

FORM 6-66

4 November 1966

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report For Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966  
(RCS REPORT -63) (U)

**TO:** See Distribution

**SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES**

1. (C) General: During the reporting period 2 August through 31 October 1966, the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division participated in Operations PAUL REVERE II, III, and IV, for a total of 92 days of consecutive combat duty. These operations were conducted in the following time phases:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Commenced</u>	<u>Terminated</u>
PAUL REVERE II	1 August	25 August
PAUL REVERE III	26 August	18 October
PAUL REVERE IV	18 October	Operation continuing

a. (C) Mission: The mission assigned the 3d Brigade Task Force for each operation was to maintain surveillance of the RVN/Cambodian border and areas east thereof, conduct ambushes, and block penetrations into the assigned area of operation.)

b. (C) Operational area: The area designated for Operation PAUL REVERE II was identical to that of Operation PAUL REVERE I. Specific boundaries of the area of operation were the RVN/Cambodian border in the west, Route 14 in the east, the east-west grid line YA-ZA 50 in the north, and the east-west grid line YV-ZV-AQ 60 in the south. The area of operation encompassed approximately 2040 square miles.)

c. (C) Control: The brigade task force was engaged when Operation PAUL REVERE II commenced. The technique of "checkerboarding" (moving from one numbered 10,000 meter grid square to another), which proved effective during previous operations, was continued. The brigade task force which had been under operational control authority of I Field Force Vietnam was placed under the operational control authority of the 1st Air Cavalry Division on 2 August and continued in that posture until termination of Operation PAUL REVERE II on 25 August. On 26

\*Operation PAUL REVERE I was included in the previously submitted Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 15 August 1966.

August the brigade task force reverted to operational control authority of I Field Force Vietnam for the duration of Operation PAUL REVERE III. The brigade came under operational control authority of 4th Infantry Division on 18 October and continued in that status throughout the remainder of the reporting period.

d. (C) Task organization: The organization of the 3d Brigade Task Force remained the same throughout Operation PAUL REVERE II and III. In conjunction with Operation PAUL REVERE IV, the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, was released from operational control authority of 18 October 1966. Throughout all three operations, many units were placed under the temporary operational control authority of the 3d Brigade Task Force for varying periods of time. The principal units of the 3d Brigade Task Force, with commanders' names and dates of command, and the major supporting and operational control authority units are as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division  
Brigadier General Glenn D. Walker, 1 August - 20 October  
Colonel James G. Shanahan, 20 October - 31 October

1st Battalion, 14th Infantry  
Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Proctor, Junior

1st Battalion, 35th Infantry  
Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Kingston

2d Battalion, 35th Infantry  
Lieutenant Colonel Philip R. Feir

2d Battalion 9th Artillery  
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Holbrook

1st Battalion, 69th Armor (CHOP 18 October)  
Lieutenant Colonel R. J. Fairfield, Junior, 1 - 31 August  
Lieutenant Colonel Clyde O. Clark, 1 September - 31 October

3d Support Battalion (Provisional)  
Major Andrew H. Housand

C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry  
Captain William S. Graf

Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion  
Captain Clarence H. Stetzinger

52d Aviation Battalion (GS)

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Battery A, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (atch 1 August - 20 September) (OCA 20 September - 18 October) (OSA 30 - 31 October)

Battery A, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (OCA 15 October - 18 October)

Battery B and C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (atch 1 - 2 August) (OCA 20 September - 18 October)

Battery A, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (OCA 1 August - 27 October)

Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (OCA 12 - 30 September)

Battery C, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (OCA 11 - 15 October)

3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment (CRID) (CHOP 21 August)

1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division (OCA 2 - 8 August) (OCA 26 - 29 August)

2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division (CHOP 1 August)

3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (OCA 1 - 2 August)

A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division (OCA 6 - 12 August)

2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (OCA 28 September - 18 October)

2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (OCA 29 August - 16 September)

1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (OCA 16 September - 28 September)

e. Brigade base camp security: Throughout the period, the 3d Brigade Task Force maintained an adequate defensive posture to provide continuous security for its brigade base camp vicinity of Pleiku. The forces and organization established in the initial defensive plan, OPLAN IRON BAND, were re-evaluated and on 15 September OPLAN STEEL CLAW was implemented. The brigade will continue to incorporate refinements in this plan to enhance the defensive capabilities of the forces at the brigade base camp.

f. (U) Operation PAUL REVERE II conducted during the period 1 to 25 August is covered in the After Action Report PAUL REVERE II attached as inclosure 1.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy activities 1 - 25 August are contained in After Action Report Operation PAUL REVIRE II attached as inclosure 1. Significant enemy activities 26 August - 31 October are as follows:

(1) General. The beginning of the reporting period coincided with an increase in ARVN agent reports and sightings related to threatened enemy increases of overt and covert attempts to disrupt and discredit GVN elections which were scheduled for 11 September 1966. The weather conditions continued to have adverse effects on friendly operations in the area, playing particular havoc with land lines of communication.

(2) 26 - 31 August 1966: The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, operating north of Highway 19 began to have considerable success in breaking down the Viet Cong infrastructure in the area. Operating with a CIDG unit from Plei Djereng, the battalion was instrumental in the apprehension of one Viet Cong and the killing of another who were members of the local Viet Montagnard Cong. One small North Vietnamese Army unit was contacted in the area north of Highway 19 resulting in four NVA KIA and one NVA captured. The prisoner of war was from the 17th Transportation Battalion. Based on his circumstances of capture and interrogation results, it was determined that a NVA battalion was possibly located in the rugged terrain about 5-10 kilometers east of Plei Djereng. Major NVA units of the 630th front were believed to be in their Cambodian sanctuary vicinity Chu Pong Mountain.

(3) 1 - 6 September 1966: Agent reports of up to one enemy regiment reinforced by local forces were moving to disrupt GVN elections and incidents, all minor, at the brigade forward base of operation and base camp, as well as the 4th Infantry Division base area. It was theorized that the Viet Cong would possibly attempt to overtly and covertly influence the GVN elections.

(4) 13 September 1966: The Viet Cong threat for disrupting the elections did not occur locally.

(5) 21 - 29 September 1966: Visual sightings and special agent reports indicated enemy may have been infiltrating from the Chu Pong area to bases southeast near Highway 14 and possibly to Phu Yen Province.

(6) 4 - 13 October 1966: This period was marked by significant increase in enemy activity in an apparent southwest to northeast direction to the northern periphery of the area of operations. Special agent reports (AR) of unidentified enemy units (also unknown) continued to increase.

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It became apparent that as many as five North Vietnamese Army regiments were located in area bounded by YA-ZA 00 north-south grid line on the east, the Se San River and YA 90 east-west grid line on the south, RVN/Cambodia border on the west, and YA 70 east-west grid line on the north. Of these enemy forces, one regiment was considered possibly located in area east of Plei Djereng. Possible enemy courses of action at this time were considered to be as follows:

(a) Using Plei Djereng as the "bait," adopt "Bait and lure tactics" to cause US Forces to move into the area described above. This would afford the enemy maximum terrain advantages.

(b) Attack targets which would have a significant psychological/prestige effect such as Pleiku, Plei Djereng, Duc Co, Plei Ma, Thanh An.

(c) If US Forces entered area, exfiltrate and avoid contact using ambushes, decoys, small unit attacks and stealth.

(7) October 14 - 17 1966: Friendly forces became engaged in area east of Plei Djereng and the enemy situation continued to develop along the lines described in paragraph 2a(6), above.

