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8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report (U)

(2) During the afternoon of 31 Oct 67, 1/18 Inf made contact with an estimated Viet Cong company force in the vicinity of grid XU795097. Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty fired 1600 rounds in support of the contact. Several times the fire was brought in as close as 50 meters from friendly forces. Fire control lines were established which formed a sealed triangle of artillery, tactical air strikes and gunships around the area of contact. Approximately one half of the enemy dead were attributed to artillery fires.

(3) On 310055 Oct 67, the Viet Cong launched a combined mortar, rocket and ground attack against a sub-sector headquarters in an ARVN compound (XU730020) and the fire support base (XU731078) of Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty and Company C, 2d Bn, 23rd Inf. The artillery battery utilized one howitzer to fire 302 rounds in self-illumination and another howitzer fired 578 rounds direct fire across an airstrip to break up the ground attack. The remaining 4 howitzers fired 705 rounds in a counter mortar/counter rocket program.

8. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Resupply notions were conducted almost entirely by CH-47 aircraft. This required very close control over the A-22 bags and sling equipment. It required a maximum effort to keep class V supplies prepared for delivery to the field.

b. A supplementary air warning center was established at Coisson III S to broadcast air data to the air traffic along Highway 19. This helped speed the response time for artillery fires.

c. Ammunition expended for Savannah II:

| | |
|----------------|------------|
| 105mm Howitzer | 107,145 |
| 155mm Howitzer | 28,291 |
| 31n Howitzer | 6,146 |
| 175mm Gun | <u>682</u> |
| TOTAL | 142,264 |

9. (C) COMMANDER ANALYSIS:

a. There were no written orders issued during the course of the operation. Verbal orders and flexibility were the usual requirements. Decisions made by the Commanding General were quickly translated into action by moving units on short notice to support the maneuver units. The optimum number of 105 Batteries were attached to the direct support battalions throughout the operation. At no time did it appear that more direct support artillery was needed. An entire medium artillery battery would have been a valuable asset in the Loc Ninh area. More targets could have been engaged with the greater range capability.

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b. On several occasions, the maneuver units found dead Viet Cong and destroyed base camps while on search and destroy operations. This attests to the effectiveness of target acquisition and an effective H & I program.

10. (c) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions:

(1) Effective artillery fires delivered in support of close contact should not be lifted for delivery of air strikes or for gunships. Artillery fires should, if necessary, be shifted to permit the use of air and gunships on the far flanks of the area of contact.

(2) Fire coordination lines worked to great advantage when they were determined in coordination between the ground commander and the supporting artillery commander.

(3) The necessity for the use of air observers for units in contact was conclusively proven. The forward observer's observation is too limited in the jungle terrain. The ground and air observers, working in concert, can effect good placement of artillery fires.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) In situations where units are moved quickly by air and attached to another commander, the present assignment of radio frequencies is not adequate. Spare frequencies must be made available to Division Artillery to avoid overcrowded fire direction nets.

(2) Artillery fires, gunships and tactical air can be utilized concurrently in close support of the maneuver units. Assignment of fire coordination lines.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Donald A. Pissone
DONALD A. PISSONE
Major, Artillery
Adjutant

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| <u>#</u> | <u>TARGET</u> | <u>DTG</u> | <u>LOW LEVEL VISUAL RECON OBSERVATIONS</u> |
|----------|----------------|------------|--|
| 1 | BINH LONG 1302 | 080230 Oct | Base camp containing knapsacks with 3 to 4 mortar rounds, 2 good bunkers, ponchos, heavy foot traffic through bomb craters. The area was occupied just before and after strike. Uncovered 3 base camps. Numerous wires crossing trail; could be communication wires. |
| 2 | BINH LONG 1303 | 091040 Oct | Destroyed 75% of a base camp. Uncovered or partially destroyed several huts. Uncovered camouflaged fighting positions, bunkers, base camps with broken pottery in area, trenchline, and 4 foxholes. |
| 3 | BINH LONG 1304 | 140605 Oct | 20 bunkers, mostly destroyed. Small base camp destroyed. One military structure destroyed. 8 fighting positions. Cut axonut trail. Uncovered tunnel entrance. One storage area. One large bunker; base camp with 7 bunkers. |
| 4 | BINH LONG 1305 | 181900 Oct | 8-10 fighting positions destroyed. One foxhole destroyed. One bunker damaged. One tunnel entrance destroyed. Platoon sized base camp partially destroyed. 19 bunkers uncovered. 2 huts uncovered. 2 locations of foot traffic after strike. Uncovered equipment on ground. |
| 5 | BINH LONG 1306 | 191200 Oct | Base camp destroyed. Storage area destroyed. 2 huts destroyed. 2 spiderholes destroyed. Uncovered work-oid base camp. |
| 6 | BINH LONG 1309 | 201500 Oct | 2 KBA (BC). Company size base camp and sqd size BC dest. 20 bunkers destroyed. One storage bunker destroyed. 7 fighting positions destroyed. 5 military structures damaged. 3 rocks cut. 2 trenches opened up. 2 military structures damaged. 3 tunnel entrances uncovered. 6 secondary explosions. |
| 7 | BINH LONG 1310 | 210600 Oct | Battalion size base camp (20-25 bunkers) destroyed. 500 meters of trench partially destroyed. 2 huts (10x10) partially destroyed. Foxhole with trenchline partially destroyed. 3 fighting positions destroyed. Tunnel entrance uncovered. (VR discovered heavy trail movement to S-SW since 201500 Oct). |
| 8 | BINH LONG 1307 | 220600 Oct | 100 meters tunnel destroyed, trail network destroyed, 2 bunkers destroyed; 3 fighting positions, 3 bunkers and 1 tunnel entrance uncovered. |

ANNEX D

ANNEX D, B-52 STRIKERS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION SHERWOODAH II, PHASE I

29 September to 30 October 1967

2/6

| <u>#</u> | <u>TARGET</u> | <u>DTG</u> | <u>LOW LEVEL VISUAL RECON OBSERVATIONS</u> |
|----------|----------------|------------|---|
| 1 | BINH LONG 1302 | 080230 Oct | Base camp containing knapsacks with 3 to 4 mortar rounds, 2 good bunkers, ponchos, heavy foot traffic through bomb craters. The area was occupied just before and after strike. Uncovered 3 base camps. Numerous wires crossing trail; could be communication wires. |
| 2 | BINH LONG 1303 | 091040 Oct | Destroyed 75% of a base camp. Uncovered or partially destroyed several huts. Uncovered camouflaged fighting positions, bunkers, base camps with broken pottery in area, trenchline, and 4 foxholes. |
| 3 | BINH LONG 1304 | 140605 Oct | 20 bunkers, mostly destroyed. Small base camp destroyed. One military structure destroyed. 8 fighting positions. Cut excavated trail. Uncovered tunnel entrance. One storage area. One large bunker; base camp with 7 bunkers. |
| 4 | BINH LONG 1305 | 181900 Oct | 8-10 fighting positions destroyed. One foxhole destroyed. One bunker damaged. One tunnel entrance destroyed. Platoon sized base camp partially destroyed. 19 bunkers uncovered. 2 huts uncovered. 2 locations of foot traffic after strike. Uncovered equipment on ground. |
| 5 | BINH LONG 1306 | 191200 Oct | Base camp destroyed. Storage area destroyed. 2 huts destroyed. 2 spiderholes destroyed. Uncovered work-aid base camp. |
| 6 | BINH LONG 1309 | 201500 Oct | 2 KBA (BC). Company sized base camp and sqd sized BC dest. 20 bunkers destroyed. One storage bunker destroyed. 7 fighting positions destroyed. 5 military structures damaged. 3 roads cut. 2 trenches opened up. 2 military structures damaged. 3 tunnel entrances uncovered. 6 secondary explosions. |
| 7 | BINH LONG 1310 | 210600 Oct | Battalion sized base camp (20-25 bunkers) destroyed. 500 meters of trench partially destroyed. 2 huts (10x10) partially destroyed. Foxhole with trenchline partially destroyed. 3 fighting positions destroyed. Tunnel entrance uncovered. (VP discovered heavy trail movement to S-SW since 201500 Oct). |
| 8 | BINH LONG 1307 | 220600 Oct | 100 meters tunnel destroyed, trail network destroyed. 2 bunkers destroyed. |

ANNEX D, B-52 STRIKES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION SILENT DAWN II, PHASE I, (Cont)

29 September to 30 October 1967

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| <u>#</u> | <u>TARGET</u> | <u>DTG</u> | <u>LOW LEVEL VISUAL RECORD OBSERVATIONS</u> |
|----------|-----------------|------------|---|
| 9 | BINH LONG 1308 | 230600 Oct | 11 bunkers destroyed, 3 foxholes destroyed, 1 foxhole partially destroyed, 10 bunkers uncovered, 20 meters of trench exposed, 12 foxholes exposed, 2 platforms exposed, 6 or 7 logs, 8 fighting positions exposed. Due to heavy concentration of bunkers, (est 120) foxholes, and fighting positions in the area XT665554 - XT674558, it is believed that this area could be a very large base camp. A large amount of ordnance fell in this area and churned up the ground to the point that it was difficult to identify what had been there prior to the strike. |
| 10 | BINH LONG 1304 | 260610 Oct | Appears to be a bn size base camp or larger. Estimated size: 100 or more bunkers and 1000 meters of trench. Strike went right through the middle of the base camp. Estimate camp 50% destroyed. |
| 11 | BINH DUONG 1305 | 300715 Oct | Company or larger sized base camp, 50% destroyed. Size: 150-175 meters in diameter. Extensive trench system connecting bunkers and fighting positions. Footprints in craters indicated area had been occupied after strike. Additional Data: 8 bunkers destroyed, 2 bunkers, 1 tunnel entrance, 100 meters of trench partially destroyed, 2 fighting positions and 45-50 meters of trenchline uncovered. |

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ANNEX D, B-52 STRIKES IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION SUNDOWN II, PHASE II
29 October to 19 November 1967

| <u>SEQ</u> | <u>TARGET</u> | <u>DTG</u> | <u>LOW LEVEL VISUAL RECON OBSERVATIONS</u> |
|------------|----------------|------------|--|
| 1 | BINH LONG 1203 | 291725 Oct | Estimated crater diameter 12-14 meters, depth 6-10 meters, 2 bunkers and 7 foxholes partially destroyed. |
| 2 | BINH LONG 47 | 302045 Oct | 4 bunkers uncovered, 2 trails destroyed from cratering. |
| 3 | BINH LONG 1204 | 311700 Oct | 2 company sized base camps partially destroyed, 1 company sized base camp uncovered, platoon sized base camp partially destroyed. |
| 4 | BINH LONG 46 | 011120 Nov | 100% of the ordnance fell within the target box, craters covered 75-80% of target area. Unknown results. |
| 5 | BINH LONG 1205 | 021438 Nov | 2 Fox holes destroyed, 4 bunkers partially destroyed 2 bunkers 2'x2' and 20 meters of trench exposed and 3 tunnels entrance partially destroyed and 20 meters of trench uncovered. |
| 6 | BINH LONG 1201 | 021130 Nov | 4 bunkers with connecting foxholes destroyed and 7 bunkers with connecting foxholes uncovered. |
| 7 | BINH LONG 1313 | 051115 Nov | Major East-West tunnel complex dest. trails destroyed by crater, area was used after strike. |
| 8 | BINH LONG 1312 | 070400 Nov | 100% of ordnance fell within box 60% of target, unknown results. |
| 9 | BINH LONG 1315 | 081345 Nov | Tunnel entrance and fighting position uncovered. |
| 10 | BINH LONG 1316 | 091230 Nov | 2 bunkers destroyed, 2 bunkers uncovered, 2 fighting positions uncovered. |
| 11 | BINH LONG 1207 | 120110 Nov | 100% ordnance on target 80% in target box, unknown results. |
| 12 | BINH LONG 1232 | 130550 Nov | A major tunnel complex was uncovered and partially destroyed by the strike. Hole 10 feet deep and two large craters 1'x3' tunnel entrance made of wood partially destroyed. 1 tunnel entrance 4' x 5' uncovered, and an underground complex destroyed. |

B-52 STRIKES SHENANDOAII II

29 SEP - 30 OCT

MAP REF: 1:50,000 VIET NAM

MAP SHEETS: 6231 I, 6231 II, 6331 IV, 6331 III

63
57 +

1309

1303

1302

1308

1310

1307

1305

1306

1304

1304
DB
DB

1305

72
54 +

50

B-52 STRIKES

70
+
20

SHEWANDOAH II

29 OCT-19 NOV

MAP REF: 1:50,000 VIET NAM

MAP SHEETS: 6232 I, 6232 II

6332 IV, 6332 III

6332 I, 6332 II

1201

1203

1312

⑧

②

1207

⑬

5

⑦ 1313

1316

⑩

1315

1232

④



5

1204
G

120
G

53

⑫ 1232

⑦ 1313

⑩ 1316

⑨ 1315

⑧ 1205

80

+

00

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST AVIATION BATTALION
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-AV

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report Operation Sherandoah II

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-TT
APO 96345

1. GENERAL: The 1st Aviation Battalion provided general aviation support to the 1st Infantry Division throughout Operation Sherandoah II. Aviation support consisted of (a) planning, coordinating, and executing airmobile operations with organic and non-organic resources; (b) providing normal organic aviation support; (c) providing aerial fire support; and (d) providing coordination and control of all air traffic at Quan Loi and Loc Ninh during phase two (2) of the operation.
2. MISSION:
 - a. The 1st Aviation Battalion planned and conducted two (2) airmobile operations in support of the 1st Brigade during Operation Sherandoah II. Both operations were conducted on 10 October 1967. The first operation began at 1030 hours with an airmobile insertion of the 1-2 Infantry (Dracula) into LZ via XT633507. The second operation began at 1245 hours with the extraction of 1-28 Infantry from a PZ via XT705585 to an LZ at Chon Thanh. Both operations were conducted with 15 aircraft flying a total of 75 troop carry sorties for each operation. Five (5) aircraft were provided by A Co 1st Aviation and ten (10) aircraft from the 188th Assault Helicopter Company. LZ suppression and enroute escort were provided by the Rebels of A Co 1st Aviation Battalion and the Spiders of the 188th AHC.
 - b. A Co 1st Aviation Battalion also participated in six (6) additional airmobile operations during phase one (1) of Sherandoah II and during phase II conducted a platoon size lift to secure a downed aircraft vicinity Loc Ninh. In each case five (5) aircraft were provided.
 - c. Statistics for airmobile operations planned and/or executed by the 1st Aviation Battalion are as follows:
 - (1) Total sorties: 600
 - (2) Troops or troop equivalents moved: 2100
 - d. On 17 October 1967 LTC Paul B. Malone III Battalion Commander 1st Aviation Battalion was designated air mission commander to conduct the extraction of numerous dead and wounded of the 2-28th Infantry after a major engagement with a battalion of the VC 271st Regiment. Due to the heavy jungle canopy early extraction efforts were confined to the use of hoist and jungle penetrator equipped aircraft. The relief force succeeded in cutting out a small opening in the jungle which late that day came to be known as the "hole". Several OH-13 aircraft from the aviation sections of the 1st Brigade and Division Artillery were used to extract wounded. Later the "hole" was enlarged and UH-1H helicopters were able to make the 100 foot vertical descent to the ground from tree top level to evacuate wounded. LTC Malone requested additional UH-1's and continued the operation with the resources at hand. The last wounded man was extracted on the last available aircraft. Only the dead remained. With darkness rapidly approaching, LTC Malone without regard for his own

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SUBJECT: After Action Report Operation Sherandoah II

personal safety elected to begin evacuation of the dead to the nearby NDP with his own CAC aircraft. On approach to the "hole" LTC Malone's aircraft became the target of intense automatic weapons fire. His aircraft was hit six (6) times and LTC Malone was seriously wounded in the right foot. At that time LTC Malone was evacuated to the hospital. The evacuation of the dead continued by aircraft from A Co 1st Aviation Battalion and the 162nd Assault Helicopter Company. Sporadic fire was received until the mission was terminated by darkness. One (1) other aircraft was hit by Viet Cong fire during the operation. Five (5) UH-1D's of A Co 1st Aviation Battalion returned on 18 October to complete the extraction. LTC Malone was later evacuated to CONUS as a result of his wounds.

e. Of significant note is the role played by the Armed Helicopter Platoon "Rebels" of A Co 1st Aviation Battalion during the Loc Ninh phase of Sherandoah II. The "Rebels" were employed nightly between 29 October and 6 November in support of ARVN, Special Forces and 1st Infantry Division units heavily engaged with elements of three (3) Viet Cong Regiments in the Loc Ninh area. They were continuously exposed to heavy antiaircraft machine gun fire but continued their support and were given credit on three (3) occasions for preventing the VC from over running friendly positions. During the battle of Loc Ninh the "Rebels" proved themselves as a most effective and responsive fire support asset, particularly during night operations.

3. Statistics for 1st Aviation Battalion aircraft during Operation Sherandoah II are as follows:

| a. Type aircraft | Hours flown | Sorties | Cargo (T) | Pax |
|------------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| UH-1D | 2945 | 7215 | 123 | 8608 |
| UH-1 (Armed) | 414 | 685 | --- | --- |
| OH-138 | 1086 | 1448 | --- | 642 |
| OV-1 | <u>262</u> | <u>345</u> | <u>---</u> | <u>---</u> |
| Totals | 4707 | 9693 | 123 | 9290 |

b. Aircraft availability:

| | |
|--------------|-----|
| UH-1D | 76% |
| UH-1 (Armed) | 85% |
| OH-138 | 81% |
| OV-1 | 70% |

c. Ammunition expended:

| | |
|---------|-------------|
| 7.62mm | 549,550 Rds |
| 40mm | 1,811 " |
| 2.75FFR | 1,793 |

d. Friendly losses by hostile actions:

Aircraft Hit: 7 (16 hits 1 aircraft)

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SUBJECT: After Action Report Operation Starvation II

e. Enemy Losses:

VC KIA (BC) - 26

VC KIA (Prob) - 18

f. Friendly personnel evacuated:

WIA - 53 KIA - 68

h. Lessons Learned:

a. It became apparent early during the Loc Ninh phase of the operation that the facilities at Quan Loi airstrip were going to be severely taxed in order to handle the rapid build up of supplies, personnel, and equipment. The Pathfinder Detachment of the 1st Aviation Battalion was taken to Quan Loi to assist in airfield control later this team were positioned at Loc Ninh to control air traffic. Handling Fixed and Rotary wing traffic simultaneously at Quan Loi proved to be very difficult. It was necessary to establish priorities for landing in order to get priority cargo on the ground ASAP. It was necessary to station an officer in the tower to identify aircraft with priority cargo and give them priority in landing and to assist in holding aircraft when the airfield was being used as a staging area for airmobile operations. Definite coordination is required between personnel controlling the tactical operations and the logistical build up. On several occasions USAF cargo aircraft arrived at Quan Loi and at Loc Ninh during airmobile operations and had to be held away from the airfield so as not to interfere with the tactical operation. In addition USAF aircraft consistently arrived in large numbers in a short time span and had to be held due to limited cargo off loading space.

Recommendations: (1) That LOCC impose time restrictions on USAF cargo aircraft in order to prevent interference with tactical operations. (2) That consideration be given to off loading capabilities when aircraft are scheduled into forward airstrips.

b. Some forward airfield control difficulties were experienced by the Pathfinder as a result of a lack of multicomunications. Normally aircraft work with the supported unit on their FM radio leaving only UHF radio for landing information and advisories. Currently the Pathfinders have portable FM communications only. During the period the Pathfinder controlled Loc Ninh an AN/PBC-41 portable UHF radio was borrowed from the Combat Controller Team at Quan Loi.

Recommendation: That the Pathfinder Detachment be authorized the AN/PBC-41 UHF radio or a radio with similar capability.

c. During armed helicopter fire support missions against VC initiated attacks the Rebels encountered numerous 50 Cal and 12.7mm anti-aircraft weapons. In each case the weapons were positioned to provide all around defense for the attacking force. Invariably the VC gunners would not engage the armed helicopters on their firing passes, rather they would wait until the aircraft turned away and began climb out. To counter act this tactic the second aircraft in the fire team would fly with all lights blacked out and attempt to be in position to engage the VC AA position during the lead aircrafts break and climb out. Utilising the above technique the Rebels were able to silence three (3) heavy machinegun positions on the night of 31 October at Loc Ninh and one (1) position on the night of 2 November vicinity Dong Tac TUP.

Robert M. Silgeff Jr.
ROBERT M. SILGEEFF JR.
CSC. INC.

AVDB-CI-3

10 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO SF 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321

1. NAME OF OPERATION: SHENANDOAH II
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 170600 Oct 67 thru 192400 Nov 67.

3. GENERAL: The command headquarters for the engineer portion of Operation Shenandoah II was Headquarters, 1st Engineer Battalion, Lai Khe, acting in accordance with 1st Inf Div FMAG OMDL 93-67, dated 15 Oct 67. The 1st Engineer Battalion supported the Infantry Division by sweeping, rooting, maintaining, and clearing jungle on Route 13 from Lai Khe to An Loc.

a. Reporting Officer: LTC THOMAS R. PATRICKSON
Commanding Officer
1st Engineer Battalion

b. Task Organization:

Hq's, 1st Engr Bn - LTC THOMAS R. PATRICKSON

(1) Company A - CPT MICHAEL ALAUX

(2) Company B - CPT MARION L. CALDWELL

(3) Company C - CPT JAMES I. CHRISTIAN

(4) Company D - CPT EDWARD W. WILDLACK III

4. INTRODUCTION:

a. Terrain: The area of interest during this operation was in the Binh Duong and Binh Long Provinces. Specifically, the Richard Battalion was involved in repairing and upgrading CL 13 from Ben Cat (XT 742332) to An Loc (XT 747883), and supporting combat operations in the vicinity of Loc Ninh (XU 735095). The terrain adjacent to the southern sector of CL 13 was poorly drained and characterized by secondary growth and rice paddies. The northern sector of CL 13 was characterized by heavy forest and rubber plantations in which the visibility was very limited.

b. Army Situation: The area south of Ben Cat is considered pacified while the area north is dominated by VC and security must be maintained. The enemy units in the area were t.n. 165th Regt, 9th NVA Div, 271st Regt, 7th VC Div and Phu Loi Bn (a local guerrilla force). Units providing engineer work party security made contact with these VC units during the operation. One RPG round was fired at engineer elements at XT 788543 on 12 Nov 67.

SUBJECT: Combat Operations of the 1st Infantry Division

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c. Intelligence During Operation: Prior to and during the operation daily low level reconnaissances were made on CL 13. In addition, the Tunnel Mats conducted missions at XT 73674 and XT 75533, and the Reconnaissance Section made the following ground reconnaissances:

- (1) Road recon, LTL 1A, vic XT 86220
- (2) Road recon, LTL 1A, vic XT 700734
- (3) Road recon, Route 246, vic X. 722890
- (4) Road recon, CL 13, vic XU 742046
- (5) Water Point recon, vic XU 735095
- (6) Bridge recon, XT 722972
- (7) Bridge recon, XT 785628
- (8) Bridge recon, XT 882661
- (9) Bridge recon, XT 834688

d. Mine and Booby Trap Incidents During Operation:

- (1) 25 Oct 67 vic XT 830900 dozer hit mine
(minor damage, 1 KIA)
- (2) 28 Oct 67 XT 788472 dozer hit mine
(scored cut)
- (3) 1 Nov 67 XT 785435 dozer hit mine
(minor damage)
- (4) 1 Nov 67 XT 793436 dozer hit mine
(scored cut)
- (5) 2 Nov 67 XT 765510 command AT mine
- (6) 3 Nov 67 XT 420794 booby trapped pressure mine
- (7) 4 Nov 67 XT 793440 command mine
(1 KIA)
- (8) 10 Nov 67 XT 792462 mine blown in place
- (9) 13 Nov 67 XT 866275 butterfly bomb destroyed

5. MISSION: The 1st Engineer Battalion supports the 1st Infantry Division's combat operations along route CL 13 from Lai Khe to Cuan Loi with road opening, jungle clearing, and LZ missions.

6. COMMITMENT OF OPERATION: ... Company conducts engineering operations along Route CL 13 from Cuan Loi to XT 766740. C Company conducts engineer operations along Route CL 13 from Lai Khe to XT 755740. B and D Companies provide dump trucks, LZ teams, and mine sweep parties in support of A and C Companies. Hq Company equipment Platoon provides equipment support for A and C Companies.

7. ADDITION:

17 Oct 67

A Company - moved by fixed wing aircraft from Phouc Vinh to Cuan Loi and prepared for road opening.

C Company - One demolition team sent to destroy rice cache, vic XT 641547.

18-19 Oct 67

C Company - Stood down for maintenance.

20 Oct 67

C Company - Rose plows and bull blades cleared 35 acres of light rubber trees vic XT 779365 and 59 acres of heavy jungle from XT 765365 to XT 759357.

21 Oct 67

C Company - 1st platoon deployed on LZ at 1/16 Inf KOP vic

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22 Oct 67

C Company - 1st platoon cleared fields of fire at 2/28 Inf MDP, XT 692549, Six Rome plows and four bull blades cleared approximately 63 acres via XT 7635.

23 Oct 67

C Company - Four Rome plows and two bull blades cleared approximately 77 acres via XT 7635.

24 Oct 67

C Company - One mine sweep party sent to 1/4 Cavalry. The Rome plows cleared 38 acres via XT 7635.

25 Oct 67

A Company - Constructed two 36"x24' corrugated steel culverts for later emplacement on Route 13.

C Company - 1st platoon cut LZ at XT 693548. Five Rome plows and one bull blade cleared 58 acres via XT 7635.

26 Oct 67

A Company - Constructed 24' double barrel box culvert.

B Company - 2nd platoon cut a resupply LZ at XT 660330.

C Company - 1st platoon continued to work on LZ vic XT 693548. Five Rome plows and one bull blade cleared approximately 64 acres via XT 7635.

27 Oct 67

A Company - Constructed two 36"x24' corrugated steel culverts for later emplacement on Route 13.

C Company - Rome plows with equipment platoon leader (Richard 80) cleared approximately 64 acres via XT 7634.

28 Oct 67

C Company - Five Rome plows and two bull blades cleared 56 acres from XT 788409 to XT 788427 and 5 acres via XT 7635.

29 Oct 67

B Company - The 2nd platoon provided three mine sweep teams and one MCO to 2/28 Inf. The 3rd platoon provided two mine sweep teams and one MCO to 1/4 Cavalry Squadron.

C Company - Rome plows and two bull blades cleared approximately 110 acres via XT 7635.

30 Oct 67

C Company - Cleared approximately 60 acres via XT 7635 with seven Rome plows.

31 Oct 67

C Company - 2nd platoon moved to MDP vic XT 766413, prepared defensive positions, and stockpiled rock and other road repair material.

D Company - Sent three mine sweep teams from Quan Loi and

6 teams from D1 An to the positions at 1100 hrs. 2nd platoon began construction of a resupply LZ at XU 689087.

1 Nov 67

B Company - 2nd and 3rd platoons were airlifted by CH47 from D1 An to XT 765728 to construct a 70' class 50 timber trestle bridge which was completed at 1630 hrs.

C Company - 9 home plows and two bull blades cleared approximately 30 acres just north of Lai Khu. Route 13 was routed from XT 792415 to XT 793436. 2nd platoon replaced two box culverts 12"/18"X24' at XT 767719. 3rd platoon replaced two 12"/14"X24' corrugated steel culverts at XT 765575. 1st platoon used 6 loads of laterite and two loads of rock for road repair on route 13 north of Lai Khu.

D Company - 2nd platoon completed LZ at XU 689087.

2 Nov 67

A Company - Cleared rubber and made road repairs on Route 13 from Cuan Loi to XT 766800. Repaired a large crater in road vic XT 766800 with 12 loads of rock and a laterite cap.

C Company - 1st platoon graded Route 13 vic Bau Long. 2nd platoon used 14 loads of laterite to repair craters and potholes. 13 loads of rock were hauled to KBF vic Chon Thanh. Home plows cleared 112 acres of jungle along Route 13 from XT 765666 to XT 765647. Route 13 was routed from XT 792436 to XT 796473 and from XT 786473 to XT 784416.

3 Nov 67

A Company - Replaced two 36"X24' corrugated steel culverts and widened the roadway on Route 13 vic XT 767761. Assisted C Company with fill in repairing crater vic XT 766751.

C Company - 1st and 2nd platoons maintained ready reaction forces (RAF). 3rd platoon installed two 24"X24' culverts at XT 751462. Equipment platoon cleared 75 acres along Route 13 from XT 766666 to XT 766672 and from XT 760648 to XT 766687. Route 13 was routed from XT 796473 to XT 786492 and from XT 785494 to XT 787476.

D Company - 2nd platoon cut LZ for Infantry vic XU 779137.

4 Nov 67

A Company - Constructed two 36"X24' corrugated steel culverts.

B Company - 1st platoon was airlifted from D1 An to XU 785135 to cut a resupply LZ for the Infantry. 3rd platoon supported Route 13 operation with 3 dump trucks.

C Company - 1st and 2nd platoons maintained RAF for Route 13. 3rd platoon hauled 13 loads of laterite to culvert site, XT 767468. Equipment platoon cleared 62 acres along Route 13 from XT 766696 to XT 766715 with 7 home plows.

5 Nov 67

B Company - 1st platoon airlifted from D1 An to cut LZ in grid square XU 753074.

C Company - 2nd platoon graded Chon Thanh airfield. Rector operations continued in Bau Long area vic XT 793547. Equipment platoon cleared 140 acres of jungle and rubber along route 13 from XT 766692 to XT 766721, from XT 766710 to XT 766719, and vic XT 790418.

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5 Nov 67

A Company - Filled potholes on Route 13.

C Company - 2nd and 3rd platoons repaired craters along Route 13 from Lai Khu to grid line 73. Both sides of Route 13 were rooted to XT 767625. Equipment platoon with 7 Rome plows cleared 72 acres of dense jungle along Route 13 from XT 766721 to XT 766735.

7 Nov 67

A Company - Opened laterite pit at XT 767759 and hauled laterite for road upgrading.

C Company - 2nd and 3rd platoons hauled 23 loads of laterite in support of Route 13. Equipment platoon cleared 92 acres along Route 13 from XT 766744 to XT 766769.

8 Nov 67

A Company - Continued to upgrade and repair Route 13.

C Company - 2nd platoon hauled 5 loads of laterite in support of Route 13 operations. 3rd platoon hauled 14 loads of laterite for potholes via XT 793547. Equipment platoon cleared 76 acres along Route 13 from XT 794435 to XT 789461, from XT 767752 to XT 767757, and from XT 768762 to XT 767779.

9 Nov 67

C Company - 2nd platoon repaired potholes north of Chon Thanh and reconnoitered for laterite. 3rd platoon used 20 loads of laterite on Route 13 via XT 793547. Equipment platoon with seven Rome plows cleared 82 acres along Route 13 from XT 768779 to XT 768793.

10 Nov 67

A Company - Continued road repairs and repaired bridge approaches at XT 765728.

C Company - 2nd platoon reconnoitered laterite pit XT 790545 and repaired potholes north of Chon Thanh. 3rd platoon repaired potholes and filled mine craters at XT 766462.

11 Nov 67

A Company - Maintained and improved Route 13.

C Company - 2nd platoon repaired road north of Chon Thanh with 9 loads of laterite. 3rd platoon repaired road from Lai Khu to via XT 793547. Equipment platoon cleared 70 acres from XT 768793 to XT 767800 Route 13.

12 Nov 67

A Company - Maintained and improved Route 13.

C Company - 2nd platoon repaired potholes via Chon Thanh with 4 loads of laterite. 3rd platoon repaired potholes from Lai Khu to Ban Long. Equipment platoon cleared 69 acres via XT 767700.

13 Nov 67

A Company - Maintained and improved Route 13.

C Company - 2nd platoon used 31 loads of laterite to repair via Chon Thanh. Equipment platoon with four Rome plows cleared 57 acres via XT 766767.

10 December 1967

14 Nov 67

A Company - Completed maintenance and improvement of Route 13 to Chon Thanh.

C Company - 2nd platoon used 13 loads of laterite to repair potholes vic of Chon Thanh.

15 Nov 67

C Company - All elements returned to Lai Khe.

8. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Elements of the 1/4 Cavalry and 2/2 Infantry (moch) were utilized on a daily basis for immediate security of engineer work parties and the Rome plow clearing team.

b. Overall area security was provided by elements of the 2nd Brigade. Fire support bases were placed so that all portions of Route 13 could be supported by artillery fire and secured rapidly each day.

