

**NOMINATION OF RICHARD HELMS TO BE AMBASSADOR  
TO IRAN AND CIA INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC  
ACTIVITIES**

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**HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS**

**FIRST SESSION**

**ON**

**NOMINATION OF RICHARD HELMS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF  
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ON HIS NOMINA-  
TION TO BE AMBASSADOR TO IRAN AND CIA INTERNA-  
TIONAL AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES**

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**FEBRUARY 5 AND 7 AND MAY 21, 1973**

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[The February 7 hearing was held in Executive Session and classified  
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## CONTENTS

Hearing days :  
February 5, 1973-----  
February 7, 1973-----  
May 21, 1973-----

Statements by--  
Helms, Richard, nominee to be Ambassador to Iran :  
February 5, 1973-----  
February 7, 1973-----  
Helms, Richard, Ambassador to Iran, May 21, 1973-----

Insertions for the record :  
Biography of Richard Helms-----  
"CIA Discloses It Trained Police from 12 Agencies," article by David  
Burnham, from the New York Times, February 6, 1973-----  
Letter to Hon. Edward I. Koch, House of Representatives, from John  
M. Maury, Legislative Counsel, CIA, dated January 29, 1973-----  
"Fourteen City Policemen Got CIA Training--Learned How To  
Analyze and Handle Information," article by David Burnham, from  
the New York Times, December 17, 1972-----  
"4 Watergate Defendants Reported Still Being Paid," article by  
Seymour M. Hersh, from the New York Times, January 14, 1973-----  
Exchange of correspondence between Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff, U.S.  
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and Ambassador Richard  
Helms, concerning exchange during Ambassador Helms' testimony,  
dated November 16 and December 1, 1973-----  
"CIA's Involvement Appalling," article by Carl T. Rowan, from the  
Washington Star-News, May 11, 1973-----  
"Watergate Case Called Broad Plot," article by Martin Schram, from  
the Washington Post, January 7, 1973-----

(ii)

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[COMMITTEE STAFF NOTE: Mr. Helms also appeared on March 6, 1973, in Executive Session.  
That transcript has not been published.]

(ii)

**NOMINATION OF RICHARD HELMS TO BE AMBASSADOR  
TO IRAN AND CIA INTERNATIONAL AND DOMEST  
ACTIVITIES <sup>1</sup>**

**MONDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1973**

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 422 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, McGee, Aiken, Pearson and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

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The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mr. Helms to be Ambassador to Iran.

[Mr. Helms' biography follows:]

**BIOGRAPHY OF RICHARD HELMS**

*Position for which considered:* Ambassador to Iran.  
*Present position:* Director of Central Intelligence.  
*Office address:* Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.  
*Born:* March 30, 1913, St. Davids, Pennsylvania.  
*Legal residence:* Maryland.  
*Marital status:* Married.  
*Family:* Wife: former Cynthia McKelvie.  
*Home address:* 4701 Willard Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015.  
*Education:* B.A. 1935, Williams College.  
*Language ability:* French, German.  
*Experience:*  
Nongovernment:  
1935-37: Staff Correspondent in Europe, United Press.  
1937-42: Member, Business Staff, Indianapolis Times Publishing Co.  
Military, 1942-46: United States Naval Reserve: (1) Headquarters Eastern Sea Frontier, (2) Office of Strategic Services.  
Government:  
1947- : With Central Intelligence Agency.  
1965-66: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.  
1966 to present: Director of Central Intelligence.  
*Awards:* Career Service Award, National Civil Service League, 1965.  
*Clubs:* Chevy Chase (Maryland).

**WITNESS' BACKGROUND**

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms, we are very pleased to have you this morning. Would you for the record just state what you have been doing the last 10 or 15 years?

<sup>1</sup>The testimony of James Keogh, nominee to be Director of USIA, and Daniel Moynihan, nominee to be Ambassador to India, who were also heard, appears in a separate volume.

**STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELMS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO IRAN**

Mr. HELMS. I was working for the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad for it to come out at last. This has all been classified.

I think this is the first time you have ever appeared before this committee in open session, isn't it?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All these years.

Mr. HELMS. In all these years.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sure we were wise in having them in executive session?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been Director of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Six and a half years, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been with the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Since it was founded in 1947.

The CHAIRMAN. You must be the senior member of the CIA.

Mr. HELMS. I think I am, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess you are.

Seniority is a very questionable principle, I understand from the press.

Senator McGEE. Just sometime.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms, personally I regret seeing you leave the CIA because I believe in seniority and experience, I think it has some value. I have a feeling that you know more about the CIA than you do Iran. Do you think that is a fair statement?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is a fair statement, Mr. Chairman.

**CIA OATH**

The CHAIRMAN. Are you under the same oath that all CIA men are under that when you leave the Agency you cannot talk about your experiences there?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, I feel bound by that.

The CHAIRMAN. You feel bound by that, too?

Mr. HELMS. I think it would be a very bad example for the Director to be an exception.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be very useful, though. It would be very helpful.

**WITNESS' KNOWLEDGE OF IRAN**

Tell us about Iran then. You are going there. [Laughter.]

You haven't taken an oath not to tell the committee about Iran?

Mr. HELMS. Well, Mr. Chairman, you know as much about Iran as I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Well—

Mr. HELMS. I hope to inform myself so that the next time I appear before the committee I will know a great deal more than I do today

and maybe I can have some constructive and helpful statement make.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been studying Iran, haven't you, from CIA point of view for a long time.

Mr. HELMS. Oh, yes, sir.

**BUILDUP OF IRANIAN ARMED FORCES**

The CHAIRMAN. While we are on this subject, I have been startled to hear in recent months about a relatively enormous build of their armed forces. I think I saw the other day that Iran has spent about \$2 billion on armaments in the last 3 or 4 years. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. HELMS. I have not looked into those exact figures. I had understood that the purchase of arms in this country would perhaps cost \$2 billion but I do not know what has been spent in recent times. It is my understanding that the Iranians are in the process of modernizing their armed forces but the extent of this, and so forth, frankly have not gotten to, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, it is their business if they want to spend money on arms. The question arises what do they expect to do with it. After the experience between India and Pakistan, it troubles me very much to see friendly countries begin to arm like this. The immediate question arose in my mind of what they intend to do with it. Do they have their eyes on their neighbors or do any of their neighbors have their eyes on them. What is there in that area that seemed to justify that kind of rather unusual expenditure for armaments.

I was not aware of any tension there that seemed to threaten Iran. It had not occurred to me that Iraq, a relatively small country, notwithstanding as powerful or as rich as Iran, is about to attack it.

Mr. HELMS. It is my impression that Soviet arms have been going into Iraq and into Syria and I think that may be what is concerning the Iranian Government, plus the fact, as you know, the British have withdrawn from the Persian Gulf and I would assume the Iranians were interested in being strong enough to protect their interests there.

The CHAIRMAN. My impression is that the arms in Syria and Iraq are more related to the Israeli war than to possible attack upon Iran.

Mr. HELMS. I think that is quite true, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an ongoing problem in that area which only emphasizes the importance of our trying to bring about some settlement of that war.

I don't know, Mr. Helms, whether there is anything that we should ask you about this morning since you do not wish to talk about your experience in the CIA.

Senator Symington, do you have any questions?

**COMMENDATION OF WITNESS**

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would first say I have been around this town a long time, and believe Director Helms has established a reputation which may well have saved the Central Intelligence Agency from a good deal of additional criticism because of the respect of all of us for him as a person and the way he has operated.

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE MEMBERS' MEETINGS WITH SUBCOMMITTEE  
ON CIA

I would ask a question or two about the operation. I believe I have been on the armed services subcommittee of CIA since he first took office. Perhaps at my suggestion, because at times this agency so clearly involved foreign policy, a group of the senior members of the Foreign Relations Committee by invitation met with that subcommittee for some years. Later that was abolished. Do you know why?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I have no idea.

OPERATION OF CHAIN OF COMMAND

Senator SYMINGTON. Under the Kennedy letter your people of the Central Intelligence Agency report to the Ambassadors in question?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And if their work was not satisfactory to the Ambassadors, it was handled.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I congratulate you in at least one instance where it was handled.

The Ambassadors go through the State Department, do they not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. How is it possible for the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington to report directly to the President—I am talking organization now—at the same time their man in the field reports to the Ambassador who, in turn, reports to the President.

I do not quite see the nature of the chain of command.

It is no secret that the CIA has been running a major war in Laos, directing it, but it is a fact that until this committee had Messrs. Pincus and Paul look into it, and later Messrs. Lowenstein and Moose, the conduct of said war not only was handled without the approval of the Congress, but without the knowledge of the Congress. This was because of the degree of the secrecy under which your agency operates, as well as your agency's budget.

How can you have a chain of command in a country, where, in effect, our Ambassador in that country directs the war, reports to the State Department, but you do not report to the State Department. You operate the war and report directly to the President. It really is the President's Army so far as Laos is concerned. I do not understand how it operates. Would you comment?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, the only comment that I can make on it is that in the end Ambassadors report to the President as well, and what has been done in this area has been done under the aegis of the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State sits on that body so that I think that it is there that these things come together. I grant you the logic of the organizational arrangement is open to question, but I think in the end it gets worked out in the National Security Council mechanism.

SHIFT IN CIA RESPONSIBILITIES

Senator SYMINGTON. Our former subcommittee counsel Roland Paul, has just written a book in which he describes the history of the CIA.

declassified by State. It is a complicated story. I have great respect for Dr. Schlesinger, knowing him as a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee; but he has a long way to travel before he understands fully the operation you have run in the CIA.

The other day, unfortunately, the first head of the CIA died, a friend of mine, who came from the same town. At the time he became the head, we discussed it at length, when the National Security Act was formed. At that time I was in the Pentagon. As I understood, it was going to be an agency to gather intelligence, not an agency to operate wars in secrecy without the knowledge of the people or the Congress.

Do you know when this shift came, when the CIA took on these additional responsibilities. This is the last time we will have the privilege of seeing you in this role. Could you give us the benefit of your knowledge as to when all this new responsibility started, when the change occurred in the original concept of the agency?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it was certainly after he left, sir, and I apologize, but I do not remember the exact date; it was sometime between 1947 and 1950. I think that Admiral Hillenkoetter was the director at the time.

Senator SYMINGTON. The change was to operate more in the military field?

Mr. HELMS. I think it was a question, not so much of that, it was an additional function that was given to the agency which came on rather strong during the Korean War.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I think this a very fine appointment, and believe the administration is fortunate to have Mr. Helms go to Iran.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator Symington.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pearson.

Senator PEARSON. I do not have any questions. I just wish you well. Mr. Helms, I am not a great student of that part of the world, but when one reads the newspapers and thinks about some of the events, this must be I think a very important assignment and a very challenging one. So in your tour there I wish you the very best of luck.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator Pearson.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGee.

COMIC STRIP, "PLURIBUS"

Senator MCGEE. It is rather unusual, I think, when a new Ambassador quickly becomes the subject of a comic strip. I suppose you followed Pluribus, which has some great plug lines in there.

How about the head of the CIA becoming ambassador?

Well, the fellow says, I hope I never get an invitation from him.

Why is that?

Because I would have to memorize and then swallow it.

[Laughter.]

It looks like the head of the CIA is going to be a very handsome ambassador. Don't he look great in that cutaway coat?

Well, the other fellow says, That ain't him, stupid. He is the briefcase.

[Laughter.]

And the... aning the fact that he can't repair the new ambassa-

I think it is flattering they would pay this much attention. But it does focus on the importance of, as Senator Pearson has indicated, your new role.

#### INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF AREA

You alluded to the Persian Gulf and the other events that are taking place around there. Would it be fair if we interpret your particular background, coming from where you do, as a conscious decision to place greater importance on what takes place in that part of the world?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is fair, Senator McGee. I do not think there is any question but what that part of the world is going to become increasingly important. It has been important all along, but will become increasingly important as our energy problems proliferate, and as we become more and more dependent for just plain oil on the countries in that part of the world.

#### COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator McGEE. I would join my voice with those who have applauded your leadership where you have been. I think that has been refreshing and it has enhanced the credibility of the CIA and its role.

It has also, I think, been a great tribute to your leadership in that role. We hate to lose you there. I guess I would have to confess, without knowing all the other details, that I would sleep better if you were still there, but that is no reflection on your successor. It is simply the fact that we liked your candor with the committee and that you were as helpful as you could be and were honest enough to say "I don't know" when you did not know.

I must say that I have no misgivings about the astuteness of your performance where you are headed now. I think it is a very important area, and if you have to leave us here we are glad to have you there.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator McGee.

Senator McGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I have no questions to ask. I am sure we will miss Dick Helms. But bringing up his relations with the Congress, he has proved he is a real diplomat and I hope he gets along as well over there as he has with the Congress.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

#### HELPFULNESS OF WITNESSES' MEETING WITH SUBCOMMITTEE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Senator PERCY. Mr. Helms, this committee has established a subcommittee to study and conduct hearings into the role of multinational corporations in the conduct of American foreign policy. Would it be helpful to these hearings to meet with you before you leave? Your advice and counsel in this area would be extremely valuable to the committee. What would you suggest?

Mr. HELMS. I do not think that I have anything to contribute, Senator Percy, that could not very easily be acquired from any of my

associates, my former associates. I am no longer Director, as you know I ceased to be on Friday, so I am actually a free man at the moment. But I think that I would have nothing to contribute that would be of any particular significance to the committee.

Senator PERCY. So, if we have questions, it would be best to go directly to the new Director.

Mr. HELMS. I think so, sir, yes. They have the records.

Senator PERCY. Fine.

#### QUESTION OF IRAN AND OIL CONSORTIUM

I think we are all very much interested in the Shah of Iran's position on the oil consortium question following his announcement January 23, that his government will not extend the present agreements which expire in 1979.

Could you give us any feeling as to the attitude of the Shah on this and what brought about this decision on his part?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I had understood, sir, without certainly having communicated with anyone in the Iranian Government, I had simply understood that there was a feeling in Iran that the arrangement that the oil companies had made with the Arab States were more favorable than the ones they had with Iran, and this was an effort to equate them. But I am not tutored enough in the precise details and pricing mechanism and all the rest of it to know how this would come out.