(8) 20-29 October 1966: Significant contacts were made on the high ground east of Plei Djereng with up to company size enemy forces. Documents and prisoners of war identified enemy force in contact as elements of the 95B (also known as Song Ma) Regiment. It was determined that at least one battalion reinforced was located in the area of contact, and that these units had crossed the Se San River from the west during the period 1 - 9 October 1966. Stated missions of the enemy forces were to attack Plei Djereng and ambush US Forces. During this period, friendly forces west of the Se San River began to have sporadic contact which developed into battalion size enemy attacks against friendly company/battalion bases during the hours of darkness and sharp, small unit engagements during daylight. Significant, relative to the night attacks, was the fact that the enemy was in position to attack in approximately thirty minutes to two hours after EENT, even though friendly units had not previously used enemy objective areas for bases. This tends to substantiate prisoner of war reports that enemy was using small (approximately 10 man) reconnaissance elements to observe and report friendly units' movement allowing enemy maximum possible reaction time, and/or the enemy had previously made a reconnaissance for likely areas the US Forces would occupy. During this period it was determined that the total enemy force committed in the area of operation described in paragraph 2a(6) above, included four to six regiments. Among the units identified were: 95(B) NVA Regiment, 635th Battalion, 32d NVA Regiment, and an unidentified battalion, 23d Regiment. Other possible enemy units believed to be in the area were: 22d

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NVA Regiment, 33d NVA Regiment, 66th NVA Regiment, elements of 24(B) NVA Regiment, elements of 88th NVA Regiment, and elements of 18(B) NVA Regiment.

(9) 30 - 31 October 1966: During this period engagements with enemy forces decreased in intensity to small, sporadic contacts. Indications of possible enemy movement to the north and west were observed, but the intentions of the enemy were not clear.

b. Enemy successes: None

c. (U) Statistical summary of enemy personnel and equipment losses\*:

(1) (C) Personnel:

	<u>1-25 Aug.</u>	<u>26 Aug - 31 Oct</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(a) KIA (BC)	379	85	464
(b) CIA	15	37	52
(c) Returnees	0	1	1
(d) Suspects	<u>0</u>	<u>167</u>	<u>167</u>
TOTALS	394	290	684

(2) (U) Weapons:

	<u>1-25 Aug.</u>	<u>26 Aug - 31 Oct</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(a) Small arms	100	105	205
(b) Automatic	13	4	17
(c) Crew served	<u>22</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>26</u>
TOTALS	135	113	248

(3) (U) Other equipment:

(a) Ammunition:

	<u>1-25 Aug.</u>	<u>26 Aug - 31 Oct</u>
1. Small arms	4903	3179
2. TNT	303	11 (1/4 lb blocks)

\*Losses were compiled from INTSIRM.

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	<u>1-25 Aug</u>	<u>25 Aug - 31 Oct</u>
<u>3.</u> 81/82mm mort	16	278
<u>4.</u> 60mm mort	90	68
<u>5.</u> Grenades	758	51
<u>6.</u> B-40 rk rds	357	17
<u>7.</u> Bangalore torpedos		2
<u>8.</u> 12.7mm	3200	
<b>(b) Personal equipment:</b>		
<u>1.</u> Packs	377	98
<u>2.</u> Shovels	130	14
<u>3.</u> Canteens	270	8
<u>4.</u> Web gear	298	7
<u>5.</u> Helmets		4
<u>6.</u> Misc medical supplies		150 lbs
<b>(c) Miscellaneous:</b>		
<u>1.</u> Comm wire	5 1/4	9 mi
<u>2.</u> AK 47 magazines	3	14
<u>3.</u> Flashlights		3
<u>4.</u> Cooking pots		11
<b>(d) Material destroyed:</b>		
<u>1.</u> Rice	.4 tons	7-3 tons
<u>2.</u> Huts	353	510
<u>3.</u> Bridges	1	6
<u>4.</u> Bunkers	29	527

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	<u>1-25 Aug</u>	<u>26 Aug - 31 Oct</u>
<u>5.</u> Tunnels		52
<u>6.</u> Foxholes		250
<u>7.</u> AA positions		6
<u>8.</u> Boats		5
<u>9.</u> Wheat		1 ton

3. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES

a. Plans: The brigade has contingency plans for the relief of CIDG camps Plei Ma, Plei Djereng, Duc Co, Dak Pek, etc. Concurrent planning continues for subsequent operations in PAUL REVERE IV.

b. (C) Operations:

(1) Operation PAUL REVERE II commenced 010001 August. The 3d Brigade Task Force was deployed in the operational area in a tactical posture resulting from Operation PAUL REVERE I. During the latter part of July, contacts indicated major North Vietnamese Army forces were active in the area of operation. Based on this, additional units from the 1st Air Cavalry Division were moved into the area of operation and placed under operational control authority 3d Brigade Task Force, which was subsequently redesignated Task Force WALKER. On 2 August, Task Force WALKER was dissolved and the 3d Brigade Task Force came under the operational control authority of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The brigade task force remained in this status until termination of Operation PAUL REVERE II, 25 August. A detailed chronological account of all facets of Operation PAUL REVERE II is provided in the after action report which is appended as inclosure 1.

(2) Operation PAUL REVERE III commenced 260001 August with the 3d Brigade Task Force reverting from under the operational control authority of the 1st Air Cavalry Division to I Field Force Vietnam. The 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was placed under operational control authority to the 3d Brigade Task Force as the operation started. Disposition of tactical units of the task force at the outset of the operation were as shown on inclosure 2.

(a) Period 26 August - 10 September:

1. General: During this period the brigade task force continued its mission of surveillance of the border, ambushing likely routes of infiltration or egress, blocking the enemy if he crossed the

border in strength and conducting search and destroy operations during daylight hours. Enemy contact, although occurring on an almost daily basis, consisted primarily of snipers and small groups of individuals. Only once during the period was a unit of approximately platoon size sighted. The pattern of operations concentrated efforts principally in the area south and east of Duc Co. Other positions of the area of operation were periodically searched as depicted on the operations schematic at inclosure 3.

2. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: The battalion, less one rifle company, provided security for the brigade base camp vicinity of Pleiku and refitted for subsequent operations from 26 August through 1 September. During this period the rifle companies rotated to the brigade forward base of operations at CATECKA and were placed under the operational control authority of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, to assist in its security. On 2 September, the battalion commenced air lifts into areas of operation 36 and 44, where search operations were conducted through 5 September, resulting in only minor contacts. On 6 September, the battalion conducted an air lift into area of operation 32 and operated in that area until 8 September without significant contact. After several weather delays the battalion lifted into area of operation 30, closing there on 10 September.

3. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: From 26 August through 2 September, the battalion conducted search operations throughout period the battalion also provided security for several "Round UP" operations conducted in that area and worked in conjunction with CIDG elements therein. On 3 September, the battalion less Company B, lifted to the vicinity of Plei Me and conducted local patrols at that location. Company B moved to OASIS and provided security for an artillery battery located there. On 5 September, the battalion conducted air lifts into areas of operation 48 and 55. Operations were subsequently conducted in areas of operation 48, 55 and 56 until 10 September without contact.

4. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry: The battalion with a platoon of C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, conducted surveillance and ambush operations in areas of operation 27 and 35 from 26 August through 1 September with light contact. On 2 September, the battalion, less Company C, conducted an air assault into area of operation 28. For the next several days only light contact was encountered in that area. Company C was attached to Task Force M10, 2 thru 6 September and operated in area of operation 27. This company was then placed under the operational control authority of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, to assist in the security of the brigade base of operations at CATECKA. On 7 September, C Troop came under the operational control authority of 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry as that unit was assigned to an area of operation 27. It continued operations in that area without contact through 10 September.

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5. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor: During this period elements of the battalion provided security at the brigade forward base of operations and the CIDG camps at Plei Ma and Duc Co. The battalion constituted Task Force MAC consisting of an armor company, cavalry troop, self propelled artillery battery, an infantry platoon and CIDG elements from 26 August to 7 September. The battalion provided security and conducted road opening operations along Highway 19 almost daily throughout the period. From 2 to 6 September, Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was placed under the operational control authority of the armor battalion to assist in its security missions.

6. Task Force MAC: This task force conducted screening, surveillance and mounted reconnaissance operations from 26 August through 6 September. The task force operated principally in the area south and west of Duc Co.

7. 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry: This unit was placed under operational control authority of the brigade task force on 26 August and provided security for installations at OASIS until its release 29 August.

8. 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry: Elements of the battalion were air lifted in the operational area on 29 August and the battalion came under the operational control authority of the 3d Brigade Task Force on 30 August. The battalion conducted search and destroy operations in areas of operation 21 and 22 throughout the period without significant contact.

