

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LAS

COMBAT OPERATIONS RESEARCH GROUP



AD
CORG-M-353
USACDC Control No.

CORG MEMORANDUM
CORGM-353

C0071640


A REVIEW OF THE MILITARY DOG PROGRAM (U)

CLASSIFIED BY
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1974.

UNCLASSIFIED
REGRADED BY AUTHORITY
OF DDO DIR S200.112
BY KMETS ON 26 Aug 85

Allen K. McIntosh
Coke L. Westbrook

June 1968



In addition to security requirements which must be met, this document is subject to special export controls and each transmittal to foreign governments or foreign nationals may be made only with prior approval of Headquarters, United States Army Combat Developments Command.

Prepared by
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS, INCORPORATED
COMBAT OPERATIONS RESEARCH GROUP
under
DA CONTRACT NO. DAAG-05-67-C-0547
for
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.	GROUP 4 Downgraded At 3 Year Intervals: Declassified After 12 Years.	Special Handling Required Not Releasable To Foreign Nationals By Authority Of CG USACDC 1 June 1968
--	--	--

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy ___ of ___ Copies

CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
SUMMARY	vii
INTRODUCTION	1
PROCUREMENT	3
Procurement Organization and Management	3
Availability and Cost	4
Possible Improvements in Procurement	8
SENTRY DOG PROBLEM	10
Background	10
Organization	10
Concepts and Doctrine	11
Personnel and Training	14
Deployment and Utilization	15
Current Status of Sentry Dog Program	17
Program Problems	18
SCOUT DOG PROGRAM	22
Background	22
Organization	23
Concept and Doctrine	26
Personnel and Training	27
Deployment and Utilization	29
Current Status of Program	29
Program Problems	31
TRACKER DOG PROGRAM	33
Background	33
Organization	35
Doctrine and Utilization	36
Personnel and Training	40
Current Status of Program	41
Program Problems	42
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS	43
Background	43
Off-Leash Scout Dog Program	43
Mine and Tunnel Dog Program	47

CONTENTS (continued)

	Page
Breeding Development Program	49
Dogs for the Detection of Nuclear and X-Radiation	49
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	50
Conclusions	50
Recommendations	54
APPENDIXES	
A. Task Assignment	58
B. Brief Historical Background on Military Dogs	60
C. Doctrinal Guidance for US Army Scout Dog Program	67
D. Guidance for Deployment and Utilization of US Army Scout Dogs	70
E. Tracking Guidance for US Army Combat Tracker Program	76
F. Off-Leash Scout Dog Training Guide	78
G. Australian Tracking Guidance	88
H. British Visual Tracker Instruction Course	99
I. British Combat Tracker Team Three-Week Instruction Course	113
J. Physical Training Program for British Visual Tracker and Combat Tracker Team Courses	119
K. War Dog Notes for Combat Tracker Teams	121
L. Hand and Arm Signals for Combat Tracker Teams	125
LITERATURE CITED	126
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	127
TABLES	
I. Dogs Procured and Donated for the Years 1961 to 1968	5
II. Cost Breakdown of Dogs Purchased for FY 1961 to 1966	6
III. Sentry Dog Program (Third Quarter FY68	17
IV. Divisional Assignments of Scout Dog Platoons	30
V. Army Scout Dog Program	30
VI. Combat Tracker Units in Vietnam	42
VII. Summary of World War II Army Dog Program	64
VIII. Training Schedule	79
IX. Authorized Hand and Arm Signals	125

CONTENTS (concluded)

	Page
FIGURES	
1. Field Manual Doctrine on Sentry Dogs	13
2. Field Manual (FM 19-30) Guidance on Sentry Dog Utilization	16
3. Field Manual (FM 20-20) Guidance on Sentry Dog Utilization	16
4. Infiltration of Hostile Lines.	71
5. Deployment of Scout Dog Team on Ambush and/or Outpost Sites	72
6. Search Operations; Villages, Hamlets	73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNCLASSIFIED

A REVIEW OF THE MILITARY DOG PROGRAM (U)

INTRODUCTION

(U) Under the Advisory Program for Vietnam a requirement developed for scout dog platoons to serve with the Vietnamese Army. To meet this need US Army dog trainers were sent to Vietnam where they trained five scout dog platoons and about fifteen sentry dog platoons. US Army scout dog platoons were brought back into the Army as the result of a Joint Chiefs of Staff decision in 1965. These platoons were to be trained under the ENSURE program for Vietnam.

(U) Today the US Army is using a large number of tactical and non-tactical dogs in Vietnam. These dogs, numbering close to 1000 are providing excellent support for a wide range of military tasks. However, the dogs and personnel that are associated with their training, deployment, and utilization are a product of a system that lacks adequate centralization, coordination, interest, and support. As a result of this situation, this study is being conducted to determine the current status of the various Army dog programs. In addition, the study was directed toward determining the status of Army doctrine pertaining to the use of dogs for military purposes. A final goal of the study effort was to establish the amount of research needed to develop and justify a balanced and responsive Army program for dogs.

(U) This mission obviously covers many areas of interest. The main body of this report presents information on the sentry, scout, and tracker dog programs, including procurement, requirements, and training for the various programs; doctrinal information supporting the various programs; the current problems of each program; and the organizational characteristics of each program. Research and development efforts extending or developing new uses of dogs are described. The conclusions present the findings of this investigative effort and identify the needs of the dog program. The recommendations section includes a study and data collection program designed to provide the basis for meeting the program needs. The appendixes

UNCLASSIFIED
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 3

describe the history of the use of military dogs, the available field manual guidance on utilization of sentry and scout dogs, and information from British and Australian sources on the tracker-dog training programs and utilization.

PROCUREMENT

Procurement Organization and Management

(U) The implementation of the Department of Defense Instruction 4115.1 of June 1964 and amended by Change 1, dated 12 October 1964, transferred the responsibility for procurement of "live animals not raised for food" from the Army Quartermaster Corps to the Air Force Air Training Command at Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas. The Air Force, in addition to procuring dogs for the Army within CONUS, also handles the procurement of dogs in Europe and the Far East.

(U) In accordance with AR 715-31 (AFR 70-12) all operational aspects of the responsibilities assigned to the Air Force are performed under the staff supervision of the Commander, Air Training Command. Sentry/scout dog procurement is accomplished by the Commander, Lackland AFB who:

- Procures sentry/scout dogs.
- Accomplishes central accounting and disposition functions.
- Assigns an ear brand number for each dog.
- Maintains a dog register.
- Prepares dog record cards.
- Maintains records of separation.
- Receives through the Commander, Air Training Command, and processes through the same channels, all correspondence, questions, inquiries, and requests of a policy nature submitted by sellers and by installations and activities of the Federal Government relevant to dog procurement and supply management matters.

(U) The present physical facilities at Lackland AFB are such that a maximum of about 450 dogs can be accommodated at any one time. Additional kennels are now under construction and still more are in the planning stage. When planned construction is finished, the center will be able to handle 700 to 800 dogs.

(U) Procedures to be followed by the Army in obtaining dogs from the Air Force are outlined in AR 715-31 (Procurement-Sentry/Scout Dogs) and AR 190-12 (Military Police-Sentry Dogs). AR 715-31 is a joint regulation (AFR 70-12) and is concerned primarily with Air Force responsibilities and administrative details. AR 190-12 defines Army procurement procedures as follows:

Sentry Dog team requirements will be staffed through appropriate command channels for approval. Upon receipt of the approved program, requisitions for animals will be processed in accordance with AR 715-31. Simultaneous requests for handler personnel will be submitted through personnel channels.

(U) In practice, sentry dog requirements of using units are submitted to major command headquarters for approval. If initial authorization is involved, approval is secured from the Physical Security Branch of the Provost Marshal's Office. When requirements are approved, a requisition is forwarded to the USA Mobility Equipment Command in St. Louis. Scout Dog requirements are forwarded to MECOM through USCONARC.

(U) The Mobility Equipment Command acts as the middle man between the Army and the Air Force. When a requisition is received at MECOM, they make up a military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (DD Form 448) and forward it to the Procurement Officer at Lackland Air Force Base. After the dogs are shipped from Lackland to the using unit, MECOM is billed for the dogs, supplies, equipment, medical examinations, food, and transportation (if commercial carrier is used). MECOM, in return, cites OMA funds to the Air Force and is reimbursed by AMC.

(U) AR 715-31 provided for modification of acceptable standards in times of emergency when large numbers of dogs were needed. This had been put into effect on at least one occasion in the past. The modification (dog height and weight) was for some reason rescinded in a short time and a good bit of confusion resulted. The lesson learned from this experience was that a general revision of acceptance standards is very difficult to bring about on anything other than a permanent basis. Standards can be and are slipped slightly on an informal basis.

(U) The same specifications apply to prospective scout and sentry dogs. In practice, the requirements may be eased somewhat for scout dog candidates, as a smaller, less aggressive dog is considered well suited for this type of training. Dogs are selected for scout training during the initial screening process. They are shipped to Fort Benning, with the understanding that if they don't work out, they may be returned within 90 days and replaced at no additional cost to the Army.

(U) Section A, paragraph 6, of AR 715-31 states

...if an Air Force activity has a request for other than sentry/scout dogs, the request with specifications will be sent to HQ, USAF. Activities outside the Air Force will send their requests with specifications to the Contracting Officer, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, 78236.

(U) The personnel at Lackland interpret this to mean German Shepherds to be trained for other than scout or sentry duty. They have no plans at this time to procure any dogs other than German Shepherds.

Availability and Cost

(U) The number of dogs programmed for procurement during fiscal 1968 is 3510. All these need not be new acquisitions; requirements for new dog procurement are reduced to the extent that excesses develop among users in the field and are returned to Lackland. The total number of dogs required has increased markedly over the past two years. A breakdown of

the number of dogs procured by or donated to the Army and Air Force for CONUS, Okinawa, Korea, and Vietnam is shown in Table I.

TABLE I (U). DOGS PROCURED AND DONATED
FOR THE YEARS 1961 to 1968

Fiscal Year	Number of Dogs Procured	Number of Dogs Donated	Total Number of Dogs Available
1961	173	0	173
1962	585	12	597
1963	524	92	616
1964	407	0	407
1965	312	40	352
1966	761	290	1,051
1967	-	-	2,827
1968	-	-	3,510 (programmed)

(U) A breakdown of the costs involved in procuring dogs is found in Table II. Cost data for FY 1966 to 1968 is generally lacking. The actual purchase price of the dogs is \$10 to \$20 less than the \$125 that the Army pays the Air Force for each dog, since the Air Force charges include overhead expenses. Rejection rates range between one-third and one-half the total number of dogs examined by the Air Force.

(U) It has become increasingly difficult to obtain the required numbers of military dogs through normal procurement activities. Two possible reasons for this are: first, there are only a limited number of dogs available that can meet the high standards established for military service, and increased quotas have brought the procurement activity to a point of diminishing returns; and second, competition for available dogs is increasing as more dogs are being used by local law enforcement agencies and private security concerns.

(U) The Air Force has so far managed to meet its assigned quotas; to do so, however, it has been necessary to send "recruiting teams" into the field to buy dogs. These teams consist of a team leader, procurement officer, veterinarian and assistants, dog trainers and handlers, and a transportation officer-- altogether around 12 men. The team moves into an area, usually making its headquarters at a local military installation, and makes its presence known by means of local news media. Prospective donors or sellers can then bring their dogs for an examination, which is conducted on the spot.

(U) The decision to purchase or reject a dog is made immediately so that the owner does not have to wait to see if the dog is acceptable. This program has proved successful. The public seems to react favorably to the elimination of the long waiting period and red tape that characterize

TABLE II (U). COST BREAKDOWN OF DOGS PURCHASED FOR FY 1961 to 1966

	FY 1961			FY 1962			FY 1963			FY 1964			FY 1965			FY 1966		
	USAF	Army	Total															
Purchase Contracts	105	68	173	364	221	585	364	160	524	299	108	407	191	121	312	288	473	761
Total Purchase Price	\$10,030	\$7,871	\$17,901	\$41,636	\$23,231	\$64,867	\$40,436	\$16,776	\$57,212	\$35,316	\$12,582	\$47,898	\$23,044	\$14,321	\$37,365	\$32,893	\$54,123	\$87,016
Average Purchase Price	\$95.32	\$115.75		\$114.38	\$105.11		\$111.08	\$104.85		\$118.11	\$116.50		\$120.64	\$118.35		\$114.21	\$114.42	
Transportation Costs (Accepted Dogs)	\$5,580	\$1,202	\$8,788	\$19,805	\$11,990	\$31,795	\$21,371	\$7,949	\$29,989	\$15,989	\$5,653	\$21,642	\$10,862	\$7,299	\$18,161			
Average Transportation Costs (Accepted Dogs)	\$53.14	\$47.06		\$54.40	\$54.25		\$58.56	\$49.68		\$53.47	\$52.34		\$56.86	\$60.32				
Transportation Costs (Rejected Dogs)			\$7,086			\$23,041						\$27,836			\$25,716			
Number of Dogs Rejected			81			291			392			373			273			648
Percent of Dogs Rejected			31.9			33.2			42.8			47.8			39.9			46.0

(U) The going price for a sentry/ scout dog is \$150.00, although this is not an absolute maximum since the Air Force can (and sometime does) pay more for a good prospect. As a rule, the price offered (\$150.00) is not a point of contention. Some people will hold out for more money but this does not happen very often. There does not seem to be any clearcut relationship between the price of dogs offered for sale on the market and their desirability for military service. In other words, those qualities which cause a particular animal to command a higher price on the open market are not demonstrably valuable to the military.

