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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (6 Dec 67) FOR OT RD-67X072

11 December 1967

SUBJECT: *operations* Combat After Action Report - Operation PERSHING, 3d Brigade
Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, Period 12 February -
19 April 1967

U.S. Army, 25th Division, 3d Brigade

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is a report, subject as above.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE TASK FORCE
25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96355

AVDC-C-OP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

THRU: Commanding General
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
APO 96490
ATTN: AVDA-GT

TO: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: AVF-GC-TNO
APO 96350

1. (U) IDENTIFICATION OF OPERATION: PERSHING
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: Operation PERSHING commenced 120700H February, 1967 and terminated 191200H April 1967.
3. (C) LOCATION OF OPERATION: The area designated for Operation PERSHING included sandy shorelines and coastal plains as well as mountainous areas rising precipitously from near sea level to 700 meters or more. The Nui Mieu Mountain Area with center of mass at BR9875 rises from near sea level to 600 meters. The Crescent area includes the flat coast plain between the Nui Mieu Mtns to the south, the Cay Giap Mtns (BR9389) to the north, the South China Sea to the east and the high ground from BR9276 to BR8887 to the west; Hwy 1 bisects the Crescent area. The 506, Khe Sanh, and Soui Ca Valleys are located with center of masses BR 8480, BR7381, and BR8065 respectively.
4. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, APO San Francisco 96355.
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel James G. Shanahan.
6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION:

INCLOSURE 2

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1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report For ~~XXXXXXXX~~

a. Commanders:

- (1) Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

Colonel James G. Shanahan

Lieutenant Colonel Rodney B. Gilbertson, Deputy
Commander, 1 March - 19 April

- (2) 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry

Lieutenant Colonel William H. Miller

- (3) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry

Major James E. Moore

- (4) 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry

Lieutenant Colonel Clinton E. Oranger Junior

- (5) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Holbrook

- (6) C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry

Captain John P. Irving III

- (7) 3d Support Battalion (Provisional)

Major Andrew H. Housand, 12 Feb - 18 Feb 1967

Major Robert R. Rutledge, 18 Feb - 19 April 1967

- (8) Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion

Captain Arthur J. Pansze Junior

- (9) 40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

First Lieutenant Robert W. Thackeray

b. Principal Staff:

- (1) S1 Major John D. Well

- (2) S2 Major Edgar Egeland

2

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1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for FUSQUICK

(3) S3 Major E. P. Beaman

(4) S4 Major John A. Joyce

(5) S5 Captain John Schmidt III, 12 - 19 Feb 67

Major John W. Schneider, Junior, 19 Feb - 19 Apr 67

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. (C) Tactical air support was provided by 7th USAF and utilized by the 3d Brigade TF as indicated.

Inclusive dates of operations	FAC Missions		Combat Proofs	
	Request	Run	Request	Run
(1) 12 Feb - 28 Feb	36	23	40	11
(2) 1 Mar - 31 Mar	102	68	59	14
(3) 1 Apr - 19 Apr	45	37	31	11
(4) Total	183	128	130	36
% Run	70%		28%	

b. (C) Aviation Support: The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion supported the 3d Brigade TF with the 119th Assault Helicopter Company, 12 Feb - 28 March 1967, and the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion with the 174th Assault helicopter company 28 March - 19 April 1967. Troop lifts, landing zone preparation command and control capability and resupply missions were provided.

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1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

d. During the period 12 February - 19 April 1967, the mission of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was direct support of the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division, under the OPCON of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on Operation PERSHING.

(1) Battery A, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

(2) Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, during the period 13 February - 14 April 1967. On 14 April 1967 Battery B was attached to the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, and had the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, under the OPCON of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

(3) Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was attached to the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, with the mission of direct support of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, under the OPCON of the 4th Infantry Division on Operation SAM HOUSTON during the period 13 February - 2 April 1967. On 15 April 1967, Battery C was attached to the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, under the OPCON of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on Operation LE JEUNE.

(4) Battery D (Provisional), 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was formed on 2 March 1967 by taking four 105mm Howitzer sections and necessary personnel and equipment from Headquarters and Service Battery, Battery A, and Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. Battery D had the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, for the period 2-16 March 1967. On 16 March 1967 Battery D was dissolved, to be reformed on 17 March in the same manner and given the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, for the period 17 March - 3 April 1967 Battery D was again dissolved.

(5) Additional artillery attached to or under the OPCON of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period is listed below.

(a) Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16 Artillery, was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 13 February - 18 April 1967 with the mission of general support of the 3d Brigade TF.

(b) Battery A, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm-towed) (52d Artillery Group), was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 14 February - 26 March 1967 with the mission of general support of the 3d Brigade TF.

(c) Battery C, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm-towed) (52 Artillery Group) was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 22 February - 2 March 1967 with the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.

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1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

7
(d) Battery D (Provisional) (155mm-towed), 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (I Field Force Vietnam Artillery), was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 28 March - 8 April 1967 with the mission of general support of the 3d Brigade TF.

(e) Battery B, 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 15 - 18 April 1967 with the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)), under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade TF.

(f) One searchlight, Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight) (I Field Force Vietnam Artillery), was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery during the period of 18 February - 18 April 1967, with the mission of providing illumination of the 3d Brigade forward base camp and surrounding area.

(g) Two sections M42 (40mm AA-SP), Battery C, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW-SP) (52d Artillery Group), were attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 24 March - 18 April 1967 with the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

One squad M55 (Quad .50), Battery C, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 24 March - 18 April 1967 with the mission of direct support of the 1st Bn, 4th Infantry, (24 March - 9 April); DS 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry (9 - 18 April). Two sections M42 (40mm AA, SP); Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery, were attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period of 9 - 18 April 1967 and were under the OPCON of the Support Command, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), for defense of LZ HAMMOND.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. General - As in THAYER II the 3d Brigade TF continued under the operational control of the First Cavalry Division (AM) during Operation PERSHING.

(1) Beginning at the South China Sea in the vic of the CAY GIAP Mountain Range (vic BR9390) the Brigade area of operations extended generally west into the 506 Valley (vic BR8875). Following the high ground to the west of the SUOI C. Valley (vic BR8065) the boundary stretched south until it met the PHU MY - BINH KHE border, (vic 7460). The NUI MEUI Mountain range (vic BR0060) was located at the extreme southern portion of the AO. This terrain in the area is similar to that of THAYER II with sandy shoreline, coastal plains, and mountainous terrain rising as high as 700 meters.

(2) The weather encountered was generally favorable for friendly offensive operations, however, heavy concentrations of ground fog during the early morning hours favored enemy movements.

5

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1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for FERSHING

b. Enemy disposition - At the beginning of Operation FERSHING the enemy remained fragmented and dispersed from the NE end of the Oregon Trail (DR7365) to the vic of the Kon River rest area. Some elements of the 18th Regiment may have been located in the high ground vic the Kim Son Valley area, and west of the 506 Valley.

(1) It was believed that elements of the 22d Regiment to include the 7th, 8th, and 9th battalions along with Regiment Headquarters was located directly to the north of the 3d Brigade TF area of operation.

(2) Intelligence indicated that the E23 (50th Battalion) remained in the Nui Na Mountains, while the E210 (52d Battalion) was probably located in company-size units in the high ground south of the Oregon and Sante Fe trail. Other local force VC companies were located throughout the Nui Mieu/Crescent Area.

c. Significant activity in the area of operations of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

(1) During the early days of Operation FERSHING (12-25 February) it became obvious that elements of the 18th NVA Regiment would attempt to re-establish operations in the Cat-Son Long Dinh area. This evidence was supported by information obtained from one Rallyer and one POW, both from the 124th Mortar Co, 10th Regiment. Enemy contact remained light. Between 18 and 21 February contact increased in the southern SUOI CA Valley, indicating that the 18th Regiment had indeed attempted to re-enter the SUOI CA-CAT SON area.

(2) Enemy contact showed a marked increase between 25 February and 5 March. Numerous contacts were reported in the Kim Son Valley. One of the contacts resulted in the capture of documents that revealed letter box numbers of Headquarters, 2d VC Regiment, the 1st company of the 97th Battalion, 2d VC Regiment and the 95th Battalion of the 2d VC Regiment. There was a definite increase of mining incidents along Highway 1 and terrorist activities, such as the ambush of an innocent civilian and the murder of a Vietnamese politician. From these indications it was concluded that preparations for the dry season campaign of the 3d NVA Division had begun. Sniping, mining, and other terrorist activities were expected to continue with intentions to disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program within Phu Ly/Thu Cat Districts.

(3) The first major contact of Operation FERSHING occurred at 1005 hours on the 6th of March when B 1/35th Infantry encountered an estimated Battalion size force, vic DR96880. A fast moving battle developed which continued until after dark. Documents captured during the battle confirmed that contact had been with the 9th Battalion, 18th Regiment. As a result of this battle, 84 bodies were counted and numerous weapons and equipment were captured.

(a) An NVA Prisoner of War captured after contact was made, stated that the 7th and 8th Battalions, of the 18th NVA Regiment were located in the vicinity of 506 Valley (DR8480) in the process of reorganizing.

(b) It was believed that the remnants of the 9th Battalion would attempt to move west and rejoin the main body of the 18th Regiment.

(4) The remainder of this period (06-31 March) was characterized by light sporadic contact with 1 to 5 individuals. Numerous booby traps were found indicating a harassing attempt to slow and hamper the advance of US Forces while the enemy refitted.

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1 May 1967

9
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

(5) During the remaining days of Operation PERSHING (11-19 April) the 18th NVA Regiment became increasingly active. It was believed that after IET the 18th Regiment began assembling company sized units in order to secure rice and to be resupplied with ammunition and equipment. It was also estimated that the 18th Regiment received some replacements during the previous months. Contacts by both U. S. and ARVN units with elements of the 18th Regiment demonstrated that they had a plentiful supply of small arms ammunition. Additional intelligence sources indicated that the 18th Regiment was at a greater strength than before and were working closely with local guerrilla forces, however, it was believed that the 18th Regiment would continue to avoid any major engagement.

(6) Operation PERSHING concluded without significant contact with the enemy, with 3d Brigade TF elements experiencing only sniper and harassing fire from 1-3 individuals when encountered.

(7) SUMMARY OF ENEMY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES:

(a) <u>PERSONNEL:</u>	<u>PERSHING</u>
<u>1</u> KIA (DC)	251
<u>2</u> CIA	334
<u>2</u> Returnees	29
<u>4</u> Suspects	0
(b) <u>WEAPONS:</u>	
<u>1</u> Small Arms	70
<u>2</u> Crew served	7
(c) <u>OTHER EQUIPMENT:</u>	
<u>1</u> AMMO:	
<u>a</u> Small arms	20,144
<u>b</u> 81/82mm Mortar	2
<u>c</u> 60mm Mortar	8
<u>d</u> Grenades	27
<u>e</u> TNT	16

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1 May 1967

2 PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT:

<u>a</u> Packs	98
<u>b</u> Clothing sets	67
<u>c</u> Canteens	2
<u>d</u> Web gear	22
<u>e</u> Ponchos	23

3 MISC:

<u>a</u> Magazines	72
<u>b</u> Flashlights	4
<u>c</u> Medical equip	43 lbs
<u>d</u> Radios	1

4 MATERIAL DESTROYED:

<u>a</u> Huts	135
<u>b</u> Rice	9.7 tons
<u>c</u> Burkers	1605
<u>d</u> Tunnels	22
<u>e</u> Foxholes	58
<u>f</u> Boats	7
<u>g</u> Salt	6.1 tons

5 MATERIAL CAPTURED

<u>a</u> Rice	17.3 tons
<u>b</u> Salt	11.8 tons

9. (c) MISSION

a. General:

(1) Reference OPOD 6703 (PERSHINE) (1), Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Div (AM), dated 111310H Feb 67.

(a) Occupy assigned AO on D - Day.

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1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PHU MY

// (b) In cooperation with the 22D ARVN Div forces, provide security protection in general support of RD operations in the PHU MY Area by conducting reconnaissance and surveillance patrolling and search and destroy operations within bde AO.

(c) Secure communications complex at AL MEADE commencing on D - Day.

(d) Continue to provide one company OPCON Spt Cmd for physical security of LZ HAMMOND.

(e) Responsible for tactical security of LZ HAMMOND.

(f) Be prepared to conduct Quick Strike raids within the BOND SON Plain or along the BINH DINH- QUANG NGAI Provincial border north and northwest of BOND SON with up to 4 Bns.

b. Specific missions, less those of minor importance, were as follows:

(1) Reference: FRAGO 7044-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 12 February 1967.

(a) In cooperation with 22d ARVN Div Forces prov close security protection in general support of RD operations.

(b) Assume responsibility for the conducting of search and destroy ops in the Crescent Plain area when the Marine TF is not operating in that area.

(c) Cont to secure communications complex at LZ MEADE.

(d) Cont to prov one company OPCON Support Command for physical security of HAMMOND.

(e) Continue responsibility for tactical security of LZ HAMMOND

(f) Conduct periodic recon operations in the western portion of AO to prevent buildup of enemy forces in that area.

(g) Release OPCON one plat, C Trp, 3/4 Cav to 2d Bde on 12 Feb 67.

(2) Reference: FRAGO 7044-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 13 February 1967.

(a) Assume responsibility for securing LZ HAMMOND, Effective 140000 Feb 67.

(b) Secure FSA until stocks are depleted.

9
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1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for HESHING

12

(3) Reference: FRAGO 7046-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 15 Feb 67.

(a) Relieved of responsibility for security of LZ HAMMOND effective 160800 Feb 67.

(b) Relieved responsibility for security LZ MEADE.

(4) Reference FRAGO 7050-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 18 Feb 67.

(a) Provide contact team (liaison with comm) to PHU MY District Forces guarding PHU MY Bridge NLT 18 Feb 67.

(5) Reference FRAGO 7050-3, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 19 Feb 67.

(a) Continue current mission in assigned AO.

(b) Conduct search and destroy operations in the NUI MIEU area.

(c) Be prepared to assume AO and mission of 3d Bde, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

(6) Reference FRAGO 7051-3, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile), dated 20 Feb 67.

(a) Assume responsibility for conducting operations in coordination and cooperation w/Miethamese Marine TF off 201300H, Feb 67.

(7) Reference FRAGO 7053-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 22 Feb 67.

(a) Assume OPCON one platoon, C/3/4 Cavalry from 2d Bde on 23 Feb 67.

(b) Release from requirement to provide contact team at PHU LY Bridge off 22 Feb 67.

(c) Effective 230600H Feb cdt daily mine sweep of Hwy 1 between coord BR930752 and BR915839. Mine sweep will be completed NLT 0800. Time of completion will be reported ADE.

(8) Reference FRAGO 7054-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 23 Feb 67.

(a) Execute OPLAN 12-67 (SCATTER) (U) eff 231200H Feb 67.

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1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report for PIRSHIND

(b) Condition amber will be in off at ENGLISH/(BONG SON) until otherwise indicated by this headquarters.

(9) Reference FRAGO 7057-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 26 Feb 67.

(a) Open hwy 506 to dry weather class 32 traffic from BR918720 to BR803834.

(9) Reference FRAGO 7067-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 8 March 67.

(a) Relieved of responsibility for conducting operations in the CAT GIEP Mtns/Eastern Crescent Area eff 09 March 1967.

(10) FRAGO 7072-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 13 March 1967.

(a) Coordinate operations in southern NUI MIEU with 41st ARVN Regiment.

(11) FRAGO 7079-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 19 March 1967.

(a) Assume responsibility for search and destroy operations in the Crescent AO in coord and cooperation with units of 22d ARVN Div.

(12) FRAGO 7082-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 23 March 1967.

(a) Continue present missions.

(b) Assume responsibility within AO for tactical security of LZ HAMMOND. Coordinate with 41st ARVN Regt for tactical security of LZ HAMMOND within 22d ARVN Division AO.

(c) Assume OPCON of base defense security company (-) at LZ HAMMOND from DISCOM for daylight operations only. Co (-) will return to LZ HAMMOND NLT 1800H each day.

(d) Assume responsibility for protective fires for security of LZ HAMMOND.

(e) Provide Arty LNO team to DISCOM to coordinate fires for security of LZ HAMMOND.

(f) Coordinate with CRID to provide protective fires by ROK Arty units vic LZ HAMMOND.

(g) Conduct frequent "show" of power demonstrations vic LZ HAMMOND (include ROK Arty).

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AVDC-C-OP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

(a) Implement extensive interdiction fires vic LZ HAMMOND (include ROK Arty).

(13) Reference FRAGO 7103-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry (Airmobile) dated 13 Apr 67.

(a) Deploy one bn to LE JEUNE on 15 April; SUOI CA Bde on arrival. Reassume OPCON this bn o/a 25 April 67.

(b) Assume OPCON 1 bn 2d Bde on 15 April; return OPCON to 2d Bde on departure from PERSHING AO o/a 25 April 1967.

(c) Be prepared to deploy bde (-) to LE JEUNE AO o/a 25 April 1967 and close entire bde in LE JEUNE AO MLT 30 April 1967.

(d) Be prepared to assume responsibility from 2d Bde o/a 25 April 1967.

(14) Reference FRAGO 7103-3, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 13 April 1967.

(a) Commence clearing civilians from 506 valley beginning 16 April 1967. Coordinate with Division 05 for disposition of displaced civilians.

10. (C) Concept of Operation:

(a) General: Operation PERSHING commenced 120700H February 1967 with the 3d Brigade TF extending its operation from its present AO as shown in enclosure 4, under the operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The operation terminated 191200H April 1967 with the 3d Brigade TF assumption of responsibility for the LE JEUNE AO.

(b) Period 12 - 17 Feb 1967: 3d Brigade TF initiated operation PERSHING on 12 February 1967 by assuming screening positions along the western SUOI CA and eastern KIM SON Valleys and providing security in general support of Revolutionary Development (RD) operations in the PHU MY Area. Brigade CP was located at LZ BRONCO BEACH. 1/14th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the SUOI CA Valley, provided security for LZ MEADE (1 plat), B 5/16 Arty (1 plat), and LZ HAMMOND (1 Co). 1/35 Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the NUI MIEU Area, Crescent Area, and 506 Valley. 1/35 Infantry Battalion(-) helilifted from vic southern SUOI CA Valley to vic LZ UPLIFT and established the Battalion CP/FSB at that location.

(c) Period 18 - 28 February: Brigade CP displaced to LZ UPLIFT closing 181030H February 1967. On 20 and 21 February Co A, 1/14 Infantry Battalion had a sporadic contact vic BR8059 resulting in 11 NVA KIA and 6 small arms captured, (4-AK47, 2-SKS). Co B, 1/14 Infantry Battalion on 26 February engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results 7 NVA KIA.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report for PERSHING

(d) Period 1 - 9 March 1967: On 1 March Recon Plt and Co A 1/35th Infantry contacted an unknown size enemy force via B3890775 (See inclosure 1). On 4 March 1967 1/35th Infantry Battalion initiated operation "CHECKMATE" in the Crescent Area. 1/35th Infantry displaced the Bn CP/FSB to LZ ANCHOR (BR943844) on 6 March 1967. Heavy engagement with an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions was made by B Co, 1/35 Infantry Battalion at 061440H March 1967 via BR968880. Contact with enemy was maintained throughout the afternoon with employment of 5 companies and elements of C 1/9 Cav. (See inclosure)

(e) Period 10 - 20 March 1967: On 10 March 67 D/65th Engrs began road repair operations, Road 506. 1/14th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the IRON TRIANGLE (center of mass BR7975), lower SUOI CA Valley and its western approaches. On 15 March 1967, 2 companies, 1/35 Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in southern NUI MEU area in coordination and cooperation with 41st Regiment (ARVN). Co C, 1/14th Infantry Battalion on 20 March 1967 at vic BR800572 engaged unknown size enemy forces. Results: 2 VC KIA, 5 VC WIA/CIA.

(f) Period 21 - 31 March 1967: 1/14 Infantry Battalion on 21 March 1967 conducted platoon size search and destroy operations in the Crescent Area and the southern PHU MY Area in coord with elements of the 22d ARVN Div. On 22, 23, and 24 March 1/14th Infantry Battalion conducted Hammer and Anvil operations to entrap and destroy enemy elements in the SW portion of 41st ARVN Regt AO, via BR829613 and the hill mass adjacent to the eastern side of the SUOI CA Valley respectively. On 26 March 1967, 1/35th Infantry Battalion and C 1/9 Cavalry initiated screening operations and Cat flights in the vicinity of the Eastern Crescent Beach Area, over the DAM-TRA-O-Lake, and the Eastern PHU MY Area in coordination and cooperation with the elements of the 22d ARVN Div. On 31 March 1967, assault platoon 1/14 Infantry Battalion at vic BR872607 contacted unknown size enemy force. Results: 7 enemy KIA, 1 crew-served (1 BAR), 4 SA weapons captured (1 AK-47, 1 M-1 Rifle, 2 US Carbines, 1 US KIA).

(g) Period 1 - 19 April 1967: On 3 April 1967 1/14th Infantry Battalion CP helilifted to LZ TIP. On 3 April 1967 2/35th Infantry Battalion conducted tactical road march from Pleiku Base Camp to forward assembly area via LE HAIHOND, released from OPCON 4th Infantry Division upon arrival. On 4 April 1967 2/35th Infantry Battalion CP/FSB closed LZ ILLINI, commenced search and destroy operations in upper SUOI CA Valley region. 1/14th Infantry Battalion continued conducting search and destroy operations in the southern PHU MY Area in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN). 1/35th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the northern Crescent Area and southern CAY GIEP Area. On 15 April 1967, 1/14 Infantry Battalion airlifted by C130 aircraft to the vic CHU LAI, Attached to 196th Light Infantry Brigade. On 15 April 1967, 2/35th Infantry Battalion airlifted by C7A and CH47 aircraft to vic DUC PHO, OPCON 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). On the same day 1/5 Cavalry airlifted to 3d Brigade TF AO, OPCON 3d Brigade on arrival, conducted search and destroy operations in the SUOI CA Valley and adjoining hill masses. During the period 17 - 19 April 1967, elements of 3d Brigade TF deployed by sea and air to LE JEUNE AO via DUC PHO. On April 1967 3d Brigade TF assumed missions in LE JEUNE AO relieving 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) effective 1200 hrs; at that time 3d Brigade TF was relieved of missions in PERSHING AO by 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

CONFIDENTIAL

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

16

(h) The operation ended with the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The kill ratio of friendly in operation PERSHING to enemy was 1 : 14.7 or 14 friendly versus 251 enemy KIA.

11. (C) EXECUTION

a. Period 12 - 17 February 1967:

(1) 1/14th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the SUOI CA Valley. Provided security for LZ MEADE (recon platoon), LZ BRONCO BEACH (reinforced squad Co A), B/5/16 Artillery (assault platoon) and LZ HAMMOND (Co A). At 121330H Assault Platoon engaged 2 enemy at vic BR878570. Results: 2 VC KIA. On 141005 February 1967, 3d platoon Co B at BR704649 contacted 4 VC. Results: 2 VC KIA, 1 US Carbine CIA. Co A (-) Combat Assault Platoon BR774580 on 16 February 1967 then conducted search and destroy operations. At 1545 hrs engaged 2 VC at BR777586. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 US Carbine CIA.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion: Conducted search and destroy operations in NUI MIEU Area, Crescent Area, and 506 Valley. Battalion (-) helilifted from vic southern SUOI CA Valley to vic LZ UPLIFT. Co A helilifted from LZ TIP (BR790625) to LZ UPLIFT (BR923754) on 121000 February 1967. Co B remained at LZ PIN (CR022718), supporting RD operations, and conducted search and destroy operations. Co C closed LZ UPLIFT on 121708 hrs. On 14 February 1967 Co A (-) patrolled NW of LZ UPLIFT to vic BR892775. At 0930 hrs at BR893771 made contact with 4 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA. At 1000 hrs at BR905774 made contact with 3 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA. At 1330 hrs engaged unknown size enemy force at BR892775. Results: 2 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47 CIA. At 1435 hrs at BR891774 made contact with 1 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA.

(3) 2/35th Infantry Battalion: OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) OPCON 4th Infantry Division, 1st platoon (-) OPCON 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile). 2 Scout sections provided security for LZ BRONCO BEACH.

(5) LRRP

LRRP	DATE	SUCCESS TO OPERATIONS
3B	12 February 1967	BR836581
3B	14 February 1967	BR818580
3A	14 February 1967	BR860508
3A	16 & 17 February 1967	BR853754
3B	16 February	BR859571

b. Period 18 - 28 February 1967:

(1) 1/14th Infantry Battalion: Co C on 18 February at BR703623 during search and destroy operations NW from LZ MONKEY, located a complex of 513 bunkers. All bunkers were destroyed by D/65th Engineers. At 192010 February Co A contacted 8 VC vic BR818583. Artillery was called in. On 202100 February at BR804580 Co A contacted estimated 15 - 20 NVA. Results: 5 NVA KIA, 2 small arms CIA (2 AK47). Co A, on 22 February, while conducting search and destroy operations along the eastern Sante Fe Trail Area, at 0445 hrs made contact with 4 enemy vic BR805592. Results: 4 NVA/CIA, 4 small arms CIA (2AK47, 2 SKS). At 0755 hrs sweep area of contact found 1 NVA KIA; another enemy attempted to evade friendly forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report for PERSHING.

17 Results: 1 NVA KIA. Co A on 23 February continued to conduct deliberate search and destroy operations and employ numerous tactical ambushes along the eastern portion of the Sante Fe Trail. On 26 February, Co B (-) conducted search and destroy operations into the lower KIM SON Valley. At 1725 hrs at BR692778 Co B (-) contacted 12 - 18 NVA. Results: 5 NVA KIA, 1 enemy Carbine CIA. At 1725 hrs at BR670763 made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Results: 2 enemy KIA.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion continued to provide close security protection in general support to Revolutionary Development Operations in the PHU MY area by conducting search and destroy operations and recon and surveillance patrols in the NUI MIEU area, the Crescent area, and in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN). Co B provided blocking forces, while elements of the 2d Battalion, 41st Regiment conducted a sweep toward the blocking position from the SW. On 25 February D Co, 5/7 Cavalry was placed under the OPCON of the 1/35th Infantry Battalion with the mission to provide security for LZ UPLIFT. On 26 February Co A established blocking positions on the hill mass to the west of the Crescent Area in coordination with ARVN Marine TF Bravo (Operation SONG THAN) in western plains of Crescent area. Co A and recon plat continued in blocking positions on 27 February in coordination with Operation SONG THAN to block exfiltration of enemy forces to the west.

(3) 2/35th Infantry Battalion OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON to the 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon was released from OPCON of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on 23 February. 1st platoon provided security LZ UPLIFT and LITTS Airfield and with assistance of D/65th Engineers conducted daily road clearing operations on Highway 1.

(5) D/65th Engineers conducted mine sweeping operations along Hwy 1 during the period 23 - 28 February between 0600 hrs to 0800 hrs daily. On 26 February D/65th Engineers commenced construction of aircraft revetments at LZ UPLIFT and continued to clear fields of fire at LZ UPLIFT. The Bde Engineer conducted a thorough recon of road 506 in preparation for road repair operations.

