

## **IV. CURRENT DOG PROGRAMS**

### **A. THE DOG PROGRAMS FROM VIETNAM TO TODAY**

To understand the current Military Working Dog (MWD) program requires some explanation of what happened after the US pulled out of Vietnam. As Lemish comments, the US MWD programs ebb and flow, “with the close of one conflict or the start of a new one. What is disturbing is that the lessons learned are not always carried to the next generation and the experiences of the past are often lost, only sometimes rediscovered, and all too often ignored” (Lemish, 1996, p. 243-244). For instance, the military cancelled the scout, mine/tunnel, and tracker dog teams at the end of the Vietnam War, even though the programs demonstrated their effectiveness in Vietnam.

The lessons regarding the effectiveness of patrol dogs started as an Air Force experiment in 1968 when the Air Force leadership recognized that sentry dogs were too aggressive to be used on patrol in law enforcement roles. Four of the new patrol dogs were trained for the Air Force by the Metropolitan Police, Washington, DC (Kelch, 1982, p. 34). The first patrol dog class began at Lackland Air Force Base in August 1969. The patrol dog was not supposed to be a raging, snarling beast although on command it would become aggressive and attack. It was used off-leash and in situations that were unsuitable for the use of sentry dogs, such as around crowds. The patrol dog was a multipurpose dog, while the sentry dog was considered single purpose.

“Beginning in 1971, the Air Force ‘discovered’ that dogs could be used to detect narcotics and explosives” (Lemish, p. 244). The first narcotic dogs were used to search for marijuana on flights inbound from Vietnam to the United States. The program was soon expanded to include a number of other narcotics. Many techniques were used to get the narcotics past the dogs, but most failed and dogs proved to be highly reliable and effective in this new role.

The British in 1971 were using dogs effectively to detect explosives in Northern Ireland. This quickly became important due to the increasing number of airline hijackings and threats. Other federal agencies soon realized the capability that the dogs offered.<sup>8</sup>

MWDs did not participate in Grenada (October 18, 1983). A few were included in Panama in 1989, but participated only in the military police role. The use of dogs in other roles was not considered. Eighty dog teams were used in Desert Storm in 1991 (Lemish, p. 248). The dogs were used for narcotics and explosive detection and for security.<sup>9</sup> According to Lemish, Carlo, a dual-purpose explosive-sniffing Belgian Malinois, was quite effective in Kuwait, "During their sixty-day tour together, Carlo alerted [his handler] to 167 caches of explosives, some rigged to explode on contact. One booby trap consisted of a pack of cluster bombs hidden beneath a case of American MRE (Meals-Ready-to-Eat) containers" (Lemish, p. 248).

"These dogs were never used under actual combat circumstances, but far away from the actual fighting and frequently in Kuwait after the Iraqi withdrawal" (Lemish, p. 248). FM 3-19.17 outlines the most recent contributions of MWDs:

In the 1990s and early 2000s, MWDs were deployed around the globe in military operations such as Just Cause, Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Uphold Democracy, and Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. These teams were effectively utilized to enhance the security of critical facilities and areas, as well as bolster force protection and antiterrorism missions, allowing commanders to use military police soldiers and other assets more effectively elsewhere....MWDs are force multipliers. Installation commanders should include MWDs when planning for force protection and antiterrorism countermeasures....The various uses of MWDs have been effectively employed in many aspects of military police missions. MWDs are utilized effectively at gates, camps and bases, and checkpoints and for random searches for narcotics and explosive devices. MWDs are also utilized for other missions in support of combat, combat support, and combat service support units (FM 3-19.17, p. 1-3).

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<sup>8</sup> By this time the terminology had changed somewhat and the military began to refer to its dogs simply as military working dogs (MWD) along with their specialty (patrol, patrol/explosive, or patrol/narcotic). This terminology is still in use and is included in the current FM 3-19.17, *Military Working Dogs*, manual dated July 2005.

<sup>9</sup> This was the first deployment of Belgian Malinois in combat (Belgian Malinois had been previously adopted for use due to the reduced risk of hip dysplasia compared to the German Shepherds).

Worth noting is that according to FM 3-19.17, "PD [Patrol Dog] teams are effective on combat patrols and as listening posts and reconnaissance team members" (FM 3-19.17, p. 1-6). However, Jesse Mendez and several other former Vietnam handlers are skeptical of the patrol dog teams' capabilities in combat in these roles. They are confident in their proven effectiveness as law enforcement tools, but to support combat units creates several potential difficulties. This is based on the training that it took to prepare a scout dog team for Vietnam. The aspects of the PD that concern them the most are the potential for barking during a patrol if a dog has not been specifically trained for silent alert, the degree to which controlled aggression may make the dog more difficult to control in contacts with the enemy, minimal scout training, and lack of realistic, simulated combat training. Combat training, as far as many Vietnam Veterans are concerned, needs to incorporate the supported units and the firing of all potential weapons systems to desensitize the dog to the probable stimuli in a dynamic combat environment.

This is not to say that MWDs have not proved effective in current operations. Examples of handlers and dogs working in Iraq with explosive detecting patrol MWDs are Marine Corporal Paldino teamed with Santo, a Czechoslovakian Shepherd, and Marine Corporal Cleveringa teamed with Rek, a German Shepherd. They were two of fourteen Marine Dog teams in Iraq during 2004. Their experiences were captured in an article in *Solder of Fortune* magazine in May 2005. As the article describes, "When the enemy went underground after major hostilities ended in May 2003, they hid their weapons and explosives in buildings and beneath the surface of the ground." The article goes on to note, "It didn't take the Marine Corps long to determine that dogs with highly skilled handlers were needed to locate the hidden caches of weapons and explosives being used with deadly effect against coalition forces" (p. 42). For instance, the dogs were able to detect a weapons cache that was buried one foot below the surface of the ground. (Cooper, 2005, p. 46).

The handlers both remember the 147 degree heat during the day, making the conditions extremely dangerous for the dogs. They said that dogs could not accompany the Marines on 12 hour patrols due to the canines' sensitivity to extreme heat.

According to Cooper's article, CPL Paldino, "says he and the other dog handlers had a 'general idea' of what they were getting into before they deployed to Iraq, but they didn't know exactly what to expect until they came under fire for the first time" (p. 43). They initially came under fire while searching an apartment complex. Their battalion commander also wanted the dog teams to sweep the future sites for his Command Operations Center. In describing the sweeps, Paldino and Cleveringa admitted, "It was kind of scary because everybody else was stepping back and we were stepping forward" (p. 43). The two teams searched the outside perimeters of the building before entering and then went room to room searching for booby traps or trip wires. Their dogs never found any devices during their searches. On one occasion, their dogs alerted to a blue van and the patrol was ambushed by an enemy with automatic weapons. Discussing some of the other challenges and dangers facing handlers and dogs in Iraq, Paldino comments, "Under no circumstances does a handler unleash his dog. It's too dangerous during a firefight. Too much lead flying around. My dog could be killed by friendly fire just as easily as he could be by enemy fire" (Cooper, 2005, p. 43). Paldino's comments also raises possible concerns for the current "off-leash" dog handling programs, such as the Specialized Search Dog (SSD) programs (described below).

The handlers also commented that they experienced little sleep due to mortar or rocket fire and that they could see Marine artillery and aircraft firing on insurgents in Falluja. Paldino and Cleveringa stated that their dogs, "would spring to their feet and bark when something went "BANG" during the night, but as time wore on, they'd just open their eyes and go back to sleep next to their handlers" (pp. 44-45).

"The US Army has some 30 dogs in Iraq, guarding bases and checking cars for explosives. Zalwski [a Staff Sergeant and Army Kennel Master in Iraq] says the dogs have uncovered car bombs and have such sensitive noses that one was able to smell an ammunition clip in a woman's pocketbook (Meixler, 2004, p.1). According to R. Norman Moody, "An estimated 400 dog-and-handler teams are serving currently in Southwest Asia, including about 250 in the war in Iraq. The Department of Defense has about 1,800 military working dogs in all" (Moody, 2005, p.1).

According to Staff Sergeant Ann Pitt, a US Army dog handler based near Nasiriya in Iraq. "We have many items to help us do our mission, but I don't think we have a

better detection tool than a dog....These dogs are amazing. They are more dependable and effective than almost anything we have available to us” (Lacey, 2005). Pitt describes the dog’s olfactory sense in these terms, “...dogs have 25 times more smell receptors than humans....We smell spaghetti sauce and we think ‘Oh, the spaghetti sauce smells good’....To a dog, they would smell the tomatoes, the onions, the basil, and oregano. They smell all the odors individually” (Lacey, 2005).

The majority of canines in recent combat operations have been patrol dogs. Most have been dogs trained at Lackland AFB. However, some unit commanders, just as in Korea, have bought dogs on their own from civilian contractors. According to Robert Dameworth, the current DoD MWD Program Manager, the best estimates were that until recently there were 65 contractor dogs being used by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. This practice of using contractor dogs has since been eliminated. The reasons for not allowing the use of the contractor dogs are numerous, ranging from the lack of standardization and certification to the lack of proven effectiveness that may place US soldiers’ lives at increased risk. The debate over contractor or military-trained dogs seems to be a problem that haunts the history of the dog program.

## **B. CURRENT PROGRAMS**

The Department of Defense (DoD) MWD program is managed from Lackland Air Force Base near San Antonio, TX. The current DoD MWD program manager is Robert Dameworth, a former Air Force Dog Handler with extensive Vietnam experience. His responsibilities include the proper training and implementation of all military working dogs in the Department of Defense. Mr. Dameworth chairs a committee called the Joint MWD Committee, which has the basic charter of reviewing and setting DoD policy for anything that includes dogs. The committee also meets to discuss the training program at Lackland AFB and other training centers.

Directive 5200.31 (7 September 1983) designates:

The Air Force as the single manager for the Services’ Military Working Dog Program. This directive also designated the DOD Dog Training Center as the primary training facility for MWDs.

The Air Force designated the Office of Security Police (AFOSP) as its Service proponent office. Similarly, proponent for MWDs was established by the other Services within their law enforcement channels.

This program alignment has had a major limiting effect on the overall MWD program in terms of its application to military operations outside the traditional law enforcement area (Thornton, p. 7).

FM 3-19.17 states that the, "MWDs are a unique item; they are the only living item in the Army supply system. Like other highly specialized equipment, MWDs complement and enhance the capabilities of the military police. MWD teams enable the military police to perform its mission more effectively and with significant savings of manpower, time, and money" (p. 1-2).

The realization that a dog team is a DoD asset and not a Service asset is the key to better understanding current DoD dog programs. The best explanation of the role of Mr. Dameworth and the program is one given by CPT John Larson, who is the US Army exchange officer, Concepts and Doctrine Branch, and the commander of D Company, 701<sup>st</sup> Military Police Battalion. CPT Larson was also a former dog handler during his enlisted time in the Army. According to CPT Larson,

It is his [Mr Dameworth's] job to fill DoD requirements. When an RFF [Request for Forces] comes in he fills it first with service specific forces in the AO [Area of Operations] and then fills any shortfalls with sister services. Two examples: (1) When SOF [Special Operations Forces] requests MWD support in Afghanistan, he fills it with Army and Marine MWD Handlers. The Navy Handlers are not trained or equipped for those type of missions. (2) The Explosive Detector Dog Teams (EDDT) are always on standby for the POTUS [President of the US] missions. They are required to have civilian dress clothes and a passport. When the President moves, a tasking comes down to Bob who tasks out the nearest geographical EDDT who then work with the Secret Service until mission complete.

One more example: The United Nations General Assembly just met in New York. The State Department requirement for support involved over 55 dog teams and a Kennel Master. Bob put that together with teams from all four services.

The MWDs have never been solely a Military Police [MP] Mission, but you can see how that is the most appropriate Branch to have Executive Agency over them. MPs cover 5 Battlefield Functions, and the Handlers can perform in all five (Area Security, Movement and Mobility Ops, EPW, Law and Order, and Police Intelligence Operations). Plus the tie to Law Enforcement, working with the Secret Service, Homeland Security, US Border Patrol, and other Government Agencies. It is this State Department work that helps us justify the expense of the [dog] program.

