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Speech by Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee Member  
Hoang Tung on Plans Before Chinese Invasion. (DOI: 14  
and 15 February 1979).

1. On 3 March 1979 the overseas party coordination and operations section of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party Central Committee (VNCPC) forwarded to party committees and party chapter committees abroad the text of a speech by VNCPC member Hoang Tung to a conference of reporters on 14 and 15 February 1979. The document was for internal party use only. One portion of the speech covered VNCP internal tasks for the 1979 - 1980 period.

2. Tung states, "The SRV must contend with the war of aggression of China and build up the SRV in order to abolish our economic backwardness and establish a balance among politics, the economy, the culture and the National Defense system. In the immediate future, we must successfully carry out the 1979-1980 task: eliminating hunger and making good use of arable land so that we have ample food; during this year's winter season, 100,000 additional hectares were put under cultivation and potato output increased by 400,000 to 500,000 tons." Tung asked if this output could be doubled next year. (Headquarters Comment: The Chinese invasion of the SRV began on 17 February 1979.)

5 3. Tung said, "We must cultivate new qualities of man in the  
4 Vietnamese revolution. This is not an abstract idea of a man, but a man  
3 who has the ability to organize, the ability to engage in practical  
2 actions, a man who knows how to sacrifice for the collective in order  
1 to create new production capacity and create beauty in life for the sake

of Communist ideals. The Vietnamese do not nurture the ambitions of one who rules by force, of struggling to overthrow others and do not proclaim ourselves kings or rulers. We are persons who still embody the individualism of small-scale production: we compete with one another and are greedy over trivial things. This is a weakness. Our stability lies in the spirit of ownership; we think and act in a voluntary manner, and this is a force propelling us forward. Ours is not blind obedience, which would lead to the undermining of the revolution. We must insure that millions of persons act in a steady and dependable manner - act in a voluntary manner.

4. "The two important factors within the party at this time are: first, exercising collective ownership and raising labor productivity; struggling against the violations of the right of

collective ownership and the standards and quality of a person, namely, labor productivity and the exercise of collective ownership. Secondly, we must create a new fighting strength and a new capability for action. We must structure and strengthen a new organization and bring more youth into the party. The average age of our party members, 40 years of age, is the highest in the world. We must reduce it to 30 years of age. The standard for accepting persons into the party is that they be persons who are willing to do battle in the struggle against China and in economic construction, not that they be persons who are easily led.

5. "These are the preparations for implementing the third five-year plan. In the immediate future we must resolve the food problem in order to move forward and resolve the energy and labor productivity problems. What problems could be resolved if we begin the implementation of the third five year plan with stomachs that are still empty?"

6. Tung concluded his remarks by stating, "At the end of 1979 the constitution will be announced, and in 1980 we will summarize the victories and experiences of the Vietnamese revolution against the strategies of the reactionary powers. If we talk about the process of advancing to Communism, today we have only taken a short step. Now, we will go forward and take another step, the step of building the material-technical bases of Socialism and Communism and fighting to protect our fatherland."

Speech by Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee Member  
Hoang Tung On the Kampuchean Revolution and Chinese Threat.  
(DOI: 14 and 15 February 1979).

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1. On 3 March 1979, the Overseas Party Coordination and Operations Section  
5 of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Communist Party (CCVNCP) sent to  
4 all party committees and party chapter committees abroad the text of a  
3 speech by Central Committee member Hoang Tung to a Conference of  
2 Reporters on 14 and 15 February 1979. The document was provided for  
1 internal party use only. One part of the speech discussed the Kampuchean

revolution. (Headquarters Comment: The Chinese invasion began  
on 17 February 1979, shortly after this speech was given.)

2. Following is a summary translation of the internal party  
document. "Kampuchea is the weakest of the three countries of  
Indochina, and the Kampuchean party was founded after the parties  
of Vietnam and Laos. The party is not strong and, consequently,  
China seized control of Kampuchea to oppose Vietnam. China turned  
Kampuchea into a testing ground for Chinese strategy. China pur-  
sued a policy of mass murder, killing of all opposing forces. It  
made the entire country a prison camp and implemented primitive  
communism in Kampuchea. They have carried out their scheme to  
control Kampuchea and used Kampuchea to attack southern SRV, because  
they maintain southern SRV is a weak area and a place where Kampuchea  
has the opportunity to occupy some land. The Chinese maintained  
that their strengths in southern SRV are the one million Vietnamese  
of Khmer ancestry and the one million Vietnamese of Chinese ancestry.  
As regards the economic aspect, they took into consideration the  
fact that the economy of the south was long dependent upon United  
States and Japanese aid and that we are unable, in the immediate  
future, to resolve the economic situation there; they also took  
into consideration their base of support, namely, the persons of  
Chinese ancestry among us.

3. "In May 1975, they attacked us, but not with sufficient  
strength. Following a period of time spent consolidating and  
building their forces, they attacked Chau Doc and Tay Ninh, and  
asserted 'we can successfully attack Vietnam. Vietnam does not  
have the ability to retaliate. Vietnam cannot repel the forces  
of Kampuchea.' In December 1977, we retaliated. The forces of the  
enemy were repulsed and we still declared our willingness to nego-  
tiate. However they refused to negotiate and intensified their  
harassment of us. Consequently, we were forced to attack in order  
to cut out the cancer growing in Kampuchea. To attack and bring  
down the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary reactionary clique, we had to be willing  
to contend with a war by China. Vietnam joined the Comecon Bloc  
and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet  
Union for mutual protection, for the acceleration of socialist  
construction, etc. Only when our strategy had been firmly deployed  
did we attack. We had to consider the possible actions that China  
might take if the Kampuchean reactionaries were unable to contend  
with us; the problem here was China. We determined that China  
5 would only increase its aid and send more advisors and not send 5  
4 troops into Kampuchea because of the political problem it would 4  
3 pose. China was also unable to send technical supplies into 3  
2 Kampuchea; which air or sea routes could China use, by which method 2  
1 could it send these supplies? As regards a fight directly 1

between China and Vietnam, although we were prepared for such a  
possibility, we did not fear it.