(6) LRRP

LRRP	DATE	LOCATION OF SURVEY OPERATIONS
3A	18 February	BR846756
3B	19 February	BR749733
3B	19 February	BR758698
3A	20, 21 February	BR901765
3A	22, 26 February	BR865808
3B	22, 26 February	BR835588

c. Period 1 - 9 March 1967:

(1) 1/14th Infantry Battalion: Co A on 1 March continued to conduct search and destroy operations and daylight ambushes in SUOI CA Valley and along eastern Sante Fe Trail. At 1015 hrs at BR783580 Co A loc est 3-4 tons salt, which was extracted to PHU CAT District. On 4 March Co C conducted search and destroy operations along 3 axes to the east entering the westward portion of the "IRON TRIANGLE" (center of mass BR8074). Assault platoon on 8 March conducted a

CONFIDENTIAL

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for FLASHING

combat assault at BK854603, established a blocking force as elements of the 41st ARVN Regiment swept SA.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion: Recon platoon on 1 March conducted search and destroy operations from BK901765 in a northerly direction along eastern edge of 506 Valley. At 1403 hrs at BK886775, Recon platoon contacted unknown size enemy force. Results: 7 NVA KIA, 4 small arms captured (2AK-47, 2AKS), and 3 US KIA, and 5 US WIA. On 4 March 1967 1/35th Infantry Battalion initiated Operation "CHECKMATE" conducting search and destroy operations in the western and northern Crescent Area. A/2/5 Cavalry helilifted to LZ UPLIFT 051605 March, OPCON 1/35th Infantry Battalion to provide security LZ UPLIFT. Co B on 061446 March at BR968880 became heavily engaged with an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions. The contact resulted in the commitment of 5 companies and one Cavalry Blue Team. Results: 84 enemy KIA; 5 crew-served, (3LM, 1 RPG-2, 1 RPG), 15 small arms weapons CIA (1 M-79, 6 SKS, 3 AK-47, 4 M-16, 1 US Carbine), US Losses 5 KIA, 18 WIA. Operation "CHECKMATE" terminated 091110 March.

(3) 2/35th Infantry Battalion continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon provided security of LZ UPLIFT during the hours of darkness. During daylight hours the 1st platoon conducted clearing operations along Highway 1, provided security force for LITTS airfield, and provided security for engineer road repair operations, road 506. On 6 March 5 APC's the 1st platoon provided security at LZ ANCHOR (BR940849) for the 1/35th Infantry Battalion forward CP and A/2/9 Artillery FSB. On 080715 March an APC of the 1st platoon C/3/4 Cavalry hit a mine on Highway 1 vic BR923825. Results: 3 US KIA, APC destroyed (2 WIA - D/65th Engineers). On 090845 March, at vic BR926823 located a mine (2 - 105mm artillery shells) on Highway 1 road clearing operations. Results: mine destroyed.

(5) LRRP

<u>LRRP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS</u>
3B	1 March	BR735654
3B	2-6 March	BR732648
3A	7-9 March	BR798594

(6) Remark: On 040930 March persistent CS agent was dispersed to cause the enemy to be canalized into an area of surveillance for LRRP 3A.

d. Period 10 - 20 March 1967

(1) 1/14 Infantry Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations in IRON TRIANGLE area (center of mass BR7975), lower SUOI CA Valley and its western approaches, and the lower KIM SON Valley. On 141100 hrs Co A and recon platoon reacted to an intelligence report of a suspected enemy CP located BR793612. Recon platoon C/A and Co A conducted 3 pronged envelopment of the objective; negative results for the operation. At 201121 March vic BR800572, Co C engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results: 2 VC KIA, 5 VC WIA/CL.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in 506 Valley and adjoining hill masses with two companies. One company provided security for engr road repair operations, road 506 and provided security for LZ UPLIFT. On 12 March three companies conducted combat assaults into the western Crescent area to act as a screening force for possible enemy infiltration west from area of contact in 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division's (Airmobile) AO. Three companies and C 1/9 Cavalry Blue Team conducted cordon and search operations throughout the western Crescent area. 1/35th Infantry Battalion (-) consisting of the Battalion Forward CP and Companies B and C were placed under the OPCON of 2d Bde, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) effective 121600 March, then released from the OPCON of 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) effective 131200 March. A/1/7 Cavalry was OPCON to the 1/35th Infantry Battalion during the period 12-16 March with the mission of providing security for LZ UPLIFT and providing security for D/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506. On 16 March Co C conducted search and destroy operations along the western side of the NUI MIEU Mountain in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN).

CONFIDENTIAL

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

1/35th Cav was under the OPCON of 1/35th Infantry Battalion during the period 10-17 March with the mission of providing security for LZ UPLIFT and providing security for D/65th Engineer Road Repair operations, road 506. On 17 March Co B conducted search and destroy operations along three axes in the SE NUI MIEU area in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN). At 1629 hrs, BR 735650, Co B received sniper fire which developed into an engagement of an enemy force of unknown size. Results: 1 enemy KIA, 2 small arms CIA (1 AK-47, 1 M-1 rifle). Companies B and C continued to conduct search and destroy operations on 17 March in the southern NUI MIEU area in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN).

(3) TF RUTLEDGE became operational 121600 March; task organization consisted of Co A, 1/35th Infantry Battalion, a Troop, 1/7 Cavalry and Recon platoon 1/35th Infantry Battalion. Co A 1/35th Infantry Battalion conducted village search operations in western Crescent area and established numerous squad sized ambushes along BR 7070. A Troop (-) 1/7th Cavalry continued to provide security for LZ UPLIFT while one platoon provided security for D/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506. Recon platoon 1/35th Infantry Battalion provided security for the 4.2" mortar platoon FSB at LZ CORRAL, and conducted search and destroy operations along Hill mass to the east. TF RUTLEDGE was dissolved 131200 March 1967, and its elements reverted to their parent units.

(4) 2/35th Infantry Battalion continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(5) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON to the 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon provided security LZ UPLIFT during hours of darkness. During daylight hours, the 1st platoon continued to provide security for 1. The airfield and provided security for D/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506. 1st platoon was OPCON to the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) during the period 121035 - 121540 March, reverted and returned to LZ UPLIFT 121925 March to provide night security. On 16 March, 5 APC's were given the mission to provide security of FSB, LZ IVY. On 19 March, 3 APC's provided a blocking force during the morning village search operations conducted by Co A, 1/35th Infantry Battalion at BR925780.

(6) D/65th Engineers conducted road repair operations, road 506, and continued to improve the defensive perimeter of LZ UPLIFT.

(7) LRRP

<u>URI</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS</u>
✓	10 March	BR803585
✓	10- 13 March	BR867767
✓	12- 13 March	BR735650
✓	15- 20 March	BR887779
✓	16- 17- 18 March	BR792692
✓	19- 20 March	BR775770

8. Period 21-31 March

(1) 1/14 Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the NUI CA Valley and its western approaches. On 22 March, 3 companies and Recon platoon deployed in the SW portion of 41st Regiment (ARVN) AO, conducted

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-C-OP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Actions Report for PERSHING

20

Hammer and Anvil operations to entrap and destroy enemy elements suspected to be existing west from the previous day's contact with elements of the 41st Regiment (ARVN). Recon platoon established blocking positions (Anvil) while 3 companies (Hammer) swept N toward blocking positions. At 1517 hrs, BR857604, Co B engaged 3 enemy, results: 2 enemy KIA, 2 US Carbines CIA. On 23 March, 3 Infantry companies and 2 platoons conducted Hammer and Anvil operations to entrap and destroy a suspected enemy CP located via BR829613. Companies B, C, and C 1/35th Infantry Battalion (Hammer) swept W on multiple axes across the hill mass adjacent to the SUOI CA Valley, with recon platoon and 3d platoon Co A establishing blocking positions (Anvil) at BR816613 and BR815618 respectively; Negative results for the operation. On 24 March, 4 companies, recon platoon and assault platoon conducted Hammer and Anvil operations intended to search out and destroy suspected enemy locations in the hill mass adjacent to the eastern side of the SUOI CA Valley. Negative results for operation. On 261855 March at BR845596 elements of Co B observed possible enemy movement, Artillery was called into the area. Searched at first light. Results: 7 enemy KIA. On 28 March 1/14th Infantry Battalion conducted CAT flights in coordination with 41st Regiment (ARVN) over the southern-eastern portion of the NUI MIEU area. Co A conducted search and destroy operations E in the lower SUOI CA Valley to vic BR853605 when at 301635 March 6 enemy were engaged. Results: 3 enemy KIA. Assault platoon conducted search and destroy operations SW from LZ IVY and at 311025 March, BR872507, received small arms and automatic weapons fire from unknown size enemy force, friendly forces returned fire. Contact was broken 1150 hrs. Results: 7 enemy KIA, 1 crew/served, (1BAR) 4 small arms CIA (1-AK47, 1 M-1 rifle, 2 US Carbines), 1 US KIA.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy in the 506 Valley. On 23 March Co A thoroughly searched the southern NUI MIEU Area via BR973696 in response to intelligence report of a suspected enemy CP at that location. The operation was conducted in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN) with negative results. On 28 March the 1/35th Infantry Battalion conducted CAT flights in coordination with 22d Arvn Division along the eastern Crescent and eastern NUI MIEU Area in coordination and cooperation with the 40th Regiment (ARVN).

(3) 2/35 Infantry Battalion continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon provided security for D/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506, continued to provide security for LITTS airfield, and provided security for LZ UPLIFT during the hours of darkness.

(5) D/65th Engineers continued to conduct road operations, road 506; road work was completed 31 March 1967.

(6) LRRP

<u>LRRP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS</u>
3B	22 - 24 March	BR864769
3A	21 - 30 March	LZ SANTA
3B	25 - 27 March	BS878782
3A	27 - 30 March	BR888824
3B	30 - 31 March	CRO05749
3C	31 March	BR873787

f. Period 1 - 19 April 1967

(1) 1/14th Infantry Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations and village search and clear operations in the SUOI CA Valley and its western approaches and in the southern PHU MY Area in coordination with the 41st Regiment (ARVN). Assault platoon on 020817 April conducted CA via BR915585 and swept NE along the northern bank of the river, in coordination with Capital ROK Infantry Division sweep along southern banks of the river.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-C-CP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

At 0910 hrs vic BR934584 1 enemy KIA; at 1127 hrs vic BR928585 1 enemy KIA, 1 enemy CIA/WIA, 1 enemy CLA. On 041100 April BN CP was airlifted to LZ TIP. A/2/12 Cav was placed under the OPCON of 1/14 Infantry Battalion for daylight operations 061530 April. One scout section, 1st plat C 3/4 Cavalry was under the OPCON of 1/14 Infantry Battalion 5-6 April and conducted sweep operations along the SIEM GIANG River with elements of the Battalion. 1st platoon (-) C 3/4 Cavalry OPCON 1/14 Infantry Battalion 7-13 April conducted village sweeps and search and destroy operations with elements of the Battalion. On 15 April, 1/14 Infantry was airlifted by C-130 aircraft to Chu Lai, OPCON on arrival to 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations in the NUI MIEU Mountains area and Crescent Area in coordination and cooperation with elements of the 22d ARVN Division. Co B, on April, conducted Hammer and Anvil operations along the eastern Crescent beach area. A 2/5 Cavalry OPCON 1/35th Infantry Battalion 1-2 April conducted search and destroy operations vic BR989751. D/1/5 Cavalry OPCON 1/35th Infantry Battalion 2-4 April conducted search and destroy operations vic BR993760. Co A on 4 April established blocking positions vic BR9577 in coordination with a sweep to the south conducted by the 1st Battalion, 40th Regiment (ARVN). On 5 April the TAC CP and FSB was inserted at LZ ANCHOR. At 1955 hrs a large explosion occurred in the CP area which was estimated to be either a time or command detonated 250 pound bomb. Results: 4 US WIA. Co A on 6 April established blocking positions vic BR960920 to BR982913 in coordination and cooperation with the 4th Battalion, 40th Regiment (ARVN) operation to the north. On 11 April the TAC CP/FSB was extracted to LZ UPLIFT. On 19 April the 1/35 Infantry Battalion deployed by air to the LE JEUNE AO.

(3) 2/35th Infantry Battalion continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division until 4 April when the Battalion conducted a road march from base camp/Pleiku to LZ HARMOND and was released from OPCON 4th Infantry Division upon closure. On 5 March the Battalion CP/FSB and Co A closed LZ ILLINI and the Battalion commenced search and destroy operations in lower KIM SON Valley, SUOI CA Valley and adjoining hill masses. On 15 April the entire Battalion was airlifted by C7A and CH-47 aircraft to the LE JEUNE AO, OPCON on arrival to the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON to 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon provided security for LZ UPLIFT during hours of darkness and provided security for S/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506, during daylight hours. During the period 5-8 April one scout section was OPCON 1/14th Infantry Battalion. 1 Scout team provided security for LZ UPLIFT. On 18 April C Troop (-) conducted convoy movement from base camp/ Pleiku to holding area vic Qui Nhon, released from OPCON 4th Infantry Division upon closing area. 1st platoon on the same day conducted a road march from the PERSHING AO to Qui Nhon and reverted to the control of C Troop. The Troop commenced deployment by LST to the LE JEUNE AO on 20 April.

(5) D/65th Engineers continued to improve defensive perimeter of LZ UPLIFT. Deployment to the LE JEUNE AO by LST commenced on 18 April 1967.

(6) IRRP

<u>IRRP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS</u>
3A	1-4 April	BR853596
3B	1-2 April	CRO10750
3C	1-2 April	BR870798
3B	7-8 April	LZ SANTA
3A	7-9 April	LZ ILLINI
3C	7-8 April	BR864774
3C	9-11 April	BR802612
3D	9-11 April	BR850801
3B	12-13 April	LZ SANTA
3C	12-13 April	BR833618

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-C-OP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

12. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

22

a. Logistics:

(1) Supply:

(a) No major supply problem existed during Operation PERSHING. The 3d Brigade TF was supported with all classes of supplies by the Forward Support Area. TF WRIGHT/WATSELL of the 1st Logistical Command. Supply points to distribute class I, II, III and IV supplies were operated by the 3d Brigade TF trains area by forward support elements of the 3d Support Battalion, 3d Brigade TF.

(2) (U) Transportation:

(a) The truck squads continued to be utilized for line haul between the base of operation and the Forward Support Area.

(b) An Air Force C7A was utilized daily to transport replacements, R&R, ETS, emergency leave, mail and critical supply items from base camp to the Area of Operation. C7A statistics:

1	Sorties Flown:	454
2	Passengers:	5,083
3	Cargo:	181,623 lbs

(3) On 15 February 3D Brigade TF moved from BRONCO BEACH by organic vehicle 30 km to LZ UPLIFT.

(4) (C) New Equipment

(a) The 3d Brigade TF has received all M16E1 Rifles to replace M14's Rifle and 90 per cent turn in of the M-14's has been completed.

(b) 100 CAR 15 Submachine guns were received and issued to units in the 3d Brigade TF for test and evaluation.

(5) Medical

(a) Number of patients treated by 3d Brigade TF clearing Station: 2482

(b) Number of disease cases: 2,133

(c) Number of Battle casualties: 161

(d) Number of non battle casualties: 213

(6) Statistics:

(a) Class I:

1	A Rations:	588,668
2	C Rations:	152629

(b) Class III

1	Mogas	205,077 gal
2	Diesel	154,572 gal
3	JP4	616,658 gal

(c) Class V

1	40MM	13,340 Rds
2	81MM HE	18,090 Rds
3	4.2"HE	10,050 Rds
4	105MM HE	38,900 Rds

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-C-OP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

b. Personnel

93 (1) (C) Total number of casualties suffered by elements of the 3d Brigade TF during Operations PERSHING were as follows:

(a) UNIT	1/1A	1/35	2/35	3/4	2/9	HHC	D/65
1 KIA	2	10	1	3	1	-	-
2 WIA	22	30	2	-	6	1	9

(b) Total

1 KIA - 17

2 WIA - 90

13. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. Civil Affairs/ Psyops activities during the reporting period (12 February - 19 April 1967) continued throughout the base camp area as well as in the area of operations. The Brigade S5 section worked with Military Intelligence personnel, PSYOPS Team, MACV subsector personnel, National Police, GVN officials and Infantry units in support of tactical operations.

b. GVN representatives accompanied the Civil Affairs and PSYOPS Team whenever possible, to insure maximum impact on indigenous personnel. In many areas, this was the first exposure to the GVN for the people of the rural areas.

c. Civil Affairs Area of operation was in the Binh Dinh Province (PHU CAT and PHU MY Districts).

d. Summary:

(1) Total MEDCAP Operations:

- (a) Sickcall: 4,648 Personnel treated
- (b) Dental Hygiene: 56 Personnel treated
- (c) Baths for Children 142 Children bathed
- (d) A doctor accompanied the CA/PSYOPS Team on 19 operations

(2) Public Works:

- (a) Playground set at DIEM TIEU refugee hamlet.
- (b) Well dug at DIEM TIEU refugee hamlet.
- (c) Market place (3 buildings) at MY THO.
- (d) Highway 506 from HOAI AN to Highway #1 was repaired by D/65th Engineers and opened to traffic 31 March 1967.
- (e) 50 rolls of concertina and 20 rolls of straight barbed wire were provided to PHU MY District for the construction of hamlet defense in the Revolutionary Development program.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-C-OP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERKING

24

(3) Public Welfare:

- (a) 9½ tons of captured rice were returned to district officials for redistribution.
- (b) 120 pounds of captured salt was distributed.
- (c) The new market at MY THO hamlet in PHU MY district was officially opened on 8 April giving the people of Eastern PHU MY district a place to trade and improve their economy.

(4) Government and Education:

- (a) 2 village bulletin boards have been erected at MY THO and DIEM TIEU.
- (b) GVN flags were presented to the village chiefs of MY THO and DIEM TIEU.

(5) Refugee Assistance:

- (a) A total of 1,177 refugees were relocated from areas controlled by VC and NVA to refugee centers in PHU MY district.
- (b) The following supplies and assistance was given to the refugees.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
1 Rice	18,780 lbs
2 Salt	120 lbs
3 Clothing	330 lbs
4 Tobacco	24 ctms
5 Candy	725 bags
6 Canned goods	144 cases
7 Bread	1,069 loaves

(c) Remarks:

1 Refugees in the PHU MY District suffered from many diseases, principally pneumonia, tuberculosis, and glaucoma. The children suffered from Eczema. MEDCAP missions were specifically arranged to help the newly located refugees.

2 The refugees problem in PHU MY District is considerable, with approximately 20,000 presently in the centers. Only 52% of the heads of families were gainfully employed. The camps themselves are generally overcrowded and lack for sanitary facilities. Efforts are being made by the US, ARVN and GVN agencies to alleviate the condition.

(2) Psychological Operations:

(a) General: Psychological Operations were used in the 3d Brigade TF in coordination with tactical operations to exploit weaknesses, demoralize, and inform enemy forces of US intentions.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-C-CP

1 May 1967

25- SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

(b) Ground loudspeaker missions were used in coordination with battalion operations.

(c) Aerial loudspeakers were utilized U-10 aircraft.

(d) Operations:

1 Leaflets dropped	9,236,090
2 Speaker time	104 hrs
3 Hoi Chanhs	29

14. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) ITEM: Stay behind ambushes:

DISCUSSION: The enemy in the PERSHING AO established a pattern of trailing US units on search and destroy operations. When this pattern was discovered the companies began employing squad sized stay behind ambushes. This tactic has proved extremely successful. The ground commander must carefully select the area, paying close attention to available cover and concealment.

OBSERVATION: Unit commanders should encourage the use of stay behind ambushes, and on occasion consider reversing his direction of march and move back into an area already searched.

(2) ITEM: Clearing of defoliated areas:

DISCUSSION: During Operation PERSHING numerous attempts were made to burn a large dry-wooded defoliated area by utilizing air strikes (napalm), WP grenades, artillery (WP), and dropping 55 gallon drums of napalm out of CH47, then trying to ignite it upon impact on the ground with tracer rounds and thermite grenades from gunships. All attempts occurred during 1400-1800 hrs, the hottest and driest period of the day; all attempts were unsuccessful.

OBSERVATION: A successful system/SOP should be developed so as guidance can be given for successful accomplishment of clearing defoliated areas for tactical aerial and ground observation.

(3) ITEM: Enemy snipers.

DISCUSSION: It has been found that the VC employ snipers and booby traps concurrently. Personnel attempting to maneuver against a sniper (s) have encountered booby traps and/or mines along trails, cuts in hedgegroves and rice paddy dikes.

OBSERVATION: When maneuvering against sniper fire, keep maneuver elements off of trails and obvious approaches into the area from which the fire is emanating.

(4) ITEM: Field expedient night vision aids.

DISCUSSION: Quite often night operations require aids to assist the leader in maintaining control. At times illumination, reflectors and other man made items are not available.

CONFIDENTIAL

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AVDC-C-04

1 May 1967

26

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

OBSERVATION: Decaying bamboo has proven to contain a luminous substance. A small piece of this material placed on the back of the helmet assists in maintaining control during the hours of darkness.

(5), ITEM: Maneuvering while taking part in search and destroy operations.

DISCUSSION: The guerrilla enemy very seldom stands & fights. In most instances he attempts to avoid contact by moving to one flank or the other. He also will follow a searching unit in order to avoid being discovered.

OBSERVATION: Frequent changes in direction to include doubling back has quite often enabled friendly units to engage enemy who would have normally been passed by.

b. Commander's Comments: In Operation PERSHING the 3d Brigade TF, in coordination with elements of the 22d ARVN Division, successfully accomplished its assigned mission of providing close security protection in general support of revolutionary development (RD) operations by conducting reconnaissance and surveillance patrols and search and destroy operations both in and around PHU MY area. Throughout the operation, an elusive but determined enemy repeatedly attempted to infiltrate the PHU MY area to disrupt RD and defeat ARVN forces controlling the area, with the apparent ultimate goal of regaining control of the population and vital rice harvests of the area. US and ARVN forces, however made tremendous strides both psychologically and tactically, through the use of well planned and executed FSYOPS and Civil assistance programs, superior fire power, air and land mobility, and coordinated US/ARVN operations. As a result, when the 3d Brigade TF left the PERSHING AO on 19 April 1967, the GVN movement in the PHU MY area had developed into a well established, progressive program.


JAMES G. SHANAHAN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

1 Inclosure
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24

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AVDC-O-OP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Inclosure 1 (MAJOR CONTACTS, 1 March and 6 March 1967)
Combat After Action Report for PERSHING

1. Battle of 1 March 67:

a. Units involved: Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and Co A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

b. Mission: The Recon Platoon was on a search and destroy operation moving from east to west along the ridge line vic BR890775. Co A was on a search and destroy operation moving south on three axes vic BR877780.

c. Terrain: The terrain in the area was characterized by a high ridge line, sparsely vegetated in most areas along the crest with deep, densely vegetated draws and underbrush between the crest and the low ground.

d. Enemy: No known enemy units were reported in the area prior to the fire fight. The enemy has been known to use vegetated portions of the ridge for routes of movement from north to south.

e. Synopsis of actions:

(1) At 1330 hours, 1 March, the Recon Platoon was moving from east to west along the south side of the Crescent Ridge. Since the platoon was south of the top of the ridge, the movement was characterized by traversing of cross compartments. The platoon was in a column with point and flank security.

(2) At 1345 hours, the platoon reached a stream bed at BR889777. The point man heard movement on the higher ground to the west and then spotted several NVA. The point opened fire and the enemy returned the fire from prepared positions. The enemy had several automatic weapons and at least one machine gun.

(3) The platoon leader moved his platoon on line and maintained a heavy volume of fire to the front. Attempts to flank the enemy were fruitless since the machine gun (s) on higher ground prevented movement out from the cover of the rocks in the streambed. At this time the platoon was engaged at a range of 20 meters.

(4) The platoon leader called for fire support. The battalion commander decided to use gunships for fire/support due to the close quarters fighting. Co A was ordered to move south and east as rapidly as possible to cut off exfiltration routes. The recon plat was placed OFCON to Co A. Blocking fires by artillery were fired for the area south of the contact (an area characterized by dense vegetation and a cliff).

(5) Gunships were employed (4 ships) to fire on the area of contact. The Recon Platoon leader directed the fire to within twenty meters of his own troops. After the first two runs, the firing by the enemy failed to let up. Two more runs were made and reduced the enemy volume of fire. The Recon Plat continued to fire at the enemy throughout the period.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-C-OP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for PERISHING

28

(6) As the enemy fire diminished (1500 hrs) the Recon Platoon attempted to move forward with some success. One enemy round hit a WP grenade carried on a soldier's harness. The explosion killed one and wounded 3.

(7) The Recon Platoon was ordered to hold its advance at 1515 since Co A was then 200-300 meters away closing in on three axes to link up at the contact area. The artillery was used to block exfiltration to the south.

(8) Contact was broken at approximately 1530 hrs.

(9) Results:

a. US Losses: 3 KHA, 5 WHA

b. Enemy losses: 7 NVA KIA.

Captured: 2 AK-47, 2 SKS.

2. Battle of Hoa Tan, 6 March 1967.

a. Unit involved:

Blue Team, 1/9 Cavalry

Co A, 2/5 Cavalry

Co A, 1/35 Infantry

Co B, 1/35 Infantry

Co C, 1/35 Infantry

Co B, 2/5 Cavalry

Btry A, 2/9 Artillery (DS - 1/35 Infantry)

b. Missions: The mission of all units initially was search and destroy or security. C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry was the support of the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division. Co A 2/5 Cavalry was the security company at LZ UPLIFT. Co A and Co B, 1/35 Infantry were conducting a village search of Chua Trieu - Son (BR857943). Co C, 1/35th Infantry was OFCON to 1/14th Infantry and conducting an operation in the Upper Suoi Ca Valley region. Co B, 2/5 Cavalry was located at LZ ENGLISH. A Btry, 2/9 Arty was DS 1/35th Infantry at LZ UPLIFT.

c. Terrain: The area of contact is characterized by flat rice paddies with palm groves and hedgerows around the villages. The village of Hoa Tan is surrounded by rice paddies, and further to the north, west, and south by low hills.

d. Enemy: No enemy forces were known to be in the contact area on 6 March 1967. No previous contacts had been made in the Hoa Tan area.

e. Synopsis of action:

(1) At approximately 0720 hours, 6 March 1967, a gunship, C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry spotted a military age male standing near a bunker vic BR972879. The gunship landed to apprehend the VCS, received fire, and was forced to land on a sand bar at BR980880.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDC-C-OP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for PERSHING

29 (2) The Blue Team, C/1/9 Cavalry was inserted at approximately 0735 hours to develop the situation in the area of contact. The platoon became heavily engaged with enemy in bunkers vic BR972879. (0830 - 0900 Hours).

(3) One platoon, Co A, 2/5 Cavalry was airlifted to a blocking position on the hill vic BR970880 and touched down at 1030 hours. On landing the platoon received automatic weapons fire and suffered one WIA. The platoon was OPCOM to C 1/9 Cavalry.

(4) Co A, 2/5 Cavalry was alerted to send the remainder of the company to the contact area at 1045 hours. The CO, 1/35 Infantry was alerted to move Co A and Co B, 1/35th Infantry from their village search operation to encircle the Hoa Tan area and was directed to assume control of the area.