(b) Period 11 September - 27 September:

1. General: The brigade task force continued surveillance, search and destroy operations throughout the operational area. The areas of operation covered were proximate to those of the previous period, specifically the area south and east of Duc Co and north of Highway 19 between Duc Co and OASIS. No significant contact was developed during the period and units were disposed as indicated on inclosure 4.

2. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: The battalion continued search and destroy operations in area of operation 30 from 10-16 September. Company C was placed under operational control authority to 1st Battalion, 69th Armor on 12 September and assisted in securing the CATECKA complex area. With little contact resulting from its operation in area of operation 30, the battalion lifted to area of operation 13 on 17 September with the mission of destroying Viet Cong infrastructure in

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area adjacent to Highway 19. The battalion continued operations in this area, periodically rotating the company under operational control authority to the armor battalion and also participation in "Round-Up" operations villages within the area of operation. On 27 September, the battalion conducted air lifts into area of operation 20.

3. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: The battalion was operating in area of operation 8 at the beginning of the period and on 13 September moved by helicopter into area of operation 4. The battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations in areas of operation 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 throughout the period without significant contact. CIDG companies from the CIDG camps at Duc Co and Plei Djering periodically conducted operations in conjunction with the battalion

4. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry: Throughout the period the battalion with operational control authority for C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry continued to provide surveillance along the border, conducted ambushes, and search and destroy operations during daylight hours in area of operation 27 and adjacent areas of operation (18, 19, 26, 34 and 35). Operations during the period in the area resulted in sporadic light contact.

5. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor: The armor battalion continued providing security forces for artillery at CIDG installations and the brigade base of operations. Elements of the battalion performed a variety of tasks such as convoy escort, security for engineer road repair teams, security for "Round Up" operations and numerous road opening operations.

6. 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry: The battalion continued search and destroy operations in areas of operation 21 and 29 with light enemy contact.

7. 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry: On 16 September this unit commenced movement into the operational area and began search and destroy operations in area of operation 36. The battalion continued operations in that area without significant contact until 26 September when it conducted a heliborne assault into area of operation 44 where it operated until the end of the period.

(c) Period 28 September - 18 October:

1. General: During this period of Operation PAUL REVERE III, Task Force WALKER was again constituted. It was composed of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division,

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and 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division with the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. Elements of Task Force WALKER thoroughly saturated the operational area in the conduct of surveillance, search and destroy, ambush, and blocking operations. The border area west of Duc Co was particularly well patrolled. Search operations were conducted further north and south within the operational area than at any time previously during the operation. Elements of the task force secured a portion of Highway 19 from Pleiku east to the vicinity of Mang Yang Pass for approximately a week. Despite the concentrated search efforts the enemy persistently avoided engagement and the period was noted by its lack of significant contact. The coverage of the operational area during the period is depicted in the operations schematic at inclosure 5.

2. Task Force 3/25: The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, initially operated in areas of operation 17, 18, 19, and 20 providing surveillance along Highway 19 and the border area immediately west of Duc Co. On 9 October the battalion was lifted north to area of operation 4 and operated in that area for the remainder of the period. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, concentrated its surveillance efforts along the border northwest of Duc Co, specifically in areas of operation 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, and 11. On 14 October, the battalion was lifted northeast and operated in area of operation 6 and 506 through 18 October. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry continued operations in area of operation 30 from 28 September until 1 October. The battalion then returned to the brigade base camp, where it refitted and trained for future operations. On 10 October, the battalion assumed the mission of providing security along Highway 19. It secured the highway until 15 October when it was relieved and joined the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry in operations within area of operation 506. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry joined the task force units and moved into area of operation 6 and 7 north of CATECKA on 16 October. It conducted operations in that area until the end of the period. Throughout the period, the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor continued its missions of providing artillery and route security, and convoy escort. The variety of tasks performed by this unit attests to its versatility and effectiveness.

3. Task Force 2/4: The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, operated south of Duc Co near the border in areas of operation 26 and 27 from 28 September until 13 October. On 14 October, the battalion moved into area of operation 28 from which it was prepared to react to any attack on Duc Co. The battalion conducted extensive patrolling in this and adjacent areas. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry operated southwest of Plei Me until 11 October. On 12 October the battalion was lifted to the south and operated in the vicinity of Highway 14 in areas of operation 72 and 80 for the next three days. On 16 September it conducted an amphibious operation northwest into area of operation 21 where it continued search operations in that area between the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and 21st Infantry until termination of the operation.

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(3) Operation PAUL REVERE IV was initiated at 181000 October. At this time Task Force WALKER was dissolved and the 3d Brigade Task Force was placed under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was released from operational control authority of 3d Brigade Task Force and placed under the operational control authority of the 4th Infantry Division. The task organization of the 3d Brigade Task Force as PAUL REVERE IV commenced was as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force  
1st Battalion, 14th Infantry  
1st Battalion, 35th Infantry  
2d Battalion, 35th Infantry  
2d Battalion, 9th Artillery  
C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry  
3d Support Battalion (Provisional)  
Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion

The area of operations was expanded north of the previous operational area. The "checkerboard" concept was adopted for the new area. The disposition of the 3d Brigade Task Force elements at the beginning of this operation was as shown at inclosure 6. The brigade task force concentrated its operational efforts in the area northwest and east of Plei Djerong, along Route 509 and northwest of the Se San River. Contact during the early portion of the operation ranged from light to moderate throughout the period.

(a) Period 18 - 31 October:

1. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: The battalion operated initially in area of operation 4 and entered area of operation 504 on 20 October. During a two day period in this area of operation, the battalion had light contact with small groups of North Vietnamese Army forces. On 23 October elements of the battalion made contact with the enemy in area of operation 4 resulting in 16 NVA KIA. Sporadic light contact continued within the area of operation. On 25 October the battalion lifted the command group, 4.2" Mortar Platoon, Reconnaissance Platoon and supporting artillery battery from area of operation 4 into area of operation 504. The battalion continued to operate in that area of operation with light contact through 31 October.

2. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: The battalion was initially located in areas of operation 6 and 506. On 19 October the battalion lifted into areas of operation 3 and 503 and commenced operations in those areas. The battalion continued patrolling throughout the assigned area of operation while marshalling its forces to meet its task as the reserve reaction force for the division. On 30 October the battalion conducted a heliborne assault into area of operation 502, where it operated until the end of the period.

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3. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry: This unit lifted into area of operation 3 on 18 October and subsequently conducted searching and patrolling operations in areas of operation 3 and 503 with sporadic light contact. TP MCDONNELL, composed of the battalion reconnaissance platoon and a CIDG company, conducted extensive patrolling to the northwest in areas of operation 511 and 512. During the last several days of the period, the battalion had several contacts ranging from light to moderate. Task Force MCDONNELL had several contacts with various size enemy forces. During its search and destroy operations it discovered several ammunition and supply caches.

4. C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry: The troop was initially located in the vicinity of Plei Djerang providing security for artillery and supplies at that installation. This unit, minus one platoon, moved south into area of operation 3 and conducted mounted reconnaissance in that area. A few mining incidents indicated the enemy had been active within the area. The troop continued to operate in support of the brigade task force until 30 October when it was placed under the operational control authority of the 4th Infantry Division to assist in route security in the area of operation.

(b) The operational report period for ninety-two consecutive days ended with the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division under the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division and Operation PAUL REVERE IV continuing with sporadic, but significant contact. The kill ratio of friendly to enemy was, 1:8 or 54 friendly KIA versus 464 enemy KIA.

c. (C) Training Activities:

(1) General: The 3d Brigade Task Force Replacement Training Program was initiated 17 July. Since 1 August, a total of 1134 replacement personnel have successfully completed the training program. The training, which is organized on a five day cycle, commences with orientation subjects, progresses through combat techniques of the individual soldier, small unit tactics, weapons battlesight firing, weapons familiarization firing, and culminates in a combat ambush patrol. The instruction presented in the training program emphasizes practical work which is applied at selected locations within the brigade perimeter and at the replacement training range. The combat ambush patrol is conducted beyond the confines of the brigade base camp in the adjacent brigade operational area. Reports from commanders of the units to which the replacements have been assigned subsequent to the completion of their training, attests to the value of the training and orientation and its marked success.