If it was not for these requirements, the Army would have dropped the MWD program a long time ago! I truly feel the Infantry will have a hard time justifying a MWD program of their own. Even with these missions, we can not justify single purpose trained dog teams, hence the dual teams. A true test will be to watch the Engineer's program [to be discussed later in this chapter] (Email from CPT John Larson on October 12, 2005).

One of the key concerns that some have in respect to the DoD dog program is the fact that the teams become a DoD asset. This means that a dog and handler may not be available locally if the asset has been assigned to other units or another Service. This limits the number of people that some units are willing to send in order to receive training with K-9s. For instance, the 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment was interested in possibly training some of its soldiers at the Lackland AFB training center. But their interest subsided when they discovered that their personnel, once trained can be tasked by Mr. Dameworth, the DoD MWD Program Manager. This concern over losing assets or not being able to control their availability seems to be another impetus for some commanders turning to civilian contractors to procure trained dogs.

The other aspect of the military working dog program at Lackland is the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron. The 341<sup>st</sup> has the mission to provide:

trained military working dogs (MWDs) used in patrol, drug and explosive detection and specialized mission functions for the Department of Defense (DoD), other government agencies and allies. Conducts operational training of MWD handlers and supervisors. Sustains DoD MWD program through logistical support, veterinary care, and research and development for security efforts worldwide (Briefing provided by LTC Bannister, commander of the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).




Figure 6. Organization of the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron

The 341st consists of a command section and three 'flights': Training Support, Logistics, and Operations. The flights consist of selected personnel for all four branches of Service, Department of the Air Force civilians, and civilian contractors. The Operations Flight is responsible for the MWD Handler Course, MWD Kennel Master Course, MWD Course and, as of April 4<sup>th</sup>, 2005, the Specialized Search Dog (SSD) Course. The Training Support Flight provides support for three critical functions.

1. Training Management – is responsible for:
  - a) Implementation of ITRO Course procedures.
  - b) Development of training plans.
  - c) Scheduling courses.
  - d) Managing course allocation requirements.
  - e) Creating AETC course control documents.
  - f) Developing all MWD course curriculums.
2. Resource Management – is responsible for:
  - a) Managing budget/supply accounts:
    - 1) \$600K in O&M.
    - 2) \$2.6M Kennel Contract.
    - 3) \$1.7M MWD Procurement.
    - 4) \$2.3M SSD.
  - b) Training areas, facilities, and vehicles
    - 1) 98 training areas.
    - 2) 70 facilities.
    - 3) 36 vehicles and 61 trailers.
3. Evaluations Section – is responsible for:
  - a) MWD Evaluations.
  - b) Certifications.
  - c) MWD Feedback Program.
  - d) Squadron Self-inspection.

(Briefing provided by LTC Bannister, commander of the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

The Logistics Flight is responsible for the procurement, kenneling, and distribution of all dogs entering the program. It also tracks each dog's status for the remainder of its service life. Essentially, logistics tracks MWDs from "Cradle to Grave." As in the past, procurement continues to be a problem for the DoD Dog Program. There is a continuing debate about where the sources for the DoD MWDs are located, since the program buys so many of its dogs from European breeders (Christenson, 1999).

Also associated with the squadron are the US Army Veterinary Services and the TSA's Explosives Detection Canine Team Program. The training squadron comprises the world's largest dog school, consisting of 21 facilities plus six borrowed from other Lackland AFB organizations, over 900 kennel runs, and 400 acres of outdoor training areas (Briefing by LTC Bannister, commander of the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

The following figures illustrate the scale and numbers of handlers and trained dogs that the MWD program produces each year. The large amounts contribute to the challenges facing the MWD program. As the first Figure, MWD Handler Production, indicates, demand for handlers has been increasing. So have the requirement for trained dogs overall as seen in the second Figure, Trained Dog Requirements (TDR).




Figure 7. MWD Handler Production (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).




Figure 8. Trained Dog Requirements (TDR) (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

The 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron conducts the 55-day long, DoD MWD Handler Course, which is divided into two blocks of instruction. The blocks of instruction primarily cover the proper utilization of MWDs, installation protection, ground combat operations, presidential security, and anti-drug missions. The first block, which focuses on patrolling, is approximately six weeks long, followed by more specific training in narcotic or explosive detection training.

“The DoD MWD Trainer/Supervisor Course provides kennel masters and trainers with the skills to enhance their MWD program. The course includes instruction in kennel management, administration, dog team training, and contemporary employment concepts” (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

The DoD MWD Course [which produces the trained dogs] provides both patrol and dual certified patrol/detector dogs [Cost is about \$50,000 per trained dog.] The course is 120-days long. The dogs are trained in either drug or explosive detection. The dogs are trained to detect marijuana, hashish, heroin, and cocaine and must meet a 90 percent accuracy standard to certify. Explosive detector dogs are trained to detect seven explosive substances (smokeless powder, nitro dynamite, ammonia dynamite, TNT, C-4, water gel, and det cord) and two chemical compounds (sodium and potassium chlorate) and must meet a strict 95 percent standard (briefing by LTC Bannister, commander of the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

The 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron is also conducting a new course recently added to the training program: the Specialized Search Dog (SSD), implemented on 4 April 2005. The purpose of this program is to detect IEDs in an attempt to save lives. The intent is to develop a dog team that can work off-leash to 300 meters in dynamic environments. The off-leash capability is required for the protection of the handler in the event that the detected device can be remotely detonated. The loss would then be only of the dog. The off-leash aspect of the SSD program is the most challenging capability to develop, but is critical in an urban environment given the current IED threat. Urban environments create a dynamic and potentially unfamiliar set of conditions that can distract or confuse the dog as to the proper response. The more complex the environment, the more training is required to condition the dog and handler to know how to respond appropriately in particular situations, while the specific level of training required will be dependent on the individual dog and handler.

The Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps each expressed a need for the program and funding was allocated by the Joint IED Defeat Task Force (Appendix D contains the memo authorizing each Service its funding for each satellite test program). The course is attempting to train dogs and handlers to operate off-leash and may incorporate a variety of technologies to enhance the teams' capabilities. The Air Force course is 93 days long and taught at Lackland AFB and the Yuma Proving Grounds. Currently, the dog and handler are trained as a team and should deploy as a team. The dogs are trained only to detect and are not trained to attack or to operate as patrol dogs.




Figure 9. The forecasted TDR for SSD and Mine Detector dogs for DoD and TSA. (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

“In the fall of 2002, the US Army requested the 341<sup>st</sup> TRS develop a mine dog detection course. To date the course resource estimate has been completed and we are awaiting US Army approval. Expected start date FY 06” (Briefing by LTC Bannister the commander of the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron, on September 7, 2005).

Through the US Army Engineer School (USAES) at Fort Leonard Wood, the Army began its SSD program in October 2004. The DoD MWD program manager authorized the Department of the Army (DA) to conduct three SSD pilot courses as a bridge to the DoD SSD program with the contract ending in March 2006. On the Army’s staff for this program are subject matter experts from Great Britain and Canada who have expertise that is directly related to the SSD program and its requirements. The instructors at Fort Leonard Wood from Concurrent Technologies Corporation (CTC) have over 50 years of experience. The program manager for the USAES SSD program is James Pettit, a former Ohio policeman, dog handler, and Army National Guard Engineer. The program is under the direction of the Fort Leonard Wood’s Counter Explosives Hazards Center. The Leonard Wood SSD program also includes personnel who have already deployed to the combat theaters and have captured many lessons learned that the program manager has incorporated into the training. According to Ron Mistafa of Calgary-based Detector Dog Services International Ltd., a contracted instructor for the USAES SSD program, “Recognizing the value of trained dogs in combat zones rife with mines and booby traps, armies worldwide are scrambling to enlist more of them. There are not enough handlers or instructors....There are probably 28 different explosive scents” (Slobodin, 2005, p. B3). The teams have 48 total months of experience and the Leonard Wood program is the only one to date that has published any written doctrine for SSD operations.

The USAES first set up a MWD program in 2001 with the purpose of producing Engineer Mine dogs. The 30-team Engineer Mine dog detachment was created to search for mines in combat theaters. The program is an enhanced version of the M-dog program set up by the Army in WWII. USAES and Engineer personnel from the combat theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan have estimated that they require a ratio of one SSD to two Mine dogs to support operations in theater (telephone interview on September 28, 2005 with Mr. Jim Pettite, the program manager for the USAES SSD Program).

### **C. IMPROVEMENTS AND ONGOING CONCERNS**

The current programs have operated in a similar manner for a many years. Even though, the MWD program has been viewed as being very successful, there are areas of improvement that have been identified by individuals working within the program. One example of the numerous suggestions that have been made to improve the program is demonstrated by a memorandum written on April 2003 by CPT Rick Heidorn, the commander of D Company, 701<sup>st</sup> MP Battalion which represents the Army personnel in the Lackland AFB MWD program. He states, "Shortcomings in training standardization and organizational support challenge the program [US Army Military Working Dog Program] to maintain high standards." The current commander of D Company indicated that most of the issues identified by CPT Heidorn still exist in the program. Heidorn's concerns may be an indication of why some handlers seem to think that each Service should have its own programs. The development of the SSD programs seems to support the fact that each Service has its own considerations and requirements of dog programs.

One of Heidorn's recommendations was to, "capture and consolidate valuable doctrine form MACOM [Major Commands] SOPs...and to develop an Army MWD Soldier Training Plan (STP)." From Heidorn's perspective, "the consolidation and publication of the proven best practices will advocate standardization. Enforcements of a single set of certification standards will enable high quality collective training and performance." This recommendation identified the need to develop a standardized training plan that handlers and kennel masters can use, incorporating lessons learned from ongoing operations. Basically, he advocates a centralized repository for information that can be accessed by all handlers and kennel masters to facilitate training and lessons learned to develop plans for deployment.

Another issue identified by Heidorn has to do with who owns the dog teams after training. The US Army Military Police School, USAMPS, establishes the training and certification for all Army MP assets, except for Army MWDs. This means that the training and certification is not Service-specific, meaning that the dogs are not tailored for specific Army needs that may be different for other Services' needs, even though training is the responsibility of the MACOM Kennel Masters. Heidorn recommended that an Army MWD Program Quality Assurance Team be formed to, "provide quality

control and standardization of MACOM certification authorities. This team would be able to conduct inspections, training assistance visits, and have the ability to form and execute Mobile Training Teams to update the field with the most current training techniques, record keeping, and preventive veterinarian medicine.” The result would be, “Army MWD teams that are universally trained to one standard, ensuring increased operational responsiveness and effectiveness.”

Heidorn contradicts himself in the area of the need for standardization when he later argues in his memorandum, “All Army MWDs train to the same standards, each MACOM and subordinate kennels have variable quality and quantities of training equipment and facilities.” He recommends that the Lackland program, “query each MACOM to produce a list of required training and mission essential equipment.” Since the units have the lessons learned from the combat theaters, these lessons if properly consolidated and reviewed would provide a list of items that should be standard equipment for each MACOM. The MWD program could then facilitate research into these items and decide what to make available to the teams. This lack of equipment seems to be another example of history repeating itself, given the shortages of equipment for the dog units in Korea. Heidorn points out that the standardized common table of allowances would, “enable a seamless transition of MWD teams from one-duty location to another.”

Heidorn also implies that the DoD MWD Program does not provide the complete education required by Kennel Masters in the Army. “The DoD course does not cover Army specific task needed to lead an Army kennel.” He recommends an additional course be developed to augment the current DoD courses in order to, “provide timely and accurate Army specific training to the field.” Heidorn also touches on the issue of career progression in the Army Military Police career field. The current method of career progression requires Non-commissioned Officers (NCO) pass through a number of leadership positions in order to be considered for senior ranks. Since the dog handler job does not receive the same consideration for promotion as that of a platoon sergeant, many experienced dog handlers must leave the dogs and work within other Military Police functions. There are very few senior NCO positions available. This means that much of the experience has to move on in order to be promoted and is not immediately available

to the MWD program. If the dog program positions were viewed differently then the program could benefit from the retention of its “best” people and technical expertise.