(5) Co A, 2/5 Cavalry completed its move to the blocking position by approximately 1130 hours. The Blue Team maintained sporadic contact throughout this period and several gunship strikes were called on the bunker positions in an attempt to neutralize the enemy.

(6) By 1130 hours, Co A and Co B, 1/35th Infantry were moving northeast (by foot) to the contact area. Co A sent one platoon by ground to secure LZ ANCHOR (BR942853) so that A battery, 2/9 Arty could be displaced from LZ UPLIFT. The contact area was at maximum range for the 155MM Arty Battery at LZ UPLIFT.

(7) Co B, 1/35th Infantry moved astride the road to a position vic BR967875, arriving at that location at 1300 hours. At that point, the company split into two columns with the 1st and 3d platoons maneuvering to the southeast, then north, into the area of contact of the Blue Team. The Company minus, consisting of the 2d and 4th platoons, preceded towards the town of Hoa Tan.

(8) Co A, minus the platoon at LZ ANCHOR, moved through the saddle at BR952878 to occupy blocking positions north and west of Hoa Tan along the high ground. The company's move would, in effect, seal off the area since Co A, 2/5 Cavalry had blocked to the north.

(9) The CO, 1/35th Infantry assumed control of all forces in the area at approximately 1330 hours upon the completion of an air strike being conducted by CO, C/1/9 Cavalry. The Blue Team was extracted and placed on standby.

(10) As elements of Co B, 1/35th Infantry advanced along the finger at BR974876, they came under heavy automatic weapons fire at approximately 1400 hours. Gunships were used in support.

(11) Co B (-) approached the town of Hoa Tan on two axes and initiated contact with enemy occupying bunkers, and spider holes, and trenches. To the east on the finger, the 1st and 3d platoons withdrew a short distance to call for additional gunship support from C/1/9 Cavalry.

(12) As the afternoon progressed, the action of the 1st and 3d platoons continued to be characterized by sporadic contact. The Company (-) became more heavily engaged within the village of Hoa Tan. The enemy positions were well concealed and constructed. The enemy allowed some elements to pass and then came up from spider holes to fire on US Troops from the rear.

CONFIDENTIAL

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AVDC-C-OP

1 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for PERSHING

30

(13) By 1600 hours the blocking force of Co A was in position and the 105 Battery (A/2/9) had closed LZ ANCHOR. The use of artillery at that time however was not feasible in the contact area. Blocking fires were used to the North of Co A, 1/35th Infantry position. Gunships from C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry and the 119th Avn Co were used to give close support to Co B, 1/35th Infantry.

(14) At 1545 hours, Co C, 1/35th Infantry was airlifted into LZ's vic BR977930 and moved south to blocking positions along the ridge from BR960920 southeast to BR977907. The company closed at dusk.

(15) Co B, 2/5 Cavalry was airlifted into blocking positions vic BR958900. The Blue Team was inserted at BR971900. These two units were placed OPCON to 1/35th Infantry on touchdown and were giving blocking missions.

(16) At 1630 Hours, the B company Commander, 1/35th Infantry was wounded and subsequently evacuated by the Battalion CO. The company was still engaged at close quarters in the fortified village and the use of supporting fires was hampered by the proximity of the friendly troops and blocking forces. Accordingly, B Co minus withdrew to positions along the road east of the village so that additional casualties could be evacuated and ammo resupply could be effected. The 1st and 3d platoons also withdrew 100 meters south for the same reason.

(17) Contact was broken at approximately 1900 hours. Co B was ordered to blocking positions - one at BR976876, the other at BR975875. At this point, A Battery, 2/9 Artillery began an intensive program to neutralize the fortified village and block escape routes.

(18) Throughout the night of 6-7 March Artillery was fired. At 0800 on 7 March, after six - battery volleys, B Co 1/35th Infantry attacked along the same axes and met only light resistance. Co A, 1/35th Infantry moved to the low ground just west of the village to afford better support. Co B, 1/35th Infantry cleared the town and began to police the battlefield.

f. Results:

(1) Enemy losses: 84 NVA KIA, 3 IMG, 1 RPG 2, 1 RFD, 1 M-79, 6 SKS, 3 AK-47's, 4 M-16, 1 US Carbine, 3 57MM-Rif rounds, 7 60MM mortar rounds, 1 flare pistol, 28 grenades, misc packs, documents, and ammunition.

(2) Documents recovered indicate the enemy unit was the 9th Battalion, 18th NVA Regiment. It is believed at least two enemy companies were involved in the battle.

(3) US Losses:

Co B, 1/35th Infantry - 3 KHA, 10 WHA

A Btry, 2/9 Arty - 1 KHA

C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry - 1 KHA, 5 WHA

A Co, 2/5 Cavalry - 3 WHA

g. Comments: This battle is typical of actions in fortified villages. Both the Blue Team and Co B, 1/35th Infantry were engaged in close quarters. The battle area was encircled to prevent escape. In this action, however the company withdrew periodically to utilize gunship and air support. Artillery when available after the displacement, was employed to the maximum extent possible to "soften" up the village. By chance, Co B, 1/35th Infantry was wearing armored vests on 6 March a fact which saved at least five lives. This is a good example of the "hammer and anvil" techniques.

41
W

IVOC C-32

4 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(NCS REPORT -63) (U)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General: During the reporting period, 1 August through 31 October 1966, the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division participated in Operations PAUL REVERE II, III, and IV, for a total of 92 days of consecutive combat duty. These operations were conducted in the following time phases:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Commenced</u>	<u>Terminated</u>
PAUL REVERE II	1 August	25 August
PAUL REVERE III	26 August	18 October
PAUL REVERE IV	18 October	Operation continuing

a. (C) Mission: The mission assigned the 3d Brigade Task Force for each operation was to maintain surveillance of the RVN/Cambodian border and areas east thereof, conduct ambushes, and block penetrations into the assigned area of operation.

b. (C) Operational area: The area designated for Operation PAUL REVERE II was identical to that of Operation PAUL REVERE I. Specific boundaries of the area of operation were the RVN/Cambodian border in the west, Route 14 in the east, the east-west grid line YA-ZA 50 in the north, and the east-west grid line YV-ZV-AQ 60 in the south. The area of operation encompassed approximately 2040 square miles.

c. (C) Control: The brigade task force was engaged when Operation PAUL REVERE II commenced. The technique of "checkerboarding" (moving from one numbered 10,000 meter grid square to another), which proved effective during previous operations, was continued. The brigade task force which had been under operational control authority of I Field Force Vietnam was placed under the operational control authority of the 1st Air Cavalry Division on 2 August and continued in that posture until termination of Operation PAUL REVERE II on 25 August. On 26

*Operation PAUL REVERE I was included in the previously submitted Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 15 August 1966.

August the brigade task force reverted to operational control authority of I Field Force Vietnam for the duration of Operation PAUL REVERE III. The brigade came under operational control authority of 4th Infantry Division on 18 October and continued in that status throughout the remainder of the reporting period.

d. (C). Task organization: The organization of the 3d Brigade Task Force remained the same throughout Operation PAUL REVERE II and III. In conjunction with Operation PAUL REVERE IV, the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, was released from operational control authority of 18 October 1966. Throughout all three operations, many units were placed under the temporary operational control authority of the 3d Brigade Task Force for varying periods of time. The principal units of the 3d Brigade Task Force, with commanders' names and dates of command, and the major supporting and operational control authority units are as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division
Brigadier General Glenn D. Walker, 1 August - 20 October
Colonel James G. Shanahan, 20 October - 31 October

1st Battalion, 14th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Proctor, Junior

1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Kingston

2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Philip R. Feir

2d Battalion 9th Artillery
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Holbrook

1st Battalion, 69th Armor (CHOP 18 October)
Lieutenant Colonel R. J. Fairfield, Junior, 1 - 31 August
Lieutenant Colonel Clyde O. Clark, 1 September - 31 October

3d Support Battalion (Provisional)
Major Andrew H. Housand

C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Captain William S. Gref

Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion
Captain Clarence H. Stetzinger

52d Aviation Battalion (GS)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSPOE-65) (U)

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (etch 1 August - 20 September) (OCA 20 September - 18 October) (OEA 30 - 31 October)

Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (OCA 15 October - 18 October)

Battery B and C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (etch 1 - 2 August) (OCA 20 September - 18 October)

Battery A, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (OCA 1 August - 27 October)

Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (OCA 12 - 30 September)

Battery C, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (OCA 11 - 15 October)

3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment (CRID) (CHOP 21 August)

1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division (OCA 2 - 8 August) (OCA 26 - 29 August)

2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division (CHOP 1 August)

3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (OCA 1 - 2 August)

A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division (OCA 6 - 12 August)

2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (OCA 28 September - 18 October)

2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (OCA 29 August - 16 September)

1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (OCA 16 September - 28 September)

e. Brigade base camp security: Throughout the period, the 3d Brigade Task Force maintained an adequate defensive posture to provide continuous security for its brigade base camp vicinity of Pleiku. The forces and organization established in the initial defensive plan, OPLAN IRON BAND, were re-evaluated and on 15 September OPLAN STEEL CLAW was implemented. The brigade will continue to incorporate refinements in this plan to enhance the defensive capabilities of the forces at the brigade base camp.

f. (U) Operation PAUL REVERE II conducted during the period 1 to 25 August is covered in the After Action Report PAUL REVERE II attached as inclosure 1.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy activities 1 - 25 August are contained in After Action Report Operation PAUL REVIRE II attached as inclosure 1. Significant enemy activities 26 August - 31 October are as follows:

(1) General. The beginning of the reporting period coincided with an increase in ARVN agent reports and sightings related to threatened enemy increases of overt and covert attempts to disrupt and discredit GVN elections which were scheduled for 11 September 1966. The weather conditions continued to have adverse effects on friendly operations in the area, playing particular havoc with land lines of communication.

(2) 26 - 31 August 1966: The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, operating north of Highway 19 began to have considerable success in breaking down the Viet Cong infrastructure in the area. Operating with a CIDG unit from Plei Djereng, the battalion was instrumental in the apprehension of one Viet Cong and the killing of another who were members of the local Viet Montagnard Cong. One small North Vietnamese Army unit was contacted in the area north of Highway 19 resulting in four NVA KIA and one NVA captured. The prisoner of war was from the 17th Transportation Battalion. Based on his circumstances of capture and interrogation results, it was determined that a NVA battalion was possibly located in the rugged terrain about 5-10 kilometers east of Plei Djereng. Major NVA units of the 630th front were believed to be in their Cambodian sanctuary vicinity Chu Pong Mountain.

(3) 1 - 6 September 1966: Agent reports of up to one enemy regiment reinforced by local forces were moving to disrupt GVN elections and incidents, all minor, at the brigade forward base of operation and base camp, as well as the 4th Infantry Division base area. It was theorized that the Viet Cong would possibly attempt to overtly and covertly influence the GVN elections.

(4) 13 September 1966: The Viet Cong threat for disrupting the elections did not occur locally.

(5) 21 - 29 September 1966: Visual sightings and special agent reports indicated enemy may have been infiltrating from the Chu Pong area to bases southeast near Highway 14 and possibly to Phu Yen Province.

(6) 4 - 13 October 1966: This period was marked by significant increase in enemy activity in an apparent southwest to northeast direction to the northern periphery of the area of operations. Special agent reports (AR) of unidentified enemy units (also unknown) continued to increase.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(ICS CSFOR-65) (U)

It became apparent that as many as five North Vietnamese Army regiments were located in area bounded by YA-ZA 00 north-south grid line on the east, Se San River and YA 90 east-west grid line on the south, RVN/Cambodia border on the west, and YA 70 east-west grid line on the north. Of these enemy forces, one regiment was considered possibly located in area east of Plei Djereng. Possible enemy courses of action at this time were considered to be as follows:

(a) Using Plei Djereng as the "bait," adopt "Bait and lure tactics" to cause US Forces to move into the area described above. This would afford the enemy maximum terrain advantages.

(b) Attack targets which would have a significant psychological/prestige effect such as Pleiku, Plei Djereng, Duc Co, Plei Ma, Thanh An.

(c) If US Forces entered area, exfiltrate and avoid contact using ambushes, decoys, small unit attacks and stealth.

(7) October 14 - 17 1966: Friendly forces became engaged in area east of Plei Djereng and the enemy situation continued to develop along the lines described in paragraph 2a(6), above.

(8) 20-29 October 1966: Significant contacts were made on the high ground east of Plei Djereng with up to company size enemy forces. Documents and prisoners of war identified enemy force in contact as elements of the 95B (also known as Song Ma) Regiment. It was determined that at least one battalion reinforced was located in the area of contact, and that these units had crossed the Se San River from the west during the period 1 - 9 October 1966. Stated missions of the enemy forces were to attack Plei Djereng and ambush US Forces. During this period, friendly forces west of the Se San River began to have sporadic contact which developed into battalion size enemy attacks against friendly company/battalion bases during the hours of darkness and sharp, small unit engagements during daylight. Significant, relative to the night attacks, was the fact that the enemy was in position to attack in approximately thirty minutes to two hours after EENT, even though friendly units had not previously used enemy objective areas for bases. This tends to substantiate prisoner of war reports that enemy was using small (approximately 10 man) reconnaissance elements to observe and report friendly units' movement allowing enemy maximum possible reaction time, and/or the enemy had previously made a reconnaissance for likely areas the US Forces would occupy. During this period it was determined that the total enemy force committed in the area of operation described in paragraph 2a(6) above, included four to six regiments. Among the units identified were: 95(B) NVA Regiment, 635th Battalion, 32d NVA Regiment, and an unidentified battalion, 23d Regiment. Other possible enemy units believed to be in the area were: 100th

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS OMPOR-65) (U)

NVA Regiment, 33d NVA Regiment, 66th NVA Regiment, elements of 24(B) NVA Regiment, elements of 88th NVA Regiment, and elements of 18(B) NVA Regiment.

(9) 30 - 31 October 1966: During this period engagements with enemy forces decreased in intensity to small, sporadic contacts. Indications of possible enemy movement to the north and west were observed, but the intentions of the enemy were not clear.

b. Enemy successes: None

c. (U) Statistical summary of enemy personnel and equipment losses*:

(1) (C) Personnel:

	<u>1-25 Aug.</u>	<u>26 Aug - 31 Oct</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(a) KIA (BC)	379	85	464
(b) CIA	15	37	52
(c) Returnees	0	1	1
(d) Suspects	<u>0</u>	<u>167</u>	<u>167</u>
TOTALS	394	290	684

(2) (U) Weapons:

	<u>1-25 Aug.</u>	<u>26 Aug - 31 Oct</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(a) Small arms	100	105	205
(b) Automatic	13	4	17
(c) Crew served	<u>22</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>26</u>
TOTALS	135	113	248

(3) (U) Other equipment:

(a) Ammunition:

	<u>1-25 Aug.</u>	<u>26 Aug - 31 Oct</u>
<u>1.</u> Small arms	4903	3179
<u>2.</u> TNT	303	11 (1/4 lb blocks)

*Losses were compiled from INTSUM.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

	<u>1-25 Aug</u>	<u>25 Aug - 31 Oct</u>
<u>3.</u> 81/82mm mort	16	278
<u>4.</u> 60mm mort	90	68
<u>5.</u> Grenades	758	51
<u>6.</u> B-40 rk rds	357	17
<u>7.</u> Bangalore torpedos		2
<u>8.</u> 12.7mm	3200	
(b) Personal equipment:		
<u>1.</u> Packs	377	98
<u>2.</u> Shovels	130	14
<u>3.</u> Canteens	270	8
<u>4.</u> Web gear	298	7
<u>5.</u> Helmets		4
<u>6.</u> Misc medical supplies		150 lbs
(c) Miscellaneous:		
<u>1.</u> Comm wire	5 1/4	9 mi
<u>2.</u> AK 47 magazines	3	14
<u>3.</u> Flashlights		3
<u>4.</u> Cooking pots		11
(d) Material destroyed:		
<u>1.</u> Rice	.4 tons	7-3 tons
<u>2.</u> Huts	353	510
<u>3.</u> Bridges	1	6
<u>4.</u> Bunkers	29	527

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

80

	<u>1-25 Aug</u>	<u>26 Aug - 31 Oct</u>
5. Tunnels		52
6. Foxholes		250
7. AA positions		6
8. Boats		5
9. Wheat		1 ton

3. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES

a. Plans: The brigade has contingency plans for the relief of CIDG camps Plei Ma, Plei Djereng, Duc Co, Dak Pek, etc. Concurrent planning continues for subsequent operations in PAUL REVERE IV.

b. (C) Operations:

(1) Operation PAUL REVERE II commenced 010001 August. The 3d Brigade Task Force was deployed in the operational area in a tactical posture resulting from Operation PAUL REVERE I. During the latter part of July, contacts indicated major North Vietnamese Army forces were active in the area of operation. Based on this, additional units from the 1st Air Cavalry Division were moved into the area of operation and placed under operational control authority 3d Brigade Task Force, which was subsequently redesignated Task Force WALKER. On 2 August, Task Force WALKER was dissolved and the 3d Brigade Task Force came under the operational control authority of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The brigade task force remained in this status until termination of Operation PAUL REVERE II, 25 August. A detailed chronological account of all facets of Operation PAUL REVERE II is provided in the after action report which is appended as inclosure 1.

(2) Operation PAUL REVERE III commenced 260001 August with the 3d Brigade Task Force reverting from under the operational control authority of the 1st Air Cavalry Division to I Field Force Vietnam. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was placed under operational control authority to the 3d Brigade Task Force as the operation started. Disposition of tactical units of the task force at the outset of the operation were as shown on inclosure 2.

(a) Period 26 August - 10 September:

1. General: During this period the brigade task force continued its mission of surveillance of the border, ambushing likely routes of infiltration or egress, blocking the enemy if he crossed the

border in strength and conducting search and destroy operations during daylight hours. Enemy contact, although occurring on an almost daily basis, consisted primarily of snipers and small groups of individuals. Only once during the period was a unit of approximately platoon size sighted. The pattern of operations concentrated efforts principally in the area south and east of Duc Co. Other positions of the area of operation were periodically searched as depicted on the operations schematic at inclosure 3.

2. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: The battalion, less one rifle company, provided security for the brigade base camp vicinity of Pleiku and refitted for subsequent operations from 26 August through 1 September. During this period the rifle companies rotated to the brigade forward base of operations at CATECKA and were placed under the operational control authority of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, to assist in its security. On 2 September, the battalion commenced air lifts into areas of operation 36 and 44, where search operations were conducted through 5 September, resulting in only minor contacts. On 6 September, the battalion conducted an air lift into area of operation 32 and operated in that area until 8 September without significant contact. After several weather delays the battalion lifted into area of operation 30, closing there on 10 September.

3. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: From 26 August through 2 September, the battalion conducted search operations throughout period the battalion also provided security for several "Round UP" operations conducted in that area and worked in conjunction with CIDG elements therein. On 3 September, the battalion less Company B, lifted to the vicinity of Plei Me and conducted local patrols at that location. Company B moved to OASIS and provided security for an artillery battery located there. On 5 September, the battalion conducted air lifts into areas of operation 48 and 55. Operations were subsequently conducted in areas of operation 48, 55 and 56 until 10 September without contact.

4. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry: The battalion with a platoon of C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, conducted surveillance and ambush operations in areas of operation 27 and 35 from 26 August through 1 September with light contact. On 2 September, the battalion, less Company C, conducted an air assault into area of operation 25. For the next several days only light contact was encountered in that area. Company C was attached to Task Force M10, 2 thru 6 September and operated in area of operation 27. This company was then placed under the operational control authority of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, to assist in the security of the brigade base of operations at CATECKA. On 7 September, C Troop came under the operational control authority of 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry as that unit was assigned to an area of operation 27. It conducted surveillance in that area until its departure on 10 September.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1956
(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

5. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor: During this period elements of the battalion provided security at the brigade forward base of operations and the CIDG camps at Plei Ma and Duc Co. The battalion constituted Task Force MAC consisting of an armor company, cavalry troop, self propelled artillery battery, an infantry platoon and CIDG elements from 26 August to 7 September. The battalion provided security and conducted road opening operations along Highway 19 almost daily throughout the period. From 2 to 6 September, Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was placed under the operational control authority of the armor battalion to assist in its security missions.

6. Task Force MAC: This task force conducted screening, surveillance and mounted reconnaissance operations from 26 August through 6 September. The task force operated principally in the area south and west of Duc Co.

7. 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry: This unit was placed under operational control authority of the brigade task force on 26 August and provided security for installations at OASIS until its release 29 August.

8. 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry: Elements of the battalion were air lifted in the operational area on 29 August and the battalion came under the operational control authority of the 3d Brigade Task Force on 30 August. The battalion conducted search and destroy operations in areas of operation 21 and 22 throughout the period without significant contact.

(b) Period 11 September - 27 September:

1. General: The brigade task force continued surveillance, search and destroy operations throughout the operational area. The areas of operation covered were proximate to those of the previous period, specifically the area south and east of Duc Co and north of Highway 19 between Duc Co and OASIS. No significant contact was developed during the period and units were disposed as indicated on inclosure 4.

2. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: The battalion continued search and destroy operations in area of operation 30 from 10-16 September. Company C was placed under operational control authority to 1st Battalion, 69th Armor on 12 September and assisted in securing the CATECKA complex area. With little contact resulting from its operation in area of operation 30, the battalion lifted to area of operation 13 on 17 September with the mission of destroying Viet Cong infrastructure in

AVDC-CWOP

4 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966

area adjacent to Highway 19. The battalion continued operations in this area, periodically rotating the company under operational control authority to the armor battalion and also participation in "Round-Up" operations villages within the area of operation. On 27 September, the battalion conducted air lifts into area of operation 20.

3. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: The battalion was operating in area of operation 8 at the beginning of the period and on 13 September moved by helicopter into area of operation 4. The battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations in areas of operation 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 throughout the period without significant contact. CIDG companies from the CIDG camps at Duc Co and Plei Mying periodically conducted operations in conjunction with the battalion

4. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry: Throughout the period the battalion with operational control authority for C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry continued to provide surveillance along the border, conducted ambushes, and search and destroy operations during daylight hours in area of operation 27 and adjacent areas of operation (18, 19, 26, 34 and 35). Operations during the period in the area resulted in sporadic light contact.

5. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor: The armor battalion continued providing security forces for artillery at CIDG installations and the brigade base of operations. Elements of the battalion performed a variety of tasks such as convoy escort, security for engineer road repair teams, security for "Round Up" operations and numerous road opening operations.

6. 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry: The battalion continued search and destroy operations in areas of operation 21 and 29 with light enemy contact.

7. 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry: On 16 September this unit commenced movement into the operational area and began search and destroy operations in area of operation 36. The battalion continued operations in that area without significant contact until 26 September when it conducted a heliborne assault into area of operation 44 where it operated until the end of the period.

(c) Period 28 September - 18 October:

1. General: During this period of Operation PAUL REVERE III, Task Force WALKER was again constituted. It was composed of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

4 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(Case CBFOR-65)

14

and 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division with the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. Elements of Task Force WALKER thoroughly saturated the operational area in the conduct of surveillance, search and destroy, ambush, and blocking operations. The border area west of Duc Co was particularly well patrolled. Search operations were conducted further north and south within the operational area than at any time previously during the operation. Elements of the task force secured a portion of Highway 19 from Pleiku east to the vicinity of Mang Yang Pass for approximately a week. Despite the concentrated search efforts the enemy persistently avoided engagement and the period was noted by its lack of significant contact. The coverage of the operational area during the period is depicted in the operations schematic at inclosure 5.

2. Task Force 3/25: The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, initially operated in areas of operation 17, 18, 19, and 20 providing surveillance along Highway 19 and the border area immediately west of Duc Co. On 9 October the battalion was lifted north to area of operation 4 and operated in that area for the remainder of the period. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, concentrated its surveillance efforts along the border northwest of Duc Co, specifically in areas of operation 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, and 11. On 14 October, the battalion was lifted northeast and operated in area of operation 6 and 506 through 18 October. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry continued operations in area of operation 30 from 28 September until 1 October. The battalion then returned to the brigade base camp, where it refitted and trained for future operations. On 10 October, the battalion assumed the mission of providing security along Highway 19. It secured the highway until 15 October when it was relieved and joined the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry in operations within area of operation 506. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry joined the task force units and moved into area of operation 6 and 7 north of CATECKA on 16 October. It conducted operations in that area until the end of the period. Throughout the period, the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor continued its missions of providing artillery and route security, and convoy escort. The variety of tasks performed by this unit attests to its versatility and effectiveness.

3. Task Force 2/4: The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, operated south of Duc Co near the border in areas of operation 26 and 27 from 28 September until 13 October. On 14 October, the battalion moved into area of operation 26 from which it was prepared to react to any attack on Duc Co. The battalion conducted extensive patrolling in this and adjacent areas. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry operated southwest of Plei Me until 11 October. On 12 October the battalion was lifted to the south and operated in the vicinity of Highway 14 in areas of operation 72 and 80 for the next three days. On 16 September it conducted a mobile operation northwest into area of operation 21 where it continued search operations in that area between the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and 2d Brigade until the termination of the operation.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

15

(3) Operation PAUL REVERE IV was initiated at 181000 October. At this time TASK Force WALKER was dissolved and the 3d Brigade Task Force was placed under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was released from operational control authority of 3d Brigade Task Force and placed under the operational control authority of the 4th Infantry Division. The task organization of the 3d Brigade Task Force as PAUL REVERE IV commenced was as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force
1st Battalion, 14th Infantry
1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
2d Battalion, 9th Artillery
C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry
3d Support Battalion (Provisional)
Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion

The area of operations was expanded north of the previous operational area. The "checkerboard" concept was adopted for the new area. The disposition of the 3d Brigade Task Force elements at the beginning of this operation was as shown at inclosure 6. The brigade task force concentrated its operational efforts in the area northwest and east of Plei Djerong, along Route 509 and northwest of the Se San River. Contact during the early portion of the operation ranged from light to moderate throughout the period.

(a) Period 18 - 31 October:

1. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: The battalion operated initially in area of operation 4 and entered area of operation 504 on 20 October. During a two day period in this area of operation, the battalion had light contact with small groups of North Vietnamese Army forces. On 23 October elements of the battalion made contact with the enemy in area of operation 4 resulting in 16 NVA KIA. Sporadic light contact continued within the area of operation. On 25 October the battalion lifted the command group, 4.2" Mortar Platoon, Reconnaissance Platoon and supporting artillery battery from area of operation 4 into area of operation 504. The battalion continued to operate in that area of operation with light contact through 31 October.

2. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: The battalion was initially located in areas of operation 6 and 506. On 19 October the battalion lifted into areas of operation 3 and 503 and commenced operations in those areas. The battalion continued patrolling throughout the assigned area of operation while marshalling its forces to meet its task as the reserve reaction force for the division. On 30 October the battalion conducted a heliborne assault into area of operation 502, where it operated until the end of the period.

Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(PCS CSFOR-65)

3. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry: This unit lifted into area of operation 3 on 18 October and subsequently conducted searching and patrolling operations in areas of operation 3 and 503 with sporadic light contact. TP MCDONNELL, composed of the battalion reconnaissance platoon and a CIDG company, conducted extensive patrolling to the northwest in areas of operation 511 and 512. During the last several days of the period, the battalion has several contacts ranging from light to moderate. Task Force MCDONNELL had several contacts with various size enemy forces. During its search and destroy operations it discovered several ammunition and supply caches.

4. C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry: The troop was initially located in the vicinity of Plei Djerang providing security for artillery and supplies at that installation. This unit, minus one platoon, moved south into area of operation 3 and conducted mounted reconnaissance in that area. A few mining incidents indicated the enemy had been active within the area. The troop continued to operate in support of the brigade task force until 30 October when it was placed under the operational control authority of the 4th Infantry Division to assist in route security in the area of operation.

(b) The operational report period for ninety-two consecutive days ended with the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division and Operation PAUL REVERE IV continuing with sporadic, but significant contact. The kill ratio of friendly to enemy was, 1:8 or 54 friendly KIA versus 464 enemy KIA.

c. (C) Training Activities:

(1) General: The 3d Brigade Task Force Replacement Training Program was initiated 17 July. Since 1 August, a total of 1134 replacement personnel have successfully completed the training program. The training, which is organized on a five day cycle, commences with orientation subjects, progresses through combat techniques of the individual soldier, small unit tactics, weapons rattlesight firing, weapons familiarization firing, and culminates in a combat ambush patrol. The instruction presented in the training program emphasizes practical work which is applied at selected locations within the brigade perimeter and at the replacement training range. The combat ambush patrol is conducted beyond the confines of the brigade base camp in the adjacent brigade operational area. Reports from commanders of the units to which the replacements have been assigned subsequent to the completion of their training, attests to the value of the training and orientation and its marked success.

(2) Cadre: The Replacement Detachment Training cadre consists of one officer and ten non-commissioned officers. This cadre is organized as follows:

**OPERATIONAL REPORT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)**

- (a) Captain: OIC.
- (b) 1st Sergeant: NCOIC.
- (c) Platoon Sergeant: Assistant NCOIC and instructor.
- (d) Eight Staff Sergeants: Instructors.

After several training cycles of the program were completed it was decided that this organization was best suited to provide the depth and continuity required to efficiently and effectively conduct the replacement training.

(3) A training schedule reflecting subjects, time phases, training areas, and instructor requirements is attached as inclosure 8.

d. Chemical: There were no significant operations conducted wherein chemical agents were used. Periodic inspections of protective masks support the requirement for proper storage of the masks to preclude deterioration of the filters.

e. PSYOPS:

(1) During Operation PAUL REVERE III and the early portion of PAUL REVERE IV, PSYOPS appeals were primarily directed at specific villages and individuals. Incorporating the current intelligence situation, the PSYOPS program supported the daily tactical operations to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure. Ground PSYOPS teams and the PSYWAR aircraft were coordinated and used to support these tactical operations. Leaflet drops and ground presentation were conducted simultaneously.

(2) Picture leaflets of returnees and prisoners of war were used during initial questioning in the villages. This technique was quite successful in gaining information from the people about members within Viet Cong infrastructure.

(3) Aircraft (U-10) support for PAUL REVERE III was only fair. The major problems were aircraft availability, lack of timeliness, and bad weather. During PAUL REVERE IV, the major problem area was bad weather.

(4) PSYOPS Summary:

(a) PAUL REVERE III:

1. Total speaker hours: 24.
2. Leaflets: 1,054,000.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
RCS CSFOR-85)

3. Returnees: 14.

(b) PAUL REVERE IV:

1. Total speaker hours: 6

2. Leaflets: 600,000

3. Returnee: 1.

f. Tactical air support:

(1) Statistics for Operation PAUL REVERE II are contained in Inclosure 1.

(2) Statistics for Operations PAUL REVERE III and PAUL REVERE IV are as follows:

	<u>Man req</u>	<u>Man flown</u>	<u>Sky Spot</u>	<u>FAC</u>	<u>Trp in contact</u>
PAUL REVERE III	534	442	342	84	16
PAUL REVERE IV	100	75	44	20	11

(a) Sky Spots were utilized primarily to interdict known routes of infiltration and egress frequented by enemy forces and as reaction to daily visual reconnaissance sightings not within artillery range.

(b) There was no difficulty experienced in obtaining tactical air support except during that period when the availability of aircraft was severely limited.

g. Aviation: A change in internal functions of the aviation section organization was accomplished during this period. One change involved consolidation of maintenance crews into teams to provide a split maintenance capability at the brigade forward base of operations and the fixed base maintenance area. A second change was: The section assumed the responsibility of coordinating supporting aerial resupply aircraft for the brigade. The aviation section also assumed the responsibility for broadcasting artillery advisories over UHF radio. Prior to this, the task was accomplished by supporting aviation units equipped with a portable control tower. A hot line was established between the brigade FSE and the aviation section to pass advisory information. This system works well and is within the capability of the aviation section.

h. Airmobile operations: The following statistics were compiled during the reporting period:

19

3. Returns: 14.

(b) PAUL REVERE IV:

1. Total speaker hours: 6
2. Leaflets: 600,000
3. Returns: 1.

f. Tactical air support:

(1) Statistics for Operation PAUL REVERE II are contained in Inclosure 1.

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h. Airmobile operations: The following statistics were compiled during the reporting period:

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

20

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>	<u>CARGO*</u>	<u>BN LIFTS</u>	<u>ARTY BTRY</u>	<u>COMBAT ASLT</u>
Aug 66	9,310	3,636.1	16	14	30
Sep 66	11,520	3,615.2	17	18	38
1-17 Oct 66	7,936	2,887.0	12	10	22
18-31 Oct 66	Unk	Unk	5	6	2

4. (C) LOGISTICS:

A. (U) General: Support for combat operations has been more than adequate, and no major problems have developed. At no time was the tactical operation significantly affected by logistical problems.

b. (U) Supply: Supply of the brigade task force elements is accomplished through a combination of unit and supply point distribution. Bulk Class I and V supplies were distributed to brigade units by organic transportation from the 3d Support Battalion (Provisional). Bulk Class III and IIIA have been transported from the Pleiku Sub Area Command to the brigade forward base of operation. Class II items including repair parts have normally been distributed by supply point distribution directly from Qui Nhon or Pleiku to 3d Support Battalion (Provisional). Distribution of Class II items to subordinate units is normally made directly from the brigade base camp.

c. (U) Transportation:

(1) The medium truck squad has been utilized primarily for line haul operations between Pleiku and Qui Nhon.

(2) The light truck squad has been utilized for task force troop haul, ration pick-up and distribution, and general cargo distribution.

d. (C) Maintenance:

(1) The new family of radios has created serious problems over an extended period of time due to a shortage of signal repair parts. Although the shortage of signal parts and components precluded the attainment of an acceptable operational readiness status during the early weeks of this period, increased emphasis by 1st Log Command on repair parts delivery has considerably improved the situation in the latter part of the period.

(2) Although improvement has been made since the last period, the repair of fire control instruments continued to be a problem. As in the case of signal items, the primary difficulty was non-availability of repair parts.

*Cargo (tonnage) was based on 1000 pounds per UH1 sortie and 7000 pounds per CH 47 sortie. All artillery battery lifts are statistically reported as cargo moves.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

e. (C) Equipment: During the first quarter of FY 67, insufficient M16 rifles were received to complete a 100% replacement of M14 rifles in the hands of combat troops as had been planned.

f. (U) Construction:

(1) Base camp construction increased sharply as the rain stopped and the soil dried out. Semi-permanent mess halls, troop billets, and offices are presently under construction.

(2) Construction of the approved central water supply for Pleiku area is slated to start during the second quarter FY 67.

(3) The installation and operation of a second 100 KW generator has greatly improved the central power supply within the brigade base camp area.

(4) An ice plant is nearing completion within the brigade base camp and is expected to be in operation by the end of November. This plant will be operated by Pleiku Sub Area Command for all troops in the immediate area, but the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division will be the major user.

g. (U) Statistics for the period 1 August to 31 October:

(1) Fuel:

(a) Mogas: 422,530 gallons.

(b) Diesel: 246,360 gallons.

(c) Engine oil: 15,300 gallons.

(2) Ammunition:

(a) 40mm: 8,372 rounds.

(b) 81mm: 27,642 rounds.

(c) 20mm: 820 rounds.

(d) 4.2mm: 21,760 rounds.

(e) 105mm: 22,000 rounds.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

(3) Rations:

- (a) A rations: 510,730 meals.
 - (b) B rations: 605,990 meals.
 - (c) C rations: 324,000 meals.
- Total 1,440,720 meals.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. Civic actions were conducted throughout Pleiku Province during PAUL REVERE III and IV. Major emphasis was placed on "Round Up" type operations. The brigade's civic action teams worked with military intelligence personnel, PSYOPS ground teams, PSYWAR aircraft, Pleiku Sector liaison teams, and infantry units in support of tactical operation.

b. Whenever possible, GVN representation accompanied CA/PSYOPS teams into remote areas. In many of these villages, the Thanh An District Chief brought the GVN image to the Montagnard tribesmen for the first time.

c. Civil affairs summary:

(1) 3000 (+) received medical treatment.

(2) Public works projects:

(a) A Montagnard school house is being built vicinity Thanh An District.

(b) Two spillways were constructed.

(3) 500 (+) civilian laborers were hired.

(4) Food, clothing, and blanket material were distributed to the needy.

(5) Coordination was made for operations with the National Police.

(6) Extensive communications/PSYOPS programs were conducted.

(7) Band concerts were conducted for Montagnards.

6. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. (U) General:

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

(1) The attachment of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, to the 4th Infantry Division on 18 October 1966, effected a substantial decrease in the brigade strength.

(2) The 40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog), consisting of 1 officer and 26 enlisted men, was attached to the brigade on 7 September 1966.

b. (C) Unit strength:

(1) As of 31 October, the strengths of the units of the task force were as follows:

UNIT	AUTH			ATCH			ASG PLUS ATCH			PSY		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
d Bde TF	34	9	240	12	3	233	54	8	462	50	8	433
nf	37	2	790	0	0	0	43	1	860	42	1	779
nf	37	2	790	0	0	0	41	2	815	40	2	763
nf	37	2	790	0	0	0	40	2	853	39	1	803
ty	38	3	452	0	0	0	47	2	514	45	2	481
3/4 Cav	5	0	179	0	0	0	5	0	183	5	0	177
65th Engr Bn	6	0	216	0	0	0	7	0	215	6	0	212
Bn (Prov)	7	0	127	8	0	146	8	0	161	6	0	148
25th Med Bn	8	0	80	2	0	2	11	0	79	11	0	70
725th Maint	8	0	95	0	0	6	4	2	104	3	2	101
nf Plat (Scout Dog)	1	0	26	0	0	0	1	0	24	1	0	23
IO Det	2	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	4	2	0	4
	<u>216</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>3788</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>264</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>4274</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>3994</u>

(2) The task force strength fluctuated daily during this period. The following are periodic strength figures:

AUGUST

DATE	ASSIGNED			PRESENT FOR DUTY		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
5 Aug	244	21	4848	223	15	4152
12 Aug	250	21	4913	230	16	4329
19 Aug	259	21	4883	232	15	4313
26 Aug	265	20	4886	253	17	4325
31 Aug	280	19	4914	252	16	4338

AVDC-C-OP

4 November 1966

**SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)**

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>			<u>ATCH</u>			<u>ASG PLUS ATCH</u>			<u>OFF</u>
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	
HHC, 3d Bde TF	34	9	240	12	3	233	54	8	462	50
1/14 Inf	37	2	790	0	0	0	43	1	860	42
1/35 Inf	37	2	790	0	0	0	41	2	815	40
2/35 Inf	37	2	790	0	0	0	40	2	853	39
2/9 Arty	38	3	452	0	0	0	47	2	514	45
C Trp, 3/4 Cav	5	0	179	0	0	0	5	0	183	5
Co D, 65th Engr Bn	6	0	216	0	0	0	7	0	215	6
3d Spt Bn (Prov)	7	0	127	8	0	146	8	0	161	6
Co B, 25th Med Bn	8	0	80	2	0	2	11	0	79	11
Co D, 725th Maint	8	0	95	0	0	6	4	2	104	3
40th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	1	0	26	0	0	0	1	0	24	1
14th PIO Det	2	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	4	2
	<u>216</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>3788</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>264</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>4274</u>	<u>259</u>

(2) The task force strength fluctuated daily during this period. The following are periodic strength figures:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>			<u>PRESENT FOR DUTY</u>		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
5 Aug	244	21	4848	223	15	4352
12 Aug	250	21	4913	230	16	4329
19 Aug	259	21	4883	232	15	4313
26 Aug	265	20	4886	253	17	4225
31 Aug	280	19	4914	252	16	4329

AVDC-0-CP

4 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSPOR-65) (U)

SEPTEMBER

DATE	<u>ASSIGNED</u>			<u>PRESENT FOR DUTY</u>		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
2 Sep	275	19	4912	243	16	4313
9 Sep	276	19	4853	244	16	4145
16 Sep	284	20	4901	249	16	4016
23 Sep	297	20	4979	262	18	4152
30 Sep	300	20	5134	273	18	4375

OCTOBER

DATE	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
7 Oct	300	20	5009	268	19	4290
14 Oct	301	20	5083	271	15	4395
21 Oct	266	17	4498*1	243	14	3912
28 Oct	263	17	4248*2	247	15	3965
31 Oct	263	17	4274	250	16	3994

(3) Replacements received:

AUGUST

	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	0	1	0	4	14	19
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
1/35 Inf	0	0	0	2	2	8	38	50
2/35 Inf	0	0	0	6	7	6	79	98
1/69 Arm	0	0	0	3	4	8	10	25
2/9 Arty	0	0	0	1	4	2	23	30
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	0	1	9	24	34
3d Spt Bn	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>15</u>
TOTAL	0	0	0	16	20	41	196	273

*1 Attachment of 1st Battalion, 62nd Armor to 4th Infantry Division.

*2 Loss of hospitalized personnel.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

22
26

SEPTEMBER

	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	0	1	1	1	0	5	36	44
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	2	1	2	109	114
1/35 Inf	0	0	0	1	2	3	92	98
2/35 Inf	0	0	0	1	1	5	93	100
1/69 Arm	0	0	0	4	7	11	16	38
2/9 Arty	0	1	0	0	0	3	45	49
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	0	1	0	10	11
3d Spt Bn	0	0	0	0	1	2	6	-26
TOTAL	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>418</u>	<u>480</u>

OCTOBER

	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	1	1	0	3	6	10	27	48
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	5	3	4	55	67
1/35 Inf	0	0	1	5	9	4	71	90
2/35 Inf	0	0	1	4	1	2	65	73
1/69 Arm	0	0	0	2	1	6	18	27
2/29 Arty	0	0	1	0	2	9	81	93
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	0	1	4	21	26
3d Spt Bn	0	0	0	1	3	2	21	27
TOTAL	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>359</u>	<u>451</u>

(4) The number of friendly casualties* for August, September, and October are as follows:

	KIA	WIA	MIA	WIA DUE TO WOUNDS
Organic units:	28	193	1	4
OCA units:	30	94	0	unk

(5) Number of emergency leaves:

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
HQ, 3d Brigade	2	0	3
HQ, 1st Bn, 14th Inf	1	1	2
HQ, 1st Bn, 35th Inf	4	2	5
HQ, 2d Bn, 35th Inf	4	5	3
HQ, 2d Bn, 9th Arty	1	0	3
HQ, 1st Bn, 69th Arm	2	4	3
3d Spt Bn, Prov	0	0	0
C Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav	0	0	2
Co D, 65th Engr Bn	1	1	2
40th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	0	0	0
Co D, 725th Maint Bn	1	0	0

* Friendly casualties from organic units were compiled from morning reports; casualties from units under OCA of the brigade were compiled from reports.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(BCS CSFOR-65) (U)

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
Co B, 25th Med Bn	0	1	0
14th Public Inf Det	0	0	0
	<u>16</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>23</u>

(6) Personnel who departed for separation:

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
1/14 Inf	30	26	35
1/35 Inf	26	46	24
2/35 Inf	24	29	20
2/9 Arty	15	22	21
1/69 Arm	18	24	8
C/3/4 Cav	7	7	18
Spt (S&T, HHC 3d Bde, D/65 Engr)	<u>23</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>53</u>
TOTAL	143	165	179

(7) On 26 October 1966, the USARV Patient Casual Company was activated. This helped considerably by reducing the brigade's assigned strength by the number of personnel in in-country hospitals. A total of 358 personnel were dropped effective 26 October 1966.

(8) This headquarters published Regulation Number 335-2 on the conduct of quarterly muster formation. The muster report completed with the unit morning report should assist immeasurably in promoting accurate strength accounting.

c. (C) Morale: Morale continues to be excellent within the command.

(1) Mail:

- (a) Number of bags received: 2835.
- (b) Number of bags dispatched: 2209.
- (c) Total money orders sold: 23,947.
- (d) Total value of money orders sold including fees:
\$1,533,677.81.
- (e) Total stamp value sold: \$16,332.90.
- (f) Dates mail was not received:
 - 1. August: 16th, 22d and 24th.

4 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS OEPOR-65) (U)

24
2/2

2. September: 9th, 14th, 20th and 25th.

3. October: 5th, 8th, 13th, 18th and 26th.

(2) R & R:

(a) Allocations appear to be adequate and are definitely a positive morale factor.

(b) The monthly allocations were as follows*:

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	25	26	24
1/14 Inf	60	50	42
1/35 Inf	49	44	41
2/35 Inf	52	44	44
1/69 Arm	52	47	38
Co D, 65th Engr	13	10	9
Spt Bn	20	19	18
2/9 Arty	<u>28</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>27</u>
TOTAL	299	269	243

d. Promotion allocations:

	<u>AUGUST</u>					
	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	1	2	0	5	11	22
1/14 Inf	0	0	2	14	20	44
1/35 Inf	0	0	1	20	23	40
2/35 Inf	0	1	2	19	20	40
1/69 Arm	0	0	2	6	5	40
2/9 Arty	0	1	0	3	0	11
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	2	5	5
3d Spt Bn	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>26</u>
TOTAL	1	5	9	74	111	242 (115)

	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>					
	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	0	4	12	30
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	9	26	53
1/35 Inf	0	0	0	2	5	40
2/35 Inf	0	0	0	7	25	45
1/69 Arm	0	0	0	3	4	40

*Figures include standby allocations.

AMC-3-OP
 SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	
2/9 Arty	0	0	0	4	10	18	
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	2	8	8	
3d Spt Bn	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>	
TOTAL	0	0	0	38	94	244	(376)

OCTOBER

	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	1	3	14	28	
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	3	14	54	
1/35 Inf	0	0	0	3	10	40	
2/35 Inf	0	0	1	1	14	30	
1/69 Arm	0	0	0	3	5	40	
2/9 Arty	0	0	0	3	15	20	
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	2	12	12	
40th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	0	0	0	1	0	9	
3d Spt Bn	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>16</u>	
TOTAL	0	0	2	22	90	249	(263)

e. Awards and decorations:

(1) During this period the brigade awards and decorations program was fully implemented and received much emphasis.

(2) Awards presented:

	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER
Purple Heart	30	125	83
Air Medal	43	35	52
Air Medal with "V" Device	1	1	1
Army Commendation Medal	6	25	235
Army Commendation Medal with "V" Device	0	10	12
Bronze Star	11	32	182
Bronze Star with "V" Device	86	76	37
Legion of Merit	1	2	1
Soldiers Medal	0	2	0
Silver Star	3	10	4
Distinguished Service Cross	0	0	2

f. Religion:

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

130

(1) With personnel widely dispersed it is often difficult to provide complete religious coverage. Nevertheless, the chaplains have apparently overcome this obstacle and the religious services have been more than adequate.

(2) The unit chaplains made numerous trips to visit brigade hospitalized personnel.

(3) Jewish personnel were given an opportunity to attend Yom Kipper services in Nha Trang.

g.. Reenlistment:

(1) The high reenlistment rate in the brigade is a positive indication of the high morale which predominates this unit.

(2) Reenlistments:

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
Last Prior Service RA (career)	12	10	9
Last Prior Service	1	9	11
Last Prior Service AUS	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	15	21	21
PERCENTAGE	28%	33%	25%

7. ARTILLERY:

a. 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery continued as the direct support artillery battalion for the brigade. The brigade was supported by additional artillery as indicated in paragraph 1d, above.

b. During the period 1 August to 18 October an aerial observer was airborne continuously during all flyable daylight hours. This was curtailed subsequent to that date because of the reduction of aircraft assets.

c. Countermortar radar was employed throughout the period, but there were no reported enemy mortar incidents within range of the radar.

d. Interrogation reports attest to the effectiveness of interdiction fires. These fires were planned in conjunction with the brigade S2 and were based on current intelligence/information.

8. ENGINEER:

a. Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion continued in general support of the task force providing support both in the area of operation and at brigade base camp.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

b. (C) Operations:

(1) Plans: The company will continue to provide engineer support both in the area of operation and base camp.

(2) Support in the area of operation consisted of bunker destruction, EOD, assisting in preparation of defensive perimeters, clearing landing zones and other general engineer support. Two combat engineer squads are normally employed with each committed maneuver battalion.

(3) Brigade base camp support included the construction of semi-permanent buildings for the brigade; i.e., messhalls, billets and headquarters. This work is being done on a self-help basis with engineer technical assistance. Layout, siting, and concrete work is being done by the engineer company. Materials for vertical construction is prefabricated by the engineer company for the using unit.

c. (C) Logistics:

(1) Maintenance of 5 ton bridge trucks, M139, became a maintenance problem because of a shortage of repair parts. Authorization to cannibalize one truck to remove others from deadline provided short term relief.

(2) Materials for brigade base camp construction are now received from both Pleiku Sub Area Command (PSAC) and 1st Logistical Command in Qui Nhon. Prior to opening of the Class IV yard at PSAC, all materials were hauled from Qui Nhon to the brigade base camp by this company.

(3) The Bridge Platoon of the engineer company has been used a great deal for transporting supplies and personnel.

(4) No major logistics problems, directly affecting the engineer company, were noted except the shortage and difficulty of receiving construction equipment. Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command is knowledgeable of this problem.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS OSF02-55) (U)

28
W

SECTION II COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Observation (Lessons Learned) (C)

1. (C) Personnel:

a. Item: Maintaining Current Individual DA Form 41, Record of Emergency Data.

Discussion: On numerous occasions, promptly submitted and well composed letters of sympathy have been returned by USARV because addressee on letter was contrary to information contained on deceased serviceman's DA Form 41, Record of Emergency Data. Regardless of information contained in company records, information obtained from personal acquaintance with deceased serviceman, or information of specific circumstances, USARV will not forward letter to survivors unless name and address of next of kin is exactly as stated on their copy of DA Form 41.

Observation: Commanders must ensure that the individual's DA Form 41 is kept current and that all letters of sympathy conform exactly to the data contained therein.

b. Item: Nature of wound.

Discussion: Casualty reports reflecting inaccurate information in the "nature of wounds" entry have caused considerable confusion when letters of sympathy and awards have been written. Commanders who have personal knowledge of exactly how their men were killed have rightfully refused to compromise their account of the injury to conform with an inaccurate casualty report. The brigade casualty reporting team takes their information from doctors located in the brigade clearing station. A small fragment wound may appear to be a gunshot wound. Only if the medic on the spot indicates what type wound it is, will the doctor be able to confirm it.

Observation: Company aidmen must take great care to ensure that item 14 (diagnosis) of DD Form 1380, US Field Medical Card, attached to evacuee clearly indicates appropriate injury, i.e., "GS" or "FRAG". all doctors and casualty reporting personnel should take the time necessary to read this card before making an erroneous and irrevocable entry on the official casualty report.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Item: Destruction of tunnels and bunkers.

Discussion: NVA forces make frequent use of well-constructed bunkers and tunnel systems which are impervious to anything except direct


SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

32


hits by heavy artillery or heavy bombs. Destruction of these bunkers and tunnels is a task for which the only feasible solution is the expert use of demolitions.

Observation: A system providing maximum destruction per unit of explosives is graphically portrayed below:

FRONT AND SIDE VIEW NVA BUNKER W/TUNNEL




FILLING PASSAGEWAY




CHARGE EMPLACEMENT

1. Hole for charge approx 3/4 depth of cover
 2. Charge placed
 3. Hole filled & tamped hard
- Passageway filled



DETONATION



SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

30
23

b. Item: Means for pilots to identify the locations of friendly units under heavy tree canopy.

Discussion: Infantry units are frequently required to operate in areas where the tree canopy is extremely dense. They are often required to mark their locations for aircraft flying overhead to receive artillery fire support, tactical air support, air-dropped resupply, or navigational assistance. The smoke generated from smoke grenades currently issued often fails to penetrate the canopy or, when it does penetrate, has frequently drifted with the wind from the point where it was activated.

Observation: A pyrotechnic device which produces colored smoke and also propels the smoke upward should be made available for issue. Consideration should be given to using the M79 as the launcher.

c. Item: Field expedient use of Claymore Mines to clear LZ.

Discussion: When an infantry company needs to expand a landing zone and does not have proper demolitions readily available, a properly placed Claymore Mine will quickly and effectively destroy a tree trunk. By placing the mine against the tree as if the tree were the enemy and then securing the mine against the tree using the carrying case, the mine will blow down a tree two to twelve inches in diameter.

Observation: Claymore Mines are a good emergency substitute for C4 when trees must be felled to clear a landing zone.

d. Item: Pursuit.

Discussion: When pursuing NVA and VC elements in the highlands, it has been noted that the enemy often rapidly disappears even in dense undergrowth. Subsequent area search often reveals trails that allowed the enemy rapid movement. On one occasion, a platoon was able to move back to its base in 40 minutes by a trail over a distance that had required three hours when moving cross country.

Observation: When the NVA break contact and disappear, look for possible trails on which to pursue; pursuit should be executed with caution when using prominent trails with maximum emphasis on security measures to preclude walking into an ambush.

e. Item: Enemy foraging parties.

Discussion: NVA forces harboring in an area send out small (2-3 men) foraging or rice carrying parties for distances up to 5 - 6 thousand meters from their main base.

AFMC-C-OP

4 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(PSS CWP04-65) (U)

NY

Observation: US Forces have been successful in capturing prisoners from these small groups who, under interrogation, have provided extremely valuable information.

f. **Item:** Fire coordination line.

Discussion: Fire coordination lines cannot be arbitrarily selected without mutual agreement between commanders. Additionally, to aid in recognition by ground units and aerial observers the fire coordination line should follow a well defined terrain feature.

Observation: To avoid confusion the boundary between units and the fire coordination line should be one and the same.

g. **Item:** Close in adjustment of artillery.

Discussion: It is often necessary to fire artillery extremely close to friendly units (50-100 meters). During any firing to recoil of the weapon, aiming post displacement or shifting of trails may cause the weapon to be a few mils out of lay. This difference can endanger friendly troops when close-in firing is required.

Observation: A technique used when close-in firing is provided, is to continuously check the lay of each piece with the aiming circle and re-lay the howitzer if necessary. During firing this is accomplished by calling out one piece at a time, checking it, re-laying if necessary, and continuing on to the next piece.