(2) Cadre: The Replacement Detachment Training cadre consists of one officer and ten non-commissioned officers. This cadre is organized as follows:

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- (a) Captain: OIC.
- (b) 1st Sergeant: NCOIC.
- (c) Platoon Sergeant: Assistant NCOIC and instructor.
- (d) Eight Staff Sergeants: Instructors.

After several training cycles of the program were completed it was decided that this organization was best suited to provide the depth and continuity required to efficiently and effectively conduct the replacement training.

(3) A training schedule reflecting subjects, time phases, training areas, and instructor requirements is attached as inclosure 8.

d. Chemical: There were no significant operations conducted wherein chemical agents were used. Periodic inspections of protective masks support the requirement for proper storage of the masks to preclude deterioration of the filters.

**e. PSYOPS:**

(1) During Operation PAUL REVERE III and the early portion of PAUL REVERE IV, PSYOPS appeals were primarily directed at specific villages and individuals. Incorporating the current intelligence situation, the PSYOPS program supported the daily tactical operations to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure. Ground PSYOPS teams and the PSYWAR aircraft were coordinated and used to support these tactical operations. Leaflet drops and ground presentation were conducted simultaneously.

(2) Picture leaflets of returnees and prisoners of war were used during initial questioning in the villages. This technique was quite successful in gaining information from the people about members within Viet Cong infrastructure.

(3) Aircraft (U-10) support for PAUL REVERE III was only fair. The major problems were aircraft availability, lack of timeliness, and bad weather. During PAUL REVERE IV, the major problem area was bad weather.

**(4) PSYOPS Summary:**

**(a) PAUL REVERE III:**

- 1. Total speaker hours: 24.
- 2. Leaflets: 1,054,000.

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3. Returnees: 14.

(b) PAUL REVERE IV:

1. Total speaker hours: 6

2. Leaflets: 600,000

3. Returnee: 1.

f. Tactical air support:

(1) Statistics for Operation PAUL REVERE II are contained in Inclosure 1.

(2) Statistics for Operations PAUL REVERE III and PAUL REVERE IV are as follows:

	<u>Man req</u>	<u>Man flown</u>	<u>Sky Spot</u>	<u>FAC</u>	<u>Trp in contact</u>
PAUL REVERE III	534	442	342	84	16
PAUL REVERE IV	100	75	44	20	11

(a) Sky Spots were utilized primarily to interdict known routes of infiltration and egress frequented by enemy forces and as reaction to daily visual reconnaissance sightings not within artillery range.

(b) There was no difficulty experienced in obtaining tactical air support except during that period when the availability of aircraft was severely limited.

g. Aviation: A change in internal functions of the aviation section organization was accomplished during this period. One change involved consolidation of maintenance crews into teams to provide a split maintenance capability at the brigade forward base of operations and the fixed base maintenance area. A second change was: The section assumed the responsibility of coordinating supporting aerial resupply aircraft for the brigade. The aviation section also assumed the responsibility for broadcasting artillery advisories over UHF radio. Prior to this, the task was accomplished by supporting aviation units equipped with a portable control tower. A hot line was established between the brigade FSE and the aviation section to pass advisory information. This system works well and is within the capability of the aviation section.

h. Airmobile operations: The following statistics were compiled during the reporting period:

19

3. Returnees: 14.

(b) PAUL REVERE IV:

- 1. Total speaker hours: 6
- 2. Leaflets: 600,000
- 3. Returnee: 1.

f. Tactical air support:

(1) Statistics for Operation PAUL REVERE II are contained in Inclosure 1.

(2) Statistics for Operations PAUL REVERE III and PAUL REVERE IV are as follows:

	<u>Man req</u>	<u>Man Flown</u>	<u>Sky Spot</u>	<u>FAC</u>	<u>Trp in contact</u>
PAUL REVERE III	534	442	342	84	16
PAUL REVERE IV	100	75	44	20	11

(a) Sky Spots were utilized primarily to interdict known routes of infiltration and egress frequented by enemy forces and as reaction to daily visual reconnaissance sightings not within artillery range.

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g. Aviation: A change in internal functions of the aviation section organization was accomplished during this period. One change involved consolidation of maintenance crews into teams to provide a split maintenance capability at the brigade forward base of operations and the fixed base maintenance area. A second change was: The section assumed the responsibility of coordinating supporting aerial resupply aircraft for the brigade. The aviation section also assumed the responsibility for broadcasting artillery advisories over UHF radio. Prior to this, the task was accomplished by supporting aviation units equipped with a portable control tower. A hot line was established between the brigade FSE and the aviation section to pass advisory information. This system works well and is within the capability of the aviation section.

h. Airmobile operations: The following statistics were compiled during the reporting period:

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<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>	<u>CARGO*</u>	<u>BN LIFTS</u>	<u>ARTY BTRY</u>	<u>CMET ASLT</u>
Aug 66	9,310	3,636.1	16	14	30
Sep 66	11,520	3,615.2	17	18	38
1-17 Oct 66	7,936	2,887.0	12	10	22
18-31 Oct 66	Unk	Unk	5	6	2

4. (C) LOGISTICS:

A. (U) General: Support for combat operations has been more than adequate, and no major problems have developed. At no time was the tactical operation significantly affected by logistical problems.

b. (U) Supply: Supply of the brigade task force elements is accomplished through a combination of unit and supply point distribution. Bulk Class I and V supplies were distributed to brigade units by organic transportation from the 3d Support Battalion (Provisional). Bulk Class III and IIIA have been transported from the Pleiku Sub Area Command to the brigade forward base of operation. Class II items including repair parts have normally been distributed by supply point distribution directly from Qui Nhon or Pleiku to 3d Support Battalion (Provisional). Distribution of Class II items to subordinate units is normally made directly from the brigade base camp.

c. (U) Transportation:

(1) The medium truck squad has been utilized primarily for line haul operations between Pleiku and Qui Nhon.

(2) The light truck squad has been utilized for task force troop haul, ration pick-up and distribution, and general cargo distribution.

d. (C) Maintenance:

(1) The new family of radios has created serious problems over an extended period of time due to a shortage of signal repair parts. Although the shortage of signal parts and components precluded the attainment of an acceptable operational readiness status during the early weeks of this period, increased emphasis by 1st Log Command on repair parts delivery has considerably improved the situation in the latter part of the period.

(2) Although improvement has been made since the last period, the repair of fire control instruments continued to be a problem. As in the case of signal items, the primary difficulty was non-availability of repair parts.

\*Cargo (tonnage) was based on 1000 pounds per UH1 sortie and 7000 pounds per CH 47 sortie. All artillery battery lifts are statistically reported as cargo moves.

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e. (C) Equipment: During the first quarter of FY 67, insufficient M16 rifles were received to complete a 100% replacement of M14 rifles in the hands of combat troops as had been planned.

f. (U) Construction:

(1) Base camp construction increased sharply as the rain stopped and the soil dried out. Semi-permanent mess halls, troop billets, and offices are presently under construction.

(2) Construction of the approved central water supply for Pleiku area is slated to start during the second quarter FY 67.

(3) The installation and operation of a second 100 KW generator has greatly improved the central power supply within the brigade base camp area.

(4) An ice plant is nearing completion within the brigade base camp and is expected to be in operation by the end of November. This plant will be operated by Pleiku Sub Area Command for all troops in the immediate area, but the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division will be the major user.

g. (U) Statistics for the period 1 August to 31 October:

(1) Fuel:

(a) Mogas: 422,530 gallons.

(b) Diesel: 246,360 gallons.

(c) Engine oil: 15,300 gallons.

(2) Ammunition:

(a) 40mm: 8,372 rounds.

(b) 81mm: 27,642 rounds.

(c) 20mm: 220 rounds.

(d) 4.2mm: 21,750 rounds.

(e) 105mm: 22, 100 rounds.

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(3) Rations:

(a) A rations: 510,730 meals.

(b) B rations: 605,990 meals.

(c) C rations: 324,000 meals.