(U) The Air Force charges the Army \$125.00 each for scout or sentry dogs. This is an average price based on experience over a period of several years. It takes into consideration dogs donated to the Air Force as well as those purchased, so the average price of \$125.00 is actually below the normal price of \$150.00 paid for a dog by the Air Force. The cost of medical exams averages \$22.00, and the Army is billed for this amount. Food costs are 49¢ per dog per day. Transportation costs vary, depending on the destination of the dog. The Army is billed only for transportation from Lackland and then only if military transportation is unavailable. No charge is made to the Army for initial transportation to Lackland nor does the Army assume a pro-rata share of the cost of returning rejected animals to their owners. Whenever a MIPR is sent to Lackland, an estimated unit price for that particular order of dogs is included. This unit price includes the Army's \$125.00 purchase price per dog, medical expenses, food, transportation. As an example, the unit price averages \$800.00 for dogs sent to Vietnam, \$500.00 to Alaska, and \$370.00 to Fort Benning. Initial billing is based on this estimated price and at the end of the accounting period, a review of actual expenses is made and any other payment is adjusted. There is usually a refund due the Army because of the availability of military transportation in many cases.

Possible Improvements in Procurement

(U) The Army is concerned about the present procurement system primarily because it doubts the Air Force's ability to provide sufficient numbers of dogs to support the sentry and scout dog programs on a continuing basis. Requirements have increased markedly over the past two years, and it appears that they will continue to increase for the foreseeable future. The present procurement system has been taxed by these increases and it has been necessary to take extraordinary measures to meet quotas, but quotas have been met and there is no indication that they will not continue to be met.

(U) The alternative to the present system would be for the Army to assume a part or all of the responsibility for procuring their own dogs. This would mean duplication of facilities unless the Army were willing to assume responsibility for the entire procurement program, in which case the Army would face the same problems the Air Force now has. There does not seem to be any reason to assume that the Army would be more successful at obtaining dogs than the Air Force, particularly since the Air Force has several years experience with dog procurement, whereas the Army would be starting from scratch.

(U) It seems clearly more economical for the Army to continue the present system. To build up a procurement capability would involve investment in kennel space, medical examination facilities, shipping crates, advertising, and personnel. All these are now provided by the Air Force at no cost to the Army. It is difficult to see how the Army could procure and maintain their own dogs for anything less than what they pay the Air Force for them.

(U) All things considered, it would be to the Army's advantage to continue the present procurement arrangement.

SENTRY DOG PROGRAM

Sentry Dog - A German Shepherd trained to assist in providing tactical or non-tactical security in and about fixed installations; a powerful psychological deterrent against intruders and attack; a highly aggressive animal able to work either on- or off-leash, controlled at all times by a skilled handler; part of a physical security element. (Author's definition).

Background

(U) The use of a dog as a sentry or guard probably goes back to the early periods of man's history when man trained wild dogs for domestic purposes. During the Middle Ages dogs were used as guard dogs for the armies of the day, as well as for the local populace. In 1798, Napoleon, in his military campaigns in Egypt, suggested that dogs be used to guard the walls, warn of approaching intruders and, if attacked, form the first line of resistance. A historical review of military dogs from World War I to the Vietnam war is given in Appendix B.

(U) Today, the Air Force trains all Army sentry dogs for CONUS at Lackland; since August 1967 the Air Force has assumed the responsibility of training Army sentry dogs for Europe at Wiesbaden, Germany. The Air Force has assumed a large portion of the Army's sentry dog training under their official Sentry Dog Program, which was established to meet the widespread demand for sentry dogs and the anticipated increase in future requirements. The Army trains its sentry dogs for operations in Vietnam at the USARPAC Sentry Dog School at Okinawa. Requirements for sentry dogs in Korea are met by the Eighth Army Sentry Dog School at Seoul, Korea. These are the only two locations that the Army operates for the training of sentry dogs and dog handlers.

(U) The following sections will cover the current Army Sentry Dog Program. The contributions that the Air Force makes to this program will be mentioned only to the extent that it will clarify the Army's activity with sentry dogs.

Organization

(U) The Department of the Army Sentry Dog Program is monitored by the Provost Marshall General (OPMG). The Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, working in coordination with the OPMG and the Surgeon General

...is responsible for the approval of all new requirements involving the use of sentry dogs throughout Continental United States and for special requirements originating

outside CONUS. . . The Department of the Air Force Air Training Command is responsible for the procurement and training of sentry dogs in CONUS (Ref 1, p 1).

However, in those overseas areas where Air Force support is not available (Okinawa and Korea), the major Army command is responsible for the training of sentry dogs to meet command needs, although the procurement of sentry dogs for these areas is handled by the Air Force. In Europe, the Army's procurement and training requirement for sentry dogs is now being met by the USAFE Sentry Dog Center at Wiesbaden, Germany. This Air Force dog training facility is organized under the 7100th Security Police Squadron, 7101st Air Base Wing.

(U) Within CONUS, Army sentry dog teams, each team composed of dogs and two dog handlers, are normally part of those TOE units that require this form of physical security element. For example, TOE 44-537G, Air Defense Artillery Battery, Nike-Hercules, has four sentry dogs and dog handlers integrated into its organizational structure. In addition to those sentry dog teams that are organic to other TOE elements, there are three STRAF Military Police Physical Security Companies (TOE 91-97G), each of which has a handler-sentry dog section.

(U) Supporting current Army operations in Vietnam are the 212th and the 981st Military Police Companies (Sentry Dog) (TOE 19-500E) organized under the 19th Military Police Brigade. The 212th Military Police Company (SD) has three operational platoons covering, as its tactical area of responsibility, Third and Fourth Corps areas of Vietnam. The 981st Military Police Company (SD) covers the Second Corps areas in Vietnam with four operational platoons.

(U) Each of these companies has dismounted patrol dog teams; according to TOE 19-500E each team has two dogs and two handlers. However, to meet the requirements in Vietnam, this team concept is not being followed. Instead, a dismounted patrol dog team is the total number of dogs and handler personnel at a particular using site. The number of dogs and handler personnel making up these teams will vary from four dogs and handlers (which is the minimum number that can be supported efficiently) to ten or more dogs and handlers, an estimated minimum number that can provide efficient physical security. Currently, the 212th has seven of these teams and the 981st has eleven. In addition to supporting its own eleven teams, the 981st supports, in a limited administrative manner, the 97th Artillery Group, Air Defense which has its own in-house sentry dog capability.

Concepts and Doctrine

(U) The official Army literature on sentry dogs is primarily contained in FM 20-20, Military Dog Training and Employment and FM 19-30, Physical Security. Another manual with limited information on sentry dogs is FM 31-16, Counter-Guerrilla Operations. In addition to these manuals, the Air Force has AF Manual 125-5, USAF Sentry Dog Program.

Of the three Army Field Manuals, FM 19-30 provides the most detail on those informational areas that can be identified as relating to concepts and doctrine. The abstracted paragraphs, shown in Figure 1, represent most of the conceptual and doctrinal information currently available on sentry dogs.

(U) Doctrinal information that appears in the other Army Field Manuals (FM 20-20 and FM 31-16) is practically the same as that provided above in Figure 1. The Air Force Manual 125-5 also contains doctrinal information similar to that found in FM 19-30.

(U) The above doctrinal information on sentry dogs is, generally speaking, adequate for physical security operations within CONUS and for other parts of the world that are not experiencing armed conflict and tension. However, the experience that is being gained by the Military Police sentry dog teams in Vietnam is of such a nature that important contributions would be made to the doctrinal literature if this experience would be reduced to meaningful concepts and techniques. For example, information from Vietnam indicates that site commanders need guidance in determining and evaluating their requirements for the use of sentry dogs to augment their physical security programs. Guidance is needed on the best techniques for integrating sentry dog teams into the using combat units to achieve maximum support from the sentry, as an economy of force measure, in search and seizure operations now being experimented with in Vietnam. If this tactically oriented mission for sentry dogs is successful, it should be incorporated in the doctrinal literature before the knowledge is lost. Other areas where doctrinal guidance is needed is in the tactical formations appropriate for perimeter security in low-intensity conflict environments, town and village curfew patrols, the use of sentry dogs in urban warfare, and highway and railroad convoy physical security operations.

(U) The above details, obtained from discussions with military police personnel in Southeast Asia, bring out the point that it is important, from a doctrinal point of view, to distinguish between the tactical and non-tactical employment of sentry dogs. This is especially the case in low-intensity conflicts where a military police unit with a sentry dog capability is assigned a tactical area of responsibility. This immediately brings forth an entirely different set of problems than those encountered in non-tactical operations. Instead of providing physical security against the thieves, saboteurs, and espionage agents that are present in a noncombat environment, the sentry dog teams are now working against highly trained and well armed guerrillas, many of them members of suicide squads determined to reach their objective. This changes the concept of utilization of sentry dogs, in that all operations must be conducted in a tactical environment and must reflect tactical considerations, methods, and techniques. Commanders, whether they be with military police units or at sites having sentry dog teams, need more detailed tactical guidance to help them plan and conduct physical operations in a highly effective manner. Anything less than this could mean site penetration and possible disaster.

General

"The requirements for physical protection of installations within the United States and overseas theater of operations continues to increase yet the manpower available for this purpose has always been, and probably will continue to be, limited. The sentry dog, properly trained and properly utilized, can be a great asset to the physical security program of any installation.

The Sentry Dog

a. "The mission of the sentry dog is to detect intruders, alert his handler, and when necessary, pursue, attack, and hold any intruder who tries to escape. Normally, the dog has done his job by detecting the intruder and alerting the handler who is then responsible for taking appropriate action.

b. "The sentry dog and the handler work as a team. Since the outstanding qualifications of the sentry dog for guard type duties are his keen sense of hearing and smell, he is used to most advantage during the hours of darkness or poor visibility when the guard's vision is restricted. Because of the added perception of the handler-dog patrol, guard posts can often be lengthened without sacrificing coverage. (FM 20-20, Military Dog Training and Employment, presents detailed discussion on types of dogs, i. e., scout dog, sentry dog; their desirable characteristics; traits and care of military dogs; basic training; and specialized training.)

Selection of Posts

The sentry dog is a very versatile animal, however, he does have some limitations with respect to type of assignment. The odor of petroleum products decreases the effectiveness of his smelling. Noise is a definite limitation, as it decreases his sense of hearing. Activity near a sentry dog post is also another limitation, as it tends to distract the dog.

Advantages of the Use of Sentry Dogs

There are some definite advantages to incorporating the use of sentry dogs in an installation physical security plan to supplement the military or civilian guard force. Some of these advantages are:

- a. The presence of sentry dogs provide a very strong psychological deterrent to intruders.
- b. The use of dogs is beneficial where guard forces have been reduced.
- c. The dog's keen sense of smell and hearing enable him to detect the presence of danger and to alert the guard.
- d. Safety is a consideration. There is less chance of a fatality through the release of a dog than through firing a weapon at an intruder.
- e. The dog's ability to apprehend intruders during hours of darkness is a definite advantage.
- f. A dog is more effective during inclement weather than a guard. This type of weather offers ideal conditions for illegal entry.

Disadvantages of the Use of Sentry Dogs

a. There are problems inherent in the use of sentry dogs. Attrition and turnover of personnel trained as handlers reduces the efficiency of the dog program. Other problems include

- (1) A break-in period is necessary to facilitate man and dog working as a team. This results in many nonproductive hours
- (2) The type of dog best suited for security work is naturally dangerous. Care must be taken that innocent persons are not hurt by the dogs.
- (3) Kennels and training areas must be isolated and kept off-limits to unauthorized persons. Signs should be posted warning of the presence of sentry dogs.
- (4) Care and maintenance of sentry dogs must be considered in manpower requirements. To maintain the physical fitness required of sentry dogs, periodic services of a veterinarian are necessary. This often poses a problem at small or isolated installations. Special facilities are required for the care and training of sentry dogs, which adds to the initial expense of adding dogs to the security program.
- (5) The selection and training of handler personnel has been a problem area. The qualities of a handler dictate, to a great extent, the effectiveness of the sentry dog. Volunteers and personnel who like and understand dogs are not always available as handlers. There will be some morale problem among the handlers as most of the work is at night and, in addition to guard duty, they are normally required to care for and train their assigned dogs.
- (6) Public relations must be considered when planning for the use of dogs. There is strong feeling on the part of many persons that using dogs for security or police purposes is uncivilized.

b. Although these problem areas must be considered, care should be exercised that the value of the sentry dog, especially in a theater of operations, is not underestimated. Any method of reinforcing available manpower, whether it be weapon, machine, or animal should be carefully appraised. Certainly the capabilities of a guard will increase in scope when augmented by a properly trained sentry dog. The sentry dog, used in conjunction with other physical safeguards, can be invaluable to the commander's physical security program.

