

IV. 18 Mar 76

NORTH VIETNAM

DRV / AF
FILE SUBJ.
DATE SUB-CAT.
3176 / N15ca.

MILITARY JOURNAL ON U.S. ASIAN STRATEGIC DISPOSITION

Hanoi in Vietnamese to Vietnam 2330 GMT 14 Mar 76 BK

[Report on "Military data article" published in TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN--date not given--entitled: "The United States is Adjusting and Consolidating Its Strategic Lines in Asia and the Pacific After Vietnam"]

[Text] Dear comrades and friends: In its strategic withdrawal after the Vietnam (defeat), the U.S. imperialists are continuing their activities to build a new strategy to cope with the vigorous development of the revolutionary high tide in Asia and the Pacific and to maintain the remaining U.S. military presence in this region. To have an idea of the U.S. imperialists' military activities in this region, let us study the military data published in TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN entitled: "The United States Is Adjusting and Consolidating Its Strategic Lines in Asia and the Pacific After Vietnam." This article analyzes the three military trends of the U.S. imperialists in Asia and the Pacific: 1) Cling to the remaining positions in Southeast Asia, 2) Consolidate the northeast Asian strategic defense line, and 3) Withdraw to the Pacific basin region and establish a defense line there. Dealing with the specific schemes and activities of the imperialists to consolidate their remaining positions in Southeast Asia and the world and with their unprecedentedly disadvantageous position in this region, the article points out:

After its Indochina defeat, many military bases of the United States on the Southeast Asian mainland were dissolved. As a result, the remaining U.S. military bases in this region have been plunged into a precarious situation and, moreover, the U.S. bases in South Korea, the Mediterranean and other places have been vigorously shaken. As former U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesinger admitted, the U.S. stature has indeed shrunk a lot following events in Southeast Asia (U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 26 May 1975). For this reason, the United States needs to patch up its defense line in Southeast Asia in order to consolidate its global strategic position and to check the seething development of the revolutionary movement in this region.

Harboring such sinister ambitions and afraid of losing its position in Southeast Asia immediately after its defeat in Vietnam, the United States has withdrawn to firmly cling to its strategic line west of the Mekong River and to the line of islands in this region, including Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, and has used Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines as a bridgehead to check the revolutionary impetus.

Simultaneously with providing economic aid in exchange for the maintenance of its remaining military forces and bases in Southeast Asia, the United States has spent money secretly building local puppet armies and native special forces to use as tools to repress the revolution and create disturbances in this region. The United States is recruiting Wang Pao's Hmo troops, who earlier fled Laos, to turn them into U.S. mercenaries to sabotage and thwart the struggle movement of the Lao and Thai peoples. The United States had a hand in the Indonesian Army's aggressive attacks in East Timor and in the recent encroachments on Laos' airspace and territorial waters by the Thai Armed Forces. The United States also organized joint military maneuvers with Thailand.

According to an AP dispatch on 22 October 1975, following of its Southeast Asia policy of relying on Indonesia, the United States has increased its military aid to Indonesia from \$20 million to \$42.5 million for the 1976 fiscal year. For the 1975-76 fiscal year, U.S. military aid to the Philippines has risen to \$35 million--the highest figure for military aid given to this country since 1951. Recently, the United States gave five new patrol boats to the Philippines. In Thailand, the United States has 13,200 troops, mostly air force personnel, and a number of fighter aircraft and high-altitude reconnaissance planes.

AFP reported on 25 October 1975 that former Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman called for the postponement of the U.S. troops' withdrawal from Thailand under the pretext that the continued presence of U.S. troops in Thailand would create conditions for any bargaining between Thailand and North Vietnam. In its November 1975 issue, the French paper LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE reported that even though U.S. combat units might withdraw from Thailand in March 1976, the United States would continue to use for a long time two of its four large air and naval bases on Thai territory in order to maintain its aerial, ground and maritime control and detection apparatus and to conduct protracted intelligence warfare from southern China to Cambodia. The United States also has 16,000 troops belonging to the 13th Air Force and 24 fighterbombers stationed at Clark Air Force Base and at Subic Bay in the Philippines.

The United States envisages that once forced to withdraw from Thailand, many air force units will be [words indistinct] 110 warships and 95,000 tons of ammunition in stock. The United States is negotiating with the Philippine authorities on the maintenance of U.S. military bases in the Philippines until 1991 according to an agreement previously signed by both sides. Marcos has agreed with Ford that the United States would be authorized to maintain two of its military bases in the Philippines to insure an effective U.S. presence in the western Pacific (UPI, 7 Dec 1975). According to Adm Gayler, U.S. commander, Pacific, together with the U.S. bases in Japan, the bases in the Philippines are considered a key to the new U.S. strategic system.