Total 1,440,720 meals.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. Civic actions were conducted throughout Pleiku Province during PAUL REVERE III and IV. Major emphasis was placed on "Round Up" type operations. The brigade's civic action teams worked with military intelligence personnel, PSYOPS ground teams, PSYWAR aircraft, Pleiku Sector liaison teams, and infantry units in support of tactical operation.

b. Whenever possible, GVN representation accompanied CA/PSYOPS teams into remote areas. In many of these villages, the Thanh An District Chief brought the GVN image to the Montagnard tribesmen for the first time.

c. Civil affairs summary:

(1) 3000 (+) received medical treatment.

(2) Public works projects:

(a) A Montagnard school house is being built vicinity Thanh An District.

(b) Two spillways were constructed.

(3) 500 (+) civilian laborers were hired.

(4) Food, clothing, and blanket material were distributed to the needy.

(5) Coordination was made for operations with the National Police.

(6) Extensive communications/PSYOPS programs were conducted.

(7) Band concerts were conducted for Montagnards.

6. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. (U) General:

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(1) The attachment of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, to the 4th Infantry Division on 18 October 1966, effected a substantial decrease in the brigade strength.

(2) The 40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog), consisting of 1 officer and 26 enlisted men, was attached to the brigade on 7 September 1966.

b. (C) Unit strength:

(1) As of 31 October, the strengths of the units of the task force were as follows:

UNIT	AUTH			ATCH			ASG PLUS ATCH			DUTY		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
d Bde TF	34	9	240	12	3	233	54	8	462	50	8	433
nf	37	2	790	0	0	0	43	1	860	42	1	779
nf	37	2	790	0	0	0	41	2	815	40	2	763
nf	37	2	790	0	0	0	40	2	853	39	1	803
ty	38	3	452	0	0	0	47	2	514	45	2	481
3/4 Cav	5	0	179	0	0	0	5	0	183	5	0	177
65th Engr Bn	6	0	216	0	0	0	7	0	215	6	0	212
Bn (Prov)	7	0	127	8	0	146	8	0	161	6	0	148
25th Med Bn	8	0	80	2	0	2	11	0	79	11	0	70
725th Maint	8	0	95	0	0	6	4	2	104	3	2	101
nf Plat (Scout Dog)	1	0	26	0	0	0	1	0	24	1	0	23
IO Det	2	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	4	2	0	4
	<u>216</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>3788</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>264</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>4274</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>3994</u>

(2) The task force strength fluctuated daily during this period. The following are periodic strength figures:

AUGUST

DATE	ASSIGNED			PRESENT FOR DUTY		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
5 Aug	244	21	4848	223	15	4152
12 Aug	250	21	4913	230	16	4329
19 Aug	259	21	4883	232	15	4313
26 Aug	265	20	4886	253	17	4325
31 Aug	280	19	4914	252	16	4338

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(1) The attachment of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, to the 4th Infantry Division on 18 October 1966, effected a substantial decrease in the brigade strength.

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b. (C) Unit strength:

(1) As of 31 October, the strengths of the units of the task force were as follows:

UNIT	AUTH			ATCH			ASG PLUS ATCH			OFF
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	
HHC, 3d Bde TF	34	9	240	12	3	233	54	8	462	50
1/14 Inf	37	2	790	0	0	0	43	1	860	42
1/35 Inf	37	2	790	0	0	0	41	2	815	40
2/35 Inf	37	2	790	0	0	0	40	2	853	39
2/9 Arty	38	3	452	0	0	0	47	2	514	45
C Trp, 3/4 Cav	5	0	179	0	0	0	5	0	183	5
Co D, 65th Engr Bn	6	0	216	0	0	0	7	0	215	6
3d Spt Bn (Prov)	7	0	127	8	0	146	8	0	161	6
Co B, 25th Med Bn	8	0	80	2	0	2	11	0	79	11
Co D, 725th Maint	8	0	95	0	0	6	4	2	104	3
40th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	1	0	26	0	0	0	1	0	24	1
14th PIO Det	2	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	4	2
	<u>216</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>3788</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>287</u>	<u>264</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>4274</u>	<u>250</u>

(2) The task force strength fluctuated daily during this period. The following are periodic strength figures:

AUGUST

DATE	ASSIGNED			PRESENT FOR DUTY		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
5 Aug	244	21	4848	223	15	4152
12 Aug	250	21	4913	230	16	4320
19 Aug	259	21	4883	232	15	4313
26 Aug	265	20	4886	253	17	4225
31 Aug	280	19	4914	252	16	4320

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SEPTEMBER

DATE	<u>ASSIGNED</u>			<u>PRESENT FOR DUTY</u>		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
2 Sep	275	19	4912	243	16	4313
9 Sep	276	19	4853	244	16	4145
16 Sep	284	20	4901	249	16	4016
23 Sep	297	20	4979	262	18	4152
30 Sep	300	20	5134	273	18	4375

OCTOBER

DATE	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
7 Oct	300	20	5009	268	19	4290
14 Oct	301	20	5083	271	15	4395
21 Oct	266	17	4498*1	243	14	3912
28 Oct	263	17	4248*2	247	15	3965
31 Oct	263	17	4274	250	16	3994

(3) Replacements received:

AUGUST

	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	0	1	0	4	14	19
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
1/35 Inf	0	0	0	2	2	8	38	50
2/35 Inf	0	0	0	6	7	6	79	98
1/69 Arm	0	0	0	3	4	8	10	25
2/9 Arty	0	0	0	1	4	2	23	30
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	0	1	2	24	31
3d Spt Bn	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>15</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>273</b>

\*1 Attachment of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor to 4th Infantry Division.

\*2 Loss of hospitalized personnel.

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SEPTEMBER

	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	0	1	1	1	0	5	36	44
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	2	1	2	109	114
1/35 Inf	0	0	0	1	2	3	92	98
2/35 Inf	0	0	0	1	1	5	93	100
1/69 Arm	0	0	0	4	7	11	16	38
2/9 Arty	0	1	0	0	0	3	45	49
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	0	1	0	10	11
3d Spt Bn	0	0	0	0	1	2	6	26
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>418</u>	<u>480</u>

OCTOBER

	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	1	1	0	3	6	10	27	48
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	5	3	4	55	67
1/35 Inf	0	0	1	5	9	4	71	90
2/35 Inf	0	0	1	4	1	2	65	73
1/69 Arm	0	0	0	2	1	6	18	27
2/29 Arty	0	0	1	0	2	9	81	93
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	0	1	4	21	26
3d Spt Bn	0	0	0	1	3	2	21	27
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>3559</u>	<u>451</u>

(4) The number of friendly casualties for August, September, and October are as follows:

	KIA	WIA	MIA	WIA DIED OF WOUNDS
Organic units:	28	193	1	6
CCA units:	30	94	0	unk

(5) Number of emergency leaves:

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
HQ, 3d Brigade	2	0	3
HQ, 1st Bn, 14th Inf	1	1	2
HQ, 1st Bn, 35th Inf	4	2	5
HQ, 2d Bn, 35th Inf	4	5	3
HQ, 2d Bn, 9th Arty	1	0	3
HQ, 1st Bn, 69th Arm	2	4	3
3d Spt Bn, Prov	0	0	0
C Trp, 3d Sqdn, 4th Cav	0	0	2
Co D, 65th Engr Bn	1	1	2
40th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	0	0	0
Co D, 725th Maint Bn	1	0	0

\* Friendly casualties from organic units were compiled from personnel reports; casualties from units under CCA of the brigade were compiled from reports.

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	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
Co B, 25th Med Bn	0	1	0
14th Public Inf Det	0	0	0
	<u>16</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>23</u>

## (6) Personnel who departed for separation:

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
1/14 Inf	30	26	35
1/35 Inf	26	46	24
2/35 Inf	24	29	20
2/9 Arty	15	22	21
1/69 Arm	18	24	8
C/3/4 Cav	7	7	18
Spt (S&T, HHC 3d Bde, D/65 Engr)	<u>23</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>53</u>
TOTAL	143	165	179

(7) On 26 October 1966, the USARV Patient Casual Company was activated. This helped considerably by reducing the brigade's assigned strength by the number of personnel in in-country hospitals. A total of 358 personnel were dropped effective 26 October 1966.

(8) This headquarters published Regulation Number 335-2 on the conduct of quarterly muster formation. The muster report compared with the unit morning report should assist immeasurably in promoting accurate strength accounting.

c. (C) Morale: Morale continues to be excellent within the command.