4. "When we did attack, the revolutionary forces annihilated the Kampuchean reactionaries so quickly because of two factors: first, our forces were overwhelming in terms of their fighting strength, combat equipment, troop strength, combat experience and command experience. The Kampuchean reactionary forces could not contend with us. Secondly, because of the cruel regime of Pol Pot-Ieng Sary, the people had to arise in resistance to it; if the people were not enlightened, the revolutionary army would not have been accepted. Over the long range, this second factor will become the factor of utmost importance. These two factors combined to form a blitzkrieg style of attack; in less than one week, the revolutionary army liberated the five eastern provinces. It then crossed the first defense line and reached Phnom Penh on 7 January 1979. Between 7 and 17 January, the liberation army mopped up and smashed the main strength of the reactionary regime, took control of all roads and tightly closed border roads and ocean routes. The uprising by the masses took the form of the masses breaking out of concentration camps. Twenty-three divisions rapidly collapsed; two-thirds were defeated on the southern defense line. A number were defeated in the east and some were defeated at Battambang and Siem Riep. One of our units attacked and pursued the enemy for ten days over a distance of 600 kilometers. By 17 January, the strength of a hastily organized, regular force of conscripts had been routed. This marked the true conclusion of the first stage and the start of the second stage of building the revolutionary government, the stage of the people exercising true ownership.

5. "However, it was not until the start of the second stage that true difficulties were encountered. The former corps of revolutionary cadres had suffered extremely heavy losses, had been totally annihilated and could not be restored. Those cadres who do remain, who are valuable assets but are extremely small in number, must reorganize the entire life of a society, that is, the entire population of Kampuchea must be relocated because, in the past, the entire urban population was forced to move into the countryside, the move from one area to another. There is a lack of cadres; the revolutionary army is there but does not speak the language and the counter-revolutionaries have taken advantage of this to cause disturbance. Although the situation is a difficult one, the counter-revolutionaries cannot organize large-scale combat operations because the people do not support them and they have no forces. Where will they obtain weapons and ammunition? Practically all weapons and ammunition are now in the hands of the

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restitution, of the people. China has said that it will resupply them through Thailand; but even if it does, this resupply effort cannot be large. Although the situation is a difficult one and the fight drags on, they are not capable of toppling us; we have legitimized political, economic and military assistance for Kampuchea and brought overwhelming force to bear in order to help our friends win victory. However, the largest difficulty at this time is the difficulty involving cadres.

6. "This victory is the victory of the people's democratic revolution and the advance by Kampuchea to the socialist revolution. Thus, all three countries of Indochina are advancing to socialism; although Indochina consists of three separate countries, they share but one revolution. This offensive is a coordinated offensive of a self-defense nature by the three countries of Indochina; it is not aggression. We assisted Kampuchea in the past for the purpose of self-defense and are assisting the revolution in Kampuchea today for the same purpose; it is a typical

example of the living closeness between independence and international alliance of the three countries of Indochina. The concrete truth that applies here is, if we coordinate with one another, we shall continue to live; if we oppose one another, we shall die.

7. "The resolution of the Kampuchean problem has caused the genuine revolutionary forces to unite with one another around this revolution; Ethiopia, South Yemen and, more recently, even Mozambique have united with us. In addition to the socialist countries (with the exception of Romania and Korea), the communist parties of France, Japan, United States and Canada and the two communist parties in India have unanimously taken our side. As regards the imperialists, although they have made promises to Beijing, they do not dare attack us. We sent troops into a foreign country and were closely watched by the United States from the very outset, but the United States has done nothing at all. China did not dare jump in.

8. "However, the imperialists said that they will teach Vietnam a lesson, and they could retaliate in several ways:

a. By establishing a phantom government and saying that it is continuing the war of resistance.

b. They might assemble a force consisting of Kampuchean, 5  
4 regardless of whom they are, in order to establish a government. 4  
3 3  
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c. They might bribe persons who have relations with

Beijing to stop sending us aid. Although we would lose more than 100 million dollars, the loss of 100 million dollars is nothing when the cause is the removal of a political cancer; this victory cannot be bought for hundreds of millions of dollars.

d. An attack by "leftists." They have said that they would teach Vietnam a lesson and this could occur in one of the following manners: They could mass troops and harass us in order to wear us down, prevent us from assembling the forces needed to build the country and make us always fearful of an attack. They maintain this lesson would be more painful than an actual attack. They could launch a ground, air and naval assault against a number of places using army forces to attack our territory in order to say that disgrace was not brought to China. They could declare actual war on us, that is, engage us in a large-scale fight.

9. "Recently, the Chinese reactionaries deployed for an attack along the entire Sino-Viet border. We must keep abreast of the developments in this situation. Following the victory of Kampuchea, the new situation in Indochina cannot be reversed by anyone. All types of wars of aggression by China against us will surely be defeated. The three nations of Indochina have truly begun to build a new era. The economic capabilities of the three countries of Indochina are very large, and we are in the period of the second scientific-technological revolution, a favorable period. Although the situation on the border is still complex, we have the strength needed to build. In view of the fact that the revolution of China has not been revived, we must use this time to become stronger in order to resist the threats and aggression of China. If necessary, we can coordinate with and assist the Chinese revolution. China has massed troops along the border to attack us; if we are encountering difficulties, China must be encountering twice as many difficulties and, in the end, it will meet with shameful defeat."