3. (C) Training:

a. **Item:** M16 Rifle battlesight zeroing.

Discussion: The ballistic characteristic difference between the ball and tracer ammunition dictate that the weapon be zeroed to fire one or the other. Those leaders who continually fire tracer ammunition should establish their battlesight zero with tracer and those who do not normally fire tracer should establish their battlesight zero with ball ammunition. This has been implemented in this brigade's replacement training program.

Observation: Junior leaders should be apprised of this and Replacement Training programs should adopt this procedure.

b. **Item:** Indirect fire adjustment.

Discussion: Experience has shown that individuals have difficulty adjusting indirect weapons fire unless they can see the

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

22
47

round in the proximity of the target. Most individuals are capable of submitting subsequent fire requests.

Observation: The elements of the initial fire request should be stressed in basic and advanced individual training to overcome this shortcoming.

c. Item: Grenadier training in the firing of the XM576 round.

Discussion: The sight on the M79 was not designed to fire the XM576 shotgun round.

Observation: Grenadiers should undergo a familiarization firing program for the firing of M79 with the shotgun round.

4. (C) Intelligence:

a. Item: Enemy observation of friendly units.

Discussion: Prisoners of war reported that they maintained contact with friendly forces through use of reconnaissance units which reported location, direction of movement, and strength to higher headquarters. These reconnaissance units allegedly reported by both land line and radio to higher headquarters. Their "modus operandi" included established outposts/listening posts or actually following units. The enemy use of these elements could explain in part how the enemy was able to attack friendly positions within thirty minutes to two hours after EENT with up to battalion size strengths. These enemy reconnaissance patrols, plus some preparation of the battlefield and knowledge of the terrain, would have allowed the enemy to anticipate where friendly forces would stand down for the night. The enemy could then position himself for an attack.

Observation: US personnel should be appraised of this enemy tactic and the enemy's ability to capitalize on the information gained. Commanders should adopt procedures to counteract this enemy "modus operandi" such as the utilization of stay behind forces to ambush routes used.

b. Item: The ratio of enemy KIA (PO) to weapons captured during PAUL REVERE IV has been nearly 1:1.

Discussion: Past experience has shown that a good body count to weapons captured ratio was 3:1. It is believed that the favorable improvement of this ratio can be attributed to two primary causes. First, aggressive pursuit by friendly forces using fire and maneuver which precluded the enemy from making a thorough job of battlefield sanitization. Second, the influx of large numbers of replacements may be having an adverse effect on the discipline within enemy units.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

24

Observation: This information should be made available to commanders and considered as an item for exploration in PSYOPS.

c. Item: Viet Cong infrastructure.

Discussion: The significant lack of North Vietnamese Army contact during portions of this period afforded commanders of US Forces the opportunity to commit forces to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure for the first time. The initiation of operations against the Viet Cong infrastructure is difficult for several reasons: There is little information/intelligence maintained by ARVN from which US Forces can get a good start; this is understandable since it is difficult to penetrate the Viet Cong infrastructure.

Observation: The problem of attacking the infrastructure has to be approached on a long range basis and as a joint effort with both ARVN and US Forces participation. The US Forces should be used to suppress overt guerrilla activities, while the ARVN concentrates on the collection of necessary OB information to root out the Viet Cong.

d. Item: Maps.

Discussion: Battalions have been using both the standard 1:50,000 topographic maps and the new 1:25,000 pictomaps. It has been found that if only one map is used, the 1:50,000 map is the best. However, when using the pictomaps as a supplement to the 1:50,000 map, many details of the terrain are brought out which definitely aid the man on the ground in determining his location. It should be pointed out that the new 1:50,000 map series incorporate some of the faults of the old series. The terrain in mountainous, heavily jungled areas is often vaguely depicted. Prominent ridges, ravines, streams, etc. are found on the ground which do not appear on the maps. This sometimes makes for difficult land navigation.

Observation: Junior leaders should be appraised of these facts.

5. (C) Logistics:

a. Item: Use of the 250 gallon rubber water drum.

Discussion: These drums are sling loaded to forward LZ. The maximum capacity that may be carried by a HU-1D aircraft is 125 gallons. If the ceiling is low, the HU-1D aircraft has difficulty carrying the sling loaded drum because the aircraft is not able to contour with a sling load. Experience dictates that the nozzle must be carefully handled.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

WJ

as it is easily broken and even more easily lost. Four water drums are required to support the four companies of each battalion.

Observation: Drums should not be used when the ceiling is low. To ensure that all water in the drum is used, a hoist should be constructed. Water cans must be rapidly available for use when weather conditions preclude the use of the water drum.

b. Item: Front sight, M16 rifle.

Discussion: Water accumulates in the front sight. If not removed, it will cause the sight to rust and become inoperable.

Observation: A few drops of oil on the front sight and exercising the sight will preclude this.

c. Item: Centralized control of aviation section personnel and maintenance procedures.

Discussion: Normally a crew-chief is assigned per aircraft and mechanics' helpers used in general support of the section. The crew-chief remained with his aircraft whether in the field or in the rear area. Problems experienced with this organization were:

(1) Inability to use crew-chiefs for inspection of other aircraft.

(2) Crew rotation between the field maintenance base and the forward base of operation was based upon aircraft availability and led to an inconsistent employment of crew-chiefs.

(3) The training of mechanics' helpers was impossible since qualified crew-chiefs were not readily available.

Consolidation of maintenance crews into three separate teams alleviated this. One qualified mechanic stays with two mechanics' helpers day after day permitting continuity in their training. The system of two teams specializing in intermediate inspections, and one specializing in periodic inspections, improved inspection quality. Personnel are rotated systematically. An additional product of this system was the competitive spirit between the teams.

Observation: The results are worthy of consideration for adoption in other aviation sections.

28

d. Item: Indigenous Rations.

Discussion: The "C" rations are too heavy for the individual soldier to carry on patrols lasting two or more days. This is especially true while working in mountainous terrain. The problem is compounded by the extremes of temperature and the density of the ground cover. Elimination of one meal per day of "C" rations has not proven satisfactory since this impairs the performance of the individual over a 48 hour period or longer. One indigenous ration is light and provides sufficient food for two men for one meal and weighs considerably less than two "C" ration meals.

Observation: Issuing one indigenous ration as a substitute for two "C" ration meals would greatly reduce the weight each individual would be required to carry for sustained operations.

e. Item: Alleviate the shortage of anchor bolts for use in building construction.

Discussion: During the construction of buildings in the brigade base camp, a shortage of anchor bolts was experienced. The anchor bolt, which is used to prevent horizontal displacement of buildings during and after erection, were fashioned from metal rods found in the 105mm howitzer ammunition boxes. These rods are cut in 8 inch lengths and imbedded in fresh concrete.

Observation: This improvised anchor bolt is a satisfactory substitute.

6. Other:

a. Item: Unit public information representatives.

Discussion: To provide timely and accurate information, spot reports as input for news coverage of the brigade task force activities, "reporters" are required at the battalion level. These individuals can be deserving riflemen who have served six months in that capacity and have a writing ability. These representatives monitor their respective unit's activities and insure comprehensive reporting of all items of news interest.

Observation: This system of reporting was implemented and has proven superior to previous methods of reporting items of news interest.

b. Item: M16 cleaning rod.

Discussion: The M16 cleaning rod, when carried in its case on the pistol belt, often becomes bent or broken. Because of its importance to the individual soldier, it should never be separated from his weapon.

25

Observation: The cleaning rod should be secured to the hand guard of the M16 rifle. This provides easy access when needed and minimizes the chances of damage.

Part II, Recommendations

Recommend the observations noted in Part I, Section II above, be considered appropriate.

JAMES G. SHANAHAN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

~~Inc~~ w/d

- 1 - Combat Operations After Action Report for Period 1 August through 25 August 1966
- 2 - Disposition of Task Force Units PAUL REVERE III 26 August 1966
- 3 - Operations Schematic PAUL REVERE III Period 26 August - 10 September
- 4 - Operations Schematic PAUL REVERE III Period 11 - 27 September
- 5 - Operations Schematic PAUL REVERE III Period 28 September - 18 October
- 6 - Disposition of Task Force Units PAUL REVERE IV 18 October
- 7 - Operations Schematic PAUL REVERE IV Period 18 - 31 October
- 8 - Replacement Training Schedule

Distribution:

ACSFOR, DA	3
CINCUSARPAC	1
DCG, USARV	3
CG, IFFV	1
CG, 25th Inf Div	1
1/14	1
1/35	1
2/35	1
2/9	1
3d Spt Bn (Prov)	1
D/65	1
CO	1
S1	1
S2	1
S3	1
S4	1
S5	1
Sig O	1
Avn O	1
CG, 4th Inf Div	1

57 AVFPA-OC (28 Nov 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOM-63) (U) 40

HEADQUARTERS, 4th Infantry Division, APO US Forces 96262


TO: Commanding General, I Force V, ATTN: AVFA-OC-O&T, APO US Forces 96350

1. (U) Forwarded is the Operational Report of Lessons Learned for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966, submitted by the 3D Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.
2. (U) The reported unit was placed under operational control of the 4th Infantry Division on 18 October 1966.
3. (C) The report is considered adequate and has been reviewed by this headquarters. Specific comments follow:

a. Paragraph 17C, Inclosure 1, Combat Operations After Action Report for Period 1 August through 25 August 1966, recommends upgrading of Route 19 west of Route 14 to Duc Co. The 937th Engineer Group and 20th Engineer Battalion received the mission of upgrading Route 19 to a Class 50 road on 15 October 1966. Progress has been rapid and Route 19 will soon be Class 50 for two-way traffic.

b. Paragraph 17F, Inclosure 1, Combat Operations After Action Report for Period 1 August through 25 August 1966, recommends C-130 airstrips be prepared and maintained at Plei Me, Oasis, Cat, Catecka, and Duc Co. Oasis has a C-130 strip presently being repaired by the 4th Engineer Battalion. A C-130 airstrip is being prepared at Duc Co by the 4th Engineer Battalion. The 937th Engineer Group has been tasked with the mission of preparing additional C-130 airstrips. Exact locations of these airstrips are not known at this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


DENNIS E. BURKE
LT, AGC
Act AG

1 INCL
nc

Downgraded at 3 Year Interval
Declassified After 12 Years
DOD REF 5200.20

REF ID: A66017 (4 Nov 66)

2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(SAS 000005)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96350 28 DEC 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

(C) This Headquarters concurs with the 3/25th Infantry Division Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 66. The following comments are submitted:

a. Section II, Part 1, Paragraph 4c (Viet Cong Infrastructure): The most effective time to eliminate the infrastructure is during the conduct of military operations, providing surprise is achieved and proper planning has taken place. National Police assistance must be coordinated to the maximum extent possible.

b. Inclosure 1, Paragraph 16 (Clearance and Notification of Artillery and Mortar Fires): This headquarters is currently preparing a regulation covering artillery/aircraft coordination for air space utilization. This regulation will incorporate the recommendation submitted by 3/25th Infantry Division.

c. 1st Indorsement, Paragraph 3b (Airstrips): The following airstrip information has been furnished to Hq, 4th Infantry Division:

(1) PLE ME (ZA145071): CV-2 rated. No plans to upgrade to C-130.

(2) OASIS (ZA105276): All weather C-130 rated. This strip is scheduled to be rehabilitated with M8A1 Steel Mat commencing on or about January 1967 (estimated completion EIT 15 February 1967).

(3) CATECKA (ZA203341): Dry weather C-130 rated. No plans to upgrade.

(4) CAT (YU965895): Dry weather C-123 rated (poor shape). Ultimate plans are to upgrade to C-130 as required by future operations in that vicinity. Prior to upgrading, an access road must be constructed to the site. Construction of access road is programmed to be completed prior to the SW Monsoon Season.

SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS ODFOR-65)

(5) DUC CO (YUC29251): Marginal C-130 water. This strip will be rehabilitated with H&A1 Steel Mat to full all weather capability prior to 1 April 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

William B. James
WILLIAM B. JAMES
Colonel, USAF
Adjutant General

**SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (BCS CSFOR-65)**

EW

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

22 FEB 1967

**TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OT
APO 96558**

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph 4f(2), Section I, Page 18: The central water supply system has been completed and consists of a 10" line connecting a 1,000 GPM pumping station at Lake Bien Ho to a 52,000 gallon storage tank in the vicinity of ARVN II Corps Headquarters. However, inasmuch as the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, obtains most of its water requirements from a spring adjacent to its cantonment area, this central water system is of primary interest to assorted other units and activities in the Pleiku area.

b. Reference Paragraph 2b, Part I, Section II, Page 30: Illuminating, smoke, and white star cluster projectiles for the M79 Grenade Launcher are currently being tested and evaluated. Evaluation has not been completed. However, other type position markers are being evaluated concurrently.

c. Reference Paragraph 5d, Part I, Section II, Page 35: The observation on issue of indigenous rations to US Army personnel is not approved by the Surgeon General. Use of the Long Range Patrol Food Packet is recommended for use in patrol actions. On 27 December 1966, the brigade commander was informed on the availability and use of this food packet.

d. Reference Paragraph 6b, Part I, Section II, Pages 35 and 36: This headquarters has requested that the stock of the M-16 Rifle be modified to provide a receptacle for the cleaning rod and associated cleaning equipment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. J. THORNTON
1st Lt. AGC
Act. Adjutant General

8 Incl
nc

Classified When Separated
- Classified Inclosures

LC

CONFIDENTIAL

GPOR-OT(4 Nov 66)

4th Ind (U)

45

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CEFOR-65), HQ 25th Inf Div, 3d Bde Task Force


46

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 15 MAR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



G. L. McMULLIN
CPT, AGO
Asst AG

8 Incl
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NND873541

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 196TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (LIGHT) (SEPARATE)
APO San Francisco 96256

AVBFSC

16 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GC 1)

TO: Commanding General
Americal Division
ATTN: AVDF-GC (DOT)
APO S.F. 96374

1. NAME OR TYPE OF OPERATION: WHEELER/WALLOWA
 2. DATES OF OPERATION: 3 - 10 January 1968
 3. LOCATION: MAP Vietnam 1:50,000, Series L7014, sheet 6640 III, grid AT9024 to AT9927, SONG LAU River Valley from HIEP DUC to NUI LAC SON.
 4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 196th Light Infantry Brigade
 5. REPORTING OFFICER: 196th Lt Inf Bde - COL Louis Gelling
- | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 2-1 Inf - LTC Hammond, Lyman H. Jr. | 3-21 Inf - LTC Champlain, Allen R. |
| B Co - CPT Connally John F | A Co - CPT Yurchak, Paul N. |
| C Co - CPT Thomasson, John T. (WHA) | B Co - CPT Belcher, Roland (KHA) |
- 4-31 Inf - LTC Cully, Frederick R.
 - A Co - CPT Byers, Larry R.
 - B Co - CPT Speer, William L.
 - C Co - CPT Stringham, Joseph S.
 - D Co - CPT Richards, James F. (WHA)
 6. TASK ORGANIZATION: The control headquarters was the 196th Light Infantry Brigade with no units detached. The following units were attached/OPCON.

1st Squadron, 1st Armored Cavalry (-)
C Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry

7. SUPPORTING FORCES: Forces used in support of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade during this operation consisted of air strikes from the 3rd Combat Support Group and artillery from the following USA artillery

NND873541

AVBFSC

16 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GC 1) cont'd

battalions: 3d Bn, 82 Arty (105 How); 3d Bn, 16th Arty (155 How)
3d Bn, 18th Arty (8" How and 175 Gun), and 1st Bn, 21st Arty (105 How).

a. USAF: The Air Force flew 16 (37 sorties) preplanned missions, 15 (32 sorties) immediate missions and 21 radar directed missions against troop concentrations, supply routes and routes of egress. The Air Force gunships and flareships were used in support each night of the operation providing continuous illumination of the battlefield and suppressive fires during enemy attacks. Three B-52 strikes were flown against troop concentrations in the area immediately west of the operational area with unknown results.

b. USA Artillery: Army artillery accounted for 141 enemy killed while fire 12,960 rds against enemy forces and enemy routes of egress.

8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Weather: During the period 3 - 10 January 1968 the weather in the area of operations was influenced by the northeast monsoon. Increased cloudiness and ceiling of 5,000 feet were common with ceiling of 2,000 feet occurring during periods of darkness and early morning hours. Visibility of zero to three miles was common in the early morning hours on the mountains and in the valleys of the operational area while afternoon visibility increased to 5 - 7 miles.

b. Terrain:

(1) Observation and fields of fire - The rice lands offered excellent to poor fields of fire with the limiting factors being the numerous dikes. The low hills offered excellent fields of fire while the mountains and valleys which are characterized by brush and grass 1-3 meters high offered fair to poor observation and fields of fire. Air observation was good in the rice lands and poor in the heavily canopied forest.

(2) Cover and concealment - Concealment was poor in rice land with fair cover provided by the paddy dikes. Cover and concealment in the rolling plains was excellent to poor depending on vegetation and relief. Excellent concealment and fair cover was provided in the mountain forest.

(3) Obstacles - Obstacles to foot traffic were provided by flooded rice paddies and dense vegetation in the mountains.

NND873541

AVBFSC

16 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GC 1) cont'd

(4) Key terrain features - High ground on either side of the valley controlled avenues of approach and offered excellent observation and fields of fire. Populated areas were considered key terrain to the enemy.

(5) Avenues of approach - Streams and valleys offered adequate avenues of approach for foot traffic in all directions. In the heavily canopied mountain areas, helicopter landing zones and airborne drop zones were limited.

c. Enemy capabilities, strength and disposition: The enemy was capable of launching a Division size attack (2nd NVA Div) along the western and northwestern border of the Brigade AO, while reinforced Bn sized attack capabilities in the northeastern part of the Brigade AO were possessed by the 70th Main Force Bn supported by two local forces companies and one Bn from the 3d NVA Regiment. One local forces Bn and five local force companies were capable of harassing friendly operations. Village and hamlet guerrillas also possessed a harassing capability and were capable of supporting main force/NVA units in terms of resupply and fortification. Enemy disposition and strengths the first week of Jan 1968 were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
2nd NVA Div	7,700	
HQ	700	AT8831
33rd Arty Regt/2nd NVA Div	1,800	
HQ	125	AT9231
GK 30 Sig Bn	220	AT9132
GK 31 AA Bn (12.7mm)	380	AT9231
GK 32 RR Bn (75mm)	200	AT9429
GK 33 Mort Bn (81/82mm)	230	AT9032
GK 40 Engr Bn	200	BT1739
1st MF Regt/2nd NVA Div	1,700	
HQ	350	AT8724
40th Bn	450	AT9028
60th Bn	450	BT0621
70th Bn (Independent)	350	BT2337
90th Bn	450	BT1331
21st NVA Regt/2nd NVA Div	1,800	
HQ	300	AT9439
60th Bn (AKA -11th Bn)	500	AT9540
70th Bn (AKA-22nd Bn)	500	AT9839
70th Bn (AKA-33rd Bn)	500	AT9940
3rd NVA Regt/2nd NVA Div	1,600	
HQ	300	AT8833
1st Bn (AKA-7th Bn)	450	BT2739

NND873541

AVBFSC

16 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GC 1) cont'd

2nd Bn (AKA-8th Bn)	450	AT9034
3rd Bn (AKA-9th Bn)	450	AT8935
Main Force Units		
105th Bn	410	BT1042
409th Sapper Bn	300	BT1912
70th Co/409th Bn	120	BT2118
Local Force		
72nd Bn	275	BT2118
V-14th Co (AKA-K-53)	100	BT2514
V-15th Co (AKA-K-51)	100	BT1836
K-52nd Co	100	BT1419
K-54th Co (AKA V-12)	100	BT2324
74th Co	120	BT2116
75th Co (AKA K-55)	110	BT3128
78th Co (Poss)	120	BT2346

9. MISSION: Search for and destroy enemy forces within the SONG LAU River Valley and interdict enemy movement along the valley from HIEP DUC to NUI LAC SON.

10. EXECUTION: On 2 January 1968 the Brigade conducted extensive S&D operations throughout the AO. A CA was conducted by C/4-31 into a cold LZ vic AT943213. Significant enemy action was confined to the interdiction of highway #1 at two locations, (BT217362 and BT264277), by destroying the culverts at those locations. Reference MAP #1 - high locations 2 Jan 68.

At 0145 on the morning of 3 Jan 68 LZ's ROSS and LESLIE came under attack and shortly thereafter FSB WEST reported incoming hand grenades and mortar rounds.

The Brigade Commander issued orders to the 3-21 Inf to have D/3-21, in stand-down at CHU LAI, prepared to CA into an LZ north of FSB CENTER 30 minutes after BMNT, and to the 4-31 Inf to have A/4-31 and D/4-31 move into the valley north of FSB WEST to block while C/4-31 crossed the river in sweep north to the valley.

At 0430 D/4-31 observed 60-70 NVA between them and FSB WEST and shortly thereafter gained contact with an unknown size force vic AT945269.

In a move to reinforce D/4-31, C/4-31 combat assaulted into a LZ vic AT935245 secured by A/4-31, and began moving north immediately. A Co moved to vic AT954259 to establish blocking positions.

C and D companies linked up at 1222 vic AT954269 and began moving

NND873541

AVBFSC

16 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GC 1) cont'd

SE to their night locations. Casualties for this action were 1 KHA, 2 WHA-evac, 6 WHA-minor, enemy body count totaled 35 VC KIA(BC). Reference MAP #2 - day movement and night locations 3 Jan 68.

FSB WEST reported 45 incoming mortar rounds between 2135 and 2234 hrs, and at 0128 on 4 Jan 68 D/4-31 reported they were in heavy contact at their night location.

C/4-31 Inf moved from their night positions to link with and support D Company and was itself in heavy contact by 0256 only 100m from D/4-31 position.

Contact was broken and the link-up completed at 0611 and both companies started sweeping operations in the area of contact. D and C companies lost a total of 4 KHA, 14 WHA-evac and 2 WHA-minor. Enemy casualties are unknown.

During the remainder of the day 4-31 Inf was reinforced by two rifle companies. C/2-1 Inf conducted a CA into an LZ secured by A/4-31 vic AT961262 while A/3-21 walked into 4-31 AO through the NUI LAC SON NFZ.

Reference MAP #3 - day movement and night locations.

During the daylight hours of 5 Jan 68 units in the 4-31 AO, in particular C/2-1 Inf reported SA, AW, and A/A fire periodically. However, no firm contact was gained during daylight hours. Reference MAP #4 - night locations 5 Jan 68.

At 1800 hrs C/2-1 came in contact at their night location in what was to be the longest sustained contact of the NVA offensive. The Co. commander and one platoon leader were the first casualties and shortly after they were dusted off the company was heavily engaged with the enemy (1856) and trying to move south. C/2-1 Inf's situation deteriorated rapidly and within 2 hours (2040) the company reported their perimeter had been penetrated. A/4-31 was moved from night positions to reinforce C/2-1 and by 044 6 Jan 68 had completed the linkup and was itself taking casualties in the continuing attack.

A/4-31 and C/2-1 remained in heavy contact until 0431. At 0545 A/4-31 reported that they received fire only when they tried to move in search of personnel from C/2-1. This type of delaying and harassing fire continued as late as 0915 hrs.

NND873541

AVBFSC

16 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GC 1) cont'd

At 0930 6 Jan 68 C/2-1 Inf was declared combat ineffective having suffered 19 KHA, 28 WHA-evac, and 32 WHA-minor vs. 186 enemy KIA (BC), and was returned to the 2-1 FSB. 4-31 Inf was reinforced by two rifle companies during the afternoon of 6 Jan with B/2-1 conducting a CA into an LZ vic AT965265 and D/3-21 CAing into vic AT966264. D/4-31 returned to FSB WEST and B/4-31 moved from the FSB to replace D Co in the valley. Reference MAP #5 - night locations 6 Jan and planned movement on 7 Jan 68.

There was no significant ground contact reported on 7 Jan. However shortly after midnight TAM KY came under a mortar attack and at 0200 CHARGER HILL received 18 mortar rounds. On the night of the seventh LZ's ROSS and LESLIE reported incoming mortars/rockets and at 2305 word was received that DA NANG was under rocket attack.

Reference MAP #6 - day movement and night locations 7 Jan 68

Reference MAP #7 - B/4-31, D/3-21 opns on morning of 8 Jan 68

On the morning of 8 Jan 68 D/3-21 and B/4-31 started sweeping opns as shown on MAP #7. By noon D/3-21 was in position vic AT958265 where they stopped for lunch. One of the helicopters resupplying D/3-21 at lunch reported observing 10 VC vic AT959268. D/3-21 sent 3 10 man teams (1 from each plat) north to check this out. They were soon followed by the D/3-21 command group and shortly behind them the remainder of the company less the weapons platoon.

Reference MAP #8 - movements after lunch 8 Jan 68

At vic AT959258 D/3-21 received SA fire from the west and 10 men were sent to suppress it. The remainder of the company continued north across the river and then SW and crossed the river again. At this point the company came under intense SA, AW and mortar fire from vic AT953271. The company was split during this action and shortly thereafter (1448?) radio communication with the company was lost. A/3-21 was sent north to assist D/3-21 and at 1331 gained contact vic AT955268 with one platoon of VC with one 60mm mortar and five machine guns. B/4-31 was also in contact at this time on the high ground NE of D/3-21. By 1845 all contact was broken and A/4-31, A/3-21 and D/3-21 had linked up vic AT960269. C/4-31, B/2-1 and B/4-31 had linked up vic AT965272. D/3-21 and A/3-21 suffered 13 KHA, 5 WHA-evac, 13 WHA-minor vs. 70 enemy KIA (BC). Reference MAP #9 - night locations 8 Jan 68 (B and C/3-21 Inf located at AT992292)

The situation in the valley during the night was quiet but FSB WEST reported continued sporadic mortar fire.

NND873541

AVBFSC

16 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GC 1) cont'd

TASK ORGANIZATION - LISE - B/4-31, C/4-31, B/2-1

HERMAN - A/4-31, A/3-21, D/3-21

Reference MAP #10 - contact on 9 Jan 68

On the morning of 9 Jan Task Force LISE and HERMAN started sweeping toward the west from their night locations. Both Task Forces had a 200-400 meter front and had one flank on the river. C/4-31 was on the northern flank of LISE and A/3-21 was the northern flank of HERMAN.

At 1025 C/4-31 started drawing heavy SA and AW fire from their north, and at 1117 A/3-21 gained heavy contact from the north.

A/4-31 moved from their position on the southern flank of HERMAN to each flank of A/3-21 and together D/3-21 broke contact and moved SE at 1205.

With the remainder of Task Force LISE providing covering fire from their south, C/4-31 moved south, joined B/4-31 and B/2-1 and Task Force LISE moved south of the river breaking contact.

The remainder of the NVA Offensive consisted of sporadic mortar fire directed at TF HERMAN and FSB WEST during the night of 9-10 Jan 68.

Shortly before nightfall on 9 Jan (1600) D/2-35 Inf arrived at FSB WEST to provide additional security there and Task Force BRAVO (B and C 3-21) from the 3-21 Inf moved into the high ground north of TF HERMAN and LISE and established night positions as shown on MAP #11. Reference MAP #11 - night locations 9 Jan 68.

