Vietnamese, yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You state here that you have no information worth mentioning on how these groups have fared.

Mr. TURLEY. Do I have something worth not mentioning?

Mr. DERWINSKI. No; you say that you do not have any information worth mentioning on how these groups have fared. I find that curious. Both of these groups were quite notorious and received extensive coverage from American and other journalists during the period from 1954 on, especially when they were agitating against the Government in Saigon. I find it curious that you acknowledge the fact that there isn't any information now available about them. Isn't this sort of a sinister development, this wall of silence?

Mr. TURLEY. Possibly. The information I have heard is so circumstantial and strained, as I say, I just really don't even want to mention what it is. I don't know if it means anything. There is very, very little of it. Is it possibly sinister? I don't know. Difficult to say. The Hoa Hao were concentrated in an area that throughout the world was reputed to be most free of Communist influence, and this was held to be because of the unity of the people against them.

If a Communist cadre came into a village, he would be kicked out the other side. Now, as a matter of fact, the situation wasn't quite so simple, because the Hoa Hao often made local deals with the revolutionary side. Their area was most densely inhabited and sat astride the infiltration route from Cambodia into the lower Mekong Delta, and in order to use that area, the Communists had to make certain deals with the Hoa Hao to get free passage, as it were. From friends we have there

in the Hoa Hao—my wife, I should mention, was teaching there at the Hoa Hao Buddhist University in Long Xuyen for 1 year—it appeared that local accommodations had been made, in return for Communist respect for the essential autonomy and self-government of the Hoa Hao.

Now, as you say, since there has been so little mention of them, since the spring of 1975, it raises a question in my mind whether that original wartime agreement has been respected, given the Communist propensity to want to consolidate central control, one of course has a doubt.

The important thing from the perspective of human rights, though, is, if they have moved against the Hoa Hao in some sense to try to incorporate them more into the national community, how? I don't know. I haven't the slightest idea. The case with the Cao Dai is more complex. They were perhaps more politically divided internally. There were groups of them that had accommodated quite well some time ago with the revolution.

I also had friends in that group that viewed the oncoming victory with neither trepidation nor affection, but again, we have heard very little about them.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, going back to your own statement here, the total lack of information, you interpret to mean merely that things are quiet with these sects as opposed to my possible interpretation that they have had the iron hand descend upon them.

Mr. TURLEY. Well, I think if one is going to guess, you want to know, first of all, how are these groups likely to act in the present situation, and second of all, given the record of the past, how is the government likely to handle what they do? And I think that the Hoa Hao are capable of offering resistance to the government, or at least succor to those groups that have been operating in the Mekong Delta since the spring of 1975. This, of course, would give the government reason to retaliate in some form.

On the other hand, the government has shown a great deal of skill in the north earlier in coming to terms with these groups and offering a mixture of positive and negative incentives to gradually first attract the lower classes. You may have to get rid of the leadership for a time, so you separate the leaders from the led, and you get more access to local communities, and gradually loosen up the hold of the local authorities over these people, so they can be attracted into supporting the government, with a minimum of outright coercion.

I would make that sort of generalization on much of what has happened in the north in the past, and the seeming lessons they have learned from their own experience, but it all depends on who is in local command. It depends on the degree of resistance that these groups have shown to central rule. There are a lot of imponderables, and I would be the last one to say, this must be what is happening. I wouldn't.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Father.

Father GELINAS. Since it is mentioned that there is little information regarding the Hoa Hao, I think the little bit that we have could be made public. The New York Times has published, in September 1976, mention of a letter written by the daughter of the leader of the Hoa Hao, Luong Trong Tuong, a letter which was sent to the French press, in which she pleads for the release of her husband, of her brother, of

her uncle, and of her 72-year-old father from Chia Hoa prison, in which she claims that the entire Hoa Hao leadership and tens of thousands of followers have been arrested since June 1975. Of course, no answer was ever given to this letter, but I don't see why she would plead for the release of her father and husband and brother if they were free or with her.