Senator PERCY. Can you give us a feeling as to the significance of the oil question for Iran; what percentages, for instance, of their gross national income and foreign exchange earnings come from oil?

Mr. HELMS. It must be the large part of it.

Senator PERCY. How do you view this question in the context of Iran's relations with the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries.

Mr. HELMS. I am sorry, sir, I do not understand that.

Senator PERCY. How do you view the question of changes in the oil-producing arrangements in the context of Iran's relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries? What impact does this have on East-West relationships?

Mr. HELMS. I would have thought that it would not have an impact on them. It is my understanding these are simply arrangements between the consortium and the Iranian Government which does not have any effect on anything else.

Senator PERCY. As the world's second largest petroleum exporter, what impact, if any, would an Iranian takeover of production have on the continued steady supply of oil in the United States and other industrialized countries?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it is my understanding that the issue here is not that the Iranians intend to stop the flow of oil; it is simply a proposal as to who was going to have certain ownership and who was going to have certain functions in this. But there is nothing, as far as I know, in any of the statements of the Shah of Iran that indicates that there is any intention to cut off the oil or to stop the flowing. It is simply a question of the arrangements under which it is going to be sold.

Senator PERCY. With the U.S. companies having about a 40 percent interest in the consortium, how would you assess the potential

economic impact on the United States if the consortium agreement were ended?

Mr. HELMS. Well, if I understand this correctly, the question here is who is going to handle the oil from the time it leaves the wellhead to the ports.

Back in 1951, if I understand correctly, the Iranian Government nationalized the oil holdings in Iran. Then 2 or 3 years later, an arrangement was made with the consortium and some other arrangements were made so that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., which it was known as at that time, would be compensated from this, and those are the arrangements that have run through and are due to stand as they are until 1979 in any event.

The question that the consortium and the Iranian Government are now working on is what happens after that.

Senator PERCY. What role does the U.S. Government and our own embassy have in this whole matter?

Mr. HELMS. I just do not know, Senator Percy. This is something I have to find out.

Senator PERCY. Is this a case where the primary responsibility rests with the oil companies themselves and they come to the U.S. Government for assistance, or does it relate so directly to our national energy crisis and future needs that the Government must assume the initiative itself?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think this is the question by the administration right now as to how this energy crisis is going to be dealt with and this is only one small facet of it.

#### IRAN'S SECURITY POSITION AND NEED FOR U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Senator PERCY. In another area, the Iranian Prime Minister was reported by Iranian radio as telling a group of students recently that Iran is militarily the strongest nation in the Middle East. How do you assess Iran's security position today and its need for military assistance from the United States?

About \$492,000 in security assistance has been programed for fiscal 1973.

Mr. HELMS. Well, I had understood, and I obviously have to learn a great deal more about these things, but I thought the Iranians bought what military equipment they needed from the United States and paid for it. And as far as I know, there is nothing in the picture that would require them to ask for more military assistance from the United States than they have, in the past.

#### IRANIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Senator PERCY. Finally, there has been a tremendous program of economic development carried on in Iran, and I was deeply impressed with it in my visits to that country.

What kind of progress do you see being made, and in what ways can we, as a Nation, contribute toward this progress consistent with our overall needs?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it is my impression, and I assume it corresponds with yours, that the Shah has made a great effort to improve the lot of his people, to encourage foreign investment in

an effort to build his country up and make a better life for the people of Iran, and from all that I have seen and understand, he has had great success with this so far, and there does not seem to be any reason why this should not progress satisfactorily in the future.

#### COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I would simply like to state that my 6 years in the Senate, Richard Helms has been a superb public servant. I have never gone to his agency for impartial and factual information without getting it. Judgments were left to us, but the facts known were presented forthrightly. Some of the finest briefings I had around the world were from Agency personnel, who reflect the very high standards and high quality that Richard Helms and his predecessors have built into the agency.

Mr. Helms, I appreciate your past assistance and I look forward not only to voting enthusiastically for your confirmation, but also improved and strengthened relationships between the United States and Iran, which is a fine nation with a great potential for further progress.

I think as the President's representative there, you should contribute immensely.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Senator Percy.

#### CIA'S CONNECTIONS WITH MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Helms, Senator Percy raised a question about the multinational corporations, which is a study that has begun, but we have not had any open sessions. One of the cases which was widely publicized last year alleged that the CIA had a great deal to do with and was very close to one of those corporations, specifically the ITT.

Would you care to clarify that situation?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, the agency has connections with all kinds of companies and corporations in the United States for purposes of the acquisition of information and things of this kind, and I do think—it would be not correct at all to say that its relations with ITT were any different than they were with any other corporation.

The CHAIRMAN. That raises a very serious question. I had heard that it was unique, and that you did not have that kind of relationship with all of the others. You are saying you have similar relationships with all of the others?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I am sorry if I —

The CHAIRMAN. It sounded that way.

Mr. HELMS. If that was the intention, if that is what came through with you, this was not what I intended. I am not entirely sure, if I feel that its relationship with ITT on the part of the agency was different from that of relationships with other American companies then I am not sure what we are talking about, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the reports which came out, I think, last spring, in the so-called Anderson Papers, indicating that there was a very close relationship between ITT and the CIA or put it another way, the CIA was using ITT for purposes of espionage—collecting data.

I did not intend to raise this. Senator Percy prompted me to bring this question up, and since you are here I might as well ask you about it.

You are familiar with the Anderson Papers?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, but the agency was not using ITT for espionage purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Gathering of information maybe? Is that a better way to put it?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I have no doubt in the course of discussions between members of the Embassy and ITT and Anaconda and various other companies that information was exchanged back and forth, I have no doubt of that, but this hardly qualifies as espionage.

The CHAIRMAN. I must say it is hard to say what espionage is.

Ellsberg, as I understand it, is being prosecuted for espionage, but it is hard for me to see it is espionage, too. It is very difficult. These semantics have become impossible. All I meant was gathering information.

What do you mean by espionage?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, espionage, in the definition that we give to it, is the hiring of an individual to acquire information without anyone knowing that the individual is (a) acquiring the information or (b) what he represents.

#### FORMER CIA MEN INVOLVED IN WATERGATE BUGGING

The CHAIRMAN. That reminds me of another matter you might want to clarify and comment on.

It seems that several of the people involved in the bugging of the Watergate were former CIA men.

Mr. HELMS. Former, yes, sir. They had all retired, they had left. I have no control over anybody who has left.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you do not. I am just asking you whether it is true that they were former CIA men.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, Hunt was, and McCord was.

The CHAIRMAN. They were both former CIA. It was clear, I think, in the paper that they were no longer in your employ.

Mr. HELMS. They had been, both been retired at least 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Two years.

#### CIA AND NATIONAL STUDENTS ASSOCIATION

Finally, in this respect some years ago we heard quite a bit about the CIA and the National Students Association. All of that has been cleared up—or has it?

What is the present status?

Mr. HELMS. It has totally been cleared up, even including student headquarters which have been taken over by them, and there are no liens on it or anything.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all cleared up?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

#### CIA DISENGAGEMENT FROM RADIO FREE EUROPE

The CHAIRMAN. You formerly financed, I believe, to a great extent, 90 or 95 percent, Radio Free Europe. Did you not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That has been publicized, has it not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, that we are no longer involved with Radio Free Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. You are completely disengaged from Radio Free Europe?

Mr. HELMS. Totally.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no personnel or anybody there. You have nothing to do with it?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

#### VALUE OF CONTINUING RADIO FREE EUROPE

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. I wondered if you would care to give me your views about the value of Radio Free Europe under present conditions. I mean recognizing it was created in 1950, 19 under very different conditions.

Do you think that the continuation of it today serves any useful purpose to this country?

Mr. HELMS. I realize, Mr. Chairman, that this is a matter on which honest men may disagree. I happen to feel that Radio Free Europe provides people in the countries around the Soviet Union, particularly those other Communist countries which are associated in the Warsaw Pact with the Soviet Union, with the type of straight information and the discussion of events not only inside their country but on the outside that they get in no other way.

I think it has contributed, therefore, to the expansion of the amount of information available to these people, and since I think that people who live in a democracy believe in the free dissemination of information, I think this is a net good as far as those countries are concerned and I think that both of these organizations, Radio Free Europe, and the so-called Soviet satellite countries, and Radio Liberty for the Soviet Union, contribute valuably in this respect.

#### U.S. DEVOTION TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. You say we are a democracy devoted to freedom of information. I was under the impression that there have been considerable number of moves recently, and the morning paper indicates that there is a great difference of opinion about that here, such as the incarceration of newspapermen who do not respond to the graft, and the effect of the threats of Mr. Whitehead on those who do not behave. Are you sure that is an article of faith?

Mr. HELMS. I have no comment on that.

#### INFORMATION PROVIDED BY RADIO FREE EUROPE

The CHAIRMAN. But coming back to that, you say it is a good thing for these to have information. That is information in accordance with the judgment of USIA, or formerly the CIA. You judged what was good for them when you were running it, in any case, did you not? So to you truth was whatever was said by the administration whatever it was, Johnson administration, Kennedy administration.

If the President gave a speech, that was information. That was what you gave them?

Mr.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think this is worth \$38 million a year to do that?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, in addition to that, they were receiving information about things going on in their own country which was not available to them in their own newspapers and their own radio.

The CHAIRMAN. Things we thought they ought to know?

Mr. HELMS. Things we learned about.

The CHAIRMAN. That you thought—

Mr. HELMS. That we thought would be useful. They were, after all, facts; I mean it was not innuendo or things of this kind. They were events, developments.

#### PURPOSE OF RADIO FREE EUROPE

The CHAIRMAN. And the purpose was to stir up trouble, so that hopefully they would throw out their Communist government, was it not?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, that has not been a purpose—

The CHAIRMAN. That was its original purpose?

Mr. HELMS. Ah, but that has been changed rather dramatically in recent years, and it was not the purpose, at least since 1956, to my certain knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is not the purpose of changing their government, what is the purpose? What do you seek to achieve?

Mr. HELMS. I would think the purpose, sir, was to cause an evolution in the thinking of those countries to bring harmony into the world, bring them to our way of thinking.

The CHAIRMAN. Change their government?

Mr. HELMS. Not necessarily. One can modify their government within the strictures—

The CHAIRMAN. Change of government policies?

Mr. HELMS. Well, yes, sir.

#### WHAT CAN RFE DO THAT VOA CAN'T?

The CHAIRMAN. What can the RFE do that the Voice of America cannot do? Can it reach anybody that the Voice of America cannot reach?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I believe that the listenership of RFE has been established as being a considerable one. The USIA and its Voice of America is an American governmental institution. When Radio Free Europe was established, it was an effort to get a radio and a type of broadcast which would be wider in its spectrum.

The CHAIRMAN. But it was a governmental institution, too, was it not?

Mr. HELMS. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. It was a Government institution, too, was it not?

Mr. HELMS. Guided by the U.S. Government; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You financed it?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you guided it while—

Mr. HELMS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. By deception you made them think it was private and, therefore, you think you developed a different attitude toward it. So you are playing upon the fact that you created a false impression in their mind that this was a free and independent agency and therefore, you think that we should continue to support it because there are still those benighted people who think it is a private and independent agency.

Mr. HELMS. Well, there are poor, benighted people in this country who think a lot of the broadcasts from the Communist world are unofficial, clandestine even though, as advertised as such, they certainly are not.

#### PAYING FOR BOTH VOA AND RFE QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection to its being continued if the Europeans will pay for it. I do not see why we should pay for both the Voice of America and RFE. RFE costs approximately \$38 million and we are spending \$200 million on USIA, and about \$50 million that is for the Voice of America.

I do not see the justification for doing it twice. It is like the overkill on the atomic bombs. If we can kill them once, I would think that ought to be sufficient. If we can give them the President's speech once, that ought to be enough. I do not know why they have to have it twice.

#### WHY NOT SET UP RADIO FREE CHINA?

I think the CIA spent about \$500 million on it, during the course of its life. Having spent as much as you did, if I were you I would not justify it in any case. But if this is all such a good thing, why do not set up a Radio Free China to inform those poor benighted natives?

Senator AIKEN. We had one, did we not?

Mr. HELMS. I have often wondered.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you not have one?

There was one, I believe, in Korea that was capable of broadcasting into China, was there not?

Mr. HELMS. I do not know anything about that one. I have heard of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Radio Free Korea, something like that, and I used to see these pamphlets.

#### WOULD WITNESS RECOMMEND STARTING RFE TODAY?

Do you think if we were starting all over today without this background of having created this audience of true believers who think that is a source of objective truth, would you recommend we start a Radio Free Europe today if it was not already in being?

Mr. HELMS. I must confess, Mr. Chairman, that is something I have never thought about.

The CHAIRMAN. Think about it a minute. What would you think?

Do you really think you would, in view of the change in our attitude toward the President's change toward Russia and the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt, and all the other things?

Mr. HELMS. I think it would be pretty difficult to do, let's put that way.

The CHAIRMAN. I know it would be difficult. Do you think it would be wise to do it if you could?

Mr. HELMS. Well, there are so many practical difficulties in connection with it, I doubt you would get it done even if it were wise.

#### NET GOOD FROM RFE AND RL

But I do think, I want to repeat what I said a few moments ago; I think that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, the way they have been conducted in the last 10 years here, have been a net good and if they cost \$38 million, I think it was worthwhile having \$38 million.

You look at it, you just a moment ago said that with the changes in the world and different attitude on the part of the Soviet Union, Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and all of these things, there are some forces that have been at work in the world to create these conditions, and I am not at all sure Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have not contributed to bring these things about.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you get that arrangement? What is the connection there?

Mr. HELMS. The connection is that the cold war, after all, was played by two sides. It takes two to dance, and certainly the Soviet Union was fairly hard-nosed in times past.

You just said this morning you do not think they are as hard-nosed now. Certain events conspired to change attitudes inside nations and between nations, and I think that if you were to look over the programming of Radio Liberty and such things in years past, you would find that this has all been in favor of just this kind of an evolution.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that is a result of Radio Free Europe?

