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The next witness is Mr. Sam Adams.  
Mr. Adams, will you rise and raise your right hand, please?  
Do you swear that the information you give this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?  
Mr. ADAMS. I do, sir.  
Senator SYMINGTON. Have you a statement prepared?

TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL A. ADAMS

Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.  
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you read it?

First I would like to apologize for appearing so late, but I didn't realize that I was going to testify before this committee until relatively a short time ago.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think sometime back you said you would be ready to testify, and we said we would always be willing to hear you. Is that correct?

Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Would you read your statement, please?

Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.

My name is Samuel A. Adams. I resigned from the Central Intelligence Agency on June 1, 1973. My resignation stemmed from dismay over what I thought was the sloppy and often dishonest way U.S. intelligence conducted research on the struggle in Indochina. An example of the shortcomings, I believe, was the manner in which U.S. intelligence produced reports on the political and administrative agencies of the Vietcong. These agencies, sometimes called the infrastructure, were the target of the allied Phoenix program. The Phoenix program was overseen at one time by Mr. Colby, a candidate to receive the CIA's directorship.

Seven of my 10 years at the Agency were devoted to research on our adversaries in Indochina. My reports included an extensive study on the Vietcong police system, a treatise on Communist subversive agents in the South Vietnamese Army and police, and an examination of the Vietcong's covert structure in South Vietnamese territory. In 1970, I wrote a lengthy study entitled "Guide to a Viet Cong Province" which the CIA uses as its standard field handbook on the Communists in South Vietnam. For about 5 years I gave the Agency's training course on the Vietcong to CIA case officers bound for Vietnam.

The Phoenix program is an example of a sound concept gone awry. It was meant to destroy the Communists' political apparatus, but it has not done so, and the Vietcong are in the middle of a resurgence throughout South Vietnam. Although the country's surface looks peaceful enough—at least compared to the last few years—the appearance is deceiving. Beneath the surface of the South Vietnamese Government, the unraveling is well along.

Phoenix was conceived when the Allies' main weapons in South Vietnam were American warplanes, and heavily armed battalions whose mission was to "search and destroy." The weapons were bludgeons, which all too often failed to discriminate between the enemy soldier and the innocent bystander. More important, they were virtually useless against the Vietcong political cadre, who, it came to be realized, was just as dangerous as the Vietcong warrior.

Phoenix was designed to fill the gap. Copied from a British concept which had succeeded in Malaya, the Phoenix program was meant to replace the bludgeon with a scalpel. The key to the operation was precise targeting. Instead of bombs—which killed large numbers of civilians in addition to the occasional political operative of the Vietcong—Phoenix's main tools, theoretically, were good intelligence and good files. The object of the program was to find out who among the Vietnamese population were Vietcong cadres, and to arrest or kill them. In theory, arrests were preferable to assassinations, because a

# NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY

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HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION  
ON  
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY TO BE DIRECTOR  
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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JULY 2, 20, AND 25, 1973

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