The Hoa Hao certainly, as Dr. Turley has said, are a strongly united group. They have always shown independence, so it is very likely that the Communists would feel the need to crush them, but all the sources that we have is that their leadership is gone. It has been wiped out.

Now, regarding the Buddhists, there is much more information. The self-immolation by fire of 12 Buddhist nuns near Cam Ta was made public, and actually, the day this document came out of Vietnam, a prominent lay Buddhist leader was arrested, and has never been heard of since. He probably is the one who did smuggle this information outside of the country, and here I would like to add something to correct possibly a wrong impression.

Mention has been made many times of the persecution against Catholics. It is true that the government is trying to deprive the Catholic Church of any authority over the people. First of all, all orphanages, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, leprosarium, have been taken away from the church. There are about between 200 and 300 priests presently in jail. The official list at the Vatican is 176, but that list is already many month old, and there are certainly more now in jail.

Six bishops are in jail. So, they are trying to control the church, but the point I want to make is, if you compare the Catholic Church with the Buddhist Church, one should admit that the Catholic Church is in a privileged position. Their treatment of the Buddhists is much harsher than the treatment of the Catholics.

For instance, most—not all, but most—Catholic Churches in the city of Saigon are still open to the cult. This is not true in the provinces. In many, many instances the church has been closed down because they need a building, because there is no priest, or they don't allow the priest to go, or for many reasons, but in the city, most churches are open, while most Buddhist monasteries, most Buddhist pagodas have been closed.

Another instance, the Feast of Christmas has been celebrated with the permission of the Government, and even with the encouragement of the Government. When I was there, some priests had to go to the police station and were very seriously blamed because they did not put up enough fuss for the Christmas celebration. We were told to put more lights and more decoration and all that. So, they are permitting some cults and even encouraging, of course, for propaganda reasons, probably, but the Hsinh Nhat Phat Giao, the feast of the birthday of Buddha, which is the equivalent Buddhist feast, was simply suppressed.

A small notice in the Tin Sang, in the newspaper, saying that this year the birthday of Buddha will be celebrated by a stronger effort to work on this day, that is all, meaning, there is no holiday. So, they certainly are giving—yielding more to the Catholics because they are international, and they are afraid of the bad propaganda that they might get if they persecute the Catholic Church openly.

Well, the Buddhists, not being international, at least not as closely knit, not as well organized, are being crushed with less harm on their public image.

Now, the last fact on this subject, there was a special political session for the Catholic priests at the end of January 1977, and it was said openly that by the end of the 5-year plan, by 1982, Christianity will have ceased to exist. They explained that Christianity, the purpose of Christianity was to bring in the Kingdom of God, happiness, paradise, and by 1982 this will have been brought to Vietnam, so there will be no more need for Christianity.

This was published in the "Cong Giao Va Dan Toc" of February 6, 1977.

MR. DERWINSKI. I have no further questions.

MR. FRASER. Ms. Forsythe mentioned a second newspaper that she understood was operating at the time she left. Is that still going, do you know?

FATHER GELINAS. Yes; the Tin Sang is the one newspaper, she said correctly, which is not officially the government newspaper, but it does publish the same news as the government newspaper, with the same bias and the same editorials.

MR. FRASER. I am not that familiar with Communist regimes, but in the Soviet Union there is both a government and a party newspaper.

FATHER GELINAS. Isvestia and there is another one, yes.

MR. FRASER. Is there that same duality in South Vietnam?

FATHER GELINAS. The Saigon Giai Phong is a very dry paper which, to force the comparison, looks almost like the Congressional Record or something. [General laughter.]

I mean, it just publishes the official things. That is all. So, no one reads it. [General laughter.]

I am sorry. While the Tin Sang—

MR. FRASER. We are very sensitive about that.