Mr. HELMS. I do not say it is a result of that individually. I say it is simply one factor in these developments.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I yield.

#### SPENDING BY SOVIET UNION AND ALLIES TO JAM RFE

Senator PERCY. Mr. Helms, can you tell us how much the Soviet Union and its allies have spent or spend a year to jam Radio Free Europe?

Mr. HELMS. More than twice what Radio Free Europe costs.

Senator PERCY. Do you think that because they are spending twice as much for jamming as we are spending to transmit, that there must be certain liberalizing pressures that have been brought about by Radio Free Europe? Do you think that they feel pressures on them as a result of these broadcasts to do certain things that they might not be inclined to do otherwise?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think it is perfectly true they do not like these broadcasts. I mean they have made that clear on various occasions.

#### DESIRABILITY OF BROADCASTING FACTUAL INFORMATION

Senator PERCY. I have seen the transition in Radio Free Europe programming and have participated in broadcasts from Munich. There seems to be no attempt that I have seen to transmit the old, cold war type of information or to ferment something, but simply to give factual information.

For instance, it is not wise for all Eastern European nations to have full information about an accord that has been reached between Chancellor Brandt and East Germany; that there is now access back and forth; that West Germans can visit family members in East Germany, and that there is a remarkable change in general?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is true and if I didn't make it clear in what I said earlier, the broadcasts have been designed in the last 10- to 15-year period to bring about what we would hope to be an evolution in the manner of thinking of the Eastern European countries.

Senator PERCY. I understand that when the President's arrival in Peking was announced, indicating a dramatic change in policy toward the People's Republic of China, less than a minute was devoted to that by Radio Moscow. Was it not desirable for Radio Free Europe to be able to transmit daily broadcasts as to what the President was actually doing in the People's Republic of China and the nature of his visit?

Mr. HELMS. I would have thought so.

Senator PERCY. When we have a space achievement, is it not going for us to have the attention of Eastern European peoples on such accomplishments?

Mr. HELMS. I think so.

Senator PERCY. Is there any other way of their getting information?

Mr. HELMS. Not that I know of, except through VOA and the radios.

Senator PERCY. As the chairman knows, I had the personally very unhappy responsibility during my first week on this committee to have to oppose the chairman's position on this. I collected the signatures of 66 Senators on a resolution of support for Radio Free Europe. We have a division of opinion in the Senate on the value of these programs, and I am following with great interest the Commission that was established, headed by Dr. Milton Eisenhower, to respond to the chairman's suggestions that there be a greater sharing of responsibilities and costs of operating Radio Free Europe. I am thoroughly sympathetic with his attitude on this, but I also feel we have a greater responsibility ourselves. In the end, we benefit tremendously from providing true information and, through the power of knowledge, having liberalizing forces exerted in Eastern Europe that make possible new accommodations to lessen the tensions and bring us, as the President has said, to an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.

#### CONTINUING INSTITUTION SUPPORTED

I would just want to say that I respectfully agree with the Chairman about burden-sharing, but I also believe that it should be a major responsibility of ours to see that this institution continues.

Thank you.

#### GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE IN PUBLIC BROADCASTING AND PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. I guess we have spent enough time on this. I wish that this great enthusiasm for information that the Senator expressed could be applied to the domestic scene and our own public broadcasting and our own television stations and our own newspapers could be encouraged to tell the truth, too, and not be under the kind of wrangle that this Administration is seeking to put on them.

Senator PERCY. If I may say so, I served as Chairman of the Ford Foundation Adult Education Commission for 2 years and we put \$20 million into starting educational television. I have expressed my own view that there seems to be too much government intervention in public broadcasting. I objected to Firing Line, Bill Buckley's program, being taken off, as the removal of this program would represent undue government influence in public broadcasting which I think should be left as free as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; but it isn't. As I understand, the Administration is asking for \$46 million for Radio Free Europe for 1974. A while ago I said \$38 million is the request for the current year. So they are expanding it at the same time they are liquidating our own domestic broadcasting, what you might call, Radio Free America. Supposedly, the public television was supposed to bring objective news to the people, and now they are liquidating that and, as you know, the President vetoed the bill.

It seems very odd to me we are so interested in taking the truth to the benighted people of Eastern Europe but denying it to the people of the United States, which is a very odd posture, I think, for us to put before the world.

Thank you very much, Mr. Helms.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very glad to have you here and we wish you well.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon at 11:45 a.m., the Committee adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.]

[EXECUTIVE SESSION]

**NOMINATION OF RICHARD HELMS TO BE AMBASSADOR TO IRAN AND CIA INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES**

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1973

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-1 the Capitol Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright [chairman], presiding.  
Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, Pell, Aiken, Case, Javits and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The Foreign Relations Committee is meeting this morning in executive session with Mr. Richard Helms, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Ambassador-designate to Iran for further discussion of questions which have been raised by members of the committee, as well as other Senators, subsequent to the public hearing at which Mr. Helms appeared on Monday.

The meeting this morning was called in the first instance because of a story in yesterday's New York Times headlined: "CIA Discloses Trained Police from 12 Agencies."

This story in turn was based on a letter of January 29 from Mr. John M. Maury, legislative counsel to the CIA, to Representative Edward R. Koch, responding to an inquiry which Mr. Koch had made of the CIA regarding an earlier New York Times story of December 17.

The two newspaper stories and Mr. Maury's letter will be placed in the record at this point. Copies are also available for members of the committee.

[The information referred to follows:]

[From the New York Times, Feb. 6, 1973]

C.I.A. DISCLOSES IT TRAINED POLICE FROM 12 AGENCIES

(By David Burnham)

The Central Intelligence Agency has acknowledged training policemen from about a dozen city and county police forces in the United States on the handling of explosives, the detection of wiretaps and the organization of intelligence files. The acknowledgement that the C.I.A. has trained policemen from approximately 12 agencies in the last two years was made by John M. Maury

legislative counsel for the C.I.A., in a letter to Representative Edward I. Koch. Mr. Koch, a Manhattan Democrat, said that the training activities of the C.I.A. violated the existing law and should be investigated by Congress. He called the matter to the attention of Representative Chet Holifield, Democrat of California, chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, and Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Democrat of North Carolina, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights.

Mr. Koch on Dec. 28 had asked Richard Helms, the recently retired Director of Central Intelligence, about the agency's domestic activities after it was disclosed that 14 New York policemen had been trained in the handling of political intelligence files last September.

Responding to Mr. Koch's inquiry, the C.I.A.'s legislative counsel wrote on Jan. 29 that fewer than 50 policemen, "from a total of about a dozen city and county police forces, have received some kind of agency briefing in the past two years."

The counsel, Mr. Maury, said that the training sessions "have covered a variety of subjects such as the procedures for the processing, analyzing, filing of information, security devices and procedures, and metal and explosives detection techniques."

In a statement prepared for insertion in today's Congressional Record, based on both Mr. Maury's letter and an earlier telephone conversation, Mr. Koch described the training as involving "the handling of explosives and foreign weapons, as well as audio control measure techniques."

The Representative said Mr. Maury had explained that "audio control measure techniques" involved the detection of wiretaps and bugs" in which foreign interests are involved."

'NO COST TO RECIPIENTS'

Mr. Maury said that the C.I.A. "briefings have been provided at no cost to the recipients." He added, "Since they have been accomplished merely by making available, insofar as their own duties permit, qualified agency experts and instructors, the cost to the agency is minimal."

In his request to Mr. Holifield for an investigation by the House Government Operations Committee, Mr. Koch said that "since the C.I.A. is barred by statute from participating in law-enforcement activities in the United States, I consider their disregard of the law most serious."

Mr. Maury, however, in his letter to Representative Koch, said that "we [the C.I.A.] do not consider that the activities in question violate the letter or the spirit" of the law. The National Security Act of 1947, which authorizes the establishment of the C.I.A., provides that "the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement or internal-security functions."

Mr. Koch, in his statement for The Congressional Record, said that the C.I.A. had provided him with the names of some of the jurisdictions whose policemen had been trained but asked him "to keep the specific locations confidential because the agency pledged this confidentiality to those police departments."

Though Mr. Koch said the request for secrecy "makes it even more incumbent that the C.I.A. be prohibited from any training of this nature," he did not disclose the locations in his statement. Mr. Koch, however, did make them available to the House and Senate committees he asked to investigate the training activities.

An independent and reliable source has told The Times that in addition to the 14 policemen from New York, the C.I.A. has acknowledged training police officials in Boston, Washington, D.C., Montgomery County, Md., and Fairfax County, Va. It could not be determined where the balance of the jurisdictions are situated.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,  
Washington, D.C., January 29, 1973.

HON. EDWARD I. KOCH,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. KOCH: This is in response to your letter to Mr. Helms of 28 December 1972, regarding a New York Times story describing some briefings which the Central Intelligence Agency has provided to the New York Police Department, and to your request during our telephone conversation on the same subject on 23 January 1973.

Regarding the first question in your letter, I do not have a precise figure but I can assure you that less than fifty police officers all told, from a total of about a dozen city and county police forces have received some kind of Agency briefing within the past two years.

These briefings have covered a variety of subjects such as the procedure for the processing, analyzing, filing and retrieving information, security devices and procedures, and metal and explosives detection techniques.

These briefings have been provided at no cost to the recipients. Since they have been accomplished merely by making available, insofar as their other duties permit, qualified Agency experts and instructors the cost to the Agency is minimal.

All of these briefings have been conducted in response to the requests of various recipients. The Agency intends to continue to respond to such requests on matters within its competence and authority, and to the extent possible without interfering with its primary mission.

Regarding the Agency's authority to conduct such briefings, the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253, as amended) specifically provides that "the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions." We do not consider that the activities in question violate the letter or spirit of these restrictions. In our judgment, they are entirely consistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-351, 42 U.S.C.A. 3701 et seq.). In enacting that law it was the declared policy and purpose of Congress "to assist State and local governments in strengthening and improving law enforcement at every level by national assistance" and to "... encourage research and development directed toward the improvement of law enforcement and the development of new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime and the detection and apprehension of criminals" (42 U.S.C.A. 3701). By the same law Congress also authorized the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to use available services, equipment, personnel and facilities of the Department of Justice and of "other civilian or military agencies and instrumentalities" of the Federal Government to carry out its function (42 U.S.C.A. 3756).

The identities of the individual police forces which have attended these briefings have, by mutual agreement, been kept confidential and I would therefore appreciate your treating the information I gave you in our conversation regarding these identities accordingly.

I trust the foregoing information is responsive to your interests, and I will be glad to discuss the matter with you further if you so desire.

Sincerely,

JOHN M. MAURY,  
Legislative Counsel.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 17, 1972]

FOURTEEN CITY POLICEMEN GOT C.I.A. TRAINING—LEARNED HOW TO ANALYZE AND HANDLE INFORMATION

(By David Burnham)

Fourteen New York Policemen—including First Deputy Police Commissioner William H. T. Smith and the commander of the department's Intelligence Division—received training from the Central Intelligence Agency in September.

A spokesman for the C.I.A., Angus Thuermer, confirmed that the 14 New Yorkers had been given training but denied that the agency had regular instruction programs for local police officials.

Mr. Thuermer acknowledged, however, that "there have been a number of occasions when similar courtesies have been extended to police officers from different cities around the country."

In response to an inquiry, Mr. Thuermer said he was not able to determine how many police officials or how many departments had come to the Washington area to receive agency training.

"I doubt very much that they keep that kind of information," he added.

Mr. Thuermer scoffed when asked whether the agency's training of policemen some of whom are responsible for collecting information about political activists—violated the congressional legislation that created the C.I.A. to collect and evaluate intelligence relating to national security, "provided that the agen-

shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal security functions."

Twelve of the New York policemen—one captain, three lieutenants, five sergeants and three detectives—received four days of training from the C.I.A. in a facility in Arlington, Va., beginning last Sept. 11, according to the Police Department.

Commissioner Smith and Deputy Chief Hugo J. Masini, commander of the Intelligence Division, attended one day's training, on Sept. 13.

Commissioner Smith said during an interview that in connection with the reorganization of the department's intelligence work, "we decided we needed some training in the analysis and handling of large amounts of information."

Mr. Smith said the department had decided that the C.I.A. would be the best place for such training. "They pretty much set this up for us," he explained. "The training was done gratis, only costing us about \$2,500 in transportation and lodging."

Both the International Association of Chiefs of Police, a professional organization that does police efficiency studies and runs training seminars on a variety of law-enforcement subjects, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation said they were not equipped to provide instruction on the storage, retrieval and analysis of intelligence information.

One branch of the Police Department's Intelligence Division, the security investigation section, is the subject of a pending suit in Federal court here. The suit, filed by a group of political activists, charges that the surveillance and infiltration activities of the security section violate "the rights of privacy, free speech and association granted and guaranteed" the plaintiffs "by the United States Constitution."

The present reorganization of the security section—and the part of the Intelligence Division that collects information on organized crime—is being financed by a \$166,630 grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a branch of the Justice Department. As of October 13, a police roster indicated that there were 365 policemen assigned to the intelligence Division.

The CHAIRMAN. In addition to that item which appeared in the papers, Senator Ervin, who is chairman of the Government Operations Committee, and is interested in the operations of the CIA, if any, in its relation to the recent Watergate incident, has requested that I inquire about some questions that had been raised in other articles.

#### SWEARING IN OF WITNESS

I think, Mr. Helms, in view of the nature of these questions, it would be appropriate that you be sworn as a witness, which is customary where we have investigative questions. Would you raise your hand and swear. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HELMS. I do, sir.

#### QUESTION OF KOCH LETTER

The CHAIRMAN. We will start with the question of the Koch letter. That was the first item mentioned. You are fairly familiar with that, I take it?

#### STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELMS, NOMINEE TO BE AMBASSADOR TO IRAN

Mr. HELMS. The letter, I am, yes, sir.

What is involved here, and I want to say that I am glad that I have an opportunity to come before you to discuss this because, frankly,

what is involved here is nothing but what we regard as a public spirited act and it started in the following fashion.