9. RESULTS:

a. Friendly losses:

(1) Personnel: 8 WIA, 1 KIA

(2) Equipment: 1 Rome plow, 1 bulldozer

b. Enemy losses:

(1) Personnel: Unknown

(2) Equipment: Unknown

c. Construction:

(1) Constructed one class 50 timber trestle bridge 70' long via XT 765128.

(2) Constructed five LZ's at coordinates XU 785135, XT 693548, XT 660330, XU 689087, XU 779137, XU 753716.

(3) Assembled and installed 72 feet of box culvert and 100 feet of CSC.

(4) Route 13 was opened and maintained during the entire operation.

(5) Four mines and booby traps were found and destroyed by engineer personnel.

(6) Over 1,846 acres of jungle and rubber cleared along Route 13 and vic of Lai Khe.

(7) 435 loads of laterite and rock were used on Route 13.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Average strength in the field: 125.

b. Supply: Normal supply channels were used. POL for Rome plows was trucked to field locations from Lai Khe.

c. Maintenance: Equipment repair was performed at either Lai Khe, Quan Loi, or field location. A contact team from the 1st Engineer maintenance section remained with the Rome plows.

10 December 67

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d. Transportation: Organic transportation was supplemented by four low boys from supporting units, and various types of helicopters which were used for reconnaissance, command and control, resupply, and LZ missions.

e. Communications: TO & X radios were the principle means of communication.

f. Medical Support: Organic medical personnel were utilized.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Site preparation for a 70' timber trestle bridge was accomplished with explosives. This technique proved to be advantageous in that it reduced construction time by one day and obviated the need for moving engineer construction equipment to the site.

12. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: No new problem areas in combat engineer support were encountered during this operation. Shenandoah II provided the 1st Engineer Battalion with additional experience in planning and coordination, engineer reconnaissance, mine detecting, jungle clearing, road maintenance and upgrading, LZ construction, and resupply.

However, one phase of this operation presented an excellent example of the requirement for and rewards of flexibility in reacting to changing situations. The day before engineer work was to begin, the Viet Cong cratered the road in three locations along a three-km stretch of Route QL 13. This interdiction was carefully planned as the cratered area was located halfway between the rock sources required for repair. The attached sketch illustrates the situation as of 311045 October, when the northern crater was blown.

The plan of repair for the first day (1 Nov) called for A Company to move south out of An Loc to repair the northern culvert site, while B Company to be airlifted with pre-cut bridging into the southern site to begin construction of the 70'-ft timber trestle bridge. The best estimates, considering the time required to sweep the road out of An Loc each day, to repair sites 1 and 2 and concurrently construct the 70'-ft bridge was two days. On the third day (3 Nov), the last crater at the northern end of site 3 would be filled by trucks from the north as the finishing touches were put on the bridge.


At 1630 hours on the first day, the Battalion Operation Section received the report from Bravo 6 that he expected the bridge to take traffic by late that evening. The S-3 asked for a confirmation of this report as it was thought impossible to complete the task in that short time. However, Bravo 6 reaffirmed his report stating that all of our plans had gone even better than expected, and that with the exception of curbing, the job would be completed prior to lift off that evening.

The way was then open to complete all sites in one and one-half days, instead of the two and one-half days estimated. C Company's mission was changed immediately to load rock at Lai Kho that night and to move at first light. November 2nd found A Company sweeping out of Quan Loi to complete site 1 and moving to site 2. C Company moved north out of Lai Kho, picked up additional rock trucks at Chon Thanh, and moving over the now passable B Company bridge site, filled the northern crater at site 3. They then proceeded north to meet the A Company trucks at site 2 for a combined effort on the final repair. The road was completely repaired by 1400 hours, and the main supply convoy was able to move one day ahead of schedule, at 1430 hours on 2 November.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Stanley G. Omega
STANLEY G. OMEGA
CAPT. USAF

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Inlosure 1 to Combat Operation After Action Report, 7 December 1967.

Incl 1 to ANNEX F

Introduction: (C) Sherandoah II will be dealt with in two phases:
 Phase I: 29 Sep 67 to 29 Oct 67; Phase II:
 29 Oct 67 to 7 Nov 67. Sherandoah II officially
 continued until 191930 Nov 67, however no
 significant contact occurred after 7 Nov 67.

PHASE I:

1. (C) Intelligence prior to the operation: The area was chosen as a probable troop concentration target. Intelligence reports indicated that elements of the 271st VC Regt had recently moved into the area west and southwest of Chon Thanh. Also probably in the area were the 165th NVA Regt, Phu Loi Bn, C 64 Dan Tieng Dist Co, and C 45 Chon Thanh Dist Plat. Although the 101st NVA Regt was unlocated it was thought that elements were possibly in the area. There were many reported and confirmed VC installations throughout the entire operational area. The 83d Log Group was known to be operating in the area. Visual reconnaissance confirmed the presence of active trails and base areas.
2. (C) Enemy situation during the operation: Friendly forces moving into the operational area immediately made contact. More than 60 contacts were made ranging from 1-2 VC to Regimental size. Night defensive positions were mortared on several occasions. On 2 Oct, 1-2 Inf received 40-50 rounds of 82mm mortar. Also on 2 Oct a NVA PW captured by 1-2 Inf stated that his unit, Phu Loi II Bn, was located in its base camp vic XT 657 529. 1-2 Inf on 4 Oct, XT 712 537, contacted an unknown number of VC resulting in 12 VC KIA (BC). On 061914 Oct 1-18 Inf received 150 rounds of 60 & 82mm mortar. Counter mortar and ground fire based on information gained from PW captured 27 Oct. The PW (NVA), Do An Mai, stated his unit, 2d Bn, 271st Regt was located in a base camp vic XT 723 575 on 4 Oct and participated in the mortar attack. Mai also stated that Recon elements of Phu Loi Regt (G-2 comment: probably Phu Loi II Bn) had been attached to his bn. He further stated his unit was short of food. Documents captured on 7 Oct vic XT 685 434 indicated the presence of a rear service element of the 83d Logistics Group. At 110945 Oct, 1-18 Inf at XT 700 552 made contact with estimated 100-150 VC resulting in 21 VC KIA (BC). Documents taken from the bodies identified 2d Bn, 271 Regt. Other documents taken from a VC body at XT 636 514 identified 271st Regt (possibly 1st Bn). On 12 Oct a document captured vic XT 672 549 consisted of a letter from the Rear Service Office of the 7th VC Division to HQ GP 83. It stated in essence that the 271st Regt had moved from XT 0070 to its present location in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone because GP 81 was unable to provide it with logistical support. The Regt was therefore moved to the Long Nguyen area in order to receive support from Group 83. (G-2 comment: Only the presence of the 1st and 2nd Bn's was verified; however, it is believed that the entire Regt was in the area. The move of the Regt to this area also indicates that there were sufficient supplies stored in this area to support the Regt). On 16 Oct, 2-28 Inf at XT 698 568 contacted a VC force in a base camp; air and arty accounted for 17 VC KIA (BC). The most significant contact occurred on 17 Oct when A and D Companies, 2-28 Inf at XT 686 576, had heavy contact with an estimated Regt (271st). VC losses for this encounter were 101 (BC). On 22 Oct having suffered heavily from contacts, arty, air and B-52 strikes, the 271 Regt began to move southwest into the 25th US Div area. From this point on there was only one other significant contact when on 291405 Oct, 2-2 Inf, XT 705 442, received 40-50 rounds of 60mm mortar. In addition to contacts, ground troops uncovered many installations and active base areas.

Significant amounts of rice, salt and ammunition were captured and destroyed. Visual reconnaissance and BDA indicated the presence of many more installations. Shenandoah II caused the VC considerable losses both in manpower and supplies.

PHASE II (THE LOC NINH BATTLES):

1. (C) Intelligence prior to operation: During the early morning hours of 29 Oct, the USSF/CIDG Camp and the District Hq in Loc Ninh were subjected to a major VC attack by fire followed by ground assault. This was the first of a series of significant engagements on the Loc Ninh area which lasted until 7 Nov. Enemy units involved during the course of the battle were the Hq, 9th VC Div, the 273d and 272d Regt's and probably rocket and arty units of unknown size. Additionally, evidence indicates that individual fillers (and possibly small units) from the 141st and 165th Regt's assisted the 272d and 273d Regt's respectively. There is some evidence that the 271st Regt was also originally intended for these battles but because of its losses in the Long Nguyen area in Oct, could not be committed. A possible VC/NVA reason for targeting Loc Ninh at that time appears to have been to embarrass the GVN by demonstrating a capability to seize a district capital during the period of the inauguration of their new president. There could also have been the desire to strengthen KR-10 as a VC "safe area" possibly for future political reasons. It is our best estimate that the decision to remain in the Loc Ninh area after the first attack was a NVN political decision perhaps based upon lack of knowledge of the military realities in SVN caused in part by the favorable VC/NVA reports flowing northward and a misinterpretation of the political situation in the US. The continued presence of the Hq 9th VC Div and 272d Regt in the Loc Ninh area from 3 to 7 Nov does not appear to have been a decision to press the siege but rather an effort to minimize losses during the reorganization prior to withdrawal. Evidence suggests that major elements of the 273d Regt withdrew on or about 3 Nov from the western periphery of the Loc Ninh area. The withdrawal of the 272d Regt was less well organized, but the Regt appeared to have left the area by 7 Nov.
2. (C) Enemy Situation During The Operation:
 - Enemy operations in the Loc Ninh area began with a mortar attack on the Special Forces Camp and the Loc Ninh District Headquarters Compound. Hostile fires started at 290115 Oct and continued until 0535H. The VC infantry units later identified as 1st and 2d Bns 273d VC Regt subordinate to VC 9th Division, assaulted the area across the airfield which lies to the west of the compound area. A portion of the District Headquarters was overrun and held by the VC until 1515H. The VC suffered 147 KIA(BC) as a result of this attack. At approximately the same time US forces at Quan Loi received 14 rounds of 75mm RR fire and An Loc District Headquarters received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar. At 291208 October, 1-18 Inf which had been placed in the area, made contact with an estimated VC Co at XU 698098; the unit identified here was the 165th NVA Regiment. In this engagement, the VC lost 12 KIA(BC) and 50 KIA(poss). The following day, there were four significant engagements. An RF Co outpost vicinity XU 770055 received 100 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire, commencing at 0445H. At 0450H a hamlet vicinity XU 775050 received 50 rounds 60mm mortar. At 301230 October, a 1-18 INF/CIDG patrol vicinity XU 695094 made contact with an estimated VC Bn(-) of the 165th Regt; results 1 KIA(BC), 72 KIA(poss). At 1715H the VC attacked a hamlet at XU 740133 with small arms and mortar fire. During the third day of the battle the compound area at Loc Ninh was attacked by the 1st and 2d Bns 272d VC Regiment.

The attack began with mortar fire and 122mm rocket fire at 310050 October, built up to a ground attack which was repulsed by friendly units in the area, and ended in the early morning hours leaving 66 VC KIA(BC). At one point during this encounter, direct fire was employed by the artillery. The US units involved in the battle were C/2-28 Inf and A/6-15 Arty. At 310050 October Quan Loi received 6-8 rounds of 82mm mortar. Sporadic SA, AW and mortar fire was again employed against Loc Ninh from 010100 November until 010320 November. At 010703 Nov a patrol from 1-28 Inf engaged an unknown size force, killing 5 VC(BC). 1-28 Inf made contact again that day at 1412H resulting in 2 VC KIA(BC) and 4 KIA(possible). From 020030 until 020400 November, vicinity XU 695095 the 1-18 Inf received 100 rounds 82mm mortar, RPG, 50 cal MG and heavy SA fire. In the battle that ensued, 198 VC were killed by body count. The enemy unit which mounted the attack was again the 2734 Regiment. During the same time 2-28 Inf at XU 733080 was under attack, they received 20 rounds of 82mm mortar, RPG and SA fire until 0410H. At 0743H 1-28 Inf vicinity XU 756079 contacted 20 VC, resulting in 5 VC KIA (possible). At 1200H A/1-18 vicinity XU 695096 contacted an estimated VC platoon with unknown results. At 2340H, 8 VC accidentally walked into 2-12 NDP vicinity XU 783138. Results of this were 4 VC KIA(BC) and 4 POW's from the 272d Regiment. 2-12 Inf was attacked the following day (3 Nov) at 0220H vicinity XU 786135. The VC used 82mm mortar, 50 cal and SA fire. The VC lost 28 KIA(BC) in this encounter. At 0623H 2-28 Inf received 20-25 rounds 82mm mortar. On 041128 Nov 1-28 Inf vicinity XU 775 102 made contact, killing 1 VC(BC). There were no contacts on 05 Nov. 2-12 Inf in their NDP vicinity XU 786135 received 20 rounds 60mm mortar and SA fire from 1825 until 1920H. The last major contacts of the operation were made on 7 November. 2-12 Inf XU 786135 received 40 rounds 82mm mortar fire west of their NDP at 0100H. In heavy fighting at 1310H, 1-26 Inf was in contact with the 3d Bn, 272 Regt vicinity XU 835125. Contact was broken by the VC at 1420 leaving 66 dead(BC). During the remainder of the operation only two attacks occurred. A/1-18 Inf XT 815905 received 25-30 rounds 122mm rockets at 0900H Nov. At 090025 Nov An Loc SF Camp and District Headquarters received 20 rounds 75mm RR, 82mm mortar and 120mm rocket fire. In addition to major elements of the 272d and 273d Regts involved in the Loc Ninh area, elements of the 165th and 141st Regiments were employed apparently to replace the 271st which although originally scheduled to participate in the attack was unable to do so due to the heavy casualties sustained in the Long Nguyen area. The 141st NVA Regt identified by documents in the 1-18 Inf area at Loc Ninh on 01 Nov at XU 702099 and on 02 Nov at XU 695094; the 165th NVA Regt was identified by documents captured by 1-18 Inf on 05 Oct vic XU 695094 and a POW from that unit captured by 1-18 Inf on 02 Nov at XU 695095 and further identified through documents by 2-26 Inf on 02 Nov vic XU 755079. A POW, Nguyen Van Tuan of the 2d Bn, 141st Regt, captured by B/1-18 Inf on 08 Dec 67 vic XT 764732, indicated that his unit was used as a reserve force in the Loc Ninh area but was never committed. While the magnitude of commitment of the 141st Regiment is not known, it is clear from documents taken from bodies that at least individual troops from the regiment were engaged during the course of the battle. PW Le Quoi Quid, 2d Bn, 165th Regt, captured by 1-18 Inf on 10 Dec vic XT 752819, indicated that the regiment occupied a base camp west of Loc Ninh on 1 Nov, and that the 165th Regt did participate in the battle and further that this base camp was hit by air and artillery early in the attack.

Appendix 1 (Aerial Surveillance, Terrain and Weather) to Annex 6
(Intelligence) to After Action Report for OP Shenandoah II (U)

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1. (C) 0-2 Air operational control was exercised from Lai Khe throughout the period.
2. (C) During the period the following aerial surveillance was conducted in support of division operations.
 - a. Red Base:

| | |
|------------------|-------------|
| (1) ASTA Platoon | 33 missions |
| (2) 73d AVN Co. | 60 missions |
| (3) AF | 4 missions |
 - b. SLAR:

| | |
|------------------|-------------|
| (1) ASTA Platoon | 19 missions |
| (2) 73d AVN Co. | 35 missions |
 - c. D Troop, 1/4 CAV:

| | |
|-----|--|
| (1) | Conducted 155 VR's during this period. |
| (2) | H-3 hours flown; 1,006.45 |
| (3) | HU-1B hours flown; 786.35 |
 - d. Visual:

| | |
|-----|--|
| (1) | 0-2 Air section personnel flew approximately 245 hours of visual reconnaissance. |
| (2) | II FFV Air personnel flew approximately 25 hours of visual reconnaissance. |
| (3) | 73d AVN Co. personnel flew approximately 60 hours of visual reconnaissance. |
 - e. Photographic support provided during the period.

| | |
|-----|--|
| (1) | ASTA - 46 requests flown. |
| (2) | AF - 18 requests flown (3 priority missions) |
 - f. Bloodhound - Division Chemical flew 52 missions in the area reporting 884 hotspots.
3. (C) Significant Accomplishments:
 - a. Maintained visual and LSAR surveillance over the area of operation and surrounding area.
 - b. Coordinated the division's reconnaissance efforts.
4. (C) Problems Encountered:
 - a. Seven Red Base and five SLAR missions were cancelled because weather or equipment malfunction.
5. (C) Terrain and Weather:
 - a. Terrain: Shenandoah II area of interest includes two areas. The area in the south has the following coordinates: XT 5032 - XT 5020 - XT 8370 - XT 8332. Prominent terrain features are: the Song Saigon, forming the western border; large rubber plantations, the largest being Michelin, in the west. The area is generally flat with relief under 60 meters and is covered with secondary forests and bamboo. QL/13 is the primary N/S road, with 239 and 240 secondary routes. The northern part of Shenandoah II area is bounded by the Cambodian border on the North and East, on the West by the 90 (N-S) grid line and on the South by the 88 (E-W) grid line. The center of this area is covered by rubber plantations with secondary and virgin jungle along the edges. QL/13 is the main N-S route.
 - b. Weather: The weather during operation Shenandoah II was generally rainy but only hindered operations on one day. The mean temperatures during the period were 74.7° high to 70° low. The average relative humidity was 76%. The number of days with visibility restricted to 5 miles or less due to ground fog was 22. The number of days with a ceiling below 4000 ft was 28 days. The total rainfall during the period amounted to 18.9 inches.

| <u>DTG</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>UNIT</u> | <u>TYPE INSTALLATION</u> | <u>ACTION</u> |
|------------|--------------------|-------------|---|---------------|
| Sep 67 | | | | |
| 290933H | XT 768513 | C/1-16 | 10 Foxholes | Destroyed |
| 290940H | XT 765514 | C/1-16 | 4 Foxholes | Destroyed |
| 291012H | XT 703516 | C/1-2 | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 291012H | XT 703516 | C/1-2 | Punker w/OH cover | Destroyed |
| 291020H | XT 730509 | D/2-28 | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 291020H | XT 730509 | D/2-28 | 20 Mil structures | Destroyed |
| 291233H | XT 800428 | 1/16 | 1 bunker | Destroyed |
| 291233H | XT 800428 | 1/16 | Tunnel | Destroyed |
| 291505H | XT 720420 | N/S | 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 291554H | XT 670573 | N/S | 7 bunkers, 25m of trench | Destroyed |
| 291636H | XT 672506 | N/S | 4 bunker | Destroyed |
| 291636H | XT 656484 | N/S | 1 structure, 1 bunker | Destroyed |
| 291710H | XT 670523 | N/S | Structure, 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 300831H | XT 675422 | N/S | 9 bunkers(dest), 2 bunkers exposed | N/A |
| 300952H | XT 714570 | N/S | 3 bunkers | Exposed |
| Oct 67 | | | | |
| 011310H | XT 660424 | N/S | 6 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 011415H | XT 693443 | N/S | 8 Bunkers | Destroyed |
| 020845H | XT 713449 | N/1-16 | 50 spider holes, 1 bunker | Destroyed |
| | | | 2 huts | Destroyed |
| 020921H | XT 690507 | N/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 020937H | XT 710455 | N/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 021235H | XT 710481 | B/2-28 | 2 trenches, loan-to | Destroyed |
| 021315H | XT 675427 | N/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 021412H | XT 676432 | N/S | 6 bunkers(exposed), 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 030940H | XT 666415 | N/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 031113H | XT 673474 | N/S | 6 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 031203H | XT 682440 | N/S | 3 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 031222H | XT 727438 | C/1-16 | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 031222H | XT 713380 | C/2-2 | bunker | Destroyed |
| 031225H | XT 735466 | N/1-16 | Punker | Destroyed |
| 031309H | XT 664469 | N/S | 50m trench(exposed), 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 031315H | XT 682527 | N/S | 7 fighting pens, mil structures | Destroyed |
| 031335H | XT 726434 | C/1-16 | Prono shelter | Destroyed |
| 031519H | XT 675422 | N/S | Storage bunker | Destroyed |
| 041350H | XT 720577 | N/S | 7 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 041524H | XT 695415 | N/S | 2 structures | Destroyed |
| 050945H | XT 726546 | N/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 051157H | XT 715568 | N/S | 1 bunker | Destroyed |
| 051233H | XT 686435 | N/S | 2 base camps, 5 bunkers, 200m of trench (uncovered) | N/A |
| 051530H | XT 683443 | C/1-16 | Hut | Destroyed |
| 051632H | XT 650542 | N/S | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 060838H | XT 677532 | N/S | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 060845H | XT 718543 | N/1-2 | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 060939H | XT 718574 | N/S | 4 bunkers, hut | Destroyed |
| 060956H | XT 832913 | D/1-16 | 10' tunnel, log bridge | N/A |
| 061003H | XT 635511 | N/S | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 061010H | XT 943515 | N/1-28 | 4 spider holes | Destroyed |
| 061117H | XT 667405 | N/S | 2 huts, 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 061118H | XT 650543 | N/S | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 061143H | XT 704530 | D/1-18 | 2 bunkers, 5' trench | Destroyed |
| 061232H | XT 677528 | N/S | Bunker | Damaged |
| 061240H | XT 712566 | 1-28 | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 061250H | XT 660426 | N/S | 13 bunkers (uncovered) | N/A |
| 061339H | XT 677525 | N/S | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 061512H | XT 712566 | N/S | 3 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 061607H | XT 685547 | N/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 061607H | XT 692518 | N/S | 18 bunkers | N/A |
| 070927H | XT 713534 | N/1-2 | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |

| <u>DTG</u> | <u>COORDINATES</u> | <u>UNIT</u> | <u>TYPE INSTALLATION</u> | <u>ACTION</u> |
|------------|--------------------|---------------|--|---------------|
| 071011H | XT 677415 | N/S | Storage bunker | Destroyed |
| 071043H | XT 684545 | N/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 071117H | XT 677413 | N/S | 10 bunkers(uncovered) | N/A |
| 071305H | XT 706524 | B/1-2 | 3 mil structures, lean-to | Destroyed |
| 071314H | XT 693535 | N/S | Foxhole | Destroyed |
| 071353H | XT 685545 | N/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 071410H | XT 685545 | N/S | 100m trench, 2 bunkers, 5 foxholes, 5 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 071537H | XT 706524 | N/S | 25m trench(uncovered), 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 071616H | XT 692547 | Recon 1-18 | 6 bunkers, 5 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 071720H | XT 690515 | N/S | 30m trench(uncovered), 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 080230H | XT 658553 | B-52 strike | Numerous bunkers, trenches, foxholes | Destroyed |
| 081000H | XT 692538 | C/1-18 | 25 prone shelters | Destroyed |
| 081207H | XT 698540 | N/S | 30 fighting pens, 30m trench | Destroyed |
| 081240H | XT 683545 | N/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 081400H | XT 693450 | C/1-16 | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 081415H | XT 658493 | N/S | Storage structure, 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 081557H | XT 695545 | C/1-18 | Large hole | N/A |
| 081612H | XT 652550 | N/S | 3 structures, 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 081645H | XT 675432 | N/S | 2 bunkers, 25m trench | Destroyed |
| 090930H | XT 704564 | N/S | Bunker, 4 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 090955H | XT 704564 | N/S | 7 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 090955H | XT 696455 | D/1-18 | 2 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 091040H | XT 659526 | B-52 strike | Numerous bunker, trenches huts | Destroyed |
| 091247H | XT 663562 | D/2-18 | 33 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 091330H | XT 683486 | 1st Bn 8th Bn | Foxhole | Destroyed |
| 091434H | XT 668405 | N/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 091520H | XT 704564 | N/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 091803H | XT 663565 | N/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 101000H | XT 728418 | B/2-2 | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 101135H | XT 894250 | D/2-16 | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 101138H | XT 632512 | N/S | 3 bunkers(uncovered) | N/A |
| 101158H | XT 686451 | C/2-2 | 130m trench | Destroyed |
| 101306H | XT 709550 | N/S | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 101310H | XT 735521 | N/1-2 | 4 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 101425H | XT 666559 | N/2-28 | 18 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 101505H | XT 703563 | N/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 101650H | XT 692525 | N/S | 4 bunkers (damaged) | N/A |
| 111047H | XT 702419 | B/2-2 | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 111245H | XT 660491 | C/1-16 | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 111245H | XT 685460 | C/1-16 | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 111450H | XT 664553 | 2-2 | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 111553H | XT 661555 | N/2-28 | 20 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 111630H | XT 644500 | D/1-2 | 6 bunkers, 1 mess room, 1 tunnel in well | Destroyed |
| 111640H | XT 687428 | Recon/2-? | 25 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 120810H | XT 663554 | N/S | 25m trench (exposed), 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 120941H | XT 650505 | N/S | 1 bunker, 2 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 120955H | XT 705540 | 1-18 | 34 prone shelters, 26 spider holes | N/A |
| 121100H | XT 665555 | N/2-28 | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 121107H | XT 670552 | N/S | Mil structure, 2 large buildings | Destroyed |
| 121153H | XT 700561 | N/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 121230H | XT 685428 | Recon/2-2 | Well, 12 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 121237H | XT 713566 | N/S | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 1213:08 | XT 637502 | D/1-2 | 4 bunker | Destroyed |
| 121325H | XT 713566 | N/S | bunker | Destroyed |
| 121445H | XT 621508 | Recon/1-2 | 15 mil structures | Destroyed |

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| 121530H | XT | 665487 | C/1-16 | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 121532H | XT | 691535 | Bacon/1-18 | 8 spider holes; 7 prone shelters | N/A |
| 121656H | XT | 621507 | A/S | 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 130800H | XT | 685395 | L/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 131046H | XT | 640499 | B/1-2 | Mil structures, bunker | Destroyed |
| 131120H | XT | 703417 | C/2-2 | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 131149H | XT | 635452 | A/S | 150m trench (exposed) 15 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 131205H | XT | 643517 | A/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 131307H | XT | 683545 | A/S | 4 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 131405H | XT | 661471 | L/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 131419H | XT | 683545 | A/S | bunker | Destroyed |
| 131455H | XT | 695414 | B/2-2 | 2 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 131445H | XT | 684537 | B/1-28 | 5 foxholes, bunker | Destroyed |
| 131448H | XT | 735526 | L/1-2 | 3 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 131512H | XT | 661472 | A/S | 100m of trench (exposed) | N/A |
| 131724H | XT | 667472 | A/S | 50m of trench (exposed) | N/A |
| 131801H | XT | 667472 | A/S | 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 131822H | XT | 677472 | A/S | 4 bunkers, 150m of trench | Destroyed |
| 140605H | XT | 659526 | B52 strike | Many bunkers | Destroyed |
| 140704H | XT | 775553 | C/1-4 | Underwater bridge | Destroyed |
| 141008H | XT | 695536 | B/1-28 | 25 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 141032H | XT | 664474 | A/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 141035H | XT | 646510 | D/1-2 | 5 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 141107H | XT | 653470 | A/S | 5 bunkers, 50m trench | Destroyed |
| 141130H | XT | 694525 | A/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 141207H | XT | 658472 | A/S | 3 bunkers, 20m trench | Destroyed |
| 141315H | XT | 644521 | D/1-2 | 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 141333H | XT | 691523 | A/S | 1 mil structure | Destroyed |
| 141345H | XT | 725528 | N/1-4 | 3 "V" shaped holes | Destroyed |
| 141505H | XT | 667560 | A/S | 3 bunkers, mil structure | Destroyed |
| 141540H | XT | 691523 | A/S | 2 mil structures, 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 141630H | XT | 693358 | 1-2 | 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 141643H | XT | 688524 | A/S | bunker, 5 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 141812H | XT | 640483 | A/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 151114H | XT | 688524 | A/S | 13 hooches, 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 151115H | XT | 656465 | A/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 151135H | XT | 688524 | A/S | 3 bunkers, tunnel | Destroyed |
| 151144H | XT | 637518 | B/1-2 | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 151155H | XT | 685577 | A/S | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 151215H | XT | 656465 | A/S | 6 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 151420H | XT | 683578 | B/2-28 | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 151450H | XT | 684394 | C/2-2 | Mil structure w/tunnel | Destroyed |
| 160955H | XT | 697465 | N/1-16 | 30' x 40' mil structure | Destroyed |
| 161045H | XT | 632530 | A/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 161120H | XT | 681539 | A/S | 4 fighting pens, 13 LA pens | Destroyed |
| 161145H | XT | 698563 | A/S | Mil structure, 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 161438H | XT | 698565 | A/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 161506H | XT | 682528 | A/S | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 161615H | XT | 698567 | A/S | 10 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 161555H | XT | 698567 | A/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 161633H | XT | 698565 | A/S | 8 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 170854H | XT | 695567 | A/S | O/H bunker | Destroyed |
| 170850H | XT | 684528 | A/S | 2 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 170910H | XT | 695570 | A/S | Large o/h bunker | Destroyed |
| 170807H | XT | 684528 | A/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 171012H | XT | 628527 | A/S | Bunker, 15m trench | Destroyed |
| 171055H | XT | 684528 | B/1-28 | 2 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 171120H | XT | 686576 | A/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 171109H | XT | 625523 | Bacon/1-2 | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 171712H | XT | 670560 | A/S | 2 o/h bunkers (uncovered) | N/A |
| 180852H | XT | 675545 | A/S | O/H bunker | Destroyed |

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|---------|----|--------|--------|--|-----------|
| 181023H | XT | 683394 | I/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 181112H | XT | 672546 | I/S | 14 fighting pens, 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 181205H | XT | 672548 | I/S | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 181334H | XT | 672548 | I/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 181356H | XT | 672548 | I/S | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 181435H | XT | 672548 | I/S | 5 bunkers, hut | Destroyed |
| 181500H | XT | 687562 | B52 | strike Many bunkers, tunnels, foxholes | Destroyed |
| 181617H | XT | 672548 | I/S | Hootch, 2 bunkers, trench | Destroyed |
| 181645H | XT | 672548 | I/S | 50m trench, 5 bunkers (uncovered) | N/A |
| 181628H | XT | 672548 | I/S | 6 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 181730H | XT | 672548 | I/S | 6 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 191023H | XT | 632231 | I/S | 2 bunkers, tunnel | Destroyed |
| 191200H | XT | 698555 | P52 | strike Many mil structures, storage area, many bunkers | Destroyed |
| 191430H | XT | 657529 | I/S | Bunker, 100m trench | Destroyed |
| 191505H | XT | 663510 | I/S | Foxhole, bunker | Destroyed |
| 191550H | XT | 663483 | B/2-2 | 2 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 191712H | XT | 624470 | I/S | 20m trench, bunker (uncovered) | N/A |
| 191730H | XT | 680525 | I/S | 2 mil structures, bunker | Destroyed |
| 200720H | XT | 825382 | I/S | 4 fighting pens, bunker | Destroyed |
| 200754H | XT | 692545 | I/S | 4 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 200830H | XT | 821386 | I/S | 2 fighting pens, bunker | Destroyed |
| 200930H | XT | 676474 | I/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 201200H | XT | 676474 | I/S | 4 bunkers, 25m trench | Destroyed |
| 201240H | XT | 676474 | I/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 201310H | XT | 702566 | I/S | 2 bunkers | Damaged |
| 201332H | XT | 611377 | I/S | 15 fighting pens, 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 201500H | XT | 644530 | B52 | strike Many mil structures, storage bunker, base camp | Destroyed |
| 201640H | XT | 815385 | I/S | 100m trench (exposed) 6 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 210600H | XT | 668541 | B52 | strike 2 huts, base camp, 500m trench | Destroyed |
| 211042H | XT | 645125 | I/S | 4 bunkers, 50m trench | Destroyed |
| 211024H | XT | 676474 | I/S | 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 211240H | XT | 679546 | I/S | 2 bunkers, mil structures | Destroyed |
| 211319H | XT | 676475 | C/2-2 | 5 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 211325H | XT | 630510 | I/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 211615H | XT | 676554 | I/S | Hootch, 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 211647H | XT | 623503 | I/S | Mil structure, 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 211625H | XT | 623503 | I/S | Hootch, bunker | Destroyed |
| 220600H | XT | 687578 | B52 | strike 100m trench, many bunkers & fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 220907H | XT | 675540 | I/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 220945H | XT | 702561 | I/S | 1 bunker, 2 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 221045H | XT | 624491 | I/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 221020H | XT | 665545 | I/S | 3 bunkers, trench | Destroyed |
| 221100H | XT | 684472 | B/2-2 | 2 o/h foxholes | Destroyed |
| 221110H | XT | 624491 | I/S | Hootch, 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 221315H | XT | 704562 | B/1-16 | 2 bunkers, 6 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 221515H | XT | 674472 | I/S | 5 bunkers, 30 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 221530H | XT | 685550 | B/1-28 | 15 foxholes, mil structure | Destroyed |
| 221659H | XT | 709527 | I/S | 2 bunkers, mil structure | Destroyed |
| 221757H | XT | 709527 | I/S | 20m trench, 3 bunkers (uncovered) | N/A |
| 230600H | XT | 665554 | B52 | strike Base camp, many bunkers & fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 230850H | XT | 644513 | 1-2 | 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 230949H | XT | 700563 | I/S | 6 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 231107H | XT | 675526 | I/S | 5 bunkers, 9 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 231128H | XT | 695523 | I/S | 4 bunkers, 5 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 231247H | XT | 700489 | I/S | 50m trench, 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 231248H | XT | 710563 | I/S | 50m trench (uncovered), 2 bunkers | Destroyed |