The United States also has 1,700 tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea and the Philippines, carried by more than three aircraft carriers, 22 cruisers and destroyers, 26 landing craft and a number of other ships belonging to the 7th Fleet. According to foreign sources, the United States is maintaining its presence in Southeast Asia with a force composed of 55 warships, 500 aircraft and 55,000 U.S. troops and considers this force an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in this region to deter Asian nations and to support U.S. allies in this region.

Of course, Southeast Asia has entered a new era since the end of the Indochina war. The Mayaguez incident failed to intimidate the Southeast Asian peoples who are fanning the revolutionary flame in this region. Though rallying Southeast Asian henchmen to some extent around the United States, U.S. dollars and weapons can neither win back their confidence in the United States nor check their tendency to gradually detach themselves from the United States. Simultaneously with the shaking of U.S. lackey administrations in Southeast Asia, U.S. military bases in this region are in a very precarious position. This becomes all the more obvious through the fact that nobody regretted the demise of the aggressive SEATO bloc on 24 September 1975. The quiet dissolution of the aggressive SEATO bloc was the natural result of the complete victory of the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance of the three Indochinese peoples.

Twenty-one years ago the creation of SEATO marked an important turn in the aggressive and warmongering policy of the United States and its clique in Indochina and Southeast Asia. Today, the demise of SEATO marks a serious setback to the global counterrevolutionary strategy of the United States in this region of the world. The SEATO disintegration eloquently demonstrates the bankruptcy of the U.S. policy of joint intervention and military expansion in Indochina as well as the ineffectiveness of its policy of rallying the imperialists and their henchmen to counter the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia. At the same time, it shows that the more serious the U.S. failure in Indochina became, the more acute the internal contradictions of interests between the United States and its allies and the group of henchmen within this bloc grew leading to the instability, ineffectiveness and breakdown of this aggressive bloc.

The fact that the United States has been forced to dissolve SEATO is obviously a U.S. strategic defeat in Southeast Asia. However, it would be wrong to assume that the SEATO dissolution reflects a basic change in U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia. U.S. President Gerald Ford himself brazenly declared at his 6 May 1975 press conference that although withdrawing from Indochina, the United States would not withdraw from Asia. Nevertheless, by consolidating a defense line west of the Mekong River, and another defense line made up of the island countries and by finding it necessary to admit the demise of the aggressive SEATO bloc, the United States is being placed in the weakest and most favorable position ever in this region. This is precisely the root cause of the failure and disintegration of these defensive lines, in particular, and the U.S. aggressive policy in Southeast Asia, in general.

After its Indochina defeat, the United States considers Japan and South Korea as a forward defense line between the United States and the Soviet Union and China, a line composed of positions of vital importance to U.S. strategic, economic and political interests in Asia and to be supported at all costs by U.S. military strength. What has the United States been doing to consolidate its strategic defense line in northeastern Asia? The article says:

To protect its forward defense line between the United States and the Soviet Union and China and to turn Japan into an combat force supporting U.S. strategy in Asia, over the past 8 months high-ranking U.S. officials from the defense secretary to the secretary of state feverishly moved about to find ways to increase U.S. military strength in South Korea and Japan and further tighten its alliance with these countries through secret military pacts with them and Taiwan. These acts fully conformed to the designs of U.S. President Gerald Ford, who said that the U.S.-Japan security treaty is the key to stability in the Pacific and that the insuring of joint security with South Korea is a policy of primary importance to the United States.

According to the Western Press, the northeast Asian base system is composed of South Korea, Japan and Okinawa; and this tripolar joint base is manned by 118,000 U.S. troops concentrated mostly in South Korea and Japan. In South Korea, the total number of U.S. troops is 42,000, including the 2d Infantry Division stationed north of Seoul, an artillery brigade equipped with Hawk missiles and nuclear weapons, the 314th Air Division and 82 fighter aircraft.

In Japan, there are 52,000 U.S. troops including the 3d Marine Division composed of some 15,000 men stationed in southern Okinawa, about 100 marine jet fighters, and other fighters in the Iwakuni base on Honshu, the principal island of Japan. U.S. aircraft in Japan belong to the 313th Air Division and include about 70 fighters stationed at Kadena air base on Okinawa, plus Lockheed jet reconnaissance planes and the SR-71's and KC-135 tankers of the Strategic Air command. The largest U.S. air base remaining in Japan is Yokota in the Tokyo suburbs. The United States has also stationed in Japan some 27,000 troops of the 7th Fleet, the nucleus of which is the aircraft carrier "Midway" based in Yokosuka.