About 4 years ago or so I was having dinner with the police chief of four or five major cities. I was doing this because in various way in connection with our investigations of our personnel and work as so forth these police associations or organizations have been helpful so I thought it would be a friendly thing to have them to dinner.

In the course of our dinner conversation, which ranged over a wide number of things, I was rather appalled to learn that in almost all of these police departments there were no intelligence files. In other words, if a criminal had a record in the 32d precinct and was arrested two or three times and was picked up next in the 15th precinct there was nothing in police headquarters to indicate that the man had ever been arrested before. And many of these police chiefs agreed this was a bad situation.

So, I said, "Well, at least there is one thing we know how to do in the Central Intelligence Agency and that is how to set up intelligence records and files and methods of keeping these files, and, as an individual American citizen who is interested in law and order and decency in his community, if there was any way that we could help to instruct you as to how these files are indeed set up I would be glad indeed to have a man available."

I heard nothing more about this until about 2 months later on police chief, that is, the gentleman from Chicago, said he would be interested, so I was able to put a man, who understood about files and how you make records track and so forth, in touch with them and he helped them establish a system for keeping this information.

As the years have gone on, it has been the consistent policy of mine and I say mine is when I was Director of the Agency, that anything we invented or devised or were able to do in the Agency that I thought would be helpful in the field of law enforcement we have turned over to the FBI, and in more recent times Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the LEAA.

For example, some time ago in connection with a problem, and a recurring problem, in the Vietnamese war, where certain individuals were Vietcong at night and supposedly law-abiding South Vietnamese citizens in the daylight, our technicians devised a nontoxic spray which when sprayed on a man's hand as soon as the spray dries and the hand is subjected to ultraviolet light, if that hand has been in contact with metal any time in the preceding 24 hours, it will show this. Each metal has a distinctive color under the ultraviolet, some red, some purple, some gold, and so forth; so it was possible to tell that that fellow had had a handgun in his hands during that period.

In other words, we thought since this worked in Vietnam—we had a chance to test it in hundreds of cases—the police organization might find it useful. After all, if they had picked up in a few hours the fellow who had shot Senator Stennis and he didn't have a gun on him you would have been able to tell he had a gun in his hands during the preceding period, and about the size of the gun.

We also developed a system where treating a cloth with chemicals and in wiping off a man's hands you can tell whether he had dealt with explosives or not. It seemed to us, it seemed only proper that the

domestic law enforcement agencies be given the benefit of it, and we have given—

#### QUESTION IS PROPRIETY OF ACTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think anybody questions your capacity to do all these things. It is the responsibility, in view of what we thought was a restriction upon the CIA's operating domestically. I thought your responsibility was through the FBI. They conduct a very thoroughgoing school, as you know, with formal graduations every year, for these police departments. Whatever you would have to contribute, I would have thought would have been given through the FBI.

Mr. HELMS. Well, it has been, sir. But in the case of the—I was just going to come to the case of the New York policemen.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only question. It is not your very sophisticated methods. It is whether or not it is proper for you to directly become the mentor of our police. Somewhat like the idea of USIA propagandizing the United States.

Mr. HELMS. Oh, no, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. They make some pretty good films, but they are not supposed to be shown to the American people.

#### CASE OF NEW YORK POLICEMEN

Mr. HELMS. Let's take the case about the New York policemen. The first deputy commissioner of the New York police came to the agency and said that on advice of a lawyer from the Ford Foundation who was advising him—I believe the man's name was Kerstetter—that the agency has the best files and retrieval system in the U.S. Government.

#### CIA FILES AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM

The CHAIRMAN. The FBI does?

Mr. HELMS. The CIA does.

The CHAIRMAN. Yours is better than the FBI?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. On what system?

Mr. HELMS. I beg pardon?

Senator CASE. Best files on what?

Mr. HELMS. On files of individual names. After all, we maintain espionage files for the U.S. Government, so we have to have records of all of these individuals, and this is a system of storing the information and then being able to retrieve it and the retrieval is the more difficult part and some years ago we got into a terrible problem about this because we were having difficulty in getting the cards and files because there were so many of them. With the coordination of the IBM, we devised a brandnew system which does not exist any place else in the U.S. Government, so far as I am aware, for storing and retrieving this kind of personnel information.

The CHAIRMAN. And the FBI does not have a comparable one?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They used to pretend they did. You are supposed to call them up and they are supposed to produce a voluminous record

instantaneously on nearly everybody. I don't know whether Hoover would agree with you or not. Did he ever agree with that yours was better than his?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall ever discussing it.

#### DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITY OF CIA

The Chairman. The narrow point I want to discuss, which is raised by Mr. Koch, is what is the domestic responsibility of CIA? Are you supposed to keep records on domestic criminals and domestic

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; these are counterespionage files, but files records can be kept with various names and in various ways.

The CHAIRMAN. The very narrow question is should you train police officers when the FBI overtly does it. I think everybody assumes that is the agency to do this. We didn't think CIA was supposed to do this.

Mr. HELMS. I quite agree, and we don't train police officers. We conducted a seminar for these men for 3 days and told them how to set up files and how you go about the method of retrieval, and that was all that was involved.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. HELMS. That is all that was involved.

The Chairman. All right.

#### CHIEF OF RADIO FREE EUROPE POLISH DESK

There are one or two other questions. Do you know who the chief of the Polish desk of Radio Free Europe is and has been during the last year?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anybody?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know his name.

The CHAIRMAN. Who in the CIA, would know about this? Who is familiar with the personnel?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know that anybody is any more because I have—

The CHAIRMAN. Who was last up until—

Mr. HELMS. Well, it was a fellow named Richardson over there.

The CHAIRMAN. What is his first name?

Mr. HELMS. John, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. John Richardson?

Mr. HELMS. I think he is the one.

The CHAIRMAN. How do I identify him? Is that all I need?

Mr. HELMS. I would think that the sensible thing to do actually would be to ask somebody to call Mr. Karamessines and he could connect with this. He is in charge of that area and find someone. Richardson is the correct one.

The CHAIRMAN. You wouldn't know who that was?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; I don't.

#### EUGENIO ROLANDO MARTINEZ

The CHAIRMAN. There have been several articles, one in the New York Times on January 11, the Washington Post on January 15, and

Washington Post on January 7. You may be familiar with these. They are all very much the same. I will read to you from the Hersh article of January 14, 1973, and I will put it in the record.

"One member of the Watergate team, Eugenio Rolando Martinez, was an active employee of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of the break-in and kept a diary. He was stricken from the CIA's payroll within a day of his arrest and the diary was subsequently found by Federal investigators in the trunk of his car parked at Miami International Airport."

Do you know who Mr. Eugenio Rolando Martinez is?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know him personally, sir. Mr. Martinez was never an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. He was on a retainer of \$100 a month at that time, seen occasionally by a representative of the Agency. His role was simply to identify to us, from those legal and illegal immigrants from Cuba, those individuals whom he thought might be of interest for informational purposes. He simply was to identify them and we took it from there. It was a very loose kind of arrangement in which he reported in from time to time. And it is indeed true as soon as it was found out he was involved in the Watergate thing we simply turned him off and have not talked to him since.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you describe him again? He was not an employee but on a retainer? What do you call him, a consultant or what?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; in this case I think you can say that this was a fiduciary relationship, but he was not an employee on the rolls of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you describe it? He was employed to provide and give services?

Mr. HELMS. Let me step back just a minute so we are talking about the same thing. When we refer to a CIA employee, we refer to those who are actually hired by the Central Intelligence Agency or on our rolls in Langley and are considered to be employees of the Government Agency.

Then in doing our work in various parts of the world we are in contact with various people with whom we set up a fiduciary relationship, either for purposes of espionage or whatever the case may be. So there is a distinction between a man who actually is on the payroll there and is directly under my control and those that form the network that we run in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. It is somewhat like this committee. We have what you call consultants whom we pay so much a day or week to do certain things, but, they are not on the regular rolls of the committee. Is that true?

Mr. HELMS. That is not a bad analogy.

The CHAIRMAN. This is what I meant when I said we have those kind of people.

That clarifies his relationship and you did cut it off as soon as you heard about the break-in.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

FELIPE DE DIEGO

The CHAIRMAN. What about Felipe De Diego? Do you know him?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a similar relationship?  
Mr. HELMS. No.

REINALDO PICO

The CHAIRMAN. Did a man named Reinaldo Pico?  
Mr. HELMS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. These are all mentioned in the same story.  
Mr. HELMS. Yes; I realize that.

The CHAIRMAN. You are probably familiar with them.

Mr. HELMS. I am not entirely, sir, because I think I may have been away at the time that particular article came out.

BERNARD L. BARKER

The CHAIRMAN. De Diego, 43, is a real estate salesman who was employed in the Miami real estate office of Bernard L. Barker, one of the Watergate defendants.

Was Mr. Barker ever an employee or a consultant?

Mr. HELMS. During the Bay of Pigs he was one of the Cuban derivatives who was involved in that operation and it is my recollection that all lines with him on the part of the Agency were eliminated some time in the middle sixties. As a matter of fact, we found out he was involved in certain gambling and criminal elements and we didn't like the cut of his jib and we cut him off.

The CHAIRMAN. So that is some time in the middle sixties.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

FRANK STURGIS

The CHAIRMAN. And Frank Sturgis, was he an employee?

Mr. HELMS. Never.

The CHAIRMAN. In any capacity?

Mr. HELMS. I am sure of that.

VIRGILIO R. GONZALES

The CHAIRMAN. Did I mention Virgilio R. Gonzales?

Mr. HELMS. You didn't, but he was not either.

The CHAIRMAN. He has never been in a similar position?

Mr. HELMS. No.

JAMES W. McCORD

The CHAIRMAN. And James W. McCord?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, he was actually an employee of the Agency

The CHAIRMAN. Up until when?

Mr. HELMS. Up until 2 years, 2 or 3 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. But since then he has had no relationship?

Mr. HELMS. None whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. He hasn't been on a retainer?

Mr. HELMS. Of any kind.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody can interrupt.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why did he leave the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Retired, sir. He had served his time and he just left of his own free will and on his retirement.

Sen

Did he get a pension when he left?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. HELMS. Regular civil service retirement. It is no special pension.

The CHAIRMAN. How long had he served?

Mr. HELMS. Many years. I think he must have been there 15 or 20 years.

E. HOWARD HUNT

The CHAIRMAN. Was E. Howard Hunt, Jr., an employee?

Mr. HELMS. He also had been an employee of the Agency.

The CHAIRMAN. In a similar situation?

Mr. HELMS. He also, but my recollection is that he resigned rather than retired. I am not sure exactly. It was one or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. About when?

Mr. HELMS. About 2, 2½ years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. He had no relationship to the CIA since then?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

G. GORDON LIDDY

The CHAIRMAN. What is G. Gordon Liddy's relationship with the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Never?

Mr. HELMS. Never under any circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. He never has been. I see.

Mr. HELMS. Never.

MR. ST. GEORGE AND MR. STURGIS

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a Mr. St. George? Are you familiar with him?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, I don't know him.

The CHAIRMAN. The article says, "Mr. St. George and Mr. Sturgis are controversial figures in their own circles, where they have mixed reputations."

Mr. St. George has never been an employee of the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Not to my knowledge, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No one other than the first man we just mentioned—

Mr. HELMS. Martinez.

MARTINEZ ONLY CIA EMPLOYEE INVOLVED IN WATERGATE

The CHAIRMAN. Martinez. No one in the employ of the CIA in any capacity was involved in the Watergate other than Martinez.

Mr. HELMS. That is a correct statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

[The article referred to follows:]

[From the New York Times, Jan. 14, 1973]

4 WATERGATE DEFENDANTS REPORTED STILL BEING PAID

(By Seymour M. Hersh)

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13.—At least four of the five men arrested last June in the Watergate raid are still being paid by persons as yet unnamed, according to sources close to the case.

One of the defendants, Frank A. Sturgis, acknowledged that payments continued after his arrest but also said that his funds had been sharply reduced in the last few months. Another closely involved source said that payments to the four men now ranged from \$400 a month up.

Mr. Sturgis mentioned his cutback in funds during a meeting in Miami nearly two weeks ago, before the start of the trial, now under way, in which he and six others are accused of attempting to plant eavesdropping devices in the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate complex here.

The trial has been recessed until Monday amid indications that some of the defendants may try to plead guilty. One defendant, E. Howard Hunt Jr., already has.

Mr. Sturgis's statements on the financial arrangement of the arrested group were corroborated later by a source close to the defense.

The conversation with Mr. Sturgis was one in a series by The New York Times with Federal investigators, political figures and defense lawyers, all familiar with various aspects of the Watergate case.

MAJOR POINTS LISTED

Among other points made by more than one of those interviewed were the following:

High officials of the Committee for the Re-election of the President have acknowledged privately that they are unable to account for \$900,000 in cash raised for President Nixon's 1972 campaign—far more than the \$235,000 mentioned in court as the cost of the activities of the Watergate group.

A Nixon supporter working in the Democratic Headquarters, apparently either recruited or infiltrated by the intelligence team, taped open the latches on the doors leading to the basement of the Watergate offices, allowing the five men to enter the building.

One member of the Watergate team, Eugenio Rolando Martinez, was an active employe of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time of the break in and kept a diary. He was stricken from the CIA's payroll within a day of his arrest and the diary was subsequently found by Federal Investigators in the trunk of his car parked at Miami International Airport.

These same sources provided, in interviews over the last two months, further details of the intelligence operations that were described in court this week by Earl J. Silbert, the chief Assistant United States Attorney who is prosecuting the case.

The Times sources said, for example, that the Republicans had planted an undercover agent in the campaign staffs of Senator Edmund S. Muskie and Senator George McGovern, the two leading candidates for the Democratic Presidential nomination.

Mr. Silbert told the court that the Republican team had recruited Thomas J. Gregory, a 20-year-old Utah student, as a spy, first on the Muskie staff and then on the McGovern staff.

The New York Times information was obtained after it was learned two months ago that Andrew St. George, a free lance writer with close connections with anti-Castroites in Miami was circulating an outline to New York publishing houses of what he described as the experiences of Mr. Sturgis.