#### **D. CONCLUSIONS**

1. The current MWD program is heavily biased to the use of dogs in the law enforcement role. This can be attributed to their long standing use and training by the military police and security forces personnel. The lack of tactical units at Lackland AFB may further hinder the exploration of expanding the use of dogs in current operations. Another factor that may influence the program is “institutional inertia”. The Lackland program has been operational and resourced for many years and has been viewed as a successful program when producing “patrol dogs.” Since the program has been successful some may desire to keep it on the same course instead of assuming the risk of change. As John Spivey, the First Sergeant of D Company, 701<sup>st</sup> Military Police Battalion at Lackland AFB (which is the highest ASI Z6 coded (dog handler) enlisted position in the Army) puts it, “If the AF does not lose its ‘COP’ mentality and begin to train the teams as war fighters, the Army and USMC will be forced to develop their own training in order to remain relevant” (emailed questionnaire response from ISG Spivey, dated October 12, 2005).

A dog that works for the military police may not be the “best fit” for an infantry patrol in a combat environment. This issue was addressed during Vietnam by training personnel who conducted the patrols as the handlers. The Infantry already possess equipment and training that are specific to their role as Infantrymen; the dogs used on their patrols may also need the same level of Infantry specific training. According to many Vietnam-era handlers, to be effective handlers need a background and training similar to that of the supported unit in order to integrate effectively with the supported unit. This problem correlates directly back to WWII when the patrol leaders were biased against the Quartermaster handlers due to their lack of Infantry training.

2. There are risks involved with housing the DoD program at Lackland AFB. One is that the focus is on the needs of the Air Force since the majority of the facilities and training environment belongs to the Air Force. Another problem is the potential for “Group Think.” The danger for the DoD program is that the instructors, trainers, and handlers are all from the same program. An independent study or review of the DoD

program may be necessary to periodically assess whether or not “Group Think” has taken hold and/or is affecting the program.

3. The SSD programs were started as satellite programs in the Army and Air Force. (The Marine Corps embarked on a number of test programs to determine the dogs’ best utilization; however, the information on the Marine Corps dog programs is limited.) As mentioned earlier, the Army’s program is staffed by subject matter experts from Great Britain and Canada.

As a consequence, the Leonard Wood program is incorporating many of the techniques used by the British that were validated in Northern Ireland. The Lackland program, in contrast, seems to be an extension of the explosive detection program that is already used with the patrol dogs--the extension meaning an ability to work off-leash to detect explosives. Also, the Air Force SSD program is currently using the standard seven scent training aid kit, whereas the program at Fort Leonard Wood is attempting to incorporate devices that are being encountered in theater.

One concern raised during my observations at Lackland occurred when I asked the Air Force’s SSD program manager (PM), a recently retired NCO from the 341<sup>st</sup> Training Squadron, if the training at Yuma used IEDs similar to those found in Iraq. I received an answer that surprised me. The PM stated that while the Yuma training facility staff were willing to build car bombs and devices exactly like those found in Iraq, he had told the Yuma personnel to just put the explosives in the car trunks. The PM also said that Yuma would “daisy chain” artillery rounds together, to mimic those found in Iraq, but that he didn’t feel it was necessary that they be that realistic since the dog didn’t alert to those aspects of the devices. This seems quite contrary to the principles of training used by the Scout Dog program for Vietnam, when the aim was to replicate conditions as exactly as possible since no human can ever be exactly sure what cues the dogs might pick up on.

If there are as many as 28 different explosive scents dogs should alert to, then the current explosive scent kit used at Lackland AFB may not be adequate. To ensure that the current training is adequate and accurately reflects the threat, periodic reviews should be done of procedures and training aids. Any discrepancies between the nature of the

threat and the actual training can then be addressed. Ideally, this would lead to more realistic training such as that used in the earlier Scout Dog program that reflected such a high degree of success.

Also, the dogs the Air Force program uses are from the DoD dog procurement process. The SSD program at Lackland AFB does receive the “pick” of dogs from the kennels at Lackland; but these are dogs originally procured for patrol work. This means that by the time Lackland acquires the dogs, at around one year of age, they may have already received some training from the breeders in Germany. The breeders know the criteria that the procurement program personnel use and prepare the dogs for the tests. This means that some dogs have more or less training than others.

Historically, aggressive dogs or dogs that have the attributes to attack or patrol seem to work less effectively off-leash than on leash. This is based on testimony from Jesse Mendez and other handlers. The off-leash dogs need to exhibit more self-control and be more subdued. This problem goes back to the procurement problems of the past: how to find adequate numbers of qualified dogs and then effectively and efficiently determine which dogs have the required attributes.

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## V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. QUESTIONNAIRE BACKGROUND

Over the course of my research, through extensive conversations, correspondence, emails, and site visits, I developed a 39 question survey (Appendix E) which was then disseminated via the US War Dog Association and Jesse Mendez. Former and current handlers responded with pages of answers. This is the only attempt I am aware of to capture the perceptions of the most knowledgeable and experienced individuals in the art of handling dogs in combat or in the military. Not all of the responses were from handlers who had been to combat with their dogs, but the insights of non-combat handlers proved no less valuable. The expertise of these individuals cannot be overstated and their interest in furthering the use of dogs in the military to save US lives is inspiring, to say the least.

The questionnaire reflected a number of the issues that surfaced during conversations, numerous emails, my research, and observations at Lackland AFB. While the questions are not “all inclusive” of the issues I discovered, I believe these should provide a baseline of information that may spur further research, exploration, and investigation. The issues that most people regarded as important revolved around training—and the need for realistic, scenario-based training—the eternal problem of procurement, and the potential need for each Service to develop a specific dog training program that can fulfill each Service’s independent requirements.

Most handlers maintain that dogs *should be* used as defensive mechanisms and are essential in Iraq. As one former sentry dog handler from Vietnam, Kiernan Holliday emailed, “I believe that the soldiers in Iraq are in a much more dangerous situation than we were in Vietnam.”

The majority of the concerns expressed by former handlers focused on the training of the dogs and handlers. Specifically, the respondents were most concerned about whether the training of the handlers was adequate for the combat role. The handler, they suggested, seems to be the member of the team whose performance is the

most questionable. The handler has to develop a keen ability to read his individual dog. The sustainment of the dog teams' effectiveness before, during, and after operations is also a major concern.

A total of 26 responses were received by me as of October 16, 2005.<sup>10</sup> The demographic composition of these respondents is: 1 – Korean War Handler, 13 – Vietnam War Handlers, 10 -- Current Handlers, Current Program Managers, Kennel Masters, and Trainer/Instructors, and 2 – “Others” category. In addition, I also received numerous emails with individual comments referring to several questions, though these individuals did not complete the entire questionnaire. Of the respondents, 17 had seen combat as dog handlers in at least one theater. Only one person responded with a negative perception about the dogs' capabilities. He was a former sentry dog handler and on two occasions the dog alerted and, according to him, could have led to “friendly fire” incidents that could have killed Americans.

What follows is a summary of the concerns addressed and raised in response to the questionnaire.

## **B. PROCUREMENT**

Procurement is a perennial issue. Especially contentious are what breeds and breeders to use, and whether dogs should be single of dual purpose. This raises the question of what the dogs are being procured for. John Spivey, First Sergeant of D Company, 701<sup>st</sup> Military Police Battalion at Lackland AFB, describes the issue in these terms:

...the DoD needs to widen its vendor base and look at other vendors, particularly in the US. The personnel they have selecting dogs for training must realize that we are looking for War Dogs and not police K-9s. The dogs we are procuring are too small in most cases and do not have strong enough drive.” (questionnaire response, October 12, 2005)

Worse is the perception, deserved or not, that, “the Air Force screens and keeps the best dogs for themselves; they recently sold a BLIND dog to the Army that had already been rejected by the Mine dog school” (Michael Landers, a former handler, September 29, 2005). The issue according to Bill Riley, a former handler, is that, “In the

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<sup>10</sup> I cannot say with how many people received the questionnaires, as they were distributed through the internet and the US War Dog Website.

past poor quality, civilian rejected dogs were successfully trained for sentry work, but more complex higher demanding functions required better dogs” (questionnaire response, October 7, 2005).

There is a continual debate about dual versus single purpose dogs. According to Captain Haggerty, a former handler, “Dual purpose dogs are a mistake. The Scout Dog is the exception, but they are not ‘dual purpose’ but rather also detect mines, punji pit, trip wires. If you were trapped in a mine field and a dog was assigned to get you out would you rather the dog be a mine and patrol dog or a full-time mine dog?”

According to Mike Lister, a former handler:

Patrol Dogs are dual purpose if they are also trained in explosive detection or drug detection, and they do both well. I am sure you could also train a Patrol Dog to be a Scout Dog, or possibly a mine dog. When training the Super Dogs at Ft. Benning on scouting, mine detection, and tracking, there were some problems. [We] Thought the dogs could perform all three functions, they were not as proficient as the specialized dog. This was especially true when teaching the scout or mine dog to track, because they were trained to keep their heads up for airborne scent, and vice versa for tracker dogs. Could one dog be trained to be a scout dog and mine dog, yes it is possible, but my experience says their proficiency would drop. (questionnaire response, September 29, 2005)

If the dog is expected to perform a particular task flawlessly, then a single purpose dog may be the best option. The dual purpose dog provides an increased capability with fewer numbers, since a dog can perform two roles: patrolling and drug/narcotics detection, for instance.

An issue subsidiary to procurement is what to do with dog teams once the service-member receives orders to leave the theater. Current and former handlers alike believe that dogs and handlers should rotate together. This is primarily due to the “bond” that develops between the dog and the handler that makes them a team. Some handlers who operated in Vietnam do admit that the dogs could stay and work with new handlers, as they did there. That way the dog is familiar and adjusted to the environment. As one individual remarked, “I think a dog that has adapted to the theater gives the new handler a better chance of coming home alive. Mine taught me all he knew.” Others are concerned that dogs need time away from combat, just as people do, in order to remain effective.

Or, as Kiernan Holliday, a former handler put it:

The answer to this question is governed by emotions. It makes no difference what arguments you marshal on either side, the answer is always going to be based on your belief about dogs and people. If you believe that dogs should stay with handlers because they form a "bond," then the answer is yes. Dogs aren't people, they're dogs. We changed handlers on the dogs in Vietnam every year, and it worked fine. If you have a good dog who works well in combat, why bring it back to the States? If the answer is to satisfy a "bond" between the handler and the dog, then you're back to emotions. (questionnaire response, September 11, 2005)

Jim Pettit, the SSD program manager for the US Army Engineer Center, voices concerns over not only procurement of the dogs, but also about handlers:

Great care must be taken in the selection of personnel for training as a dog handler. A trained dog expertly handled will pay untold dividends, whereas a badly handled one might easily become a liability. Potential handlers must be chosen from volunteers who possess a natural understanding of and sympathy with dogs. Reliability is another essential characteristic of the potential handler; a person must be capable of performing without strict supervision what he/she has been taught during training. (questionnaire response, October 11, 2005)

Overall, it seems the current procurement process is working adequately. Whether the system can accommodate larger numbers if needed is questionable, as it always has been in the past.

### **C. TRAINING**

Beyond selection and procurement is training. Gregory Blaylock's response to the questionnaire, on October 18, 2005, in reference to training was:

I tell each graduating class I get to speak to that, as a dog handler, I kept looking for that one 'expert' trainer or kennel master, or that next course/class that would teach me everything I need to know...it doesn't exist. We must always seek to improve. The enemy studies our Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, just as we study theirs. And they change accordingly. Getting things changed from the operational world to the training world seems to be a particular challenge. Formal course changes involve reviews and validations and many other 'procedures.' We need a more real-time method of adapting to changes in theater tactics/needs. Keep in mind, however, except for SSD we train dog and handler separately – only to an apprentice level. I believe we share the responsibility to make needed improvements with the entire MWD world. What makes MWD teams effective is just that...TEAM. The dogs and

new handlers we train should be paired at the gaining base and trained, trained, trained. There should always be Regional Training Centers to provide "Just In Time" training for those bound for specific theaters of operation. (questionnaire response, October 18, 2005)

Such statements are echoed over and over. Or, as John Burnam puts it:

I can only suggest that the course for any type of training be mocked-up to mirror a realistic scenario one would expect to encounter during a live mission. That scenario should be constantly tested for its reliability and preparedness of the dog team, and its application to beat the current needs of the missions being assigned. The course material and mock-ups should evolve and be managed with the current lessons learned provided from the field in the practical combat situations now being encountered. (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005)

Other suggestions for enhancing training include: running test scenarios with old versus new training methods to compare them; a required stint at the National Training Center (NTC) or another training center; and a train the trainer course for troubleshooting problems.