Figure 1 (U). Field Manual Doctrine on Sentry Dogs

Personnel and Training

(U) Personnel entering the Army sentry dog program are primarily drawn from military police career fields. Prospective sentry dog handlers should be volunteers who appreciate dogs and who possess reasonable intelligence, dependability, resourcefulness, and patience.

(U) The CONUS requirements for Army sentry dog handlers are established by the Army Air Defense Command. To meet the requirements, personnel are taken from two sources: volunteers from units having sentry dog handlers organic to their TOE, and volunteers from the military police Advanced Individual Training (AIT) course at Fort Gordon, Georgia. In both instances, the personnel entering the program are sent to Lackland Air Force Base, where they are assigned a sentry dog (German Shepherd) and put through an eight-week dog-handler training program.

(U) Sentry dog handler requirements for Southeast Asia are currently being met by personnel volunteering from the military police AIT course at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Before being sent to Vietnam, the prospective sentry dog handler attends a one-week orientation course at the Military Police School and then goes to the USARPAC Sentry Dog School in Okinawa. Here the student receives either a dog that has been returned from Vietnam for retraining or an untrained dog as his assigned dog for the period he will be a sentry dog handler. The training program at Okinawa is six weeks long. Upon completion of the program the handler and his dog are sent to Vietnam for a regular tour of duty.

(U) In Korea, Army sentry dog handler requirements are satisfied by Eighth Army. Volunteer personnel, taken from units using sentry dogs, are sent to the Eighth Army Sentry Dog School at Seoul (which is operated by the 820th Military Police Platoon) for a four-week training program. At the school the student dog handler is assigned his dog, which may be an untrained dog, a dog being retrained, or a dog that was sent from Okinawa to Korea for retraining and utilization in Korea.

(U) The Army's sentry dog handler requirements for Europe are being met by volunteers from those units that have sentry dogs organic to their TOE. These volunteers are sent to the USAFE Sentry Dog Center at Wiesbaden, Germany, where they each receive a dog, either untrained or being retrained, and then a six-week training program.

(U) All dogs needed to support the Army's sentry dog program are procured by the Air Force. The procurement officer at Lackland Air Force Base handles all of the requirements for CONUS, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Dogs for Army sentry requirements in Europe are procured by the Wiesbaden Air Force Base Procurement Officer.

(U) Special qualification identifiers are authorized for use with any MOS and skill level character to identify special requirements of certain positions and special qualifications of personnel who are capable of filling such positions. The character "D" -- Dog Handler -- is used to identify positions that require assignment of personnel qualified as dog handlers.

This special qualification identifier is awarded upon completion of a training course or as a result of on-the-job training. Authority to award the identifier is defined in AR 600-200, Chapter 2. The special qualification designation remains with the individual so long as the basic MOS is retained, and individuals having the D suffix can be identified by command review of MOS. Those people handling dogs in the military police corps would have a 95 B as their MOS, plus a skill level of 2 or 4, which is followed by the suffix "D."

Deployment and Utilization

(U) A dog that has been assigned to a prospective sentry dog handler at the beginning of the training program stays with the handler until he leaves the sentry dog training program. The close team relationship that develops between the sentry dog and dog handler is necessary for effective operations; the two are never deployed separately. The dog and the dog handler are currently being trained and deployed as teams for CONUS, Europe, Vietnam, and Korea. In CONUS, Air Force-trained Army sentry dog teams are sent from Lackland Air Force Base to major subcommands that use these teams to balance out those TOE units requiring sentry dogs. The same procedure applies for Europe, but the trained Army sentry teams are sent from Wiesbaden Air Force Base. Sentry dogs and handlers graduating from the USARPAC program at Okinawa are sent to Vietnam, where they are attached to either the 212th or 981st Military Police Company (Sentry Dog) for administrative and logistical support. However, these teams are assigned to major subcommands for operational utilization at those sites requiring sentry dogs. In Korea, graduates of the Eighth Army Sentry Dog School are returned to their assigned unit as qualified sentry dog handlers.

(U) Information concerning the utilization of sentry dog teams is found in FM 19-30, Physical Security and FM 20-20, Military Dog Training and Employment. The Air Force Manual 125-5 has additional information on the utilization of sentry dogs. The paragraphs from the two Army Field Manuals, reproduced in Figures 2 and 3, represent practically all the currently available official information on the utilization of sentry dogs.

(U) The war in Vietnam has presented new and challenging problems in the utilization of sentry dog teams. The above information provides the using site commanders with general guidelines on where and how sentry dog teams can be utilized. However, discussions with personnel in Vietnam indicate that this information should be expanded to provide details on how things should be done. Obviously, all situations cannot be covered or explained in a field manual in a manner that would be a "textbook solution" to the numerous field problems. But it is felt that additional information is needed to enable using site commanders to better utilize their resources in providing site physical security. For example, the manual should provide guidance on the number of sentry dogs required as a function of the size of the base camp or type of base camp. Questions involving the utilization of sentry dog teams overlap into the

Utilization of Sentry Dogs

a. For the purpose of this manual, only the sentry dog will be considered. The overall aim of the sentry dog program is to provide commanders with a means of increasing the security of areas against acts of sabotage, espionage, and pilferage.

b. The sentry dog is used principally on interior guard duty as a watchdog. This type of dog is trained to give warning to his handler by growling or barking, or by silent alert. He is habitually worked on leash. The handler, keeping the dog on leash, patrols his post and can depend on the dog to alert him to the approach or presence of strangers in or about the area being protected. When the dog alerts, the handler must be prepared to cope with the situation as circumstances dictate; that is, he must challenge; investigate; keep carefully under cover; or make an apprehension. The dog, being kept on leash and close to the handler, will also assist as a psychological factor in such circumstances. He will attack on command of his handler.

c. Sentry dog posts can be broken down into three types for reference and utilization. These are:

- (1) Perimeter. This type post is along a portion of, or the entire fence line, either inside or outside, which may enclose security areas such as tactical aircraft parking areas, POL storage areas, POL pipeline and pumping stations, remote transmitter sites, guided missile sites, radar sites, special weapons and ammunition storage areas, and depot storage areas.
- (2) Area. This type post is located around a group of buildings, or at such places as launching pads which may be considered critical, but do not justify perimeter posts. These posts are used for security in depth.
- (3) Specific. This type can best be described as that used for buildings such as warehouses.

d. The sentry dog patrol is especially effective in areas of little activity such as isolated perimeters, remote storage areas, pipelines, and open storage areas. The dog also tends to keep the guard on post more alert, give him added self-assurance, and to relieve the ever-present monotony and loneliness of guard duty.

e. In addition to a man and dog walking post, which is the most common and desired method, there are other methods of employment of dogs. Some of these are:

- (1) Sentry dogs may be utilized as warehouse dogs. Dogs may be placed in warehouses at the close of the day, remain throughout the night, and then be taken out of the warehouse the next morning. This eliminates the necessity of having a guard stay with the dog all through the night, only requiring a roving patrol to check on the presence of the dog. The dog will alert the guard force by barking at any attempt by intruders to enter his patrol area.
- (2) Sentry dogs also may be used on cables which may be extended between two buildings or areas. The dog is hooked to this cable and is permitted to run.
- (3) Sentry dogs also may be used between double fenced areas, which are used primarily around exclusion areas. In this situation the dog is allowed to run between a double fenced area which is blocked off every 400-500 yards. The sentry dog will alert the guard if anyone comes near the fence either inside or outside.
- (4) Sentry dogs also may be staked in front of an entrance of a security area and will bark when anyone comes close.
- (5) Sentry dogs also may be used in vehicles. While this method has not been used to any great extent, it has possibilities for guard force applications.

f. The proper utilization of the sentry dog will depend upon the existing situation and the results desired, but normally the handler-dog patrol is the most effective method of employment. Regardless of how the sentry dog is utilized, the mere knowledge by potential intruders that dogs are on duty in the area will have a great psychological effect and often be a deterrent in itself. A vicious dog is often more feared than an armed guard by intruders.

Figure 2 (U). Field Manual (FM 19-30) Guidance on Sentry Dog Utilization

b. The sentry dog can be used to advantage in such critical locations as -

- (1) Airplane dispersal areas.
- (2) Gun emplacement areas.
- (3) Beach patrol areas.
- (4) Ammunition dumps.
- (5) Ration dumps.
- (6) Motor pools.
- (7) Dynamite storage areas.
- (8) Guided missile sites.
- (9) Waterworks.
- (10) Warehouses.

c. The sentry dog is a one-man dog. Each dog is assigned to only one handler for care, training, and duty.

e. There is no need to withdraw sentry dog teams from post during rainy weather. Although a heavy rain

will tend to reduce a dog's effective alerting range, its ability to detect intruders will still exceed that of the handler. No difficulties should be encountered in the employment of sentry dogs in cold climates where temperature fall to 40° F. below zero. The dogs will adjust rapidly to the extreme temperature; however, for peak efficiency in such cold climates, carry out the following special instructions.

- (1) Assign the dogs to their duty sites during the summer months so they can gradually become acclimated before cold weather sets in.
- (2) Cold weather housing for dogs should be unheated and located out-of-doors.
- (3) In extremely cold climates, provide the dogs with boots to protect their pads against ice cuts. Dog boots may be made from canvas or leather.

Figure 3 (U). Field Manual (FM 20-20) Guidance on Sentry Dog Utilization

doctrinal area and because of this, both these areas should be closely examined to take advantage of experience gained during current sentry dog operations in Vietnam.

Current Status of Sentry Dog Program

(U) The total number of personnel involved in the worldwide Army sentry dog program is approximately 2000 with 1910 out of 1913 authorized sentry dogs currently available (Third Quarter FY68) to support these personnel in physical security operations. A breakdown of the authorized number of sentry dogs as opposed to the actual number, according to major command, is provided in Table III.

TABLE III (U). SENTRY DOG PROGRAM
(THIRD QUARTER, FY68)

Command	Authorized	Actual
CONARC	85	28
STRATCOM	15	16
USARDCOM	448	447
USAREUR	190	123
USARPAC	1,139	1,257
USARAL	36	39
Totals	1,913	1,910

(U) The Army sentry dog program is currently experiencing a slow rate of growth, which has brought its force level up to the currently authorized strength of a little over 1900 sentry dogs. The number of dogs available for sentry duty during the Second Quarter FY68 was 1746. This has now grown during the Third Quarter to some 1910 dogs. Constantly changing worldwide requirements will cause the sentry dog force level to fluctuate, but the overall trend is expected to be one of slow growth.

(U) There are several factors that will contribute to this slow growth of the sentry dog program. The reduction of troop force levels in Europe is expected to enlarge the requirements for sentry dog teams, since they will be increasingly relied upon to provide physical security for the equipment reserves held at strategic locations throughout Europe. The increased threat presented by infiltrating elements across the Korean DMZ may bring about a requirement for additional sentry dog teams within Eighth Army. Although the current number of sentry dogs in

Vietnam is expected to remain relatively stable for the next year or so, an increase in troop levels in Vietnam could bring about the need for additional sentry dog capabilities. However, a reduction of force levels in Vietnam could also increase the requirements for sentry dogs, since they would be assuming more of the physical security task for US and South Vietnamese installations. Growth of the sentry dog program will also be influenced by the planned utilization of sentry dog teams for the SENTINEL antimissile-missile air defense system. This system is not expected to be operational until after 1970, but this long-range growth potential together with the more current increased needs, will cause the sentry dog program to grow slowly for the next several years.

Program Problems

(U) The US Army Sentry Dog Program, under the monitorship of the Provost Marshal General, is not experiencing any serious problems at the present time. There are two main reasons for this program's success: First, the program has a central coordination point, the Provost Marshal General; second, much of the training of Army sentry dogs and dog handlers is conducted by the Air Force. Where Air Force training support is available, within CONUS and Europe (the Air Force training facility in Japan is being phased-out), the Army's sentry dog program is greatly simplified. The Air Force, in assuming the responsibility for training Army sentry teams, has also taken on all the problems associated with operating a dog and dog handler training facility.

(U) The situation in Korea and Okinawa, where Air Force training support is not available, is somewhat different. Here, the training of sentry dogs and dog handlers is the responsibility of Eighth Army and USARPAC, respectively. In Korea, several problem areas are worth noting, if these problem areas could be solved, significant contributions would be made to the sentry dog program. However, the problems are not serious and do not require immediate attention, but they should be considered in planning for physical security within the Eighth Army Command.