ALLEGATIONS CHECKED

In checking on the allegations in the book outline, The Times talked on a number of occasions with its author, Mr. St. George, and with Mr. Sturgis.

Their statements were subsequently checked, wherever possible, with others who might have knowledge of the events.

Some of the allegations were corroborated in these independent checks. Some allegations were denied. Still others were neither corroborated nor denied.

One allegation in the St. George outline was that the bugging had extended to Democratic Senators' offices on Capitol Hill, and that former Attorney General John N. Mitchell had been kept informed of the intelligence group's activities. This allegation was supported by Mr. Sturgis but not independently corroborated by other sources.

Sources were reluctant to talk about specific aspects of the intelligence operation because the trial judge, Chief Judge John J. Sirica, had forbidden those concerned with the trial to discuss the case publicly.

#### REPUBLICAN AIDE REPLIES

DeVan L. Shumway, director of public affairs for the Republican campaign committee, told that this report would appear in *The Times*, described the allegations in connection with the committee as "outrageously false and preposterous."

Mr. Shumway's statement added:

"If *The Times* chooses to publish these unsupported statements, it will be a serious act of journalistic recklessness and irresponsibility. Mr. John Mitchell has authorized me to say that he joins fully in this statement."

The campaign press aide was asked specifically to respond to the allegation that the Republicans were unable to account for more money than previously known, to the assertion that Mr. Mitchell knew more than has been disclosed about the extent of the political intelligence activities and to the allegation that some funds—initially from the Republicans—were still being used to pay the Watergate defendants.

Mr. St. George signed a contract last month with *Harpers' Magazine Press* for a book based on Mr. Sturgis's life experiences, including his activities for the political intelligence team. Mr. St. George has also negotiated a contract with the National Broadcasting Company calling upon the Watergate defendant to provide in a television interview a first-hand account of the intelligence operation. Mr. Sturgis said that the contract was for \$8,000.

A spokesman for Harper & Row, which is affiliated with *Harpers' Magazine Press*, confirmed that a contract had been signed with Mr. St. George for what was termed "under \$5,000." The work is tentatively titled "Inside Watergate," the official said.

An official at N.B.C. also acknowledged that a contract with Mr. Sturgis was signed early this month but said that less than \$8,000 was involved.

Mr. St. George was given a "finder's fee" of about \$1,000 for delivering Mr. Sturgis to the network, the official said. The contract calls for Mr. Sturgis to be interviewed on the network's "First Tuesday" monthly news show, after the trial.

Both Mr. St. George and Mr. Sturgis are controversial figures in their own circles where they have mixed reputations. While some praise Mr. St. George's intelligence and his passionate devotion to his work, others describe him as a journalist who sometimes confuses fact and fantasy.

While there are many in the Miami area who have denounced Mr. Sturgis as a fabricator, there are obviously those who thought him reliable enough to join the intelligence team.

Mr. St. George about 45 years old, lives in Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., with his wife and two children. He has written and reported about the anti-Castro Cuban community in Miami since the late nineteen-fifties. Mr. St. George talks constantly about Fidel Castro, the Premier of Cuba.

Once a free-lance photographer who worked for *Life* magazine, Mr. St. George became—as did Mr. Sturgis—a friend of Mr. Castro in the early days of the revolution. He won two awards in 1959 for his exclusive photographs of the Cuban leaders.

Over the next few years, however, his fortunes waned, and he became involved in a number of abortive projects—including an alleged attempt by a Cuban exile group to invade Haiti. He sold his account as exclusive television property to the Columbia Broadcasting Company in 1967. The invasion never took place.

Mr. St. George's contacts in Latin America apparently remained firm during these years, however, and enabled him to come up with a world journalistic beat in 1968—the diaries of the slain revolutionary, Ernesto Che Guevara.

#### HAS NO STEADY JOB

Mr. Sturgis, 48, is a native of Norfolk, Va. He has no steady job but has been heavily involved in anti-Castro, anti-Communist activities since the Cuban revolution. Mr. Sturgis contended in a recent meeting that he had once served as a Vice Chief of Staff for the Cuban Air Force under Mr. Castro. He said that he fell out with Mr. Castro over the Premier's leftward drift.

Since the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, for which Mr. Sturgis says that he helped to train Cuban guerrillas in Guatemala, he has been linked to a number of highly publicized exploits, including an airborne propaganda leaflet raid in 1962 over Cuba that he later said during a court hearing never took place.

Mr. Sturgis was arrested and jailed a few years later, for the alleged hijacking off the coast of Mexico of a ship that he said he planned to use for a commando raid on Cuba.

Mr. Sturgis said that he had never seen the outline for the book that Mr. St. George presented to the New York publishers. But he said that there had been many meetings between them, and that he knew that Mr. St. George was preparing a book about him.

In the outline, Mr. Sturgis is depicted as joining the political surveillance group in the late summer of 1971 and working directly for Hunt, a former Central Intelligence Agency official who was then serving as a consultant to the White House on narcotics traffic.

Hunt is said by the prosecutor to have recruited some members of the political intelligence team.

#### A DRUG INVESTIGATION

Mr. St. George's book outline also asserted that Mr. Sturgis worked for months under Hunt's direction in an undercover investigation of alleged illicit drug traffic in Mexico, Panama and Paraguay. He was then recalled to Washington, according to the outline, where he began assisting Hunt in an extensive investigation into the background and activities of Senator Edward M. Kennedy, with special emphasis on the death of a young woman in an automobile accident at Chappaquiddick, Mass.

The outline quotes Mr. Sturgis as saying that he joined the political surveillance operation, known as S.O.G., or Special Operations Group, sometime in early 1972.

The *New York Times* has been told by a source close to the defense that Mr. Sturgis gave basically the same account of his recruitment and of the drug investigation to one of the Watergate defense lawyers. The *Times* has also been told that at the time of his arrest, Mr. Sturgis was carrying a false passport and other false documents that he believed had been prepared by the C.I.A. at Hunt's request.

Hunt had served for many years as a counter-intelligence expert for the agency and was said by sources close to the defense to have often worked with his wife, Dorothy, while on operations for the agency.

Mrs. Hunt, a former employe of the Spanish Embassy here, was killed in the crash Dec. 8 of an airliner in Chicago. She was later found to have been carrying \$10,000 in cash and to have \$200,000 worth of flight insurance.

#### HIGH-RISK OPERATION

Counter-intelligence is one of the most clandestine and high-risk operations of the Central Intelligence Agency and involves the close observation of men and women said to be agents in the United States of the Soviet Union and other nations.

In another interview, a legal source with close connections to the financial arrangements inside the Committee to Re-elect the President reported that Hugh W. Sloan, Jr., the campaign treasurer who resigned shortly after the Watergate break-in, has said that the committee cannot account for \$900,000 in cash contributions.

"That's the amount he says the books just won't jibe with," the source said. This account was supported by a source close to the defense.

The \$900,000 is far greater than previous estimates of the cash available for a Republican fund that the prosecution contends was involved in intelligence

work. Assistant United States Attorney Silbert, in his statement to the court this week, said that \$235,000—most of it apparently in \$100 bills—had been given by Republican officials to George Gordon Liddy for the intelligence operation, although his investigators could account for only \$50,000 of it.

Mr. Sloan, a pending witness in the Watergate trial, said that he was unable to discuss any aspect of the case in view of the court's ban on outside discussion.

In corroborating Mr. Sturgis's statement that four of the five men seized in the Watergate were still being paid, a source close to the defense said that the payments had been made without interruption since the arrests.

"They're not getting big money," said another source, who complained that the persons responsible for "parceling it out" were stingy.

In addition to Mr. Sturgis and Mr. Martinez, the other men arrested at the Watergate are James W. McCord Jr. of suburban Washington, a former F.B.I. and C.I.A. agent who was working as a security official for both the Republican National Committee and the Committee to Re-elect the President, and two Miami men—Bernard L. Barker and Virgilio R. Gonzales.

All had been active in anti-Castro and anti-Communist activities in Florida since the Cuban revolution.

#### FUND CUTBACK REPORTED

Mr. Sturgis indicated during a meeting that he was angry because of a cutback in funds, and because of an insistence on the part of those dispensing the money that he deal through Mr. Barker—known as "Macho" to the Watergate intelligence team.

The four defendants from the Miami area—Mr. Barker, Mr. Martinez, Mr. Sturgis and Mr. Gonzales—are said to be receiving monthly cash payments of \$400 and up. None of those interviewed knew whether a similar financial arrangement had been worked out for the fifth defendant, Mr. McCord.

While he has cited no evidence, Mr. Sturgis apparently believes that the funds are coming, in part, from accounts activated by the still-operating Committee to Re-elect the President through a variety of intermediaries.

Other money, said by Mr. Sturgis to come from right wing businesses and individuals, is also reportedly available.

Another source—not a defendant—who is receiving cash payments said in an interview that the men being paid did not know who was responsible for putting up the money and, if they did know, would not say.

"The sources say if you're going to embarrass us, you won't get a dime," this man said. "In that sense, we have to be very, very sensitive."

Another source, who knows the defendants, complained about the limited amount of cash that he said was being given to the Miami men and said that those responsible were "not doing what they should be doing."

"Everything is supersecret," he said. "All the money has to go through several washings before we get it. They're afraid that the word might get back."

#### THE "BIG PARANOIA"

"Their big paranoia is that somewhere along the line it would be found out that they were feeding money to us."

At least one cash payment was reportedly made by Mr. Barker to Henry B. Rothblatt of New York, the attorney for four of the five Watergate defendants. Mr. Rothblatt refused, in an interview, to discuss the source of his "fee," as he put it.

Federal investigators with detailed knowledge of the case suggested in subsequent interviews that any traceable connection between the Republican re-election committee and the Watergate defendants had been severed, and funds—even if they had stemmed from cash accounts once in the control of the Republicans—had long since passed into the control of those unknown men still paying the Watergate group.

According to conversations with Mr. St. George and Mr. Sturgis and substantiated by another source close to the defendants, the Watergate break-in followed this scenario:

The plan for the entry was simple. An inside man, who was said to be on both the Democratic and Republican payrolls, was to tape a number of door latches on the bottom, or basement, level of the building so the intruders could gain quick entry. Once inside, they were to be aided by keys made by Mr. Gonzales, a locksmith.

He had made casts of at least one lock in the sixth-floor area of the Democratic National Committee offices during an earlier illegal entry. The Washington police disclosed that they had found a key to the Democrats' office hidden in an ashtray by an elevator on the sixth floor and theorized that an insider had placed it there.

The inside man did his job, but an alert guard noted the tape and pulled it off. The Watergate five retaped the doors. One source asked about this detail, said that it was Mr. McCord who decided to go ahead with the entry, although the four others believed that the mission had been compromised.

When the suspicious guard returned a few moments later to the basement level of the building to double-check the doors, he found them retaped and telephoned the police. Meanwhile the five men had begun their operations inside the Democratic offices.

In an interview with The Los Angeles Times, Alfred C. Baldwin Jr., a former F.B.I. agent who was working with the political intelligence team, said that he had been assigned as a lookout at the motel across the street from the Watergate early June 17.

He saw the police pull up, he said, and relayed a warning to one of the security men. Mr. Baldwin said that he was then told that his contact was unable to reach the men on the sixth floor. The police arrived about 15 minutes after they had been summoned by the guard.

At this point, another factor came into prominence. Mr. Barker's reputation for being stingy.

Mr. Barker had served as a paymaster for the C.I.A. during the Bay of Pig Invasion and was said to be proud of his reputation for being careful with money. He was said to walk out of restaurants if the menu seemed too expensive.

He was also said to be a patron of an all-night 15-cent hamburger stand in Miami. On the night of the Watergate break-in, he boasted that he had paid only 39 cents for the tape used to secure the door latches.

#### SAVED ON BATTERIES

Once the men had gained access to the Watergate complex without, they believed, being spotted, Mr. Barker turned off the batteries on his walkie-talkie. He explained later that he did it "to save the batteries." He thus did not hear Mr. Baldwin's advance warning.

Mr. Barker's alleged deficiencies as an "operative" that night still rankle Mr. Sturgis, who when interviewed referred repeatedly to his colleague, now a Miami real estate man, as "that idiot."

One of the bizarre aspects of the case is the C.I.A. connection of those involved. The name for the political operations conducted by Hunt—Special Operations Group—is identical with that given by the C.I.A.'s clandestine services—the so called "dirty tricks" department—to its covert paramilitary operations.

In addition, nearly all of the seven indicted men had some connection with the C.I.A., either as an agent or as a contract employee hired for specific operations.

In his outline, Mr. St. George alleged that Mr. Martinez was still on the C.I.A. payroll at the time of the Watergate break-in, a statement that was subsequently confirmed by Federal sources. Officials also confirmed that a diary kept by Mr. Martinez—who is known as "El Practico" to his colleagues—had been found by F.B.I. agents and was in the Government's possession.

#### NOT ON WITNESS LIST

Mr. Sturgis indicated that he thought much potentially damaging information about his group's extensive operations had been provided to the Government both by the Martinez diary and by Felipe De Diego, a sixth member of the Watergate group who was granted partial immunity by the prosecution after his interrogation last year by the F.B.I. in Miami.

Mr. De Diego is known to have stayed at the Watergate Hotel on three occasions up to the day of the break-in. The prosecution's witness list, made available on the first day of trial last Monday, did not include Mr. De Diego.

Allegations in the St. George outline about wider bugging than that mentioned in the Watergate indictment were corroborated in general by Mr. Sturgis, but he refused to discuss any specifics.

"I'm not going to be a stoolie," he said. "If I'd wanted to have done something and make some money, I would have gone to McGovern."

The Times was unable to find any independent confirmation for the allegations. However, Mr. Silbert, said in court that the intelligence team made

two attempts to plant a listening device in the McGovern headquarters but was unable to do so. He did not mention any attempt to bug any other Senator or Representative.

The only public complaints about telephone service on Capitol Hill since the Watergate break-in came from Representative Bella S. Abzug, Democrat of Manhattan, and Senator Muskie.