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|---------|----|--------|------------|---------------------------------------|-----------|
| 231314H | XT | 680506 | I/S | Bunker (uncovered) | N/A |
| 231355H | XT | 679529 | 1-28 | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 231408H | XT | 690510 | A/S | 12 bunkers, tunnel ent | Destroyed |
| 231515H | XT | 890302 | C/2-16 | 2 mil structures, 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 231517H | XT | 688515 | A/S | Bunker, 2 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 231648H | XT | 637905 | A/1-2 | Bunker, 2 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 231715H | XT | 690510 | I/S | 8 bunkers, 250m trench (uncovered) | N/A |
| 240750H | XT | 810388 | I/S | 50m trench (exposed), 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 240930H | XT | 628519 | 1/2 | Food storage | Destroyed |
| 241000H | XT | 628518 | 1/2 | Food storage | Destroyed |
| 241030H | XT | 675529 | I/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 241051H | XT | 675525 | I/S | 5 foxholes, 2 bunkers, structure | Destroyed |
| 241101H | XT | 710544 | A/1-16 | ammo storage | Destroyed |
| 241145H | XT | 682529 | 1/28 | ammo storage | Destroyed |
| 241159H | XT | 716572 | I/S | Bunker, foxhole | Destroyed |
| 241120H | YT | 643460 | I/S | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 241345H | XT | 677515 | I/S | Hootch | Destroyed |
| 241206H | XT | 818388 | I/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 241902H | XT | 690514 | I/S | 4 bunkers, 3 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 241607H | XT | 750458 | I/S | 6 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 241628H | XT | 750458 | I/S | Hootch, 10 bunkers, trench | Destroyed |
| 241614H | XT | 650458 | I/S | 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 241707H | XT | 690514 | I/S | 5 bunkers, 12 foxholes, 300m trench | Destroyed |
| 250838H | XT | 649458 | I/S | 50m trench (exposed), 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 250915H | XT | 798515 | I/S | Tunnel (exposed), 2 hootches | Destroyed |
| 250955H | XT | 651458 | I/S | 7 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 250959H | XT | 663528 | I/S | 200m trench (uncovered), fighting pen | Destroyed |
| 251034H | XT | 642462 | I/S | 3 bunkers, 4 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 251020H | XT | 663528 | I/S | 3 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 251045H | YT | 669492 | B/2-2 | 4 mil structures, tunnel | Destroyed |
| 251155H | XT | 662513 | I/S | 3 bunkers, 50m trench | Destroyed |
| 251252H | YT | 641467 | I/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 251520H | XT | 642449 | I/S | 9 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 251525H | XT | 648548 | C/1-26 | 2 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 251750H | YT | 633529 | I/S | 4 bunkers | Partially |
| 260600H | XT | 695519 | B52 strike | Base camp | Destroyed |
| 260730H | YT | 625525 | I/S | 1 structure, 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 260731H | YT | 670471 | I/S | 7 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 260808H | YT | 632527 | I/S | Structure | Destroyed |
| 260840H | XT | 719570 | I/S | 2 o/h bunkers | Destroyed |
| 260900H | XT | 666523 | D/1-28 | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 260935H | XT | 651462 | I/1-27 | 5 fighting pens, 6 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 260935H | XT | 667527 | D/1-28 | 3 spider holes, 6 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 261043H | XT | 718524 | I/S | 4 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 261125H | XT | 681528 | D/1-28 | 15 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 261138H | XT | 647493 | C/2-2 | Tunnel | Destroyed |
| 261145H | YT | 627528 | B/1-2 | Messhall, 7 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 261206H | XT | 640513 | I/1-2 | Empty rice storage | Destroyed |
| 261300H | XT | 640516 | I/1-2 | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 261345H | XT | 715566 | B/1-16 | Tunnel; bunker | Destroyed |
| 261345H | XT | 651535 | I/S | 100m trench (uncovered) bunker | Destroyed |
| 261415H | XT | 651535 | I/S | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 261520H | XT | 662469 | D/1-26 | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 261610H | XT | 651535 | I/S | Hootch, 4 bunkers, trench | Destroyed |
| 261620H | XT | 650412 | I/S | Hootch | Destroyed |
| 270745H | XT | 671523 | D/1-28 | Mil structure, foxhole | Destroyed |
| 270809H | XT | 645455 | I/S | 4 bunkers, 7 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 270947H | XT | 640455 | I/S | 7 bunkers, 100m trench, tunnel | Destroyed |
| 270820H | XT | 636517 | I/S | Hootch | Destroyed |

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| 270925H | XT | 633528 | A/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 271615H | XT | 652535 | A/S | 40m trench, 9 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 271045H | XT | 623517 | A/1-2 | Mil structure, bunker w/oh cover | Destroyed |
| 271120H | XT | 697457 | B/1-26 | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 271132H | XT | 662455 | D/1-26 | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 271140H | XT | 704524 | A/S | 2 bunkers, hootch | Destroyed |
| 271200H | XT | 789332 | A/S | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 271200H | XT | 627468 | A/S | 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 271235H | XT | 664494 | B/2-2 | 4 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 271332H | XT | 652535 | A/S | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 271402H | XT | 915319 | A/2-18 | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 271435H | XT | 665456 | D/1-26 | 2 mil structures | Destroyed |
| 280943H | XT | 783331 | A/S | Fighting pen | Destroyed |
| 280858H | XT | 693512 | A/S | 40 bunkers and 30m trench (uncovered) | Destroyed |
| 280910H | XT | 683524 | B/1-28 | Food storage | Destroyed |
| 280917H | XT | 783331 | A/S | 3 fighting pens, trench | Destroyed |
| 280945H | XT | 707558 | D/1-16 | 4 o/h bunkers | Destroyed |
| 281155H | XT | 715566 | A/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 281249H | XT | 652536 | A/S | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 281250H | XT | 783363 | A/S | Bunker, 3 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 281653H | XT | 653537 | A/S | 4 bunkers, hootch | Destroyed |
| 281710H | XT | 653537 | A/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 281750H | XT | 653537 | A/S | 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 281634H | XT | 668496 | A/S | Mil structure | Destroyed |
| 290942H | XT | 632523 | A/S | 2 bunkers (uncovered) | N/A |
| 291002H | XT | 632523 | A/S | Bunker (uncovered) | N/A |
| 291121H | XT | 694513 | A/S | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 291250H | XT | 635515 | A/S | Foxhole, trench | Destroyed |
| 291325H | XT | 635515 | A/S | 7 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 291550H | XU | 659125 | B52 strike | 2 bunkers, many foxholes | Destroyed |
| 302045H | XU | 815240 | B52 strike | 4 bunkers (uncovered) trail | Destroyed |
| 311615H | XT | 580990 | B52 strike | 2 base camps | Partially Destroyed |
| 311640H | XT | 758057 | 1-28 | 2 mil structures | Destroyed |
| NOVEMBER 1967 | | | | | |
| 011240H | XU | 924067 | B52 strike | Foxhole | Destroyed |
| 011240H | XU | 923066 | B52 strike | 2 bunkers, 20m trench (exposed) | N/A |
| 011240H | XU | 926063 | B52 strike | 1 bunker | Partially Destroyed |
| 011405H | XU | 633040 | A/S | 1 tunnel entrance | N/A |
| | XU | 930061 | B52 strike | 2 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| | | | B52 strike | 2 tunnel entrance | Partially Destroyed |
| | XU | 931072 | B52 strike | 20m trench (exposed) | N/A |
| | XU | 931065 | B52 strike | 1 foxhole | Destroyed |
| 020220H | XU | 694091 | A/S | 2 AW pens, 1 sec explosion | Destroyed |
| 020700H | XU | 702103 | A/S | 2 sec explosions | N/A |
| | XU | 689072 | A/S | 3 fighting pens (uncovered) | N/A |
| 020900H | XU | 833049 | A/S | 1 bunker | Destroyed |
| 021004H | XU | 764102 | A/S | 1 mil structure | Destroyed |
| 021130H | XU | 584115 | E52 strike | 3 mil structure | Destroyed |
| | XU | 583114 | | 5 mil structures (exposed) | N/A |
| | XU | 584115 | | 4 bunkers | Destroyed |
| | XU | 583114 | | 7 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 021447H | XU | 784134 | A/S | 1 structure | Damaged |
| 021618H | XU | 679080 | A/S | 4 trails cut | N/A |
| 021657H | XU | 680670 | A/S | 1 mil structure, 1 bridge | Damaged |
| | | | | 2 bunkers (exposed) | |
| 021850H | XU | 705060 | A/S | Sec explosion | N/A |

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|---------|-----------|------------|---|------------------|
| 031141H | XU 775166 | N/S | 1 mil structure | Destroyed |
| | | | 1 mil structure | Damaged |
| 031350H | XU 725070 | C/2-28 | Mortar pens | Destroyed |
| 031521H | XU 788118 | N/S | 3 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 031530H | XU 788119 | N/S | 3 fighting pens | Destroyed |
| 031750H | XU 816159 | N/S | 2 tunnels (exposed) | N/A |
| 040800H | XU 712154 | 1-26 | 10 bunkers, 1 cmd bunker, 2 MG pens | Destroyed |
| 041005H | XU 800141 | D/2-12 | 1 mil structure | Destroyed |
| 041200H | XU 715114 | 1-18 | 5 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 041207H | XU 782095 | N/S | See fire | |
| 041345H | XU 815115 | N/S | 1 mil structure | Destroyed |
| 041350H | XU 781155 | 2-12 | Mort pen | Destroyed |
| 041521 | XU 810106 | N/S | Trail cut | N/A |
| 041554H | XU 789107 | N/S | 4 trails cut | N/A |
| 041705H | XU 805110 | N/S | 1 mil structure | Destroyed |
| | | | 2 trail cut | N/A |
| 041721H | XU 805109 | N/S | 1 trail cut | N/A |
| 041739H | XU 805100 | N/S | 2 trails cut, 1 structure | Destroyed |
| 050821H | XU 781152 | N/S | 20m trench, 2 bunkers (uncovered) | Destroyed |
| 050850H | XU 781152 | N/S | 3 bunkers (uncovered) | N/A |
| | | | 2 spider holes | Destroyed |
| 050910H | XU 781152 | N/S | 2 bunkers, 3 spider holes 25m trench (uncovered) | Destroyed N/A |
| 051055H | XU 775137 | B/2-2 | 3 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 051110H | XU 773138 | 2-12 | 100 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 051235H | XU 715135 | D/1-26 | 30 bunkers, RR pens | Destroyed |
| 051320H | XU 767154 | 2-12 | 30 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 051410H | XU 825036 | N/S | 2 trails cut | N/A |
| 051420H | XU 700092 | N/S | 24 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 060920H | XU 792137 | 2-12 | 10 MG pens | Destroyed |
| 060945H | XU 795099 | N/S | Tunnel ent (exposed) | N/A |
| 061140H | XU 688088 | 1-18 | 1 mil pen, 7 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 061200H | XU 809125 | N/S | 1 mil structure | Damaged |
| | | | 1 bridge | Destroyed |
| 061210H | XU 683081 | 1-18 | 150 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 061225H | XU 688088 | 1-18 | 7 mil pens | Destroyed |
| 061250H | XU 863098 | N/S | 2 trails cut, 1 bunker | Destroyed |
| 061352H | XU 758088 | B/1-28 | 20 bunkers | Damaged |
| 061406H | XU 754078 | B/1-28 | 30 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 061412H | XU 833100 | N/S | Trench (exposed) | N/A |
| 061505H | XU 799095 | N/S | 1 bunker (uncovered) | N/A |
| 070600H | XU 764234 | B52 strike | 80m trench | Destroyed |
| | | | 1 bunker, 2 fighting pens (exposed) | |
| 070845H | XU 750235 | N/S | 1 trail cut | N/A |
| 071025H | XU 665083 | N/S | 2 bunkers (exposed) | N/A |
| 071120H | XU 875075 | N/S | 1 trail cut | N/A |
| 071305H | XU 325160 | N/S | 2 trails cut | N/A |
| 081230H | XU 775100 | N/S | 2 bunkers (exposed) | N/A |
| 081300H | XU 775000 | N/S | 2 bunkers (exposed) | N/A |
| 081345H | XU 862096 | B52 strike | Tunnel entrance (exposed) fighting pen (exposed) | N/A N/A |
| 081558H | XU 826109 | 2-28 | Tunnel | Destroyed |
| 081600H | XU 774100 | N/S | 10 fighting pens (exposed) | N/A |
| 081650H | XU 830100 | N/S | 1 mil structure, 1 cmd bunker | Destroyed |
| 090741H | XU 795098 | N/S | 1 bunker | Destroyed |
| | | | 1 tunnel entrance (exposed) | |
| 090827H | XU 870150 | N/S | 1 trail cut | N/A |
| | | | 1 bunker (exposed) | |
| 090907H | XU 882158 | N/S | 1 mil structure, 1 bunker 2 roads cut | Destroyed N/A |

Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 29 Sep - 19 Nov 67) to Annex B (Intelligence)
to after action Report for OP SHENANDOAH II (U) (CONT'D)

| | | | | |
|---------|-----------|------------|--|----------------------|
| 091120H | XU 880157 | A/S | 2 mil structures 1 bunker | Destroyed Damaged |
| 091207H | XU 706523 | A/S | 1 sec explosion | N/A |
| 091220H | XU 800435 | A/S | 100m trench (exposed) | Destroyed |
| 091230H | XU 841102 | B52 strike | 8 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 091243H | XU 830178 | A/S | B52 strike 2 bunkers | Destroyed |
| 091511H | XU 880150 | A/S | 2 bunkers, 2 fighting pens (uncovered) | Destroyed |
| 100826H | XT 880921 | A/S | 2 small structures | Damaged |
| 110802H | XT 800925 | A/S | 1 mil structure, 1 bunker | N/A |
| 111129H | XT 600955 | A/S | 1 trail cut | Destroyed |
| 121118H | XU 889006 | A/S | 1 bunker | N/A |
| 130840H | XT 628930 | A/S | Road cut | N/A |
| 131518H | XT 824959 | A/S | 8 bunkers (exposed) | N/A |
| 140656H | XU 840033 | A/S | 2 roads cut | N/A |
| 140939H | XU 868173 | A/S | 1 bunker (exposed) | N/A |
| 141216H | XT 689920 | A/S | Bunker | Destroyed |
| 151129H | XU 745085 | D/2-28 | 1 bunker, 1 mil structure | Destroyed |
| 161030H | XU 722089 | 2-28 | Secondary fire w/white smoke | N/A |
| 161637H | XT 639961 | A/S | 1 mil structure | Destroyed |
| 171055H | XU 654046 | A/S | 1 mil structure | Destroyed |
| 181333H | XU 746063 | D/2-28 | 4 foxholes | Destroyed |
| 190421H | XU 604020 | A/S | 1 mortar pen | Destroyed |
| | | | Sec explosion w/blue smoke | N/A |
| | | | 1 bunker | Destroyed |
| | | | 1 tunnel | Destroyed |
| | | | Tunnel (exposed) | Destroyed |

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
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COMBAT ACTION REPORT

OPERATION "BERNARDINE II"

(19 September to 19 November 1967)

1st Infantry Division Support Command



**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER
12 YEARS DOD DIR 5000.10.**

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1. (U) CONTENT OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

A. (U) GENERAL

The basic concept for logistical support of Operation SKIRMISH II featured supply point distribution of high tonnage items from established forward distribution points at Lai Ede and Quan Led. A forward support area for Class III was established at Lao Nuh when disrupted by the tactical situation during the closing phase of the operation. Unit distribution of Class V was effected from Lai Ede and Quan Led by rotary wing aircraft to Fire Support Patrol Bases (FSPB) Lorraine I West of Lai Ede Lorraine II, Northwest of Lai Ede; Calson III at Ban Long Oudson V, West of Ban Long; Lao Pith II, visited by Lao Kirih Deklam RDP, visited by Lao Nuh and Dogface RDP, visited by Lao Nuh. Unit distribution of Class V 105mm ammunition was made to the Lao Nuh airstrip FSPB. The support of supply was from the rear and focused on the maintenance of adequate stocks at the forward distribution and forward supply points to meet peak unit demands without delay or adverse effect on tactical operations. Resupply of the forward distribution points at Lai Ede was predominantly by Land LOC. Resupply of the forward distribution point at Quan Led was accomplished by Land and Air LOC, and at the forward support area by air LOC exclusively. Through continuous liaison with the tactical units by Support Command elements, and by the full use of the Logistical Operation Coordination Center (LOCC), logistical problems were anticipated or identified so that remedial actions were taken before they reached a magnitude that hampered tactical operations. Through the LOCC machinery, proactive action and anticipatory planning was instituted in a timely manner to insure logistical support of all operations.

B. (U) FOURTH AND SIXTH FORTS

The Support Command Forward Command Post, in conjunction with the Logistical Operation Coordination Center (LOCC) was operational at Division Headquarters (Hq) at Lai Ede at the onset of Operation SKIRMISH II and remained so during the period. The LOCC functioned as a coordination center for all logistical support rendered during the operation. This was accomplished by recording, evaluating, consolidating and transmitting to the 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion, at Di An and its forward support elements as applicable at Lai Ede, Quan Led and Lao Nuh, requests for Class I, II and IV and III support. In a similar manner requests for Class V were transmitted to 3rd Ordnance Battalion, 29th General Support Group in Long Binh. Maintenance requirements were transmitted to the 701st Maintenance Battalion at Di An and its forward support elements at Lai Ede and Quan Led. Aggressive follow up action was initiated and continually exercised throughout the operation to insure that all valid demands were satisfied in the shortest possible time span. The LOCC, in addition, was the focal point for consolidation of data relative to consumption rates, receipts and use in of supplies and equipment. This information was transmitted into essential planning data to insure the uninterrupted and timely flow of optimum amounts of all classes of supplies and equipment to the ultimate consumer. The Division Transportation Office, which is integrated into the structure of the LOCC likewise had its Forward Command Post established at the onset of the operation. It remained so during the period. Requests for fixed wing lifts were accepted by the DFO, coordinated with the LOCC, and forwarded to the Airlift Control Center (ALCC), a part of the 635th Air Division, Fin Son Khut Air Force Base in Saigon for appropriate action. Continued monitoring and coordination between all concerned was effected to insure successful mission completion. Heavy control in support of the operation was exercised from the DFO Forward Command Post. The DFO rear element at Ft Ky, under the command and control of the DFO Forward Command Post, coordinated and assisted in loading of all cargo airlifted from Di An airdrops in support of Operation SKIRMISH II.

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0. (C) METHOD OF SUPPORT SUPPLY AND SERVICE:

1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

a. The activities of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion were controlled by the Battalion Commander through his staff and subordinate commanders. The Battalion CP was located Di An. Operation of the permanent Forward Supply Sections at Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi and the CAC aircraft refueling points at Caissou III and Loc Ninh were controlled in a normal, routine manner. The office of the Division Supply Officer served as a focal point for the coordination of the logistical support rendered by the Supply and Transport Battalion. Here data on consumption receipts and amounts on hand in the forward areas were gathered and considered with the logistical situation, locations of units and planned movements of units to insure the uninterrupted flow of adequate supplies to the forward areas. In addition, a representative of S-3 was located with the LCCC at the Division Forward Command Post for liaison with the Support Command and G4.

b. The battalion concept of supply and service support for Operation "SHEMADOAN II" involved utilization of established Forward Supply Sections at Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi base camps. All units participating in the operation were supported with Class I, Class III and Class II&IV from these three locations. In addition refueling points were established at F3PB Caissou III 8 (NY790555) and Loc Ninh to provide convenient refueling locations within the operational area for command and control aircraft. Adequate stocks were maintained at Lai Khe by LandLOC from 1st Log Command activities located in Saigon-Long Binh logistical complex and the battalion main supply facility at Di An. AF aircraft were utilized on a non-scheduled basis to supply both barrier material and fast moving Class II&IV items to Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi. Class III was supplied by air to F3PB Caissou III 8 and Loc Ninh. Normal frag of AF aircraft and Lan LOC were utilized to provide Class I and Class III materials at Lai Khe and Quan Loi. Normal frag of AF aircraft provided Class III and Class I materials to Phuoc Vinh.

c. The battalion maintained the capacity to provide for emergency refueling in isolated field locations and to expand existing Class III facilities on short notice to support air lift and airmobile assault operations for the duration of the operation.

4. SUPPORT LOCATIONS:

| <u>LOCATION</u> | <u>SUPPORT</u> | <u>DATES OPEN</u> | <u>PERSONNEL</u> |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Lai Khe | Class I, II&IV, III, OR REG, SALVAGE | Perm | 1 OCT 23 BY |
| Phuoc Vinh | Class I, II&IV, III, OR REG, SALVAGE | Perm | 1 OCT 10 BY |
| Quan Loi | Class I, II&IV, III, OR REG, SALVAGE | Perm | 1 OCT 22 BY |
| F3PB Caissou III 8 | Class III | 7 Oct-1 Nov | 2 BN |
| Loc Ninh | Class III | 2 Nov-16 Nov | 2 BN |

e. A combination of area and unit support was used during this operation. Class I and II&IV supplies were normally provided on a unit basis. Class III and OR REG were normally provided on an area basis. Salvage collection was accomplished on an area basis utilizing internal transportation assets.

1. Lai Khe

a. Unit support was provided for Class I and II&IV while Class III, OR REG and salvage collection were provided on an area basis.

b. Land and air LOC were utilized for re-supply.

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2. Phuoc Vinh

a. Unit support was provided for Class I and Class IIIV while Class III, OR EEO and salvage collection were provided on an area basis.

b. Air LOG was used exclusively for re-supply.

3. Quan Loi

a. Unit support was provided for Class I and Class IIIV while Class III, OR EEO and salvage collection were provided on an area basis.

b. Land and air LOG were utilized for re-supply.

4. F. S. P. S. Odessa III 8

a. Area Class III support was provided for command and control aircraft.

b. Air LOG was used exclusively for re-supply.

5. Loc Ninh

a. Area Class III support was provided for command and control aircraft.

b. Air LOG was used exclusively for re-supply.

2. 701st MAINTENANCE BATTALION:

a. The 701st Maintenance Battalion supported operations conducted during "SHERMAN II" using the normal base camp concept and the concept of on site support through the use of contact teams. The total efforts of C Company, 701st and the D Company Quan Loi Contact Team were directed toward support of these operations. A and B Companies participated in a limited capacity. Up to twelve contact teams with a total strength ranging from 18 to 62 personnel were employed daily. Personnel for these contact teams were drawn from all units of the battalion with the majority coming from Headquarters and A and D Companies. Aircraft support was provided by E Company from Phu Loi with extensive use of contact teams for on site repair.

b. Maintenance Teams were provided by:

1. Headquarters and A Company from DiAn and Phu Loi with augmentation personnel sent to Lai Khe and other forward areas.

2. B Company from Di An, and 8 men to Lai Khe to augment C Company.

3. C Company from Lai Khe and a 6-man contact team at Chon Thanh.

4. D Company from Phuoc Vinh, and 1 officer and 16 EM contact team at Quan Loi. Artillery repairmen deployed to Loc Ninh on call.

5. E Company from Phu Loi with on site repair team dispatched as required for repair and recovery.

c. The use of contact teams proved highly satisfactory in minimizing down time for equipment at forward locations; i. e., within three hours, three M550s were reported down for recoil mechanisms and were repaired and returned to action.

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Resupply was accomplished by use of air and surface transportation. Repair parts were loaded through Headquarters and A Company at Di An, to forward support companies at Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh and the B Company contact team at Quan Loi for immediate use of shipment to forward locations to support on site repairs. A relatively small amount of supplies were moved by air, the majority was moved by convey. Nevertheless, the movement of critically needed repair parts by air for on site repairs was vital to maintenance support.

J. AMMUNITION AND SUPPLY

a. During Operation "SHERWOODAN II", class V support provided through forward distribution points (FDP) at Lai Khe and Quan Loi. The Lai Khe and Quan Loi FDP's were resupplied by periodic Log Command convoys from Long Binh. The Quan Loi FDP was also resupplied by Air Force air from Bien Hoa. BOD service was provided by a team from the 10th Ord Det (BOD) at Lai Khe and later at Quan Loi.

b. Ammunition supply service to the Division was controlled by the DAO whose base of operation was in LOOC at Dong My Nhai in Lai Khe. The DAO was assisted in the LOOC by the two enlisted men. One EM from the DAO section, four EM from the 40th Ord Company operated the FDP at Lai Khe. Two EM from the DAO section and six EM from the 40th Ord Company operated the FDP at Quan Loi. Stockage of the FDP's was coordinated by the DAO-LOOC and the ADAO at Long Binh.

c. Method of Direct Support and Resupply: The method of resupply for the units engaged in operations "SHERWOODAN II" was split between land LOC and air LOC as follows:

| | |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Lai Khe FDP | Quan Loi FDP |
| Air LOC - 0 | Air LOC - 10% |
| Land LOC - 100% | Land LOC - 80% |

K. LOGISTICS TRANSPORTATION OFFICE

The Division Transportation Office (DTO) was organized into two basic elements, one forward and one rear. The forward element was concerned with the overall BTO operation with primary emphasis being placed on airlift and convey operations. The rear element handled outgoing and incoming hold baggage and operated the Di An fixed wing airstrip and the heliport.

D. (C) GENERAL SUPPORT AND RESUPPLY SERVICES

1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalion

The 1st Supply and Transport Battalion used its normal resupply sources throughout the operation. Requirements of supported units were routed to the Division Supply Office at Di An. For those items not available, and for anticipated requirements, a request was placed on the 50th Field Depot in Saigon.

2. 70th Maintenance Battalion

Repair parts back-up support was received from the 50th Field Depot and the 34th General Support Group.

3. Division Ammunition Office

The Long Binh Ammunition Depot, operated by the 1st Ord Bn provided ammunition by unit distribution to the Lai Khe and Quan Loi FDP's.

E. (C) UNIT SUPPLY CONCEPTS

1. 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion

Supply point distribution was provided throughout the operation. Unit trains were located vicinity Lai Khe, Quan Loi, and Phuoc Vinh. Units received supplies at the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion Forward Supply Sections at these three locations. An exception to this method of resupply was the delivery of ice cream to field locations.

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2. TOLet Maintenance Battalions

Limited transportation support was provided by the 160th Transportation Group in the movement of repair parts forward from Headquarters and I Company. The preponderance of repair parts transportation into the division and to forward support companies was accomplished with organic transportation. All of the repair parts moved by air were moved by Support Command, I Company TOLet Maintenance Battalion, and AOC.

3. Division Ammunition Offices

The Division Ammunition Office received unit distribution from Long Rich in all cases.

P. (C) SUPPORT OF NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS:

1. 1st Supply and Transportation Battalion

During Operation "SHERIDAN IX" the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion supported 3-22 (Falcon) and 2-12 (Flames) Infantry Battalion of the 25th Division from 28 Oct 67 to 5 Nov 67 with Class I, Class II and Class II&IV through the Battalion's Forward Supply Section at Quan Loi.

2. TOLet Maintenance Battalions

a. The 160th Engineer Battalion was supported on a mission by mission basis.

b. One recovery mission of an M110 howitzer was accomplished for the 6th Battalion 27th Artillery.

3. Division Ammunition Offices

Non-Divisional Infantry and Artillery were supported in the same manner as organic units.

Q. (C) MAJOR ITEM LOSSES (SUPPORT COMMAND)

There were no major items of equipment lost by Support Command units.