(U) The most pressing problem at the Eighth Army Sentry Dog School at Seoul is the school facility itself. Discussions with school personnel and on-site observations revealed that the kennels and training areas are too small to meet the needs of the school and the mission for which it is responsible. The kennels are able to accommodate only 27 sentry dogs, which generally restricts the number of students the school is able to handle to 27. The training area immediately adjoins a civilian engineering repair facility that has gradually absorbed the training area, reducing it to a size that is now less than one acre. In addition, this repair facility is a constant source of distraction for the dogs and student personnel.

(U) The length of the program of instruction is the second most significant problem area. The current course length is four weeks, each week consisting of $5\frac{1}{2}$ days. There is a total of twelve courses conducted during the year, with three days intervening between succeeding courses.

Discussions with the school personnel indicated that the four-week course of instruction was not adequate preparation for sentry dogs and dog handlers. It was felt that a six-week course of instruction was necessary to turn out a sentry dog team of a quality comparable to that provided by the USARPAC School in Okinawa. In view of the school's limited facilities and the comparatively high requirements for a continuous supply of trained handlers (there are 530 sentry dogs now in Eighth Army), it appears that the school is conducting the shorter course to provide more courses per year, and enable the school to compensate for the inadequate facilities.

(U) Eighth Army has recognized this facility problem and is now constructing new kennels that will have a 50-dog capacity. However, the kennels will be the only physical improvement, since the training areas at the new school site are more restricted than those currently available. With the expected increase in student capacity to 40, and since about 90 percent of the training is conducted outside the classroom, the training area problems are going to be pressing. There is no additional real estate in the immediate vicinity of the new school site because of the land use by the surrounding indigenous population. The solution to this appears to be the trucking of student handlers and dogs to a training area remote from the school.

(U) Student personnel prerequisites are also a problem. Students attending the school should have an eight-month tour remaining upon completion of the course, according to Eighth Army Regulation 190-23. However, many students have completed the course with less than eight months of tour remaining, some with only five months remaining. This reduces the utilization time of the school graduate and correspondingly decreases the effective period of use of the sentry dog. In addition, the dog's long-term efficiency is greatly reduced by frequent changing of handlers and consequent retraining.

(U) The school needs an in-house program to train its own instructors; the availability of qualified instructors is always a critical problem. The Eighth Army Sentry Dog School has five of the six authorized positions for MOS dog instructors in Korea, and replacements for these positions are extremely difficult to obtain. For example, when the school was visited it was found that three qualified instructors (3/5 of the instructional expertise) were scheduled to leave Korea within 30 days and no qualified instructors were available to take their place. To keep the school at strength, three instructors were being brought in, but they had absolutely no experience in training dogs. These personnel were being counted on to obtain the needed information through on-the-job-training, while at the same time being responsible for the training of others.

(U) There are three additional problem areas in the Eighth Army Sentry Dog Program which are more or less independent of the current school problems. The first of these is the age of the sentry dog population in Korea. At present approximately 30 percent of the sentry dogs are 9 to 12 years old, and a large number of the dogs are from 7 to 9 years old. Dogs this old require much more attention to retain their physical

conditions and proper levels of sentry proficiency. The effectiveness of these dogs, especially the older ones, is questionable.

(U) Korean nationals play a significant role as sentry-dog handlers in the Eighth Army physical security program. As opposed to their US counterparts, many of these Korean nationals possess an exceptional experience with sentry dogs, because many of them have been with their assigned dogs for as long as ten years. However, in spite of this experience, it was observed on several occasions that the aggressiveness and overall physical condition of the dogs belonging to Korean handlers was far below that of US sentry dogs. Approximately 35 percent of the authorized sentry dogs within Eighth Army are handled by Korean nationals. Within the Field Army Support Command (FASCOM), approximately 59 percent of the authorized sentry dogs are handled by Korean nationals. In view of the generally poor condition of the dogs being handled by Korean nationals, the effectiveness of their contribution to the physical security program within Eighth Army can be seriously questioned.

(U) Another general problem area involved deviations from FM 20-20. This complaint of the inadequacy of FM 20-20 was also discussed with the sentry dog personnel on Okinawa. It was the general concensus that FM 20-20 needed revision to incorporate, not only new doctrinal concepts, but new developments and changes in training techniques. For example, FM 20-20 does not differentiate between a "gun-shy" and a "gun-green" dog. Also, a training point that has gained acceptance with the Army sentry dog instructors is the straddle position of putting the muzzle on the dog. FM 20-20 does not illustrate this technique.

(U) The USARPAC Sentry Dog School at Okinawa, which is operated by the 180th Military Police Detachment (Dog Training), had two specific problems. The first problem involved personnel arriving from Fort Gordon for attendance in the six-week handler course. The only people that are supposed to be sent to this course are volunteers, but in actuality those currently attending the course were assigned to this duty upon completion of their training at Fort Gordon. A non-volunteer generates many problems deriving from his lack of interest in the program. The handling of dogs requires interest and patience. People who do not bring these to the program have to be motivated by the program itself (which happens at Okinawa) or they generally wash out and are not graduated from the course.

(U) The second problem involved the physical condition of the dogs returning from Vietnam. They, like humans, have trouble resisting indigenous diseases and it is difficult to keep them healthy. The dogs returned to Okinawa from Vietnam for retraining are in poor condition and it usually takes several weeks to get them back to sufficient health that retraining can be started.

(U) A potential problem area currently exists for the entire Army sentry dog program in the area of training the dogs and handlers by the Air Force. A new concept in dog training is being implemented by the Air Force. This involves the training of a Patrol Dog, which is able to

carry out four or five tasks. This type of training is unacceptable to the Army since it is generally held by many dog experts that a dog should be trained for only one job and be able to do that job well. The animal should not become a "jack of all trades, master of none." If the Air Force decides to begin training all dogs for the Patrol Dog Concept, then the Army may be forced to begin training its own sentry dogs. Until that time, it is to the Army's advantage to have the Air Force handle most of the sentry dog training.

(U) In an effort to improve the overall operation of the Sentry Dog Program, the Provost Marshal has assigned a veterinary officer to coordinate and monitor the program on a full-time basis. In addition to this, the veterinary officer has been charged by the Provost Marshal with the responsibility of initiating actions to bring the entire Army dog program, covering scouts, trackers, and any other programs that may develop, under the monitorship of the Provost Marshal. If this task is executed successfully, then one of the major problems, that of over-coordination of the Army dog program, will have to be resolved.

SCOUT DOG PROGRAM

Scout Dog --A German Shepherd trained to work silently either on-or off-leash, day or night, and to alert to airborne scent, to "signal" the handler when it has picked up the presence of nearby dangerous objects or personnel, and to support maneuvering infantry elements in a wide range of tactical tasks. (Author's definition)

Background

(U) The Army scout dog platoon is the result of an extensive research and development program conducted during the early years of World War II at Cat Island, Mississippi. After successful field trials in the Spring of 1943, the program grew to the point where there were twenty TOE scout dog units by the end of the year, fifteen of which saw action in the South Pacific and Europe. The support for this invaluable capability was enthusiastic from the combat areas, especially the South Pacific, and plans were being formulated for the activation and training of some 1600 scout dogs (approximately 65 scout dog platoons) when the war abruptly ended. In spite of post-war recommendations to maintain a limited number of scout dog platoons for training and support purposes, all scout dog platoons were gradually deactivated and Army expertise in dog training and utilization was practically lost.

(U) When the Korean War began, the 26th Scout Dog Platoon was reactivated and sent to join in the conflict approximately one year after the war began. This unit, which received the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation for outstanding action on Luzon, distinguished itself in Korea with over 1000 patrols. For its outstanding contribution to the Korean War effort, the 26th received the Korean Presidential Unit Citation. It has been estimated that this unit reduced the casualty rate by about 65 percent when its scout dog teams accompanied maneuvering infantry units. The 26th was the only scout dog platoon to see action in Korea. After the Korean War, the Army Scout Dog Program was again inactivated, except for the 26th, which went to Fort Benning for "show purposes." At Fort Benning, the platoon was used to support activities of the United States Army Infantry School. This support mainly consisted of guarding installations against Ranger attack problems and guarding road junctions and trails for escape and evasion problems. However, in spite of the program's very inactive status, Scout Dog Unit TOEs were still carried on the books for the Army Force Structure.

(U) The Army Scout Dog Program has a long history of outstanding success, dating back to the first field evaluative trials held in the South Pacific during World War II. Since that time, crash programs have been initiated during each major US conflict to place the capabilities of the scout dog platoon onto the battlefield. At the end of each period of hostilities the scout dog platoons are deactivated and the experienced personnel scattered, almost beyond recovery.

5
(U) In mid-1966, the Army Scout Dog Program was reactivated by a Joint Chiefs of Staff decision under the ENSURE Program for Vietnam only. USCONARC was directed by the Chief of Staff to assume the responsibility for training scout dog platoons at Fort Benning, Georgia. In December 1965, the 26th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog), operating under the 197th Infantry Brigade, initiated a training program for four infantry scout dog platoons and one US Marine Corps platoon. Today this program has grown to the point where it has produced a total of 23 TOE units and 17 platoon replacement packets. In addition to this, a specialized research and development training program was conducted for the US Army Limited War Laboratory.

(U) The Scout Dog Program, currently in operation at Fort Benning, is a crash program with a multiplicity of problems. This program has been ordered to produce enough scout dog platoons and replacement personnel to meet the requirements of the Vietnam War. The following pages will present a detailed explanation of the current Army Scout Dog Program. The good and bad points of the program will be described and where possible, solutions to problem areas will be suggested.

Organization

(U) The Army Scout Dog Program is currently organized under the 197th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia. The training mission is assigned to the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry, with Company B of the battalion supplying the administrative and logistical support, and the 26th and 51st Infantry Platoons (Scout Dogs) providing the instructional support. What originally started to be a one-time training requirement for the 197th in September 1965, which was to be completed in June 1966, has now grown into a training program that is supported by a patchwork organizational structure stretched to its effective limits.

(U) The 197th Infantry Brigade accepted the USCONARC request to train four infantry and two Marine scout dog platoons in September 1965, providing that a personnel fill of 44 people for the 26th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) was received. In addition, an expansion of the existing kennel and veterinary facilities was requested. The request for the additional personnel was denied. However, the 197th received approval for 30 enlisted men and one officer, who were assigned to the Infantry School Table of Distribution.

(U) During the early part of 1966, the requirement for scout dog platoons expanded to 13 infantry and 3 USMC platoons. This requirement for the training of 10 additional scout dog platoons over-extended the capability of the 26th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) to conduct an effective training program. The Brigade could not support the expanded program without an increase in the instructor and support base. To meet the new program requirements, the 197th Infantry Brigade proposed that a US Army Training Unit be authorized to handle the Army Scout Dog Program. This self-contained organization would, under a commanding officer, have an administrative supply section, supply and mess organization, and a training organization. This request was forwarded to USCONARC through the US

Army Infantry Center and Third Army, where the proposed Table of Distribution (TD) for two officers and 42 enlisted men was rejected. Instead, an increase of one officer and 30 enlisted men was authorized.

(U) The additional personnel were not assigned to the 197th Brigade. Instead they were assigned to the US Army Center Troop Command and attached to the 197th and further attached as an augmentation to the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry. This did not solve the critical shortage of instructional personnel needed to meet the expanding requirements. To solve this problem, the 51st Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog), which was designated as a STRAF Unit, was activated in November 1966 to supplement the TD augmentation and the 26th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog).

(U) In May 1967, the TD augmentation to the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry consisting of one officer and 30 enlisted men, was organized by the US Army Infantry Center into the Headquarters Detachment Scout Dog, US Army. This gave the 197th Brigade authorization to attach all the student TOE units to the Headquarters Detachment while these units were undergoing training.

(U) The request for a Table of Distribution was resubmitted in December 1967. This proposal was to combine the 26th, the 51st, and the Headquarters Detachment into an organizational structure that would fit the mission of being responsive to the requirements for scout dog units and replacement personnel. This request was rejected and no additional personnel were authorized to the 197th for the Scout Dog Training Program. Early in March 1968, the request for a TD organizational structure was again submitted because of new requirements being imposed on the scout dog training base. Again the TD was rejected, which means that the Scout Dog Program continued to lack school status. However, a further augmentation of one officer and 16 enlisted men was approved to meet the new training requirements.

(U) The 26th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) was organized under TOE 7-167D when it began the training of five scout dog platoons in September 1965. This Delta series TOE consisted of a headquarters element and three squads, each of which had six scout dogs and three extra dogs for attrition replacement. The total number of dogs in this series was 27. After the 25th and 35th Infantry Platoons (Scout Dog) were trained and deployed in Vietnam, it was found that there were an insufficient number of scout dog teams within the Delta series TOE. This problem brought about an augmentation of the Delta series TOE by General Order, which added one extra squad. This General Order brought the total number of dogs per platoon up to 36, with 12 extra dogs authorized per platoon. However, the 38th and 39th Infantry Platoons (Scout Dog) were deployed before this General Order went into effect. Thus, the first four scout dog platoons that were sent to Vietnam had only three authorized squads making up their TOE.