Another point of concern is that current handlers have almost no experience training with infantry. This is of concern since the dog generally has to be desensitized to new conditions so that the handler learns to read the dog's reactions. If the dog team has not been trained with an infantry unit and then has to operate with one on a deployment, the handler may discover that the dog may need more training in order to be effective, yet the time required for re-training is not likely to be available. One reason this is important is that, as Burnam points out, "I learned in Vietnam that once my dog alerted on the enemy, I was nothing more than an infantryman in combat and survival depended on other skills" (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005).

Most current handlers have never conducted long marches with their dogs. One exception is Spivey, who saw combat in Panama. Another individual responded that he marches with his dog monthly on his own initiative. Currently, there seem to be no requirements regarding physical conditioning of the canine member of the dog team. This issue is one that seems to merit further attention.

As Bill Riley explains:

As an instructor we force marched the training dog platoons on a regular basis. They needed to be ready for the hot humid climate of Viet Nam.

Handlers were taught how to identify and treat K-9 heat exhaustion or prostration. A dog team that is not properly conditioned becomes a hazard. If the dog doesn't have stamina it will become tired and lose interest. He may start to slack off and stop picking up scent. Walking point or being on guard requires a full attention. (questionnaire response, October 7, 2005)

Whereas most former handlers were trained on all methods of transportation and deployment, helicopters, military vehicles, rappelling, waterborne, current handlers are not receiving formal training in all transportation methods. The implication is there is no set standard, and that training varies from kennel to kennel.

One of the points that must be reiterated is that training *must* be ongoing and continuous. Burnam emphasizes training, but also the responsibility of the handler:

There is always that little fear factor of 'Am I prepared for life and death situations in combat?' You hope you are prepared and training pays off. But you're never sure until you get in the field and put your dog to work on point. In Vietnam, no one ensured I was prepared. It was not an item on a checklist that was checked off by the dog platoon leader before I walked out the gate to go on a mission. I was just expected to be ready for a mission when called upon. Therefore, it was up to me to be prepared. (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005)

Unfortunately, as one anonymous respondent points out, "I stand behind my belief that nothing prepares you for the real thing. I do believe I was adequately trained to be trained some more, whether by real-world personal experience or simulation" (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005).

Theodore McCall III explains that all contexts or environments are important:

Dogs will be most proficient if trained in the environment that they will work in, you can't train a dog in too many environments, but unfamiliar environments can seriously affect the dogs understanding of what is expected of it. For example, take a dog and teach it to jump a standard obedience hurdle, once it has mastered it and you know the dog will perform on command, take the dog to a fence that it can see through, that is the same height, and give the command to jump. 99% of the time the dog will not understand what it is expected to do. However, if you teach the dog to jump a hurdle, wall, bush, rope, etc., and then bring it to a fence the very first time, the dog will most likely jump the fence without hesitation. (questionnaire response, October 14, 2005)

In other words, begin with a baseline and add variation to it. This even applies to specialized or environment-specific training.

#### **D. SERVICE SELECTION**

As has been alluded to above, and as John Burnam states:

The dog handler is really an infantryman when deployed to support infantry ground operations. I was a combat infantryman with the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry before becoming a war dog handler. I saw plenty of combat and was wounded in combat. During my second tour in Vietnam as a scout dog handler with the 44<sup>th</sup> Scout Dog Platoon, I relied heavily on my infantry combat experience as a scout dog handler supporting infantry ground operations. It worked and I survived along with my dog. After basic dog training has been completed at the dog training center, I think the dog team should be shipped to an infantry unit for further training. This would familiarize the infantry unit with the purpose and use of a dog team as well as the dog team with the infantry unit's make up and operational capabilities. (questionnaire response, September 30, 2005)

If infantry is the future "environment" in which the dog will work then this is who should help train the dog. Or, as Kiernan Holliday points out:

Of course, the Marines and the Army use the dogs for different work than the Air Force does. It simply makes sense to train the dogs and the handlers for the mission. A basic familiarization course for all services to teach the handlers how to deal with the dogs is probably necessary. Looking back on it, that was what the Sentry Dog Handler Course did. (questionnaire response, September 11, 2005)

Again, much of this is a matter of common sense and, as remarked on by Bill Riley:

A sentry dog is a sentry dog. I trained platoons of both Army and Marines in scout dog deployment. The dogs were implemented in the same way. The specific needs of a Navy SEAL could be quite unique and not common to other services. If there is a specialty, the best trainers are people with operational experience and understanding of the unique requirements within that discipline. (questionnaire response, October 7, 2005)

#### **E. FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following are my recommendations based on the research conducted for this thesis. These recommendations do not take into account the expenditure of resources required, and each is intended only as a point for further consideration and research.

1. The current DoD dog program must include more extensive scenario-based, realistic training. Nothing is more important as far as former handlers are concerned. The scenario-based training has to be based on a system that includes feedback from units that have been to combat to ensure that units in the combat areas get what they need and adjustments are made as the threats change.

2. The DoD MWD Program must incorporate an After Action Review (AAR) Report. The report should be simple while providing information that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the current use of dogs in combat. This data can be used as future justification for expanding particular programs or modifications to programs. Currently, no formal system is in effect to collect data. The one page AAR forms used in Vietnam had more potential than was realized at the time—and are worth a close look today. The Vietnam Scout Dog Program at Fort Benning used these AAR forms to adjust training if certain trends became apparent via the reports.

3. The DoD MWD Program should make Lackland AFB the repository for all military working dog information. A library to collect military manuals and documents and civilian publications on working dogs should be created and maintained. The ideal solution would be a web-based library to be maintained by Lackland AFB, accessible to all current and former handlers. Such a library would provide a “reach back” capability to handlers who are deployed. A bulletin or message board would also be tremendously helpful.

4. The DoD MWD Program should maintain a database listing former and current handlers, similar to the database that already exists for its dogs.

5. The DoD MWD Program should consider using former handlers from Vietnam and others with combat experience to proof, vet, and validate the training currently being conducted or developed. The Vietnam War dog handlers have a wealth of experience and many would be willing to give the program their honest, candid recommendations and evaluations.

6. The DoD MWD program should incorporate Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). The MTT personnel would be educated in the latest training, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and lessons learned from units in Iraq and Afghanistan. The MTTs could then

share these with the field units and Kennel Masters to ensure that everyone has the latest information, as well as serving as points of contact for “reach back” at Lackland AFB. The MTTs could also help guide greater baseline standardization.

7. The DoD MWD program must increase its efforts to educate the leadership of the supported units. This must start at the patrol leader level and work to the highest levels of leadership. Increased awareness will only enhance the program’s ability to justify increases in manpower and funding. The greater awareness there is among the leadership, the more such awareness will enhance the effectiveness of the dog teams since the leaders will have a greater appreciation for their capabilities *and* limitations.

Spivey suggests that:

Large majorities of the MWD Handlers are young, junior enlisted Soldiers that typically do not have the experience level that is required to brief commanders and operational planners on what their capabilities and limitations are, thus we have teams that are being mis-utilized and/or underutilized. Example – A Patrol/Explosive MWD team being used exclusively at an access control point and not being used in a direct combat or combat support role....MWD course students must be trained in a realistic fashion and must be educated on how to “Sell” themselves to their commanders. Proper use of MWD teams must be taught at all NCOES and Officers Training Courses; if officers and NCOs are given a brief understanding of the roles that an MWD Team can perform and given guidance on how not to use the teams, I believe this will go a long way in helping the program to grow and become stronger. (Response to questionnaire received on October 12, 2005)

The program could develop its equivalent of “mod-demo teams” (in US Army Special Forces). The teams could be comprised of retired dogs and handlers with the mission to educate leaders throughout the military. The use of retirees would then allow for demonstration for education purposes while not pulling current dog teams from training or operations. Also, the dog program could develop videos to be shown at the various Services’ leadership courses. These videos would educate the junior officers and NCOs who will be leading the patrols to which the dog team will be assigned.

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# APPENDIX A: THE GUIDE FOR TRAINING OF SCOUT DOG PLATOONS FROM THE OFFICE OF SENIOR ADVISOR DURING THE ARVN ADVISOR PROGRAM, PROVIDED BY JESSE MENDEZ

OFFICE OF SENIOR ADVISOR  
ARVN HEADQUARTERS COMBAT TRAINING CENTER  
TRUNG TUYEN PROVINCE

3 Oct 1962

SUBJECT: Guide for Training Scout Dog Platoons

1. Unit Training. When a scout dog and his handler arrive at their TO&E Unit their training has only started. It is the responsibility of the Platoon Leader to organize a training program for his Platoon and to insure that each dog and handler train daily, except when on a combat operation.

2. Type Training. The training program for each Platoon should consist of the following:

- a. Basic Obedience
- b. Intermediate Obedience
- c. Advanced Obedience
- d. Specialized Training consisting of Quartering a Field, simulated and outpost duty.

3. Specialized Dog Training Principles, this is the most important phase of the scout dog training program and comprises (75) percent of the Units training. Scout dogs should consist of specialized training. The following fundamental principles apply.

(a). The dog must be trained for only one job: He may learn to be a scout dog or Sentry dog, but never both.

(b). The general attitude of the handler is all important. A handler must fully realize the importance of the work that he is doing. He must understand and appreciate the facts that dogs are used to conserve manpower, conserve life and to further the work of the Military Service through the use of their peculiar powers.

(c). The importance of the handler dog relationship cannot be overestimated. The dog and his handler must work as a team. Once a team has been formed, the team should not be separated.

(d). Association of dog with special training. Where special equipment is used, such as the harness, the dog must learn to associate this equipment with his work.

(e). The dog should be motivated not only by his handlers praise and affection, but also by the goal of accomplishing a mission. The dog can and should be trained to complete a task as an end in itself, not simply for the sake of reward by his master. In all his training, therefore, he must be urged to finish every exercise successfully, no matter how many errors he makes. He must always "win".

(f). Conduct training over varying terrain and in the face of gunfire and other distractions to develop the dog's responsibility for given tasks and to insure the accomplishment of his mission.

(g). In the early stages of training, training should be conducted during daylight. The effects of daylight training will carry over into actual service at night. Training is difficult to conduct in darkness because the handler can't see all errors to observe the dog's errors and correct them. But the dog can

CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

carry over into night performance the effects of good daylight training. The dog and handler must be proficient in daylight training before any training at night is attempted.

(h). Review of previous training maintains and raises the level of performance. Handlers must use their best judgement in determining how often and how many times previously learned exercises should be repeated.

(i). Successful training of Military dogs depends on the care taken for their welfare. Unless the dogs are kept in good health, properly groomed, fed, and kenneled, the effectiveness of the training program will be diminished.

#### (4). TRAINING CONDITIONS.

(a). The handler must learn to read and understand his dog so that he can interpret his every signal with regard to the approach or presence of the Enemy's Scent, sound or sight.

(b). Members of the dog Platoon will act as decoys.

(c). Training will be conducted in the prescribed training area. The decoy should not always conceal himself behind a tree, rock or bush because a dog will soon associate such spots with his discovery of the decoy and will consequently rely on his inferior eyesight to find him. He will not use his nose and ears, which are the senses he must learn to depend on. Training locations in the training area must be changed daily so that the dog does not learn to associate the decoy with a given area.

(5). Wind and Scent. The wind is the most important, and at the same time, the most variable factor a handler has to contend with in employing his scout dog to the best advantage. It is the wind that carries the all important human scent to the dog or away from him (a scout dog does not track) a handler must therefore always be wind-conscious. He should learn all he can about the wind "habits" and he should be able to feel or sense what direction the wind is blowing at any time without having to rely on such expedients as dropping dust or a handful of hair from the dog's back and noting its direction of drift. If a handler keeps track of the wind and his dog gives an alert, he knows that there is only one direction to look for the enemy. The exceptions to this course when the dog gives a sound or sight alert. A handler must be able to distinguish the different types of alerts his dog gives from close familiarity with his dog's reactions as observed in training.