## (1) Mail:

- (a) Number of bags received: 2835.
- (b) Number of bags dispatched: 2209.
- (c) Total money orders sold: 23,947.
- (d) Total value of money orders sold including fees: \$1,533,677.81.
- (e) Total stamp value sold: \$16,332.90.
- (f) Dates mail was not received:
  - 1. August: 16th, 22d and 24th.

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2. September: 9th, 14th, 20th and 25th.

3. October: 5th, 8th, 13th, 18th and 26th.

(2) R & R:

(a) Allocations appear to be adequate and are definitely a positive morale factor.

(b) The monthly allocations were as follows\*:

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	25	26	24
1/14 Inf	60	50	42
1/35 Inf	49	44	41
2/35 Inf	52	44	44
1/69 Arm	52	47	38
Co D, 65th Engr	13	10	9
Spt Bn	20	19	18
2/9 Arty	<u>28</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>27</u>
TOTAL	299	269	243

d. Promotion allocations:

	<u>AUGUST</u>					
	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	1	2	0	1	11	22
1/14 Inf	0	0	2	11	20	44
1/35 Inf	0	0	1	20	38	40
2/35 Inf	0	1	2	19	30	40
1/69 Arm	0	0	2	6	5	40
2/9 Arty	0	1	0	3	0	11
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	2	5	5
3d Spt Bn	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>26</u>
TOTAL	1	5	9	78	111	242 (44%)

	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>					
	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	0	4	12	30
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	9	26	53
1/35 Inf	0	0	0	2	5	40
2/35 Inf	0	0	0	7	25	45
1/69 Arm	0	0	0	3	4	40

\*Figures include standby allocations.

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	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	
2/9 Arty	0	0	0	4	10	18	
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	2	8	8	
3d Spt Bn	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>	
TOTAL	0	0	0	38	94	244	(376)

OCTOBER

	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	1	3	14	28	
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	3	14	54	
1/35 Inf	0	0	0	3	10	40	
2/35 Inf	0	0	1	1	14	30	
1/69 Artn	0	0	0	3	5	40	
2/9 Arty	0	0	0	3	15	20	
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	2	12	12	
40th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)	0	0	0	1	0	9	
3d Spt Bn	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>16</u>	
TOTAL	0	0	2	22	90	249	(363)

e. Awards and decorations:

(1) During this period the brigade awards and decorations program was fully implemented and received much emphasis.

(2) Awards presented:

	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER
Purple Heart	20	125	83
Air Medal	43	35	52
Air Medal with "V" Device	1	1	1
Army Commendation Medal	6	25	235
Army Commendation Medal with "V" Device	0	10	12
Bronze Star	11	32	152
Bronze Star with "V" Device	56	76	37
Legion of Merit	1	2	1
Soldiers Medal	0	2	0
Silver Star	3	10	4
Distinguished Service Cross	0	0	0

f. Religion:

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(1) With personnel widely dispersed it is often difficult to provide complete religious coverage. Nevertheless, the chaplains have apparently overcome this obstacle and the religious services have been more than adequate.

(2) The unit chaplains made numerous trips to visit brigade hospitalised personnel.

(3) Jewish personnel were given an opportunity to attend Yom Kipper services in Nha Trang.

g. Reenlistment:

(1) The high reenlistment rate in the brigade is a positive indication of the high morale which predominates this unit.

(2) Reenlistments:

	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
Last Prior Service RA (career)	12	10	9
Last Prior Service	1	9	11
Last Prior Service AUS	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	15	21	21
PERCENTAGE	28%	33%	25%

7. ARTILLERY:

a. 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery continued as the direct support artillery battalion for the brigade. The brigade was supported by additional artillery as indicated in paragraph 1d, above.

b. During the period 1 August to 18 October an aerial observer was airborne continuously during all flyable daylight hours. This was curtailed subsequent to that date because of the reduction of aircraft assets.

c. Countermortar radar was employed throughout the period, but there were no reported enemy mortar incidents within range of the radar.

d. Interrogation reports attest to the effectiveness of interdiction fires. These fires were planned in conjunction with the brigade S2 and were based on current intelligence/information.

8. ENGINEER:

a. Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion continued in general support of the task force providing support both in the area of operations and at brigade base camp.

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b. (C) Operations:

(1) Plans: The company will continue to provide engineer support both in the area of operation and base camp.

(2) Support in the area of operation consisted of bunker destruction, EOD, assisting in preparation of defensive perimeters, clearing landing zones and other general engineer support. Two combat engineer squads are normally employed with each committed maneuver battalion.

(3) Brigade base camp support included the construction of semi-permanent buildings for the brigade; i.e., messhalls, billets and headquarters. This work is being done on a self-help basis with engineer technical assistance. Layout, siting, and concrete work is being done by the engineer company. Materials for vertical construction is prefabricated by the engineer company for the using unit.

c. (C) Logistics:

(1) Maintenance of 5 ton bridge trucks, M139, became a maintenance problem because of a shortage of repair parts. Authorization to cannibalize one truck to remove others from deadline provided short term relief.

(2) Materials for brigade base camp construction are now received from both Pleiku Sub Area Command (PSAC) and 1st Logistical Command in Qui Nhon. Prior to opening of the Class IV yard at PSAC, all materials were hauled from Qui Nhon to the brigade base camp by this company.

(3) The Bridge Platoon of the engineer company has been used a great deal for transporting supplies and personnel.

(4) No major logistics problems, directly affecting the engineer company, were noted except the shortage and difficulty of receiving construction equipment. Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command is knowledgeable of this problem.

ADG-0-0  
 SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966  
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SECTION II COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Observation (Lessons Learned) (C)

1. (C) Personnel:

a. Item: Maintaining Current Individual DA Form 41, Record of Emergency Data.

Discussion: On numerous occasions, promptly submitted and well composed letters of sympathy have been returned by USARV because addressee on letter was contrary to information contained on deceased serviceman's DA Form 41, Record of Emergency Data. Regardless of information contained in company records, information obtained from personal acquaintance with deceased serviceman, or information of specific circumstances, USARV will not forward letter to survivors unless name and address of next of kin is exactly as stated on their copy of DA Form 41.

Observation: Commanders must ensure that the individual's DA Form 41 is kept current and that all letters of sympathy conform exactly to the data contained therein.

b. Item: Nature of wound.

Discussion: Casualty reports reflecting inaccurate information in the "nature of wounds" entry have caused considerable confusion when letters of sympathy and awards have been written. Commanders who have personal knowledge of exactly how their men were killed have rightfully refused to compromise their account of the injury to conform with an inaccurate casualty report. The brigade casualty reporting team takes their information from doctors located in the brigade clearing station. A small fragment wound may appear to be a gunshot wound. Only if the medic on the spot indicates what type wound it is, will the doctor be able to confirm it.

Observation: Company aidmen must take great care to ensure that item 14 (diagnosis) of DD Form 1380, US Field Medical Card, attached to evacuee clearly indicates appropriate injury, i.e., "GS" or "FRAG". all doctors and casualty reporting personnel should take the time necessary to read this card before making an erroneous and irrevocable entry on the official casualty report.

2. (C) Operations:

a. Item: Destruction of tunnels and bunkers.


Discussion: NVA forces make frequent use of well-constructed bunkers and tunnel systems which are impervious to anything except direct

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
hits by heavy artillery or heavy bombs. Destruction of these bunkers and tunnels is a task for which the only feasible solution is the expert use of demolitions.

Observation: A system providing maximum destruction per unit of explosives is graphically portrayed below:

FRONT AND SIDE VIEW NVA BUNKER W/TUNNEL




FILLING PASSAGEWAY




CHARGE EMPLACEMENT

1. Hole for charge approx 3/4 depth of cover
2. Charge placed
3. Hole filled & tamped hard



DETONATION



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b. Item: Means for pilots to identify the locations of friendly units under heavy tree canopy.

Discussion: Infantry units are frequently required to operate in areas where the tree canopy is extremely dense. They are often required to mark their locations for aircraft flying overhead to receive artillery fire support, tactical air support, air-dropped resupply, or navigational assistance. The smoke generated from smoke grenades currently issued often fails to penetrate the canopy or, when it does penetrate, has frequently drifted with the wind from the point where it was activated.