II (C) EXPERIENCE DATA

A. MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

1. (C) SUPPLIES

a. (V) Quantities of Supplies Consumed:

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>AIR LOG</u> | <u>LAND LOG</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|---|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Class I (Short Tons) | 637.7 | 1,154.4 | 1,792.1 |
| Class III | | | |
| JF4 (Gallons) | 709,440 | 1,106,270 | 1,815,710 |
| Avgas (Gallons) | 72,750 | 67,100 | 139,850 |
| Hogas (Gallons) | 177,900 | 305,650 | 483,550 |
| Diesel (Gallons) | 199,200 | 346,200 | 545,400 |
| Class II&IV (SHORT TONS) | 40 | 59 | 99 |
| Less Barrier Material | | | |
| Barrier Material | 43 | 60 | 103 |
| Small Arms & Other Class V (Short Tons) | 23.10 | 3289.90 | -0- |
| Arty and Large Caliber | 447.87 | 7512.46 | -0- |
| Repair Parts | 27 | 386 | -0- |

b. (C) Support to C-5 Activities

None

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(1) Locations Lai Khe

(a) A Rations:

| DATE | d/d | TOTAL REQ'D | AV DLY REQ'D | TOTAL A/R | S/T RMC | TOTAL ISSUE | AV DLY ISSUE | AV DLY O/R REQ'D |
|-------------|-------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| 29 Sep | 1 day | 10,890 | 10,890 | 0 | 10.8 | 6,900 | 6,900 | 13,728 |
| 30 Sep-6Oct | 1 day | 52,170 | 7,310 | 0 | 44.7 | 52,400 | 7,343 | 20,431 |
| 7 Oct-13Oct | 1 day | 56,874 | 8,096 | 0 | 56.8 | 52,267 | 7,467 | 20,262 |
| 14Oct-20Oct | 1 day | 65,307 | 9,328 | 0 | 65.7 | 52,300 | 7,328 | 23,711 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | 1 day | 39,315 | 5,645 | 0 | 39.8 | 30,300 | 7,186 | 22,601 |
| 28Oct-3Nov | 1 day | 49,600 | 7,085 | 0 | 30.3 | 49,300 | 7,043 | 18,098 |
| 4Nov-10Nov | 1 day | 44,200 | 6,314 | 0 | 44.4 | 44,500 | 6,357 | 19,641 |
| 11Nov-17Nov | 1 day | 48,498 | 6,928 | 0 | 48.7 | 43,250 | 6,179 | 24,823 |
| 18Nov-19Nov | 1 day | 12,442 | 6,221 | 0 | 12.5 | 13,870 | 6,935 | 23,782 |
| RECAP | 1 day | 378,349 | 8,472 | 0 | 373.7 | 363,087 | 7,842 | 23,388 |

(b) B Rations:

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|---------|--------|--------|---|-------|---------|-------|--------|
| 29 Sep | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 68,700 |
| 30 Sep-6Oct | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50,400 | 7,200 | 32,700 |
| 7 Oct-13Oct | 15 days | 80,000 | 11,429 | 0 | 120.0 | 54,600 | 7,800 | 47,871 |
| 14Oct-20Oct | 15 days | 80,000 | 11,429 | 0 | 120.0 | 0 | 0 | 74,985 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 52,500 | 7,500 | 85,700 |
| 28Oct-3Nov | 15 days | 80,000 | 11,429 | 0 | 120.0 | 49,000 | 7,000 | 69,628 |
| 4Nov-10Nov | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20,700 | 2,957 | 86,343 |
| 11Nov-17Nov | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 44,100 | 6,300 | 48,900 |
| 18Nov-19Nov | 15 days | 40,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 56,300 |
| RECAP | 15 days | 20,000 | 4,285 | 0 | 360.0 | 271,300 | 4,844 | 61,330 |

(c) C Rations:

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------|--------|-------|---|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| 29 Sep | 5 days | 3,072 | 3,072 | 0 | 17.5 | 561 | 561 | 26,291 |
| 30 Sep-6Oct | 5 days | 3,840 | 548 | 0 | 13.7 | 7,904 | 1,229 | 24,456 |
| 7 Oct-13Oct | 6 days | 12,288 | 1,755 | 0 | 40.0 | 8,942 | 1,277 | 19,065 |
| 14Oct-20Oct | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6,684 | 955 | 21,324 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6,228 | 890 | 15,573 |
| 28Oct-3Nov | 5 days | 21,504 | 3,029 | 0 | 65.2 | 3,516 | 502 | 26,809 |
| 4Nov-10Nov | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,918 | 425 | 27,753 |
| 11Nov-17Nov | 6 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,071 | 153 | 26,343 |
| RECAP | 5 days | 44,544 | 1,290 | 0 | 133.8 | 37,954 | 740 | 26,918 |

(d) Sundry Packs:

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------|-----|----|---|------|-------|----|-----|
| 29 Sep | 3 days | 90 | 90 | 0 | 2.1 | 21 | 21 | 460 |
| 30 Sep-6Oct | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 219 | 31 | 430 |
| 7 Oct-13Oct | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 210 | 30 | 391 |
| 14Oct-20Oct | 3 days | 300 | 43 | 0 | 7.0 | 204 | 29 | 285 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | 3 days | 240 | 34 | 0 | 5.6 | 174 | 25 | 365 |
| 28Oct-3Nov | 3 days | 160 | 23 | 0 | 3.5 | 178 | 25 | 457 |
| 4Nov-10Nov | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 159 | 23 | 368 |
| 11Nov-17Nov | 3 days | 30 | 4 | 0 | .7 | 181 | 25 | 221 |
| 18Nov-19Nov | 3 days | 120 | 60 | 0 | 2.8 | 7 | 3 | 217 |
| RECAP | 3 days | 540 | 31 | 0 | 21.7 | 1,353 | 28 | 399 |

(2) Locations Phuoc Vinh

(a) A Rations:

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|-------|--------|-------|------|---|--------|-------|--------|
| 29 Sep | 1 day | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4,500 | 4,500 | 19,399 |
| 30 Sep-6Oct | 1 day | 39,380 | 5,626 | 44.4 | 0 | 34,090 | 4,870 | 20,174 |
| 7 Oct-13Oct | 1 day | 21,254 | 3,036 | 20.3 | 0 | 25,746 | 3,678 | 19,310 |
| 14Oct-20Oct | 1 day | 45,614 | 6,516 | 46.1 | 0 | 34,585 | 4,941 | 20,911 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | 1 day | 28,536 | 4,076 | 29.8 | 0 | 33,818 | 4,831 | 17,329 |
| 28Oct-3Nov | 1 day | 30,832 | 4,404 | 30.3 | 0 | 28,250 | 4,036 | 18,244 |
| 4Nov-10Nov | 1 day | 15,815 | 2,259 | 15.3 | 0 | 22,860 | 3,265 | 17,062 |

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| DATES | S/S | TOTAL REC'D | AV ELY REG'T | TOTAL AIR | S/T HWY | TOTAL ISSUE | AV ELY ISSUE | AV ELY OH END |
|-------------|-------|-------------|--------------|-----------|---------|-------------|--------------|---------------|
| 11Nov-17Nov | 1 day | 33,408 | 4,772 | 33.1 | 0 | 27,990 | 3,992 | 16,368 |
| 18Nov-19Nov | 1 day | 8,276 | 4,188 | 8.1 | 0 | 748 | 374 | 19,069 |
| RECAP | 1 day | 223,217 | 4,359 | 227.4 | 0 | 212,547 | 4,310 | 19,657 |

(b) B Rations:

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|---------|---------|--------|-------|---|---------|-------|--------|
| 29Sep | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 67,949 |
| 30Sep-1Oct | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 36,900 | 5,214 | 42,444 |
| 7Oct-13Oct | 15 days | 90,000 | 0 | 135.0 | 0 | 33,075 | 4,725 | 72,104 |
| 14Oct-20Oct | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33,775 | 4,825 | 64,244 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | 15 days | 73,621 | 10,571 | 110.4 | 0 | 3,745 | 535 | 48,903 |
| 28Oct-3Nov | 15 days | 38,400 | 5,485 | 53.0 | 0 | 28,140 | 4,020 | 87,307 |
| 4Nov-10Nov | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23,485 | 3,355 | 84,285 |
| 11Nov-17Nov | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 27,440 | 3,920 | 57,975 |
| 18Nov-19Nov | 15 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50,135 |
| RECAP | 15 days | 202,021 | 16,056 | 299.0 | 0 | 186,160 | 3,324 | 71,793 |

(c) C Rations:

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|---|--------|-------|--------|
| 29 Sep | 5 days | C | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,188 | 1,188 | 21,288 |
| 30Sep-6Oct | 5 days | 15,714 | 2,244 | 54.0 | 0 | 7,974 | 1,139 | 29,371 |
| 7Oct-13Oct | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9,758 | 1,394 | 24,890 |
| 14Oct-20Oct | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4,724 | 674 | 18,183 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | 5 days | 14,608 | 2,086 | 47.3 | 0 | 5,800 | 828 | 22,545 |
| 28Oct-3Nov | 5 days | 348 | 49 | 1.0 | 0 | 3,664 | 523 | 22,255 |
| 4Nov-10Nov | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5,248 | 750 | 18,932 |
| 11Nov-17Nov | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4,828 | 689 | 15,737 |
| 18Nov-19Nov | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11,184 |
| RECAP | 5 days | 30,670 | 4,379 | 103.2 | 0 | 43,177 | 698 | 22,935 |

(d) Sundry Peaks:

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------|-----|-----|------|---|-----|----|-----|
| 29 Sep | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | 369 |
| 30Sep-6Oct | 3 days | 90 | 12 | 2.1 | 0 | 128 | 18 | 331 |
| 7Oct-13Oct | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 158 | 23 | 252 |
| 14Oct-20Oct | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 110 | 27 | 132 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | 3 days | 296 | 42 | 12.6 | 0 | 210 | 30 | 320 |
| 28Oct-3Nov | 3 days | 421 | 60 | 9.8 | 0 | 53 | 7 | 731 |
| 4Nov-10Nov | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 68 | 9 | 733 |
| 11Nov-17Nov | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 95 | 13 | 558 |
| 18Nov-19Nov | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 34 | 17 | 570 |
| RECAP | 3 days | 807 | 114 | 24.5 | 0 | 872 | 20 | 499 |

(3) Locations Quinn Lois

(a) A Rations:

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|-------|---------|-------|-------|------|---------|-------|--------|
| 29 Sep | 1 day | 2,700 | 2,700 | 2.5 | 0 | 1,890 | 1,890 | 10,090 |
| 30 Sep-6Oct | 1 day | 6,050 | 864 | 4.8 | 0 | 12,290 | 1,736 | 6,762 |
| 7Oct-13Oct | 1 day | 10,000 | 1,428 | 7.9 | 0 | 11,435 | 1,633 | 14,238 |
| 14Oct-20Oct | 1 day | 8,150 | 1,164 | 8.2 | 0 | 10,630 | 1,518 | 11,201 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | 1 day | 14,225 | 2,032 | 19.1 | 0 | 11,795 | 1,685 | 13,001 |
| 28Oct-3Nov | 1 day | 19,805 | 2,829 | 19.0 | 0 | 20,680 | 2,868 | 11,597 |
| 4Nov-10Nov | 1 day | 40,400 | 5,771 | 34.3 | 6 | 31,895 | 4,555 | 17,682 |
| 11Nov-17Nov | 1 day | 23,650 | 3,378 | 16.0 | 7.8 | 30,238 | 4,319 | 18,674 |
| 18Nov-19Nov | 1 day | 8,225 | 4,112 | 0 | 8.3 | 5,200 | 2,600 | 18,292 |
| RECAP | 1 day | 133,205 | 3,233 | 111.8 | 22.1 | 135,403 | 2,848 | 15,187 |

(b) B Rations:

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|---------|--------|-------|-----|---|--------|-------|--------|
| 29 Sep | 10 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 65,820 |
| 30Sep-6Oct | 10 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12,750 | 1,821 | 59,227 |
| 7Oct-13Oct | 10 days | 47,000 | 6,713 | 0 | 0 | 11,550 | 1,650 | 76,220 |
| 14Oct-20Oct | 10 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10,810 | 1,544 | 76,992 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | 10 days | 4,200 | 685 | 7.2 | 0 | 12,320 | 1,760 | 65,057 |
| 28Oct-3Nov | 10 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24,450 | 3,778 | 46,625 |

| DATE | S/S | TOTAL REQ'D | AV ILY REQ'T | TOTAL AIR | S/T PMY | TOTAL ISSUE | AV ILY ISSUE | AV ILY OH END |
|---------------|---------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| 4 Nov-10 Nov | 10 days | 60,000 | 8,571 | 0 | 60.0 | 36,646 | 5,235 | 28,734 |
| 11 Nov-17 Nov | 10 days | 30,463 | 4,351 | 0 | 30.0 | 29,180 | 4,168 | 71,920 |
| 18 Nov-19 Nov | 10 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 61,380 |
| REQ'D | 10 days | 12,263 | 2,340 | 7.2 | 90.0 | 139,706 | 2,494 | 68,951 |

(c) C Rations:

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|--------|--------|--------|------|-------|--------|-------|--------|
| 29 Sep | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 276 | 276 | 30,084 |
| 30 Sep-6 Oct | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 906 | 128 | 29,513 |
| 7 Oct-13 Oct | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 480 | 68 | 28,779 |
| 14 Oct-20 Oct | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 748 | 106 | 28,112 |
| 21 Oct-27 Oct | 5 days | 3,072 | 438 | 10.7 | 0 | 1,592 | 227 | 29,361 |
| 28 Oct-3 Nov | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11,552 | 1,653 | 28,617 |
| 4 Nov-10 Nov | 5 days | 80,072 | 11,439 | 42.1 | 127.4 | 12,148 | 1,735 | 51,284 |
| 11 Nov-17 Nov | 5 days | 1,794 | 256 | 0 | 1.8 | 5,024 | 717 | 84,179 |
| 18 Nov-19 Nov | 5 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 848 | 121 | 81,660 |
| REQ'D | 5 days | 81,738 | 1,516 | 52.8 | 129.2 | 33,664 | 665 | 48,948 |

(d) Sundry Packs:

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|--------|-------|-----|-----|-----|-------|----|-------|
| 29 Sep | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 412 |
| 30 Sep-6 Oct | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 124 | 17 | 397 |
| 7 Oct-13 Oct | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 50 | 7 | 257 |
| 14 Oct-20 Oct | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 134 | 19 | 147 |
| 21 Oct-27 Oct | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 111 | 15 | 213 |
| 28 Oct-3 Nov | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 257 | 36 | 166 |
| 4 Nov-10 Nov | 3 days | 1,140 | 120 | 9.8 | .7 | 340 | 48 | 643 |
| 11 Nov-17 Nov | 3 days | 120 | 17 | 0 | 1.2 | 309 | 44 | 1,014 |
| 18 Nov-19 Nov | 3 days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 71 | 10 | 856 |
| REQ'D | 3 days | 1,260 | 17 | 9.8 | 1.9 | 1,396 | 24 | 513 |

(A) Class I Consumption Trends:

Class I was available for issue at Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh and Quan Loi. Generally, consumption of C rations was on a one meal per day basis in field locations, while A rations were consumed for the other two meals. Supporting elements and units not deployed to field locations consumed a complete A ration. Consumption of ice and other related Class I items was not out of proportion to standards established in previous operations.

(1) Location: Lat. Rm

(a) JP-4:

| DATE | AV. NO OF DISP PTS | S/O GAL | TOTAL REC'D | AV DLY REC'D | TOTAL AIR | S/T HWY | TOTAL ISSUE | AVG DLY ISS | AVG DLY O/H END | VARIATION O/H TO S/O END (+ -) |
|---------------|--------------------------|------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|------------|----------------|-------------------|--------------------------|--|
| 29Sep67 | 17 | 70000 | 15000 | 15000 | 0 | 45 | 16266 | 16266 | 79159 | |
| 30Sep-6Oct67 | | 70000 | 120000 | 17142 | 0 | 360 | 118209 | 16887 | 74093 | |
| 7Oct-13Oct67 | | 70000 | 135000 | 19285 | 0 | 405 | 135141 | 19305 | 76563 | |
| 14Oct-20Oct67 | | | 110000 | 15714 | 0 | 330 | 121466 | 17352 | 75937 | |
| 21Oct-27Oct67 | | | 131100 | 18728 | 0 | 393.3 | 127728 | 18246 | 73658 | |
| 28Oct-3Nov67 | | | 131000 | 18714 | 0 | 393 | 117395 | 16770 | 72130 | |
| 4Nov-10Nov67 | | | 49700 | 7100 | 0 | 149.1 | 51140 | 7305 | 86138 | |
| 11Nov-17Nov67 | 70000 | | 60000 | 8571 | 0 | 180 | 57346 | 8192 | 85713 | |
| 18Nov-19Nov67 | 70000 | | 30000 | 15000 | 0 | 90 | 40419 | 20209 | 76842 | |
| RECAP | 17 | 70000 | 718700 | 16905 | 0 | 2345.4 | 77370 | 17561 | 87066 | |

Highest Day Issue: 34,272 on 28 Oct

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the period: 195%

(b) Avgas

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|-------|-------|------|---|-------|-------|------|-------|--|
| 29Sep | 10000 | 5000 | 5000 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 15900 | |
| 30Sep-6Oct67 | | 5000 | 714 | 0 | 15 | 6000 | 857 | 14100 | |
| 7-13 Oct67 | | 5000 | 714 | 0 | 15 | 6600 | 942 | 13194 | |
| 14-20Oct67 | | 1000 | 1428 | 0 | 30 | 9900 | 1414 | 12957 | |
| 21-27Oct67 | | 1000 | 1428 | 0 | 30 | 11100 | 1595 | 11514 | |
| 28Oct-3Nov67 | | 7100 | 2044 | 0 | 21.3 | 6400 | 914 | 12457 | |
| 4-10Nov67 | | 10000 | 1428 | 0 | 30 | 6000 | 857 | 13400 | |
| 11-17Nov67 | | 5000 | 714 | 0 | 15 | 9100 | 1300 | 12542 | |
| 18-19Nov67 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1200 | 600 | 11100 | |
| RECAP | 10000 | 57100 | 3128 | 0 | 171.3 | 56300 | 1048 | 17848 | |

Highest Day Issue: 3400 on 24 Oct

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the period: 269%

(c) Mogas

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|-------|--------|------|---|-------|--------|------|-------|--|
| 29Sep | 45000 | 5000 | 5000 | 0 | 15 | 5855 | 5855 | 51527 | |
| 30Sep-1Oct67 | | 35000 | 5000 | 0 | 105 | 24481 | 4125 | 49275 | |
| 7-13Oct67 | | 35000 | 5000 | 0 | 105 | 37791 | 5378 | 55326 | |
| 14-20Oct67 | | 35000 | 5000 | 0 | 105 | 37458 | 5351 | 52907 | |
| 21-27Oct67 | | 35000 | 5000 | 0 | 105 | 38175 | 5453 | 52007 | |
| 28Oct-3Nov67 | | 35650 | 5092 | 0 | 106.9 | 37752 | 5393 | 49775 | |
| 4-10Nov67 | | 25000 | 3572 | 0 | 75 | 32723 | 4674 | 46267 | |
| 11-17Nov67 | | 45000 | 6428 | 0 | 135 | 36475 | 5210 | 49182 | |
| 18-19Nov67 | | 10000 | 5000 | 0 | 30 | 16125 | 862 | 45024 | |
| RECAP | 45000 | 260650 | 5636 | 0 | 781.9 | 271235 | 5287 | 56448 | |

Highest Day Issue: 10,300 on 1 Nov

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the Period: 194%

(d) Diesel

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|-------|--------|------|---|-----|--------|------|-------|--|
| 29Sep67 | 50000 | 5000 | 5000 | 0 | 15 | 8269 | 8269 | 50500 | |
| 30Sep-6Oct67 | | 40000 | 5714 | 0 | 120 | 34539 | 4935 | 48753 | |
| 7-13Oct67 | | 25000 | 3571 | 0 | 75 | 36076 | 5153 | 53197 | |
| 14-20Oct67 | | 35000 | 5000 | 0 | 105 | 36246 | 5178 | 45523 | |
| 21-27Oct67 | | 40000 | 5714 | 0 | 120 | 40832 | 5832 | 41542 | |
| 28Oct-3Nov67 | | 45000 | 6428 | 0 | 135 | 43242 | 6177 | 46121 | |
| 4-10Nov67 | | 40000 | 5714 | 0 | 120 | 46503 | 6643 | 42854 | |
| 11-17Nov67 | | 45000 | 6428 | 0 | 135 | 48495 | 6927 | 42606 | |
| 18-19Nov67 | | 15000 | 2500 | 0 | 45 | 15959 | 7959 | 33434 | |
| RECAP | 50000 | 290000 | 6383 | 0 | 870 | 310201 | 7139 | 50554 | |

Highest Day of Issue: 10,926 on 4 Nov

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the Period: 153%

(2) Locations: Phase Visk

(a) JPL

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|--------------|----------|---------------|-------------|--------------|
| 29Sep67 13 | 70000 | 20390 | 20390 | 61.1 | 0 | 14590 | 14590 | 76900 |
| 10Sep-6Oct67 13 | | 37400 | 5342 | 112.2 | 0 | 52700 | 7528 | 65192 |
| 7-13Oct67 | | 73400 | 10771 | 274.2 | 0 | 40800 | 5828 | 84921 |
| 14-20Oct67 | | 35590 | 9078 | 106.6 | 0 | 47950 | 6890 | 78014 |
| 21-27Oct67 | | 52500 | 5700 | 157.5 | 0 | 52800 | 7542 | 77528 |
| 28Oct-3Nov 67 | | 28200 | 4028 | 84.6 | 0 | 27900 | 3928 | 75657 |
| 4-10Nov67 | | 47300 | 8724 | 141.5 | 0 | 26250 | 3790 | 92028 |
| 11Nov-17Nov67 | | 24400 | 3485 | 73.2 | 0 | 40400 | 5772 | 96157 |
| 18-19Nov67 | 70000 | 11400 | 5700 | 34.2 | 0 | 14450 | 8225 | 83000 |
| MEAN | 70000 | 532340 | 8401 | 917.1 | 0 | 319440 | 8000 | 91523 |

Highest Day of Issues: 16450 on 3 Oct
 Percentage of Highest Day Over Average Day for the Period: 205%

(b) Avgas

| | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|--------------|----------|--------------|------------|--------------|
| 29Sep67 | 10000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 900 | 900 | 13200 |
| 30Sep-6Oct67 | | 9000 | 714 | 13 | 0 | 5300 | 157 | 12190 |
| 7-13Oct67 | | 2400 | 342 | 7.2 | 0 | 7950 | 1135 | 10378 |
| 14-20Oct67 | | 7950 | 1135 | 23.8 | 0 | 2900 | 328 | 9678 |
| 21-27Oct67 | | 1500 | 214 | 45 | 0 | 1850 | 264 | 14814 |
| 28Oct-3Nov67 | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4050 | 578 | 12342 |
| 4-10Nov67 | | 5600 | 800 | 14.8 | 0 | 4880 | 697 | 11974 |
| 11Nov-17Nov67 | | 4000 | 571 | 12 | 0 | 3070 | 438 | 11300 |
| 18-19Nov67 | | 12000 | 6000 | 36 | 0 | 2500 | 1250 | 19525 |
| MEAN: | 10000 | 38450 | 1222 | 155.8 | 0 | 32400 | 742 | 14395 |

Highest Day of Issues: 2700 on 7 Oct 67
 Percentage of Highest Day Over Average Day For The Period: 36%

(c) Mogas

| | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|--------------|----------|---------------|-------------|--------------|
| 29Sep67 | 40000 | | | | | 900 | 900 | 48900 |
| 30Sep-6Oct67 | 40000 | 15000 | 2142 | 45 | 0 | 18550 | 2650 | 48271 |
| 7-13Oct67 | | 17200 | 2457 | 51.6 | 0 | 23500 | 3357 | 40107 |
| 14-20Oct67 | | 18000 | 2571 | 54 | 0 | 21400 | 3097 | 33750 |
| 21-27Oct67 | | 25600 | 3657 | 76.8 | 0 | 16800 | 2400 | 43992 |
| 28Oct-3Nov67 | | 15700 | 2242 | 47.1 | 0 | 18900 | 2700 | 42021 |
| 4-10Nov67 | | 14800 | 2114 | 44.4 | 0 | 14350 | 2050 | 45414 |
| 11-17Nov67 | | 11200 | 1600 | 33.6 | 0 | 17300 | 2471 | 34000 |
| 18-19Nov67 | | 4000 | 2000 | 12 | 0 | 4450 | 2225 | 31425 |
| MEAN | 40000 | 121300 | 2147 | 563.9 | 0 | 136150 | 2726 | 46872 |

Highest Day of Issues: 6400 on 5 Oct
 Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the Period: 24%

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| DATE | AMOUNT OF DISP PIS | d. Diesel | | AVG DAILY REC'D | TOTAL AIR | S/T HT | TOTAL ISSU'D | AVG DLY ISSUES | AVG DAILY O/B |
|---------------|--------------------|-----------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|----------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| | | S/O G.L. | TOTAL REC'D | | | | | | |
| 29 Sep | | 30,000 | | | | | 2350 | 2350 | 35,250 |
| 30 Sep-6Oct | | | 19050 | 2721 | 50.5 | 0 | 23250 | 3321 | 34271 |
| 7 Oct-13Oct | | | 21500 | 3071 | 64.5 | 0 | 32700 | 4671 | 29721 |
| 14Oct-20 Oct | | | 16400 | 2342 | 48.9 | 0 | 16350 | 2335 | 29414 |
| 21Oct-27Oct | | | 32800 | 4685 | 89.6 | 0 | 23350 | 3335 | 36514 |
| 28Oct-3 Nov | | | 12800 | 1828 | 38.4 | 0 | 17700 | 2528 | 37000 |
| 4 Nov-10 Nov | | | 14000 | 2000 | 42 | 0 | 15850 | 2264 | 38935 |
| 11 Nov-17 Nov | | | 15200 | 2171 | 45.6 | 0 | 17500 | 2500 | 34907 |
| 18 Nov-19 Nov | 30,000 | | 3200 | 1500 | 9.6 | 0 | 3350 | 1675 | 31725 |
| TOTAL | 30,000 | | 134,950 | 2352 | 388.2 | 0 | 152100 | 2785 | 38467 |

Highest Day of Issues: 5500 Gallons on 5 Oct.
 Percentage of Highest Day over average day for the period 203%.

(3) Locations Qurn Loi

(a) JP-4

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|-----------|---------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| 29 Sep 15 | 80000 | 20390 | 20930 | 61.1 | 0 | 145950 | 145950 | 76900 | |
| 30Sep-6Oct | | 26800 | 3828 | 80.5 | 0 | 42450 | 6064 | 64257 | |
| 7 Oct 13 Oct | | 75400 | 10771 | 225.8 | 0 | 41600 | 5942 | 86778 | |
| 14 Oct 20 Oct | | 21500 | 3071 | 64.5 | 0 | 31350 | 4478 | 68057 | |
| 21Oct-27 Oct | | 31,700 | 4528 | 95.1 | 0 | 28450 | 4064 | 70965 | |
| 28 Oct 3 Nov | | 197,000 | 28,142 | 449.4 | 141.6 | 187,350 | 26764 | 56,071 | |
| 4 Nov 10 Nov | | 261,500 | 37,357 | 214.5 | 570 | 209,600 | 29005 | 92,628 | |
| 11 Nov 17 Nov | 80000 | 80,000 | 11,428 | 0 | 24.0 | 93,100 | 13,300 | 117,185 | |
| 18 Nov 19 Nov | 80000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 33,100 | 16,550 | 105,050 | |
| TOTAL | 15 | 80,000 | 714,290 | 14939 | 1,190.8 | 951.6 | 67,5590 | 15,104 | 82,611 |

Highest Day of Issues: 53,300 gallons on 8 Nov.
 Percentage of Highest Day Over Average Day for the Period 353%.

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(b) 1972.

| DATE | AVG TO CR | AVG | TOTL LB | AV DATE | TOTL | AVT | TOTL | AVT | ISSUE | AVG DATE |
|-----------------|-----------|--------|---------|---------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|----------|
| REP PER | CAL | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE |
| 29 Sep | 10,000 | | | | 12.9 | 0 | 500 | 500 | 19,200 | |
| 30 Sep - 6 Oct | 2600 | 2600 | 2600 | 1228 | 7.2 | 0 | 614 | 614 | 14,135 | |
| 7 Oct - 13 Oct | 2400 | 2400 | 2400 | 343 | 0 | 0 | 878 | 878 | 10,378 | |
| 14 Oct - 20 Oct | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 321 | 321 | 10,050 | |
| 21 Oct - 27 Oct | 8000 | 8000 | 8000 | 1142 | 24 | 0 | 1572 | 1572 | 11,635 | |
| 28 Oct - 3 Nov | 7700 | 7700 | 7700 | 1100 | 23.1 | 0 | 1,505 | 1,505 | 12,092 | |
| 4 Nov-10 Nov | 10,000 | 10,500 | 10,500 | 2071 | 20.5 | 15 | 1,821 | 1,821 | 14,185 | |
| 11 Nov-17 Nov | 10,000 | 5000 | 5000 | 714 | 0 | 15 | 1071 | 1071 | 15,250 | |
| 18 Nov-19 Nov | 10,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 125 | 125 | 10,350 | |
| TOTAL | 10,000 | 16,200 | 16,200 | 824 | 35.7 | 30 | 14,880 | 14,880 | 19,300 | |

Highest Day of Issues: 3750 Gallons on 4 Nov.
 Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the Period: 392%.

(c) 1972.

| DATE | AVG TO CR | AVG | TOTL LB | AV DATE | TOTL | AVT | TOTL | AVT | ISSUE | AVG DATE |
|-----------------|-----------|--------|---------|---------|-------|-------|---------|---------|--------|----------|
| REP PER | CAL | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE | ISSUE |
| 29 Sep | 10,000 | | | | 13.5 | 0 | 900 | 900 | 19,900 | |
| 30 Sep - 6 Oct | 14,500 | 14,500 | 14,500 | 2072 | 51.6 | 0 | 2435 | 2435 | 19,200 | |
| 7 Oct - 13 Oct | 17,200 | 17,200 | 17,200 | 2457 | 0 | 0 | 3257 | 3257 | 15,707 | |
| 14 Oct - 20 Oct | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 785 | 785 | 19,192 | |
| 21 Oct - 27 Oct | 8,000 | 8,000 | 8,000 | 1142 | 24 | 0 | 1,042 | 1,042 | 17,050 | |
| 28 Oct - 3 Nov | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 571 | 12 | 0 | 1,671 | 1,671 | 14,848 | |
| 4 Nov - 10 Nov | 13,000 | 13,000 | 13,000 | 1714 | 24 | 75 | 1,576 | 1,576 | 14,135 | |
| 11 Nov - 17 Nov | 10,000 | 20,000 | 20,000 | 2657 | 0 | 60 | 1,992 | 1,992 | 14,614 | |
| 18 Nov - 19 Nov | 10,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3,725 | 3,725 | 14,600 | |
| TOTAL | 10,000 | 76,700 | 76,700 | 3786 | 155.1 | 135 | 197,300 | 197,300 | 21,560 | |

Highest Day of Issues: 9000 Gallons of 4 Nov.
 Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the Period: 353%.

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(1) Manual.

| DATE | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF |
|---------------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|---------|--------|---------|
| DATE | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF | AVR OF |
| 29 Sep | 30,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35,250 |
| 30 Sep-6 Oct | 30,000 | 15,600 | 2228 | 40.2 | 19,050 | 2350 | 0 | 19,050 | 2721 | 24,900 | 2350 | 35,900 |
| 1 Oct -13 Oct | 30,000 | 21,500 | 3071 | 64.5 | 24,500 | 3500 | 0 | 24,500 | 3500 | 29,721 | 3500 | 37,750 |
| 14 Oct-30 Oct | 30,000 | 1500 | 357 | 7.5 | 1750 | 678 | 0 | 1750 | 678 | 37,750 | 678 | 38,428 |
| 28 Oct-31 Oct | 30,000 | 7200 | 1028 | 10.8 | 10050 | 1435 | 0 | 10050 | 1435 | 24,400 | 1435 | 25,835 |
| 1 Nov-10 Nov | 30,000 | 28,400 | 1057 | 51.6 | 39700 | 5671 | 336 | 39700 | 5671 | 35,476 | 5671 | 35,476 |
| 11 Nov-17 Nov | 30,000 | 28,000 | 1002 | 9 | 28,070 | 1124 | 75 | 28,070 | 1124 | 32,400 | 1124 | 32,400 |
| 18 Nov-19 Nov | 30,000 | 20,000 | 2857 | 0 | 20,250 | 2892 | 60 | 20,250 | 2892 | 35,950 | 2892 | 35,950 |
| 20 Nov-19 Nov | 30,000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2400 | 700 | 0 | 2400 | 700 | 30,147 | 700 | 30,147 |
| TOTAL | 30,000 | 123,220 | 2199 | 183.6 | 133,715 | 3008 | 188.6 | 133,715 | 3008 | 133,715 | 3008 | 133,715 |

Highest Day of Issues 11,150 Gallons on 2 Nov.
 Percentage of Highest Day over Average for the Period 370%.

(a) Locations Los Rich

(a) 37-4

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------|---|------|--------|------|------|---|---|--------|-------|------|
| 2 Nov-8 Nov | 2 | 4000 | 6000 | 1500 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 7500 | 1875 | 2350 |
| 9 Nov-15 Nov | 2 | 4000 | 4300 | 614 | 12.1 | 0 | 0 | 5000 | 826 | 4365 |
| 16 Nov | 2 | 4000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 2 | 4000 | 10,300 | 1057 | 30.1 | 0 | 0 | 12,500 | 1,701 | 3917 |

Highest Day of Issues 2000 Gallons on 6-8 Nov.
 Percentage of Highest Day over Average for the Period 114%.

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(b) Above.

| DATE | AV DAILY ISSUES | AV DAILY GAL. | TOTAL ISSUES | TOTAL GAL. | AV DAILY ISSUES | AV DAILY GAL. | TOTAL ISSUES | TOTAL GAL. | AV DAILY ISSUES | AV DAILY GAL. |
|---------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------------|------------------|
| 2 Nov -8 Nov | 2000 | 2000 | 500 | 6 | 3750 | 237 | 3750 | 237 | 1425 | 1425 |
| 9 Nov -15 Nov | 1700 | 2500 | 257 | 1.5 | 2600 | 228 | 2600 | 228 | 2171 | 2171 |
| 16 Nov | 2000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 2000 | 45000 | 757 | 13.5 | 6350 | 502 | 6350 | 502 | 1796 | 1796 |

Highest Day of Issues: 2000 gallons on 2 Nov.
Percentage of Highest Day over average day for the period 377%.
.....

(c) Above.

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|
| 2 Nov -8 Nov | 500 | 200 | 75 | 2 | 600 | 157 | 600 | 157 | 137 | 137 |
| 9 Nov -15 Nov | 500 | 1900 | 272 | 5.7 | 150 | 81 | 150 | 81 | 700 | 700 |
| 16 Nov | 500 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 500 | 2100 | 347 | 6.6 | 1000 | 110 | 1000 | 110 | 837 | 837 |

Highest Day Issues: 200 gallons on 7 Nov.
Percentage of Highest Day over average day for the period 100%.
.....

(d) Discard.

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|------|-----|----|-----|------|-----|------|-----|------|------|
| 2 Nov -8 Nov | 1000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 160 | 190 | 160 | 190 | 1309 | 1309 |
| 9 Nov -15 Nov | 1000 | 500 | 71 | 1.5 | 1300 | 185 | 1300 | 185 | 1005 | 1005 |
| 16 Nov | 1070 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 1000 | 500 | 71 | 1.5 | 2060 | 187 | 2060 | 187 | 2314 | 2314 |

Highest Day Issues: 160 gallons on 5 Nov.
Percentage of Highest day over average day for the period 265%.
.....

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(5) Location Cassidy III XT79555

(a) JPL

| DATE | AV ER OF DISP PIS | S/O GAL | TOTAL ISSUE | AV D-IIE O/A END | TOTAL AIR | S/T S/T | TOTAL ISSUE | AV D-IIE P/PUS | AV D-IIE O/A END |
|---------------|----------------------|------------|----------------|---------------------|--------------|------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| 7 Oct-13 Oct | 2 | 2000 | 1000 | 142 | 3 | 0 | 1200 | 171 | 700 |
| 14 Oct-20 Oct | | | 2000 | 205 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2000 |
| 21 Oct-27 Oct | | | 500 | 328 | 19.5 | 0 | 500 | 7.4 | 2325 |
| 28 Oct-1 Nov | | | 2500 | 357 | 7.5 | 0 | 200 | 245 | 2335 |
| <hr/> | | | | | | | | | |
| ICOLP | 2 | 2000 | 12000 | 225 | 26 | 0 | 8200 | 292 | 1005 |

Highest dry of issues: 1700 gallons on 25 Oct.
Percentage of highest dry over average dry for the period 502%.