(6). Effects of Topography on wind. Wind hitting a hilltop, crest of a hill or heavy undergrowth is prone to break into two or three smaller streams. Scents blown by the wind off a hill top or from a man in a tree may be scattered, blown into the air or dissipated before it comes into contact with the ground. A dog, when he does pick up the scent from a hill top or a tree will find it once he comes close because it is being blown over his head. The only wind that carries scent with any steadiness is that which comes over a flat or even surface.

#### (7). Impermanence of Scent.

(a). Human scent dissipates more rapidly in a hot and dry climate than it does in an area where there is quite a bit of moisture. Heat from the sun makes scents evaporate rather rapidly. During rains, scent remains close to its source.

(b). Human scent from foxholes or other holes in the ground become borne by the wind because scents evaporate as it rises, this type of scent is not as strong as that from men in the open.

(c). The scent factors listed in Paragraphs (a) and (b) above will determine the distance at which a dog will be able to detect the enemy's presence from scent.

(3). Silence of Scout 1-12. The silence of a Scout Dog is struck  
usually in all cases of training or in a kennel or c. If the dog  
attempts to bark or whine, he is given "K". If he whines or barks he is  
silenced by his handler who will then praise him when he is silent.

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# APPENDIX B: THE PERSONNEL LISTING FOR THE 26TH IPSD AT FORT BENNING, PROVIDED BY JESSE MENDEZ

**TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES**  
**SECTION II - ORGANIZATION**

TDA NO. \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
TDA  MTDA

INDEX		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	ID	REQ	AUTH	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	MTDA SEQ	BMC
PAR	LINE										
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
01	00	Detachment Headquarters									
	01	Commander	Major	04371			1	1			01
	02	Plvt Sgt	E5	11420			1	1			01
	03	Unit Administrative Specialist	E5	71230			1	1			04
	04	Clerk Typist	E4	71830			2	2			08
02	00	Support Section									
	01	Section Kennel Officer	L4	04371			1	1			02
	02	Kennel NCO	E7	91740			1	1			04
	03	Supply NCO	E7	78240			1	1			04
	04	Kennel Steward	E4	94840			1	1			09
	05	Asst Supply NCO	E5	78240			1	1			03
	06	Kennel NCO	E5	43240			1	1			04
	07	Senior Vet Animal Specialist	E5	91740			1	1			04
	08	First Cook	E5	94220			2	2			09
	09	Vet Animal Specialist	E4	91720			2	2			04
	10	Supply Clerk	E4	78430			1	1			09
	11	Cook	E4	94220			4	4			09
	12	Ammer	E4	78230			1	1			04
	13	Light Vehicle Driver	E3	11730			9	9			04
14	Kennelman	E3	11730			9	9			02	
03	00	Operations and Instructional Sec.									
	01	Director Oper and Instruction	L4	04371			1	1			02
	02	Asst Director of Instruction	E6	33230			1	1			03
	03	Operations NCO	E7	11740			1	1			02
	04	Chief Instructor	E7	00C40			6	6			03
	05	Senior Instructor	E6	00C40			12	12			03
	06	Instructor	E5	00C40			12	12			04
	07	Asst Instructor	E4	00C30			12	12			04
	08	Training Specialist	E4	11730			1	1			04
	09	Clerk	E4	71420			1	1			09

DA FORM 2952-R (Replaces DA Form 608-4 (1 and 6 parts) and DA Form 608-4a (1 part), which are obsolete effective 1 Oct 65)

**TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES  
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION**

TDA NO  
DATE

TDA  MTDA

DESIGNATION		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	SR	TD	REQ	AUTH	ARMY MGT STRUCTURE CODE	MTD REQ	RMC
INDEX											
PAR	LINE										
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
		<del>Headquarters</del>									
		<b>Officers</b>									
		Infantry 04371	3								
			1	1							
		<b>Non-Commissioned Officers</b>									
		11630	1		1						
		11730	1		1						
		91740	2		1		1	1			
		76240	2		1		1	1			
		11740	1			1					
		00040	30		6	12		12			
		94040	1			1					
		94030	2					2			
		63040	1					1			
		71820	1					1			
			42		2	8	14		18		
		<b>Other Enlisted Personnel</b>									
		71810	1						1		
		71820	1						1		
		91720	2						2		
		76410	1						1		
		94020	4						4		
		76230	1						1		
		11720	2						2		
		11710	16							16	
		00020	12						12		
		11720	1						1		
		71820	1						1		
			42						26	16	

DA FORM 2952-R (Replaces DA Form 508 4 (1 and 6 parts) and DA Form 508 4a, 1 Jul 65) which are obsolete effective 1 Oct 65.

**TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION AND ALLOWANCES  
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION**

TDA NO  
DATE


TDA  MTDA

DESIGNATION		DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BR	TD	REQ	AUTH	ARMY MCT STRUCTURE CODE	MTDA REQ	RMC
INDEX											
PAY	LINE										
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
		REMARKS:									
	01	Grade Not Authorized									
	02	Grade Authorized TOE title change required									
	03	Grade Authorized TD title change required									
	04	Grade Authorized TOE MOS & title change required									
	05	Grade Authorized TD MOS & title change required									
	06	Up-grading of Grade & title Change required TO Auth									
	07	Down-grading of Grade & title Change required TO Auth									
	08	TOE Grade & title Auth									
	09	TD Grade & title Auth									

DA FORM 2952-R (1 Jul 65) (Replaces DA Form 608-4 (1 and 6 parts) and DA Form 608-4a. which are obsolete effective 1 Oct 65)

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**APPENDIX C: THE REMAINING PORTIONS OF OPERATIONAL  
READINESS TEST USED AT FORT BENNING, PROVIDED  
BY JESSE MENDEZ**



ORT  
INF PLATOON  
SCOUT DOG

34-112

ANNEX H (Critique Note Outline) to ORT Directive (Continued)

6. Conduct of River Crossing & Sweep Operations:

7. Reaction to Ambush:

8. Perimeter Defense:

PHASE III

9. Heliborne Techniques:

10. Search and Operations in VC Village:

H-2

ANNEX H (Critique Note Outline) to ORT Directive (Continued)

OVERALL COMMENTS

11. Major Strength:

12. Major Weaknesses:

13. Recommended Future Training:


14. Rating: (Combat Ready) (Not Combat Ready):

---

EVALUATOR

H-3

SFC MENDOZA



ORT  
INF PLATOON  
SCOUT DOG

34-1151

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 29TH INFANTRY  
197th INFANTRY BRIGADE  
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905

AJIB-1-29

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Test Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

TO: See Distribution

1. Purpose: This letter outlines the administrative requirements and general conduct of the operational readiness test.

2. General Description: This Operational Readiness Test has no precedent. Currently, there is no training test prescribed for testing the Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog). This test was developed to supplant the usual ATT conducted and prescribed for the majority of Army units. The duration of the test will be approximately 56 hours divided into three phases. The scheduled test dates and units are as indicated below. Fort Benning training area W-1, W-2, W-3 and W-4 will be used as the primary test site and area.

Test Dates: \_\_\_\_\_

Units to be Tested: \_\_\_\_\_

3. Objectives:

a. To determine the combat readiness of each tested scout dog platoon.

b. To provide the commanders concerned with an objective evaluation of the state of training of these scout dog platoons.

c. To provide a realistic training exercise for the participating units and personnel making maximum use of limited tactical training areas.

4. Concept:

a. The test will be conducted on the Fort Benning Military Reservation utilizing training area W-1 thru -4 and available mock-up Vietnamese villages.

AJIB-1-29

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Test Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

b. The conduct of the test will be based upon the following assumptions:

- (1) Friendly forces have air superiority
- (2) Both Aggressor and friendly forces have CBR capabilities.
- (3) There will be live aggressor play; represented on the ground on a one-for-one basis.
- (4) Medical evacuation of simulated casualties can be made by helicopter only at cleared landing sites.
- (5) The tested units and supporting troops participating as friendly forces will be required to operate tactically throughout the entire test.

c. Platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders will be allowed sufficient time for troop leading procedures.

d. Each tested platoon will undergo the following:

- (1) Combat preparedness checks of personnel and equipment
- (2) Scouting and patrolling
- (3) Ambush and counter-ambush exercises
- (4) Search and Clear operations
- (5) River crossing
- (6) Perimeter defense
- (7) Air assault via helicopter
- (8) Armored Personnel Carrier familiarization

e. Ratings: Each scout dog platoon will be judged to be either 'Combat Ready' or 'Not Combat Ready', in accordance with the following:

- (1) The overall demonstrated performance of the platoon to conduct its TOE mission
- (2) Control and troop leading procedures of unit leaders
- (3) Camouflage, concealment and security
- (4) Reaction to CBR situations
- (5) Demonstrated health and field sanitation practices
- (6) Evaluation of the individual scout dogs and handlers

f. Critique: The critique will be scheduled for the morning immediately following the conclusion of the test. The shuttling of the units through Phase III of the test precludes holding the critique following the close of the test. A written report will be provided to the platoon leader at a later date.

AJIIB-1-29

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Test Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dogs)

5. Administrative/Logistical:

- a. Actual and simulated intelligence will be played.
- b. Medical personnel with an M-170 ambulance will be required throughout the test. Phase III may require additional medical coverage if two different Vietnamese mock-up villages are utilized.
- c. Real casualties will be reported to the OIC immediately and evacuated to Martin Army Hospital, if required.
- d. Requests for resupply of POL, blank ammo, etc., will be processed through control HQ. Vehicles will be refueled daily.
- e. Supporting troops, friendly and aggressor, will be fed by their parent units; the unit providing the preponderance of personnel will be responsible to coordinate on issuance of rations - only one mess line will be operated in either the friendly and aggressor force area. Control personnel will feed with the friendly force.
- f. Vehicle transportation will be by organic vehicles or as supplied in accordance with Annex E, Administrative Requirements.
- g. Blank ammunition, simulators, and other pyrotechnics will be issued as available.
- h. Control headquarters will act as all higher headquarters for friendly force problem play, i.e., forward observers, company headquarters etc.
- i. Uniforms for the tested platoons and friendly forces will be fatigues with field gear and weapons.
- j. All TOE equipment issued to the tested platoons will be with the platoons during the period of the test.

6. Communications:

- a. A field telephone will be installed by communications personnel of the 1/29 Infantry to provide telephonic communications between the control group operations center and the Fort Benning telephone system.

AJIIB-1-29

SUBJECT: Operational Readiness Test Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

- b. Details of control net are given in Annex C.
- c. Communications for the friendly force and aggressor force will be by radios provided by supporting units; see Annex E.
- d. Radio frequencies will be assigned in accordance with Appendix I to Annex C.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ANNEXES: A - Scenario  
B - Control Plan w/overlays  
C - General Plan  
D - Instructions for Aggressor Forces  
E - Administrative/Support Requirements  
F - Orientation and Critique  
G - Evaluation Sheets  
H - Critique Note Outline

DISTRIBUTION: Special

ANEX A (Scenario) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

#### GENERAL SITUATION

Friendly forces have been operating in the area South of the CHEE (Chattahoochee) River on a search and destroy operation during the past few days. Elements, consisting of two platoons, of Co \_\_\_\_\_, 1/29th Inf, are currently in a defensive perimeter VIC FL 897766 awaiting instructions on future operations. Prior to this date, VC contact has been light and sporadic, with no organized resistance. Reconnaissance air patrols during the night utilizing infra-red radar equipment detected motorized movements approaching UCHEE CREEK along Highway 101 (101st Airborne Div Road) from the Southeast. Additional Intell reports indicate that the VC apparently detrucked somewhere in the vicinity of UCHEE CREEK in an apparent attempt to surprise and oppose friendly force units. Early this morning, two scout dog platoons arrived at La Son (Larson) Air Base (25 miles to the North) and were proceeding SE on Highway 101 to join their new parent units. Due to the overnight movement of VC along Highway 101, Higher HQ's directed Co \_\_\_\_\_, 1/29th Inf to intercept the two scout dog platoons and attach them to Co \_\_\_\_\_ (-) for immediate employment in their area of operations.