Observation: A pyrotechnic device which produces colored smoke and also propels the smoke upward should be made available for issue. Consideration should be given to using the M79 as the launcher.

c. Item: Field expedient use of Claymore Mines to clear LZ.

Discussion: When an infantry company needs to expand a landing zone and does not have proper demolitions readily available, a properly placed Claymore Mine will quickly and effectively destroy a tree trunk. By placing the mine against the tree as if the tree were the enemy and then securing the mine against the tree using the carrying case, the mine will blow down a tree two to twelve inches in diameter.

Observation: Claymore Mines are a good emergency substitute for C4 when trees must be felled to clear a landing zone.

d. Item: Pursuit.

Discussion: When pursuing NVA and VC elements in the highlands, it has been noted that the enemy often rapidly disappears even in dense undergrowth. Subsequent area search often reveals trails that allowed the enemy rapid movement. On one occasion, a platoon was able to move back to its base in 40 minutes by a trail over a distance that had required three hours when moving cross country.

Observation: When the NVA break contact and disappear, look for possible trails on which to pursue; pursuit should be executed with caution when using prominent trails with maximum emphasis on security measures to preclude walking into an ambush.

e. Item: Enemy foraging parties.

Discussion: NVA forces harboring in an area send out small (2-3 men) foraging or rice carrying parties for distances up to 5 - 6 thousand meters from their main base.

AMPC-G-07

4 November 1966

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**Observation:** US Forces have been successful in capturing prisoners from these small groups who, under interrogation, have provided extremely valuable information.

f. **Item:** Fire coordination line.

**Discussion:** Fire coordination lines cannot be arbitrarily selected without mutual agreement between commanders. Additionally, to aid in recognition by ground units and aerial observers the fire coordination line should follow a well defined terrain feature.

**Observation:** To avoid confusion the boundary between units and the fire coordination line should be one and the same.

g. **Item:** Close in adjustment of artillery.

**Discussion:** It is often necessary to fire artillery extremely close to friendly units (50-100 meters). During any firing to recoil of the weapon, aiming post displacement or shifting of trails may cause the weapon to be a few mils out of lay. This difference can endanger friendly troops when close-in firing is required.

**Observation:** A technique used when close-in firing is provided, is to continuously check the lay of each piece with the aiming circle and re-lay the howitzer if necessary. During firing this is accomplished by calling out one piece at a time, checking it, re-laying if necessary, and continuing on to the next piece.

3. (C) Training:

a. **Item:** M16 Rifle battlesight zeroing.

**Discussion:** The ballistic characteristic difference between the ball and tracer ammunition dictate that the weapon be zeroed to fire one or the other. Those leaders who continually fire tracer ammunition should establish their battlesight zero with tracer and those who do not normally fire tracer should establish their battlesight zero with ball ammunition. This has been implemented in this brigade's replacement training program.

**Observation:** Junior leaders should be reminded of this and Replacement Training programs should adopt this procedure.

b. **Item:** Indirect fire adjustment.

**Discussion:** Experience has shown that individuals have difficulty adjusting indirect weapons fire unless they can see the fire.

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round in the proximity of the target. Most individuals are capable of submitting subsequent fire requests.

Observation: The elements of the initial fire request should be stressed in basic and advanced individual training to overcome this shortcoming.

c. Item: Grenadier training in the firing of the XM576 round.

Discussion: The sight on the M79 was not designed to fire the XM576 shotgun round.

Observation: Grenadiers should undergo a familiarization firing program for the firing of M79 with the shotgun round.

#### 4. (C) Intelligence:

a. Item: Enemy observation of friendly units.

Discussion: Prisoners of war reported that they maintained contact with friendly forces through use of reconnaissance units which reported location, direction of movement, and strength to higher headquarters. These reconnaissance units allegedly reported by both land line and radio to higher headquarters. Their "modus operandi" included established outposts/listening posts or actually following units. The enemy use of these elements could explain in part how the enemy was able to attack friendly positions within thirty minutes to two hours after EENT with up to battalion size strengths. These enemy reconnaissance patrols, plus some preparation of the battlefield and knowledge of the terrain, would have allowed the enemy to anticipate where friendly forces would stand down for the night. The enemy could then position himself for an attack.

Observation: US personnel should be appraised of this enemy tactic and the enemy's ability to capitalize on the information gained. Commanders should adopt procedures to counteract this enemy "modus operandi" such as the utilization of stay behind forces to ambush routes used.

b. Item: The ratio of enemy KIA (DG) to weapons captured during PAUL REVERE IV has been nearly 1:1.

Discussion: Past experience has shown that a good body count to weapons captured ratio was 3:1. It is believed that the favorable improvement of this ratio can be attributed to two primary causes. First, aggressive pursuit by friendly forces using fire and maneuver which precluded the enemy from making a thorough job of battlefield sanitization. Second, the influx of large numbers of replacements may be having an adverse effect on the discipline within enemy units.

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Observation: This information should be made available to commanders and considered as an item for exploration in PSYOPS.

c. Item: Viet Cong infrastructure.

Discussion: The significant lack of North Vietnamese Army contact during portions of this period afforded commanders of US Forces the opportunity to commit forces to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure for the first time. The initiation of operations against the Viet Cong infrastructure is difficult for several reasons: There is little information/intelligence maintained by ARVN from which US Forces can get a good start; this is understandable since it is difficult to penetrate the Viet Cong infrastructure.

Observation: The problem of attacking the infrastructure has to be approached on a long range basis and as a joint effort with both ARVN and US Forces participation. The US Forces should be used to suppress overt guerrilla activities, while the ARVN concentrates on the collection of necessary OB information to root out the Viet Cong.

d. Item: Maps.

Discussion: Battalions have been using both the standard 1:50,000 topographic maps and the new 1:25,000 pictomaps. It has been found that if only one map is used, the 1:50,000 map is the best. However, when using the pictomaps as a supplement to the 1:50,000 map, many details of the terrain are brought out which definitely aid the man on the ground in determining his location. It should be pointed out that the new 1:50,000 map series incorporate some of the faults of the old series. The terrain in mountainous, heavily jungled areas is often vaguely depicted. Prominent ridges, ravines, streams, etc. are found on the ground which do not appear on the maps. This sometimes makes for difficult land navigation.

Observation: Junior leaders should be appraised of these facts.

5. (C) Logistics:

a. Item: Use of the 250 gallon rubber water drum.

Discussion: These drums are sling loaded to forward LZ. The maximum capacity that may be carried by a HU-1D aircraft is 125 gallons. If the ceiling is low, the HU-1D aircraft has difficulty carrying the sling loaded drum because the aircraft is not able to contour with a sling load. Experience dictates that the nozzle must be carefully handled.

as it is easily broken and even more easily lost. Four water drums are required to support the four companies of each battalion.

Observation: Drums should not be used when the ceiling is low. To ensure that all water in the drum is used, a hoist should be constructed. Water cans must be rapidly available for use when weather conditions preclude the use of the water drum.

b. Item: Front sight, M16 rifle.

Discussion: Water accumulates in the front sight. If not removed, it will cause the sight to rust and become inoperable.

Observation: A few drops of oil on the front sight and exercising the sight will preclude this.

c. Item: Centralized control of aviation section personnel and maintenance procedures.

Discussion: Normally a crew-chief is assigned per aircraft and mechanics' helpers used in general support of the section. The crew-chief remained with his aircraft whether in the field or in the rear area. Problems experienced with this organization were:

(1) Inability to use crew-chiefs for inspection of other aircraft.

(2) Crew rotation between the field maintenance base and the forward base of operation was based upon aircraft availability and led to an inconsistent employment of crew-chiefs.

(3) The training of mechanics' helpers was impossible since qualified crew-chiefs were not readily available.

Consolidation of maintenance crews into three separate teams alleviated this. One qualified mechanic stays with two mechanics' helpers day after day permitting continuity in their training. The system of two teams specializing in intermediate inspections, and one specializing in periodic inspections, improved inspection quality. Personnel are rotated systematically. An additional product of this system was the competitive spirit between the teams.