(b) Avgs.

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|--|------|------|-----|------|---|------|-----|------|
| 7 Oct-13 Oct | | 1000 | 3000 | 128 | 9 | 0 | 1550 | 221 | 735 |
| 14 Oct-20 Oct | | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1100 |
| 21 Oct-27 Oct | | | 2500 | 357 | 7.5 | 0 | 1500 | 214 | 1657 |
| 28 Oct-1 Nov | | | 1000 | 142 | 3 | 0 | 1200 | 171 | 857 |
| <hr/> | | | | | | | | | |
| ICOLP: | | 1000 | 6500 | 231 | 19.5 | 0 | 4250 | 151 | 1490 |

Highest Day of Issues: 700 gallons on 12 Oct.
Percentage of highest dry over average dry for the period 161%.

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(6) Class III Consumption Trends:

Analysis of Class III Consumption trends for Operation "HAWAIIAN II" revealed no particular variation from past operations with the exception of the period from 28 Oct to 9 Nov at Guam Led. It should be noted that the consumption of JP-4 at Guam Led during this period was more than half of what was consumed at that location during the entire operation. This can be attributed both to the amount of C-47 aircraft traffic required to reposition artillery batteries and the amount of Helicopter assault aircraft used to transport the infantry battalions to the Los Rios area. Consumption of Avgas at Guam Led also dropped sharply after the Los Rios battle. Consumption of Hogas and Diesel did not vary greatly from trends established in previous operations.

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(7) Class II and IV Analysis

(1) Selected Common Items.

| <u>ITEM</u> | <u>IAI USE</u> | <u>QUAN LCK</u> | <u>RECOYD</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|---------------------------|----------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|
| Plates, Paper (Gtm) | 682 | 399 | 180 | 1,261 |
| Cop, Paper (Gtm) | 545 | 130 | 160 | 835 |
| Knife, Plastic (Hundreds) | 6120 | 1800 | 3390 | 11,310 |
| Fork, Plastic (Hundreds) | 96,100 | 1800 | 2640 | 11,050 |
| Spoon, Plastic (Hundreds) | 5,940 | 2669 | 3600 | 12,209 |
| Can, Water (ea) | 80 | | | 80 |
| Sandbags (ea) | 951,000 | 2,083,200 | 458,800 | 2,593,000 |
| Compartina (Klad) | 80 | 319 | 8 | 407 |
| Pickets (Ba) | 21,570 | 21,570 | 8,868 | 52,007 |
| Hachets 18" (ea) | 60 | | 100 | 160 |
| Swing Blades (ea) | 50 | 50 | 33 | 133 |
| Batteries: M-306 | 500 | 5,828 | 2,796 | 9,124 |
| M-30 | 19,104 | 39,352 | 3,918 | 58,374 |
| M-200 | 480 | 730 | 360 | 1,570 |

(2) Selected Repair Parts/ASL Item Demand Data

| <u>End Item</u> | <u>By Sp'd</u> | <u>Accts Replaced</u> |
|------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| M113, Carrier Personnel | 13 | |
| M113A1, Carrier Personnel | 136 | 12E, 11F, 2G |
| M4A3, Tank, Combat | 34 | 13E, 8F, 2F |
| M50, Recovery Vehicle Medium | 10 | 1E, 1F, 2G |
| M570, Recovery Vehicle Light | 5 | 1E |
| M10A1, Motorcar, 105MM | 72 | 7F, 9G |
| M109, Motorcar, 155MM | 18 | 9E, 3G |
| M10, Motorcar, 81, 8" | 4 | 2F, 2G, 3G |

- NOTE:
- E - Engine
 - T - Transmission
 - b - Transfer
 - F - Final Drive
 - D - Differential
 - R - Road
 - C - Cannon Assy

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7. (U) Class V Analysis

| ITEM | (1) Location of SPI | | LAI No | DATES OFF: 28 Sept - 19 Nov 67 | | ISSUED | ISSUED | TOTAL | TOTAL |
|------------------------------|---------------------|--------|--------|--------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|-------|-------|
| | Q/A ID | Q/A ID | | NO | NO | | | | |
| GRASS | 14,709 | 62,124 | 112 | 372.48 | 21 | 95,336 | 1044 | 1044 | 19.71 |
| ROCK | 13,578 | 97,170 | 1033 | 808.24 | 26 | 96,981 | 1089 | 1089 | 70.26 |
| WOOD | 926 | 32,128 | 806 | 1800.07 | 12 | 32,256 | 809 | 809 | 50.75 |
| SOIL | 826 | 6,123 | 115 | 637.80 | 4 | 6,567 | 828 | 828 | 31.00 |
| LEAF | 3003 | 22,800 | 130 | 174.30 | 1 | 21,450 | 131 | 131 | 51.50 |
| OTHER | 1049 | 3,130 | 63 | 14.88 | | 3,082 | 53 | 53 | |
| (2) Location of SPI from LAI | | | | | | | | | |
| GRASS | 6536 | 24,840 | 1120 | 152.46 | 42 | 25,904 | 1176 | 1176 | 28.04 |
| ROCK | 13,635 | 52,620 | 2391 | 1417.87 | 35 | 52,176 | 2399 | 2399 | 64.54 |
| WOOD | 4022 | 1,304 | 195 | 214.39 | 5 | 3,061 | 119 | 119 | 29.60 |
| SOIL | | | | | | | | | |
| LEAF | 3766 | 5200 | 236 | 108.05 | 4 | 3,680 | 167 | 167 | 11.75 |
| OTHER | 2694 | 5126 | 233 | 16.82 | | 3,144 | 156 | 156 | |
| | | | | 147.07 | 1576.17 | | | | |

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2. (U) UTILITIES

a. (U) Maintenance:

(1) Direct Support Workload 708st Maintenance

Statistics-

Job Orders Received: 10,015
 Job Orders Completed: 9,954
 Average ASL on hands: 18,300
 Average A/L demand accommodations: 74.3%
 Total Demands: 44,666
 TOTAL ISSUES: 49,317

(2) Locations Supporting Operations

| <u>JOBS COMPLETED</u> | <u>DA</u> | <u>FLA</u> | <u>IK</u> | <u>OTW</u> | <u>IV</u> | <u>QL</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|-----------------------|-----------|------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| Arty | 35 | 28 | 55 | 3 | 52 | 140 | 313 |
| Auto, wheel | 309 | 50 | 210 | 1 | 86 | 150 | 806 |
| Auto, track | 57 | 20 | 102 | 6 | 6 | 27 | 217 |
| Signal | 2217 | | 1422 | 7 | 1033 | 189 | 4689 |
| Armament | 525 | | 500 | 181 | 882 | | |
| Aircraft | | 294 | | | | | 294 |
| Other | 19 | 395 | 1249 | 3 | 488 | 119 | 2273 |

Parts Supply Requested: 8,498
 Received (Issued): 7,206
 % of fill: 85%

*These jobs were completed by contract team personnel from the location given not necessarily accounting labor at the location shown in the column heading.

b. (U) Laundry and Bath

| | <u>LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATION</u> | | | |
|------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| | <u>IV</u> | <u>QL</u> | <u>IK</u> | <u>T</u> |
| Number of Showerheads: | 0 | 8 | 8 | 16 |
| Number of Washers | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 |

c. (U) Graves Registration

| | <u>LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATION</u> | | | |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| | <u>IV</u> | <u>QL</u> | <u>IK</u> | <u>T</u> |
| Remains Probed | 7 | 37 | 82 | 126 |

d. (U) Salvage Collection

| | <u>LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATION</u> | | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| | <u>IV</u> | <u>QL</u> | <u>IK</u> | <u>T</u> |
| Turn-In Documents Processed | 204 | 163 | 257 | 624 |

e. (U) EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

Following is a recapitulation of Explosive Ordnance Disposal support provided by the 42nd Ord Det during the operation.

- (a) Number of Incidents - 78
 - (1) HE items destroyed:
 - U. S. - 269
 - V. C. - 40

Small Arms destroyed:
 U. S. - 5025

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B. TRANSPORTATION:

1. Summary of Fixed Wing Aircraft

| Origin | C123 | | | C130 | | |
|--------------|------|--------|------------|------|-------|------------|
| | Sort | Pax | Cargo (lb) | Sort | Pax | Cargo |
| Di An | 537 | 4435 | 1,560,000 | 9 | 0 | 90,000 |
| Tan Son Nhut | 208 | 1144 | 780,000 | 7 | 0 | 70,000 |
| Bien Hoa | | | | 2 | 40 | 3,900 |
| Phuoc Vinh | 126 | 2500 | | 7 | 80 | 53,000 |
| Quan Loi | | | | 2 | 2 | 21,500 |
| Lai Khe | 114 | 2272 | | | | |
| Los Binh | | | | | | |
| Song Be | | | | 15 | 69 | 155,700 |
| Phi Loi | | | | 7 | 0 | 75,100 |
| Wang Ton | | | | | | |
| TOTALS | 905 | 10,350 | 2,340,000 | 49 | 191 | 469,000 |
| | | | | 672 | 6,934 | 18,169,800 |

2. Summary of Convoy Operation

a. Di An to Lai Khe

| Date | No of Vehicles | No of Units Participating | | Control Headquarters |
|--------|----------------|---------------------------|---------|----------------------|
| | | Div | Non-Div | |
| 29 Sep | 43 | 9 | 3 | Deputy |
| 30 | 47 | 7 | 2 | Deputy |
| 1 Oct | 47 | 8 | 2 | Deputy |
| 2 | 65 | 9 | 2 | Deputy |
| 3 | 21 | 10 | 3 | Deputy |
| 4 | 39 | 7 | 2 | Deputy |
| 5 | 78 | 11 | 2 | Deputy |
| 6 | 88 | 9 | 2 | Deputy |
| 7 | 76 | 7 | 3 | Deputy |
| 8 | 56 | 7 | 3 | Deputy |
| 9 | 76 | 9 | 2 | Deputy |
| 10 | 71 | 9 | 2 | Deputy |
| 11 | 100 | 7 | 3 | Deputy |
| 12 | 57 | 4 | 4 | Deputy |
| 13 | 31 | 7 | 2 | Deputy |
| 14 | 33 | 5 | 2 | Deputy |
| 15 | 58 | 12 | 3 | Deputy |
| 16 | 62 | 4 | 2 | Deputy |
| 17 | 45 | 9 | 2 | Deputy |
| 18 | 62 | 9 | 3 | Deputy |
| 19 | 81 | 7 | 2 | Deputy |
| 20 | 87 | 6 | 2 | Deputy |
| 21 | 62 | 11 | 3 | Deputy |
| 22 | 69 | 5 | 2 | Deputy |
| 23 | 56 | 9 | 3 | Deputy |
| 24 | 56 | 9 | 2 | Deputy |
| 25 | 56 | 11 | 3 | Deputy |
| 26 | 60 | 11 | 3 | Deputy |
| 27 | 57 | 13 | 3 | Deputy |
| 28 | 91 | 11 | 2 | Deputy |
| 29 | 62 | 10 | 2 | Deputy |
| 30 | 71 | 8 | 2 | Deputy |
| 1 Nov | 78 | 10 | 2 | Deputy |
| 2 | 80 | 12 | 2 | Deputy |
| 3 | 86 | 9 | 2 | Deputy |
| 4 | 73 | 7 | 2 | Deputy |
| 5 | 53 | 5 | 0 | Deputy |
| 6 | 53 | 10 | 1 | Deputy |
| 7 | 53 | 10 | 2 | Deputy |
| 8 | 53 | 8 | 2 | Deputy |
| 9 | 53 | 5 | 2 | Deputy |
| 10 | 53 | 7 | 2 | Deputy |

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TRANSPORTATION CONT'D

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>FROM - TO</u> | <u>S&T VEHICLES</u> |
|-------------|------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 Nov | DA - IK | 24 |
| 2 Nov | DA - IK | 11 |
| 3 Nov | DA - QL | 47 |
| 5 Nov | DA - QL | 48 |
| 5 Nov | DA - IK | 10 |
| 7 Nov | DA - IK | 8 |
| 7 Nov | DA - QL | 65 |
| 9 Nov | DA - IK | 12 |
| 11 Nov | DA - IK | 14 |
| 11 Nov | DA - QL | 27 |
| 12 Nov | DA - IK | 8 |
| 13 Nov | DA - IK | 4 |
| 15 Nov | DA - IK | 9 |
| 15 Nov | DA - QL | 36 |
| 17 Nov | DA - QL | 10 |
| 18 Nov | DA - IK | 6 |
| 19 Nov | DA - IK | 18 |

III. (C) LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS

A. Items Repair Parts Shortages

The 701st Maintenance Battalion continued to experience severe repair parts shortages. Forty per cent of ASL lines were at zero balance. This situation required extensive use of maintenance personnel to expedite repair parts supply and the use of air transportation to get austere supplies to where they were most critically needed. The problem was particularly acute for Remington Chain Saws, mine detectors, heavy engineer equipment (D7E Dozers), 105 Howitzer sight mounts and recoil mechanism components for the M101, SP Howitzer. Use of maintenance float for replacement of those items which could not be repaired for lack of parts proved extremely valuable. Initially the extensive use of controlled substitution was necessary to prevent the deadline of critical equipment.

B. Items Deadline Rate of D7E Tractors (Dozers)

DISCUSSION: During a short period eleven D7E's were doled at one time. The entire heavy engineer equipment repair capability within the battalion plus the loan of three repairmen from Saigon Support Command was required. The excessively high deadline rate is directly attributable to the lack of scheduled maintenance stand-downs.

RECOMMENDATION: That a scheduled maintenance stand-down program be implemented so that the 701st and organizational elements can pool maintenance resources to keep the D7E's in a high state of maintenance.

C. ITEMs Inadequate Information

DISCUSSION: During Operation "SHEKJONGH II" emergency requests for supplies were received many times which could not be filled immediately because of inadequate information concerning item. Generally the information omitted was; exact type of item needed, amount of item needed; where the item was to be shipped; when the item was to be shipped and who would pick up the item at destination. As a result of this inadequate information requests for supplies were delayed unnecessarily, while the needed items were in stock and readily accessible if adequate information had been received.

RECOMMENDATION: That all requests for supplies state exact nomenclature and ASN when possible, amount, where the item is to be shipped, when the item is needed, and who will receive item at destination. This will eliminate needless delays of badly needed supplies at all levels.

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D. ITEMS: MORTUARY REFRIGERATORS:

DISCUSSION: During normal graves registration activities of Operation "SIEMKINDOH II", it was necessary to store human remains overnight at both the Di An Base Camp as well as at forward locations. Usually, receipt of remains of deceased personnel in forward OR REG section occurred late in the afternoon, with processing and identification completed by 2200 hours. Transportation for evacuation of remains became available the following morning. Upon arrival at Di An, the remains were processed further at the Division Collection Point and evacuated to the E.H. SOF. MORTUARY by early afternoon. As a result of this procedure, decomposition had been occurring for approximately 24 hours before the remains were placed under refrigeration.

RECOMMENDATION: That mortuary refrigerators, with a capacity of five cadavers be placed at Di An and at each forward OR REG facility. Refrigeration at those points would virtually halt the decomposition process throughout the chain of evacuation, thereby making identification easier and causing less grief to the family of the deceased.

E. ITEMS: DELIVERIES TRANSPORTATION:

DISCUSSION: During Operation "SIEMKINDOH II" many emergency requests were received by the Supply and Transport Battalion. In most instances the item was immediately available but no immediate means of transportation to the field location or base camp was on hand. Delivery was made by waiting until the item could be shipped to the nearest fixed wing air strip or by having the individual who was to receive the item divert a rotary wing re-supply aircraft to Di An to pick it up. In most instances the latter method was used as the unit felt the item could not wait. Therefore a re-supply aircraft which would normally work between the forward base camp and the field location was diverted to be utilized between Di An and a forward base camp or field location. A similar requirement exists when delivering ice cream to field locations, an important morale factor. This requires proper coordination by the unit trains to receive the ice cream, have the re-supply aircraft available for loading at the time of receipt for immediate delivery to the field location. When this is not properly coordinated the unit in the field receives the ice cream in a poor condition. However, when the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion has an aircraft available for delivery of ice cream to field locations the ice cream is assured of arriving in the proper condition and on a regular basis. Another requirement for an immediate responsive means of transportation exists in the Graves Registration Section of the Supply and Transport Battalion. It is always desirable to remove human remains from the forward areas as fast as possible but after proper registration and collection procedures have been followed. Expedient evacuation of remains should not be dependent upon the availability of aircraft. Yet another requirement appears in the widely dispersed nature of the Supply and Transport Battalion operation throughout the Division area; because of this, each base camp, and many times in field locations as well, requires the commander and his staff and subordinate commanders to exercise supervision and control through continuous personal inspection of these areas. An aircraft must be available for this purpose and to provide the overall system with the flexibility and responsiveness required each day and to meet emergency situations as they arise.

RECOMMENDATION: That a UH-1D helicopter be made available to the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion on an as required basis.

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IV (C) LESSONS LEARNED:

A. Non-divisional support maintenance cannot provide adequate support as envisioned by the current maintenance support doctrine and organization. The current doctrine has provided TOE's that are designed to repair 80% of equipment within the division and evacuate 20% to non-divisional back-up support units. During Operation "SHEKUNDQAH II" this was not feasible. Most of the equipment had to be repaired at forward locations since evacuation could only be accomplished by air. Back-up support was only used in the electronics maintenance area and amounted to less than 1% of the maintenance battalion workload. This back-up support was required where the repair was beyond the capability of the division was only addition to the fact that repair of equipment must be accomplished in the forward areas because of the limitations of air evacuation, another factor forces the division to repair 97% of its workload within the division maintenance battalion. Non-divisional support cannot provide the high degree of responsiveness required by a division in this type war. The average turn-around time for repair and return to units is approximately 3 days when field maintenance is accomplished within the division. The average turn-around time for equipment evacuated to back-up support units varies from 20 days to several months depending on commodity. This situation makes it imperative that the division maintenance battalion repair all equipment for which it has a repair capability. It's TOE must be modified to meet 100 per cent of the division's direct support maintenance requirements.

B. The present repair parts supply system forced the maintenance battalion to use an excessive number of personnel to expedite parts in support levels are required to expedite parts. In addition to the drain of man-power caused by parts expediting, many manhours were inefficiently used substituting parts to keep equipment operational. This doubles the time required to replace any one component, and is an additional drain on man-power during the repair parts system becomes more responsive, parts expediting is absolutely essential to the readiness of divisional equipment.

C. The transportation system for supply of repair parts from the depot to the division maintenance battalion was not responsive to the needs of the division. While some non-divisional transportation was available to bring repair parts to the division, the present stockage levels in the battalion necessitated that repair parts be received in the maintenance battalion within 24 hours or they were ready for pickup at the depot. This could only be accomplished by using transportation organic to the maintenance battalion. This further reduced the man-power resources available to the battalion for the accomplishment of its primary mission.

D. The need for a land line of communications for delivery of supplies to a forward supply section was proven once again, when the road to Quan Loi was effectively utilized and air delivery was used only as an alternate delivery means for critical periods during Operation "SHEKUNDQAH II". On 9 November 1967, the large number of aircraft refueling at the rate of 4,000 gallons per hour at Quan Loi necessitated the immediate delivery of 100,000 gallons of JP-4 at Quan Loi. This larger than normal requirement was shipped by land LOC. If this amount had been delivered by air LOC it would have required approximately 25 aircraft (C-130) and 3 days time to deliver. However, the fuel was delivered in one day by 20 - 5,000 gallons tankers using land LOC. This demonstrated the importance of land LOC to support an operation from a forward location while using air LOC merely as an alternate means of delivery. An additional lesson learned concerning fuel was the desirability of maintaining back-up pumps, particularly JP-4 pumps, for use in the event of a breakdown during the height of a massive refueling period such as that mentioned in paragraph A. Loss of a pump at such a critical time would seriously hamper the

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6. Experience gained during Operation "SHERWOOD II" showed that the use of 500 gallon collapsible rubber bladders was the most convenient means of delivering fuel by air to a location other than an established forward supply section. This was due to the ease with which they were relocated as the tactical situation changed.

7. As a minimum, human remains pouches must be aired out once monthly, and carefully inspected at that time. Experience gained during Operation "SHERWOOD II" showed that pouches rapidly became unserviceable due to heat and humidity if this practice was not followed. It was also determined that a minimum of 50 human remains pouches should be on hand at each forward supply section. This policy has become standard in the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion.

8. The small two man graves registration section in the Battalion's forward supply section's were frequently unable to handle the large number of casualties that had to be processed at one time during the operation. In order to supplement each forward supply section's assigned graves registration personnel, Graves Registration Teams of three men each were formed at Di An. These teams were airlifted into the forward areas where there were ten or more casualties at one time. Their presence greatly facilitated the processing and identification of remains. In keeping with this concept, remains were shipped directly from the forward location to the SON NHUT mortuary, bypassing the Di An GR REG facility. Additional Battalion Graves Registration personnel were sent to the TSN mortuary, where they met incoming remains and completed the processing time by at least one third, and frequently cut the time in half. This shortened time aided greatly in the prevention of decomposition.

9. During Operation "SHERWOOD II" a requirement for 2 low bed semi-trailers became apparent. The transportation motor transport company of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion provided the 1st Infantry Division with evacuation of salvage in the amount of an average of 15 tons per day. This salvage consisted principally of trucks, armored personnel carriers, forklift trucks, front loaders and other heavy, oversized bulky items of equipment. These 2 low bed semi-trailers are also needed to provide often required over-the-road movement of the Battalion's 20 forklift trucks to and from the Log Base at Di An, the forward supply section at Quan Loi and Lai Kho base camps, temporary forward supply section, and Bien Hoa Air Base for movement by aircraft.

10. During Operation "SHERWOOD II" it was proven once again that the requirement to pick-up supplies in Saigon as well as the haul supplies to forward areas requires additional 1st Supply and Transport Battalion tractors and 12 ton S&T's. One solution to the problem would be to reduce the 1st S&T's light truck capability and increase the medium lift capability by replacing 1 light truck cargo squad with a medium truck cargo squad.

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SHEA DOAH II

I. (C) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

During Operation SHEA DOAH II, units of the 1st Medical Battalion provided division level medical service from their base camps and field locations. Headquarters & Company A, located at Di An, coordinated the medical evacuation helicopters and controlled medical resupply. Company B provided medical support from Lai Khe; Company C provided support from Quan Loi and Di An; Company D supported the operation from their base camp at Phuoc Vinh.

A. GENERAL

The overall concept of the operation was direct and area support to all units involved in the operation. In addition to the above mentioned support, the following was provided.

On 4 October 1967, a physician from Company D, 1st Medical Battalion, replaced the battalion surgeon of the 1/2nd Infantry Battalion due to the latter being KIA.

On 17 October 1967, a "Go Team" from Company D, 1st Medical Battalion provided professional augmentation to the battalion aid station of the 2-28th Infantry Battalion. The "Go Team" returned to its Phuoc Vinh base camp on 18 October 1967.

On 3 November 1967, the remainder of Company C located at Di An, was moved to Quan Loi in direct support of the 1st Brigade.

On 4 November 1967, a "Go Team" from Hq & Company A, was dispatched to Song Be for support of troops in that area. The "Go Team" returned to its Di An base camp on 6 November 1967.

On 7 November 1967, a "Go Team" from Company B, was dispatched to Loc Minh. The "Go Team" returned to its Lai Khe base camp the same evening.

B. Forward Command Post

The 1st Medical Battalion did not establish a forward command post. Operations were controlled from the battalion headquarters at Di An, and by frequent staff visits.

C. Method of Direct Support and Resupply

Medical resupply to the division was provided from the medical companies at Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh, Quan Loi, and Division Medical Supply at Di An. Resupply was by air.

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D. General Support and Resupply Sources

The advance platoon of the 32nd Medical Depot provided medical resupply to the division from its location at Long Binh. Patient care was provided by the 24th and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals located at Long Binh. Aeromedical evacuation was provided by the Air Ambulance Company (Prov) at Long Binh, and by the 45th Medical Detachment (Air Ambulance) Long Binh, by locating one standby "Dust Off" at both Quan Loi and Lai Khe.

E. Unit Resupply Concept

Medical resupply to infantry units of the division was by supply point distribution. Units desiring medical supplies brought their requests to the medical companies providing area support. Supplies were issued immediately.

F. Support of Non-Divisional Units - None

G. Major Item Losses - None

II. (C) EXPERIENCE DATA

A. Material and Services

1. Supply

a. Quantities of Supplies Consumed:

| Class II & IV | <u>Air Log</u> | <u>Land Log</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| Medical Supplies | 6500 | 0 | 6500 |

b. Support to G-5 Activities: Y/A

c. Class I Analysis: N/A

d. Class III Analysis: N/A

e. Class II & IV Analysis: No problems encountered.

f. Class V Analysis: N/A

2. Services

a. Maintenance: Maintenance support was provided by Company C, 701st Maintenance Battalion with no problems.

b. Medical:

LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

| <u>PATIENTS TREATED</u> | <u>DI AN</u> | <u>LAI KHE</u> | <u>PHUOC VINH</u> | <u>QUAN LOI</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|-------------------------|--------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| IRHA | 6 | 209 | 41 | 174 | 430 |
| KRIB | 10 | 79 | 7 | 37 | 133 |

B. TRANSPORTATION

1. Fixed Wing - None

2. Rotary Wing - All medical personnel and medical supplies were transported by "Dust Off" R/W aircraft.


3. Convoy Operations - Twenty-four vehicles from Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, located at Di An, were transported via convoy to Quan Loi on 3 November 1967.

4. Support Command Convoys - None


ANNEX A (C) (Schematic of Area Operations and Logistical Unit Development)
Operation SHIMADDA II.




"0" Forward



"D" Company




"B" Company



Hq & "A" Company
"C" Company (-)


**Annex B (C) (Summary of Units Supported by Location)
Operation SHAMMOAH II**




Task Force Dixie



1st Bde




**3rd Bde
Div Fwd
Div Arty Fwd**



**2nd Bde
Support Command**

In addition to units listed at various locations, all units of the division were supported by the 1st Medical Battalion either fully or limited.

Annex C (U) (Schematic of Transportation Routes--Land and Air)
Operation SHERWOOD II



LEGEND

AIR - - - -
LAND - - - -

HEADQUARTERS
121ST SIGNAL BATTALION
1st Inf Div APO 96345

3 December 1967

AVDB-SI-9

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Shenandoah II (U)

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-TT
APO 96345

1. (U) Name and Type of Operation:

"Shenandoah II", a search and destroy/road clearing operation in War Zone "C".

2. (U) Date of Operation:

29 September 1967 to 19 November 1967.

3. (U) Location:

War Zone C vicinity.

4. (U) Command Headquarters:

121st Signal Battalion, 1st Infantry Division.

5. (C) Unit Commanders:

| | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| LTC Francis J. Sheriff | Battalion Commander |
| CPT Harvey J. Reynolds | CO, Company A |
| CPT Peter P. Batrow | CO, Company B |
| CPT James A. Olive | CO, Company C |
| 1LT William X. Lain | Plt Ldr, 1st Plt Sig Plt |
| 1LT William H. Brown | Plt Ldr, 2d Plt Sig Plt |
| 1LT Kenneth V. Kosecky | Plt Ldr, 3d Plt Sig Plt |

6. (U) Intelligence: No enemy electronic warfare was noted during Operation "Shenandoah II".

7. (U) Mission: Provide radio relay, Amend FM radio, and secure on line teletypes to all advance elements of the Division. Provide the three Infantry Brigades with radio relay links into the Division Communications Systems.

8. (C) Concept of Operation: Operation "Shenandoah II" was a search and destroy/road clearing operation to destroy or capture VC/NVA forces and militarily significant installations in the Lai Khe - Quan Lai area.

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a. Company A continued mission to support Division Main at Di An Base Camp and was tasked to provide radio relay, AM, FM radios and secure teletype for Danger Forward at Lai Khe. Danger Main signal center, Di An, was discontinued on 18 October 1967.

b. Company B continued to support Division Artillery at Phu Loi and provide a radio relay link into the Division Communication System for each of the three Brigades.

c. Company C was tasked to continue to support the Division Support Command/Division Rear complex at Di An Base Camp. The company also continued to provide FM retransmission facilities in support of Division operations.

9. (C) EXECUTION:

a. Company A supported Division Main and Division Forward, with the following major items of equipment:

| <u>Equipment</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>Purpose</u> |
|------------------|-----------------|--|
| AM/MRC-69 | 8 ea | Provide 120 radio relay channels for Division Main and 72 radio relay channels for Division Forward. |
| AM/GRC-26 | 2 ea | Provide AM RITT in Net 1 for Division Main and Division Forward. |
| SB-611 | 1 ea | Provide patching and test facilities for radio relay circuits at Danger Forward. |
| SB-457 | 1 ea | Provide patching and test facilities for radio relay circuits at Danger Main. |
| AM/MRC-121 | 1 ea | Provide FM communication for Division FM nets. |
| AM/MSC-29 | 1 ea | Provide secure teletype for Division Forward Command. |
| AM/MRC-112 | 1 ea | Provide 4 radio relay channels to interconnect Dragon into the Division Comm System. |
| AM/MTC-1 | 2 ea | Provide common user telephone service for Division Main and Forward. |
| AM/MRC-34 1/2 | 2 ea | Interconnect divisional elements into the Division Comm System. (Loe Minh and Song Ba) |

b. Company B was given the mission of providing support for Division Artillery, 1st, 2d and 3d Bde's. The company displaced the following personnel and equipment:

(1) 1st Platoon: Supported 1st Bde at their base camp at Phuoc Vinh and Bde Forward at Cassion III and Quan Loi. Major items of equipment:

| <u>Equipment</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>Purpose</u> |
|------------------|-----------------|--|
| AM/MRC-34 1/2 | 1 | Provide radio relay link into the Div Comm System from 5do Fwd at Cassion III. |
| AM/MRC-69 | 1 | Provide radio relay link into Div Comm System from Quan Loi. |

11c
SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Shenandoah II (U)

(2) 2d Platoon: Supported 2d Bde at their base camp at Di An and Bde Forward via Hoa Loi (2). Major items of equipment utilized were:

| <u>Equipment</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>Purpose</u> |
|------------------|-----------------|---|
| AM/MOC-34 | 1 | Provide radio relay link into the Div Comm System from Bde Fwd. |
| AM/MOC-17 | 1 | Provide secure teletype for Bde Fwd. |
| AM/GRC-46 | 1 | Provide RATT station for Bde Fwd in Div Net #1. |

(3) 3d Platoon: Supported 3d Bde at their base camp at Lai Kho.

a. Company C continued to support Division Support Command/Division Rear. Major items of equipment utilized were,

| <u>Equipment</u> | <u>Quantity</u> | <u>Purpose</u> |
|------------------|-----------------|--|
| AM/MOC-69 | 3 | Provide radio relay link into the Div Comm System. |
| AM/MOC-17 | 1 | Provide secure teletype for Support Comd/Div Rear. |
| AM/MOC-2 | 1 | Provide common user telephone service for Support Comd/Div Rear. |
| AM/GRC-26 | 1 | Provide RATT station for Div Spt Comd/Div Rear. |

10. (C) Results:

a. The battalion provided simultaneous communications for twelve different elements of the Division.

- (1) Division Main
- (2) Division Forward
- (3) Division Artillery
- (4) Division Support Command/Division Rear
- (5) 1st Bde Rear
- (6) 1st Bde Forward
- (7) 2d Bde Rear
- (8) 3d Bde Forward
- (9) 3d Bde
- (10) 1st Lt. Cav TP
- (11) 1st Lt. Cav TP
- (12) Song Be TP

b. Telephone circuits provided:

- (1) Song Be TP

CONFIDENTIAL

SVDB-SI-3

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Shonash II (U)

| | |
|--------------------------------|----|
| (b) Division Forward | 43 |
| (c) Division Artillery | 8 |
| (d) Division Fmt Comd/Div Rear | 2 |
| (e) 1st Bde Rear | 6 |
| (f) 1st Bde Fwd | 6 |
| (g) 2d Bde Rear | 11 |
| (h) 2d Bde Fwd | 6 |
| (i) 3d Bde | 3 |
| (j) 1/4 Cav TP | 1 |
| (k) Loc Minh TP | 1 |
| (l) Song Ba TP | 2 |

11. (U) Administrative Matters: No major administrative problems were encountered during the operation.