#### PHASE I SITUATION

Due to the vagueness of intelligence concerning the sudden overnight move of the VC. Co \_\_\_\_\_ (-), 1/29th Inf is directed to send out patrols from their base perimeter to search their immediate area utilizing the new scout dog units. The patrols are directed along prescribed routes with an additional mission of establishing ambush sites along trails in the area. It is expected that VC movements in the area will not be willingly conducted during daylight hours due to FF air superiority but rather at dusk or at night.

#### PHASE II SITUATION

The VC activity disclosed as a result of yesterday's patrols and ambushes reveal the necessity of executing a search and clear operation. A captured POW has revealed that a small number of VC are concentrated in the area West of the Highway 101 - UCHEE River bridge vicinity coord FL 903748. Snipers have become increasingly active. Due to the increased sniper activity it is decided to employ APC's to move the FF to their search and clear operation. Concurrently, additional patrols are dispatched to seek and destroy snipers in the area.

#### PHASE III SITUATION

The VC activity within the area of operations has subsided due to the successful friendly forces operations conducted yesterday (Phase II). Intelligence reports indicate that a VC headquarters has been using the village of Thong Lo Vic (L. 090918). Higher headquarters directs that the 1/29th Inf conduct a heli-borne operation, augmented by scout dogs, on a search and destroy mission against the suspected village. Co \_\_\_\_\_, 1/29th Inf is given this mission.

A-1

ANNEX C (General Plan) to ORT Directive (Inf Plat Scout Dog)

1. Planning Concepts. a. The organization of the friendly forces (FF) should be such that unit integrity and control are enhanced. In this connection, the officers and enlisted personnel should all be from the same base unit. The inherent results will become obvious during the conduct of the ORT. Additionally, participation as the friendly force in the ORT is an excellent opportunity for personnel of the 1/29 Inf to receive tactical unit level training.

b. The OIC, ORT directs all information, instructions, orders, etc, through the FF comdr thereby exercising the leadership techniques of the Officers and NCO's involved in the FF chain of command. In this connection, the scout dog leaders are required to advise, recommend, and support the operations of the friendly forces - a realistic function in their normal operations.

c. The FF base camp is required to be tactical in every respect. No civilian cars are permitted. Rations and blank ammunition supplies are maintained at the control CP.

d. The control CP is located Vic FL 885767. It is separated from the sphere of activity of the entire ORT operations in an attempt to keep the problem area realistic and void of administrative matters. It is an administrative CP operated with the minimum personnel. This control CP maintains radio contact with both FF and Aggressor and has a drop (telephone) line into the main post switchboard.

e. The evaluators are in the same uniform as the FF except for shoulder harness and weapons. This aids to keep the patrols as close to realistic as possible. The evaluators are all provided by the 26th Scout Dog Training Unit. They do not interfere whatsoever, except in emergencies, in the conduct of the patrol or tactical operations. They should remain as obscure as possible.

2. Control Signals. a. Aside from voice and radio control over actions during the ORT, two visual signals are utilized to halt the action in emergency situations:

- (1) Daylight hours - RED SMOKE GRENADE - CAUTION, GRASS FIRES MAY RESULT.
- (2) Darkness hours - WHITE STAR CLUSTER " " " "

b. These pyrotechnics are issued to all evaluators and control personnel (OIC, Asst OIC, FF Comdr, and Aggressor OIC).

c. Anyone seeing or sensing a dangerous or unsafe situation is authorized to call a halt to the action.

3. Organization of Patrols. a. Initially, the FF including the tested Scout Dog Placeons, are organized into two groups (A and B).

b. Phase I - Each group forms into 4 patrols each. The aggressor force is divided into 4 equal forces, one for each of the 4 patrol routes. This organization permits the maximum number of dogs to be gainfully employed and tested.

ANNEX C (General Plan) to ORT Directive (Inf Plat Scout Dog) (Cont'd)

c. Phase II - The nature of the operations are larger in scale requiring that the FF and scout dog platoons organize their groups into two patrols each.

d. Phase III - The patrol organization of Phase II is maintained for this operation.

e. The scout dog platoon leaders select their teams to support each operation. There is no requirement that all dog/handler teams be employed during each phase - this decision is left to these platoon leaders.

4. The appendices to this annex outline the composition of the radio nets utilized during the ORT (Operational Readiness Test).

APPENDIX

- 1 - Aggressor Forces and Control Net - SOI
- 2 - Friendly Forces - SOI

Appendix 1 (Aggressor Forces and Control Net - SOI) to Annex C to ORT Directive  
(Inf Plat Scout Dog)

AGGRESSOR FORCES AND CONTROL NET SIGNAL OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

Call sign - LAVISH CRITIC	Frequency - 18.4
Control Headquarters (NCS)	Lavish Critic - 28
OIC/ORT Director	Lavish Critic - 3
Asst ORT Director	Lavish Critic - 33
NOIC Director Staff	Lavish Critic - 34
Aggressor Force Commander	Lavish Critic - 46
Aggressor Patrols vs Group A	
a. Patrol #1	Lavish Critic - 41
b. Patrol #2	Lavish Critic - 42
c. Patrol #3	Lavish Critic - 43
d. Patrol #4	Lavish Critic - 44
Aggressor Patrols vs Group B	
a. Patrol #5	Lavish Critic - 51
b. Patrol #6	Lavish Critic - 52
c. Patrol #7	Lavish Critic - 53
d. Patrol #8	Lavish Critic - 54

1-C-1

FRIENDLY FORCES SIGNAL OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

Callsign - TOASTER CONTACT	Frequency -	38.4
Control Headquarters (NCS)	Toaster Contact -	28
OIC/ORT Director	" "	- 3
Asst OIC/Deputy Director	" "	- 33
Friendly Force Commander	" "	- 36
Group A Patrols:		
a. Patrol #1	" "	- 11
b. Patrol #2	" "	- 12
c. Patrol #3	" "	- 13
d. Patrol #4	" "	- 14
Group B Patrols:		
a. Patrol #1	" "	- 21
b. Patrol #2	" "	- 22
c. Patrol #3	" "	- 23
d. Patrol #4	" "	- 24

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AGGRESSOR FORCES

1. Composition and Organization.
  - a. The aggressor force will be composed of one officer-in charge, (LT), 16 NCO's and 24 other enlisted personnel.
  - b. The aggressor force will be organized into eight 5-man teams with an NCOIC, asst NCOIC (if available), and three other enlisted men for the first day. Four 10-man groups the 2d day; 20 men for the 3d day.
2. The aggressor force will have radio communications with each team with all teams operation of the same frequency. The control headquarters will also operate one radio on this frequency. Call signs and frequencies will be provided at coordination meeting.
3. The aggressor personnel will wear the aggressor uniform, be armed with the M14 rifle w/blank adapter (except M60 machine gunners), and wear web equipment with first aid pouch and canteen. Approx 20 aggressor personnel should be in civilian clothing w/weapon.
4. Transportation will be provided by parent unit.
5. Organic unit will be responsible to feed aggressors. In accordance with par 9-10, below, aggressor forces will require 3 meals in the field for the entire force and 2 meals for half of the force as follows:
  - a. Supper, 1st day - All
  - b. Breakfast, 2nd day - All
  - c. Dinner, 2nd day - All
  - d. Supper, 2nd day - 1/2 of group
  - e. Dinner, 3d day - 1/2 of group
6. Reconnaissance and briefings for aggressor OIC and team leaders will be as scheduled by senior OIC, 1/29th Infantry.
7. The senior OIC is responsible for safety throughout the test, however the aggressor commanders must insure that all safety requirements are strictly adhered to by their forces. The following requirements will apply:
  - a. No Physical contact will be made with the friendly forces.
  - b. Blank ammunition will not be fired at personnel within 30 yards of the firer.

ANNEX D (Instruction for Aggressor Forces) to ORF Directive (Inf Plat SD)

- d. No tampering with any blanks, simulators or pyrotechnics.
  - e. After each phase and prior to the release of any aggressors from the test site, a shakedown and turn-in of any remaining blanks, simulators, and pyrotechnics will be made by each team chief. The aggressor CIC will turn-in the unused items to control headquarters prior to requesting release of his personnel.
  - f. Any accidents or incidents will be reported without delay to the control headquarters. The aggressor radio frequency may be used for this purpose.
8. When the aggressor force is deployed within the test site, it is imperative that all personnel do their best to carry out the missions assigned. Nothing should be injected into the problem play that will detract from realism of the test; initiative in adding realism to the test is wholeheartedly welcome.
9. The aggressor force will be required to stay in the field overnight, and the provisions of par 7c, above, will apply prior to its release from the test area.
- a. The entire aggressor force will bivouac (administratively) in the field the first night of the test.
  - b. Upon completion of the river crossing portion of Phase II,  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the aggressor force will return with the APC's to the supporting units barracks. The remaining half of the aggressor force will stay in the field and probe the FF perimeter; this half of the aggressor force will return to its barracks upon completion of the probing action and is released from the problem.
  - c. Aggressor forces for Phase III (VC Village) will consist of those personnel released early from Phase II.
10. The aggressor rendezvous area is designated as the road junction PL 881772 for Phase I. Phase III rendezvous area will be the available VC Village. Aggressor forces will report to the rendezvous areas at the times specified below:
- a. Phase I, 1300 hrs at rendezvous point.
  - b. Phase III, 0700 hrs at VC Village.
- II.c Special equipment for Aggressor forces, provided by parent unit.
- a. 5 radios, AN/PRC 10. (Must be operational)
  - b. 4 each Metascopes for night operations only)

ANNEX D (Instructions for Aggressor Forces) to ORT Directive (Inf Flat SD)

- c. Flashlights, as required - for administrative use only.
  - d. 8 M60 MG for Phase I and II only; 4 M60 MG for phase III.
  - e. Lister Bag or extra water cans.
  - f. Insect repellent, as required.
12. Medical coverage and blank ammunition will be provided by 1/29th Inf.

D - 3

ANNEX (Administrative and Support Requirements) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: The requirements indicated within this Annex are based upon the testing of two scout dog platoons with the equivalent of four squads each (8 squads total).

1. Friendly force troop and equipment requirements.
  - a. 3 Officers, 16 NCO's (squad leaders and asst sq leaders); 64 other enlisted/ These personnel will remain in the field with the tested units for the entire test period.
  - b. Four 2½ ton trucks for transportation to test site only and pick up upon completion of test of exercise.
  - c. AM/VRC-10 radios (include 1 spare).
  - d. 8 compasses ( one per squad leader).
  - e. 10 maps or aerial photos of test area.
  - f. 4 APC M-113 w/mounted M-60 MG (Phase II).
  - g. Helicopters (Phase III) 1 CH 47 or 5 HUID.
  - h. 3 three-man rubber boats (Phase II) (safety for river crossing only).
  - i. Blank adapters for all M14s & M60 MGs.
  - j. One water trailer.
  - k. One ½ ton truck w/VRC-10 radio.
  - l. 2 M170 Ambulances w/Medics (1 to be used at control CP).
2. Aggressor forces troop and equipment requirements - see Annex D. Additionally, WAC personnel, if available, for Phase III.
3. Control group personnel and equipment requirements.
  - a. 2 Officers - OIC and Asst OIC.
  - b. 3 NCO's - Operate CP on 24 hr basis.
  - c. 2 ½ ton trucks w/VRC-10 radio each and drivers.
  - d. S-3 Operations Van w/driver.

**ANNEX ( Administrative and Support Requirements) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)**

- e. 1 admin vehicle, 3/4 ton truck w/trailer and driver (trailer for blank ammunition pick-up and storage).
- f. One water trailer - for control group personnel & aggressor force relocated to VC Village on 3d day of test.
- g. Field telephone - drop line into main post.
- h. Min of 8 scout dog evaluators - provided by 26th IPSD.

**4. Training Areas and Facilities:**

- a. Area W 1,2,3 & 4 Fort Benning, Military Reservation for entire 3 days of the ORT.
- b. VC Village (Requested in accordance w/ USAIC Circular 350-1) for the 3d day of the ORT.