(U) The Echo TOE series, which is currently in effect, was developed to incorporate the changes that were brought about because of operations in

Vietnam. This new series TOE reflects the additional squad that was an augmentation to the Delta series, but the number of extra dogs per squad was reduced to one. The total number of dogs in the current Echo series is 28.

(U) In an effort to standardize all TOE units at the Department of Army level, the Gulf series TOE was developed. The Gulf TOE changed the handler duty MOS from 11F (Intelligence) to 11B (Infantry), which is desirable because of the anticipated usage of the dogs by infantry front line units. This new TOE series has yet to be approved by DA.

(U) When USARV received the draft of the Gulf series TOE, they were preparing a Modified TOE of the Echo Series, which coincidentally, had many of the changes that came out in the draft Department of Army TOE. The most significant change is the basic organization of the platoon itself. Originally, the platoon was organized along the lines of four six-man squads. However, the squad has no functional task within a scout dog platoon, since the functional unit is the scout dog team -- one man and one dog. The basic change includes a switch from squads to sections with no change in the total number of platoon personnel. This change eliminates two E-6's and adds two E-4 dog handlers. At full strength this MTOE would have 22 handlers, a net increase of two. In addition to this change, the title of Scout Observer was changed to Dog Handler and there were several equipment changes. For example, USARV wanted the dog handlers to have the AR-15 as their basic weapon. Also, some medical equipment for the veterinary technician was added. It is anticipated that DA will approve this Gulf series MTOE; when approval is obtained, orders will then be issued to standardize all platoons currently in Vietnam.

(U) In addition to training TOE scout dog units, the headquarters detachment, scout dog, also handles the training of replacement packets. These packets are organized in the same manner as the student TOE units for organizational control and training purposes. However, when these replacement packets have completed their scheduled training, the personnel are assigned to those scout dog platoons requiring replacement personnel.

(U) New TOE units, as well as the replacement personnel, pass through the 90th Replacement Battalion where they are then brought under the administrative control of the US Army Dog Training Detachment (Provisional). This organization, which is responsible to the Commanding General, USARV, coordinates all in-country training. The scout dog platoon goes through the divisional in-country training school; after completing this two- to three-week training program, the scout dog platoon is assigned to a brigade. Here the headquarters element of the scout dog platoon establishes its base of operations. From here, the capabilities of the scout dog platoon, which exist in the form of teams, are then distributed and utilized on a restricted basis by maneuvering infantry platoons or by company- or battalion-size units within the brigade.

Concept and Doctrine

(U) The operational concept of a scout dog team centers about its ability to detect the presence of hidden personnel and objects, trip wires, mines, punji sticks, tunnels, etc. The ability of the team to carry out its operational mission is based primarily on two capabilities that can be acquired only by a thorough training program. The first is oriented toward the general capabilities of the German Shepherd, that is, its senses of smell and hearing, and to a lesser extent, its eyesight. A German Shepherd has the capability, when properly trained, of detecting the presence of hidden personnel anywhere from 30 to 300 meters distant. Under ideal conditions of wind and terrain, the detection of personnel at 500 meters is not unusual. The German Shepherd has the capability of hearing sounds that far exceed the hearing thresholds of human beings. In fact, the dog can hear about 40 times better than a man. These three capabilities must be developed in a special training program, but once they are developed, the dog becomes a specialized capability for infantry operations.

(U) The second capability is more man-oriented and it too comes about only through a carefully designed training program. This is the ability of the dog handler to recognize when the dog has alerted on hidden personnel or objects. Many dogs do not have an easily recognizable pattern of behavior that signifies his detection of something. It is up to the handler to interpret the dog's behavior and determine if the dog has detected something. In addition, the handler should be able to determine, by the dog's actions, where the object is and how far it is from the dog. The ability to do this comes about only in an extended training program and through close association with the dog. Both these capabilities are required for a successful scout dog team. If either of these capabilities is lacking, the scout dog team does not exist as an operational entity.

(U) The doctrinal information that supports this detection capability of the scout dog team is found primarily in FM 20-20, Military Dog Training and Employment. Additional information is obtained in FM 21-75, Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling, and to a lesser extent in FM 31-30, Jungle Training and Operations. The information presented in Appendixes C, D, and E has been abstracted from these manuals. This information is felt to represent the doctrinal guidance to be found in today's official US Army literature.

(U) Discussions with personnel who have had direct experience with scout dogs have indicated that the current doctrinal information covering scout dog platoons is, with a few exceptions, adequate. The main problem with the doctrinal guidance is not the information itself, but getting the using unit commanders to read and believe what is written.

(U) The experience that is being gained in Vietnam by the US Army Scout Dog Platoons is extensive. With some 20 platoons now in-country and more possibly on the way, it is reasonable to say that these platoons are making a significant contribution to the war effort. The experience

that is being gained by all of the scout dog platoons should be documented for future use. The specialized tasks that scout dog teams are being asked to perform, the new developing tactics for counter guerrilla operations, and the various forms of organization needed to meet the ever-changing operational environments are having a direct impact on doctrine. For example, when a scout dog unit is assigned to a division, the manner in which that division integrates the scout dog capability into its organization is in many ways dependent upon the division's operational situation. Doctrine should specify the alternative ways to organize one or several scout dog platoons into a divisional organizational structure.

(U) The current trend in Vietnam is to combine the capabilities of a tracker dog with those of a scout dog into a unit before going on a tactical mission. This new organizational concept has doctrinal implications, but they are not known in any detail at present. However, it is a reasonable assumption that these two capabilities could be combined into a TOE unit that has organizational and utilization features that are distinctly different from today's regular tracker and scout dog units. New doctrine would have to be developed to support this new concept, since two distinct, although mutually supporting, capabilities are now being combined into one unit.

(U) Another area that has unknown doctrinal implications is the utilization of scout dog teams with long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP). It is not enough to say that scout dogs can be used with LRRP; doctrine has to go further by providing guidance on how they may be best used with LRRP, and under what conditions they may be employed.

(U) In summary, the doctrinal guidance supporting Army scout dog operations in Vietnam appears to be adequate. There are, however, several new areas that generate requirements for doctrinal development; these areas should be explored by an agency responsible for developing doctrine for the Army Dog Program. In addition to this, the experience that is being gained by the scout dog platoons in Vietnam is far too valuable to be forgotten. It should be incorporated in a written record for future operations in low-intensity conflict environments.

Personnel and Training

(U) Officially, personnel entering the program are either "volunteers or selected individuals." However, most of the personnel attending the scout dog training program are not volunteers but are obtained through Department of Army levy or local recruiting. This lack of volunteers for a program that is essentially training a point man for every infantry patrol he accompanies is a source of many problems for the training personnel at Fort Benning. A man assigned to the training program does not bring with him the needed motivation and desire to perform at the best of his abilities in the program. A non-volunteer tends to hinder the training of others because of his lack of interest. A man entering the program has to like dogs, he must be able to communicate and establish a close rapport with the dog, and he must become fully aware of the limitations and capabilities of the dog. The handler and his dog are on the point of most patrols and to

handle this job in an effective and confident manner requires a better-than-average individual, in training as well as in the necessary mental and physical qualities. The handler needs to be a realistically self-confident person, impressionable in his manner and behavior, but not a show-off or braggart. The handler is the object of curiosity and is the expert when it comes to the employment of his dog in tactical operations. It takes an extremely mature and reasonably intelligent individual to handle this job. Anything less than this produces an ineffective scout dog team.

(U) Personnel entering the program bring with them an MOS of 11B. This is the desirable MOS, whether the individual is a volunteer or the result of a levy. However, if the person volunteers for the scout dog program, any MOS would be acceptable.

(U) After a person graduates from the scout dog program at Fort Benning, a "D" suffix for dog handler is attached to his record. However, those newly trained dog handlers become lost in the personnel pipeline to Vietnam because the "D" suffix never gets on their orders. Individuals are assigned from a Vietnam-oriented AIT course to USARV, with an intervening stop at Fort Benning for scout dog handler training, and Fort Benning does not cut new orders for these individuals. Thus, when the scout dog graduates are sent to the 90th Replacement Battalion, they have their original MOS with no "D" suffix and they end up in line infantry units. To solve this problem, personnel rosters are forwarded to the US Army Dog Training Detachment (Provisional) and then these people on the roster are picked out as they come into the 90th Replacement Battalion.

(U) The scout dog program at Fort Benning is twelve weeks in length for on-leash scout dogs. This twelve-week period, however, is not a continuous block of instruction, since personnel entering the program are not POR (Preparation of Overseas Replacement) qualified. In addition, there is in-processing and out-processing time included in this twelve-week period. The ideal situation for the dog training program would be to have the personnel arrive POR qualified, have one week for in and out processing, and a full twelve-week training time. If all volunteer personnel, POR qualified, could be obtained, then it is estimated that the program of instruction could be cut to eight weeks using previously trained dogs. Even with volunteer personnel entering the program who needed to be POR qualified, it is felt that the twelve-week training time could be reduced, since the volunteer is motivated and interested in the program.

(U) The current scout dog training program is not an MOS-producing course. As was previously mentioned, successful completion of the course results in an award of a suffix "D" OJT, MOS special qualification identifier. The two MOS that are essential for the continued development of the Army dog program (04371-Dog Training Officers and OOC4H-Dog Trainer/Instructor or OOC4D Dog Trainer/Handler) cannot be awarded by this program or any Army training program, for that matter.

(U) This inability to qualify instructors wastes money, manpower, and experience. The current instructional staff continues to be levied for foreign service as infantrymen, with little chance that once reassigned they will

return to the scout dog program. Personnel are reassigned to CONUS by MOS (11B or 11F) regardless of the "D" suffix, and they usually do not get back to Fort Benning. The only real solution to this problem and to the volunteer problem as well, is to create a permanent Dog Training School.

Deployment and Utilization

(U) Scout dog platoons are deployed on the basis of two platoons per division or one per separate brigade. When a division receives a scout dog platoon, the platoon is sent to the divisional in-country school and is then assigned to one of the brigades. The brigade controls the utilization of that scout dog platoon within the division. The scout dog platoon headquarters element is established at brigade level. From here, scout dog teams, each consisting of one man and one dog, are sent to maneuvering elements within the brigade on an "as-needed" basis. These teams support a wide range of tactical operations from search and destroy missions to night outpost defenses. The overall performance of these scout dog teams has been of high professional caliber.

(U) As with the doctrinal guidance, information on the deployment and utilization of scout dog teams is contained primarily in FM 20-20, and to a lesser extent in FM 21-75 and FM 31-30. This information is considered to be generally adequate for the current operational problems encountered in Vietnam. However, the same qualifying statement needs to be made here as in the concepts and doctrine section. The experience that is being developed by these scout dog platoons in Southeast Asia should be preserved in the form of meaningful documentation. This record could cover such areas as organization, tactics, personnel, and training. The compilation of this information could provide valuable inputs into the doctrinal literature and thus provide a better information base to be used in fighting the next "war of national liberation."

(U) The abstracts in Appendix D are indicative of the guidance currently available for the deployment and utilization of scout dog teams.

Current Status of Program

(U) At present time there are twenty Army scout dog platoons in Vietnam. These platoons are operating in all parts of the country against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese regulars. The distribution of these scout dog platoons according to their assigned division is shown in Table IV.

(U) The Army scout dog program has grown rapidly in the past two and one-half years. The program grew from an original requirement of four infantry and one USMC scout dog platoons in late 1965 to a total of thirteen infantry and three USMC platoons in March 1966. Table V shows the program size, projected to February 1969.

TABLE IV (U). DIVISIONAL ASSIGNMENTS OF SCOUT DOG PLATOONS

Unit	Platoon	Unit	Platoon
1st Inf Div	35th 41st	101st Abn Div	42d 58th 47th
1st Cav Div (AM)	25th 34th	Americal Div	48th 57th
4th Inf Div	33d 40th 50th	173d Abn Bde	59th 39th
9th Inf Div	43d 45th	199th Lt Inf Bde	49th
25th Inf Div	38th 44th 46th		

TABLE V (U). ARMY SCOUT DOG PROGRAM

Scout Dog Units	Army		USMC	
	Platoon	Replacement Packets	Platoon	Replacement Packets
TOE platoons trained and deployed by August 1967.	16	-	3	-
TOE platoons scheduled for deployment by 2 February 1967.	2	-	0	-
Activation of new platoons during period 2 January-18 September 1968.	-	13	-	4
Replacement platoon packets by February 1968.	3	-	0	-
Replacement platoon packets during period 6 April 1968-22 February 1969.	-	18	-	4
Total TOE Platoons	21		3	
Total Replacement Packets		31		8

In addition to the above, personnel and dogs from the Limited War Laboratory were trained for the experimental off-leash Scout Dog Program and the

51st Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) was activated, trained, and held as a support for the training base.