12. (C) Commander Analysis: During Operation Shonash II, the Battalion experienced no unusual communication problems. Sufficient equipment was available to support the Division throughout the entire operation.


FOR THE COMMANDER:


3 Incls

- 1 - Radio Rptg Diagram
- 2 - Telephone Traffic Diagram
- 3 - HF Radio Diagram

E. R. C. Weeks
E. R. C. WEEKS
CPT, SigC
Adjutant







Incl 3 to
ANNEX J

HF RADIO DIAGRAM

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5
APO 96345

AVIB-CA

9 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SHEMANDOAH II

TO: ACoFS, G5

The Combat Operation After Action Report for the G5 area of responsibility for Operation SHEMANDOAH II is as follows:

1. Date of Operation: 29 September 1967 - 19 November 1967.

2. General: The G5 staff section performed and coordinated the civil affairs and psychological warfare operations elaborated below in support of Operation SHEMANDOAH II. The Division was assisted in these efforts by elements of the 246th Psyop Company and the 9th Aerial Command Squadron. Within the Division, the 1st Engineer Battalion and the 1st Brigade G5 section played key roles in achieving the results elaborated below. It is significant to point out that while the preponderance of Psyop assets of the Big Red One were being utilized in an experimental Chieu Hoi Campaign in southern Binh Duong Province, in coordination with the 25th Infantry Division, U.S. Province Advisors, and CVN personnel, the Division was still capable of providing extensive Psyop support to SHEMANDOAH II.

3. Psychological Operations:

During Operation SHEMANDOAH II, the Big Red One conducted the greater amount of its psychological warfare operations against the 9th VC Division, which included the 271, 272 and 273rd VC Regiments, as well as elements of the 141 and 165 A NVA Regiments. Operations consisted of leaflet drops, loudspeaker appeals, face-to-face communication, and the introduction of a Chieu Hoi message which was screen painted on cloth. This latter innovation was implemented at the suggestion of COMUSMACV. A total of 600 cloth Chieu Hoi appeals were dropped in Northern Binh Duong Province. Although it is difficult to pinpoint success or failure of a specific psyops mission due to the nature of this form of warfare, it should be noted that no VC/NVA utilized the cloth to attract an aircraft to assist him to rally.

In addition, 7,850,000 standard leaflets were dropped in support of combat operations. These included standard Chieu Hoi appeals, safe conduct passes and themes calculated to lower NVA morale (these themes included: lack of medicine, homesickness, increased air and artillery missions, the inevitable defeat). In addition, special "quick-reaction" leaflets exploiting the battlefield successes of the Big Red One were distributed throughout SHEMANDOAH II.

One leaflet of particular interest contained a letter by MG Hay addressed to the co commander of the 9th VC Division, in which, the Commanding General of the Big Red One reminded the VC command of their terrible losses incurred at Loc Ninh and challenged them to again commit their forces in a similar manner. 200,000 copies of this leaflet were dropped on the suspected location of the 9th VC Division Headquarters.

Leaflets were augmented by extensive use of aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, which, for the most part, were utilized on a "quick-reaction" basis. A total of 69 hours of aerial broadcasts were used against specific hostile units.

Face to face communication was effected through the use of a special team of "Hoi Chanhs" operating with the division which circulated in the battlefield area among the civilian population. This team proved particularly effective when it was used among the refugees and civilian personnel immediately after the Loc Ninh Battle.

AVDB-CA


SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation SHENANDOAH II,
9 Dec 67, Cont-

4. Civic Action/Civil Affairs

Over 50 tons of rice and 800 lbs of salt were captured during this operation. This was evacuated to the G5 warehouse and subsequently re-distributed for civic action projects.

The focus of civil affairs action during the operation was in the Loc Ninh-An Loc area. When the VC attacked the subsector compound on 29 October 67, a stream of refugees began moving south towards An Loc. The refugee crisis reached its peak on 3 November 67 at An Loc when approximately 3500 refugees arrived in that area. Of these, approximately 2700 were completely dependent on government support while the others were taken in by relatives and friends. In addition, food shortages resulted when An Loc was cut off from many of the neighboring communities in the area. In some cases, food had been confiscated by the VC.

The greater number of the refugees were concentrated in 4 locations: the Catholic school, the Buddhist temple, and the old and new market place. Various types of food and other assistance were provided by the 1st Infantry Division upon request by province authorities while the refugees were concentrated at An Loc. On 5 November 67 the refugees began moving back to their homes with the assistance of U.S. province officials who coordinated a Caribou airlift.


FRANCIS G. GEROZ JR
Major, GS
ACofS, G5

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~~DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY~~
~~HEADQUARTERS~~
1ST BRIGADE, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVIS-SP-F

8 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/MCR/J2/J21)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96345

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J21
APO San Francisco 96345

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OPERATION: Operation SHENANDOAH II; search and destroy.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 290300H Sep 1967 to 192400H Nov 1967.

3. (U) SUMMARY: Central and crossed headquarters for the operation was 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, and COMBINATION was as shown in OPORD 23-67 (OPERATION SHENANDOAH II). The operation was conducted with the northern limit as LOC KDM, the southern limit LAI 13; the eastern limit Hwy 13; and western limit was the 25th Inf Div area of operations. The plan envisioned by the commander was a one phase operation. That phase was to search and destroy the 271st VC Regiment and its field positions along Highway 13. Initially the 1/2 Inf moved from field location along Highway 13 cross country to establish MOP AT7454. 1/28 Inf would air assault into LZ A13 (LTW93594). 1/16 Inf would clear and secure Highway 13 in sector. 1/4 Cav (A) would clear and secure Highway 13 in sector, provide convoy escort, and secure FSB's CALSON II and CALSON III.

a. Reporting Officer: Colonel George E. Newman

b. Task Organization:

- (1) 1st Bde, Col George E. Newman
- (2) 1st Bn 2d Inf, LTC Joseph R. Stauffer
LTC Mortimer L. O'Connor
- (3) 1st Bn, 16th Inf, LTC Calvert P. Benedict
- (4) 1st Bn, 16th Inf, LTC Richard E. Cavasco
- (5) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Arthur D. Stigol
LTC Floyd G. Stephenson
- (6) 1st Bn, 28th Inf, LTC James P. Murphy
LTC James F. Cochran
- (7) 2d Bn, 28th Inf, LTC Terry Allen Jr.
Maj Louis C. Menzrey
- (8) 1st Bn, 4th Cav, LTC John A. Seigle
- (9) 2d Bn, 12th Inf, 25th Inf Div, LTC Michael D. Tice
- (10) 1st Bn, 5th Arty, LTC Joseph V. Spitzer
- (11) 6th Bn, 15th Arty, LTC Frank E. Serio

4. (U) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence Prior to Operation. There had been numerous reported VC unit sightings in the Brigade AO just prior to the operation. An evaluation of all available intelligence indicated that the 165th NVA Regiment (estimated strength: 1700); the 271st VC Regiment (estimated strength: 1600); the PHU LOI Battalion (estimated strength: 450); C&A DaU TIE-3 District Company (estimated strength: 60); and C&S GIC: Truoi District Platoon (estimated strength: 50), were probably located in the Brigade AO. This estimate was based on an evaluation of agent reports, Bloodhound hot-spots, LAI returns, Visual Reconnaissance, and other reports from sources of high reliability. The most serious threat to the Brigade was believed to have been the 165th NVA Regiment, the 271st VC Regiment, and the unlocated elements of the 7th NVA Division. These units could be expected to receive combat support from the 69th Artillery Regiment and possibly the 84th Artillery Regiment, and logistical support from the 83rd Group (Rear Service).

SUBJECT: Combat after Action Report (MACV/ACG/J3/J21) (CONT'D) 112

It was estimated that reinforcements would most likely come from the 101st NVA Regiment and the 273rd VC Regiment, both of which could possibly reinforce within 24-48 hours.

b. Enemy Situation During Operation. Evidence accumulated during the early part of the operation confirmed the presence of the Headquarters, 271st VC Regiment in the LOIG NGUYEN base area, and established a high probability that the preponderance of its subordinate elements were also located in the same general area. On 2 October 1967 the first POW was captured by the 1-2d Inf. Results of the interrogation of this POW indicated that the FNU LOI Battalion II was based in the southeastern part of the brigade AO. The strength of this unit was determined to have been 300 men, the majority of whom had infiltrated into South Vietnam from North Vietnam. No contact was ever made with the FNU LOI Battalion II during the operation. Enemy documents captured by the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, as a result of enemy contacts on 11 October 1967, confirmed that the 1st and 2d Battalions, 271st VC Regiment were located in the Brigade AO. On 12 October 1967, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry captured a document which was determined to have been a letter from the Rear Services Office of the 9th VC Division to Headquarters, Group 83 (Rear Services). This letter indicated that since Group 81 (Rear Services) was unable to provide logistical support to the 271st VC Regiment, the regiment was moved into base areas within the LOIG NGUYEN Secret Zone in order to receive support from Group 83 (Rear Services). The document also stated that as a result of a lack of food, the physical condition of the 271st VC Regiment had deteriorated. At the time of the capture of this document, only the presence of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 271st VC Regiment in the Brigade AO had been verified. However, the contents of this captured document indicated that the entire regiment was most likely located in the area. The move of the 271st VC Regiment to the LOIG NGUYEN area also indicated that there were sufficient supplies already stored in this area to support the regiment. The presence of the 271st VC Regiment on the Brigade AO was again confirmed on 27 October 1967, when a POW captured by the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was determined to have been from the 2d Battalion 271st VC Regiment. This POW stated that prior to 17 October 1967, a 20 man Recon Platoon from the FNU LOI Regiment (probably FNU LOI Battalion II) was attached to the 2d Battalion, 271st VC Regiment to assist in gathering information on US troop movements. During the operation around the LOC HINH - AN LOC area, positive identification was made of the enemy units with whom major contacts were made. The identification of enemy units was greatly facilitated by the capture of 12 POWs and many enemy documents. It was determined that the 273rd and 272d VC Regiments supported by rocket and AA artillery units participated in the attack on LOC HINH on 29 October and in the other battles which followed. Additionally, evidence indicated that individual filler and possibly small units from the 141st and 165th VC Regiments assisted the 272d and 273rd Regiments respectively. There was also evidence that the attack was originally planned as a divisional attack by all three regiments of the 9th VC Division, but because of the heavy losses inflicted upon the 271st VC Regiment in the LOIG NGUYEN area, a late decision was made to reinforce the 9th VC Division with fillers from the regiments of the 7th VC Division (141st and 165th).

c. Terrain and Weather. The Brigade AO encompassed all types of terrain common to the III Corps Tactical Zone. The area included all types of vegetation, including rubber plantations, rice paddy areas, and jungle. Observation ranged from poor in the jungles to excellent along roads and across rice paddies and clearings. The heavy vegetation in many areas afforded excellent concealment to units during search and destroy operations. During the period of this operation, the Brigade AO was in the autumn transition season between the southwest and northeast monsoons. There were several days and nights of scattered heavy precipitation which hampered air operations and aerial reconnaissance. Additionally, on several days, early morning fog, which restricted visibility to less than 1 mile, delayed early morning air operations. With the exceptions of these occasional days of restricted weather conditions, the weather had no adverse effects on the Brigade operations.

d. Fortifications. A large number of VC fortifications were located and destroyed by both ground and air actions during this operation. Among these were 873 bunkers, 198 fighting positions, 61 foxholes, 96 prone shelters, 27 tunnels and over 3,600 meters of trench line. Many of the base camps located were newly constructed and extended over large distances. Some bunkers had overhead cover constructed of bamboo logs and covered with mounds of dirt. The majority of the fortifications found were located in the thick jungle areas away from the main roads. A large majority of the fortifications located were destroyed by air strikes.

Those destroyed by ground forces were destroyed by demolitions. Every effort was made to destroy or render unusable all fortifications found in the Brigade AO.

e. Civil Affairs. During the initial phases of OPERATION SHENANDOAH II there were very few civilians in the AO. Not until the action in the LOC MINH vicinity did the civilian populace enter the picture. The prolonged fighting in LOC MINH and the surrounding areas resulted in over 5,000 refugees moving out of the area to the South. The vast majority of these personnel were placed in temporary facilities at AN LOC. Close cooperation between COMUSMACV advisor personnel, Province Officials, and 1st Infantry Division representatives resulted in adequate care and handling of these personnel. Refugees appeared to greatly appreciate GVN and US efforts to help them, and most of them blamed VC/NVA forces for the existing situation. In the meantime Brigade elements conducted a MEDCAP in LOC KHAM. The local District Chief said that it was the best thing to happen to the town since the battle began, and it seemed to instill confidence in the remaining villagers. After the fighting died down the refugees began to leave AN LOC. All but a few moved back to their homes in the LOC MINH vicinity, while the remainder moved South, apparently to the Saigon vicinity. At the present time the civilian population in this area, while remaining more or less neutral, is extremely critical of GVN forces, and if forced to choose between the VC or the GVN it is questionable whom they would choose. On the other hand, for the most part they seem quite receptive to US forces, and seem to feel that we are trying to help them. Vietnamese Information Service and ARVN psychological operations personnel are in the process of trying to project a better GVN image to the people, however they have a difficult task facing them.

5. (C) MISSION: 1st Bde, commences OPERATION SHENANDOAH II 290600 Sep to search out and destroy the 271st Viet Cong Regiment and other guerilla forces in assigned sector, conducts security operation at PHUOC VINH, and continues over-watch of SF/CIDG operation within Bde AO.

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Bde assumes OPCON of forces deployed along Highway 13 between LAI KHE and CHON THANH. 1-2 Inf conducts search and destroy Ops to the West in AO Mike. 1-16 Inf clears and secures Highway 13 in sector. 1-26 Inf secures PHUOC VINH. 1-23 Inf Air Assaults into LZ APPLE (XT698 94) and conducts search and destroy Ops to the Southeast within AO PAT. 1-4 Cav (-) clears and secures Highway 13 in sector, provides convoy escort and secures FSPB's CAISSON II and CAISSON III. Two tactical air strikes, a 28 minute artillery preparation and a 2 minute gunship preparation precedes the assault landing.

7. (C) EXECUTION: OPERATION SHENANDOAH II was initiated on 290800 Sep, when the 1-2 Inf moved cross country from field location to establish NDP XT7454.

29 Sep (1) 1/2 Inf: The bn (-) moved by foot West from their field location and established an NDP vic XT726240. C/1-2 Inf moved cross country from field location along Highway 13 and married up with the Bn (-) at the new NDP.

(2) 1/28 Inf: The bn (-) moved by RVN from PHUOC VINH to CHON THANH and then by foot vic XT708585 and established an NDP. Change in operation due to weather.

(3) 1/16 Inf: The bn (-) cleared and secured Highway 13 between LAI KHE and BAU BANG. After closing the road, the bn moved by foot to LAI KHE and became OPCON 3d Bde upon closure.

(4) A/2-2 Inf (Mech): The Co became OPCON 1st Bde CTOON. The company provided security at FSPB's CAISSON II and III, cleared and secured Highway 13 in sector and provided convoy escort as required under control of 1-4 Cav (-).

(5) 1-4 Cav (-): The squadron (-) became OPCON 1st Bde at OTOON. provided security at FSPB's CAISSON II and III, cleared and secured Highway 13 in sector, and provided convoy escort.

(6) 1/26 Inf: The Bn provided security for PHUOC VINH.

(7) 1/5 Arty: The bn provided support for the Bde Ops.

30 Sep

- (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and secured NDP.
- (2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn conducted a search and destroy operations and secured NDP.
- (3) 1-4 Cav (-) + A/2-2 Inf (Mech): The squadron (-) with attached Co of 2-2 Inf (Mech) continued security mission PSPB's CAISSON II and III and conducted limited search and destroy operation West of CAISSON III.
- (4) 1/18 Inf (-): The Bn moved R/W to PHUOC VINH and became OPCOM 1st Bde upon closure.
- (5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support Bde operations.
- (6) 1st Bde CP: The 1st Bde moved by R/W to PSPB CAISSON III and established a forward CP.

1 Oct

- (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and secured NDP. At 1040H, Co B had 2 claymore mines detonated against them resulting in 2 (two) US slightly wounded. Return fire was placed into the area of contact with unknown results.
- (2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn continued search and destroy operations and secured NDP.
- (3) 1-4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) with attached Co from 2/2 Inf (Mech) continued road operations betw. Check Point 99 and Tragon Bridge (XT765-799). Two anti-tank mines were located.
- (4) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

2 Oct

- (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) moved by foot to a new NDP via XT735-30 and conducted local search and destroy patrols. At 0955 via XT73531, Co C fired R/W at movement. At 1105, Co B found 2 VC (1 KHA, 1 WHA) in the vic Co C fired at movement. At the same location, 2 AK-47 were found. The wounded VC was evacuated to LAI KHE.
- (2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) moved by foot to a new NDP via XT72-1584 and conducted local search and destroy patrols.
- (3) 1-4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-), plus Co A/2-2 Inf (Mech), continued to secure PSPB's CAISSON II and III and conducted local security patrols.
- (4) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

3 Oct

- (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and secured NDP.
- (2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and secured NDP.
- (3) 1-4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-), plus Co A/2-2 Inf (Mech), continued local patrolling operations and continued security of PSPB's CAISSON II and III.
- (4) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

4 Oct

- (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted security operations via NDP and conducted search and destroy operation to the West of the NDP. At 0730, the Recon platoon made contact with an undetermined size enemy force via XT712537. Co C was moved into a supporting position and also became heavily engaged. Contact was broken at 1100H. A/S, artillery, and LRF's were placed into area of contact to EDF. US forces sustained 4 KHA and 26 WHA. Enemy losses were 12 KHA and 3 WHA.
- (2) 1/28 Inf: The Bn (-) conducted security operations via NDP and conducted search and destroy to the Northwest. During the day's operation the Bn located a fresh base camp via XT720577. Air was placed on the base camp with unknown results.
- (3) 1-4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-), plus Co A/2-2 Inf (Mech), conducted security operations via PSPB's CAISSON II and III and local patrolling.
- (4) 1/18 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted an amphibious move from PHUOC VINH to CHON THINH. From CHON THINH the Bn executed an assault landing into an LZ via XT835532. No contact was made by the Bn, however during LZ operations, 11 VC were killed as a result of gunship activity and 19 VC killed by artillery.
- (5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

5 Oct

- (1) 1/2 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations in sector. At 1007H via XT713543 the Recon platoon executed an ambush killing 2 VC. Contact was broken at 1030H with no friendly casualties.
- (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and security of NDP. At 1125H via XT693545 Co C located and destroyed a base camp. The base camp contained 28 bunkers; trench lines; 2 wells; and tunnels. At 1500H via XT694599, Co C made contact with a VC squad size element resulting in one (1) US KIA; VC losses unknown.

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(3) 1/2 Inf(-): The bn conducted search and destroy operations and security of NDA. At 1135H vic AT720575 the Recon platoon made contact with a VC squad size element. Arty supported the contact which resulted in 3 (three) VC KIA. No US losses were reported.

(4) 1-4 Cav(-): The Squadron(-) continued operations at CAUSON II and III. At 1330H C/2-28 Inf received OPCON to the squadron. At 1330H C/2-28 Inf moved by A/C to a secured LZ vic AT732540. Btry A, 1/5 Arty and Btry A 2-33 were lifted by A/C from CAUSON IV and III respectively to LZ vic AT732540 (CAUSON V).

6 Oct: (1) 1/2 Inf(-): The bn(-) conducted search and destroy operations to the North of their NDF, with 2 (two) company size elements.

(2) 1/18 Inf(-): The bn(-) conducted search and destroy operations North and South of the NDF. At 1436H, 5 (five) 105mm mortar rounds were received in the Southern sector of the NDF. There were no casualties. Counter mortar fire and air strikes were directed into vic AT655639 with unknown results. At 1859H a Co B ambush patrol made contact with a platoon size VC force within 250 meters of the NDF. The patrol withdrew to the NDF. Results of contact were 2 KIA and 1 KIA. At this time Co B's portion of the perimeter came under mortar attack. Co F and Co D ambush patrols were returned to NDF. Co C ambush patrol made contact, contacts returning to the perimeter. At 2130H Co C (Northern portion of B) received close range fire. Artillery was adjusted. At 2200H Co D (Southern portion of the perimeter) received mortar fire and mortar fire. Only a heavy mortar attack was observed against Co D. At 2345H, results of contact were 3 US KIA and 4 US KIA. VC losses were 50 KIA and a large number of weapons.

(3) 1/20 Inf(-): The bn conducted search and destroy operations with 2 companies patrolling South of the NDF. At 1310H Co B made contact with 1 (one) VC vic AT722376 resulting in no US casualties and unknown enemy losses. At 1240H, Co B located 2 VC in bunkers vic AT712540. An air strike was directed on these coordinates resulting in 1 bunker and 3 (eight) military structures destroyed.

(4) 1/4 Cav(-): The Squadron(-) continued security operations at CAUSON III and V and conducted local search and destroy operations in sector.

(5) 1-5 Arty(-): The bn(-) continued to support 1st ACD operations.

7 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf(-): The bn moved from their field locations to CAUSON V and NDF.

(2) 1/23 Inf(-): The bn conducted search and destroy operations and secured NDF.

(3) 1/18 Inf(-): The bn conducted search and destroy operations and security of NDA. At 1000H vic AT653538 Co C located and destroyed 25 prone shelters. At 1014H vic AT690541 Co C received S/A and A/C fire. Fire was returned, Co C moved back and adjusted Arty fire. There were no VC casualties and unknown VC casualties. At 1055 vic AT694552, Co D received heavy S/A fire. Fire was returned and Arty adjusted on located contact. The results of contact were unknown VC losses and no VC losses.

(4) 2/28 Inf(-): The bn conducted a A/C move to CHON THINH and A/C into field location vic AT-97590.

(5) 1/4 Cav(-): The Squadron(-) conducted security of NDF at CAUSON III and V, local patrolling in sector and secured CHON THINH airstrip for 2/28 Inf.

(6) 1/5 Arty(-): The bn continued to support 1st ACD operations.

8 Oct (1) 1/18 Inf(-): The bn conducted search and destroy operations plus NDF security.

(2) 1/28 Inf(-): The bn conducted search and destroy operations plus NDF security.

(3) 1/4 Cav(-): The Squadron(-) conducted security of NDF at CAUSON III and V and local patrolling in sector.

(4) 2/23 Inf(-): The bn conducted search and destroy operations plus NDF security.

(5) 1/5 Arty(-): The bn continued to support 1st ACD operations.

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9 Oct (1) 1/12 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and security. At 2215H via XT096545 Co B and 2 VC out of track. At 0100 0100, Co B linear receiving small arms and a/n fire. As Co B withdrew, VC forces maneuvered to the front and flanks. Air and artillery was employed against VC elements. A VC attack formed on Co B left (west) flank, LRT were employed against the mounting attack. The VC made human wave assaults and hit Co B left flank. Co B was in position and fought off the VC at ranges down to within ten meters. Heavy air and artillery barrages were placed on the area. Result of contact was 22 VC KIA and numerous weapons. An estimated 40 VC were killed by air and artillery.

(2) 1/23 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and security of NUP.

(3) 2/28 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and security of NUP. At 1225H via XT065525 Companies A and B received heavy a/n and a/n fire. Arty and a/S were placed in the area of contact. Results of the contact were 4 VC KIA, 6 US KIA and one unknown VC KIA.

(4) 1/a Cav (-): The Squadron (-) conducted security of FSB's CAISSON III and V, conducted local patrolling and conducted Rto Recon to the East along Highway #302.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Battalion continued to support 1st Bde operations.

20 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf: The Bn conducted a/n into LZ via XT035509 and secured LZ.

(2) 1/13 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy in sector and security NUP. At 1045H via XT096542 the Recon Platoon located and dug up three graves containing 3 VC. These bodies were believed to be the bodies of 3 VC killed in the previous night attack on Bn NUP. At 1130H Co D received heavy a/n and a/n fire. Arty and a/S were placed in the area of contact. Result of the contact were 1 (one) US KIA and unknown VC losses.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The Bn conducted a combat extraction from NDF/T2 via 707507 to H.30C VI'PH.

(4) 2/28 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations in sector and secured NUP. At 0725, 2 CHICOM claymores were fired into NUP. The Recon Platoon's ambush patrol was near the claymores at the time of firing but suffered no cas. At 1305 and 1432 via XT065559 Co A located 50 lbs of rice and fish, 12 bunkers, bloody clothing, 100-200 canteens, 2 CHICOM grenades, 2 (two) 100mm rockets and fresh trails leading out of the area of the find. All items of equipment were returned to the NDF.

(5) 1/4 Cav: The Squadron (-) conducted security of FSB's CAISSON III and V, conducted local patrolling in sector, and route Recon along Hwy #13 and #302. At 1234H via XT731520, Co A 6/27 Inf located and destroyed 4 cans of oil and 4 fighting positions.

(6) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

11 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and security. At 0700H via XT028511, Co C located 3 fresh VC bodies. At 0803 via XT041512, Co C located and destroyed 6 T-shaped bunkers with overhead cover. At 1125H via XT044508, Co D located and destroyed 3 bunkers. At 1630H via XT044500, Co D located and destroyed 5 large bunkers, mounding area, a 105 booby trap, a CBU booby trap, 1 tunnel, and 1 water well.

(2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operation and NUP security. At 1038H via XT700852, Co B and Co D received heavy S/A and a/n fire from ground and tree locations. The companies returned S/A and a/n in the area of contact. Arty and a/S were also placed in the area of contact. Results of the contact were 2 VC KIA, 1 US KIA and 1 US KIA. Both companies reported VC were NVA. At 1420H via XT700551 Co B and Co D located 1 VC body and 1 AK-47. At 1530H via XT700555 Co B and Co D received S/A fire. Fire was returned by the companies S/A, a/n and the arty. Result of contact was neg. At 1457H via XT099552, Co D received S/A fire. Arty and a/S were placed in the area of contact. Result of the contact was 1 US KIA and no VC losses.

(3) 2/28 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations and NUP security. At 1150H via XT063554, Co B and Co D located a large base camp. The items located and destroyed in the base camp were 3 tables, 10 bunkers, and poncho hoses. At 1505H via XT064553 Co B and Co D located and destroyed one military structure and 3 water containers. At 1605H via XT061555 Co B and Co D located and destroyed 20 bunkers, 3 large bundles of clothing and 1 large medical area. Medical area had been used within 48 hours. During the search of the Base Camp, 2 VC were taken under fire by Co B. Result of the contact was 1 AK-47 recovered.

(4) 1/a Cav (-): The Squadron (-) conducted local patrolling in sector and security operation at FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

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US REPORT (MACV/ACF/33/321) (CONT'D)

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12 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf: The on conducted search and destroy operations to the east of MDT. At 1120h via ATU24508 the recon platoon located and took under fire 2 VC. Results of contact were neg US losses and neg VC losses. At 1320h via ATU37502 Co U located and destroyed 4 bunkers, 1 military structure, 25 ft long and 5 ft wide, 2 "T" shaped military structures, and 1 tunnel entrance. At 1425 via ATU37502 Co U located and returned to their MDT 100 rounds of AK-47 and 51bb of rice.

(2) 1/3 Inf: The on conducted search and destroy operations and MDT security. At 1000h via ATU705540 Co D located and destroyed 30 prone shelters believing they were night before, and 4 VC bunkers. At 1415h via ATU98555 the on (-) located and destroyed 1 concrete bunker, 30 ft wide, 8 ft long. The concrete bunker had 3 small security holes dug around it. At 1520h via ATU91555 the Recon platoon located and destroyed 7 prone shelters and 3 spider holes.

(3) 2/23 Inf: The on conducted search and destroy operations and MDT security. At 0910h via ATU60550 Co U located and destroyed a trench line and shelter which was large enough to house 25 VC. At 1050h via ATU66454 located and destroyed 50 living type bunkers. At 1105h via ATU66553 Co D located and destroyed 1 military structure containing medical supplies. The medical supplies were returned to the on MDT. At 1217h via ATU68552 Co U made contact with an unknown size VC sniper element. S/A fire was returned in addition to arty fires and A/S in area of contact. Result of the contact were neg US losses and unk VC losses. At 1400 via ATU70549, Co D received incoming small arms fire. Fire was returned by S/A and arty was placed in the area of contact. Result of the contact were VC losses unk, 1 AK-47, and US losses neg. At 1458h via ATU72549 Co D received S/A fire. Fire was returned with S/A and arty. Result of the contact were U losses neg and VC losses unk.

(4) 1/4 Cnv (-): The Squadron (-) conducted MDT security at Calibuh III and V, and conducted local patrolling operations in sector.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The on continued to support 1st Bde operations.

13 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf: The on conducted search and destroy operations and MDT security. At 1144h via ATU40499 Co B located and destroyed or returned to the on MDT, documents, 50 lbs of fish and rice, 1 bunker 14 ft long, 2-2 man holes, 1 tunnel, 5 chickens, 2 pigs, 4 bunks, and 1 military structure. At 1455h via ATU75520, Co A located 5 cans of Com-Lions. At 1500h via ATU20508, Co A located and returned to the on MDT 350 rounds of 7.65 ammo and playing cards. At 2000h via ATU27512 Co G's ambush patrol on tripod. 2 VC were seen moving southwest, 12 claymores were blown S/A were fired and arty fire was placed in the area of contact. Results of the contact 1 VC body count, 1 AK-47, documents, and neg US losses.

(2) 1/28 Inf: The on conducted a S/A patrol in place, secured MDT, and conducted local security patrolling. At 1456h via ATU94537 Co B located and destroyed 5 fishholes, 2 ft x 2 ft, and 1 long concrete bunker.

(3) 2/28 Inf: The on conducted search and destroy operations, and MDT security. At 1500h via ATU61551 Co G located 1 body (VC) in a hole. At 1520h via ATU21551, Co U located 1 VC body in a hole.

(4) 1/4 Cnv: The Squadron (-) conducted security operations at FSB's Calibuh III and V, conduct local patrolling in sector, and secured CHON in hill airstrip. At 1210h via ATU77555 Co C patrol located and destroyed 1 under water bridge. At 1510h via ATU73553, Co U local patrol located and destroyed 1-105 round and five (5) gal cans of oil.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The on continued to support 1st Bde operations.

14 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf: The on conducted search and destroy operations to the northeast and MDT security.

(2) 1/28 Inf: The on conducted search and destroy operation and MDT security. At 1215h via ATU87533 Co U made contact with an unknown size VC element. Arty, mortars, and A/S were employed against the enemy. Result of the contact were unknown VC losses and 1 U. MDT and 1 US MDT.

(3) 2/28 Inf: The on (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus MDT security.

(4) 1/4 Cnv: The Squadron (-) conducted security operation at FSB's Calibuh III and V and conducted local patrolling in sector.

(5) 1/5 Arty: The on continued to support 1st Bde operations.

15 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The on moved by foot to new MDT via ATU42526 at 1752. At 1144h via ATU37528, Co B located and destroyed or returned to MDT 1 military structure 40' x 10', 1 bag of rice, various documents, entrenching tools and dry rock. At 1356h via ATU41525, Co B engaged 3 VC, wounding 1 who later died. Wounded VC had in possession 1 AK-47. At 1621h local security elements via new MDT located a large quantity of rice which was moved by H/W to LAI KHE.

SUBJECT: Combat action report (LVT/CS/33/22) (USAF)

15 Oct (2) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations in sector. At 1030H, via ATU9555, Co A made contact with an unknown size VC force. Small arms and arty fires were placed in the area of contact. Results of contact 2 VC KIA and 1 US KIA.

(3) 2/20 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations in sector and air security. At 1420H, via ATU9570, Co D located and destroyed or returned to base camp containing: 1 bunker, 3 packs, 1 air round, 24 blinding caps, assortment of accoutrements, 7 uniforms, and 2 bottles of pills.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-) + 1/2 Inf + 1/2-2: The Squadron (-) plus attached Inf companies conducted security One via CAISOM III and CAISOM V.

(5) 1/5 arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

16 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations and air security. At 1525H, via ATU40520, Co D located and destroyed a mound of loose, unpolished rice. The cache was 12' x 12' x 4'. At 1555H, via ATU42523, Co D located and destroyed a rice cache 12' x 12' x 4'.