11. RESULTS:

Friendly losses.

64 US KHA
92 US WHA-evac
112 US WHA-minor

Enemy losses.

191 VC KIA (BC)
238 NVA KIA (BC)
10 gas masks captured
28 individual wpns captured
3 crew-served wpns captured
45 HG captured
299 small arms rds captured
2.5 tons rice captured

12. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

a. Operations against the NVA regulars during the period

NND873541

AVBFSC

17 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GC 1) cont'd

3-10 Jan 68 indicated a significant difference in the type operations conducted by the NVA as opposed to the Viet Cong. The NVA are well equipped, well trained and will stay and fight whenever they are dug in or when they gain an advantage over an American unit. These operations indicated the NVA will attempt to have small groups of soldiers fire on an American unit and then withdraw from contact. Units which pursue the enemy force are frequently ambushed, cutoff from the main body and then engaged with heavy volumes of direct and indirect fire.

b. During the period 3-10 Jan 68 heaviest contact was made during the hours of darkness. The full effectiveness of available combat support was not realized because supporting agencies had difficulty identifying limits of unit positions. The currently available pyrotechnic devices were found to lack effectiveness when units are under fire and require immediate support.

c. All types of air support were required in order to resist enemy attacks during the early part of Jan 68. The concentration of all resources in a localized area operating on the supported companies frequency created a complicated control problem as well as hazardous conditions for air supporting agency due to the possibility of being hit by friendly artillery/mortar fires.

13. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. When operating against confirmed NVA forces units should not pursue retreating enemy forces with less than a company sized force. Two company task force operations are advisable so that the companies within reinforcing distance of each other.

b. It is believed that electro luminescent tape and strobe light, Light Marker Distress FSN 6230-06705209 would prove to be a more satisfactory means of positively identifying friendly front lines than the methods presently being used.

c. Air support agencies should be controlled on the fire direction net of the Inf Bn being supported. This would allow all aircraft to be keep abreast of friendly fires through the Bn's artillery LNO as well as allow the supported Co. direct communications with the supporting agency through the company's Forward Observer's radio.

FOR THE COMMANDER

11 Incls:
Maps 1 - 11

THOMAS M. FINNEGAN
1LT, Infantry
Asst Adj

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96345

AIRTEL

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (AOB: MAO J3-32) (X-1)(U)

THRU: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
APO 96266

TO: Commander
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: MAO J343
APO 96222

1. (U) **NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION:** Operation SHENANDOAH II was a reconnaissance in force operation and a road clearing operation conducted in two phases. References: Map, Vietnam, Sheets 6231 I, 6231 II, 6331 III, 6331 IV, 6232 I, 6332 I, 6332 II, 6332 III, 6332 IV.
2. (U) **DATES OF OPERATION:** Phase I: 290800H Sep - 262400H Oct 67. Phase II: 290001H Oct - 191935H Nov 67.
3. (O) **LOCATION:** SHENANDOAH II was conducted in two phases. Phase I was conducted west of Highway 13 from Ben Cat to Chon Thanh in the Long Nguyen base area. Phase II was conducted in the rubber and jungle areas surrounding Loc Ninh. The areas of operation are shown at Annex B.
4. (O) **CONTROL HEADQUARTERS:** Operation SHENANDOAH II was a 1st Infantry Division controlled operation.
5. (O) **REPORTING OFFICER:** The reporting officer is Major General Keith L. Ware, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division. A list of commanders is shown at Annex A.
6. (O) **TASK ORGANIZATION:**

Phase I (29 Sep - 28 Oct 67)

1st Brigade	2d Brigade	3d Brigade
1-26 Inf	2-16 Inf	2-2 Inf (Mech)(-)
1-28 Inf	2-18 Inf	1-16 Inf
1-2 Inf	TASK FORCE STEEL	1-18 Inf
1-4 Cav (-)	1-7 Arty (DB)	2-28 Inf
1-5 Arty (DB)		B/2-34 Armor
6-15 Arty (DB)		2-33 Arty (DB)

7. (O) **SUPPORTING FORCES:**

a. Artillery: See Annex C.

b. USAF:

(1) **Tactical Air:** Tactical Air was used extensively throughout Operation SHENANDOAH for close support, landing zone preparatory fires, and the destruction of base camps. Preplanned air strikes were employed on a daily basis in areas scheduled to be reconnoitered. These air strikes were planned to be expanded just prior to the arrival of the ground forces in the objective area. Preplanned air strikes were also scheduled to destroy base camps discovered by ground forces during reconnaissance in force operations and by aerial reconnaissance units. All landing zones scheduled for aerial assault by infantry battalions were elaborately "prepped" with bombs, napalm and OBU. The fact that no ships were lost or casualties sustained during these aerial assaults testifies to the effectiveness of the tactical air and the soundness of the practice. Tactical air was used extensively in a close support role both day and night for all contacts sustained during the operation. The Battle of Loc Ninh is an example of the use and effectiveness of close air support at night. When anti-aircraft positions were identified by the F-4's and gunships, bombs were effectively used to destroy these positions. At Loc Ninh, repeated strikes, using OBU, were run parallel to the runway on the east side in the rubber when the VC attempted to use that avenue of approach to the District Headquarters. Each time a unit came in contact, as in the case of the 1-18 Infantry on 29 and 30 October, airstrikes were used simultaneously with artillery to block the VC from retreating and to destroy those that tried to escape. In one instance, during the 1-18 Infantry contact on 30 October, the artillery was used to block the VC from the rear and airstrikes were brought in between the artillery blocking fires and the friendly forces. Tactical air was also used to protect the flanks of units while in contact. It is always the objective of the 1st Infantry Division to use weapons of massive destruction, such as tactical air, as close to the point of contact as possible, in conjunction with other means of destruction to effectively destroy the VC once he has been located by ground forces.

The following is a resume of the sorties flown and ordnance expended during Operation SHENANDOAH II:

	PHASE I	PHASE II	TOTAL
Preplanned	744 sorties	462 sorties	1,206 sorties
Immediate	629 sorties	339 sorties	1,028 sorties
	1,433 sorties	801 sorties	2,234 sorties
Ordnance	1,902.92 tons	873.74 tons	2,776.66 tons

(2) **B-52 Strikes:** There were 11 B-52 strikes conducted during Phase I and 12 during Phase II. Strikes were delivered based upon intelligence and their impact on the scheme of maneuver. The B-52 strike is extremely effective in opening jungle areas habitually used by the VC. Due to the extensive construction of base camp complexes found during Phase I, the B-52 strike offered one practical method of destroying them. Some base camps extended over three to four grid squares requiring more than one B-52 strike to effectively destroy them. The value of B-52 strikes cannot be over emphasized. A list of targets and the results obtained are included as Annex D.

c. Army Aviation - See Annex E.

AVDRLST

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROR: MAC J3-32) (K-1)(U)

12 April 1968

(1) Aviation units supporting Operation SHERWOOD:

- (a) 1st Aviation Battalion
- (b) 11th Aviation Battalion
- (c) 222d Aviation Battalion
- (d) 269th Aviation Battalion
- (e) 214th Aviation Battalion

(2) Statistics for airmobile operations during Phase I:

	Date	Unit Moved	Nr of R/A Aircraft	Sorties	Passengers
(a)	29 Sep	1-28 Inf	25	75	450
		1-16 Inf	20	60	360
(b)	1 Oct	1-16 Inf	25	75	450
(c)	2 Oct	2-28 Inf	25	75	450
(d)	4 Oct	1-18 Inf	15	75	450
(e)	8 Oct	2-28 Inf	25	75	450
(f)	10 Oct	1-26 Inf	25	75	450
		1-2 Inf	25	75	450
(g)	13 Oct	1-18 Inf	25	75	450
		1-16 Inf	25	75	450
(h)	15 Oct	1-18 Inf	10	50	300
(i)	17 Oct	O/2-28 Inf	10	20	120
		D/1-16 Inf	10	20	120
(j)	18 Oct	1-2 Inf	20	65	210
		1-16 Inf	20	45	270
		2-18 Inf	20	60	360
(k)	19 Oct	1-28 Inf	10	70	420
(l)	21 Oct	1-16 Inf	20	70	420
(m)	23 Oct	1-26 Inf	20	70	420
(n)	28 Oct	1-2 Inf	20	70	420
		1-26 Inf	20	75	450
		1-16 Inf	20	65	360
TOTALS		22 Units	425	1,425	8,280

5

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (X-1) (U)

(3) Statistics for airmobile operations during Phase II:

	Date	Unit Moved	Hr of R/W Aircraft	Sorties	Passengers
(a)	29 Oct	1-16 Inf	20	65	210
		1-26 Inf	20	20	120
		1-18 Inf	20	80	480
(b)	31 Oct	1-28 Inf	20	75	450
		1-2 Inf	20	75	450
(c)	2 Nov	1-26 Inf	20	75	450
		2-12 Inf	20	80	480
(d)	6 Nov	1-26 Inf	20	75	450
(e)	7 Nov	1-18 Inf	10	75	450
		2-12 Inf	20	80	480
(f)	10 Nov	1-16 Inf	20	75	450
(g)	11 Nov	1-28 Inf	20	75	450
(h)	16 Nov	1-16 Inf	10	75	450
(i)	19 Nov	2-18 Inf	20	75	450
	TOTALS	14 Units	260	1,000	5,820

(4) CH-47 Support - Phase I.

- (a) Average aircraft per day - 8.5.
- (b) Total troops moved - 23,000.
- (c) Tons of equipment and supplies moved - 7,900.

(5) CH-47 Support - Phase II.

- (a) Average aircraft per day - 8.
- (b) Total troops moved - 16,000.
- (c) Tons of equipment and supplies moved - 5,000.

8. (U) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex F.9. (C) MISSION:

a. Phase I: 1st Infantry Division conducts operations commencing 29 September 1967 to locate and destroy the 271st VC Regiment; to capture or destroy militarily significant installations, equipment, and supplies; to open access Route 240 from Ben Cat to vic XH63493 and clear jungle approximately 100 meters to the flanks of the road.

b. Phase II: 1st Infantry Division conducts operations commencing 29 October 1967 to locate and destroy the 272d and 273d VC Regiments and capture or destroy militarily significant installations, equipment and supplies in the rubber and jungle area surrounding Loc Ninh.

AVDR-IT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Lotion Report (RCS: YnC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

12 April 1968

10. (O) CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Phase I: 1st Infantry Division employs the 1st Brigade in AO SHERMANSOUTH North to locate and destroy the 271st VC Regiment commencing 29 September 1967; 3d Brigade in AO SHERMANSOUTH South to locate and destroy VC/NVA units and installations, clear and repair Route 240 from Ban Cat to vicinity XT653493 commencing 30 September.

b. Phase II: 1st Infantry Division employs 3d Brigade initially on 29 October 1967, then 1st Brigade on 30 October 1967 to locate and destroy the 272d and 273d VC Regiments in the vicinity of Lee Minh commencing 29 October 1967.

11. (O) EXHIBITION:

PHASE I (29 September - 28 October)

a. 29 Sep - The 1st Brigade initiated Operation SHERMANSOUTH II by moving the 1-2 Infantry from CAISSON II (XT792513) to field position vicinity XT740540.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted an air assault into a field position vicinity XT728602 at 1000 hours.

The 1-16 Infantry moved overland from vicinity XT790466 to Lai Khe.

The 1-26 Infantry located at Phuoc Vinh became the Division RIF.

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) secured Fire Support Patrol Base CAISSON III South (XT790555) and CAISSON II (XT792513).

b. 30 Sep: 1st Brigade - the Brigade tactical CP moved from Phuoc Vinh to CAISSON III S (XT790555).

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT737541. At 1055H vicinity XT742545 Co D made contact with 2 VC. VC broke contact immediately.

The 1-26 Infantry moved via F/W from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi and became OPOON 3d Brigade.

3d Brigade - The 3d Brigade began Operation SHERMANSOUTH by moving the 2-2 Infantry (Mech)(-) and elements of the 1st Engr Bn from Lai Khe to vicinity XT725336 and commencing RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair operations.

The 1-18 Infantry moved via F/W from Quan Loi to Phuoc Vinh and became OPOON to the 1st Brigade.

c. 1 Oct - 1st Bde - The 1-2 Inf conducted operations northwest of their field position. At 1032H, Co B, working with a combat tracker team, was hit by two command detonated devices vicinity XT712539, causing 2 MIA. The VC withdrew into a suspected base camp area. Three airstrikes and artillery were put into the area.

The 1-4 Cav (-) continued security of FSPD CAISSON III South (XT790555) and CAISSON II (XT792513).

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mech)(-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair operations along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome

AVDB-TT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: IAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

The 1-16 Infantry Battalion conducted an air assault vicinity XT701444 and established FSPB LORRAINE I (XT710432).

d. 2 Oct - 1st Bde - The 1-28 Inf established a new NDP vicinity XT721585. The 1-2 Inf established a NDP vicinity XT718537. At 0905H a Reconnaissance platoon outpost received M-79 fire. At 0955H Co O reported movement while searching the area from which the fire had been received. Co C fired into the area with small arms. At 1105H Co B located 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA vicinity XT718537. Two AK-47 weapons were captured. The wounded VC was evacuated. At 0220H the 1-2 Inf NDP vicinity XT736543 received 15 82mm mortar rounds from the southwest. Countermortar was fired and Spooky and LFT supported. There were 8 US WHA.

3d Bde - The 2-28 Infantry conducted an air assault vicinity XT715485. At 1235H Co B located 5 tons of unpolished rice vicinity XT710481.

The 2-2 Inf (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. At 0805H a Rome Plow hit a mine vicinity XT718393 causing no casualties or damage. The Rome Plows cleared 70 acres. The 1-16 Inf secured FSPB LORRAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 1156H Co D received small arms fire from vicinity XT692437. A search of the area revealed a base camp and 19 VC suspects. 2 US were WHA and the suspects were evacuated.

e. 3 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry Battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity XT721585. At 1004H vicinity XT723578 Co D located and destroyed an underwater footbridge.

The 1-2 Inf conducted RIF operations vicinity XT718537. At 1610H vicinity XT713544 a patrol from Co O engaged 1 VC with negative results.

The 1-4 Cav (-) continued to secure FSPB CAISSON III South (XT790555) and CAISSON II (XT792513).

3d Brigade - 2-2 Infantry (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome Plows cleared 70 acres of jungle.

The 1-16 Inf secured FSPB LORRAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 1225H vicinity XT735466 Co B located and destroyed 2 bunkers. At 1150H vicinity XT669414, an AO received 1 round of small arms fire through the aircraft window. Arty fired into the area resulting in 1 VC KIA (DC), 4 military structures destroyed, 1 large tin building destroyed and 4 water buffaloes destroyed. At 1845 vicinity XT704445 the Reconnaissance Platoon made contact with 4 VC. Arty fired blocking fires and a LFT expended into the area. Contact was broken at 1853H. Results were 1 VC KIA (DC) and negative US casualties. Equipment captured: 1 set of webgun, 2 pr blue pajamas, 10 days supply of food, 3 AK-47 magazines and 300 rounds of ammunition.

The 2-28 Inf located and destroyed 5.5 tons of rice vicinity XT710481.

f. 4 Oct - 1st Brigade - The Reconnaissance Platoon and C Co, 1-2 Infantry, departed their NDP vicinity XT718537 at 0735H. At 0745H contact was made with an unknown size VC force vicinity XT712537. Artillery and mortars supported the contact and a light fire team was airborne at 0800H. The first airstrike was put in at 0835H. The Reconnaissance Platoon and C Co closed back into the NDP vicinity XT718537. A total of ten VC were captured and 1000 lbs of supplies were destroyed.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDRLTT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROB: M&O J3-32) (K-1) (U) 12 April 1968

US casualties were 3 KIA and 27 MIA. There were 12 VC KIA (BC) and 3 VC KIA (POSS).

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Phuoc Vinh to Chon Thanh and conducted an air assault into an area vicinity XT692541. A large VC base camp was located 500 meters west of the LZ consisting of bunkers and tents. 7 airstrikes vicinity XT607542 resulted in 19 VC KIA (BC).

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) secured FSPB CAISSON III South (XT790555) and CAISSON II (XT792919).

CAISSON II was disestablished and CAISSON IV established vicinity XT778542.

3d Brigade - The 2-28 Infantry Battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity XT700477 and extracted to Lai Khe and assumed RIF mission.

The 2-2 Inf (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome Flows cleared 95 acres of jungle.

The 1-15 Inf secured FSPB LORRAINE I (XT709432) and conducted RIF operations.

g. 5 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 10:00H Company B located and destroyed 12 bunkers with overhead cover vicinity XT685540. At 1510H vicinity XT694543 Co C local security elements made contact with an estimated VC squad resulting in 1 US KIA. VC losses unknown. VC broke contact immediately.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT719538. At 1130H vicinity XT724575 the Reconnaissance Platoon received small arms fire while searching a base camp. 2 VC in the open and 1 VC in the bunker were sighted. Fire was returned with small arms, M-79 and hand grenades resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC).

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT719538. At 1007H vicinity XT713543 an ambush force from the Reconnaissance Platoon killed 2 VC and 4 VC (POSS). At 1015H vicinity XT714542 the platoon received sniper fire. Fire was returned with small arms and M-79 and artillery was fired into suspected locations.

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) continued to secure FSPB CAISSON III South (XT790444) and CAISSON IV (XT778546). CAISSON IV was disestablished and CAISSON V established vicinity XT736540.

3d Brigade - The 2-28 Infantry conducted security operations at Lai Khe and was the Division RIF. At 1324H Company C moved to CAISSON V.

The 2-2 Infantry (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome Flows cleared 100 acres of jungle.

The 1-16 Infantry secured FSPB LORRAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 0635H Company C moved to a new MDP vicinity XT690437. At 1205H vicinity XT690437 Co C received approximately 12 M-79 rounds and 100 rounds of small arms fire.

AVDB:IT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MIO J3-32) (Σ-1) (U)

12 April 1968

h. 6 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 1435H vicinity XT698534 5 60mm mortar rounds landed inside the NDP. The counter mortar program was fired and an airstrike resulted in 1 VC KBI (BC) and 4 bunkers destroyed. At 1852H vicinity XT699537 an AP engaged an unknown number of VC. The VC returned fire with at least two heavy machineguns, small arms and 3 claymores. The AP maneuvered back to the NDP under heavy automatic weapon and small arms fire. US casualties were 2 WHA and 1 MIA. A Spooky, LPT, and dust-off were requested but could not get airborne due to bad weather. At 1916H the NDP began receiving 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. The firing stopped at 1916H and started again at 1926H and stopped at 1933H. An estimated 75 rounds of 82mm mortars were received. As of 1928H four batteries were firing in support. At 1952H the Battalion received heavy automatic weapons fire on the south side of the perimeter. Fire was returned with small arms and M-79. Firing ceased at 1954H. At 1955H a patrol was sent out to the location of contact to search for the missing man. Spooky began dropping flares at 2020H. The patrol came under mortar and small arms fire during the entire mission and was unable to locate the missing man. At 2050H an AP from Co C made contact while returning to NDP resulting in 1 US WHA. At 2120H 1 VC body was pulled into the perimeter. The VC was dressed in fatigues and had 1 Chinese Communist carbine, a large amount of ammunition, North Vietnamese money and postage stamps. At 2114H automatic weapons fire was received on the east side of the perimeter. At 2116H automatic weapons and small arms fire was received on all sides of the perimeter. The firing continued every 5 to 7 minutes until 2145H. A second Spooky was on station at 2111H. At 2317H the perimeter received a heavy mortar attack and a ground attack consisting of automatic weapons, small arms and grenades. An estimated 60-70 mortar rounds (60mm and 82mm) were received and 7 machinegun positions were observed. The attack was broken off at 2334H resulting in 2 US KIA and 5 US WIA. A VC rallier picked up by the 1-16 Inf on 27 October 1967 vicinity XT698566 stated that his unit, the 2d Battalion, 271st Regiment had 59 KIA and 67 WIA as a result of counter mortar and ground fire during the attack described above. At 070615H 1 wounded man died. At 070815H a patrol located the missing man who was KIA.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT719538. At 1240H vicinity XT712566 Company D located 2 bunkers and sighted 2 VC in the area. An airstrike in the area resulted in 1 VC KBI (BC) and 3 bunkers destroyed.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT719536. At 2250H vicinity XT719538 the NDP received 3 mortar rounds causing no casualties or damage.

1-4 Cavalry (-) continued to secure FSPB CAISSQI III South (XT790555) and CAISSQI V (XT736540). At 1005H vicinity XT786554 4 individuals were detained and evacuated for interrogation. 3 were released and 1 turned over to the National Police.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. At 0853H vicinity XT707435 an APC hit a mine causing 6 WIA. At 0905H vicinity XT732363 a squad from Co B fired on 3 VC. A platoon reinforced the squad to make a search of the area. 7 military structures with a camp fire burning were located and destroyed. Also located and destroyed in the

AVDA-IT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROB: MAC J3-32) (X-1)(U)

same area were 6 bunkers, 1 trip flare, 1 Chinese Communist grenade and 5 CBU's.

The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure FSPB LORVAINE I and conducted RIF operations. At 0804H vicinity XT683432 a patrol from Company C received approximately 50 rounds small arms fire. Fire was returned with small arms and M-79. At 0942H vicinity XT705421 a patrol from Company D located and destroyed 500 pounds of rice and activated a booby trapped CBU causing 2 WHA. At 1325H vicinity XT740454 an LP from Company C received approximately 20 rounds of AK-47 fire. Fire was returned with M-79 and 81mm mortar. There was one US WHA.

i. 7 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT690534. A search of the area of the attack at 1855-2334 hours 6 October 1967 resulted in 24 VC KIA (BC), 1 AK-47 rifle, 1 Chinese Communist 56 machine gun, 1 Chinese Communist rifle, 3 rice sacks, 3 shovels, 10 Chinese Communist grenades, 4 RPG rounds & 7.62 ammunition. The VC were wearing mixed uniforms and new fatigues. Some of the VC wore belts with red stars on the buckles. 125 fighting trenches and positions were located. Most of the trenches were 4 feet by 2 feet by 1 1/2 feet. At 1205H vicinity XT693534 Company B located 6 bunkers with fresh bloody bandages inside. Airstrikes vicinity XT684545 destroyed 2 bunkers, vicinity XT675545 destroyed 16 bunkers, 5 military structures, and vicinity XT605524 destroyed 5 bunkers.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations and established a new NDP vicinity XT695506.

The 1-4 Cavalry (-) continued to secure FSPB CALISSON III South and CALISSON V. At 0930H vicinity XT736543 B Troop located 1 VC body dressed in a green uniform.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing and road repair along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. The 1-16 (-) conducted RIF operations and established a new NDP vicinity XT681484.

j. 8 Oct - 1st Brigade - At 1145H vicinity XU091345 a 1st Aviation Battalion UH1D while on a Bloodhound mission received automatic weapon fire. At XU917136 the same aircraft received small arms fire.

The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT689534. At 1000H vicinity XT692538 Company C located and destroyed 25 prone positions. Co C moved back and artillery and airstrikes were put in. At 1045H vicinity XT694525 the point man of Company D while moving into a base camp drew automatic weapons fire, returned the fire resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). Due to close proximity of the Company C contact and ground fire received by lift aircraft of 2-28, Co D was moved back to its Night Defensive Position to allow maneuver space and priority of fires to Company C and 2-28. At 2115H vicinity XT698534 an unknown number of VC activated a trip flare. Illumination was fired at 2136H and 2 VC were observed dragging a third VC. They were engaged by machine gun fire resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). The 1-2 Infantry moved to Phuoc Vinh, OPOOH to 1st Brigade, and remained DIV RIF.

The 2-28 Infantry air assaulted into a landing zone vicinity XT659557 and established an NDP vicinity XT660555. At 1105H vicinity XT658559, one lift aircraft received a short burst of automatic weapons fire. A light fire team entered into the area and the 1st flight touched down at 1112H.

AVDRLTT .

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) continued RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair along Route 13 vicinity XT725355. At 0840H vicinity XT713399 2 armored personnel carriers hit mines causing 2 MIA. Rome Plows cleared 50 acres. 12

C/1-16 Infantry continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE I. The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted RIF operations from its Night Defensive Position (XT681484).

k. 9 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 1032H vicinity XT696545 Company B received small arms and automatic weapons fire as the point entered a bare camp. The point man engaged and killed one VC. The point withdrew and artillery and airstrikes were put into the area resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and one secondary explosion. At 1955H vicinity XT677542 an ambush patrol from Company B made contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 US MIA.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) conducted RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair operations along Route 240 vicinity XT725355. Rome Plows cleared 35 acres of jungle.

Fire Support Base LORRAINE II was established at XT685483 and secured by 1-16 Infantry (-). C/1-16 Infantry continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE I.

l. 10 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. At 1000H vicinity XT69542 the recon platoon located 1 pair of sandals, 1 belt with a red star on the buckle and fresh graves. The graves contained 4 VC bodies, approximately 5-7 days old. At 1120H vicinity XT696532 a patrol from Company D made contact with an unknown number of VC. Contact was broken at 1130H. 1 US MIA. VC casualties unknown.

The 1-28 Infantry extracted to Phuoc Vinh and assumed the Division Ready Reaction Force mission. The 1-2 Infantry conducted an air assault vicinity XT637512 and established an NDP vicinity XT635509.

m. 11 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. The Battalion (-), traveling in column with Company B in the lead followed by the Command Group and Company C, received sniper fire vicinity XT700552. Light fire teams were employed on the west flank. An estimated VC company then assaulted Company B from the west in order to flank the company. Airstrikes and artillery were employed on the north and east, respectively. Company B withdrew through Company C as the VC pressed the attack against Company C. Contact was broken at 1515H. A total of 9 sorties of air were flown in support of the contact. US casualties were 1 KIA and 4 MIA. There were 21 VC KIA (DC). Documents taken from the bodies identified the 2d Battalion, 271st VC Regiment.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635509. At 0211H vicinity XT630514 an ambush patrol from Company C fired claymores at 3 VC. A grenade was thrown at the ambush patrol causing no casualties. The ambush returned fire with small arms and then moved to a new location. At 0700H a search of the area resulted in 3 VC KIA (DC). Two of the VC were wearing black pajamas and one was wearing mixed clothing. At 1830H vicinity XT642506 the recon platoon triggered an ambush with negative results. As the patrol was moving they made contact with 10-15 VC with unknown results. Artillery and mortars

AVDL:IT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (BOA: MLO J3-32) (K-1) (1)

operations vicinity XT660555. At 1553H vicinity XT661555, Company A observed 2 VC running out of a base camp as the company moved in. The VC were fired on with small arms and artillery was fired in the direction the VC were moving. In the base camp the company located 3 VC bodies and destroyed 20 bunkers and 3 bundles of clothing. 1 AK-47 rifle was captured.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE I (XT708433) and conduct RIF, jungle clearing and road repair operations along Route 240. At 1155H vicinity XT669479 an Armored Personnel Carrier was hit by a command detonated claymore causing 4 WIA. Sniper fire was also received. Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons and artillery. Contact was broken at 1206H. At 1640H vicinity XT687428 the Recon platoon located and destroyed 25 bunkers with tin roofs and 4 chickens. Four women and 15 children in the area were evacuated for interrogation.