FATHER GELINAS. While the Tin Sang has more the shape of the normal newspaper, but it is certainly Government-controlled. For instance, there is one feature of the Tin Sang which is borrowed from the Western press. They have letters of the readers. These letters, I am convinced, because I have read them for 15 months daily, they are made up by the newspaper in order to answer the mass of criticism. There is always an answer to the letters, but anyhow, it does make the newspaper slightly more attractive.

MS. FORSYTHE. To answer your question, however, there is a third publication. Saigon Giai Phong is a party document which is, as Father Gelinas says, unbelievably dry. Then there is also a governmental paper, and those are published by various governmental organizations. There is a women's paper and a students' paper and a workers' paper and a city paper, and so on and so forth.

Tin Sang is in another category again, and as I understand it from conversations that an AFSC delegation had with No Cam Duc in this past February, they view their role as one of helping to make a bridge between the new Government and the people. They want to discuss policies. They want to—they have an editorial page called Heaven and Seas, kind of offering critiques. I don't think there is any question

that that paper is certainly under scrutiny by the Government and could be closed down. I don't think it will be at this point.

Mr. FRASER. Father, I have the impression that the Catholic Church has continued to function in North Vietnam through these years. I don't know the degree of freedom of action, but I do have that very clear impression.

Father GELINAS. It is true. There are three churches which are opened in the city of Hanoi. There is one in Bui Chu. There is one in Phat Diem. There is a number of churches that are still open in Vietnam. They are crowded. People go to church. Of course, it is very difficult to preach, because there is always someone noting the sermons, and you have to walk on eggs, so to speak, not to insult the Government, or not to say something that would not be Marxist.

There is no school. There is no permission to teach religion outside of the church building itself. What you do during mass, provided you don't go against Government policy, you are allowed to do it, but all contact with the youth is cut off. Things, for instance, like confessions or spiritual directions, are not permitted, because this is secret conversation, and it could be treason. It could be plotting against the Government.

So, even in the south this is looked at very severely.

The one basic means of the Government to control the church is very simply the decree, which has been published in the south as well as in the north, that no priests or bishop can be ordained or appointed without specific first permission of the Government. Because of this, the number of priests in the north has gone down. No one can be ordained, or very, very few, only those that are lenient and approved, and the priests are very old, and they are harmless for the Government.

So, they are letting religion die. In the south, we have asked for permission for ordination. In the first months of Communist control in Saigon, we did have an ordination, in which I participated. We had four new priests, because they were not yet completely established, but after that, they strengthened their control, and it is feared now that it will be very, very difficult to have any new priests.

Mr. FRASER. Well, of course, the purpose of our inquiring into the state of affairs with respect to human rights in South Vietnam or in Vietnam is to see whether whatever we think we know should influence U.S. policy towards Vietnam. Now, unlike most countries, we have no diplomatic relations.

I would like to ask just on that point alone what the view of the panel is, whether the United States should establish—should recognize Vietnam and exchange diplomatic personnel.

Father GELINAS. Well, I may answer the first, because I am not an American. I am talking from the outside. Possibly I am the less well-informed on American policy.

Mr. FRASER. In that regard, maybe I should ask you, what is the status between Canada and Vietnam?

Father GELINAS. There is an Ambassador, a Canadian Ambassador, to Vietnam.

Mr. FRASER. There is recognition then.

Father GELINAS. And there is a group of people who are preparing the Embassy in Ottawa. In other words, the Vietnamese do not have their Ambassador, but they have charges d'affaire. They have people in charge.

As far as I understand, at least since the Carter administration—I am talking from the outside—the impression is clearly that American policy is not strictly political. I mean, contrary to other countries, America seems to have definitely made it known that its policy will be founded on principles of respect for the dignity of the human person, and not only on political interests.

Well, if this is true, and I think it is, and it is very honorable for this country that it is, if this is true, I think it is out of the question that one could ignore a situation where 23 million people are under a dictatorship which oppresses them, where no international body, be it the Red Cross or Amnesty International or the United Nations, is ever allowed to inspect the jails, the prisons, or even to walk down the streets, where no news can come out or go in the country, where there are these horrible reports of a situation.