**5. Blank ammunition and Pyrotechnics - for entire ORT and including all forces.**

- a. 22,000 7.62 blank ammo in cartons.
- b. 12,000 7.62mm blank, linked.
- c. 20 Grenade, hand, smoke, red.
- d. 20 Grenade, hand, smoke, yellow.
- e. 50 flare, trip.
- f. 200 booby trap, whistle.
- g. 200 simulators, grenade, hand.
- h. 20 flare, cluster, hand held.

**NOTE:** The 26th IPSD is responsible to submit the request for the blank ammunition and pyrotechnics in sufficient time prior to the test.

APPENDIX 1 (Control Group Material) to ANNEX E ORT Directive (Infantry  
Platoon Scout Dog)

LIST OF EXPENDABLE ITEMS

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Folding Tables	2 Each
Folding Chairs	6 Each
A-Frame	1 Each
Map Boards	2 Each
Acetate	1 Roll
Envelopes, Large	20 Each
Thumb Tacks	1 Box
Pencils	2 Dozen
Grease Pencils, Red, Blue, Black	1 Dozen Each
Scotch Tape	1 Roll
Engineer Tape	1 Roll
Masking Tape	1 Roll
Colored Tape, Red, Black	1 Roll Each
Tablets, Lined	2 Each
Paper Clips	1 Box
3 x 5 Cards & Index Markers	1 Set
Stapler	1 Each
Staples	1 Box
Message Form Books	3 Each
Rags	2 Each
CP Tent	1 Each
Water Trailer	1 Each
Latrine Box	1 Each
Toilet Paper	10 Rolls
Shovel	1 Each
Pick, Mattock	1 Each
Axe	1 Each

ANNEX F (Orientation and Critique) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout  
Dog)

ORIENTATION AND CRITIQUE

1. The tested platoons will be oriented on the test by the senior OIC prior to the beginning of the test. The time and location of this briefing will be announced at a later date. A critique of the entire test will be made the day following the termination of the test. All control and evaluation personnel will be present.
2. The initial orientation will include as a minimum:
  - a. General description of the test to include the test objectives and concept of test operation.
  - b. The evaluation system to be utilized and ratings to be determined.
  - c. Specific safety measures applicable to the test (include prevention of heat injuries).
  - d. Identification of aggressors.
  - e. Control measures to be in effect, (include comment regarding cutting of trees, etc).
3. The oral critique will cover all phases of the test. Generally, comments will be confined to major strengths and weaknesses observed by the various evaluators and control personnel. The tested platoons will receive "Combat Ready" or "Not Combat Ready" ratings for their overall demonstrated performance.

ANNEX G (Evaluation Sheets) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

1. Attached as appendixes to this Annex are the various evaluation sheets to be utilized in preparing the ratings awarded each platoon at the conclusion of the operational readiness test. The use of each sheet is described below.

2. Individual Operational Readiness Check (Appendix 1):

This sheet is completed by the scout dog evaluator prior to the beginning of the tactical operations involved with the test. Another sheet is completed on the same individual on either the 2d or 3d day of the test as prescribed by the OIC.

3. Platoon Operational Readiness Check (Appendix 2):

This form is compiled by the FF OIC in conjunction with scout dog evaluators based upon observations throughout the 3 day exercise.

4. Scout Dog Evaluation Sheet (Appendix 3):

This form is prepared for each segment of each Phase by the scout dog evaluator. The form is prepared only for those dogs and handlers actually employed during the ORT situations.

4. Handlers After Action Report (Appendix 4):

This form is completed by the scout dog handler after each situation has ended. These reports are made only if the dog handler team was used during the Phase. These reports provide the evaluator with some insight as to the proficiency of the handlers individual capabilities.

Appendix 1 to Annex G to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

INDIVIDUAL OPERATIONAL READINESS CHECK

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SATISFACTORY</u>	
	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
1. Was individual wearing the prescribed uniform?	_____	_____
2. Was uniform clean and servicable?	_____	_____
3. First Aid Pouch and packet being worn?	_____	_____
4. Canteen filled with water?	_____	_____
5. Was personal hygiene supervised and required?	_____	_____
6. Was the individual weapon present; clean and operational?	_____	_____
7. Were sufficient magazines carried by the individual?	_____	_____
8. Was the individual properly oriented regarding his duties and mission?	_____	_____
9. Did the individual know the current password & countersign?	_____	_____
10. Individual's gas mask been properly fitted; inserts for glasses	_____	_____
11. Any extra material carried in the gas mask case?	_____	_____
12. Battlesight zero fixed on the individual's rifle?	_____	_____
13. Was a shelter half or poncho available to the soldier?	_____	_____
14. Did the individual leave any equip behind that would preclude his sustained operation in the field?	_____	_____
15. Items pertaining to the execution phase:		
a. Did the individual maintain himself and his dog?	_____	_____
b. Was maintenance performed on his individual wps/Equip?	_____	_____
c. Did he notify his squad leader of resupply needs?	_____	_____
d. Was he aware of the current mission? His mission?	_____	_____
e. Was individual aware of medical evacuation procedures in the event he became a casualty; his dog?	_____	_____
f. Did individual dispose of "C" rations waste properly?	_____	_____
16. Additional comments use reverse side.		
INDIVIDUAL INSPECTED _____	EVALUATOR _____	

Appendix 2 to Annex C to-ORT Directive ( IFF FLAT SCOUT DOG )

SCOUT DOG PLATOON OPERATIONAL READINESS CHECK

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SATISFACTORY</u>	
	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>
1. Was all TOE equipment with the platoon?	_____	_____
2. Was the platoon IA equipment serviceable?	_____	_____
3. Was the platoon prepared for sustained operations in the field?	_____	_____
4. Were vehicles operational?	_____	_____
5. Were vehicles topped off and have proper oil level?	_____	_____
6. Was OVE complete, stowed and free from rust and dirt?	_____	_____
7. Were vehicle log books maintained properly?	_____	_____
8. Were metascopes on hand and operational?	_____	_____
9. Did platoon personnel properly brief patrol leader on the employment of scout dog?	_____	_____
10. Did the platoon leader check the readiness of his element prior to assigning them to the patrol or mission?	_____	_____
11. Did the platoon leader debrief his personnel as to their effectiveness on assigned mission?	_____	_____
12. Was maintenance of the individual, dogs, & equipment properly supervised, planned and effected within the platoon?	_____	_____
13. Were adequate steps constantly being taken to prepare the platoon for the next operation or mission?	_____	_____
14. Was resupply of rations, water, and ammunition, etc, timely and adequate?	_____	_____
15. Were adequate dispersion, concealment, and cover used?	_____	_____
16. Were strength and casualty reports submitted by the platoon?	_____	_____
17. Were proper field sanitation practices adhered to?	_____	_____
18. Were meals fed tactically?	_____	_____
19. Was adequate security maintained with specific attention to mounted movements, during feeding, darkness, and perimeter ( unit defense )?	_____	_____
20. Platoon field SOP; Does it exist? is it adequate? Complete?	_____	_____
21. Were scout dogs rotated on assignments?	_____	_____
22. Other comments ( see reverse side )	PLATOON EVALUATED _____	EVALUATOR _____

APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX C to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

SCOUT DOG EVALUATION SHEET

FIELD		C.P.	
PART #1		PART #2	
CADRE _____		CADRE _____	
OPS _____		OPS _____	
DATE _____		DATE _____	
PLATOON _____		PLATOON _____	
HIDDEN		DISCOVERED	
A.	1. Decoy: Male _____ Female _____	A.	1. Decoy: M _____ F _____ % _____ % _____
	2. Weapons _____		2. Weapons _____
	3. Equipment _____		3. Equipment _____
	4. Ammo _____		4. Ammo _____
	5. Bobby Trap _____		5. Bobby Trap _____
	6. Misc _____		6. Misc _____
B.	Description/or type of hiding place used	B.	Effectiveness:
C.	Comments on performance of dog teams:	C.	Comments and Recommendations:
D.	Misc:		
_____ Signature of Evaluator		_____ Signature of Evaluator	
		_____ Signature of Platoon Leader	
		_____ Signature of Reviewing Officer	

3-0-1

APPENDIX 4 to ANNEX C to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

-SCOUT DOG PLATOON  
HANDLER PERFORMANCE REPORT

NAME \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
Last MI First

DOG NAME \_\_\_\_\_ BRAND NO. \_\_\_\_\_

TO \_\_\_\_\_

A. Size Composition and type of patrol.

B. Task.

C. Time and Date of Departure and Return.

D. Area of Operation.

E. Description of terrain, swampy, jungle, wooded, rocky, etc, and obstacles that teams encountered.

F. Enemy, Strength, Disposition, Condition of defenses, weapons, where activity occurred. Did dog alert, if so how.

G. Results of encounter with the enemy, material or enemy prisoners taken. Action which occurred during encounter.

H. Miscellaneous information.

I. Conclusion and recommendations.

J. Remarks of Patrol Leader.

K. Verified by Commander of using unit.

4-G-1

ANNEX H (Critique Note Outline) to ORT Directive (Infantry Platoon Scout Dog)

PHASE I

1. Pre-combat checks:

2. Conduct of patrols:

3. Conduct of ambushes:

4. Perimeter Defense:

PHASE II

5. Conduct of Patrols:

R-1

**APPENDIX D: JOINT IED DEFEAT TASK FORCE  
MEMORANDUM AUTHORIZING FUNDING FOR SSD  
PROGRAMS.**



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Joint Improvised Explosive Device  
Integrated Process Team  
400 Army Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20310-0400

28 September 2004

DAMO-OD (IED TF)

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Authorization to Release Joint IED Defeat Funds

1. Ref. DepSecDef Action Memorandum "Joint Integrated Process Team (IPT) for Defeating Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)" dated 17 Jul 04.
2. On 27 September 2004, the Joint IED Defeat IPT approved the purchase of 39 Specialized Search Dogs (SSD) to deploy in AOR to support the IED Defeat mission.
3. I approve release of \$6,960,000 of FY 2005 IFF funds for the purchase and training of SSD. I asked the USD(C) to prepare the required Congressional notification and funding transfer.
4. Project Manager – The entire amount will be transferred to Air Force O&M, the Executive Agent for the Military Working Dog program. The Air Force will MIPR \$1,260,000 to the Army and \$3,000,000 to the USMC to fund their satellite test programs. The remainder will stay with the Air Force. The services are responsible for meeting the program parameters set by the IPT on sustainment funding for this project after the bridge funding from the task force is exhausted. Any unused funds will be returned to the Joint IED Task Force.

Fred D. Robinson  
Major General, US Army  
Chairman, Joint IED Defeat  
Integrated Process Team

CF:  
SA  
VCSA  
JIPT Principals

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**APPENDIX E: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FORMER HANDLERS AND  
CURRENT MWD PERSONNEL**



**NAVAL  
POSTGRADUATE  
SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**Thesis Questionnaire:  
DOGS OF WAR: THE USE OF DOGS ON DISMOUNTED PATROLS  
by**

MAJ Michael L. Hammerstrom  
Monterey, CA 93940

**Please Return Responses by Oct 10, 2005**

**THESIS QUESTIONNAIRE**

**Distribution Statement  
Unlimited**

## ABOUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE

**The purpose:** This questionnaire will allow me to collect responses from former and current military working dog handlers, in order to determine candid perceptions of various handlers and the effectiveness of dog teams in combat environments. The point of the exercise is to produce a collection of responses that may be used to further develop the military working dog programs.

**The intent:** The intent of using a questionnaire is to allow the handlers to respond candidly, in order to produce the best conclusions and recommendations possible.

The questionnaire will be used only to determine general trends or to determine specific areas that may require further research or inquiry. No names will be used or connected to the responses to this questionnaire. If you would like to have your responses attributed to you, please check the appropriate space and include your name on the questionnaire. The responses will be reviewed only by me, MAJ Michael Hammerstrom. The responses will be used as a source of data for analysis for my thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Please respond in the spaces provided, as they reflect your expertise. Do not feel limited by the space provided. If completed in "hard" copy, you may use the back of each sheet or insert additional pages, identified by question number. Please thoroughly explain your responses so that someone with limited understanding of military working dogs can understand your main points. The questions are not meant to be offensive or insulting to anyone or to a specific organization, they are attempts to create points of discussion and exploration. There are four short pages of questions numbered three to six.