The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure Fire Support Base LORRAINE II (XT685483) and conduct RIF operations. At 1435H vicinity XT684461 Company D located 15 tons of unpolished rice. At 1510H vicinity XT662491 Company C received sniper fire. Fire was returned resulting in 1 VC KIA. A second VC was KIA while attempting to recover the first VC's weapon. A total of 1 AK-47, 1 M-1 rifle, 5 M-16 magazines, with 90 rounds of ammunition and 4 clips of M-1 with 15 rounds of ammunition were captured.

n. 12 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698534. An ambush patrol on the previous day at 1955H vicinity XT705540 fired claymores at an estimated 5 VC. At 0955H Company D located 4 VC killed by the ambush patrol and 34 prone shelters.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT625509. At 1115H vicinity XT624508 the Recon platoon engaged 2 VC with unknown results.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT660555. At 1217H vicinity XT668552 Company D received 1 hand grenade believed to have been thrown from a tree. Fire was returned with small arms and artillery.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (Mechanized) (-) continued to secure FSPD LORRAINE I (XT708433) and conduct RIF operations, jungle clearing and road clearing operations along Route 240. At 1230H vicinity XT685428 the Recon platoon located and destroyed a base camp consisting of 12 freshly camouflaged military structures, 1 wall, 1 Chinese Communist grenade, 2 axcarts, 1 bicycle and 1 meat grinder. Rome Flows cleared 75 acres of jungle. An ambush patrol made contact with 6 VC at 2135H vicinity XT712412. Contact was broken at 2203H. Negative US casualties, unknown VC casualties.

The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations and continued to secure LORRAINE II (XT685483). At 0915H vicinity XT693457 Company D fired on 6 VC moving north. Artillery and light fire tons fired into the area with unknown results. At 1230H vicinity XT675480 an outpost received small arms fire. The outpost fired claymores and brought in artillery. The area was checked with negative findings. Eight tons of rice were found and evacuated from vicinity XT698534.

AVIB-IT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROS: MAO J3-32) (K-1) (U)

b. 13 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry extracted from vicinity XT696534 to Phuoc Vinh and became Division Ready Reaction Force. The 1-28 Infantry conducted an airmobile insertion vicinity XT698534. 14

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635509.

The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure PSPB LORRAINE II (XT685483). At 0704H Company C conducted an air assault into a landing zone vicinity XT635462. At 1010H vicinity XT657469 Company C received small arms and claymore fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 WHL. Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons. Artillery and LFT supported. Contact was broken at 1043H. At 1125H, Company C moved back into the area and received more fire causing 4 KIA and 2 WHA. Fire was returned and TAO Air, artillery and LFT supported. Contact was broken at 1325H. At 1523H, Company C moved back into the area of contact and received small arms fire. Fire was returned and TAO Air and artillery supported. Contact was broken at 1700H. At 1613H Company D moved by R/W from LORRAINE II to Landing Zone vicinity XT653466. Company C and D established an NDP at that location. At 1645H, Company B moved by R/W from Lai Kho to LORRAINE II.

p. 14 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations. At 1215H vicinity XT687531 Company D received small arms fire causing 1 KIA and 1 WHI. Fire was returned and TAO Air and artillery supported.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations and established a new NDP vicinity XT664590. At 1355H vicinity XT663560 Company D fired on 3 VC. Artillery was fired into the area with unknown results.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) continued security of PSPB LORRAINE I (XT706433) and conducted RIF operations, jungle clearing, and road repair of Route 240. Company D, 1-16 Infantry moved from field positions to Lai Kho.

q. 15 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry became OPCON to 3d Bde and moved to Song Be. The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698539. At 1035H vicinity XT895435 Company A received automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of VC. Fire was returned. Artillery and mortar supported. Contact was broken at 1100H resulting in 1 US WHI and 2 VC KIA (DO).

1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations and established a new NDP vicinity XT642527. At 1500H vicinity XT641525 Company B wounded and captured 1 VC. The VC was taken to Lai Kho for treatment but was DOA. 1 AK-47 rifle was captured. Several rice storage areas were located in the NDP (XT642527). Total estimated was 10 tons.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT684590. At 1428H vicinity XT683578 Company B located a base camp. At 1445H vicinity XT683578 Company B received automatic weapons fire from an estimated 3 VC. VC broke contact at 1453H. A pool of blood and a pair of bloody sandals were located.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) continued to secure PSPB LORRAINE I (XT706433) and conducted RIF, jungle clearing, and road repair along Route 240. At 1602H vicinity XT688379 Company C received 10 rounds of small arms fire. Fire was returned and contact broken at 1610H. Negative friendly casualties. VC casualties unknown. Mine plows cleared 65 acres of jungle.

AVDB-IT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROS: MAC J3-32) (L-1) (U) 12 April 1968

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Phuoc Vinh to Song Be and became OPOOH to the 3d Brigade. 5

r. 16 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT696539. At 0817H vicinity XT691531 the Recon platoon received small arms fire from 1 VC. Fire was returned with small arms and automatic weapons. There were negative casualties. At 1320H vicinity XT685525 Company B received small arms fire from VC in a base camp. Fire was returned with small arms, automatic weapons and artillery. Contact was broken at 1335H. There were no friendly casualties. VC casualties were unknown.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT642527. At 1525H vicinity XT648528 Company D located and destroyed 10 tons of rice. At 1952H vicinity XT638525 an ambush patrol from Co B fired claymores resulting in 1 VC KIA.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT684590. At 1245H vicinity XT698568 Company D received small arms fire and one claymore as the lead elements entered a base camp. Fire was returned and the unit withdrew to call artillery and airstrikes on the base area. Contact was broken at 1310H. US casualties were 1 KIA and 5 MIA. There were 17 VC KIA (3C), and 4 VC KIA (Poss). At 1615H vicinity XT683529 artillery fire resulted in 3 VC KIA (3C). (The 1 US KIA was the advisor to the Ben Cat Subsector attached to the 2-28 Infantry for operations).

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) moved from LORRAINE I to LORRAINE II. LORRAINE I was closed out with the removal of A Battery 2-33 Arty to Lai Khe. The 1-16 Infantry moved from FSPB LORRAINE II to Lai Khe.

s. 17 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 2-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT684590. At 0800H the Battalion (-) departed the NDP with Company A leading and Company D following. The Battalion command group was located in the center file of Company D. The direction was due south. Airstrikes were employed parallel to the column at 1,000 meters to the east in the areas of contact the previous day. The Battalion (-) continued to move without incident until 0956H when the point element of Company A encountered a well used NW-SE trail in the vicinity of XT686576 covered with freshly made foot prints. There were freshly cut trees in the vicinity. At 1015H Company A began receiving sporadic small arms fire from its right flank. The VC small arms fire built up gradually. The fires were coming from the trees as well as the ground. Some VC positions were 15 meters away.

Artillery fire was brought in five minutes after contact was made. Enemy fire became extremely heavy, having been augmented by large caliber machine guns. The VC were pressing in close to avoid the artillery. As the firing began against Company A, sporadic fire was received by Company D from approximately 5 VC located in trees on its right flank. The VC were taken under fire and eliminated. The Battalion Commander directed that the command group remain with Company D and the lead platoon maintain contact with Company A. A hull in the firing occurred at this time and Company D received instructions to prepare for the withdrawal of Company A through Company D and to assist in the extraction of Company A's casualties.

Firing broke out again to the right flank of the line of march in the Company A sector & progressed with increasing intensity down the flank toward Company D. Firing then broke out in Company D's sector on the right and left flank and left front. At this time, approximately 1045H, the Command Group had all become casualties.

Company A began to withdraw with the leading elements pulling back through the rear platoons and Company Command Group. The Company then moved north and met elements of Company B which had been sent out of the NDF by the Battalion Commander to assist in the return to the NDF.

At approximately 1220H the 1st Brigade Commander assumed command of the battalion. By 1400H Co C/2-28 Infantry had been inserted into the NDF and was committed to cover the route into the NDF while Company B moved south to assist in the withdrawal and evacuation of casualties. All firing had ceased by 1430H.

Company D/1-16 Infantry was inserted into the NDF at 1545H as additional reinforcement. The last of the wounded had been evacuated by 1730H and the last units closed the NDF by 2000H. US casualties were 56 KBA, 75 WBA, and 2 MBL. There were 106 VC KIA (BC) and 55 KIA (poss). There were 36 sorties of air used to support the contact and four batteries of artillery. The VC were identified as elements of the 271st VC Regiment.

The 2-2 Infantry (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE II (XT685483) and conducted RIF operations. At 1400H vicinity XT685483 52 individuals were detained and evacuated for interrogation to Lai Khe. At 1505H vicinity XT675483 Company C received sniper fire resulting in 1 US KBA. Artillery and airstrikes were placed into the area of contact. VC losses were unknown.

3d Brigade - The 1-18 Infantry continued security, patrolling and RIF operations at Song Be (YU142069). At 1135H vicinity YU146095 Company A received automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned and the VC broke contact immediately. There was 1 US WIA.

4. 18 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity XT698539. At 1450H an airstrike vicinity XT676546 resulted in 2 VC KBA (BC).

The 1-2 Infantry extracted from NDF loc (XT641527) to Phuoc Vinh and became the Division RIF.

The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE II and conducted RIF operations. At 1410H vicinity XT681482 an OP from Company C received sniper fire from an estimated 4 VC. Fire was returned with small arms and mortars.

The 1-16 Infantry moved from Lai Khe by R/H to NDF vicinity XT635586.

2-28 Infantry extracted from NDF vicinity XT685586 to Lai Khe, OPCON to 3d Brigade.

3d Brigade - The 1-16 Infantry was committed into the 1st Brigade AO. The 2-28 Infantry was extracted from 1st Brigade AO and was OPCON to 3d Brigade at Lai Khe.

AVIATION

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RGS: M&O J3-32) (L-1) (U)

12 April 1968

u. 19 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry was extracted from NDF to Oba: Thanh (XT765625). Extraction completed by 1125H. After a B-52 strike was placed in the vicinity XT691551 the battalion was reinserted and conducted security and patrolling vicinity of NDF. 15

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity Quan Loi. At 1500H vicinity XT821930 Company B located and destroyed 12 military structures. Inside one of the structures 2 VC bodies were found in graves approximately 2 weeks old.

v. 20 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT685586. At 1426H vicinity XT685586 5 VC bodies were located.

3d Brigade - No significant activity.

w. 21 Oct - 1st Brigade - An airstrike conducted on 20 October vicinity XT643330 resulted in 2 VC KIA (DC). The 1-2 Infantry conducted an air assault and established an NDF vicinity XT635509. At 1525H vicinity XT635496 a LFT engaged 3 VC on bicycles resulting in 3 VC KIA (BO) and 3 bicycles destroyed.

The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE II (XT685496) and conducted RIF operations. At 1319H vicinity XT674475 Company C located a suspected VC hospital consisting of 5 military structures containing 1,000 bottles of medicine, 1,000 syringes, 50 pounds of gauze, 1 sewing machine, cooking utensils, 20 medicine books and miscellaneous clothing. At 1300E vicinity XT683483 the battalion NDF received 2 RPG rounds. 1 APC received light damage. At 1537H vicinity XT686589 Company C received small arms, automatic weapons and M-79 fire. Fire was returned and contact broken at 1548H. There was 1 US KIA, VC casualties unknown. The medical supplies, with the exception of a few, were not counted due to enemy contact.

The 1-28 Infantry moved on foot to a new NDF vicinity XT692550 and secured a landing zone for the insertion of the 1-16 Infantry which was inserted to form a joint NDF with the 1-28 Infantry.

3d Brigade - At 2045H vicinity XT784175 an anti-personnel device was detonated against an RF outpost. 1 US was WFA.

x. 22 Oct - 1st Brigade - At 1017H vicinity XT942405 a platoon from 1-28 Infantry sustained 3 WFA by a booby trapped grenade as it moved to secure a downed aircraft.

The 1-16 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT692549. At 0945H vicinity XT693538 Company B threw grenades into a tunnel in a base camp resulting in 1 VC KIA (BO) and 1 VC KIA (POSS).

3d Brigade - No significant activity.

y. 23 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (MECH) (-) became OPCON to 3d Brigade and remained at FSPB LORRAINE II.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT692549.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635509.

AVDELTT

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: 120 J3-32) (X-1) (U)

3d Brigade - The 3d Brigade assumed OPCON of FSPB LORRAINE I and LORRAINE II. The 1-26 Infantry moved by R/N from Quan Loi to Chon Thanh and conducted an aerial assault vicinity XT653462. The 2-28 Infantry moved by F/N from Lai Khe to Quan Loi. 18

a. 24 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT692549. At 1145H vicinity XT682524 the Battalion (-) located 10 caches containing a total of 5 122mm rocket motors, 2 122mm rocket warheads and fuses (all with carrying cases and packed in wooden boxes), 24 120mm mortar rounds, 13 cases of RPG-7 rounds (78 rounds and boosters packed in plastic, six rounds per case), 21 81mm mortar rounds, 25 60mm mortar rounds, and 18 additional carrying cases for 122mm rockets.

The 1-2 Infantry located and destroyed 13 tons of salt vicinity XT628518.

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT856439. At 1224H vicinity XT649450 Company A received sniper fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. Fire was returned and airstrikes, artillery and a LFT supported. At 1402H vicinity XT649458 Company A received 2 claymores causing no casualties. Fire was returned and air and artillery supported.

aa. 25 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry established a new NDP vicinity XT666528.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635509. At 1245H vicinity XT823522 the recon platoon fired on 1 VC with unknown results. At 1427H Company A located and destroyed 10 tons of unpolished rice. At 1510H vicinity XT633528 a LFT engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 2 VC KIA.

The 1-16 Infantry established a new NDP vicinity XT701562.

The 2-2 Infantry (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE I (XT713447).

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry (-) secured FSPB LORRAINE I (XT713447) and LORRAINE II (XT685483).

The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT656459. At 1526H vicinity XT648458 Company C located and destroyed 3,000 pounds of rice, 4 75mm rounds, 1 claymore, 4 RPG-7s, 1,200 pounds of sugar, 15 pounds of salt, 15 canteens, 8 gas masks, 8 cooking pots, 35 sets of OD fatigues. The following items were evacuated: 2 complete night light sights, 1 magazine for Russian Rifle, 3 pounds of documents, 8 gas masks, 1 compass case, 1 mortar carrying case, 1 mortar aiming stake.

bb. 26 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT666528. At 1400H vicinity XT684519 Company D located 20 tons of salt and 6 caches of rice containing approximately 50 tons. 17 tons were evacuated and operations continued on 27 Oct.

The 1-2 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT635509. At 1145H vicinity XT627528 Company B located a base camp containing a grave with 1 VC body. 18 bunkers, 1 military structure and 2 fighting positions were destroyed. 2 pounds of documents, 1 billfold and a small amount of medical supplies were evacuated.

AVDE-TT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAO J3-32) (K-1) (U) 12 April 1968

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XT636459. 19

cc. 27 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry extracted 44 tons of unpolished rice from vicinity XT666538. The 1-2 Infantry located and destroyed a VC classroom at 1120H vicinity XT638515. A VC flag, a blackboard and some documents were evacuated. At 1220H vicinity XT638519 Company D located 1.5 tons of polished rice and extracted 500 pounds.

The 1-16 Infantry battalion conducted RIF operations vicinity XT701562. At 0910H vicinity XT698566 Company D captured 1 VC.

3d Brigade - The 2-2 Infantry continued to secure FSPB LORRAINE I and LORRAINE II. At 1335H vicinity XT664454 Company B received small arms fire and rifle grenades from 3-4 VC causing 2 WIA. Contact was broken at 1345H. Airstrikes, artillery and LFT's supported.

The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XT692457. The 1-18 Infantry continued security of Song Be (YU142069). The battalion received a total of 85 mortar rounds between 0040H and 0100H. There were no casualties.

dd. 28 Oct - 1st Brigade - The 1-28 Infantry evacuated 32 tons of unpolished rice and 2 tons of salt from vicinity XT684519.

The 1-2 Infantry moved from vicinity XT635509 to Phuoc Vinh.

At 1422H the Brigade Commander's UH-1D was hit by ground fire and landed at LORRAINE II. There were no casualties and the aircraft was extracted at 1615H.

3d Brigade - The 1-26 Infantry moved from vicinity XT656459 to Phuoc Vinh.

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Song Be (YU142069) to Lai Khe.

PHASE II (29 October - 19 November)

cc. 29 Oct - The 1-2 Infantry moved from vicinity XT666528 to Quan Loi and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade.

The 1-16 Infantry moved from vicinity XT713447 and XT685493 to Lai Khe and became OPCON to 3d Brigade.

The 1-26 Infantry moved from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi and became OPCON to 3d Brigade.

The 2-28 Infantry (-) and two batteries of artillery moved to Loc Ninh airstrip (XT730080) and established a FSPB.

The 1-18 Infantry moved from Lai Khe to Quan Loi by Chinook and conducted an air assault vicinity XU697102 at 0950H without incident. The insertion of the 1-18 was in reaction to an attack of the District Headquarters and Special Forces Camp at Loc Ninh Airfield. The VC were identified as elements of the 1st and 2d Battalion, 273d VC Regiment.

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

As the last elements of the 1-18 were being inserted, a request was received for assistance from a Special Forces element attached to a CIDG company at Lee Ninh. The CIDG company was in contact with an estimated VC platoon about 1,000 meters north of the 1-18 NDP. The Assistant Division Commander-B ordered Company C north at 1200H. When the company was approximately 600 meters north of the NDP, it made contact with the VC. The VC were in a trench line 200 meters inside the rubber oriented north. The CIDG company was 400 meters further north in the open. The point of C Company got within 20-30 meters of the VC before either side fired. The lead platoon overran the VC position killing 9. The company then deployed and policed the area. The CIDG company reported additional VC 200 meters north of Company C along the edge of the rubber. Light fire teams and artillery were called in.

About 30 minutes after the initial attack, the VC launched a counter-attack from the east with at least 2 platoons. The C Company Commander shifted his platoons to meet the attack with two platoons on line. The Battalion Commander alerted D Company to reinforce. D Company moved north and tied in to C Company's right flank. The fire fight lasted approximately 15 minutes. The VC broke contact at 1305H as D Company came on line. The CIDG Company moved to join the Battalion (-). The Battalion (-) and the CIDG Company swept to the east for 300 meters behind artillery which was constantly being shifted to concentrate on the fleeing VC. The VC fled in a north-south draw where they were subject to intense artillery and airstrikes. Bodies, numerous pieces of web gear, and miscellaneous items were later found which testified to the effectiveness of the artillery and airstrikes.

US casualties were 1 KIA and 9 WIA. There were 24 VC KIA (BC). Nine individual weapons and three crew served weapons were captured along with documents which identified the VC as elements of the 165th NVA Regiment. (See Inclosure 1 to Annex B).

A total of 10 tactical air sorties were flown in support.

22. 30 Oct - The 1-18 Infantry conducted a RIF operation with Company A to the south and east, closing at 1045H without incident. At 1200H Company A was again dispatched on a search and destroy mission. The company moved south through the rubber for 700 meters, turning southwest on a route over the western edge of Hill 203 (XU700090). As the companies moved up the slope the company was engaged at 1230H by a VC Battalion, later identified as part of the 165th NVA Regiment. The NVA Battalion was occupying trench lines and was apparently oriented to the east. The trenches occupied by the NVA were 2-3 feet in depth, 2 feet wide and varied in length.

The point element of Company A initially saw a single NVA stand up on the side of the hill and engaged him with small arms fire. The fire was returned by an NVA Battalion which had not been seen at this time. The Company Commander deployed his platoons in the direction of fire. The NVA force assaulted the company twice but was repulsed by a heavy volume of fire. The NVA then attempted to flank the left of the company position. The 3d platoon turned back the enveloping force.

The firing could be heard at the 1-18th NDP. The Battalion Commander immediately organized D Company and the CIDG Company to reinforce Company A. As the column moved out, the Battalion Commander received

The situation report from Company A. When the relief force was 200 meters short of Company A, it made contact with the NVA force attempting to envelope Company A. The Company Commander deployed two platoons on line to engage the assaulting forces. The artillery fires forced the NVA to move closer to the friendly forces. Company A withdrew 50-100 meters as artillery was brought closer and Company D worked to close the gap between Company A. The friendly forces maintained fire superiority during this time. The NVA, although well armed with automatic small arms, light machineguns and RPGs, were firing high. Artillery was shifted to the south, behind Hill 203 to allow airstrikes to be brought in on the trench line. The trench line was worked over with CBU, napalm, and LFTs for 2 1/2 hours. At 1530H the Battalion Commander ordered D Company to assault, using A as a pivot and the CIDG to protect Company D's left flank. Company D overran seven trench lines as the NVA forces fled to the northwest through a draw. US casualties were 4 KIA and 5 WIA. There were 83 VC KIA (BC); 27 individual and 5 crew served weapons were captured. Sixteen sorties of tactical air were flown in support. (See Inclosure 2 to Annex B). Company C, 2-28 Infantry secured FSPB at Loc Ninh airfield (XT733080) as Company B, 2-28 Infantry, moved from Loc Ninh to An Loc (XT764894). The 1st Brigade Tactical CP moved from CALSSON III South (XT768557) to Quan Loi. The 1st Brigade became control HQs for Phase II and assumed OPCON of the following battalions at 1800H:

1-18 Infantry
2-28 Infantry
1-26 Infantry
1-28 Infantry

A VC rallier picked up by the 1-16 Infantry on 27 October vicinity XT698566 stated that his unit had 59 KIA in an attack against the 1-18th Infantry on 061855H October vicinity XT698566. The rallier also stated that on 14 October 20 members of his unit were killed by bombs vicinity XT701568. A B-52 strike was put into that area on that date.

30. 31 Oct - The Special Forces Camp and the FSPB at Loc Ninh airfield (XU733080) came under mortar attack at 0055H. At 0115H Company C/2-28 Infantry reported receiving heavy small arms fire. At 0210H the small arms fire was sporadic. At 0314H the Special Forces Camp began receiving small arms fire. At 0407H the District Headquarters, located north of the Special Forces Camp on the west side of the runway reported VC on the air strip north of C/2-28 Infantry location and crossing from east to west. Battery A/6-15 Artillery commenced firing HE timed fire directly down the runway. At 0515H Company C/2-28 Infantry reported receiving sporadic small arms fire. At 0520H the VC were reported as having been pushed back outside the District Headquarters Compound.

US casualties were 10 WIA; ARVN casualties were 3 KIA, 21 WIA; PF casualties were 2 KIA and 1 WIA; CIDG casualties were 4 KIA, 18 WIA. There were 110 VC KIA (BC). The unit was identified as the 1st and 2d Battalions, 272d VC Regiment. 69 sorties of tactical air were flown in support of the contact.

The 2-28 Infantry conducted an air assault vicinity XU761070. At 1435H vicinity XU759082 Company B engaged 10 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC). At 1705H vicinity XT759082 the Recon platoon surprised a VC who was digging a position resulting in 1 VC KIA (BC). The 1-18 Infantry continued RLF operations vicinity engaged 3 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) and 1 AK-47 captured.

AVDR-IT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations & Action Report (ROS: MEO J3-32) (K-1) (J) 12 April 1968

The 1-2 Infantry moved from Phuoc Vinh to positions along Route 13 and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade.

The 1-26 Infantry secured PSPB CAISSON VI (XT738820) and CAISSON VII (XT764894).

hh. 1 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RLF operations vicinity XU761070. At 0703H vicinity XU755017 an ambush patrol engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 2 US KIA. There were 5 VC KIA (BC). At 1412H vicinity XU760090 the lead element of the Battalion (-) came into contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 2 VC KIA (BC) and 4 VC WIA (Poss).

Delta Troop 1-4 Cavalry engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (BC) vicinity XU728114 at 1115H. D/1-4 Cavalry killed another VC vicinity XU719128.

ii. 2 Nov - The 1-18th Infantry came under heavy mortar attack commencing at 0000H and lasting for 20 minutes. The mortar positions were reported by ambush patrols, one being directly south of the NDP and one being located to the southwest. About 5 minutes later, Company A ambush patrol reported movement coming from the south. The VC were in the rubber guiding north along a road which led into the NDP. The ambush patrol blew its claymores and returned to the NDP. One VC was KIA attempting to follow the ambush patrol inside the NDP.

To the east Company D's ambush patrol reported heavy movement and the patrol was ordered to return to the perimeter. Company C ambush patrol located north of the NDP also reported movement. The patrol blew its claymores and returned to the NDP. The VC attacked the NDP from three sides, northeast, east and south. Artillery and mortar defensive concentrations served to blunt the assault. Two VC armed with flamethrowers were killed before their weapons could be fired.

As the artillery was brought in close to the NDP from one direction, the VC fire would diminish and build up from another direction.

When LPT's arrived on station they were directed to expand on the main attacking force to the south. The gunships as well as the FAC and the AQ received heavy machinegun fire from three locations to the south. Fire from 12 heavy machineguns were identified. Airstrikes eliminated the positions. The artillery battery inside the NDP was directed to be prepared to fire anti-personnel rounds. The guns were readied but their use was not required.

Contact was broken at 0415H. US casualties were 1 KIA and 8 WIA. There were 198 VC KIA and 22 KBA by body count in the immediate vicinity of the NDP. For the next five days patrols found additional VC bodies bringing the final body count to 263 VC KIA (BC) and 6 POW's. There were 18 individual weapons, 10 crew served weapons, and 3 flamethrowers captured. The flamethrowers were Soviet Model 'PO's. The unit was identified as the 273d VC Regiment. There were 50 sorties of tactical air flown in support of the contact. (See Inclosure 3 to Annex B).

The 1-26 Infantry moved by R/W from CAISSON VI and CAISSON VII to Quan Loi and at 0820H conducted an air assault vicinity XU707147. CAISSON VII and VI then became OPCON to the 3d Brigade and the 3-22 Infantry (25th Division) was inserted at both locations.

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: M&O J3-32) (K-1) (U)

The 1-28 Infantry Battalion continued RIF operations vicinity XU761070. At 0743H vicinity XU756079 the lead elements of the Battalion made contact with an estimated 20 VC wearing khaki uniforms. Small arms fire was exchanged. The VC broke contact at 0750H. Airstrikes were called in and artillery and mortars supported the contact. There were no US casualties. VC casualties were unknown.

The 2-2 Infantry (25th Division) moved to Loc Ninh via F/M and conducted an air assault into vicinity XU788136. At 2205H 3-4 VC were discovered inside the NDP carrying flashlights. 4 VC were KIA and 4 were captured.

jj. 3 Nov - The 2-12 Infantry received 40-50 rounds of 82mm mortar fired into their NDP (XU788136) from the North. A Spooky, FAC, AO and LFT were sent to the area to support. At 0230H the Battalion received a ground attack from the northeast, east and northwest. At 0459H contact was broken. US casualties were 3 KIA and 34 WIA. There were 28 VC KIA (BC). A total of 24 sorties of tactical air were flown in support of the contact.

At 0955H the Battalion NDP received small arms fire from an unknown number of VC who were using villagers as a shield. The Battalion Commander succeeded in gathering the civilians inside the NDP and then returned the fire. There were no US casualties. VC casualties were unknown.