I think if we are sincere, and if there is a reasonable reason, a reasonable cause to believe that there are 300,000 innocent people in camps who may never come out of it, if there is reasonable cause to believe that there are literally millions of people being scheduled for deportation to the so-called new economic area, officially, the Vietnamese Government has published the total aim is 8 million city-dwellers who will be relocated to new economic areas. We know the situation in these areas.

If all of this is true, if there is no freedom of protection from the law, with the law, all these basic—no possibility of reunification of families and so on, well, then I think that it is—there is no choice. The choice is already made.

Mr. FRASER. Well, let me pursue that for a moment, though. I have been a vigorous advocate of the position of the Carter administration, but so far as I know they have never advocated the use of diplomatic recognition as one of the tools or responses to the human rights situation, as a general policy, now, because in the case of Cuba, for example, there has been a suggestion that they should let some of the political prisoners out of jail as well as getting the troops out of Angola.

In any general discussion, the question of diplomatic recognition has not arisen. Part of the question, of course, arises from the fact that we have diplomatic recognition of China and the Soviet Union, Cuba and all these other—not Cuba, but all the other Communist countries. You would advocate, I gather, that a failure to observe internationally accepted standards of human rights ought to be the basis for withdrawal of diplomatic recognition or—

Father GELINAS. No—

Mr. FRASER [continuing]. Or delay in extending it?

Father GELINAS. None, none of this. I am very sorry. I did not understand your question. I thought you meant, should America do something to try to improve the situation of civil rights in Vietnam. I did not understand that you meant, should we recognize Vietnam or not.

Mr. FRASER. No; that was just my question.

Father GELINAS. If it is your question, I think that everything should be gained by recognizing Vietnam. The more Vietnam is in with the club of civilized countries, so to speak, the more they will have to watch out what they do at home. I am sorry to say it so coarsely, but I mean that if you leave them alone, then they can crush their people much more. If they are in the open light, if they

belong to the United Nations, for instance, if they are recognized by America and all that, then this can only force them to be a little more considerate, at least to hide, to disguise their crushing of human rights.

So, I am for recognition.

Mr. FRASER. And exchanging of diplomatic personnel.

Father GELINAS. And exchanging of diplomatic personnel, yes.

Mr. FRASER. What about the other two? I assume that you would think that that is what the United States should do?

Ms. FORSYTHE. Yes. I would not only say that, of course, I think my testimony has made it very clear that I would go beyond that.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I want to get to that next.

Ms. FORSYTHE. All right.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Turley, you would also—

Mr. TURLEY. I have reached the same conclusion for somewhat different reasons and by a different route. My own problem when entertaining this question is, first of all, determining exactly what human rights are. I just finished reading the State Department's recent publication on human rights, and when you read that relative to what we know is happening in Vietnam now, it is difficult to interpret precisely what some of these statements mean in context, what they should mean, and I think it is a difficult thing to assess.

Second of all, I ask myself, how are these rights as written here understood by the Vietnamese, and there are—

Mr. FRASER. Well, let me break in there. Let's say that demonstrably they were violating internationally accepted standards. You say there is some difficulty in applying those standards, but let's say that in your mind you thought they were violating them. Would that then persuade you that we should not recognize Vietnam and not send diplomatic personnel?

Mr. TURLEY. No; because at that point I would certainly have to concur in the conclusion of Father Gelinas that if that were the case, it is simply one more argument why we should have diplomatic relations with them, that we should want someone there.

Mr. FRASER. So, whether you see a clearcut set of violations or not, you would still recognize Vietnam?

Mr. TURLEY. Oh, yes.

Mr. FRASER. Well, that disposes of that question.

Mr. TURLEY. All right.