From the U.S. viewpoint the troops stationed in Japan are considered most important in the system of island bases of the so-called sea-island naval strategy. The modern and complex air and naval bases in Yokosuka, Sasebo, Tatsumi, Yokota and Yokohama together with Okinawa form the most important [word indistinct] and repair center of the United States in Asia and constitute a springboard for military activities in the (?Mayaguez) fashion in this region.

This has induced the United States to build many important projects in Kadena--one of 59 U.S. bases [as heard] on Okinawa which is now part of the logistic network in defense of South Korea. Numerous aircraft hangars and bomb and ammunition dumps are being built at this most important U.S. air base in the Far East. Recently, 36 Phantom fighter-bombers were transferred from Taiwan. North of Kadena there is an ammunition dump which is said to have the capability of stockpiling nuclear weapons (AFP 10 Aug 1975).

Yokosuka port serves as a main harbor for the cruiser "Oklahoma City"--the flagship of the U.S. 7th Fleet--and for six destroyers and the aircraft carrier "Midway." Okinawa--which has been returned to Japan--serves as a logistic base for U.S. ground forces in Asia as well as a major stopover for giant transport planes to carry troops and equipment to future battlefields in the Pacific region.

In mid-October 1975, the U.S. Defense Department decided to spend \$13 million modernizing the joint U.S.-Japanese airfields on Japanese territory. Additionally, the United States still has 4,000 troops in Taiwan, south of this defense line.

Following the August 1975 agreement on U.S.-South Korean security, the United States has been concentrating on modernizing the South Korean Army. As revealed by the KOREAN NEWS AGENCY [as heard] on 14 October 1975, the United States planned to hand over to South Korea 60 F5-E's and F5-F's--the latest types of fighter aircraft--together with a large amount of equipment for ground forces valued at \$205 million. South Korea has requested the United States to sell it 18 F-4 fighter aircraft valued at \$180 million in total to gradually substitute for 100 Sabre jets which were used in the Korean war 25 years ago (UPI, 21 Oct 1975).

U.S. efforts to shift its main forces from Southeast Asia to northeast Asia hinge on the request that Japan seriously shoulder its role in common defense, with the essential objective of pulling Japan into the anti-Asian strategy of the United States in the post-Vietnam era. To transform Japan into a combat force to carry out aggressive U.S. policy in Asia, the United States has, on the one hand, encouraged Japan to invest in Asian countries and, on the other, actively created opportunities for expanding the Japanese military apparatus.

The United States has returned Okinawa to Japan, expanded the scope of the duties of the Japanese home guard fleet so that it can replace parts and support the U.S. 7th Fleet in the area, and helped Japan develop its air force to the point of having sufficient war potential in order to assume some of the responsibilities of the U.S. Air Force, according to the Japanese Press Department on 22 November 1975. The United States has also secretly signed various military alliance treaties and so forth. According to the fifth Japanese 5-year defense plan, it was estimated that the Japanese Armed Forces would have sufficient bombers, warships and other types of weapons to expand Japan's defensive perimeter to Okinawa and other archipelagos hundreds of kilometers away from the Japanese archipelago.

According to U.S. estimates, in 1980 Japan will have the third strongest navy in all of Asia and a sufficient number of ships to transport a fairly large number of infantrymen to other battlefields in Asia. Japan has now assumed the responsibility for defending the U.S. bases on Japanese soil in Okinawa with its navy and air force, and Japan has also participated in the joint network for the defense of Japan and South Korea, according to the September issue of the French paper LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE.

According to Western newspapers, the present U.S. Far East strategy obviously can only rely on the remaining U.S. forces in northeast Asia, which are worth mentioning. However, these forces themselves are also being eroded, because the consolidation of the defense line in northeast Asia is linked with the U.S. strategic withdrawal caused by serious U.S. setbacks in Vietnam. Moreover, many Americans are apprehensive because of the presence of U.S. armed forces in South Korea. These Americans believe that these armed forces not only will not be a deterrent, but that should a war break out the United States will be automatically involved in another ground war in Asia.