Observation: The results are worthy of consideration for adoption in other aviation sections.

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d. Item: Indigenous Rations.

Discussion: The "C" rations are too heavy for the individual soldier to carry on patrols lasting two or more days. This is especially true while working in mountainous terrain. The problem is compounded by the extremes of temperature and the density of the ground cover. Elimination of one meal per day of "C" rations has not proven satisfactory since this impairs the performance of the individual over a 48 hour period or longer. One indigenous ration is light and provides sufficient food for two men for one meal and weighs considerably less than two "C" ration meals.

Observation: Issuing one indigenous ration as a substitute for two "C" ration meals would greatly reduce the weight each individual would be required to carry for sustained operations.

e. Item: Alleviate the shortage of anchor bolts for use in building construction.

Discussion: During the construction of buildings in the brigade base camp, a shortage of anchor bolts was experienced. The anchor bolt, which is used to prevent horizontal displacement of buildings during and after erection, were fashioned from metal rods found in the 105mm howitzer ammunition boxes. These rods are cut in 8 inch lengths and imbedded in fresh concrete.

Observation: This improvised anchor bolt is a satisfactory substitute.

6. Other:

a. Item: Unit public information representatives.

Discussion: To provide timely and accurate information, spot reports as input for news coverage of the brigade task force activities, "reporters" are required at the battalion level. These individuals can be deserving riflemen who have served six months in that capacity and have a writing ability. These representatives monitor their respective unit's activities and insure comprehensive reporting of all items of news interest.

Observation: This system of reporting was implemented and has proven superior to previous methods of reporting items of news interest.

b. Item: M16 cleaning rod.

Discussion: The M16 cleaning rod, when carried in its case on the pistol belt, often becomes bent or broken. Because of its importance to the individual soldier, it should never be separated from his weapon.

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(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

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Observation: The cleaning rod should be secured to the hand guard of the M16 rifle. This provides easy access when needed and minimizes the chances of damage.

Part II, Recommendations

Recommend the observations noted in Part I, Section II above, be considered appropriate.

JAMES G. SHANAHAN  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

~~8- Incl:~~ w/d

- 1 - Combat Operations After Action Report for Period 1 August through 25 August 1966
- 2 - Disposition of Task Force Units PAUL REVERE III 26 August 1966
- 3 - Operations Schematic PAUL REVERE III Period 26 August - 10 September
- 4 - Operations Schematic PAUL REVERE III Period 11 - 27 September
- 5 - Operations Schematic PAUL REVERE III Period 28 September - 18 October
- 6 - Disposition of Task Force Units PAUL REVERE IV 18 October
- 7 - Operations Schematic PAUL REVERE IV Period 18 - 31 October
- 8 - Replacement Training Schedule

Distribution:

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3d Spt Bn (Prov)	1
D/65	1
CO	1
S1	1
S2	1
S3	1
S4	1
S5	1
Sig O	1
Avn O	1
CG, 4th Inf Div	1

AVFPA-OC (23 Nov 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966  
(RCS CSFOR-63) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 4th Infantry Division, APO US Forces 96262

TO: Commanding General, I Force V, ATTN: AVFA-OC-O&T, APO US Forces 96350

1. (U) Forwarded is the Operational Report of Lessons Learned for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966, submitted by the 3D Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

2. (U) The reported unit was placed under operational control of the 4th Infantry Division on 18 October 1966.

3. (C) The report is considered adequate and has been reviewed by this headquarters. Specific comments follow:

a. Paragraph 17C, Inclosure 1, Combat Operations After Action Report for Period 1 August through 25 August 1966, recommends upgrading of Route 19 west of Route 14 to Duc Co. The 937th Engineer Group and 20th Engineer Battalion received the mission of upgrading Route 19 to a Class 50 road on 15 October 1966. Progress has been rapid and Route 19 will soon be Class 50 for two-way traffic.

b. Paragraph 17f, Inclosure 1, Combat Operations After Action Report for Period 1 August through 25 August 1966, recommends C-130 airstrips be prepared and maintained at Plei Me, Oasis, Cat, Catecka, and Duc Co. Oasis has a C-130 strip presently being repaired by the 4th Engineer Battalion. A C-130 airstrip is being prepared at Duc Co by the 4th Engineer Battalion. The 937th Engineer Group has been tasked with the mission of preparing additional C-130 airstrips. Exact locations of these airstrips are not known at this headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



DENNIS E. BURKE

LT, AGC

Act AG

1 INCL  
nc

Downgraded at 3 Year Interval  
Declassified After 12 Years  
REF ID: A5200.10

AFHQ-CC-012 (4 Nov 66)

3d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operation Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966  
(REF 0870065)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96350 28 DEC 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307

(D) This Headquarters concurs with the 3/25th Infantry Division Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 Oct 66. The following comments are submitted:

a. Section II, Part 1, Paragraph 4c (Viet Cong Infrastructure): The most effective time to eliminate the infrastructure is during the conduct of military operations, providing surprise is achieved and proper planning has taken place. National Police assistance must be coordinated to the maximum extent possible.

b. Inclusion 1, Paragraph 16 (Clearance and Notification of Artillery and Mortar Fires): This headquarters is currently preparing a regulation covering artillery/aircraft coordination for air space utilization. This regulation will incorporate the recommendation submitted by 3/25th Infantry Division.

c. 1st Indorsement, Paragraph 3b (Airstrips): The following airstrip information has been furnished to Hq, 4th Infantry Division:

(1) PLE ME (ZA145071): CV-2 rated. No plans to upgrade to C-130.

(2) OASIS (ZA105276): All weather C-130 rated. This strip is scheduled to be rehabilitated with M8A1 Steel Mat commencing on or about January 1967 (estimated completion EIT 15 February 1967).

(3) CATCKA (ZA203341): Dry weather C-130 rated. No plans to upgrade.

(4) CAT (YU965895): Dry weather C-123 rated (poor shape). Ultimate plans are to upgrade to C-130 as required by future operations in that vicinity. Prior to upgrading, an access road must be constructed to the site. Construction of access road is programmed to be completed prior to the SW Monsoon Season.

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(DCS ODPOR-65)

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(5) DUC 00 (YUC29251): Marginal C-130 water. This strain will be rehabilitated with H&A1 Steel Hat to full all weather capability prior to 1 April 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*William H. James*  
WILLIAM H. JAMES  
Colonel AGC  
Adjutant General

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS GSPOR-65)

EW

**HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307**

**22 FEB 1967**

**TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT  
APO 96598**

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report—Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 29th Infantry Division as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:


a. Reference Paragraph 4f(2), Section I, Page 18: The central water supply system has been completed and consists of a 10" line connecting a 1,000 GPM pumping station at Lake Bien Ho to a 52,000 gallon storage tank in the vicinity of ARVN II Corps Headquarters. However, inasmuch as the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, obtains most of its water requirements from a spring adjacent to its cantonment area, this central water system is of primary interest to assorted other units and activities in the Pleiku area.

b. Reference Paragraph 2b, Part I, Section II, Page 30: Illuminating, smoke, and white star cluster projectiles for the M79 Grenade Launcher are currently being tested and evaluated. Evaluation has not been completed. However, other type position markers are being evaluated concurrently.

c. Reference Paragraph 5d, Part I, Section II, Page 35: The observation on issue of indigenous rations to US Army personnel is not approved by the Surgeon General. Use of the Long Range Patrol Food Packet is recommended for use in patrol actions. On 27 December 1966, the brigade commander was informed on the availability and use of this food packet.

d. Reference Paragraph 6b, Part I, Section II, Pages 35 and 36: This headquarters has requested that the stock of the M-16 Rifle be modified to provide a receptacle for the cleaning rod and associated cleaning equipment.

**FOR THE COMMANDER:**



**R. J. THORNTON**  
1st Lt. AGC  
Asst. Adjutant General

8 Incl  
ne

When Separated  
Classified Inclosures

OPREP-CI (4 Nov 66)

4th Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CEFOR-65), HQ 25th Inf Div, 3d Bde Task Force

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 15 MAR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



G. L. McMULLIN  
CPT, AGO  
Ass't AG

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losures