Mr. FRASER. Let me then go to the next question. Would you extend economic assistance? Now, let me separate them. There are different kinds here. One would be emergency humanitarian assistance, medicines, emergency food for genuine famine. That would be one kind of assistance, which you might call humanitarian. The other would be more in the nature of development assistance, which we thus far, to my knowledge, have never provided to a Communist country, but I am curious as to what—in those two categories, how the three of you would view—what you would recommend as the U.S. policy.

Mr. TURLEY. Well, I would support it.

Mr. FRASER. Which?

Mr. TURLEY. Both, in some measure, I suppose. I think there are two considerations. I think basically because it is in our interest to do so. I am well aware that there is an argument based on a sense of moral obligation, and whether one believes in that, I think the reality of the

situation is that we are going to give aid or not give aid on the basis of our national interests, and it is to that point that I would address myself, and there are two grounds on which I think it is in our national interest. First of all, the Vietnamese have demonstrated by any variety of actions over the past 2 years or so a desire to diversify their international relations, diplomatic, economic, political, and otherwise, and one of their reasons for doing so is to retain the maximum degree of independence they can from the Soviet Union, with which, as you may be aware, relations are quite close at this moment.

Mr. FRASER. Let me add a third component, permitting normal commercial trade. So, that would be three things—humanitarian assistance—well, let's start and take them perhaps, normal trade, humanitarian assistance, development assistance.

Mr. TURLEY. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. Now, take the three categories. You would proceed with all three, then, I would assume.

Mr. TURLEY. Yes. I think that the more linkages we form with Vietnam, the more ties of whatever nature, the more free it will consider itself to operate independently of the Soviet Union. Given the dynamics of power in Southeast Asia, I think it is to our interest to see that the Vietnamese act as independently as they can.

They have that general thrust in their policy, and I think that we could help it along a little bit. I do not think there is any such thing as Titofying Vietnam at this time in history, but it is certainly possible to increase Vietnam's capabilities for autonomous action, and that is in our interests as well.

Second, a point which has a moral component as well, we often think about giving aid to Vietnam as giving aid to the Vietnamese Government, but there is the fact that there are many Vietnamese in Vietnam, still in Vietnam, not refugees, who feel that we had made a commitment to them, and they remain there. They have suffered the same hardships as the ones who adhered to the Communist side, and if we feel that we have any kind of obligation left over from our earlier commitments, certainly it is to them and we have some capacity to alleviate their hardships. I think that this will redound over the long run to our benefit, our self-respect, to our reputation worldwide, again, of course, which is in our national interest in addition to demonstrating a basic interest in other human beings.

So, on all three counts, humanitarian assistance, trade, and development, I think that there is room for us to form some kind of relationship. Dimensions is another question entirely.

Mr. FRASER. The what?

Mr. TURLEY. The dimensions of those things is another question entirely.

Mr. FRASER. You wouldn't use the reparations argument?

Mr. TURLEY. No.

Mr. FRASER. Father Gelinias.

Father GELINAS. No; certainly not the reparations argument, but I would say that on principle, I certainly favor any assistance to the—that would relieve the misery of the Vietnamese people, but not assistance that would strengthen the arm of a government that oppresses these people.

So, if there was any way of sending assistance that would truly reach the people and make life better for them, one should not hesitate to do this. Unfortunately, the Communist government has made its point of view very clear, that they will not accept any assistance except to the Government. They will not accept any control of assistance, any presence of an inspector, any obligation to make reports that can be checked.

Now, I think the policy of the United States, because of the power that this country has, and because of its wealth, the policy of the United States should be, in order to be consistent with its policy on human rights, we are ready to assist and we are willing to assist the misery of these people, but we will do it when you give us permission to check and make sure that this money or these things reach the people. The answer of the Communists will be, then, we don't need your money, but this answer they cannot hold on forever. After a while they will yield on small beginning of American inspection or presence by a third country or any other way, and then we will have won a lot, because the fate of the people will be bettered.

I think America has a very strong arm there. They need American know-how, American goods, American assistance, and they will refuse it, trying to have it on their own terms, but if we hold our point very clearly, then maybe on the long run they will start yielding, and we will have done something for the people.