(U) At present this program is supported by some one hundred five officers and men. This is currently a sizeable program, involving hundreds of men and dogs each year, and it will continue to grow in terms of TOE units and replacement personnel. Current plans call for two additional scout dog platoons in Vietnam, assigned to the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). With these two additional TOE scout dog units in Vietnam, each division will have three scout dog platoons (one per brigade), except the 9th Infantry Division, which will have only two because of its unusual operational situation. The armored cavalry division does not have a requirement for scout dog platoons. Any increase in the force structure in Vietnam, especially infantry units, will impose additional scout dog requirements.

(U) In addition to the planned growth to meet the operational needs of Vietnam, there is a possibility that scout dog teams may be required to counter the growing guerrilla/infiltration threat in Korea. Also, if US forces become more involved in counter guerrilla operations in Thailand, there will be a requirement for scout dogs in that section of Southeast Asia.

(U) Future program plans are limited to reacting to the new requirements that are imposed upon it. If a Table of Distribution is approved, this would pave the way for the establishment of a permanent Army dog training center, and the entire Scout Dog Program would have a more secure foundation.

Program Problems

(U) One of the major problems facing the Army Scout Dog Program is its lack of school status. The present organizational situation is not conducive to adequate response to the requirements for TOE units and replacement personnel. The requirements are being met in terms of the quantity of men and dogs deployed to the field, but the quality of the product can be questioned, especially those men and dogs graduating from the more recent courses. Comments from the field have indicated a decrease in the overall quality of men and dogs, but there are no data available to support these comments. This lack of an adequate organizational structure to meet the ever-increasing requirements, the inability of the program to produce MOS essential for dog program continuity, the lack of immunity that the instructional staff has to a foreign service levy, and the inability of interested personnel to volunteer for the Scout Dog Program are all serious problems attributable to the program's lack of school status.

(U) This lack of school status causes other problems that compromise the overall quality of the program. There is no official feedback of after-action reports, evaluations, lessons learned, and other information from Vietnam that could be used to evaluate and improve the scout dog training program. At present data are obtained by personal contact, which results in a very erratic and unreliable flow of information. Another problem is the inability of the program to establish binding quotas and establish

qualifying criteria for incoming personnel. The quality of the personnel entering the program, whether they be volunteers or the result of a levy, needs to be closely controlled because of the high caliber of personnel needed to do the job. Thus, entrance examinations and interviews need to be established to weed out the undesirable, unmotivated people before they get into the training program. When the problem of the organizational status of the Army Scout Dog Program is resolved, the solutions to many of the described problems will be easy to determine.

CONFIDENTIAL

TRACKER DOG PROGRAM

Tracker Dog -- A highly trained Labrador Retriever able to work silently on a 25-foot leash following (day or night) a "ground" scent over terrain not holding a visual sign; to "signal" the handler when it is nearing the subject being tracked; to be an integral part of a reconnaissance element for tracking enemy movement. (Author's definition)

Background

(C) On 4 May 1966, General William Westmoreland and his staff were briefed by the RAC-ARPA representative from Singapore, Mr. Robert L. Hughes, on the British experiences in the use of tracker dogs in counter-insurgency operations. As a result of this briefing, the US Army Tracker Dog Program officially got underway when Brigadier General A. E. Cowan, Director of the Joint Research and Test Activity (JRATA), an agency of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA); Colonel M. G. Hatch, Commanding Officer of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV); and Captain W. G. Campbell, Jr., from USARV, visited the Headquarters, Far East Land Forces (FARELF) at Singapore and the British Jungle Warfare School in Malaysia on 10-12 May 1966. This trip resulted from two important, complementary factors. The first was an increasingly felt need by the US command in Saigon to solve the problem of re-establishing and maintaining contact with enemy forces after they have broken contact with US units. An attempt had been made to solve this problem by utilizing bloodhounds in tracking-type operations. However, this was unsatisfactory because the noise the bloodhounds made following a track endangered patrol personnel accompanying the dog. The second factor was an awareness of the British success with tracker dogs (Labrador Retrievers) in Borneo against infiltrating Indonesian and Chinese Communist guerrillas.

(C) The purpose of this trip, as directed by COMUSMACV, was to examine in detail the British experiences with tracker dog teams, to seek the advice of the British in the establishment of US Army tracker teams for Vietnam, and to solicit British resource support in getting the program started. The results of this trip were extremely favorable. Through considerable negotiation and joint coordination, the US group and the staff from FARELF developed a "Joint US British Proposal to Train Combat Tracker Teams (CTT) for the US Army," which was approved by Major General H. A. Lacelles, CBE, DSO, MGGS, of Hq, FARELF.

(C) The Joint Proposal was broken down into three phases which were designed to provide a combat tracker capability to US Army units in Vietnam in as short a time as possible. The first phase was directed toward the training and deployment of two US Army Combat Tracker Teams to Vietnam within three months of the training program initiation. Using

CONFIDENTIAL

British-trained Labrador Retrievers, US Army personnel would be trained in all areas of the tracker program and then sent immediately to Vietnam for operational evaluation. This evaluation was important, since it was anticipated by US Army planning personnel that the combat tracker team concept would be successful in Vietnam, but that changes in team organization and training would probably be necessary as a result of adapting British tracker concepts to US Army operations. The results of this evaluation would have to be available to ensure the successful completion of phase two, which provided for the training and deployment of an instructional capability within the US Army. This phase of the training proposal would take up to a year, since untrained dogs were going to be brought into the program. The third phase called for the establishment of a Combat Tracker Team Training Center somewhere in Southeast Asia (Thailand or Malaysia). However, this phase of the joint proposal was not planned in detail pending the outcome of the first two phases.

(C) It should be noted that this joint agreement between the British and American military authorities also required diplomatic sanctions. England was a signatory of the 1954 Geneva Convention partitioning Vietnam at the 17th Parallel. For the British to train military personnel for combat in Vietnam might be viewed by other foreign governments as a violation of these Geneva agreements. In addition to British diplomatic interests and considerations, the government of Malaysia had to be consulted, because the British Jungle Warfare School is located within Malaysia at Johore Bahru. The Malaysian government is neutral as far as the war in Vietnam is concerned. Thus, the training of American military personnel by British officers in a neutral southeast Asian country is a diplomatically sensitive situation.

(C) In September 1966, the governments of Malaysia, Britain, and the United States arrived at a political agreement regarding the training of US Army personnel at the British Jungle Warfare School. The political arrangements among these governments were to be in effect for a period which was approximately the amount of time needed to train fourteen US Army combat tracker teams. Phase one of the joint proposal was initiated in October 1966.

(C) In June 1967, steps were taken by USARV to extend the British-Malaysian-American agreements beyond the October 1967 cutoff period. This was necessary if replacement personnel were to be trained and deployed to Vietnam in a manner that would keep all fourteen combat tracker teams operational. Thought was given to establishing a training program in Vietnam to train replacement personnel, but it was extremely doubtful that a secure area of the size needed for conducting the program was available. Therefore, the plan was to extend the politico-military arrangements through November 1968, and at the same time, initiate the required actions to establish a training base within CONUS.

(C) In June 1967, USARV dispatched a message to the Department of Army, Washington, with information copy to USARPAC which briefly

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

covered the development of the combat tracker program in Vietnam and Malaysia, and outlined "priority" steps that the Department of Army should take to establish a training base in CONUS. Specifically, this message requested the Department of Army "...to ask an appropriate agency to procure and begin training as soon as possible, Labrador Retrievers as tracker dogs with a goal of about eighty operational tracker dogs to be provided to USARV by the end of FY69 (July 1969)." Also the Department of Army was "...to ask an appropriate agency to develop and establish a training program for visual tracker personnel and combat tracker teams..."

(C) The United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC) was officially brought into the combat tracker program in September 1967, when it was requested by DA to "...develop a training program for tracker platoons, including dog handlers and visual trackers and for visual tracker training for individuals to be assigned to long-range patrols, infantry reconnaissance units and rifle squads." This action was to be taken after USCONARC received more specific information from CINCUSPAC -- namely the organizational structure and total number of platoons to be supported by the CONUS training base and the requirements, both initial and projected, for the visual tracker to be used in other than the combat tracker teams. In response to this request, USCONARC sent a team of officers to Third Army to evaluate potential combat tracker team (CTT) training sites and subsequently assign the CTT program to a proponent agency. In November 1967, a message was sent by USCONARC to Third Army, the student training center at Fort Gordon, and the Military Police School, designating USAMPS as the proponent agency and assigning it the mission of conducting the CONUS-based CTT program. The Military Police School, designating USAMPS as the proponent agency and assigning it the mission of conducting the CONUS-based CTT program. The Military Police School immediately began to develop the CTT program but has not been able to move along as rapidly as planned.

(C) At present the US Army Military Police School has received authorization for some 200 officers and men to begin their training program. In addition, a special request for British and New Zealand experts in visual tracking and tracker dog training has been approved. These allied personnel are now at Fort Gordon, developing the appropriate training literature and beginning the training of Labrador Retrievers which have been procured by the Army.

Organization

(C) Since the US Army is borrowing heavily from British experiences with combat track teams, it is necessary to show how the current US Army CTT organizational structure has developed since the program inception in 1966.

(C) The British developed their combat tracker teams around a ten-man concept, which was subdivided into three team elements; the command, the tracker, and the protection element. The command element was made

CONFIDENTIAL

up of the team commanders (a senior NCO), the team second in command (a junior NCO), and the signaller. The tracking element was comprised of two visual trackers (usually natives to the operational area, but experienced Europeans were also used), two tracker dogs (Labrador Retrievers), and two dog handlers. The protection element consisted of three cover men. In addition to these ten men, an aid man and an additional cover man were sometimes added to the team. The British used this organizational concept in Borneo and Malaysia against the communist guerrillas, and were extremely successful with their CTT operations.

(C) The US Army planned to follow the British concept of team organization. However, it was recognized early in the training program that the team organization might be modified to better fit the operational situation in Vietnam. The first two Army combat tracker teams coming from the training program at the British Jungle Warfare School served as the basis for an in-country (Vietnam) operational evaluation. This evaluation indicated that the Army's requirement for CTT in Vietnam would be better satisfied if each ten-man team were reorganized into two five-man teams. Each team would have an NCOIC, a dog handler and one dog, a visual tracker, and two cover men.

(U) The original plans for assignment of the ten-man teams was on the basis of two teams per division, one per separate brigade. Under the new organization of five men per team, the twenty men (two ten-man teams) assigned to each division could easily become a combat tracker platoon with four five-man teams, plus an officer and NCO for command.

(U) Further work on the combat tracker platoon has now resulted in an organizational structure brought together under MTOE 7-167E. Within this proposed MTOE, the headquarters element is made up of a 2d Lieutenant, a veterinary specialist (E-4), and a clerk typist (E-4). Each of the four combat tracker teams has a team leader (E-6), a tracker dog handler (E-5), a visual tracker (E-5), and two cover men (E-4). This MTOE was authorized by a USARV General Order on 15 February 1968 and is the current organizational structure of the Army Combat Tracker Platoon. The plan for assignment of the combat tracker platoons is now one platoon per each division (four five-man teams) and a combat tracker detachment per each separate brigade (two five-man teams).

Doctrine and Utilization

(U) The primary mission of the Army combat tracker team (CTT) is to re-establish contact with the enemy. The mission of the CTT utilizes two highly developed skills: the unique capabilities of the visual tracker and the tracker dog. When these two capabilities are combined into a working team the result is a valuable reconnaissance capability for maneuvering infantry elements.

(U) A visual tracker is an expert at observing and interpreting the signs that men have left when they pass over terrain and through vegetation. The ability to achieve high levels of proficiency in performing this task

requires good eyesight, above average intelligence, excellent memory, creativity, and a thorough understanding of the natives and the enemy. The visual tracker is able to provide quite detailed information about the person being tracked. For example, a well experienced visual tracker is able to tell the sex of the people making the track and the type of weapons that they are carrying. A less experienced visual tracker can provide valuable information on the size of the group being tracked, whether they are carrying heavy loads, and usually who they are: Viet Cong or North Vietnamese regulars. If the visual tracker is familiar with the operational area, he should be able to provide valuable intelligence on terrain features, local population habits, location of trails, villages, bunkers, etc. If the tracker dog loses the track, then the visual tracker can assist in re-establishing the dog's contact. The visual tracker, even when he is not being actively utilized in following a track, can be of extreme benefit to the team because of his highly developed powers of observation. This is especially important when the enemy is elusive and is taking diversionary measures because he knows that a tracking team is being used against him.

(U) The tracker dog (a Labrador Retriever) has an outstanding ability to follow ground scents which have been left by a moving person. Each person has a scent that is peculiar to him. This scent is constantly being exuded and everywhere man goes, traces of it are left behind. In addition, man causes other scents to be left behind when he passes over terrain and through vegetation. These are the disturbances of the soil, the brushing and breaking of vegetation, and the crushing of small insects, worms, etc. All these scents combine to form what is described as a "track picture." This is what the Labrador Retriever follows when he is tracking his quarry. The tracker dog has an advantage over the visual tracker in that the dog can usually track faster and can track at night. The tracker dog can follow a track that does not leave a visible sign. The dog has the ability, by its overt behavior, to "notify" the dog handler when it is nearing the enemy. However, the tracker dog is not able to work a long track under difficult conditions because its tracking abilities deteriorate sharply. Under trying conditions, the dog may lose interest in the task and seek water.