Another source close to the four other Watergate defendants acknowledged that in a series of interviews the activities of the intelligence team had been more expensive than was previously known, but he emphatically denied any bugging efforts other than the eavesdropping on the Watergate headquarters.

He described the St. George account in the book outline as "absolutely absurd." "They never got to tap McGovern," this source went on "They tried but blew it, and it didn't work out." The attempt allegedly took place after Senator McGovern's victory in the Wisconsin primary in early April, the source said.

In his Los Angeles Times interview, Mr. Baldwin told of an attempt to bug a McGovern campaign office near the Capitol.

#### SECURITY FOR CONVENTION

Another source, who said that he had heard full accounts of the political intelligence operations from the defendants, asserted that extensive surveillance operations involving Senators Muskie and McGovern—both Presidential aspirants—had been carried out in addition to the placing of informers in each man's campaign offices.

The source also said that another of Mr. Sturgis's assertions—that he had traveled to California and other places, such as Atlanta, on behalf of the Republicans—was accurate. But he refused to say why the trips to the West Coast and elsewhere had been authorized.

The prosecution in the Watergate trial said that the group had been interested in making the Republican convention hall in San Diego secure. The convention was eventually moved to Miami Beach.

There were indications from a number of sources, including Mr. Sturgis, that many of the intelligence group's operations were prompted by a belief that the Cuban Government was attempting to contribute cash—through various conduits—to the McGovern campaign in return for a promise of a liberalized party platform on Cuban-United States relations.

These operations, the sources said, seemed to have no immediate connection with the Republican campaign committee.

Surveillance of political opponents, and even placing informers among them, is not necessarily illegal and has been a standard operating technique in many political campaigns.

Mr. Silbert told the court this week that Mr. Liddy, a former White House aide and re-election campaign counsel, had been placed in charge of various intelligence activities after a meeting with Jeb S. Magruder, a former Justice Department official who was then deputy director of the committee.

The prosecutor did not mention Mr. Mitchell in his opening remarks to the jury, and he was not listed as a prosecution witness although he testified before the grand jury investigating the case last year.

The prosecutor also did not mention any White House official as being responsible for the Watergate break-in.

The St. George book outline said that Mr. Mitchell had been informed of the operation. Subsequently, Mr. Sturgis stated in a conversation his belief that Mr. Mitchell had a role in the operation, saying, "Mitchell kept pushing and pushing" the Watergate team. But he offered no evidence for his belief, and no other source checked by The Times would confirm the report.

#### "IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONS"

Mr. Liddy, a White House aide who later became counsel to the re-election committee, was described by Mr. St. George in the book outline as being "in charge of operations on a day-to-day basis."

"He was the chief control officer and arranged all payments of money," Mr. St. George said.

Mr. Liddy was dismissed by the Republican committee after refusing to answer questions asked by F.B.I. agents about the Watergate affair.

The prosecutor, Mr. Silbert, told the court that Mr. Liddy and Hunt had been given the job of mounting an intelligence operation for the committee.

As for the operations group itself, Mr. Sturgis confirmed a report that du had been refined to the point where Mr. McCord was responsible for electronic eavesdropping, Mr. Sturgis was responsible for photographing documents, Gonzales was utilized as a locksmith and Mr. Martinez and Mr. Barker were responsible for security.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that there is anything else on it. Does anybody else have any questions on this?

#### HEROIN PRODUCTION IN GOLDEN TRIANGLE

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question of Mr. Helms, if he would be prepared to answer, on a different subject.

The CHAIRMAN. We are coming to the other one.

Senator JAVITS. It is really irrelevant and I am going to go in a minute.

Mr. Helms, could you tell us anything about the situation surrounding this so-called golden triangle of Laos, Thailand, and Burma respect of the production of heroin. We are in real trouble there. We tried to dam the flow in Turkey and we apparently are shooting the wrong target. We are now told that 70 percent of the heroin production of the world, and a minimum of a third of what gets in this country comes out of this outlaw territory.

Mr. HELMS. Senator Javits, I don't think those percentages are correct, you know. I don't know exactly what the right ones are and I realize honest men disagree and the figures are hard to get, but just don't believe those figures about the golden triangle.

Senator JAVITS. You don't.

Mr. HELMS. Certainly they produce opium up there and it is the most difficult place to police or get information in because it is controlled by brigands and outlaws and ragtag members of a former Chinese army, and so forth, but I think it has been really quite significantly exaggerated, the effect that it has had on the drug traffic in the United States, quite frankly.

Senator JAVITS. You do. Is there any way that we could test it out run it through something to find out where we stand?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has the best estimates on this, and all the information that we have been able to collect we have turned over to them.

Senator JAVITS. You have.

Mr. HELMS. And they are the kind of repository for us.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

#### ACTIVITIES OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION OFFICES

Senator CASE. The question has been raised if you are not training police on a regular basis what do your separate domestic operation division offices do in the headquarters downtown. You also have a number of others around the country.

What do they do?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, that is what we call the domestic contact service. You will recall that back even as far as World War II when Americans returned from overseas, from trips they had taken for one purpose or

intelligence, by State Department officers, and others. After the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, this business of interviewing American travelers was vested in one place, that was domestic contact service. In other words, Army intelligence was taken out of it; Navy intelligence was and State Department was. And it was agreed to have this done by this domestic contact service of the Agency as an item of common concern for the whole Government so there was only one office in these cities that was approaching people for this kind of information. It is simply a device whereby if the President of some steel company in New York travels to the Soviet Union and returns and has seen certain metallurgical plants in the Soviet Union it is of interest to this Government to know how big those plants are, what they do, and all the rest of it. And individuals from this office who go to see that gentleman and interview him about it. There is no pressure involved. There is no payment of money. There is no effort to twist anybody's arm. We simply are giving them an opportunity as patriotic Americans to say what they know about this.

#### OPERATIONS AMONG EMIGRE GROUPS

Senator CASE. Another activity at least did exist and I wonder if it still does, the operation of your agents among European emigre groups in this country.

Mr. HELMS. No, sir that has been dropped.

Senator CASE. That was the *Juri Raus* case. There was a lawsuit about that.

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Senator CASE. In which this activity, I think, was brought out.

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Senator CASE. Do you have other groups beyond the Eastern European ones where these things have operated, Cubans, for instance?

Mr. HELMS. I think in the past we have done with some Poles and Cubans and so forth. That has been pretty well dropped off so far as I know.

Senator CASE. China, Vietnam and the Middle East?

Mr. HELMS. No.

#### PEOPLE WHO GO TO HANOI

Senator CASE. What about some of our far out boys who go out to Hanoi, you know, the various people who have made a rather active shuttle operation between here and Hanoi for the past 15 or 20 years, some more than others, of course. Do you operate in that area?

Mr. HELMS. I must say, sir, I can't honestly say that many of them have been very cooperative.

Senator CASE. But surveillance of them in this country is not your function?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

#### SIZE OF DOMESTIC ACTIVITY

Senator CASE. Then generally this kind of domestic activity is not very, very, very big now, is it?

Mr. HELMS. Oh, no, sir; and this police training thing I think has been blown out of all proportion. It was simply an effort and, frankly—

Senator CASE. You wouldn't know that unless you had a chance tell us.

Mr. HELMS. You are talking to the right individual, sir, because was the one who thought this would be helpful to these people.

You know, this can be stopped today without the slightest difficulty at all, but somehow or other, under the Omnibus Crime Control Act, when we read this, it seemed to us that the desire was to have the utmost possible collaboration among all individuals that could contribute to law enforcement.

#### WITHDRAWAL OF FBI LIAISON OFFICER FROM FBI

Senator CASE. I so fully agree with that I want to ask you something on the reverse of this thing. It was gossip for some time, I guess never denied really, that Mr. Hoover got annoyed with the CIA a broke off relationships with it. Is that true?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, what happened—

Senator CASE. What did happen and did that mean that the information, the knowledge, the expertise, the sophistication the chairman spoke of, were no longer available to the FBI?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; what happened was this: Mr. Chairman, may I have your indulgence for a moment to explain this because I can do it in one sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the one who said you were in a hurry get away; so you had better keep it short for your own sake.

Mr. HELMS. I will do my best. For many years the FBI has had what they referred to as liaison officers who have worked in the State Department, in the Pentagon, in the CIA, and in various other agencies of Government. In other words, an individual, who we would say is John, each day would go from the FBI to this particular place in this case the CIA, and do whatever business there there is to be done. Mr. Hoover always "liased" on the other fellow's playing field; nobody "liased" down on his playing field. He became irritated with me because I would not oblige a member of the Agency to inform him which one of his agents in Denver, Colo., had given our man so much information. I saw no reason to put my fellow in this position. Mr. Hoover could very well have investigated his own office and ask his own employees who had talked to a fellow from the CIA, but any event he declined to do it and I stood my ground, at which point apparently in a fit of pique he simply said, "Well, my liaison officer isn't coming over to the CIA any more."

But we continued to handle all this information by mail. The CIA gradually it broke down pretty rapidly, and although the fellow never came over officially holding his forelock each day, the conduct of business between the two agencies went on as they had before.

And nowadays, with Mr. Gray, there is absolutely no problem at all. As a matter of fact, I was yesterday given a farewell lunch by the Director of the FBI which is simply new in history.

#### CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Senator CASE. Your relationship with all Government agencies then is—

Mr. HELMS. I believe it to be good, sir.

Senator CASE. Is good and active?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S 1963 MEMORANDUM TO USIA DIRECTOR

Senator CASE. There was a memorandum given to me, which is a memorandum to the USIA Director in 1963 from President Kennedy directing that the USIA coordinate with the CIA. It wasn't strange that Mr. Keogh didn't know about that when he was here. He wasn't active in it. It is a general broad policy of the USIA and its activities.

Mr. HELMS. Well, we have always coordinated with them, sir; within my memory. It has been largely in the field of policies having to do with propaganda and things of this sort. In other words, let me put this in a simple frame of reference, that if the USIA has any business with the CIA and vice versa we have a well-established liaison channel to conduct the business.

Senator CASE. That would be a reasonable thing.

This interests me, not so much just for the matter of the relationship between the USIA and the CIA but the frankness and the clarity with which the propaganda operation of USIA is stated here. I think it would be much better if we talked about it openly in these terms and not covertly. That is to say, the object of this agency is to encourage constructive public support for a global peaceful world and to identify the United States as a strong democratic nation qualified for leadership in world affairs, and must head off attempts to frustrate the efforts of the United States. This is to be a Government-wide operation except for the Defense Department, which makes a lot of sense, but this isn't the namby-pamby public opinion of this outfit which is supposed to operate here in the ether and I wish they would be more frank about everything, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

CIA INTERPRETATION OF OMNIBUS CRIME BILL QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. The thing that bothers me, though, is that the basic law, the National Security Act, says "the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions." That is pretty clear.

Mr. Maury, I take it you argue from the fact that later in the omnibus crime bill the very general language regarding the use of other civilian or military agencies and instrumentalities gives you a hunting license to do anything you would like, overriding the prior specific language. I don't believe the Congress had in mind when they passed the omnibus crime bill that it would include the CIA, because every one had assumed CIA did not operate domestically.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is a false argument.

Mr. HELMS. If I may humbly say so, I think that you drive this a bit too far. We have never enforced any laws. We have never arrested anybody. We have never done anything that infringes on this prohibition against subpoena powers and law enforcement. These were simply techniques we have turned over to these people.

NECESSITY OF KEEPING DEMARCATION LINES STRAIGHT

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. The point is keeping these lines straight. It is a little like the argument we have between the executive and the legislature. It isn't exactly analogous, but the Johnson administration argued that because Congress passed aid programs for Southeast Asia it created a climate in which the engagement in that war and defending South Vietnam was acceptable in place of a declaration of war. This was one of the many arguments. They had a lot of them, but they said the aid program showed an approval of their policy in South Vietnam.

I had always thought and understood that CIA did not have anything to do with police. If you start in teaching them and becoming their patron, and you are much more sophisticated and better than they are, they soon become part of your organization. I don't think that has happened, but I don't think it ought to happen either and I don't think you ought to go down that line.

Mr. HELMS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that if it is the desire of this committee or of any Senator that this be entirely stopped, I will simply report this to the new Director and, I imagine, it will be stopped immediately. We get nothing for this.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree, except for the adulation and admiration of the people with whom you deal.

It is a little like the Pentagon. They go to great trouble to cultivate all the leaders in every community. This is an ongoing program. They organize a meeting of all the prominent citizens of my State and others, take them out, show them the *Forrestal* and give them the red carpet treatment. These citizens all come back and write the Senators about what a wonderful organization the Navy is. You know that has been going on for 20 years. It is almost impossible to do anything about their appropriation for anything else they want because they have built a constituency, and you could build one too. I don't think it is a good idea to fuzz up those demarcations. The FBI ought to be enough.

There was one other thing I forgot a moment ago. The Polish man was writing to his friends here from Munich, asking them to be sure in both platforms there would be a statement advocating the retention of Radio Free Europe. He says in one letter: "Furthermore one should exert force on the American Polonia"—by that they mean the American Polish constituency—"and on wide masses of American people to prevent Mr. Case, whose term in office ends on January 3, 1973, from being reelected to the Senate. The stupidity of Mister Fulbright and Case should be implanted in American public opinion as extensively as possible. Some people tend to overlook the danger of the deceiving gestures of the regime toward Polonia"—that is the Polish Government toward the American Poles—"and Mr. Fulbright is ready to render services to that regime in the first place."

This goes on and on. It is very contrary to your view that all they are interested in is spreading information.

Mr. HELMS. When was that letter written, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. There are three letters here. I have them here both in Polish and in English. The one I read from is dated September

29. This is just before the election in 1972. It is written from Radio Free Europe to one of Senator Percy's Polonia constituency in Chicago. There is much more to it, but it clearly evidences that they are not interested in education. They are not interested in truth.

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I can only say we had no control over that organization whatever well over the last year and this did not occur during my watch.

The CHAIRMAN. These people are all holdovers. They are largely the same people you had all these years; they were trained by you.

Mr. HELMS. I don't know whether this gentleman was there or not.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess I can find out from Mr. Richardson, but it reminded me of this same thing, this fuzzing up the functions and opportunities for becoming involved in other things.