(2) 1/28 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations and air security.

(3) 2/28 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations and air security. At 1219H, via ATU99570 Co D made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Arty and n/s were placed in the area of contact. Result of contact was 1 US KIA and unknown VC losses. At 1245H, via ATU99570 Co D clover leafed the area of contact and was taken under fire again. Arty and n/s were placed in the area of contact. Results of contact were 1 US KIA and 9 US KIA VC losses, 17 KIA and 4 KIA (probable).

(4) 1-4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attachments conducted security operations at FORD's at CAISOM III and CAISOM V.

(5) 2-2 Inf (Tech): The bn became UCOM 1st Bde at 1603H. The bn conducted security operations FORD's LORR. II and conducted local patrolling in sector.

17 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations and air security.

(2) 1/28 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations and air security.

(3) 2/28 Inf: The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations plus air security. At 0600 the bn departed the area with Co A in the lead, followed by CP group, and Co B. At 0950H Co A point element located a trail running Southeast - Northwest at vic ATU4570 covered with freshly made foot prints. Heavy movement was reported by the Co A point element. Contact was made at 1015H by Co A at vic ATU4570. At 1020, Co C received sniper fire from the trees. At this point a heavy fight began to develop. Close artillery support was called in by respective artillery 70's. At 1030 heavy casualties were reported being received by the command group. At 1035 the command group came under heavy fire from S/N, A/N, claymores, M79's, and M16's. The bn Cmp, Bn S-2, in SGH, both RT0's and Company Commanders of both Co A and Co D were casualties. As the contact continued Co A continued to pull back for close air support. At 1100 the first n/s was placed in and at 1120H the second n/s was placed in with contact breaking. At 1130H contact was again made by Co A and D at 1145H sniper fire was being received in the lead. At 1200H the Brigade Commander assured command of the Bn (-) with the assistant Division Commander assuring command of the 1st Bde. At 1211H Co A 1/16 was put on strip alert, at LAI KHE. At 1325H Co C securing CAISOM V (ATU5540) was inserted into the air to reinforce Co D moved south from NDR to secure the casualty evacuation point. Sporadic enemy fire continued throughout the afternoon. At 1515H the Recon platoon located 30-40 wounded or dead US soldiers from both companies and the command group. The Bde S-3 was among the KIA at the casualty evacuation point. At 1545H Co D 1/16 was moved from LAI KHE to the 2/28 LDR as additional reinforcements. At 1615H cutoff aircraft, LFT, and 1st n/s in Co A's aircraft, received ground fire causing 2 KIA including an CO. At approximately 1930H evacuation of KIA was terminated, and all elements closed air at 2000H. The following day the remainder of the US KIA were evacuated. The bn (-) was then extracted to LAI KHE. The 1/16 Inf secured the air during and after the 2/28 Inf extraction. Results of the meeting engagement were 52 US KIA, 2 US KIA, 72 US KIA. VC casualties were 103 KIA (DC) and 61 VC KIA (possible).

(4) 2/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted air security at LORR. II and conducted local patrolling in sector. At 1503, via ATU75435, Co C drew sniper fire. Arty and n/s were placed in the area of contact. Result of contact were US losses 1 KIA, VC losses were unknown.

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Summary: Cont'd after release of ... (7/7/71) (C-11)

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17 Oct (5) 1/4 Coy (-): The Squadron (-) with attached Inf companies conducted security operations at FSB's CAISSO III and CAISSO V and local patrolling.
(6) 1/5 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

18 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted a combat extraction from field positions to HIGH VIII by a/c.
(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn (-) inserted into field positions occupied by 2/28 Inf. Relief was completed at 0915H. The Bn (-) conducted local security patrolling in sector.
(3) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and MIA security.
(4) 2/2 Inf (-) (Mech): The Bn (-) conducted security operations at FSB LORRAINE II and local patrolling in sector.
(5) 2/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted casualty evacuation and extracted from field positions after conducting a relief in place with 1-16 Inf. At 1432H Bn closed L.I KHU and became COMBAT 3rd Bde.
(6) 1/4 Coy (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Infantry companies conducted security operations via CAISSO III and CAISSO V and local patrolling in sector.
(7) 1/5 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

19 Oct (1) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn conducted local search and destroy operations and MIA security. At 1500H, via MDT, Co D made contact with unknown size VC unit. arty and mortars were placed in the area of contact. Result of the contact was 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. VC losses unknown.
(2) 1/28 Inf: The Bn conducted a combat extraction from MDT to CHON THINH by 1123. After completion a B-52 strike was placed near on MDT. Upon completion of B-52 strike the Bn was reinserted into MDT. The Bn then conducted MDT security and local patrolling activities.
(3) 2/2 Inf (Mech) (-): The Bn conducted search and destroy operation and FSB security at LORRAINE II.
(4) 1/4 Coy: The Squadron (-) plus attached Infantry companies conducted FSB security at CAISSO III and CAISSO V and local patrolling operation in sector.
(5) 1/5 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

20 Oct (1) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and MDT security. At 0950H, at AT686576, 5 VC bodies were located and buried.
(2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and MDT security.
(3) 2/2 Inf (Mech) (-): The Bn (-) conducted security for FSB at LORRAINE II and local patrolling in sector.
(4) 1/4 Coy (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Infantry companies conducted security operation at FSB's CAISSO III and CAISSO V.
(5) 1/5 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operation.

21 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn conducted a h/A move from HIGH VIII to CHON THINH commencing at 1052H and closed at 1159H. From CHON THINH, the Bn h/A by R/A to field positions via 634503.
(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted a combat extraction from field position and conducted joint op with 1/28 Inf via AT692550 closing at 1635H.
(3) 1/28 Inf: The Bn (-) moved to new joint FDP via XT692550 closing at 1330H and secured the LA for 1/16 insertion.
(4) 2/2 Inf (Mech) (-): The Bn (-) conducted security operation and local patrolling via FSB LORRAINE II. At 1500, 2 air rounds were received in the MDT resulting in 1 A/C slightly damaged. Results were neg US casualties and unknown VC losses. At 1537H Co C received air fire from South side of MDT resulting in 1 US WIA.
(5) 1/4 Coy (-): The Squadron (-) with attached Inf companies conducted security and patrolling operation via CAISSO III and CAISSO V.
(6) 1/5 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

22 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and MIA security.
(2) 1/16 Inf (-) + 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn's conducted search and destroy operations and MIA security from joint FDP. At 0945H via AT95558 Co B 1/16 located a tunnel complex and observed a VC running into bunker. A grenade was thrown into the bunker resulting in 1 VC KIA. Documents were found on VC's body and returned to MDT. At 1052H same vicinity Co D 1/16 located and destroyed 6 AT mines.

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22 Oct (3) 2/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted security and controlling operation via LO. at 1014H, via AT02472 Co B A/C hit an mine with damage and no casualties. At 1210H via AT924725 Co B A/C hit an mine resulting in 3 VC KIA and slight damage to the vehicle.

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(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Infantry companies conducted security operations via Foli's C.I.S.S.O. III and C.I.S.S.O. V.

(5) 1/5 arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

23 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn conducted search and destroy operation plus ID security.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-) and 1/26 Inf (-): The bn conducted search and destroy operation plus ID security. The 1/26 Inf located and destroyed a salt cache, 250-100 lb bags of salt at XT67952G.

(3) 2/2 Inf (Mach) (-): The bn (-) reverted to 3d Bde of COB at 0700H.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Cav (-) with attached Infantry companies conducted security at Foli's C.I.S.S.O. III and C.I.S.S.O. V.

(5) 1/5 arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operation.

24 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus ID security. At 0930H, via XT628519, the bn (-) located and destroyed a rice cache of unpolished rice 12' x 12' x 4'. At 1000H, the Bn (-) located and destroyed a 13 1/2 ton salt cache via XT623516.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation and security. At 1101H, via XT710544, Co A located and destroyed 34-40 mortar rounds.

(3) 1/23 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus ID security. At 0925H via XT632531, the bn (-) located 600 lbs of salt in a cache, which was destroyed. At 1130H, in same area via the bn (-) located a cache of ordnance. Included in the find were 78 MG's, 24-120mm mortar rounds, 5-120mm rockets and 2-120mm rocket warheads. All items were evacuated. Also located in the same area were 21-120mm mortar rounds and 25-120mm mortar rounds.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Infantry companies conducted security operation via Foli's C.I.S.S.O. III and C.I.S.S.O. V.

(5) 1/5 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operation.

25 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations plus ID security. At 1244H via XT631512, the Recon Platoon took 1 VC under fire with S/A, N/A and arty fire with unknown results. At 1425H, via XT635522, Co A located and destroyed 10 tons of unpolished rice.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The bn moved by foot to new ID. via XT654430.

(3) 1/23 Inf: The bn moved by foot to new ID. via XT654430.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) with attached Infantry companies conducted security and local patrolling operations at Foli's C.I.S.S.O. III and C.I.S.S.O. V. At 0330, via XT792531, Co A 2/2 Inf A/C hit an mine resulting in slight damage to A/C and 2 KIA. Size of the mine was from 30-50 lb TNT.

(5) 1/5 arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

26 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations plus ID security. At 1145H via XT627523, Co A located a recently used base camp. Located in the base camp were mortar documents, a billfold with pictures, 7 bunkers, fresh VC body in a grave, and a mess hall. At 1250H, Co B, via XT628528, located destroyed 11 bicycles and 3 pairs of black pajamas. At 1407, via XT627527, Co B located and destroyed 2 MG's and evacuated 1 MG and cloning rod.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus ID security.

(3) 1/23 Inf (-): The bn conducted search and destroy operation plus ID security. At 1350H via XT635522, the bn (-) located 3 rice caches totaling 70 tons. Later in the same location the bn located 3 additional caches.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) conducted security and local patrolling via C.I.S.S.O. III and C.I.S.S.O. V.

(5) 1/5 arty: The bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

27 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The bn (-) continued search and destroy operation plus ID security. At 1100H, via XT633515, Co A located a classroom with an NVA flag, assorted documents, and a blackboard with tactical markings on it. All items were evacuated. At 1219H via XT633579, Co D located and destroyed 1100 lbs of rice.

(2) 1/16 Inf (-): The bn conducted search and destroy operation plus ID security.

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27 Oct At 0915H, via A104500, 1 VC was captured by Co D and returned to the unit. The VC had 2 hand grenades. At 0930H, via A104570, Co A located and destroyed B-416 machine-gun with ammo, 1 D-47 rocket, and 48 grenades.

(3) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operations. The Bn (-) returned to the rice cache that was found by the unit 26 Oct. The Bn (-) extracted an estimated amount of rice.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) with attached Inf companies conducted security and local patrolling operation via FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 arty: The Bn continued to conduct support for 1st Bde operations.

28 Oct (1) 1/2 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted a combat extraction from field position commencing at 0900H and ending 1100H at 1100H.

(2) 1/10 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus the security.

(3) 2/20 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted search and destroy operation plus the security and rice extraction. The Bn (-) extracted 30 tons of rice and 2 tons of salt in CML7's to Lvl K18.

(4) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Inf companies conducted security and patrolling at FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

(5) 1/5 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

29 Oct (1) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted a combat extraction from field location to Lvl K18 and reverted to O'Connell 3d Bde upon closure.

(2) 1/28 Inf (-): The Bn (-) conducted a combat extraction from field positions to Lvl K18 reverting to 3d Bde upon closure.

(3) 1/4 Cav (-): The Squadron (-) plus attached Inf companies conducted security and patrolling operations at FSB's CAISSON III and CAISSON V.

30 Oct (1) 1st Bde (FWD) Co. dislocated from field location to Juk LOI. At 1800H the 1st Bde assumed O'Connell of the 3d Bde TAOI and all units (FOO) to the 3d Bde via LOC 1111H.

(2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn became O'Connell 1st Bde at 1800H and continued the security.

(3) 1/26 Inf: The Bn became O'Connell 1st Bde at 1800H and continued FSB security.

(4) 2/28 Inf: The Bn became O'Connell 1st Bde at 1800H and continued the security.

(5) 1/4 Cav: The Squadron (-) became OPCOM 3d Bde at 1800H.

(6) 6/15 arty: The Bn became O'Connell 1st Bde at 1800H and assumed direct support mission of the Bde operations.

31 Oct (1) 1/13 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operation plus the security at XU707090, the Bn located 3 VC bodies and 1 AK47 plus 1 D-41 rocket launcher.

(2) 1/26 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations plus FSB security at CAISSON VI. At 1315H Co C moved to and secured FSB CAISSON VII by R/W via the LOC, relieving B 2/28 Inf of the security responsibility for the FSB.

(3) 1/28 Inf: The Bn executed an assault landing into an LZ via XU70072, and established and held. At 1140H via A1755001, 3 Co patrol made contact with 10 VC, a fire was received and the patrol returned fire. The patrol observed 3 VC falling. Eight VC were dressed in black pajamas and 2 wore khaki uniforms. All were carrying heavy packs. Results of contact were no US losses and unknown VC losses. At 1700H via A1754001 the Bn returned to the LZ with negative results.

(5) 2/21 Inf: The Bn (-) conducted security and patrolling operations via the Lvl. Co moved by R/W from FSB CAISSON IV to now via LOC 1111H, and conducted security operations at the FSB south end of LOC 1111H air strip.

At 0455H the unit reported incoming rocket, mortar and small arms fire. Contact was broken at 0630H. Results of contact were 1 US KIA and 6 US MIA and unknown VC losses.

(6) 1/15 arty: The Bn conducted support for the 1st Bde operations.

1 Nov (1) 1/12 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations commencing south, west of the main security. Co B was lifted by H/H to secure 13th Bde at 1556H.

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1 NOV (2) 1/20 Inf: The unit conducted security and patrolling operations at road's C-1000, VI and C-1000, VII. At 0105, the unit received mortar rounds between 175-200 (000) mortar rounds, a LFT, arty, and s/n were used by the unit to counter the mortar attack. US losses were 1 KIA.

(3) 1/20 Inf (-): The unit conducted search and destroy operations plus IDr security. At 0703, via AU755077, Co A located and destroyed an unknown size VC element. The unit sent 5 VC KIA, US losses were 3 slightly wounded. LFT, arty and airstrikes were employed against the area of contact. At 0840H via AU755078, Co A located and destroyed a circular trench 3 ft deep, 4 holes, 5 ft deep, 20 spider holes, and bloody handprints. At 0910H via AU755080 Co A located and destroyed 6 holes 4' x 4' x 4' and 35 to 50 ft of clay ore wire. At 0945 via AU755085 Co A located and destroyed 1 C-1000 grenade. At 1245H via AU760075, 1 VC walked into Gr in the night. The VC was taken under fire with no results. At 1400H via AU760090, an (-) made contact with an unknown size enemy force. 2 n/a were fired and 5 to 6 grenades were thrown by the VC. The unit (-) returned fire with s/n, arty, and airstrike in area of contact. The unit element lost 2 VC killed in contact. No friendly casualties were reported.

(4) 2/20 Inf: The unit (-) conducted security and patrolling operations at Unit 101. Co A and Co C conducted security and limited patrolling via Field location at the southern end of LCC Hill airstrip.

(5) 6/15 arty: The unit continued to support 1st ABV operations.

2 NOV (1) 1/18 Inf (-): The unit (-) conducted search and destroy operations plus IDr security. At 0030H the unit (-) IDr received a mortar attack with from 30 to 55 mortar rounds falling in the area. A LFT, arty, and recon supported the unit (-) defense. At 0100H the unit (-) received heavy s/n and n/a fire from locations around the area. At 0205H the heavy s/n and n/a fire had tapered to scattered n/a fire about the area. At 0215H, the unit (-) received heavy s/n and n/a fire from the north and northeast. At 0220H, the unit (-) received incoming MG's. At 0237H, heavy s/n and n/a ceased along with the MG fire. At 0255, the heavy s/n, n/a, and MG's again were placed on the unit (-) area. At 0320H, n/a and MG's ceased firing with scattered s/n fire about the area. At 0415H, 50 to 100 rounds of mortar fire fell in the unit (-) area. At 0425H, the unit (-) reported heavy ground attack from the south, the ground attack ended at 0445H. US losses were 1 KIA and 6 MIA. At 0340H, Co B group around Hill and reported 4 wounded VC (0.1's). Corps were dusted off for medical aid and further interrogation. At 1200H, via AU99090, Co A made contact with an enemy VC platoon plus size element. Arty, n/a and LFT were placed into the area of contact with unknown results. No US losses. At 1300H via AU702100, Co B captured 2 VC, the VC were carrying mortar equipment. VC losses of equipment for the day were 2 flame throwers, 3 MG's, 2 LCC C-1000 50, 10 AK-47's, 2 C-1000 carbines type 50, 2 rounds of 841, 13 rounds of 140, 1 set of earphones, 1 sighting device, and VC KPA-203. At 1405H, via AU702100 Co A located 3 graves, 2 graves had 2 bodies each and 1 grave contained 1 body.

(2) 1/20 Inf (-): The unit (-) conducted an air assault into LZ via AU699105 and secured Field. At 1010H via AU714149 Co A made contact with 4 VC 500 meters east of Field location. Arty, n/a, and LFT were placed in the area of contact with unknown results.

(3) 1/28 Inf (-): The unit (-) conducted search and destroy operations and secured area. At 0745H, 20 VC moved up on the area, arty, mortars and A/S were placed on their location with no results. At 1021H via AU733095, the Recon platoon located and destroyed 3 bamboo litterers and a company size perimeter of holes. At 1300H, via 752094 the Recon platoon was fired on by 4 VC. Fires were returned with arty, LFT and s/n in the area of contact with no results.

(4) 2/12 Inf 25 Inf Div: The unit conducted an n/a into LZ via AU785135 and secured area because of lack of 1st ABV.

(5) 2/20 Inf: The unit conducted security and patrolling operations at Unit 101. Co A and Co C conducted security and limited patrolling via Field location at the southern end of LCC Hill airstrip. At 0050H, via Field Co B and Co C received 15 to 20 mortar rounds. No friendly casualties reported. At 0121H via Field, Co A and Co C received s/n fire. Arty, LFT and F&C were placed in area of contact. Contact resulted in one US KIA.

(6) 6/15 arty: The unit continued to support 1st ABV operations.

3 NOV (1) 1/18 Inf (-): The unit (-) conducted search and destroy operations plus IDr security. Co A conducted security of Field via 3000 AB. At 1045H via AU699105 Co A located and returned to the area one wounded VC. At 1045H via AU732099 the unit (-) located 5 VC bodies, 1 AK-47, area for AK-47, and 1 flame thrower. At 1150H via AU702092, the unit (-) located 15 VC bodies.

SUBJECT: Combat after action report (HHCV/HCS/J3/J21) (W/T/L)

5 Nov (4) At 1055H via AU775157, the unit (-) located and destroyed seven bunkers and 200 rounds of 40mm. At 1220H via AU77154 the unit (-) located and destroyed 30 foxholes with overhead cover. At 1200H via AU773142 the unit (-) located and destroyed 60 (one) man foxholes, 50 rounds of 40mm and 4 C1000 grenades.

(5) 2/20 Inf: The unit continued security and patrolling operations via Fung located near the southern end of LOC NINH airstrip. At 1500H via AU738083 the unit (-) located and destroyed 3 VC bunkers, one 100mm mortar sight, 17-60mm mortar rounds, and 1000 ft of clay wire.

(6) A/S arty: The unit conducted support for 1st Bde operations.

6 Nov (1) 1/18 Inf: The unit conducted search and destroy operations and air security. At 1020H via AU693090 the unit (-) located and returned to the unit 50 empty 50 cal canisters. At 1025H via AU69074 the unit (-) located and destroyed 1 mortar charge and 23 mortar round containers. At 1210H via AU69001, the unit (-) located and destroyed 150 bunkers. At this location 2 VC rounds were also located. At 1225H via AU69005 the unit (-) located one telephone, one fuel can, 1 can, 1 sack of medical supplies, 12 gas masks, 1 saw, 14 canteens, 3 hammocks, 14 packs, 100 rounds of 12.7 ammo, 6 punches, 20 shovels, 14 individual bags of rice, and a bag of documents. The unit (-) located and destroyed 7 anti-aircraft positions and 7 bunkers.

(2) 1/20 Inf: The unit conducted search and destroy operations plus air security. At 1000H via AU69162, the unit located and destroyed 50-120mm rounds, one anti-aircraft position and 15 pieces of web gear (picks and belts).

(3) 1/21 Inf: The unit conducted search and destroy operations plus air security. At 1000H via AU73102 the unit (-) located and destroyed 1 sleeping position, 9 bunkers 4x9 ft, 2 anti-aircraft positions, one flashlight, and a pile of 50 cal brass (est 2000). At 1400H via AU75074, the unit located and destroyed 30 holes est to be 3 days old.

(4) 2/12 Inf: The unit conducted search and destroy operations plus air security. At 0920H via AU792137 the unit (-) located and destroyed 10 VC positions, one flight suit (human), and bits of human remains, est 1 body. At 1050H via AU812143 the unit located 3 booby trapped bomb piles. At 1025H via AU792137 the unit received 20-100mm mortar rounds. Fire was returned with counter mortar fire. Arty, arty, A/S and LPT were placed in the area that mortar rounds came from. US losses were 1 KIA.

(5) 2/13 Inf: The unit conducted security and local patrolling operations via LOC LOI. The company C and the company B conducted security and local patrolling via airstrip at the southern end of LOC NINH. At 1035H via AT-03609, Co A patrol had a grapple through on them. US losses were 1 KIA, VC losses were unknown.

(6) A/S arty: The unit continued to support 1st Bde operations.

7 Nov (1) 1/18 Inf: The unit conducted a combat extraction from field locations to Joint LOI and upon closing, non-combat security mission.

(2) 1/20 Inf: The unit conducted search and destroy operations plus air security. The patrol route ran initially east, mostly through a rubber plantation. At 0950H, via AU62135 Co B's point element received sniper fire from one VC in a tree. Fire was returned and the VC (wearing black pajamas) ran into a village a few hundred meters east. The unit (-) pursued the VC into the village where a tunnel was discovered with negative findings. People from the village (especially children) were sparse and apparently hidden. Only a few showed themselves in the area. The unit (-) continued on its patrol route, and again started to receive sniper fire from 3 to 4 VC. At this time the patrol route was altered to a NW direction. Approximately 10 min after the unit (-) turn was made a full scale engagement was initiated by the VC. The VC deployed in the standard "U" shape formation. The initial contact began when the command group was hit directly with an unknown number of M16-2 and M16-0 rounds. Then, the main targets became all commanders and radio operators. These removals plus the southern flank constituted most of the casualties. The command group suffered 100% casualties on the initial contact. Because of the turn in the patrol route the unit (-) ran into the northern side of the VC's tactical formation. The VC then maneuvered elements around to the west to flank and eventually completely encircle the unit (-). Also at this time a group of 30-40 VC on the southern leg maneuvered and also tried to encircle the unit (-). Both elements were surprised by the trail company Co D and held in place. When artillery and air support arrived the VC became disorganized and began to withdraw to the SE. Co C point platoon had passed through the area of contact but fought through and rejoined the main element. Sniper was high in many rubber trees in the killing zone.

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7 Nov These VC were tied or strung to the trees. Also, a small element of VC maneuvered from the highway using their way between the command group and Co D. Only one heavy machine gun (3) Cal was used, from the 5th. Co A was sent in relief. The estimated strength of the VC force was a Dn (+) with both local VC and elements of the 273d Bn. The force was accompanied by laborers of both men and women. The VC were armed with RQ-2's, RQ-40's, AK 50's, AK47's, assorted carbines, slay axes, and many grenades. They were dressed in assorted clothing with some having belt buckles with embossed stars. The whole engagement was well planned, rehearsed, and executed. The VC Bn (AC) was 66, weapons captured were 1 AK-50, 1 AK-47, 1 RQ-2, 1 C-1000 grenade, and 1 mortar with 10 rounds. The casualties were 1 US KIA (1 Vietnamese interrogator KIA) and 22 US KIA. The Dn (-) led to a closed area at approximately 2115.

- (3) 1/25 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operation to the west and south plus IDI security. at 1045H via AV782065 the Dn (-) located and destroyed 5 fishholes.
- (4) 2/12 Inf: The Dn conducted a combat extraction from field location to INUOC VII without incident.
- (5) 2/26 Inf: The Dn conducted security and local patrolling operation via Phu Loi. Two companies, Co D and Co C conducted security and patrolling operations for Phu Loi at the southern end of LOC MINH airstrip.
- (6) 6/15 Arty: The Dn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

8 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Dn conducted security and local patrolling operation at Phu Loi. Company D relieved by N/A from QUANG LOI to CAISSON VII and relieved Co D 2/33 Inf of security responsibilities. Company D became OI COI 3d Bde upon closure.

- (2) 1/26 Inf: The Dn moved from field location to new field position along Hwy 13 reverting to OI COI 3d Bde upon closure.
- (3) 1/28 Inf: The Dn conducted search and destroy operation and provided IDI security.
- (4) 2/20 Inf: The Dn (-) moved by N/A to CAISSON VI and became OI COI 3d Bde upon closure. Companies D and C security and patrolling operation at the PBI at the southern end of LOC MINH airstrip without incident.
- (5) 1/16 Inf (-): The Bn (-) relieved 1/26 Inf in place and became OI COI 1st Bde upon closure of 1/16.
- (6) 6/15 Arty: The Dn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

9 Nov (1) 1/18 Inf: The Dn conducted security and local patrolling operation at Phu Loi without incident.

- (2) 1/26 Inf: The Dn (-) conducted air assault into LZ via XU03-109, during the search and destroy operation returned to same LZ and extracted without incident.
- (3) 1/20 Inf: The Dn conducted search and destroy operations in addition to IDI security. at 0640H via AV751039 the Dn company located 2 graves with bones about 3 days old.
- (4) 2/26 Inf (-): Companies D and C conducted security and local patrolling operations via Phu Loi without incident.
- (5) 6/15 Arty: The Dn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

10 Nov (1) 1/13 Inf: The Dn conducted security and local patrolling operations via Phu Loi.

- (2) 1/16 Inf: The Dn moved from field location at LOC MINH to PBI CAISSON VII and assumed security of PBI.
- (3) 1/21 Inf: The Dn conducted search and destroy operations plus IDI security.
- (4) 2/26 Inf: The Dn (-) conducted security for PBI at LOC MINH and conducted local patrolling.
- (5) 6/15 Arty: The Dn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

11 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Dn conducted security operations via CAISSON VII.
(2) 1/18 Inf: The Dn conducted security and patrolling operations via Phu Loi.

- (3) 1/28 Inf: The Dn conducted combat extraction from field location to INUOC VII.
- (4) 2/23 Inf: The Dn (-) conducted security of PBI's via CAISSON VI and southern end of LOC MINH airstrip. Local patrolling operations were conducted in each location without incident.
- (5) 6/15 Arty: The Dn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/RCC/J3/321) (CONT'D)

- 12 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn conducted FSB security at CAISSON VII and an (-) patrolled within the Bn sector. No contact was reported.
- (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted security and patrolling operations via UNK LOI.
- (3) 1/20 Inf: The Bn was given the mission as Div RDP at 1200H, continued security and patrolling operations at THUOC VINH.
- (4) 2/20 Inf: The Bn conducted security and patrolling operations for CAISSON VI and FSB at the southern end of LOC NINH airstrip.
- (5) 6/15 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 13 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn conducted security, search and destroy operations via FSB CAISSON VII.
- (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted security and local patrolling operations via UNK LOI.
- (3) 1/20 Inf: The Bn remained Div RDP in THUOC VINH.
- (4) 2/20 Inf: The Bn conducted security and local patrolling for two FSB CAISSON VI and FSB at the southern end of LOC NINH airstrip.
- (5) 6/15 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 14 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn conducted security of FSB CAISSON VII and conducted an A/A into LZ via AT74091d. At 1103H an (-) via AT74091d made contact with 15-20 VC. LFT, arty and A/A were placed in the area of contact. US losses were neg as were VC losses.
- (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted security operations via UNK LOI and local patrolling within sector.
- (3) 2/21 Inf: The Bn conducted security operations for two FSB at CAISSON VII and LOC NINH. Local patrolling was also conducted via each FSB.
- (4) 6/15 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 15 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn conducted security for FSB CAISSON VII and conducted an A/A into LZ via AT77001 at 1155H the Bn (-) received SA fire from the village via AT701035. Arty, LFT, and A/A were placed in the area of contact. Results of contact were 2 US KIA, 2 US MIA, and unknown VC losses.
- (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted security operations via UNK LOI and local patrolling in sector.
- (3) 2/20 Inf: The Bn conducted security operations for two FSB at CAISSON VI and LOC NINH. Local security patrol was also conducted in vic each FSB.
- (4) 6/15 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 16 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn (-) moved from an LOC to UNK LOI by N/1. Company C remained as FSB security at an LOC.
- (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn continued to conduct security operations via UNK LOI and conducted local patrols.
- (3) 2/20 Inf: The Bn conducted security for FSB's at LOC NINH and CAISSON VI. Company B moved from LOC NINH to LAI KHE. Company C conducted local patrolling and security operations at FSB at LOC NINH.
- (4) 6/15 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 17 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn (-) prepared for future operations. Company C provided security and local patrolling operations for FSB CAISSON VII.
- (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted security and patrolling operation at UNK LOI.
- (3) 2/23 Inf: The Bn (-) conducted security and patrolling operation for FSB's CAISSON VI and LOC NINH. Company D conducted search and destroy operations west of LOC NINH.
- (4) 6/15 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

- 18 Nov (1) 1/16 Inf: The Bn conducted relief in place relieving 2/20 Inf (-) at CAISSON VI. With the relief, the Bn assumed control of CAISSON VI FSB and security.
- (2) 1/18 Inf: The Bn conducted search and destroy operations plus base camp security at UNK LOI.
- (3) 2/21 Inf: The Bn (-) moved from its field location to LAI KHE by N/1 commencing at 0700H. Company B continued security and patrolling operations at LOC NINH.
- (4) 6/15 arty: The Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations.

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|------|---|-------------|
| | 7.62mm | 300 |
| | 9mm | 354 |
| | 30 cal | 100 |
| | M4-47 | 450 |
| | 82mm mortar | 65 |
| | 12.7mm | 106 |
| | 5.56mm | 320 |
| (3) | Ammunition (miscellaneous) | |
| | Fuse (boxes) | 24 |
| | Det Cans (boxes) | 4 |
| | Fuze plug | 14 |
| | M.O. booster | -2 |
| | 82mm mortar Charges | 10 |
| | Fuses, 82mm mortar | 12 |
| | Detonator Charge | 1 |
| (4) | Fortifications | |
| | bunkers | 1,005 |
| | Fighting positions | 195 |
| | Funji pits | 1 |
| | Spider Holes | 16 |
| | Potholes | 61 |
| | Franco shelters | 96 |
| | Tunnels | 27 |
| | walls | 4 |
| | military structures | 169 |
| | Trench | 3,000m |
| (5) | rice and salt | |
| | rice | 149,601 lbs |
| | salt | 87,300 lbs |
| (6) | Mines and Grenades | |
| | mines | 38 |
| | Grenades | 145 |
| (7) | CS Gns | |
| | liquid | 100 gal |
| | powder | 125 lbs |
| (8) | Vehicles | 24 |
| (9) | Miscellaneous medical supplies | |
| | Gauze | 24 lbs |
| | sponges | 1,000 |
| | medicine vials (filled) | 1,000 |
| | alcohol swabs | 2 qts |
| | Thermometers | 12 |
| | Circular discs | 1600 |
| | pill containers (filled) | 2 |
| | assorted medicines | unk amount |
| (10) | Miscellaneous Clothing supplies | |
| | ponchos | 13 |
| | sandals | 10,002 pr |
| | salt | 3 |
| | black oil suits | 21 |
| | jungle hats | 1 pr |
| | fatigues shirts | 1 |
| (11) | Miscellaneous Items of Equipment and Supplies | |
| | None | |

10. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Administrative matters:

(1) Supply:

(a) Class I: No major problems were encountered during this operation. A resupply element was placed on increasing amount of supplies and beverages base for use by combat element. The delivery time of potable ice was not compatible with food preparation and resupply to forward elements by aircraft. Many times ice would arrive late in the afternoon hours after the last resupply convoy had left the log base, and resupply aircraft had completed all resupply missions. A morning delivery time would have been more suitable.

b. Class II and IV: Most of resupply was normal; delays, donut and clothing equipment were in short supply.

c. Class III: No problems encountered.

d. Class V: More lighting should be placed on the ammo resupply for helicopter fire teams. It was noted that work order has been submitted.