(U) Each element of the combat tracker team has advantages and disadvantages that influence their tactical utilization on a tracking mission. The team NCOIC may trade-off these advantages and disadvantages during the team mission to obtain the greatest overall team effectiveness.

(U) At present there is no official US Army doctrinal information on combat tracker platoons, although there is some guidance available on the methods and techniques of tracking (see App E). There is, however, some information that exists in British and Australian documents. This information is being utilized, in a modified form, by Army combat tracker platoons in Vietnam. The modification comes about as the result of adapting British and Australian methods and techniques to the US Army and by the special operational requirements of Vietnam. The following paragraphs will set forth some of this doctrinal information, showing that there is a need for this doctrinal guidance to be introduced into appropriate Army field manuals.

(U) The organization of US Army combat tracker platoons follows the lines of the combat force it supports. All men in the team are cross-trained in visual tracking to provide the team with extra capabilities. For a combat tracker team to be effective in the operational environment, all members must be highly trained in tracking, fieldcraft, and weaponry. One factor that contributes to their effectiveness is their mobility. All team members are lightly equipped; readily transportable by air, road, or on foot; and able to remain in the field for 48 hours without resupply. When the team can be resupplied regularly, they can remain in the field for an indefinite period of time, except the tracker dogs, which should be relieved every 48 hours.

(U) Generally speaking, the combat tracker team has only three limitations which influence its effectiveness. First, the team is unable to track through heavy jungle at night, although with sufficient moonlight some tracking tasks can be performed through ground cover that consists of grass or low shrubs. Second, visual trackers and dogs often find it difficult to follow a track that has been subjected to heavy tropical rainfall. Third, it is difficult to follow a track that is more than 24 hours old.

(U) A combat tracker team does not accompany a maneuvering infantry element just because the unit commander feels he might find something that would require the capabilities of a combat tracker team. The teams are always held in a state of readiness at a central point until a mission develops. Once the requirement for a combat tracker team has been established, the team is immediately deployed to the location of the last known point of contact with the enemy force. Until contact is re-established with the enemy or the mission called off, the combat tracker team must be allowed to employ its unique skills in an appropriate manner. Interference from the unit that required the team will only serve to complicate the tracking task and perhaps make successful completion of the mission impossible. However, it should be emphasized that the combat tracker team is not a combat force and it should not be encouraged to engage the enemy. When the team has determined that contact with the enemy is imminent, the team should be withdrawn and the support forces brought forward to engage the enemy.

(U) The team can also serve as a source of intelligence for the using unit commander. Because of the teams unique capabilities, commanders are able to obtain information about enemy units and activity by the proper utilization of a combat tracker team. Since the training of each team member, as well as that of the functional team, is based on small unit reconnaissance techniques, the team can function as an independent reconnaissance unit, working in enemy-held territory.

(U) US Army combat tracker teams can perform a number of missions, including:

- Follow a retreating enemy and re-establish contact.
- Follow local enemy to villages or homes.
- Follow and recover US personnel captured by the enemy.

- Follow and recover US Army patrols or individuals who are lost or separated from their units.
- Back-track captured enemy personnel to determine where they have been and where they hid any supplies or equipment they may have had.

(U) These are only a few of the tasks that combat tracker teams can accomplish. Much of the success of these teams in the combat environment depends upon the motivation and creativity of the officers and men who command them.

(U) Failure to complete a tracking task successfully can usually be traced to such causes as lack of support by a combat element; failure of support element to keep up with tracking element; obliteration of signs and tracks by APC and friendly troops; and extension of track out of support artillery range. Other failures can be attributed to intentional or natural causes, such as passage of the enemy along a well traveled highway, or erasure of the track by heavy rain. Finally, there are those failures that can be attributed to the team itself, caused by poor leadership, lack of experience or proper training, or poor physical condition of the dog. Generally speaking, however, the professional performance of the combat tracker team is highly regarded by those who have used and worked with it in the combat environment.

(U) The team commander, usually a NCOIC, performs a very responsible job in the combat tracker team. His primary mission is to control the operational deployment of his team, determining when it is best to use the visual tracker and when the tracker dog. When tracking a skillful enemy force, judgments of this type must be based on accurate estimates of the situation that can come only from extensive combat experience. The team commander is responsible for passing appropriate information to higher headquarters. The team NCOIC must also plan and supervise the team training. A successful combat tracker team always maintains its skills at high levels of proficiency by conducting regular training exercises.

(U) When a standby team is called up for a tactical mission, there are a series of steps that must be taken. When the first team reaches the scene of contact, the local commander briefs the team commander with all the information needed for team deployment, such as the grid reference, details of the enemy force, limits of forward movement of friendly troops, details on the weather, and strength and composition of the support forces needed for follow-up. Defensive fires, tasks, code words, and nicknames are agreed upon. This information is passed on by the team commander to the visual tracker and a cover man who then go out and search for enemy signs. While this is being done, the remaining members of the team are briefed on the operational situation.

(U) Once the visual tracker locates the track, the team begins the tracking mission, supported by an appropriate infantry unit. When the tracking team locates the enemy force, it disengages and makes a full

report to the supporting infantry unit commander, who will either decide to engage the enemy or to follow some alternative course of action. When an immediate mission requirement no longer exists, the combat tracker team is returned to its base of operations for rest and resupply.

(U) When the standby team receives notification of a mission, the second team, if it is available, goes on standby alert. This team will take on a fresh track if the enemy splits his forces. The team could also be called upon to relieve the team that went into the field, or take on another mission if one should arise.

(U) The preceding paragraphs indicate the type of guidance that should be included in appropriate Army field manuals. Several comments were obtained from the field as to areas in doctrine where there is little or no guidance. One of these was informational guidance needed on the employment of combat tracker teams against different types of enemy forces. For example, it was felt by several senior NCO that it was easier to operate against North Vietnamese regulars because their actions were more predictable. Doctrinal guidance cannot be provided for the use of tracker teams against every specific Army of the world; however, doctrinal information could be developed to show the differences in utilization against main force units and local guerrillas in insurgency environments. This type of guidance in the appropriate manuals would aid team commanders in deploying their teams.

(U) One final need for additional doctrinal guidance is the recommended divisional organizational set-up that will make maximum use of all the combat tracker team capabilities.

(U) The full potential of combat tracker teams has yet to be realized. A properly trained team in the field can provide unit commanders with a specialized reconnaissance capability that cannot yet be obtained by any other means, including electro-mechanical devices. All early indications on the performance of these teams have shown them to be very effective; their effectiveness will undoubtedly become increasingly important to commanders in the field.

Personnel and Training

(U) All personnel currently in the US Army Combat Tracker Program are volunteers obtained from the troops already in Vietnam. The careful screening processes made it difficult to obtain sufficient numbers of personnel; however, since all the candidates were volunteers, once they satisfied the high program entrance requirements, they provided the essential motivation and interest to ensure success in the program.

(U) Personnel who receive CONUS-based combat tracker training are going to have to meet the same general criteria. There is one exception that should be noted: the trainee will probably not be a volunteer and this is going to have a negative influence on the training program. The same general type of problems will then be present here as there is the current Army Scout Dog Program.

CONFIDENTIAL

(U) The personnel prerequisites for all members of the tracker program are as follows:

- MOS 11 B
- Graduate of an RVN-oriented infantry AIT course.
- Standard aptitude score of at least 100.
- Normal color perception; visual acuity correctable to 20/20.
- Excellent hearing.
- Ability to think quickly and act decisively in emergency situations.

(U) These personnel criteria do not appear to be too limiting, but the training program is extremely difficult, both physically and mentally. Without volunteers, the program washout rate may be beyond acceptable limits. In this case, the training program requirements will have to be relaxed or volunteer recruitment increased. The latter solution is obviously the more desirable. Even with volunteers, experience at the British Jungle Warfare School has shown that approximately one third of the volunteer student personnel never graduate from the program.

(U) The training program is divided into three parts. The team visual tracker undergoes a five-week concentrated course (see App H) that develops the student's abilities to identify a track. The training of the dog and dog handler takes from three to nine months. If a previously trained dog is used in the program, it takes about three months to train the handler and retrain the dog. An untrained dog takes from six to nine months to train. When the visual tracker, the dog, and the dog handler are fully trained, they are brought together to form a combat tracker team. This team undergoes a three-week training program (see App I) that is designed to further their tracking capabilities and teach them to work together as a highly specialized team. The NCOIC of each team must not only complete the visual tracker and combat tracker courses, but must have actual operational experience with a team.

Current Status of Program

(U) At present there are seven US Army combat tracker platoons and three combat tracker detachments operating in Vietnam. This capability is the result of a reorganization of the fourteen ten-man teams originally sent to Vietnam. The current requirement is for thirty-four five-man teams, a requirement that could not be met at the time of reorganization, so some of the new platoons are understrengthened by a total of six five-man teams. The distribution of the combat tracker units in Vietnam is shown in Table VI.

(C) The USCONARC training base at Fort Gordon, Georgia is supposed to supply the additional six five-man teams to Vietnam by September 1968. However, this training program is just getting underway and will be unable to meet this deadline. Plans are not being made to extend the current

CONFIDENTIAL

British-Malaysian-American training agreements at the British Jungle Warfare School for several months to provide Vietnam with the needed teams.

TABLE VI (C). COMBAT TRACKER UNITS IN VIETNAM (U)

Major Unit	Control Tracker Unit
1st Inf Div	61st Inf Plat
1st Cav Div (AM)	62nd Inf Plat
4th Inf Div	64th Inf Plat
9th Inf Div	65th Inf Plat
25th Inf Div	66th Inf Plat
101st Abn Div	557th Inf Plat
Americal Div	63rd Inf Plat
173d Abn Bde	75th Inf Det
199th Lt Inf Bde	76th Inf Det
USARV Sp Trps	77th Inf Det

Program Problems

(C) The most pressing problem at the present time is the slow start-up in obtaining the full establishment of the CONUS Combat Tracker Program at the Military Police School. This program is not going to be responsive to the requirements of Vietnam for another six to nine months. There are several aspects to the start-up problem. The first is, of course, obtaining the facilities and space. Second there is the personnel problem, such as instructors. Fortunately, the program has been given a big boost by obtaining the services of two British and four New Zealand experts in the field of dog training and tracking. However, another personnel problem is to make the staff and unit commanders aware of the CTT capabilities and limitations. Another personnel problem is that of finding volunteers. These are necessary to develop the program, develop an instructional base that is able to respond to a wide variety of tracking problems, and form the well trained, highly motivated team members. The third start-up problem is the timely development of appropriate doctrinal literature to support the units in the field and educate the field commanders on the proper deployment and utilization of the combat tracker team.

CONFIDENTIAL

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Background

(U) Research and development in the use of dogs for military tasks in the US Army has a history that goes back to World War II. Much of the work done by the Quartermaster Corps during the early years of the war might best fall in the category of "feasibility studies" -- research to determine if dogs could perform specified tasks and then developing programs for their employment. A good example of a successful R&D program is the work that was carried out at Cat Island on the Gulf coast of Mississippi. Here, because of the jungle-type environment, extensive work was done on the development of a suitable program for preparing scout dogs for employment in the South Pacific against the Japanese. This early work can certainly be judged a success because of the continued use of scout dogs in the Korean War and currently in the jungles of Vietnam. Another example of an R&D program, started during World War II, was the development of a mine detection dog. This program was, however, judged unsatisfactory since the dogs were not able to meet predetermined criteria when used in actual battlefield situations.

(U) Interest in the employment of dogs for military tasks dropped off sharply at the end of the war, and so did research and development work. The Korean War brought about a renewed interest in the use of dogs for combat, which increased R&D work on the use of dogs for military tasks. In 1950, the US Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories (ERDL) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, in conjunction with the Stanford Research Institute, surveyed the biological sciences for principles or techniques that would be applicable to engineering developments in mine detection. Dogs were considered as one of the possibilities, but not along the line of a direct engineering approach. For the next five years, the ability of dogs to detect mines was investigated by ERDL at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. However, these further studies did not lead to any direct engineering applications and they were discontinued in 1957.

Off-Leash Scout Dog Program

Off-Leash Scout Dog -- A German Shepherd trained to work silently, off-leash, and to alert on an airborne scent; to "signal" the handler via electronic devices when it has picked up the presence of nearby personnel (30 to 1000 meters); and to support maneuvering infantry elements on a variety of tactical missions. (Author's definition)

Organization

(U) The off-leash scout dog program was initiated and developed by the US Army Limited War Laboratory at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. The first phase of this program was a feasibility study performed by the Canine

Behavioral Laboratory at the University of Maryland. This study was directed at the identification and solution of those problems that would be involved in the "training of a free-ranging (off-leash) dog to perform personnel reconnaissance" (Ref 2, p 2). This feasibility study, which was judged successful, was completed in September 1965. Approximately nine months later the Limited War Laboratory initiated a follow-on effort to the Canine Behavioral Laboratory study by training an off-leash scout dog group for operational evaluation in Vietnam. This work was carried out jointly with the 26th Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog, at Fort Benning.