Please respond by October 10, 2005 using any of the following methods:

**Mail:** MAJ Michael Hammerstrom

**Email:**

**Phone:**

**\*\*Note:** The phone response method is the least preferred, but is available if you have any questions or concerns about this questionnaire or other methods of response are unavailable to you.

Your participation is greatly appreciated. Without your expertise and cooperation this project could not succeed.

Thank you,  
Michael Hammerstrom  
MAJ, U.S. Army

## QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Do You Wish to Remain Anonymous? Yes\_\_\_\_, No\_\_\_\_

If No, then Name\_\_\_\_\_

2. Current Position:\_\_\_\_\_

3. Military Working Dog Expertise:\_\_\_\_\_

Have you been in a combat environment as a member of a dog team?\_\_\_\_\_

Afghanistan? \_\_\_ Iraq? \_\_\_ Philippines? \_\_\_ Korea? \_\_\_ Vietnam? \_\_\_ Other?\_\_\_

4. Do you feel that the current DoD Military Working Dog Program is adequate for the missions being required of the dog teams in military operations? Please indicate **YES** or **NO**.

Why?\_\_\_\_\_

5. What are the current missions that require military dogs in current operations? \_\_\_\_\_

6. What type of program or course should or could be added to enhance the effectiveness of dog teams in combat environments? If no changes are required, please circle: None.

7. What would be the ideal training requirements for dog handlers for today's operational environments, beyond dog handler training at Lackland AFB? \_\_\_\_\_

8. Do you believe dual purpose dogs are as effective as single purpose dogs? \_\_\_\_\_

Why? \_\_\_\_\_

9. Do you believe that the current procurement process provides an adequate quality of dog for current operational environments and required missions? \_\_\_\_\_ Why? \_\_\_\_\_

10. Do you believe that the current method of handler training produces handlers with adequate expertise to deploy immediately upon assignment to a unit following instruction at Lackland AFB? \_\_\_\_\_

11. Do you feel that you were adequately prepared when you attended your training courses? \_\_\_\_\_

12. What aspect of your course do you feel made the most impact on your first assignment as a dog handler?

13. Do you feel that the Services should be able to develop their own specific dog and handler training programs? \_\_\_\_\_ Why or Why not? \_\_\_\_\_

14. Do you believe that current programs using dogs for IED detection are training the dogs and handlers appropriately? \_\_\_\_\_ Why or Why not? \_\_\_\_\_

15. Do you understand the products and training requirements of the SSD program? \_\_\_\_\_

16. Do you believe that commanders or patrol leaders understand the proper utilization of dog teams?

17. How many times did you, as a handler, and your dog conduct live fire exercises with an infantry unit? \_\_\_\_\_

18. How often did you conduct road marches of more than six miles with your dog?  
\_\_\_\_\_

19. Did you fire your weapon with your dog within ten feet? \_\_\_\_\_ How often?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Was the dog working at the time? \_\_\_\_\_

20. How much did your dog weigh? \_\_\_\_\_ What type of dog? \_\_\_\_\_ What was the casualty evacuation plan for your dog if injured in training and in combat, extraction method and points of care?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

21. Should dogs be used in theater for the duration of the military operations or return with each handler on each rotation? \_\_\_\_\_

Why? \_\_\_\_\_

22. What roles would dog teams play if assigned to Infantry units? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

23. What organizational issues do you foresee with dogs being assigned to Infantry units in the Army? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

24. Were you and your dog trained for numerous infiltration and exfiltration methods, such as helicopter, military or civilian vehicle, dismounted, airborne, rappelling, or SPIES? \_\_\_\_\_

If so, what methods were you training and what types do you feel you should have had training in?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

25. What is the best method for preparing a dog team for combat conditions? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

26. Do you feel that you and your dog were adequately prepared prior to operating in a combat situation? \_\_\_\_\_

Who ensured you and your dog were prepared?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

27. Do you foresee a valid need to expand the missions of the military working dog?  
\_\_\_\_\_

What areas specifically? \_\_\_\_\_

28. Do you think that the current training requirements at the DoD Dog Center reflect realistic criteria for evaluating the training potential of candidate dogs? \_\_\_\_\_

29. What roles are dog teams the most effective in the military?  
\_\_\_\_\_

30. What is the most effective type or method of reward for a dog?  
\_\_\_\_\_

31. Ideally, one would prefer to have a minimal number of criteria which could be used as standards for ensuring optimal identification of candidate who have the most training potential. What canine characteristics should be identified as optimal for assessing training capability?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

What are the ideal characteristics for handlers? \_\_\_\_\_

32. What do you feel will be the time required to train an off leash dog team with an IED detection capability? \_\_\_\_\_

Why? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

33. Does a dog team restrict or enhance a dismounted patrol's effectiveness?  
\_\_\_\_\_

Why? \_\_\_\_\_

34. Do you believe that dogs used in urban environments must be trained differently than those used in a rural environment? \_\_\_\_\_

35. If a tactical dog program was developed to support primarily the infantry, what capabilities should be developed in the dog team? \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Where should this training be conducted? \_\_\_\_\_

Who should manage the tactical program? \_\_\_\_\_ Which Service? \_\_\_\_\_ Which Branch within the Service? \_\_\_\_\_

36. Do you feel that Infantry units would benefit from having organic dog teams assigned as part of that unit, at the Brigade or Battalion level? \_\_\_\_\_ If not, why not? \_\_\_\_\_

---

37. Do you feel that the method of assigning current "patrol" dogs to dismounted patrols is the best implementation of dog teams? \_\_\_\_\_ Why? \_\_\_\_\_

---

38. Can dog teams perform adequately on an urban dismounted patrol? \_\_\_\_\_

39. Were the latest techniques used by the enemy to emplace and produce IEDs incorporated into training? \_\_\_\_\_ If so, how? \_\_\_\_\_

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## **APPENDIX F: QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS EXPERIENCE**

The responses from the questionnaire are the following:

The following are the responses to the questions (1-3) of each individual's experience and expertise yielded the following information reproduced verbatim:

### **Former Handlers:**

From the Korean War, Captain Haggerty: currently a civilian dog trainer and formerly at the Army Dog Training Center in 1956, Commanding Officer of two Scout Dog Units (Fort Benning and Fort Ord), taught the Use of Dog in Plant Security at the MP School at Fort Gordon, and worked as Liaison Officer between the US Occupations Force, Berlin and the Berlin Police Department. Mr. Haggerty's experience is from the Korean War.

From the Vietnam War, there were numerous respondents. The experience and expertise of these individuals in no particular order:

Robert Crowder: the former Platoon Commander of the 37<sup>th</sup> Infantry Scout Dog Platoon in Vietnam. He has extensive combat experience in Vietnam.

Kiernan Holliday: currently a lawyer and a civil engineer. His MWD experience is attendance of the Sentry Dog Handler Course in 1969 and working as a dog handler at Cam Ranh Bay Air Base from June 1969 to June 1970.

William Latham: currently a computer specialist with MWD experience of two years as Scout Dog Handler in Vietnam, three years of Narcotics and Bomb Detector Dogs, and Kennel Master for the 42<sup>nd</sup> MP Group FRG.

Anonymous 1: currently a deputy sheriff and a K-9 handler with the bomb team. He has nine years of MWD experience to include combat in Vietnam.

Stephen Janke: currently a minister and a former sentry dog handler in Vietnam and at a Strategic Air Command (SAC) base in Washington State.

Bill Riley: currently inactive and with experience as a sentry dog handler in Okinawa for 14 months from 1965-1966, senior scout dog platoon instructor at Fort Benning for 14 months from 1966-1967, and a professional civilian dog trainer and

kennel master for six months from 1967-1968. He did not deploy to Vietnam and has no combat experience.

John Burnam: currently a full-time Senior Technical Writer/Editor for Information Technology Corp. He has authored the books, *Dog Tags of Courage* and *A Soldier's Best Friend*. He is also the founder and chairman of the "National War Dogs Monument" and coordinator of congressional legislation on Capital Hill with Congressman Walter B. Jones of North Carolina and the his congressional legislative staff. He is featured on a television documentary, "War Dogs". His former experience is serving as an infantryman in Vietnam with the 7<sup>th</sup> Cavalry, 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Division and as a German Shepherd Scout Dog Handler with the 44<sup>th</sup> Infantry Platoon Scout Dogs form 1966-1968.

Mark Burns: currently a telecommunications technician with past experience in the US Air Force Security Police handling Sentry and Patrol Dogs.

Gene Wimberly: self employed and has experience handling scout dogs for the 42 IPSD in the 101 Airborne Division during Vietnam.

Mike Landers: currently working at For Leonard Wood. He has prior MWD experience of three years with the Combat Tracker Platoons in Vietnam and two years as a Tracker Instructor.

Perry Money: currently a consulting engineer as a manager of his company's research and development department. His previous MWD experience includes serving as a dog handler with the US Marine Corps Mine and Booby Trap Detection Teams in Vietnam, one of the two programs, one Army and one Marine, developed by the BSI contractors for use in Vietnam.

Mike Lister: currently a certified nurse's aide. He served two tours in Vietnam as a Scout Dog Handler. For six years he was an instructor/trainer at Fort Benning and for four years he was an instructor/trainer at the Lackland AFB. He also served four years as the ISG at the Army Det. at Lackland AFB. While working at Ft. Benning he primarily worked with mine dogs, but did some work with scout dogs and tracker dogs. He was also involved with the Super Dog Program.

Ken Neal: a retired federal employee with 100% DAV. He was a dog handler from 1967 – 1969, worked at the dog school in Okinawa from 1969 – 1970, and then was a handler again from 1974 – 1975.

**Current MWD Personnel:**

Gregory Blaylock: currently serving at the Operations Officer, 341 TRS (DoD MWD Center). He has 8 years of experience as a MWD handler and trainer in the USAF.

John Larson: currently the Commander, D Co, 701<sup>st</sup> MP BN, Lackland AFB. He has 8 years of experience as an enlisted MWD Handler and Instructor MWD Handlers course.

Anonymous 2: an instructor at the MWD Handler course. He/she has experience in patrolling and detection.

John Spivey: currently the 1SG, Company D, 701<sup>st</sup> MP BN – company that supports the DoD MWD Training Center. He has served as a MWD handler (patrol/explosive team) from 1988 – 1994, MWD Kennel Master (30 dog kennel) 2000 – 2003, USAREUR MWD Certification Authority from 2001- 2003, and US Army First Sergeant MWD Training Center from 2003 – to present. Spivey served in Panama as a member of a dog team.

Robert Norman: currently the Chief for Team 1 in the Specialized Search Dog Program. He has been in the program for over 5 years now. He started out as a Narcotics Dog Handler at Parris Island, SC, and then moved on to a position as Bomb Dog Handler as well as the Trainer/Assistant Kennel Master. He then transferred to Lackland where he was a trainer at the Dog Training School. He then served one year in Iraq as a Bomb Dog Handler.

Nicholas Fontaine: currently an SSD Instructor. He has served as a PNDD Handler, PEDD Handler, Kennel NCOIC, and an instructor. Fontaine served in Afghanistan as a member of a dog team.

Anonymous 3: currently a Military Police Dog Handler. He has 2 ½ years of experience and has served in Iraq as a dog team member.

Jim Pettit: currently a program manager, engineer detection dogs, US Army Engineer School. He has no military working dog experience, but has extensive civilian experience with police working dogs.

Theodore McCall III: currently an Instructor Supervisor Kennel Master at the Trainer Course for the DoD. He has experience as a Handler of MWD Patrol Explosive, Training NCO, Instructor of Handlers and Kennel Masters at all levels of experience. He was a Shutzhund trainer before joining the military. He was Senior of 3 dog teams attached to Navy Special Ops in Iraq. He also has experience as PODUS/VPODUS protection, security for United Nations General Assembly 1997 and 2003, Security for the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, and Security for the Secretary of State.

Anonymous 4: currently a bomb dog handler. He/she has experience as a bomb and patrol dog handler.

Anonymous 5: currently a federal police officer. He has 3 years of experience in the MWD program, 4 months narcotics, and 30 months explosive handler.

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