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Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 11 Jul 70 p 1-4 S

[Text] Recently, an all-army school conference was held to study the resolution of the Central Military Affairs Committee's Standing Committee on School Tasks and to discuss measures for implementing it. Attending the conference were military and political commanders of army schools and delegates from agencies affiliated with the General Headquarters, the General Political Department, the General Logistics Department, military zones, and army branches and services.

The conference heard Maj Gen Vuong Thua Vu, Deputy Chief of the General Headquarters, and Maj Gen Pham Ngoc Mao, deputy director of the General Political Department, report on school tasks. After discussion, the conference completely agreed with the resolution of the Central Military Affairs Committee's Standing Committee.

Reviewing the achievements of schools in the past years, the conferees were pleased to note that under the leadership of the Central Military Affairs Committee and party committees of all echelons, schools have been improved fully satisfactorily. Since 1965, the policy of having schools change their training methods has improved the quality of officers in line with war conditions it is a good policy. It has enabled schools to simultaneously satisfy the demands in the number of trainees and insure the quality of officers so that they may fulfill their tasks after graduation. As a result of carrying out slogans stating their desire to serve in military units and on the frontline, and to consider the units' combat and work demands as objectives for the trainees' to follow and to use combat experiences as teaching guides, the teaching and studying quality has improved markedly.

Enthusiastic over the achievements scored and with a very high sense of responsibility, the conferees unanimously set forth the following measures for implementing most satisfactorily the resolution of the Central Military Affairs Committee's Standing Committee: Clearly define the tasks and character of each school; quickly improve the quality of trainers; accelerate the study and printing of training documents; positively build and improve the system of recruiting trainees; and satisfactorily settle the problems concerning the organization of schools and the supply of training aids to them.

Comrade Song Hao, deputy secretary of the Central Military Affairs Committee and director of the General Political Department, visited and addressed the conference. The comrade conveyed the praise of the Central Military Affairs Committee to all cadres, teachers, workers, employees, and students of schools who, in the past years, have made great efforts and scored many achievements in teaching, studying, and carrying out of tasks. They have, therefore, made very important contributions to the training and improvement of officers and have satisfied the increasingly great building and combat demands of the army.

Comrade Song Hao dealt with a number of problems outlined in the resolution of the Central Military Affairs Committee's Standing Committee on school tasks. Concerning these tasks in the days to come, the comrade said:

The U.S. imperialists are obviously defeated, but they are still very stubborn and will resort to many perfidious tricks, our troops and people will still have to overcome many hardships and sacrifices before they can win a final victory. This situation requires that all our soldiers make greater efforts in order to fulfill building and combat tasks, to satisfy immediate demands, and to create conditions for building the army on a long-term basis. Therefore, the schools' task of training officers to meet these demands is very urgent and difficult. The Central Military Affairs Committee's Standing Committee has issued a resolution on school tasks with a view to strengthening party leadership, further perfecting the school network, and improving the body of teachers, the training program, and pedagogic methods.

The comrade stressed: In the present situation, we still have to overcome many difficulties. However, there are also basic advantages for fulfilling the tasks set forth by the resolution. Our line is clear and correct. Our network of schools for the three troops categories is rather perfect. The body of cadres and teachers are experienced and serve as a key force in the schools. We have an abundant source of trainees and students have been trained and tested in combat and work.

The conference ended in an atmosphere of enthusiasm and determination to satisfactorily implement the resolution of the Central Military Affairs Committee's Standing Committee on School Tasks.

ADDITION TO REPORT ON SONG HAO ADDRESS

Hanoi NHAN DAN 15 Jul 68 p 3 X

[Scrutiny of the 15 July issue of NHAN DAN reveals that the excerpt below was omitted from the address by Lt Gen Song Hao as reported by Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese at 1400 GMT on 15 July and published 18 July on pages II. K 21-33. The excerpt should be inserted on page K 30, following the third paragraph ending "so the frontline can be victorious."]

~~[Excerpt] Pay full attention to the general character of the people's armed forces and the particular character of the self-defense militia.~~

The people's armed forces consist of three elements: Main-force troops, local troops, and self-defense militiamen. The main-force troops have the task of fighting on battlefields all over the country to destroy the enemy's important elements and major forces.

The local forces have the task of fighting in local areas, coordinating their action with the main-force troops and, together with the self-defense militiamen, carrying on guerrilla actions in local areas. The self-defense militiamen have the task of fighting to defend local areas and, along with the local troops, serving as activists for the local people's movement to fight the aggressors. They also serve in combat and on battlefields, complement the permanent troops and, along with the people's police force, carry out local security work.

All three are militant tools of revolutionary dictatorship. They all have the same goal, ideal for combat, and task. All three fully understand the party military ideological line and views, are imbued with the revolutionary nature of the proletariat, and regard the struggle traditions of the nation and the proletariat as those of their own units.