I would hate to see the CIA become involved in domestic controversy and involved in any of these training programs.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I have done my level best during my period as Director to avoid just exactly that. I couldn't be more keenly aware of it.

The CHAIRMAN. But, Mr. Maury's letter, I mean, talking about briefing and so on when you really are training them. It ought to be clear. If the Congress wants you to do it, all right. I just think that they ought not to want to do it because it is too big an agency.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions when my turn comes around.

The CHAIRMAN. I am through with this subject.

Senator PERCY. I have further questions on this subject.

The CHAIRMAN. OK.

#### CIA ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

Senator PERCY. I think we must judge this in today's context. Five years ago this wouldn't have caused the concern that it does now. We can't overlook the fact that Watergate has created special interest in intelligence and bugging and so forth. I can say that when it was discovered in Chicago that the Army was gathering intelligence on civilians, following people, and covering public meetings at which prominent persons such as Senator Stevenson were present, there were expressions of outrage from members of Congress, the general public, and the press. This is the content in which all this falls; so I would like to ask first if you believe in the 1947 statute which states that the CIA shall have no police, law enforcement, or internal security functions. Do you believe in the underlying basis for that law?

Mr. HELMS. I believe in that 100 percent.

Senator PERCY. I can see that there is some conflict with the crime in the streets law, which says national assistance shall be provided. But I would think that whatever technology CIA has in this field would also be available to the FBI, and I would strongly recommend that you pass on to your successor at the Agency the feeling that I would much sooner see this done through the FBI, so the CIA really has no direct relationships of that type in briefing sessions or training sessions, because once getting started in such a program it could grow.

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, I will convey that to the new Director and I am sure he will abide by it. We have no desire whatever to get

into these things, and now I have heard the desires of this committee will certainly convey it and I would rely on the—

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Senator would yield, I would suppose the position of the Senator from Illinois.

Senator PERCY. Just for the clarity of the record, as I understand your testimony, this was a gratuitous offer on your part to law enforcement officials, but I would like to ask whether at any time any request was made of the Agency or of you personally by anyone else in the Federal Government for this kind of service?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator PERCY. So it was a gesture on your part?

Mr. HELMS. And I am the one who did it. You are talking to the right man.

Senator PERCY. So such assistance can be provided more appropriately by the FBI, or just as well, and there will be no problem public policy involved.

I want to see the name of the CIA protected, and I want to prevent this small program from growing into something much larger. It should be cut off cleanly and sharply. The statute of 1947 must be the guideline, and certainly there is no compulsion from Members of Congress to interpret the Crime in the Streets Act as saying that every agency, including the CIA, should be involved.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, I have the message.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, that finishes my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything more on this?

Senator SYMINGTON. Not on this.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to go on to the multinational?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

#### APRIL 1947 TESTIMONY CONCERNING CIA PURPOSES

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Helms, as you know, Mr. Acheson wrote a book once called "Present at the Creation." I was in the Pentagon at the time your Agency was created.

Mr. Forrestal said before the House in April of 1947, "The purposes of the Central Intelligence Authority are limited definitely purposes outside of this country except the collation of information gathered by Government agencies."

Based on what Senator Percy just said, you agree that is your mission, correct?

Mr. HELMS. I do, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then, Congressman Brown said, "Is that stated in the law?"

Mr. Forrestal said, "It is not."

Congressman Brown, "Then that could be changed in 2 minutes; have the action within the United States instead of without, is that correct?"

Mr. Forrestal said, "He could only do so with the President's direct and specific approval."

Then Congressman Brown said, "I know, but even then it could be done without violation of law by the President or somebody who might write the order for him and get his approval and without the knowledge or direction of the Congress."

"Do you think it would be wise for the Congress of the United States to at least fix some limitation on what the power of this individual might be or what could be done or what should be done in all these safeguards so that the rights of the citizens may be protected?"

Mr. Forrestal said, "I think it is proper to explore what you need for protection, and I am completely in agreement about the dangers of sliding and abrogation of powers by the Congress."

In fact, that is what we are talking about today.

Then Congressman Lanham asked Dr. Vannevar Bush, "Do you feel there is any danger of the Central Intelligence Division becoming the gestapo or anything like that?"

Dr. Bush said, "I think there is no danger of that. The bill provides clearly that it is concerned with intelligence outside of this country, and it is not concerned with intelligence on internal affairs and I think this is a safeguard against its becoming an empire."

#### AUTHORIZATION OF CIA TO PERFORM NSC DIRECTED FUNCTIONS

Now, going over to the law itself, and I can remember well when it was passed, September 18, 1947. It authorized the CIA, the fifth point was, to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

On the other hand, the National Security Council is an advisory body to the President, is it not?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Therefore, it would be what in effect the President directed, correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

#### PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S 1963 STATEMENT CONCERNING CIA

Senator SYMINGTON. We had quite a day yesterday, in commemoration of President Truman, who said in 1963:

I never thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role I would like to see the CIA be restored to its original assignment as the intelligence arm of the President and whatever else it can properly perform in that special field and that its operational duties be terminated or properly used elsewhere.

We have grown up as a nation respected for our free institutions and for our ability to maintain a free and open society. There is something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historic position, and I feel that we need to correct it.

My knowledge of the relationship between Admiral Souers being first head of the CIA, makes me believe he would not have made that statement unless it was agreed to by the admiral.

#### MR. DULLES' STATEMENT CONCERNING APPROVAL OF CIA ACTIONS

For instance, Mr. Dulles stated in the "Craft of Intelligence,"

The facts are the CIA has never carried out any action of a political nature, given any support of any nature to any persons, potentates or movements, political or otherwise, without appropriate approval at a high political level in our government outside the CIA.

The only person that could be, based on the setup, is the President correct?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think, Senator Symington, that I am not sure which questions you are asking me, but on that latter point, as you know there has been a committee at a high political level established to clear these operations and that does not include the President, obviously one of the reasons for this is that under our system of government, which is not like the parliamentary system where a Prime Minister coming out on a moment's notice, there has to be some kind of a circuit breaker for the President in a whole series of matters, and a committee was devised for that purpose.

Senator SYMINGTON. You are talking about the special group?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

#### PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S COMMENT

Mr. HELMS. And as far as President Truman's comment is concerned I recall vividly when that was made in 1963 and we were stunned, because the document signed off by the National Security Council which put the agency in some of these matters was done during President Truman's administration.

#### COMMITTEE'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING CIA FOREIGN ACTIVITIES

Senator SYMINGTON. It is incredible to me, has been for many years that this committee does not know of your activities in foreign countries with which we are not at war. It not only doesn't make any sense but, it has resulted in heavy loss of both money and respect. I think was the one who got Senator Russell to agree to invite Senators Mansfield, Mansfield, and Hickenlooper to sit in with the Armed Services CIA Subcommittee of which I was and am a member.

#### LAOTIAN SITUATION

Take the Laotian situation. Never has this country conducted an intended war with heavy contracts with outside private firms; a war directed by the Ambassador who was the satrap, the boss, you might say, of the whole military show. But none of us knew anything about it. I was dismayed, tried to get some information.

Walter Pincus went out to Laos and came back with a startling story. Then Jim Lowenstein and Dick Moose went out and found out a lot more we didn't know. So the whole operation was totally clandestine, a heavy utilization in a war of funds of the taxpayers, not only without the approval of the Congress but literally without its knowledge, including me, on a subcommittee supposed to be the regulatory committee.

There is no use in laboring the past and you are going to go to Iraq but we are going into some hearings which could be fundamental to the future.

#### CORPORATE ASSISTANCE IN CIA INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

As the head of the main Intelligence agency, with the premise you are just gathering intelligence, not operating, you and I

help. I would have no criticism, but don't think that corporation, in turn, should use that request as a means for getting an advantage over its competition.

If I were running a company and was asked to help the CIA with information to help the security and prosperity of the United States, I would be honored, but would never trade on that fact to get more profit for my stockholders or an advantage over competition. I think that is going to be the guts of some problems to be developed in these hearings.

This is my personal opinion. There is Dr. Schlesinger, for whom I have respect, without reservation, after working with him as chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee, but he is new; so who is the one who knows of relationships developed in various countries with the Central Intelligence Agency, corporate relationships?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, this is more difficult than it seems on the surface, and I frankly don't see any substitute for calling the Director, whoever he may be. He can bring the right people along with him to the hearing, if required, if he is not familiar with all the facts, but the Domestic Contact Service has dealings with companies in this country. The other parts of the agency have dealings with foreign governments, and so forth, outside the country and, therefore I honestly don't think there is any substitute for asking him, with obviously some guidance from you as to what you wanted to discuss, and he would bring the right people with him.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I understand it, he will probably come before another committee of which I am a member—

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON [continuing]. For confirmation. Would you tell him at least one member of that committee would be interested in knowing details of the relationships of the Central Intelligence Agency with corporations. Asking corporations to help you is a very logical and constructive thing to do, but I worry about some of the recent stories that have been developed, whether or not they are true or not is what we want to find out, about the fact that this gave corporations an advantageous position, you might say.

This is the type of problem I would hope the Church subcommittee gets into, relationship with multinational corporations. Would your advice be to have Mr. Schlesinger come up and discuss frankly with this committee the problems we are talking about this morning?

Mr. HELMS. I would think so, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

#### IRANIAN COUP

Senator CASE. You were with the Agency at the time of the Iranian coup?

Mr. HELMS. At the time of what, sir?

Senator CASE. Coup in Iran.

Mr. HELMS. You mean many years ago?

Senator CASE. Involved in it.

Mr. HELMS. I knew about it.

Senator CASE. You didn't run it, did you?

Mr. HELMS. No, but I knew about it.

Senator CASE. Your involvement is not the kind of involvement that would cause you any problem now?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. I don't think so, Senator Case, because I understand when the agreement of my appointment was requested, it was given in 48 hours, which was about as fast as you can obtain these things.

Senator CASE. I don't mean in the present Government, but in the total picture of the country.

Mr. HELMS. This I don't know, sir.

Senator CASE. You don't know about that?

Mr. HELMS. No.

#### WHITE HOUSE REQUESTS TO LEARN ABOUT ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

Senator CASE. On another matter, back to the CIA, if I may expect the President can ask the CIA to do anything he wants it to do. Of course, whether the CIA does it or not, I suppose, depends upon many things.

It has been called to my attention that in 1969 or 1970 the White House asked that all intelligence agencies join in the effort to learn much as they could about the antiwar movement, and during that period U.S. Army Intelligence became involved and kept files on U.S. citizens.

Do you know anything about any activity on the part of the CIA in that connection? Was it asked to be involved?

Mr. HELMS. I don't recall whether we were asked, but we were involved because it seemed to me that was a clear violation of what the charter was.

Senator CASE. What do you do in a case like that?

Mr. HELMS. I would simply go to explain to the President why it didn't seem to me to be advisable.

Senator CASE. That would end it?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think so, normally.

Senator CASE. OK.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

#### AVAILABILITY OF TRANSCRIPT

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, we have a quorum actually, Senator Symington here, of the Multinational Subcommittee, and I would ask that the staff make this transcript available to Senator Church and the other members.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be available.

Senator PERCY. Because I think Mr. Helms is in a unique position to help us.

#### NEED FOR ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

I happen to agree with Senator Symington that we need economic intelligence information. Certainly if we had known more about the conditions in the Soviet Union, we might have bargained more effectively in the recent trade negotiations. The criticism has been that we were not as aware of the desperate need or, if we were, we didn't use the information effectively. Maybe the agency provided

Mr. Helms. I think it is the latter.

Senator PERCY. In other words, the agency did provide adequate information to the Agriculture Department and others negotiating.

In the energy crisis, information about energy sources and related matters would be tremendously valuable to our country, so I don't question the need for economic intelligence, and the need for the agency to work with corporations.

#### PROTECTING NATIONAL INTEREST IN MULTINATIONAL HEARINGS

Among my considerations in the multinational hearings, and I expressed this to the staff and to Senator Church, is that we not do anything that could hurt the national interest.

The hearings are public, and I favor doing as much in public as we conceivably can, but we would be naive to think that it is in the national interest to go public with every last bit of information available to us. In some areas, I think, we have to be concerned.

I would appreciate your judgment as to what type of information, in public hearings, could possibly be harmful to the national interest and national security as we press companies for information.

#### PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND U.S. CORPORATIONS

Also, can you describe for us in the broadest sense, Mr. Helms, what you feel the proper relationship should be between the CIA and American corporations in the gathering of economic intelligence information?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir; I think that it is essentially what it is today.

Now, I must underline that in asking the president of a company to provide information, one establishes sometimes a relationship that the president of the company would prefer to maintain as confidential, the extent to which he is providing the information, the kind of thing he is providing, for the simple reason that I think in some cases it might interfere with the attitude of foreign countries toward his employees, whoever they may be, or whatever they are doing in whatever country is concerned, and one of the reasons for this Domestic Contact Service of ours does maintain this confidentiality is that the companies want it this way. It isn't that it concerns us so much, but they are the ones who dictate the terms under which they are prepared to collaborate.

I don't honestly think that any of them get any particular advantages out of this because it is pretty much of a one-way street. There is very little that we do for these companies that is of much use to them. We don't go around giving them extended briefings about the condition of the world or anything of this kind, so that we are really beholden to them in that sense.

I mean there is no quid pro quo there.

#### PROVISION OF INFORMATION IN MULTINATIONAL HEARINGS

And so if in these hearings the extent of the information being provided by a given company is a matter on the public record, it may very well be that they will just not want to continue this kind of a relationship. I have to say that. I can't speak for any particular company. I have never discussed this with any individual.

context in which you are speaking this morning, but you asked my opinion and that is my opinion.

Senator PERCY. When the chief executive officers of companies are called before us and sworn to tell the truth, when they are under oath to describe their relationship with the CIA, where is the dividing line between serving the public interest by gaining information and hurting national security and the national interest putting them in the position, in public testimony, of revealing things they never felt they would be obligated or required to reveal.

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I think you have answered your own question, I wouldn't like it.