What is most important is that the struggle of tens of millions of Korean and Japanese people to demand the tearing up of the U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-South Korean military alliance treaties, the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops and the dissolution of the UN Command in South Korea, and the dismantling of U.S. nuclear bases on Japanese soil has been conducted fiercely and continuously. This struggle, which has been supported by all progressive mankind, continuously attacks the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, driving them into a seriously passive position. All this, coupled with bipartite or tripartite internal contradictions between the United States, Japan and South Korea and with many difficulties caused by the economic recession, is placing the northeast Asian defense line in a seriously threatened position.

Driven away from the Indochinese countries and losing its important foothold on Southeast Asia at a time when its remaining bases were in a shaky position and its northeast Asian defense line was not really strong, the United States had to pull back to build a reserve defense line right on the mid-Pacific islands of the U.S. trust territories. Analyzing this U.S. military policy, the document says:

According to a number of U.S. strategists, here more than anywhere else are to be found strategic points, military safety, long-term political stability and convenience. Nevertheless, this defense line actually reflects the gradual, step-by-step withdrawal of U.S. forces from Asia to take up a lower profile, meaning that the remaining U.S. forces are deployed in less conspicuous positions, wrote the ASIA magazine on 15 June 1975.

These bases serve as logistical support and a communications transit point for the U.S. forces stationed in the areas bordering continental Asia, a base for U.S. warships to maintain their constant presence in the Pacific and a complex of storage facilities from which materials are supplied to the U.S.-lackey forces in the Pacific. They are also places where electronic spying and radio communications stations are set up, where nuclear and conventional weapons are stored, and where U.S. warships and aircraft can make stopovers for rest and servicing. Scattered over an area measuring 80 million square kilometers of ocean, these bases also serve as stations from which to control the strategic sea lines in Asia. The Pentagon has planned that the important strategic area of the Pacific basin will enable the United States to exert its influence on all countries whose economic existence depends on the import of grain, food, fuel or strategic raw material by sea--that is, all countries in continental Asia (LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, September 1975). The United States hopes that along with bases housing missile submarines and bases in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines, these bases will reinforce U.S. offensive strength, weaken the resilience of all people's wars and reassure U.S. - allied countries.

Of this network of bases, Hawaii--the only base which is in a U.S. state--is considered an important factor for the U.S. defense strategy in the Pacific. Stationed here are 42,000 U.S. troops and 20,000 national defense workers. The 25th Infantry Division is here. Seaports and runways are always busy with military activities. The U.S. Marine Corps has a standing force ready for action in case of an emergency.

Farther to the west is Guam, a U.S. territory since 1898, which lies about 1,500 KM east of Saigon. Along with other bases on nearby islands under U.S. possession in the Micronesian archipelago, Guam will be a key point in future U.S. military plans to invade Asia. Anderson air force base on this island was the staging point of strategic B-52 aircraft during the war of aggression against Vietnam. Since 1970 Guam has become a primary communications base in the Pacific, which coordinates all military messages from Japan, Indochina, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia. There are at least four stockpiles of nuclear weapons and a base for missile submarines on this island. Stationed here now are 12,000 U.S. servicemen, including 7,000 from the navy and 5,000 from the air force.

At a distance of approximately 70 kilometers north of Guam lies Tinian, one of the 13 large islands forming the Marianas archipelago. During World War II, this island was the staging base from which the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were launched. At present the United States is planning to spend \$300 million to turn this island with a population of 1,000, which is more than 200 km long and lies about 1,000 km east of Japan, into a large joint naval and air base, a forward logistics base, an ammunition dump and a landing exercise base for the U.S. Marines. The U.S. press has also revealed that in the future there will be 13,000 U.S. troops and a still undisclosed force of foreign workers stationed here. [passage indistinct] and the attitude of the U.S. Congress is to resolutely oppose all expenditures aimed at building new bases abroad. Therefore, the U.S. authorities cannot develop their plan in a (complete) manner.

Thus, judging from U.S. military activities in Asia and the Pacific after the Vietnam defeat, we can see that U.S. imperialism, though already forced to accept a strategic withdrawal from Indochina, is still trying by every means to continue its international gendarme role in Asia and the Pacific and to stubbornly maintain its counterrevolutionary global strategy against the world peoples.

18 Mar 76

K 7

NORTH VIETNAM

However, entering the post-Vietnam period, the United States' means for attaining the objectives--chiefly its military and economic strength--have been seriously weakened and are on a constant decline.

The contradiction between the unlimited ambition of the United States and its limited capabilities and ever-weakening strength in the post-Vietnam period is unsolvable. The peoples of the Southeast Asian and Asian countries have been and are closely following the dark schemes and actions of U.S. imperialism, and they are determined to struggle to defeat the U.S. neocolonialist policy of aggression in this area.