Regarding organization, they are all revolutionary armed forces, are placed under direct, absolute, and full party leadership, and have their own command organization, mass organizations, outstanding men, appropriate units, activities of a political and ideological nature, and a certain material and technical base. In this way, whether they are main-force, local troops, or self-defense militiamen, they all share the same nature, principles, goal, and task.

However, as we go more deeply into each of the three forces, we find that the self-defense militiamen have other practical tasks and their own characteristics. Our party has affirmed that the self-defense militiamen are a strategic force in the process of revolutionary armed struggle in our country and are the principal tool of dictatorship of the people's government at the basic level. They are a paramilitary organization, still bound to production, and organized and led by local party committees, sometimes performing the tasks of production and sometimes fulfilling military tasks, growing up and fighting in local areas, existing and carrying out combat missions in a specific area of the country.

This is a nonspecialized organization fulfilling an armed task (with one element specializing in performing this task--the local troops--and nonspecialized elements--the self-defense militiamen). It consists of many elements, age brackets, social groupings, and different ways of life and combat experiences. It is organized in small units (sometimes one person or one cell) and is not highly unified in nature. It is based on local areas (cooperatives, families) as major supply sources, is equipped with very many kinds of both rudimentary and modern weapons, has a quite complicated scientific-technological nature, and operates on a small, scattered, singlehanded, independent basis.

implement the resolution of the Central Military Affairs Committee's Standing Committee on School Tasks.

In short, the basic goal, combat task, and principles for action of the self-defense militiamen are like those of the main-force troops but regarding their actual task, scope of action, conditions for organization, form of organization, and operating methods, they have different characteristics and peculiar traits that are unlike those of the main-force and local troops. While providing the self-defense militiamen with guidance over internal development and combat, we have to solve correctly the relation between the general character of the armed forces and the particular character of the self-defense militiamen.

The actual development and combat of our armed forces in the last few decades gave us lessons and experiences in this regard. These lessons are: We must start from the general, take it as a principle, and at the same time rely on actual conditions to determine the appropriate form of organization and method of action. We must attach importance to the general and the particular and combine them into a base on which to determine the needs, tasks, principles, practical measures, organizations, and operations of the local armed force. If we overstress the general, we shall be cut off from reality, easily become too mechanical, and easily tend to turn the self-defense militia into a sort of main force, one way or another. Our position and measures will be far from keen and flexible. We shall fail to develop the great strength of the self-defense militia and even create obstacles and difficulties in our developmental and combat tasks.

Overstressing the general is also an evidence of being too mechanical, lacking overall scientific vision, failing to see the real situation, hence lacking realistic and proper attitudes toward development and combat. On the contrary, overstressing particular characteristics easily leads to evading the principle and committing errors. It will be a serious mistake if we overstress the characteristics, conditions of organization, and life of militiamen. It will be a mistake if we consider them as an ordinary mass organization instead of a revolutionary armed organization, if we fail to understand that they are one of the three forces, and we thus no longer strictly carry out direct, absolute, overall party leadership. It will also be a serious mistake if we underestimate political standards in recruiting soldiers and neglect the role of political and ideological work by failing to improve their knowledge and military capacity, if we fail to implement the principles and forms of military organization of the operational principle of an armed force, or fail to maintain a tight organization and strict discipline.

By fully recognizing the general character of the people's armed forces and the particular character of the self-defense militia, we understand even better the task of the armed forces, demonstrate the sound quality of our principles and the flexibility and keenness of the forms of organization and methods of operation, and create favorable conditions for proper fulfillment of all developmental and combat tasks.

Achieve tight leadership of local party echelons over local armed forces and local military activities

The local armed forces and local military activities are a part of the party's armed forces and military activities throughout the country. The armed force is the major militant tool of the party and local administration to carry on party political and military tasks and to share with other armed forces throughout the country the fulfillment of the common political and military tasks of the party. Leadership by the local party committee is the most decisive factor behind the growth and behind all victories of the local armed force. Therefore, the local armed force and local military activity must be placed under the full and close supervision of local party echelons. Recognizing and seriously executing the party's leadership are the responsibility of party committees, party echelons, party members, and cadres in local areas and in the armed forces.

Every system, every organization, every function, and regulation must be aimed at correctly implementing this principle and creating all favorable conditions for local party echelons to achieve good leadership over the local armed force and military activity. This is why the system of party leadership over the local armed force and local military activity must also be the system applied to the armed forces in general. Specifically, the party committee assumes overall leadership, while the commander assigns responsibilities (party committees range from regional and provincial committees down to township committees; commanders are those in charge of military activities in local areas).