Senator PERCY. I need a more specific answer, on the record, the guidance of our committee members as to what, in your judgment is in the national interest, how far we should go and should not go not only good taste but to protect and continue to keep available sources of information to the CIA.

Senator CASE. Would the Senator permit one intervention at this point?

Senator PERCY. Of course.

Senator CASE. One of the understandings we have with the subcommittee, although we haven't started our hearings, is that testimony shall first be private so that the testimony adduced or attempted to be adduced would be looked at before we decided to go public. This is in your judgment a wise precaution in the light of the concern expressed by the Senator?

Mr. HELMS. A very wise precaution, Senator Case, in my opinion.

Senator CASE. That is one of the things.

Senator PERCY. I think that is very helpful.

#### COUNTRIES DOING EXCEPTIONAL JOB IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AREA

Could you tell us the countries that, in your judgment, Mr. Helms, do an exceptionally good job in this area. As I understand it, Great Britain has always used private companies around the world for the intelligence gathering. Japan is exceedingly sophisticated in this area. If Japanese corporations and British corporations were called for public testimony, would this dry them up as sources?

Mr. HELMS. Immediately I would have thought.

Senator PERCY. What other countries, in your judgment, do an exceptionally good job in this area of economic intelligence gathering through trade missions and company representatives abroad?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I think you have mentioned two of the principal ones. I think Israel has very good information on what is going on in the world at large in this area. I wouldn't be surprised if the French and the Italians and the Germans were quite sophisticated at this. I am just giving you an offhand judgment here because I have never attempted to analyze it and, quite frankly, countries are much more jealous of their economic and trade information than they are of their military information.

Senator PERCY. In your judgment, if the corporations of Japan, Great Britain, and Israel were required to testify, would they be able to provide information that would be helpful to the committee?

reveal that they gathered intelligence for their governments, it might damage the intelligence gathering of these nations.

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, there is no question about that.

#### COMPENSATION AND QUID PRO QUOS

Senator PERCY. When we come down to quid pro quos and compensation and walking in the shoes of a corporation head, as certainly Senator Symington and I can. I would say that a company has a responsibility, if it does not throw an undue economic burden on its stockholders, to cooperate in this area with their Government. If the cost involved were extraordinary, then I would feel that the company executive would have a right to say, "This is too costly for our company and our stockholders to bear."

Is there any means for the CIA to compensate companies for extraordinary costs or have you found them all ready, willing and able without compensation of any kind to provide such information?

Mr. HELMS. Senator Percy, as far as I can recollect, and as far as I am aware, we have never given any money to any American companies to do any of these things. This is not to say that the Government couldn't make funds available but it's not been the practice in the past.

Senator PERCY. Could you then, for the record, categorically state that there are no quid pro quos, that there has never been to your knowledge any offset for intelligence gathering or whatever other activities the CIA has asked companies to do?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Senator PERCY. And specifically, in the case of ITT, has any call ever been made by anyone connected with the agency to any other agency of Government on behalf of ITT to relate what they may have done in the national interest and to convey to any Government official in another agency involved in a decision affecting ITT that this company was exceptionally cooperative with CIA?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. There never has been a cent of money, to the best of my knowledge, ever go to ITT from the CIA for such purposes.

[Additional information follows:]

NOVEMBER 16, 1973.

Hon. RICHARD HELMS,  
American Ambassador, Tehran.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am writing to you at the request of Senator Percy about a portion of your testimony on February 7, 1973, in Executive Session before the Foreign Relations Committee. According to the transcript of that meeting, the following exchange took place:

"Senator Percy. And specifically, in the case of ITT, has any call ever been made by anyone connected with the agency to any other agency of government on behalf of ITT to relate what they may have done in the national interest and to convey to any government official in another agency involved in a decision affecting ITT that this company was exceptionally cooperative with CIA?"

"Mr. Helms. No, sir. There never has been a cent of money, to the best of my knowledge, ever go to ITT from the CIA for such purposes."

Since there is some question as to the responsiveness of the reply, Senator Percy has requested that you be given another opportunity to review this particular exchange before the transcript is published.

I hope to hear from you on this matter at your earliest convenience. Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

CARL MARCY.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
Tehran, Iran, December 1, 1973.

Mr. CARL MARCY,  
Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MARCY: This is in response to your letter of November 16, 1973, on behalf of Senator Percy concerning lines 19 and 20 on page 51 of the transcript of an executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee on February 7, 1973.

In the light of Senator Percy's request, I believe that in lieu of the statement appearing on those lines, the following should be substituted: "Mr. Helms. No, sir, not to my knowledge."

This is responsive only to the specific question asked. The other point which I was attempting to emphasize and which now will be dropped is, I believe adequately covered in other responses to Senator Percy's questions which appear immediately before and after this exchange.

I note from your letter that the words "for such purposes" have been added at the end of line 20 as requested in my June 6, 1973 communication to Chairman Fulbright through Assistant Secretary Marshall Wright. May I assume correctly from this that all of the other changes suggested in the June 6, 1973 communication have been made?

Please convey my sincere appreciation to Senator Percy for his interest. Also I hope the delay in your receipt of this letter has not caused any inconvenience but I was in Washington when your letter arrived here on November 26, 1973.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD HELMS.

Senator PERCY. Then putting the shoe on the other foot, has there ever been an implication of any kind of reprisal against a company if it does not cooperate, that it might not get licenses, that it might not get its OPIC guarantees, that it might not be awarded defense contracts? Has there ever been any implication of any kind of reprisal against a company if it did not cooperate with the CIA?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir; absolutely not. As I said earlier today, these relationships are totally voluntary.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you let me ask a question in context Senator PERCY. I would be happy to.

#### OVERTHROW OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you try in the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow the Government of Chile?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you have any money passed to the opponents of Allende?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. So the stories you were involved in that were wrong?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir. I said to Senator Fulbright many months ago that if the Agency had really gotten in behind the other candidates and spent a lot of money and so forth the election might have come out differently.

#### REASON FOR TALK ABOUT ITT AND CIA

Senator SYMINGTON. Why is there all this talk about the ITT and the CIA working together down there against a duly elected government?

Mr. HELMS. There were a lot of conversations between members of the Agency and members of ITT about political conditions in Chile, about the possibility of a Communist-Socialist government coming into power. As you well know, sir, the American companies have access to us, as they do to other people in the U.S. Government, and ITT was talking to a lot of people in the U.S. Government in those days and they didn't like the trends that were going on down there and were consulting with a host of people, including the Agency—a lot of this came out in the Anderson papers—but there was no exchange of money between us. We didn't collaborate with ITT except to exchange this information back and forth about the course of events.

There was, as I recall it, one occasion on which ITT asked one of our officers what they might do down there, what techniques they might use to sort of head off these eventualities. It was a conversation about this. To the best of my knowledge, the suggestions were never carried out. Nobody did anything about it. It was simply a conversation.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

#### ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION AND "THINGS OF THIS KIND"

Senator PERCY. In response to the question from Chairman Fulbright on Monday, you said the Agency has connections with all kinds of companies and corporations in the United States for purposes of the acquisition of information and things of this kind.

Could you elaborate a little bit as to what things of this kind are?

Mr. HELMS. I am afraid that all of us go off at the mouth a little bit and I was just trying to round off the sentence.

Senator PERCY. In other words, you were strictly limiting yourself to the relationship between companies—

Mr. HELMS. And the acquisition of information.

Senator PERCY. And the acquisition of essentially economic information or any other information.

Mr. HELMS. Different kinds of information, that is what I meant by "of this kind." In some cases it might be economic. In some cases it might have to do with metallurgy. In some other cases it might have to do with monetary affairs. I was simply trying to indicate that I was not making the thing so narrow that it was simply the information that they might care to give us. That is all.

#### CONNECTIONS WITH CORPORATIONS AND COMPANIES ABROAD

Senator PERCY. When you said corporations in the United States, you were not implying that you had no connection with corporations and companies abroad?

Mr. HELMS. Oh, no, sir; we see them abroad as well, of course.

#### LEVEL OF DECISIONMAKING ABOUT CIA-CORPORATE AFFAIRS

Senator PERCY. At what level are decisions made about CIA-corporate affairs? What is the policy of CIA? Do CIA representatives always, as an unbreakable rule, go to the chief executive officer, or do they go to whichever officer they feel is the appropriate one?

For instance, if a company has an international trade subsidiary it may not be necessary to go the domestic parent route, but you can go to the subsidiary at whatever level you feel is adequate to give you authority and direction.

Mr. HELMS. That is correct, sir. It has been my own feeling that one should start with the chief executive officer normally because it is not fair to these companies to set up a relationship with somebody down the line that the chief executive officer does not know about or least has not indicated that this other man is your point of contact.

Senator PERCY. At what level is it decided by the CIA that contact should be established with a given company? Is it a decision from the station chief, the headquarters, the director, the National Security Council?

Mr. HELMS. Well, I don't know that, frankly, it is all that clear, but it has been my own policy when I was Director of the Agency to encourage that they do this at the top of the company to begin with.

#### EFFECT OF PUBLICIZING CIA-CORPORATE RELATIONSHIPS

Senator PERCY. Finally, people in the Third World seem almost paranoid about the CIA, and they often use the name of the Agency as sort of a scapegoat for everything that happens. I would like to see everything possible done to protect us against this because it is not in our national interest to have the image of the CIA as an Agency that overthrows governments, meddles in the internal affairs of countries, and so forth.

In your judgment is it going to make it harder for American companies to do business abroad and do what they essentially are designed to do—to make earnings for their stockholders, employment opportunities for employees, provide for balance-of-payments offset through their operations—is it going to be more difficult for them to operate abroad if there is developed a much closer link publicly between CIA and corporations abroad, taking into account the feeling of nationalism that is running through many countries now.

Mr. HELMS. I think that is true, sir, if you are going to publicize these relationships are close and that will obviously make it difficult in certain of these countries where there is this xenophobia that you speak of.

Senator PERCY. Do you think this could increase suspicions toward Americans and American companies abroad?

Mr. HELMS. Well, to the extent that you identify an individual company, which then makes an identifiable target, then it makes it more difficult for the company. "All Americans abroad" is a pretty wide statement and I don't think it makes that much difference, but somebody wants to make a demonstration and they find out company X has collaborated with CIA it is more easy to demonstrate in front of their headquarters and burn it down than others.

#### CONFIRMATION OF NSC EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Senator PERCY. I would like to have your personal judgment on this matter and, if you would like to have this off the record or you would rather not comment, don't hesitate to say so.

There is a bill before Congress now, reported out unanimously by the Government Operations Committee, and which may be referred to this committee, for confirmation of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council. It has been my feeling that if we can have confirmation proceedings for the Director of Central Intelligence, and for every Ambassador, that the statutory position of Executive Secretary of the National Security Council should also be subject to confirmation.

Do you have a personal opinion on this?

Mr. HELMS. I do not, Senator Percy. I don't know enough about it. [Laughter.]

Senator PERCY. I will accept your evasion of the question.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY WATERGATE DEFENDANTS

The CHAIRMAN. I was not sure I finished with the statement about which Senator Ervin asked me. Four of the Watergate defendants have been said to be receiving monthly cash payments of \$400 and up. None of these interviewed knew whether a similar financial arrangement had been worked out for the fifth defendant, Mr. McCord. That, if it was paid, was not paid by the CIA or was it?

Mr. HELMS. It was not.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not paid by CIA.

Mr. Martinez was not paid \$400 a month. You said \$100 a month.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Over a period of years.

Mr. HELMS. I have forgotten how long he was doing this.

The CHAIRMAN. That was stopped as soon as you heard about his involvement?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

#### ACTIVITIES OF MR. MARTINEZ

The CHAIRMAN. Was Mr. Martinez qualified in electronics surveillance?

Mr. HELMS. I don't know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not what he was doing.

Mr. HELMS. I doubt it. At least our relationship with him had nothing to do with that.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it you expected him to do for you?

Mr. HELMS. We expected him to give us the names of Cubans who came out of Cuba recently, either legally or illegally, who might be individuals who had information about what is going on in Cuba that would be useful to us.

#### PLOTS AGAINST PRESIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. Did you hear from him or any other source about any plot on the part of Castro or others to disrupt or endanger the President in his campaign?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with that? You had no knowledge of that?

#### WITNESS' WILLINGNESS TO TESTIFY

The CHAIRMAN. The Democratic conference passed a resolution saying, "That committee reports to the Senate on all Cabinet designations and such other appointees as deemed appropriate should contain evaluation of their commitment to respond to committee requests to appear and testify before duly constituted Senate committees." If you would you appear before duly constituted committees of the Senate?

Mr. HELMS. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought that would be your answer, but I'd like to ask you that.

#### NECESSITY OF CAUTION ABOUT DISCLOSURE OF CIA CORPORATE RELATIONS

I think you have covered the questions on these multinational corporations. If I understand it correctly you think there should be great caution about public disclosure of individual corporations' relations with the CIA. Is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. Chairman, if it is possible to handle these matters concerning the CIA in executive session I would most strongly encourage the committee to do so because I think otherwise, to use a phrase that is familiar to all of us, this will tend to open a Pandora's box.

#### INFORMATION GATHERING FROM CORPORATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Has this practice been very widespread? Have you made use of a great many or only a few? ITT it seemed to me was a special case in that it was in a peculiarly effective position to be of use since it was in the communications field. My own thought was that perhaps this was a very rare occurrence.

Can you say whether it was or not?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, the communications aspect of it has played no role in it.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought that was why ITT might be very close to you.

Mr. HELMS. No. Sure, they are in the communications field, but I don't have any business with them on the communications.

The CHAIRMAN. We thought that, having internal communications they might be of particular use to the CIA.

Mr. HELMS. This might have been the case, sir, and I would like to say, I must say, I would like to right here stop because I don't know whether we ever have had any conversations with them about communications. You know our communications linkup is in one part of the Agency, and I have no idea. Maybe there are certain circuits of the ITT that some of our communications go over. I just don't happen to be familiar with them.

The CHAIRMAN. It was sort of a logical thing. I was not surprised about it.

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, all people do it. But what good would an ordinary corporation do you? I wouldn't think you would need say so all company in Venezuela to give you information. You could