Mr. FRASER. What about ordinary commercial trade? Would you remove the embargo?

Father GELINAS. I don't know. Really, this is beyond my competence, to know what the Government should do with its businessmen. Certainly I would not encourage trade in arms or in anything that would make the government stronger, better equip the police to crush the people, but other trades, really, I don't know. I could not say. I could not answer. Assistance as a government, because this people is now in a terrible state, not because of American presence in the past, for my conviction, but because of the oppressive rule of the government, but the result is the same. The people are suffering. So, if we could relieve this suffering and at the same time improve the faith of the people, we should do it by any means, but it will be difficult. They will not yield before quite a few years. They will yield when they have to.

Mr. FRASER. Ms. Forsythe.

Ms. FORSYTHE. Yes; I would like to say that certainly I would be delighted if diplomatic relations were opened. I believe that the reconciliation process that is happening in Vietnam in some ways needs to happen between our countries as well. That could go a long way in healing a lot of the wounds that GI's in this country still feel. I have met them on speaking tours and so forth. It would be good to heal some of that pain. I think.

Second, I would be very delighted if the U.S. Government could move quickly to send humanitarian aid to Vietnam. UNHCR, a food and agricultural organization, has established that there is a serious food problem in Vietnam, partially created because of the tons of Louisiana rice that were being shipped from this country until May of 1975 are no longer there, and because people are—it is just taking a

long time to get the country back together again, for whatever reasons.

People are hungry, and they need our support. We send relief to Romania after an earthquake. It would seem entirely appropriate to send relief to Vietnam.

I would agree that it is very important for us to have some kind of control or check on these things. UNICEF certainly has a representative in Vietnam, and any shipment that comes in from UNICEF or the UNHCR is overseen by their people in Hanoi. Their shipments are checked out, and they follow the shipments.

American Friends Service Committee has sent very modest amounts of postwar relief aid, and those have been checked up by delegations that visit periodically to check and see that our supplies are going where they ought to be going. Of course, that is something that we are concerned about.

The latest delegation brought back a report that they honestly feel that goods and services are being distributed in Vietnam in a way they have never been distributed before, unlike the predominant experience I had in my early days in Vietnam, where goods would come to the hospital and find their ways back into the streets, where hospital administrators and government officials just became very fat cats, literally off the people's backs.

The thing I experienced was a very different situation in the 6 months I was there, and it has been confirmed by visits since that time. Certainly Tom Hoskins, who worked in the Da Nang Hospital, had a very vivid firsthand impression of that.

The third point was developmental assistance, I think. Is that right?

Mr. FRASER. How about ordinary commercial trade?

Ms. FORSYTHE. Commercial trade. I feel quite free and easy—a number of businessmen call AFSC knowing that we have contact with Vietnam and wonder what we can do, and we always say, well, that is a Presidential order, I believe. Or is that a congressional—I think the trading—

Mr. FRASER. I think it is congressional, but I am not certain.

Ms. FORSYTHE. Well, in any case, I think that would be a very positive step forward, to get another part of normalization. I would hope that would happen very quickly. It seems that it might happen easily.

The third question is that of developmental aid, and again, I think that would hopefully come in succession, that that would be something to be talked about eventually between officials here in the United States and in Vietnam, that you all would want to work that out together. Certainly these things are always in discussion.

Mr. FRASER. Would any of you favor grant or sale on commercial or concession terms of military equipment to Vietnam?

Father GELINAS. Oh, no.

Ms. FORSYTHE. Well, I don't approve of that for Iran either.

Mr. TURLEY. That would depend on what use the military equipment was going to be put to and what we got in return, I suppose. These things are all negotiable.

Mr. FRASER. Do you see at the moment any reason why we should?

Mr. TURLEY. No.

Mr. FRASER. I have come to the end of my questions. Do any of you have any last comments you would like to put on the record?