Assuming overall leadership, provincial party committees usually issue general resolutions and particular resolutions dealing with different aspects and different sectors. Regarding military resolutions of provincial party committees, commanders and political officers of provincial military units have the responsibility to study, popularize, and organize the execution of such resolutions and are responsible to the party committee. However, organization of the execution of military resolutions of the provincial committee by the provincial unit commanders and political officers is not completely similar to the execution by politico-military commanders of resolutions of the party committee echelon in the main-force ranks. There are many aspects that involve many relations, many joint organizations, and coordination with many sectors. But these commanders are still responsible for carrying out the resolutions of the party committee echelon. Therefore, responsible cadres who are not members of party committees or who are not party members, in armed units in general as well as in primary-echelon self-defense militia units, are still totally responsible to the party echelon for the execution of the military resolutions of the party committee echelon.

As to party organization, in provincial and district military units and among local troops, the principles of organization, leadership, and execution are the same as in main-force troops. The party committee echelon of the provincial military units has the responsibility for overall leadership over the provincial military units and the local troops in the province and for fulfilling every task in accordance with the party's military line and mission, resolutions of the provincial party committee, directives and orders from the military region, and resolutions adopted at congresses of delegates from the party organizations of the provincial military units.

Being the military organ of the provincial party committee (helping them to study and to guide military activities), the party echelon of the provincial military unit has the task of reporting on the situation, pointing out any problems, and helping the provincial committee draft resolutions, directives, and plans for the internal development and combat of the local armed forces and for local military activity in accordance with the party line and resolutions and with military region directives and orders in accordance with the local situation.

After a resolution has been issued, the party echelon of the provincial unit directs the commander and provincial-unit organs to organize its execution in the provincial armed forces, guides the lower-level military organs (district and township units) and, if there are tasks that need to be coordinated with other branches and echelons for organizing its execution, it directs a movement for nationwide participation in building up the armed forces, consolidating national defense, and fighting the people's war. Consequently, the provincial unit's party committee has a very heavy responsibility in a different and complex activity that is not entirely similar to the task of the party committee echelon in the main-force troops. Therefore, heightening the overall leadership capacity of the provincial unit's party committee echelon in political, ideological, and organizational matters, vis-a-vis all forms of activity, all forces, and all tasks, is a very important need in local military activity.

Townships, enterprises, worksites, farms, lumber camps--these are the basic echelon in every aspect, the units that directly execute all the political, economic, and defense decisions and policies of the party and state. In the military field, they serve as the primary organizational units for local combat. In the self-defense militia force, the form of organization and principles of leadership are somewhat different from those of main-force and local troops. Therefore, to satisfy the party's leadership requirements, it is necessary to have appropriate forms of organization of the party members' lives and leadership.

To achieve the principle of "wherever there is command, there is party leadership; wherever there are the masses, there are party members to lead; wherever there are military activities, there is political and ideological leadership," all units of the self-defense militia, as well as all armed units in general, must be under the party's political and ideological leadership. This principle is achieved by reliance on the leadership of the party committee echelon, on the guidance of the political organs, and on the work of all cadres and party members. Because of the nature and characteristics of party leadership in the armed forces and self-defense militia, all cadres and party members must be trained in political and ideological matters, in physical culture, and in operational methods according to the leadership objectives. At the same time, while doing leadership work, all cadres and party members must develop enthusiasm, initiative, alertness, and creativity regarding forms of organization and methods of action. To fulfill this glorious task, party members must capably implement the advanced requirements in ideological matters and be exemplary in action.

The local party committee echelons are very much interested in directing local military activity and the local armed forces. Only if the party echelon in the local armed forces, and particularly the party committees of the provincial units, as well as the party committees in the local armed forces and the party members serving as self-defense militiamen, exert themselves to increase their leadership capacity, will the leadership of party echelons in local areas become more and more close and firm.

SUPPORT FOR VIETNAMESE STRUGGLE EXPRESSED

MSZMP Communique

Hanoi VNA International Service in English 1602 GMT 10 Aug 68 B

[Text] Hanoi--The Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party--MSZMP--once again declares its full solidarity with the Vietnamese brothers. The Hungarian People's Republic increases its material and technical assistance to the Vietnamese people. Thus said the communique adopted on 7 August by the enlarged session of the MSZMP Central Committee in its part dealing with the Vietnam question. The communique pointed out: The U.S. policy on the Vietnam question is more and more fully exposed and violated [as received] in the world. The DRV memorandum and the statement of the NFLSV issued on the occasion of the 14th anniversary of the signing of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam have once again voiced the Vietnamese people's determination to fight to defend the north, liberate the south, and ultimately achieve peaceful reunification of their country, thus contributing to the defense of peace in Asia and the world.

The communique went on: On this basis, the DRV Government's representative at the official conversations with the U.S. Government's representative in Paris has called on all anti-imperialist forces to unite and persistently struggle to make the United States stop the bombing and all other acts of war on the whole territory of the DRV.