(U) The training of this off-leash scout dog group was begun in September at Fort Benning and continued for 18 weeks. The first 12 weeks followed closely the basic scout dog training program that is used by the 26th IPSD; the remaining six weeks were "off-leash" training. Following this 18-week period the group underwent advanced training at the Eglin Air Force Base ranger camp. A preliminary evaluation was conducted during the ranger camp's exercise on Whitmeier Island. This exercise was a series of ambush patrols, reconnaissance patrols, and movement and contact operations that took three days and two nights to complete. The overall opinion of the off-leash scout dog group performance on this exercise was that the dogs and handlers performed their tasks well.

(U) Early in April 1967, the off-leash scout dog group was sent to Vietnam for operational evaluation. After arriving in Saigon on 3 April and spending seven days in quarantine at the 936th Veterinary War Dog Hospital, the group was sent to the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) at An Khe. Before participating in actual combat operations, the group underwent a nine-day series of acclimation and training patrol exercises. Following this, the group went on combat missions with the 1st Cavalry, participating in five search and destroy missions and one night defense mission. These combat operations covered a period of eight days.

(U) On 6 May 1967, the off-leash scout dog group went to the 41st Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog, attached to the 1st Infantry Division at Phuoc Vinh. For their operational evaluation with the 1st Division, the group was moved to C Company. Here, after experiencing some minor difficulties with enemy perimeter attacks, the off-leash scout dog group went on search and destroy missions with elements of the 1st Bn on 14, 16, and 18 May. The 18 May combat operation concluded the combat evaluation of the off-leash scout dog group.

(U) The results of this in-country evaluation were favorable. In a message sent from CG USARV Long Binh, Vietnam, the following comment is noted: "This method of scout dog operation has proven valuable. Recommend minimum 20 percent of replacement personnel and dogs receive this training in CONUS prior to deployment to RVN."

(U) Subsequent to the operational evaluation, plans have been made to incorporate off-leash scout dog training into the program at Fort Benning. However, this training has yet to begin, and scout dog teams with an off-leash capability will not be available for TOE 7-167E units in Vietnam until toward the end of 1968.

Concepts and Doctrine

(U) The operational concept that develops the rationale for the development of off-leash scout dog units is derived from an existing problem area in the employment of on-leash scout dog teams. This problem centers about that of "kill zones" in enemy ambush situations. Under conditions of unfavorable winds, on-leash scout dog teams and perhaps the supporting unit may work themselves into a "kill zone" before the scout dog would alert on enemy personnel. An off-leash scout dog, ranging freely ahead of the handler, would be able to alert on the presence of an ambush before the handler or the remaining patrol personnel entered the "kill zone."

(U) This is the concept as it has developed for actual combat situations. However, the original concept was for "a highly versatile canine reconnaissance system not dependent upon a particular handler, a pathway, or a particular kind of military unit to be protected" (Ref 2, p 2). Research into this "canine reconnaissance system" found that the concept was currently feasible only if its operation was limited to highly specified applications.

(U) Doctrine covering the deployment and utilization of off-leash scout dogs is not available in field manuals. It is a reasonable assumption that there may be a certain carry-over of principles and techniques from current on-leash scout dog operations, but the extent of such applicability is not known. Only a detailed investigation of the combat utilization of scout dogs, both on-leash and off-leash, would bring this out.

(U) The concept for the employment of off-leash scout dog teams appears to be sound and should be implemented into the Army dog program. However, concepts are not of much value to the dynamic combat situations if they do not have the support of applicable doctrine. The doctrine for off-leash scout dog teams should be developed in a timely manner to enable Army planners to consider, in detail, the role of these dog teams in future Army operations, especially those of low-intensity conflict.

Personnel and Training

(U) The personnel used to form the off-leash scout dog group were more or less hand-picked for the program. The 26th Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog, supplied a senior NCO instructor (SFC) an NCOIC, and two enlisted dog handlers. The remaining personnel were supplied by the US Army Limited War Laboratory.

(U) It is assumed that when the scout dog training detachment at Fort Benning begins to train off-leash personnel as part of their overall program, the personnel entering the program will be of the same type that are currently entering the regular on-leash training program; that is, privates who have just completed infantry AIT and who are assigned to the program.

(U) The training program for the off-leash scout dog teams is 18 weeks. For the first 12 weeks, the program closely follows the regular scout dog training program. The major deviation from the regular program is the

introduction of the "sit-stay" alerting command, which is essential for successful off-leash dog behavior. The last six weeks are devoted entirely to off-leash training. At the end of the eighteenth week, the following performance is expected of this canine reconnaissance system:

A dog and its handler should be able to work as "point" in a five-mile scouting problem with the dog off-leash and free to range out of sight of the handler. The dog should be able to keep at least 100 meters in advance of its handler while maintaining the desired azimuth with only arm signals to guide it. The handler should be able to monitor the dog solely by means of radio signals. The dog should not make any fake alerts. Alerts on 1-man to 6-man decoy parties should average not over 300 meters dog-to-decoy distance. The dog should hold a sit-stay alert until recalled by dog whistle. It should respond promptly and correctly to the recall whistle at any time.

An off-leash scout dog should be able to work on-leash if necessary. It should be reasonably proficient in all aspects of day and night performance normally expected of the average on-leash scout dog (Ref 3, p 8).

Deployment and Utilization

(U) It is planned that off-leash scout dog teams will be deployed as replacement units to fill the vacancies continually occurring in the ranks of the scout dog units currently operating in Vietnam. Since no TOE 7-167E units of off-leash scout dogs will be deployed, the on-leash units now operating in Vietnam will gradually build up an off-leash capability.

(U) When the off-leash scout dog group went to Vietnam for operational evaluation it was assigned primarily to search and destroy missions. The missions were initiated by air assault and the scout dog group was delivered to the operational area by helicopter. As has been previously mentioned, the in-country evaluation of this group was that they were successful, so it is anticipated that off-leash scout dog teams going to Vietnam as replacements will be utilized in much the same manner as that demonstrated during the operational evaluation. However, since off-leash scout dog teams can perform most of the tasks of on-leash scout dogs, these off-leash teams will, in all probability, also be used in the same manner as the regular scout dog teams. As these off-leash teams gain some combat experience, the similarities and differences between them and the regular on-leash scout dog teams will become more apparent.

Current Status of Program

(U) At present programmed operational evaluation of the off-leash scout dog program in Vietnam has been completed. As a result of this evaluation, USARV has requested that 20 percent of all dog handling

personnel coming to Vietnam be trained in the off-leash mode. To meet this request, the scout dog training detachment at Fort Benning is planning to begin training 12 of the replacement personnel in the off-leash mode on 22 July 1968. Each programmed class after July will have 20 percent trained in the off-leash mode. By the end of 1968, 24 personnel will have been trained in the off-leash scout dog mode and deployed to Vietnam; an additional 36 will be in various phases of their training program; all will be in Vietnam by February 1969.

Program Problems

(U) The amount of time and work that went into the development and implementation of the training program for the off-leash scout dog concept has been appreciable. As with other areas of research and development in the use of dogs for military tasks, this program probably lacked the top level support that it needed. But, nevertheless, the program was implemented, executed, and tested in the field and it was judged successful. There is, however, one area which appears to have received significantly less emphasis than the others, when one considers the relative amounts of time that were expended for training research, implementation of the developed training guide, and in-country field test. This area is the in-country operational evaluation. The amount of time spent in training research for the off-leash dog program is estimated as two years approximately. The amount of time taken to implement the training guide (train the dogs and personnel for operational evaluation) was approximately 23 weeks. The actual time devoted to the operational evaluation was 11 days.

(U) The operational evaluation, in spite of its limited scope, found that the concept is practical for military utilization in Southeast Asia. However, the problem is that the operational evaluation did not go far enough to show the limitations and capabilities of off-leash scout dog teams in Southeast Asia. For example, the superiority of off-leash to on-leash dogs could be determined only on a very subjective basis since no operational evaluation data were available for on-leash scout dogs. The evaluation also took no data on the size of the infantry units that the scout dog team accompanied. Nor were enough operations conducted to measure the effects of differences in terrain, weather, and foliage. Thus, it is difficult to say at this time that the extra cost in time and effort in training off-leash scout dogs is justified by increased capability or decreased casualties.

Future Program Plans

(U) The future of this program, beyond the planned training schedule at Fort Benning, is unknown.

Mine and Tunnel Dog Program

Mine and Tunnel Dog -- A German Shepherd trained to work silently and detect (by a combination of air and ground scents) hidden mines, boobytraps, tunnels, and bunkers; and to support maneuvering infantry elements on specific tasks. (Author's definition)

Organization

(U) This program is currently under development by the US Army Limited War Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground. The work is actually being done by a civilian contract firm, Behavior Systems, Incorporated, located at Raleigh, North Carolina. The research and development program is divided into two phases. The first, conducted at Raleigh, was a feasibility study to determine if an acceptable and effective training program could be developed to produce this specialized capability. The second phase will be devoted to implementing this training program and sending a trained platoon to Vietnam for operational evaluation. The 60th Infantry Platoon will be activated to support this R&D effort. It is not known how this platoon will be organized to employ its specialized capability.

Concepts and Doctrine

(U) The operational capability of the mine and tunnel dog platoon will be based on the scenting abilities of the German Shepherd. It is not known exactly how a dog is able to locate hidden objects, especially those buried for long periods. However, through some combination of scents, the dog is able to accomplish this task.

(U) The US Army has had little success with the development of mine dogs. The reasons for this have been traced back to the lack of proper training. However, the British have been successful with the development of a mine dog and it is assumed that the current US Army program will be successful.

(U) There is no doctrinal guidance available as to how a mine and tunnel dog platoon will be deployed and utilized in the field; this information will probably result from the operational evaluation in Vietnam.

Personnel and Training

(U) The program has not advanced to the stage where detailed personnel plans have been prepared. However, the most likely candidates for the program requirements will be graduates of a Vietnam-oriented infantry AIT program, with an 11B MOS. For the training program and subsequent operational evaluation, the platoon personnel will probably be hand-picked. If this platoon becomes part of the regular Army dog program, personnel recruiting will probably be done by Department of Army levy.

(U) The dogs and dog handlers will be trained at Fort Benning, going through the twelve-week scout dog program there. Upon completion of this training the dogs will be sent to Fort Gordon where they will continue their training for an additional three- to five-month period. The exact details of the training program are unavailable.

Current Status of Program

(U) The contractor is approaching the completion of Phase one, the feasibility study. Plans are now being made to move the developmental effort from Raleigh, North Carolina to the Military Police School at

Fort Gordon, Georgia, where Phase two will be conducted. Details of the operational evaluation plan are not available at this time.

Breeding Development Program

(U) The potential requirement to develop a specific type of dog for military purposes has existed for some period of time within the Army. In 1947, the Committee on Organization, with Brigadier General Frederick McCabe as chairman, recommended that "experimentation be continued with dog units along all lines, especially breeding, improving techniques of training, and extending the scope of usefulness of the dogs" (Ref 4, p 8). During the past several years the Army Research Office has reviewed the problems of dog development (breeding) programs and has concluded that it is possible and feasible to breed specific behavioral and physical characteristics into a dog.

(U) To orient these findings to a more specific area of research, the Army Research Office has prepared a long-range R&D effort for a superior ambush detector dog. This program is intended to provide the Army with a dog that is capable of performing a wide range of such tasks as scouting and tracking; locating tunnels, weapons, and mines; and locating casualties on the battlefield. The development effort is to be conducted over a five-year period. A major portion of the first year was spent in preparing the facilities for the remaining portion of the program. In addition, the foundation stock were selected and purchased. Only a few breeds of dogs have the desired characteristics needed for a military dog, so only four breeds, including the German Shepherd will be selected. The other breeds will be chosen from the following: the bloodhound, Norwegian Elkhound, Schnauzer, Standard Poodle, retriever, Springer spaniel, setter, and pointer. Stock for subsequent years will come from the progeny of the adult breeding stock. This program is currently being conducted at the Edgewood Arsenal.

Dogs for the Detection of Nuclear and X- Radiation

(U) The use of dogs to detect various forms of radiation is a very unusual concept, but it has been demonstrated by research and it may have some applicability to the needs of the Army. Recently two researchers at Purdue University inserted a plastic scintillator, which is a material that emits visible light when exposed to nuclear radiation, into the eye of a dog. After a three-month period of post-operative care, a dog was trained to react to the light stimulus produced when the plastic scintillator came in contact with a radiation source. Dogs, equipped and trained with this device may be useful for some highly unusual search tasks. For example, they might be used to find radioactive materials scattered as the result of an airline crash, or the Office of Civil Defense might find some appropriate application for this unusual capability.