The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XU761070. At 0715H vicinity XU752076 an ambush patrol from Company C killed one VC. At 0910H vicinity XU776090 the Recon Platoon received fire from an unknown size VC force. Artillery and mortars were fired into the area and a search revealed 1 VC KIA (DC) and 1 AK-47 captured. At 1005H vicinity XU776086 the Recon Platoon located a fresh grave containing three VC bodies. At 1335H vicinity XU780102 the Battalion made contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 US WIA. Airstrikes and artillery were put into the area. VC casualties were unknown.

kk. 4 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XU761070. At 1128H vicinity XU775102 the Battalion received automatic weapons fire from two locations. Contact was broken at 1145H. Results were 1 US KIA, 2 WIA. VC losses: 1 VC KIA (BC). The 1-18 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU695095. At 1040H vicinity XU699106 the Battalion located 12 VC bodies in fresh graves.

The 1-24 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU711145. At 1041H XU713164 Company C fired on 4-5 VC with unknown results. The 2-12 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU783138. At 1350H vicinity XU781135 the battalion located 6 VC bodies in 5 fresh graves. At 1415H vicinity XU780137 1 VC body and 1 AK-47 rifle were found. At 1430H vicinity XU781161 3 VC bodies and 2 60mm mortar rounds were found. At 1455H vicinity XU785135 one VC body was found. At 1500H vicinity XU783138 1 VC body was found.

ll. 5 Nov - 2-28 Infantry (-) continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh Airfield (XU733000). At 1508H vicinity XU738063 the Battalion (-) found 3 VC bodies, apparently killed by artillery or mortar fire, 17 60mm mortar rounds, 1 60mm mortar sight, 1 60mm mortar base plate, 6 canteens, 1 ruck sack, 60mm ammunition pouches, 2 VC gas masks, 6 shovels, 2 lbs of medical supplies, 800 rounds of small arms ammunition, 7 grenades and 2 RPG-2 rounds.

AVDB-TT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: M40 J1-32) (K-1) (U) 12 April 1968

The 1-18 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU950095. At 1005H vicinity XU704056 the Battalion located 3 VC bodies, 9 82mm mortar rounds, 1 82mm mortar base plate, and 2 CHICOM grenades.

The 2-12 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XU783138. At 0945H vicinity XU779139 the Battalion located 7 VC bodies, 4 60mm mortar rounds, and 1 CHICOM grenade.

ml. 6 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU761070. Company B and C of the 2-28 Infantry continued to secure the RSPB at Lee Ninh airstrip (XU733080). At 1035H vicinity XU803869 a hand grenade was thrown at Company 4 causing 1 WIA. The VC who threw the grenade ran into the village vicinity XU803869. The National Police searched the village with negative results.

The 1-18 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU695095.

The 2-12 Infantry at 0930H vicinity XU972137 found 1 VC body and destroyed 10 MQ positions. At 1825H the NDP received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire causing 1 KIA and 17 WIA. Small arms fire was also received. All incoming fire ceased at 1930H.

The 1-26 Infantry was extracted from its field position and conducted an air assault vicinity XU807127.

nn. 7 Nov - The 1-18 Infantry was extracted from field positions vicinity XU695095 to Quan Loi. The 2-12 Infantry extracted from field positions, vicinity XU783138 to Song Bo and became OPCOM to the 25th Infantry Division.

The 1-26 Infantry conducted RIF operations vicinity XU807127. The battalion route ran initially due east through rubber trees. At 0945H vicinity XU822125 the point element received sniper fire from one VC in a tree. Fire was returned and the VC ran into a village to the east. The village, mostly uninhabited, was searched with negative results. The battalion column moved east from the village and received more sniper fire from an estimated 3-4 VC. The column then returned northeast. About 10 minutes after the Battalion began to change direction, at 1305H vicinity XU838126, contact was made with an estimated VC Battalion reinforced. The command group was hit directly with an unknown number of RPG-2 and RPG-7 rounds. Commanders and radio operators became primary targets. The Battalion Command Group sustained 100% casualties during the initial contact. The VC tried to encircle the Battalion on the west using elements located north and south of the Battalion. Both encircling elements ran into the trail company in the column and were stopped. The artillery and airstrikes caused the VC to become disorganized and withdraw to the southeast. Contact was broken at 1420H. There were many snipers tied to trees. Company 4 was sent to reinforce until the arrival of Company B 1-26 Infantry from Lai Nho. At 1645H B/1-26 Infantry replaced D/1-18 Infantry at the 1-26 NDP and D/1-18 Infantry moved to Quan Loi.

The battalion closed into the NDP at 2105H. US casualties: 17 KIA, 21 WIA. VC Losses: 66 KIA (BC), 10 VC KIA (Poss), 27 VC KIA, 1 AK-50, 1 AK-47, 1 RPG-2, 1 CHICOM grenade, and 1 wallet were captured. The unit was identified as the 3d Battalion of the 272d NVN. There were 27 sorties of tactical air flown in support of the contact.

AVDRLTT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROS: M&O J3-92) (K-1) (U) 2

12 April 1968

do. 8 Nov - Task Force 2-28 Infantry moved from Quan Loi to CAISSON VI (XT745817) and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade. Companies B and C continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh Airfield (XT733060). Company B/1-18 Infantry moved from Quan Loi to CAISSON VII and became OPCON to the 3d Brigade. The 1-26 Infantry was relieved in place vicinity XU804126 by the 1-16 Infantry. The 1-26 Infantry became OPCON to the 3d Brigade.

pp. 9 Nov - At 0015H Quan Loi received 15-20 rounds of 122mm rockets causing 5 WHA and destroying one ammo trailer. The 1-28 Infantry continued RIF operations vicinity XU761070. At 0840H the Recon platoon found 2 VC bodies in separate graves vicinity XU804126. At 1023H the Battalion (-) conducted an air assault vicinity XU803109 to search a B-52 strike area. At 1501H the Battalion (-) was extracted and returned to the NDP.

qq. 10 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry was extracted from its field location vicinity XU804126 to FSPB CAISSON VII (XT764894). Company B/1-18 moved from CAISSON VII to Quan Loi. Companies B and C of the 2-28 Infantry continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh Airfield. The 1st Brigade assumed OPCON of CAISSON VI and CAISSON VII.

rr. 11 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry extracted from their field positions vicinity XU761070 to Loc Ninh by R/M and then from Loc Ninh to Phuoc Vinh by P/M.

ss. 12 Nov - The 1-28 Infantry became Division RRF at Phuoc Vinh. The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations at Quan Loi. The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure FSPB CAISSON VII (XT764894). Task Force 2-28 Infantry continued to secure FSPB CAISSON VI (XT745817). Companies B and D of the 2-28 Infantry continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh airfield.

tt. 13 Nov - No significant activity.

uu. 14 Nov - At approximately 1130H vicinity XT733945 the 399 RF Company made contact with an estimated VC platoon in an ambush position. The 969th RF Company was committed to reinforce. Contact was made at approximately 1430H. Results were 9 VC KIA (BC) including a Company Commander of the 165th Regiment. An M-47, 1 M-1 rifle, 2 M-2 carbines, and a pistol were captured.

The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted an air assault vicinity XT738917. At 1103H vicinity XT686914 Company C fired on 1520 VC with unknown results. Artillery, airstrikes and a LFT supported. 1 VC KBA (Poss) was claimed. The Battalion (-) extracted at 1510H from vicinity XT694891. The FSPB at Loc Ninh airfield received 4 rounds of mortar fire at 2159Z causing no casualties.

vv. 15 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted an air assault at 0840H vicinity XT679899. At 1145H vicinity XT701835 the Battalion (-) made contact with an estimated 40 VC. Contact was made as the Battalion (-) approached the village at those coordinates. Airstrikes, artillery and LFT supported the contact. Contact was broken at 1223H. US casualties were 2 KBA and 2 WHA. VC losses were 10 KIA (Poss). The Battalion (-) extracted from vicinity XT714854 at 1530H and returned to CAISSON VII.

AVDRL-11

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: M&O J3-32) (K-1) (U) 12 April 1968

ww. 16 Nov - The 1-16 Infantry (-) moved by R/A from CAISSON VII to Quan Loi. O/1-16 Infantry remained at CAISSON VII. Company B/2-28 Infantry moved from Loc Ninh to Lai Khe. D/2-28 Infantry continued to secure the FSPB at Loc Ninh.

xx. 17 Nov - The 1-18 Infantry conducted RIF operations at Quan Loi. The 1-16 Infantry (-) conducted RIF operations at Quan Loi. The O/1-16 secured FSPB CAISSON VI. Task Force 2-28 secured FSPB CAISSON VI. D/2-28 Infantry secured the FSPB at Loc Ninh Airfield.

yy. 18 Nov - At 0220H the Special Forces Camp at Tong Le Chon received an unknown number of mortar rounds. At 1035H vicinity XF905885 the 1-9 ARVN Battalion made contact with an estimated VO Company. 1st Brigade supplied a FAC. Airstrikes placed in the vicinity of the contact resulted in 14 VO KIA (BO) and 4 VO KIA (Poss). Task Force 2-28 Infantry (-) moved from Quan Loi to CAISSON VI. At 0020H the 2-28 received approximately 10 rounds of mortar and recoilless rifle fire at CAISSON VI. Casualties were 3 KIA and 9 WIA.

zz. 19 Nov - The 1-18 Infantry moved from Quan Loi to positions along Highway 13 and became OPCOM to 3d Brigade. The 1-28 Infantry moved from positions along Route 13 to Quan Loi and became OPCOM to the 1st Brigade. The FSPB at Loc Ninh was closed and D/2-28 moved from Loc Ninh to Lai Khe and became OPCOM to 3d Brigade. Operation SHERIDAN II terminated at 1935H November 1967.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Friendly Losses:

- (1) KIA - 106
- (2) WIA - 323

b. VO Personnel Losses:

- (1) VO KIA (BO) - 957
- (2) VO PW's - 15

c. VO Equipment Losses:

(1) Weapons:

- (a) Small Arms - 70
- (b) Crew Served - 31
- (c) Flamethrowers - 5

(2) Ammunition:

- (a) Small Arms - 6316 rds
- (b) Mortar - Total 174 rds
 - 1. 120mm - 24
 - 2. 82mm - 25
 - 3. 81mm - 21
 - 4. 60mm - 104
- (c) Rockets - Total 134 rds
 - 1. RPG-7 - 101
 - 2. RPG-2 - 23
 - 3. Unk type - 3

(3) Explosive Material:
 a Explosives - 1 lb
 b CBU - 18
 c Claymores - 21
 d Mines - 30
 e Fuse exp/ - 5
 f Grenades - 258
 g Artillery rds - 5
 h 122mm rocket warheads - 2
 i Bangalore torpedoes - 1
 j Booby traps - 141
 k Mortar charges - 1
 l Claymore detonators - unk amount
 m 122mm rocket motors - 5
 n Gunpowder - 41 lbs
 o OS - 105 lbs

(4) Foodstuffs:
 a Rice - 246.9 tons
 b Tea - 30 lbs
 c Salt - 29 tons
 d Peanuts - 5 lbs
 e Sugar - 1,200 lbs

(5) Medical Supplies:
 a Medicine - 1,000 bottles
 b Gauze - 30 lbs
 c Syringes - 1,000
 d Medical books - 30
 e Morphine - 103 bottles
 f Med supplies - 1,000 lbs

(6) Signal Equipment:
 a Sarphones - 1 set
 b Commo Wire - 710 meters
 c Radio packs - 1
 d Telephones - 1

(7) Miscellaneous:
 a Small arms magazines - 21
 b Gas masks - 23
 c Canteens - 39
 d Entrenching tools - 3
 e Pistol belts - 9
 f Tool sets - 1
 g Mortar base plates - 3
 h Mortar sights - 1
 i Mortar canisters - 23
 j Packs - 24
 k Litters - 3
 l Hammocks - 4
 m Ammo boxes - 1
 n Ponchos - 8
 o Bicycles - 33
 p Picks - 2
 q Sledge hammers - 1
 r Saws - 2
 s Shovels
 t Sewing machines - 1

- (a) Batteries - 20
- (v) Weapons racks - 1
- (w) Blackboards - 1
- (x) Documents - 81 lbs
- (y) Narcotics - 1 pkg
- (a) Cigarettes - 40 pkgs
- (aa) Cooking pots - 8
- (bb) Compass case - 1
- (cc) Night light sets for mortar - 2
- (dd) Mortar tube carrying case - 1
- (ee) Mortar aiming stake - 1
- (ff) 75mm RR cleaning staff - 1
- (gg) Clothing - 35 OD fatigues
- (hh) Pigs - 3
- (ii) Chickens - 5
- (jj) Jars - 15
- (kk) Billfolds - 4
- (ll) Notebooks - 1
- (mm) RPG cleaning rods - 2
- (nn) Film - 1 roll (exposed)
- (oo) Caps - 1
- (pp) Heavy M1 barrel - 1
- (qq) Ammo pouches - 6
- (rr) Cleaning swab for 60mm mortar - 1
- (ss) Emergency rations - 6
- (tt) Water buffalo - 13
- (uu) Occarts - 3
- (vv) Bunkers, foxholes, all structures, tunnels, etc. - dest 1994
- (ww) Oil - 5 gal.

13. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. Supply, Maintenance, and Transportation: See Annex H.
- b. Treatment of Casualties and Medical Evacuation: See Annex I.
- c. Communications: See Annex J.

14. (O) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Airmobile Operations:

(1) General: 1st Infantry Division airmobile operations are characterized by preparatory fires on the landing zone, the "five ship LZ", and the five points of LZ security.

(2) Landing zone areas are always assumed to be occupied by the VC and a policy of thoroughly "prepping" every landing zone with hard bombs, napalm and artillery is adhered to. An LZ preparatory fire plan is prepared, assigning sectors to the artillery and showing where the tactical air and gunships are to expend. Preparatory fires on a landing zone are controlled by the brigade commander through the artillery and Air Force LNO riding in his command and control ship. No more than five ships are put into an LZ at one time. This is the maximum number that should be exposed at any one time. All LZ's are secured by an initial force inserted after the "prep" which sets up five secure positions equally spaced around the LZ. Their positions are immediately marked with smoke to facilitate the immediate use of air and artillery in case of enemy contact. Insertion of the remainder of the unit begins two minutes after insertion of the security element.

AVD-IT

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (BOB: M.O. J2-32) (L-1)(U)

12 April 1968

b. The 1st Infantry Division Fighting Position: During SHIMBANDAH II the VC attacked a night defensive position on five separate occasions; 6 October, 11 October, 31 October, 2 November, and 3 November. The US KIA totaled seven. The VC KIA was 509 by body count. One of the major reasons why the friendly casualties were so low was the 1st Infantry Division fighting position. This fighting position has become standardized throughout the division and provides each soldier with adequate overhead cover, overhead clearance, a protective berm to the front with firing apertures at a 45 degree angle, a berm to the sides, adequate rear protection, and thorough camouflage. The fighting position is completed during the first day in a new MDP, before the soldier is allowed to sleep.

a. The Technique of Massing and Controlling Supporting Fires:

(1) The objective is the employment of all supporting fires simultaneously. As a rule, artillery should never be cut off to facilitate delivery of air; rather, it should be shifted if necessary to allow the use of tactical air.

(2) Supporting fires should be employed at the point(s) of contact with the enemy, along the exposed flanks of the friendly unit, and along enemy reinforcement and withdrawal routes.

(3) The technique requires a single commander, normally an infantry battalion commander, to direct the efforts of the Forward Air Controller, Artillery Aerial Observer, Light Fire Team Commander, and at night, the Flareship Pilot.

(4) The commander must know the following:

(a) The location of friendly forces.

(b) The location of point(s) of contact.

(c) Artillery gun target line(s).

(d) Location of fire coordination lines.

(e) Type ordnance on board fighter aircraft.

(5) Actions upon enemy contact:

(a) Artillery is immediately brought to bear at the point of contact. Additional batteries may be required to protect exposed flanks.

(b) Immediate airstrikes and LFTs are requested. The commander continues to work the artillery at the point of contact and along exposed flanks until the air and LFTs arrive.

(c) If the LFT arrive prior to the tactical air, they should be put to immediate use along the flanks away from the gun target lines.

(d) When tactical air becomes available, the commander may put it on the same flank as the LFT or he may impose an FCL, causing the artillery to shift and bring the air across the point of contact

AVDA-II

12 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: HGO J3-32) (L-1) (U) 30

while the artillery fires on one flank and the gunships on the other. Troops in contact receiving effective artillery fires will not have this fire lifted in favor of some other means of fire support.

15. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS:

a. SHENANDOAH II revealed several significant changes in VC tactics. Their repeated attacks, despite heavy casualties, against well prepared positions were a distinct departure from prior tactics.

b. There was a marked increase in the number of RPGs, especially RPG-7s, used during this period. The RPG has become the VC's assault artillery and is extremely effective and accurate weapon, although the sloped frontal beam of the 1st Division fighting position offers excellent protection from the round.

c. The use of the infiltration method to attack a prepared position became increasingly evident. The VC advance by crawling, digging prone shelters, firing, crawling forward again, digging in again, and repeating the same process until the perimeter is reached. The M-79, used in searching pattern of fire, has a devastating effect on this type tactic.

d. Standardized methods of operation contributed significantly to the success achieved during SHENANDOAH II. Standardization was the goal of a program begun in July 1967 to preserve the experiences of seasoned commanders who rotated in the spring and summer months.

(1) For example, airmobile operations are conducted in the same manner by all battalions in the division. Planning is facilitated because all factors are known and can be applied to any battalion. Airmobile operations become more efficient and can be conducted rapidly with a minimum of warning time given.

(2) For the defensive operations, the fighting positions and the organization of a night defensive position became standard throughout the division. The time required to construct an ICP was reduced and the effectiveness of the position to withstand assault was improved to such an extent that each VC attack was repulsed with tremendous losses to the attacker and few if any casualties to friendly forces.

(3) Standardization greatly facilitated the learning process of the new commanders, as well as their troops, and raised the proficiency of each battalion to a very high degree.

e. Another factor which contributed to the success of SHENANDOAH II was the careful analysis of the terrain, to use it to the best advantage:

(1) Objective areas must be selected where the placement of US troops poses the greatest threat to the VC/NVA units and yet offers the greatest possible security for US troops.

(2) Fire support bases should be selected so that firing batteries are in mutual support.

AVIBL-IT

12 April 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ROS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U)

21

(3) A detailed intelligence study will indicate the best areas to rapidly employ a heliborne force to block or ambush VC/NVA forces. This quick reaction type force can pay excellent dividends.

(4) Once VC/NVA forces are fixed, all available resources, combat and combat support, should be concentrated upon the destruction of that force.

f. Forward logistical bases become absolutely essential once it becomes evident that the VC/NVA forces are going to stand and fight. There must not be any lapse in providing the necessary fire power and mobility necessary for the destruction of enemy forces; therefore, placement of Class III and Class V must be as near as possible to the action. For operation SHERMANOAK II, Quan Loi provided this logistical base. Without it the entire outcome of the battle of Loc Ninh could have been very different.

16. (G) Close coordination between US/ARVN units is particularly important when both forces are engaged. There can be no error in knowledge of where each force is located. This is especially important in fire control and coordination. This coordination can best be achieved by the participating brigade placing liaison officers at province, district and any other GVN headquarters that is actively engaged. Division headquarters should place liaison officers at ARVN division level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



THOMAS L. VERRIER
CPT, AOC
Asst AG

AVFBC-RE-H (12 Apr 68) 1st Ind


SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (ECS: MAC J3-32) (K-1) (U) ⁴²

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 25 APR 1968


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

The attached after action report for the 1st Inf Div, Operation Shenandoah II, is forwarded in accordance with MACV Dir 335-8, 1 September 1967, subject: Combat Operations After Action Reports (MACV J3-32(K-1)).

FOR THE COMMANDER:



O. B. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG



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6

CAISSON
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CAISSON
79 S

CAISSON

CAISSON

3rd BDE

9th ARVN

1st BDE

THU KHUONG


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
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
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
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
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X ARTILLERY FIRE



SROK SILAMLITE
2 NOVEMBER 67
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END

⚡ AIR STRIKES

⚡ 127MM ON AATRIDOS

♂ 82MM MORTAR

↪ VC ASSAULT

43

CONFIDENTIAL

**HEADQUARTERS
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US FORCES 96345**

AVDB-RAT

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

**TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US FORCES 96345**

- 1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: SHENANDOAH II: Search and Destroy
- 2. (U) DATE OF OPERATION: 30 September 67 to 19 November 67

3. (U) GENERAL: The 1st Infantry Division Artillery was the command headquarters for the operation. The 1st Bn, 5th Artillery, was initially in direct support of the 1st Brigade. On 30 Oct 67 it was assigned the mission of reinforcing the 2d Bn, 33d Arty. The 1st Bn, 5th Arty was responsible for planning and controlling fires for Shenandoah II North. The 2d Bn, 33d Arty was in direct support of the 3d Bde and was responsible for planning and controlling fires for Shenandoah II South. The 6th Bn, 15th Arty was initially in direct support of TF DIXIE at Quan Loi. Later it was assigned the mission of direct support of the 1st Brigade in the Loc Ninh area and was responsible for planning and controlling the fires in the Loc Ninh area. The 1st Bn, 7th Arty was in direct support of the 2d Bde. The 8th Bn, 6th Arty was in general support of the 1st Inf Div. The missions were specified in Annex C (fire support plan) to OPOD 19-67 (Shenandoah II). Direct support and reinforcing fires were provided from Quan Loi, Lai Khe, and the following fire support bases:

CAISSON I	XT792446
CAISSON II	XT788515
CAISSON III S	XT788556
CAISSON III N	XT767607
CAISSON V	XT74541
LORRAINE I	XT708433
LORRAINE II	XT683483
FSPB	XU731078
FSPB	XU699102

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DDI DIR 5200.10

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8 December 1967

AVDD-RAF

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

FSPB XU711149
 FSPB XU760972
 FSPB XU804126

a. Reporting Officer: Maj Fredrick H. Niodermeyer, Assistant S-3
1st Inf Div Arty.

b. Task Organization:

1st Bn, 5th Arty (LTC Joseph V. Spittler Jr, CO)
30 Sep 67 to 30 Oct 67, DS 1st Bde.
30 Oct 67 to 19 Nov 67, reinf 2d Bn, 33d Arty.

2d Bn, 33d Arty (LTC Arthur D. Wells, CO)
DS 3d Bde.

6th Bn, 15th Arty (LTC Frank E. Serio, CO)
30 Sep 67 to 28 Oct 67, DS TP DIXIE
29 Oct 67 to 19 67, DS 1st Bde

1st Bn, 7th Arty (LTC John W. Cassel, CO)
DS 2d Bde

8th Bn, 6th Arty, (LTC Ambrose A. Szelwinski, CO)
CS 1st Inf Div

6th Bn, 27th Arty (-) (LTC Robert J. Harms, CO)
CSR 1st Inf Div Arty.

2d Bn, 13th Arty (-)
CSR 1st Inf Div Arty, further assigned
CSR 1st Bn, 7th Arty

Btry C, 7th Bn, 9th Arty (CPT Walk CO)
Attached 2d Bn 33d Arty

1st Plt, Btry B, 1st Bn, 6th Arty (LT John Sekula)
Attached 6th Bn, 15th Arty 10-17 Nov 67.

1st Plt, Btry I, 29th Arty
CS 1st Inf Div

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 19-67 (Op Shenandoah II). The terrain, weather, and fortifications encountered did not significantly effect the artillery support.

5. (C) MISSION: 1st Infantry Division Artillery provided artillery support for the maneuver elements.

45

4

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-RAT

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: Artillery units moved to field locations and occupied fire support bases Caisson I, II and III S from 25 to 29 Sep to provide initial fire support. All units were prepared to occupy additional fire support bases as required by the actions of the maneuver elements.

7. (C) EXECUTION:

1. 1 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing to fire support base Lorraine I.

2 Oct 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by road from Di An to Lai Khe and then by rotary wing to Caisson III S.

3 Oct 67 Btry S, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing to Caisson III S.

4 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 5th Arty moved by rotary wing and established Caisson V. Btry C, 7th Bn, 9th Arty moved by road from Di An to Lai Khe, attached to 2d Bn, 33d Arty.

5-8 Oct 67 No Arty moved. All units continued support of maneuver units.

9 Oct 67 Btry C, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lai Khe to Lorraine II. OPCON 1st Bn, 5th Arty

10 Oct 67 Btry F, 6th Bn, 15th Arty moved by rotary wing from Caisson III S to Caisson V.

11-15 Oct 67 No Arty moved. There were no significant arty actions during this period.

16 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lorraine I to Lai Khe.

17-22 Oct 67 No significant change in Arty support.

23 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing to Lorraine I.

24-27 Oct 67 No change in Arty support.

28 Oct 67 Btry C, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lorraine II to Lai Khe.

29 Oct 67 6th Bn, 15th Arty assumed mission of direct support of the 1st Bde, Quang Loi, for action starting in the Loo Ninh area. Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Lorraine I to Lai Khe and then by fixed wing to Quang Loi attached to 6th Bn, 15th Arty. Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty moved by rotary wing from Quang Loi to the Loo Ninh area (XU731(78))

42

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-RAT

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

Btry C, 1st Bn, 7th Arty moved by rotary wing from Quan Loi to the Loc Ninh area (XU731078), attached to 6th Bn, 15th Arty.

30 Oct 67 1st Bn, 5th Arty assumed the mission of reinforcing the 2d Bn, 33d Arty. Btry C, 1st Bn, 7th Arty moved by rotary wing from Loc Ninh back to Quan Loi.

31 Oct 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Quan Loi to Loc Ninh area (XU699102)

1 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

2 Nov 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Chisson III S to Loc Ninh area (XU711149). Attached to 6th Bn, 15th Arty. Btry C, 2d Bn, 15th Arty moved by fixed wing from Di An to Loc Ninh (XU 731078). Attached to 6th Bn, 15th Arty.

3-4 Nov 67 No significant change in Arty support.

5 Nov 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from XU711149 to XU760072.

6 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

7 Nov 67 Btry A, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved by rotary wing from Loc Ninh to Quan Loi and returned to control of parent unit. Btry C, 2d Bn, 15th Arty moved from XU731078 to XU60126 by rotary wing.

8-10 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

11 Nov 67 Btry B, 2d Bn, 33d Arty moved from XU760072 to XU731078 by rotary wing.

12-15 Nov 67 No significant Arty action.

16 Nov 67 Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty moved by rotary wing to XU731078.

18-19 Nov 67 All Arty units extracted from the Loc Ninh area. Operation terminated.

b. There were three significant artillery actions during the operation.

(1) On 17 Oct 67, 2 companies of 2d Bn 28th Infantry engaged in heavy contact with a large Viet Cong force in the vicinity of XU68857E. The immediate response of artillery fires was instrumental in disrupting the enemy force. During this engagement, an artillery observer was killed while moving between two units to adjust close in artillery fires. During this engagement, 105 Howitzers fired 6,400 rounds and 1000 rounds were fired from the 155 Howitzers.

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