RADIO VERSION OF ARTICLE ON U.S.-PHILIPPINE EXERCISE

Hanoi in Vietnamese to Vietnam 0900 GMT 17 Mar 76 BK

[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 17 March article on U.S.-Philippine joint naval exercise]

[Text] According to sources from Manila, the Philippine and U.S. naval forces are conducting a 7-day exercise from 15 to 22 March around the Subic naval base in the sea northwest of Manila. This is a fairly large-scale exercise which follows a series of previous naval exercises jointly carried out between the United States and Japan and among the United States, Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific after the U.S. defeat in Vietnam.

The Philippines is an archipelago flanking Southeast Asia. It plays the role of a floating forward base in Asia and the Pacific and controls all the international maritime routes leading to the Middle East, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The Philippine archipelago is very rich in natural resources, especially gold, silver, copper, tin and phosphate, and is also the source of various valuable agricultural products such as coffee, cocoa, coconut, pineapple, banana and sugarcane. As far as U.S. strategies in Asia and the Pacific are concerned, the military bases in the Philippines are no less important to the United States than those in Japan. Gayler, the commander-in-chief of the U.S. forces in the Pacific, observed that since the strategic position of the Philippines dominates the sea and air routes leading to South Asia and the Indian Ocean, the U.S. military bases in this country are of life-and-death importance to the United States.

Controlled and turned into a colony by the United States in 1898 and then granted independence in 1946, the Philippines still maintains close relations with the United States. In 1947, according to a 99-year pact which was revised in 1959, the Philippines allowed the United States the right to use 23 military bases on its territory. It is a member of the aggressive Southeast Asian bloc--SEATO--founded by the United States and is also a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations--ASEAN. The Marcos administration has allowed the United States to build and use many military bases on Philippine territory for war purposes, especially during the war of aggression against Vietnam, and dispatched a mercenary force to Vietnam to oppose the just resistance of our people. During the war, there were 18,000 U.S. troops and 17 U.S. military bases on Philippine territory.

At present the numbers of U.S. troops and military bases have been reduced, but the relations between the United States and the Philippines remain basically unchanged. For although the Philippines has just revised its relations with the United States, it has yet to free itself from U.S. shackles.

Following its defeat in Indochina, the stature of the United States has shrunk and many U.S. military bases in Southeast Asia have been eliminated. To patch up its defense line in Southeast Asia with a view to consolidating its global strategic position and checking the vigorous upsurge of the revolutionary movement of the Asian and Pacific peoples, the United States has planned to pull back and hold a strategic line formed by the various island countries in this area, including Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines--using the Philippines and Indonesia as springboards to oppose and sabotage the revolutions. Along with giving economic aid in exchange for the maintenance of its troops and military bases in this area, the United States has continued to provide military aid for and breathe life into its local henchmen to turn them into tools for repressing revolutions and causing regional disturbances.

At present the United States has about 16,000 combat troops in the Philippines stationed in six large and small military bases, including two big strategic military bases, Subic Bay naval base and Clark air force base--manned by the 13th Air Force. According to U.S. calculations, the U.S. Air Force units, if forced to withdraw from Thailand, would be sent to reinforce Clark air force base. Subic Bay naval base, located 80 km northwest of Manila, is a large U.S. base capable of receiving 110 warships in transit each month and of stockpiling about 95,000 tons of ammunition. This is an important and irreplaceable military base for the U.S. Navy to operate in the Pacific. The Ford administration is now trying to pressure the Philippine authorities so it can perpetuate the maintenance of these military bases in the Philippines. This was already agreed upon between Marcos and Ford during the former's official visit to the United States in December 1975. Furthermore, the United States also maintains 1,700 tactical nuclear weapons in the Philippines and some other countries in this area.

The 7-day joint exercise of the U.S. and Philippine naval forces in Subic Bay from 15 to 22 March and the previous naval exercises involving the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand are all part of the U.S. plan to deploy and assemble forces to cope with the mounting national liberation movement in Southeast Asia. Although the aggressive SEATO bloc has been declared dead, the United States is still trying to build a strong position through bipartite treaties and to consolidate its naval defense line on sea islands in continuing its aggressive and war mongering designs in Asia and the Pacific. The United States has great ambitions, but its position and strength have obviously declined. The more it tries to intensify its intervention and aggression in Southeast Asia, the heavier defeats it will court.