Ms. FORSYTHE. Yes; I do. I guess the thing I would like to say finally is that Mr. Fraser, a lot of us have been really glad that you have been pursuing the human rights question. It has been very important to us. Certainly, in AFSC, it has been something that we have been carrying for a long time, and I think the concern first came up in—certainly not first came up, but has a resounding ring for us in the situation in Vietnam under Chou. It is a very important question. I think that Secretary of State Vance has given us some good ways of talking about human rights, and we certainly are young in understanding fully all the ramifications of human rights, and how our understanding of human rights is going to affect our foreign policy.

My hope is that we are going to continue looking at Vietnam, and not just throw it away and forget about it. We certainly have had a long history of involvement there. I hope that our deep concern for those people can be shown now. I hope it can be shown by some immediate aid of rice that is going to bring immediately relief to people who are in a lot of trouble, and I hope that can carry on into the future.

Father GELINAS. Well, in my last statement, I agree with Ms. Forsythe that certainly America, who has done so much, spent so much, and given so much of its blood for Vietnam, should continue to take a great interest to find out what is happening there, and since in this inquiry at least one thing comes out, the fact that there seems to be some violation of human rights, and there is a need for more information, I think it would be a logical step to take to start a full investigation to get the facts.

Vietnam is not just any other country. It is a country that has been fighting alongside this country, and that has been mixed up in the history of America for the last 10 years very closely. There seems to be a tragedy there. The means do exist to see the truth. After all, there are 140,000 Vietnamese here. There are over 1,000 of them who have lived under the Communists and have finally run out.

It would be tedious, it would be long and possibly expensive to check the personal stories. These 100,000 people get letters from home. They can't be all liars. They can't be all criminals. One could find out what is actually going on in Vietnam, and I think it is most important that the picture, a clear, objective, nonpassionate, nonideological picture be found. The cause of human rights certainly would be better served, and the policies of this country would be run more—with more light, with more information.

So, I would suggest that this thought could be considered, the possibility of going full course to find out what is happening in Vietnam, and I suggest bringing in the Vietnamese witnesses by the hundreds, if need be, checking their stories. After all, we have modern methods to find out if someone is obviously lying or seems unreliable, to find out if someone is really telling the truth when he says that his father is an innocent and he is in jail, and his mother, and his village has been wiped out, and this and that.

So, there is certainly something tragic happening there. The mere fact that there are over 100,000 refugees in Thailand now under the care of the United Nations who have taken their life in their hands to run away from Indochina, the three countries, show that there are tremendous things happening and terrible things happening there.

I think it is a duty to find out what is happening. This would be my suggestion.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Turley.

Mr. TURLEY. Yes; only two very brief remarks.

First of all is that in considering human rights in Vietnam, one thing we haven't done is to first itemize what those rights are. One of them, I think, surely, is very clear and understood equally by all people, and that is the right to move freely from one country to another, especially for the purpose of reuniting with your relatives, and this is a theme that I touched on in my opening remarks, and I would like to end on it.

It is a right which this country can expedite. I don't think that we alone can bring it about. Obviously, it needs Vietnamese cooperation. But it is one of the things I think that we should be working for, and I would urge you to see what can be done to move things along in that direction.

The second point is that should we ever think it is relevant for us to take a position on relations with Vietnam on the basis of what we perceive to be violations of rights in that country, I would only urge you to ask yourself first of all what practical effect will such a position by us have, not on our relations with Vietnam, but in Vietnam itself, and act on your own answer.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I want to thank you all. We are examining the kinds of questions you raised with respect to a large number of countries. I think most of our attention has been devoted to the problem of military assistance to governments which appear to be highly coercive or repressive. I think generally we have found that the problems of economic assistance are more complex, and all of you have touched on some of the elements involved there as to whom the aid reaches and what the effect may be on the country if we provide the assistance.

Well, this has been a very useful afternoon. We really appreciate the time you have given us, and your testimony has been very helpful. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned scheduled to reconvene on Tuesday, June 21, 1977, at 2 p.m.]