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(2) Methods of Resupply: Rotary wing was the primary method during this operation. Fixed wing was used to resupply the base areas and rotary wing was used to the forward locations.

(3) Maintenance:

- (1) 701st Maint, provided excellent support throughout the operation.
- (2) Direct support and attached units, often did not bring their fill to the field. This results in unnecessary and off-times unreasonable demands on the supporting elements.

(4) Medical: Medical reaction from C and D Co's 1st Med Bn were prompt and adequate. Two problems in this field are still prevalent.

- (1) Initial request for dustoff often arrives with a priority of urgent, although in many cases the nature of the wound is really very minor. Medically trained personnel, if available, should determine the priority of a dusted off aircraft.
- (2) "Slick" aircraft often hunt a dustoff aircraft to the scene of a pick-up. In most cases the dustoff is never more than 10 minutes behind and the result of a wounded man being moved by untrained personnel and being deprived of emergency medical treatment available aboard dustoff aircraft could be fatal.

(5) Communications:

- (1) Communications are adequate during the operation, although the 1st Lt Col experienced considerable radio interference with FM voice, this did not hinder the operation.

f. General Comments: During this operation, the 1st Div at one time had OPOC on over 70% of the Division units without having the benefit of the logistical support of the 1st Log Command. The 1st Div S&T Bn did an outstanding job but was sorely taxed.

11. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. The 1st Div applies a well known but little used technique of "the false insertion into a likely LZ". The LZ was prepared as any normal LZ, however the lift ships were not filled with troops.

b. The 1st Div moved battalions from one HLF to another numerous times with few problems.

12. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Conclusions: The mission to search out and destroy the 701st NVA Regiment was accomplished within the first three weeks of the operation. An extensive amount of terrain was aggressively searched despite several meeting engagements. This aggressive action during OIB - TIOB, S&T Bn II disrupted and ended VC/NVA operations in the area covered by OIB - TIOB S&T Bn II.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Ambush patrols require special coordination in areas where contact with a large enemy force is anticipated. If an ambush patrol engages the enemy and sustains casualties, or if a man gets separated from his patrol, the enemy encountered routing all personnel back to the HLF often prevents effective use of air and artillery support. If a contact occurs between an ambush site and the HLF, withdrawing the ambush patrol into the HLF through the enemy positions becomes most difficult. If the ambush is allowed to remain in position, it limits the areas for employment of air and artillery support. Ambush patrols should be kept relatively close to HLF when known enemy forces are in an area, should not be sent further than 500 meters from an HLF and must be so sited that they can be withdrawn quickly with little adverse effect on HLF defensive fires.

(2) Intensive BBI fires 100 to 1000 meters in front of the HLF keeps the VC harassing actions to a minimum at night.

(3) Defensive fires must be fired prior to 1800 hours to prevent delaying ambush patrols and aid in better control of the adjustment of fire.

(4) During a round attack on night defensive positions, signal mortars may be employed most effectively at short range with zero charge.

(5) White Phosphorous grenades used for marking targets for air strikes close to friendly troops, are much more effective than white smoke grenades. White phosphorous burns longer, rises faster through a jungle canopy for a FAC to see, and is more easily identified by ground troops if the mark is too close to them.

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (HHCV/AC/33/321) (CONT'D)

(c) A system of instantaneous "on-off" reconnaissance by fire is necessary for each company and unit in jungle operations. Such a system will enable a commander to determine if return fire is being received. If precise controls are not used it is nearly impossible to determine enemy fire from friendly fire, unless the company is receiving casualties:

13. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: OPERATION SHENANDOAH II followed the planning schedule as envisioned by the Division Commander. The 1st Airborne Division's five AVN Regts. Two of the Regts engaged by the 1st Airborne were rendered combat ineffective (271st and 273rd AVN Regts). Heavy casualties were inflicted upon the 272nd, 25th and 212th AVN Regts. The mission of finding and destroying the enemy was successfully accomplished.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Michael D. Kahlert
MICHAEL D. KAHLERT
Major, Armor
adjutant

Group 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR: 5200.10 applies

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3d BRIGADE AND LAI KHE BASE
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

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AVDB-NS-C

7 December 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report

FROM: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

TO: Commander
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO 96243

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation SHENANDOAH II; search and destroy.
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 300700 September 1967 to 30 October 1967.

3. GENERAL: Command Headquarters 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Shennandoah North; and 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division Shennandoah South. 1st Inf Div OPORD 19-67 (Opn SHENANDOAH II) (U); 3d Brigade, 1st Inf Div OPORD 21-67 (Opn SHENANDOAH II) (U).

The 3d Brigade plan was to employ one mechanized infantry battalion (-) with engineer elements to clear and accomplish limited repairs on Rte 240 from Ben Cat (XT751330) to vic XT653494 commencing on 30 September 1967; employ one infantry battalion (-) to secure FSB LORRAINE I (XT700433) on 1 Oct 67, and employ both infantry battalions in search and destroy operations in assigned AO's; and to destroy VC/NVA units and installations within the operational area, commencing on 1 Oct 67.

- a. Reporting Officers: Colonel Frank E. Blasey
- b. Task Organizations:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade, Colonel Frank E. Blasey, CO
1-16 Infantry: LTC Calvert P. Benedict, CO
1-26 Infantry: LTC Arthur D. Stigall
2-2 Inf (Mech): LTC Maj Harry Mavisson, CO
2-2C Infantry: LTC Terry Del. Allen - Maj Louis Manotroy, CO
2-33 Artillery: LTC Arthur D. Wells, CO

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence prior to the operation: The area of interest covers approximately 1254 sq km and is bounded by the following coordinates: XT5032 - XT5070 XE3370 - XE3332. Prominent terrain features are the Song Saigon, which forms an arc N-S along the western border of the area, and the Thi Tinh stream, which together with smaller streams feeding it, dominates the central portion of the area. A very large part of the area is covered by plantations, the largest being the Michelin which is located in the west. There are sizeable rice land strips along the Song Saigon, the Thi Tinh, and other streams. The area is generally flat with relief under 60M. Aside from the cultivated land mentioned, the area is covered mainly with secondary forests and a few patches of bamboo. The main roads in the area are QV13, a primary road running N-S along the eastern edge, and Routes 239 and 240, both secondary roads. Together these three roads connect the main population centers -

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Ban Cat, Lai Khe, Chon Thanh, and the Michelin Plantation. There are numerous VC installations throughout the area.

b. There have recently been numerous reported VC unit sightings in the area of interest. An evaluation of material on hand shows the followings

VC Units Probably in the Area

| <u>Unit</u> | <u>Est. Strength</u> |
|--------------------------|----------------------|
| 165 NVA Regt | 1700 |
| 271 VC Regt | 1600 |
| Phu Loi Bn | 450 |
| 064 Dem Tdong Dist Co | 80 |
| 045 Chon Thanh Dist Plat | 30 |

VC Units Possibly in the Area

| <u>Unit</u> | <u>Est. Strength</u> |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Elements 101 NVA Regt | 1800 (Regt) |

(1) The units listed as probably in the area of interest are those whose operational areas are believed to include the area of interest and whose present locations based on OB holdings fall within the area.

(2) Units listed as possible in the area are known to operate at times within the area and have recently been reported to be in the area, but are currently placed outside the area by OB holdings.

c. The most serious threats to Division operations in the area are the 165th NVA Regt, the 271st VC Regt, and unlocated elements of the 7th NV. Division. These units could receive combat support from the 69th Arty Regt and possibly the 84 Arty Regt; they could receive logistical support from the 83d Rear Services Group.

d. Reinforcements would most likely come from the 101st NVA Regt and the 273d VC Regt, both of which could possibly reinforce within 24-48 hours. Further support could come from the Phu Loi Bn and the Local Forces companies located within the area. Guerrilla activity in the form of mines, sniper fire, booby-traps and other such tactics could be expected throughout the area.

e. During the operation there was one significant contact made with the enemy on 30 October by 1-10 Infantry at Loc Ninh. A total of 96 VC KIA (DC) and 72 VC KIA (POSS). On 31 October continuing operations in the Loc Ninh area came under OPCON of 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div. Along Hwy 240 in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone there were numerous small harassing attacks, as usual one to five VC would remain near a base camp or supply area in an effort to delay advancing forces. Many rice caches were located (15 in all) with the larger ones found by D 2-20 Infantry 3 October at XT701-451, D 1-16 Infantry 11 October at XT684461, and A 1-16 Infantry 16 October at XT697-465. A large base camp/supply area was discovered 24 October by 1-26 Infantry at XT649457. The base camp was over 200M wide and estimated to be capable of holding a company size force or larger. On 25 October D 2-2 Infantry located a mine factory at XT660442 which contained over 200 hand grenades, 300 rds of assorted small arms, several claymore mines, and miscellaneous equipment. The area around this site had been heavily booby trapped with hand grenades. In addition the VC conducted an unexpected daylight mortar attack on 29 October at 1405 hours against FSB LORRAINE I XT703442. Approximately 4040 rounds of 60mm mortar was received but all rounds landed over 100M short of the FSB with no friendly casualties.

f. Weather throughout the operation was hot and humid with scattered rain showers or thunder storms in the late afternoon and early evening. At no time, however, did the weather hamper ground operations.

5. MISSION: 3d Brigade clears Route 240 and jungle area 100 meters to flanks of road from Ban Cat (XT742331) to vic XT653494 commencing on 30 Sept 67. Locations

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and destroys VC/NVA units and installations in AO Shenandoah II South commencing 1 Oct 67, secures PSPD LORRAINE I, 1 Oct 67.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Manuever: 3d Brigade employs 2-2 Infantry (Moch) (-) with C/1 Engr Bn to clear and accomplish limited repairs of Rte 240 from Pen Cat (XT742331) to vic XT653494; conducts airborne assault into LZ Coliath (XT701444) with 1-16 Inf moving SE to secure PSPD LORRAINE I (XT712431); and conducts airborne assault with 2-2C Inf into LZ David (XT713454).

b. Fire Support: Artillery fire support will be as follows:
DS 3d Brigade

(1) A Btry (105), 2-33 Arty

(2) B Btry (105), 2-33 Arty

(3) C Btry (105), 2-33 Arty

(4) D Btry (4.2), 2-33 Arty

OS 3d Brigade

(5) C Btry (155), 1-6 Arty

(6) D Btry (6th), 1-6 Arty

7. EXECUTION:

30 September 1967 - The 3d Brigade initiated operation SHENANDOAH II. 2-2 Inf (Moch) (-) plus elements of the 1st Engr Bn moved to vic XT725356 and commenced S&D, jungle clearing, and road repair ops. There was no significant enemy contact during the initial stages of the operation.

1 October 1967 - 2-2 Inf (Moch) Bn (-) and elements of 1st Engr Bn conducted S & D, jungle clearing and road repair along Rte 240 vic XT725355. During the day elements of the 1st Engr Bn located and destroyed at XT721370, XT720369, and XT721371 1 each AT mine. At 1270 hrs B 1st Engr vic XT736355 located and destroyed a booby-trapped LC⁴ rd. Engr's cleared 160 acres. 1-16 Inf Bn conducted 4/4 vic XT70144 and established PSPD LORRAINE I (XT710932).

2 October 1967 - 2-2C Inf Bn conducted an air assault vic XT715485. At 1235 hrs vic XT710481 B Co located 5 tons of unpolished rice. Airstrikes vic XT710481 and XT676432 destroyed 6 bunkers. At 0605 hrs vic XT718393 a rope plow hit a mine causing no damage or casualties. At 0645 hrs 1-16 Inf Co A vic XT713449 located and destroyed 30 spider holes, 1 bunker and 2 huts. At 1156 hrs vic XT692437 1-16 Inf Co D located an active base camp. LFT and arty supported, results were 2 US WMA and 19 VC suspects. 70 acres were cleared.

3 October 1967 - At 0645 hrs vic XT718344 1st Engr's destroyed 1 booby-trapped 105mm rd and 1 CUU. At 1225 hrs 1-16 Inf Co A vic XT735466 destroyed 2 bunkers. At 1315 hrs 1-16 Inf Co C destroyed 3 bunkers, cooking utensils, 20 lbs of sugar, 4 booby-trapped CUU's and 1 CS and 1 smoke grenade vic XT727433. At 1150 hrs an AO vic XT669414 received 1 rd S/A fire. arty, fired into areas resulting in 1 VC KIA (DC), 5 structures destroyed and 4 water buffalo killed. At 1845 hrs, 1-16 Inf recon vic XT704445 made contact with 4 VC. Results were 1 VC KIA (DC) and no US casualties. The VC KIA had a complete set of web gear, 3 M47 magazines, and 300 rds of ammo. Airstrikes vic XT664415, XT673474, XT682440, and XT664469 destroyed 12 bunkers and 3 fighting positions. 20 acres were cleared.

4 October 1967 - 2-2C Inf Bn conducted S & D ops and then was recontacted to L-1 Rte and assumed the Division RRF mission. At 0930 hrs 1st Engr Co C vic XT716395 destroyed 1 AP mine. At 0900 hrs 1-16 Inf Co A vic XT704445 found 1 tunnel, 1 M47, and a waterproof bag of food. 95 acres were cleared.

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5 October 1967 - At 0615 hrs, 1 Chicou Noi turned himself into 3d Ddo CI Team. At 1730 hrs via XT692455 an M0 roc'd ground fire. Arty fired resulting in 1 VC KIA (EC) and 1 secondary explosion. At 1124 hrs 1st Engr Co C destroyed 2 CLU's and 105mm dud. At 0635 hrs 1-16 Inf Co C moved to new NDP via XT690437. At 1205 hrs 1-16 Inf Co C via XT690437 roc'd 12 M79 rds and 100 rds S/A fired, LFT, arty and 2 airstrikes supported. At 1430 hrs 1-16 Inf Co C via XT693443 destroyed 1 hut and 500 lbs rice. 100 acres were cleared.

6 October 1967 - At 0653 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) AFC via XT707435 hit a mine causing 6 WHA. At 0905 hrs, 2-2 Inf (Mech) B Co via XT737363 took 3 VC under fire. Search of area resulted in 7 huts, 6 bunkers, 1 trip flare, 1 chicon grenade and 5 CSU's destroyed. At 1655 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) C Co via XT712202 destroyed 1 M16 rifle. At 0804 hrs 1-16 Inf C Co via XT693432 roc'd 50 rds S/A fire. At 0942 hrs, 1-16 Inf D Co via XT699416 found 1 M16 rifle and destroyed 350 lbs of rice. At 2045 hrs, 1-16 Inf C via XT740454 roc'd 20 rds S/A fire resulting in 1 US WHA.

7 October 1967 - At 0655 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) D Co via XT730356 destroyed 5 bunkers, 4 booby-trapped CLU's and evacuated 1 M16 rifle. 1-16 Inf En (-) conducted 8 & D ops and established new NDP via XT691454.

8 October 1967 - At 1215 hrs a rallier with a Russian rifle turned himself into 3d Ddo MF's. At 0840 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) via XT713399 had 2 AFC's hit mines causing 2 WHA. At 1015 hrs XT716395 2-2 Inf (Mech) C Co destroyed 3 bunkers. At 1358 hrs, 2-2 Inf (Mech) D Co via XT737350 detained 4 suspects. At 0750 hrs, 1-16 Inf found 1 Chinese carbine and 6 rds of ammo. At 1400 hrs, 1-16 Inf C Co destroyed 1 hut and 1500 lbs of rice, 50 acres were cleared.

9 October 1967 - At 1730 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) via XT713420 destroyed 2 M16 rifles. At 1330 hrs 1st Engr destroyed 1 foxhole and 1 chicono claymore. 75 acres were cleared.

10 October 1967 - At 1000 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) E Co via XT697463 destroyed 1 booby-trapped 105 rd. At 1623 hrs, 2-2 Inf (Mech) D Co via XT695465 destroyed 1 M16 mine. At 1050 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) D Co via XT728416 destroyed 1 bunker and found 1 homemade rifle. At 0740 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) D Co via XT703446 destroyed 1 155 rd. At 0850 hrs, 2-2 D Co via XT699459 destroyed 2 CLU's. At 0815 hrs 1-16 Inf A Co via XT677486 roc'd 4-5 rds sniper fire. Arty supported. At 0930 hrs 1-16 A Co via XT670485 was hit by 2 claymores causing 2 US WHA. Arty and mortars supported. At 1300 hrs, 1-16 Inf Recon via XT670481 roc'd sniper fire causing 1 US WHA. Arty supported.

11 October 1967 - At 1047 hrs 2-2 Inf (Mech) E Co via XT702419 destroyed 1 bunker containing 9 desks. At 1155 hrs via XT669479 an AFC was hit by a command detonated claymore causing 4 WHA. At 1640 hrs via XT67428 Recon destroyed 25 bunkers & 4 chickens, 4 women and 15 children were held for interrogation.

12 October 1967 - At 0847 hrs via XT701634, 2-2 Inf (Mech) C Co destroyed 1 booby-trapped grenade. At 0900 hrs D Co via XT709417 destroyed 1 booby-trapped CLU. At 0730 hrs, Recon via XT665420 destroyed 12 military structures, 1 wall, 1 chicon grenade, 2 ox carts, 1 bicycle, and 1 meat grinder. At 1227 hrs, Co C 1st Engr via XT711403 destroyed 7 CLU's. At 2135 hrs via XT712512 2-2 Inf (Mech) E Co made contact with 6 VC. Small arms and automatic weapons, claymores and a LFT supported. Contact broken at 2203 hrs with no US CAS, and VC Cas unknown. At 0915 hrs, 1-16 Inf D Co fired at 6 VC. Arty & LFT supported, results unknown. At 0953 hrs 1-16 Inf C Co via XT665491 destroyed 6 booby-trapped grenades. At 1230 hrs via XT675480 1-16 Inf outpost roc'd S/A fire. Outpost fired S/A & claymores and arty supported. Results were unknown. At 1530 hrs via XT665487, 1-16 Inf Co C destroyed 9 bunkers, 6 Chinese claymores & 24 grenades. At 1735 hrs, 1-16 Inf found via XT663946 3 military structures. Which a LFT destroyed. 75 acres were cleared.

13 October 1967 - Airstrikes via XT665395, XT640483, XT660471 and XT667472 destroyed a total of 23 bunkers. At 1130 hrs via XT703417, 2-2 Inf (Mech) C Co destroyed 3 bunkers, 5 lbs of food, cooking utensils, & 1 bicycle. At 1152 hrs, 2-2 Inf (Mech) Co B via XT667452 roc'd sniper fire causing 1 WHA. Fire was returned, results unknown. At 1405 hrs via XT665453 2-2 Inf (Mech) Co B destroyed 5 bicycles. At 1455 hrs via XT695414 2-2 Inf (Mech) Co C destroyed 2 huts & 200 lbs of rice. At 1230 hrs via XT677437 a 5 ton truck from 1st Engr En hit a mine causing 2 WHA. At 0704 hrs 1-16

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Inf C Co conducted an \sqrt{a} into LZ via XT653462. At 1010 hrs via XT657469 C Co rec'd S/A and claymore fire, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 WIA. Fire was returned with S/A and A/W and arty and LFT supported, contact broken at 1045 hrs. At 1125 hrs C Co moved back into area and rec'd fire again resulting in 4 KIA and 2 WIA. Fire was returned and T/C air, arty and LFT supported. Contact broken at 1325 hrs. At 1523 hrs C Co again moved back into the area and rec'd fire again. T/C air and arty supported; contact broken at 1700 hrs. At 1613 hrs, 1-16 Inf D Co moved R/W from LORRAINE II to LZ via XT653466 and established an NDF with C Co. At 1645 hrs Co A moved from Lai Khe to LORRAINE II.

14 October 1967 - Airstrikes via XT664474, XT653470 and XT640463 destroyed a total of 11 bunkers. At 1040 hrs via XT600477 an ATC from C Co 2-2 Inf (Moch) hit an anti-personnel mine causing 2 WIA. 1-16 Inf D Co moved from field positions to Lai Khe.

15 October 1967 - Airstrikes via XT650465 and XT656465 destroyed a total of 7 bunkers. At 0920 hrs via XT712403 2-2 Inf (Moch) C Co destroyed 3 AP mines. At 1450 hrs via XT604394 C Co destroyed 1 ox cart, 1 hut, 200 lbs of rice, and 5 CBU's. At 1602 hrs via XT600399, 2-2 Inf (Moch) C Co rec'd 10 rds S/A fire. Fire was returned and results are unknown. 65 acres were cleared.

16 October 1967 - At 1050 hrs via XT773363 Co B 2-2 Inf (Moch) destroyed a 20 lb shape charge. At 0955 hrs, Co A 1-16 Inf destroyed 1 hut, and 2 tons of rice. 1-16 Inf extracted from field location to Lai Khe and became Division RRF.

17 October 1967 - Co D 1-16 Inf moved from Lai Khe to reinforce 2-2C Inf via XT605506. 1-26 Inf Co B conducted an \sqrt{a} via XT609940. At 0930 hrs D Co destroyed 2 punji pits via XT613940. At 0950 hrs, 1-16 Inf Co D destroyed 4 spider holes and 1 bunker via XU157063. At 1135 hrs via XU146095, 1-16 Co D rec'd A/W fire resulting in 1 WIA.

18 October 1967 - The 3d Dde continues ops at Lai Khe, Quan Loi and Song Do. 1-26 Inf continued security, patrolling and S & D ops at Quan Loi without incident. 1-16 Inf continued security patrolling and S & D ops at Song Do without incident. 2-2C Inf conducted training and ops at Lai Khe without incident.

19 October 1967 - 1-16 Inf continued security, patrolling and S & D ops at Song Do without incident. 1-26 Inf Co D destroyed via XT621930 12 huts and found 2 VC bodies. 2-2C Inf conducted ops at Lai Khe without incident.

20 October 1967 - 1-26 Inf continued security, patrolling, and S & D ops at Quan Loi. At 0425 hrs via XT790097 Co C located a French hospital. One individual without an ID card was detained. 1-16 Inf continued security, patrolling and S & D ops at Song Do without incident. 2-2C Inf conducted training and ops at Lai Khe without incident.

21 October 1967 - At 1741 hrs Tong Lu Chon received approximately 30 mortar rds, arty & 2 LFT's supported. At 2000 hrs again received mortars and also S/A fire. Arty and LFT supported. At 2045 hrs via XT784175 VC detonated an \sqrt{a} device against an NP outpost. Results 1 US WIA. At 1110 hrs 1-16 Inf Co D received 2 sniper rds. Fire was returned with unknown results.

22 October 1967 - 1-26 Inf continued security, patrolling and S & D ops at Quan Loi without incident. B Co 1-26 Inf moved from Quan Loi to Lai Khe. 1-16 Inf continued security, patrolling and S & D ops at Song Do without incident. 2-2C Inf conducted ops at Lai Khe without incident. Co C 2-2C Inf moved from Lai Khe to Quan Loi.

23 October 1967 - The Shenandoah operational area was divided between the 1st Dde and the 3d Dde. The 3d Dde assumed responsibility for Shenandoah II S. Airstrikes via XT700449 destroyed 2 bunkers. 2-2 Inf (Moch) destroyed 6 anti-personnel mines. 1-26 Inf moved by R/W from Quan Loi to Chon Tinh and conducted an \sqrt{a} via XT653462. D Co moved by R/W from Lai Khe to LORRAINE I (XT713442). 2-2C Inf Dn moved by R/W from Lai Khe to Quan Loi. B Co, 2-16 Inf became OPCON 3d Dde at 1124 hrs and assumed security of a portion of Lai Khe perimeter.

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24 October 1967 - Airstrikes via XT653460, XT750456 and XT650456 destroyed 22 bunkers and 1 hut. At 1224 hrs via XT649450 Co 1-26 Inf received sniper fire. Fire was returned and T&C air, arty and LFT supported. Results were 1 KIA and 2 WIA. At 1420 hrs Co received 2 claymores with negative casualties. T&C air and arty supported.

25 October 1967 - Airstrikes via XT647450, XT651450, XT641467 and XT642449 destroyed a total of 20 bunkers. At 1045 hrs D Co 2-2 Inf (Mech) via XT669492 found 100 booby-trapped grenades, 2 claymores, 300 rds 7.62mm and 2 pigs. At 1526 hrs via XT648450 Co C 1-26 Inf destroyed 3000 lbs of rice, 4 75mm rds, 1 claymore, 4 RFG rds, 1200 lbs sugar, 15 lbs salt, 15 canteens, 8 cooking pots & 35 sets OD fatigues. They evacuated 2 night light sets, 1 magazine for Russian rifle, 3 lbs documents, 8 gas masks, 1 compass case, 1 mortar carrying case and 1 mortar aiming stake.

26 October 1967 - 1-10 Inf continued security patrolling and S & D ops at Song Do. At 1045 hrs D Co 1-10 Inf via XU121047 received 2 rds sniper fire. Fire was returned and area was checked with negative results. 1-26 Inf 1 Co via XT650462 found and destroyed 6 bunkers with overhead cover. At 1520 hrs D 1-26 via XT642469 found and destroyed 4 bunker with overhead cover. At 1400 hrs via XT657499 an MC from 2-2 Inf (Mech) hit a small AF mine causing no damage or casualties. 2-2 Inf conducted operations at Quan Loi. At 1150 hrs A Co via XT67099 found 1 booby-trapped claymore. BOD team destroyed.

27 October 1967 - At 0155 hrs L-1 (Ho) base camp came under mortar attack. Lai Kho received 12 62mm mortar rds causing 1 KIA and 11 WIA. Counterattacks commenced at 0156 and a LFT and a Spooky supported. Airstrikes via XT645455, XT627464, and XT709460 destroyed a total of 20 bunkers and 7 fighting positions. At 1045 hrs via XT663401 Co D 2-2 Inf (Mech) located and destroyed 4 chicon grenades. At 1335 hrs, via XT644454 D Co 2-2 Inf (Mech) received S/A and rifle grenades from 3-4 VC causing 2 WIA. Fire was returned and airstrikes, arty, and a LFT supported. At 1311 hrs via XT650457 C Co 1-26 Inf located and destroyed 5 60mm rds. At 1132 hrs via XT665456 D Co 1-26 Inf located and destroyed 2 huts, 3 bunkers and 2 bicycles. At 0040 hrs 1-10 Inf began receiving incoming 60 mm and 82 mm mortar rds. Contact broke 0200 hrs and a total of 65 rds were received causing no casualties.

28 October 1967 - At 1008 hrs, 1-10 Inf conducted a F/W move from Song Do to Lai Kho closing at 1010 hrs. At 1116 hrs, 1-26 Inf (M) began F/W movement from field positions to Phuoc Vinh and became OFCON 1st Bde. At 1217 hrs, via XT692466 2-2 Inf (Mech) recon found and destroyed 1 AF mine. At 1229 hrs D Co 2-2 Inf (Mech) via XT705403 received a burst of F/W fire causing 2 WIA. Fire was returned with 50 Cal and a LFT was employed.

29 October 1967 - 1-10 Inf at 0634 hrs the En moved from Lai Kho to Quan Loi and at 0950 hrs conducted an A/W via XU69696 in reaction to VC attack on Loc Minh. At 1200 hrs Dn via XU69695 made contact with a VC company. Contact was broke at 1302 hrs. US casualties were 1 KIA and 9 WIA. VC casualties were 12 VC KIA (BC) and 10 VC KIA (POSS). 1 lb of documents, 4 chicon rifles, 2 RFG-2 launchers, 2 AK47's, 1 US BAR, 3 US carbines were captured. 1-26 Inf B Co moved to 2730000 and set up a FSB with A/6-10 C/1-7 arty. At 1100 hrs via XT711454 D/1-4 Co v LFT engaged 4 VC resulting in 3 VC KIA (POSS). 1-26 Inf (-) moved from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi and B Co moved from LOC MINH I to Quan Loi. Dn became OFCON 31 Bde. 1-26 Inf Dn moved from Phuoc Vinh to Quan Loi. 2-2 Inf (Mech) closed FSB LOC MINH I & II and moved to Lai Kho. 2-16 Inf D Co moved from Lai Kho to D1 (in an) because OFCON 2d Bde.

30 October 1967 - At 0437 hrs via XU697103 an LF from 1-10 Inf employed an ambush. Search of area resulted in 1 VC KIA (BC) and 1 litter. At 0940 hrs via XU709103 D/1-10 Inf found 1 VC KIA, 2 RFG & 2 litters. At 1010 hrs via XU701109 D found 2 M-1 rifles and 1 Bangalore torpedo. At 1230 hrs via XT655094 C/1-10 Inf made contact with a VC company. Co A and 1 CIDG Co moved to reinforce. 7 airstrikes, arty and LFT's supported, contact was broken at 1555 hrs. US casualties were 4 KIA and 5 WIA. VC losses were 96 KIA (BC) and 72 KIA (POSS). Items captured were 15 AK47's, 5 types line, 3 30 cal BAR, 1 chicon type 56 carbino, 2 US 30 cal carbines, 4 M1 rocket launchers, 12 RFG rds, 700 7.62 rds, 3 anti-tank grenades, 35 hand grenades, claymores and 4 bill folders containing documents. At 1700 hrs 1st Bde

summed GROUP of their TROJ and OPOW of Gama Kot, Dicho North and Lot Rush areas. At this time SERRAJODJE II ended for the 3d Brigade.

8. ARTILLERY FORCES:

a. ARTILLERY: The operation was supported by the 2-33 Artillery Battalion in direct support consisting of the following units: G/2-33 Art'y, A/2-33 Art'y, B/2-33 Art'y, I PLV/2-33 Art'y, D/2-33 Art'y, C/7-9 Art'y, C/8-6 Art'y, D/8-6 Art'y, A/8-6 Art'y (ORG)/ Artillery fires were placed on all LG's during the operation. Artillery fires were extensively used in support of ground forces. A total of 25,903 105mm rds; 13,572 155 mm rds, 6,976 8" rds and 13,345 4.2" rds were fired.

b. Air Forces: The Air Force provided aerial observation and reconnaissance throughout the operation. Air Force ordnance was used in preparation of LZ's and in support of ground forces. A total of 217 close air support sorties were flown in conjunction with the operation.

9. REMARKS:

a. Personnel Losses:

(1) US Losses: 14 KIA, 32 WIA

(2) VC Losses: 92 KIA (DC), 72 KIA (POB), 30 detainees, 1 Ocala Kot.

b. Equipment Losses:

(1) US Losses: 2 AFV's damaged

(2) VC Losses:

(a) Weapons:

7 Anti Tank Missiles
26 CMO's
3 105 mm rds
1 155 mm rd
3/0 Grenades
10 AP rds
3 anti-tank Grenades
16 AK47's
1 CS Grenade
1 M-14
1 M-16
1 Homemade rifle
3 30 cal LAR's
2 Chinese (56) carbines
2 US X cal carbines
4 D-41 rocket launchers
2C Claymores
8 Type 56 LMO

(b) Ammunition:

1000 Rds 7.62mm
300 Rds AK47
75 Rds 5.56 (M-16)
24 RPO M1's

(c) Equipment:

5 Ox carts
9 bicycles
1 wall
9 Dushs
1 Motor Generator
1 Set Work Gear
1 Trip Flare
1 Backpack Green
15 Canteens

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- 1 Box Det Cord
- 3 AK47's magazines
- 8 Cooking Pots
- 2 Night Lite Sets
- 8 Gas Masks
- 1 Compress Case
- 1 Mortar Case
- 1 Mortar Aiming Stake

(d) Explosives:

- 21,550 lbs Rice Evacuated
- 73,715 lbs Rice Destroyed
- 1,220 lbs Sugar
- 12 Chickens
- 5 lbs Miscellaneous Food
- 3 Figs
- 15 lbs Salt

(e) Fortifications:

- 4 Fighting Positions
- 50 Military Structures
- 54 Spider Holes
- 166 bunkers

(f) Miscellaneous:

- 4 Water Buffalo
- 2 Anti Fits
- 4 Pillboxes
- 35 Sets of Fatigues
- 3 lbs of Documents

c. There was 981 acres of jungle cleared during the operation.

10. ADMINISTRATIVE:

a. Supply: Resupply was conducted by air. No supply problems were encountered.

b. Maintenance: Some plows required a great deal of extra maintenance. Recurring problems were hydraulic lines and radiator punctures and the fact that the radiators needed to be blown out daily with an air compressor.

c. Treatment of Casualties; Evacuation and Hospitalization: No unusual problems were encountered with medical evacuation or treatment of the wounded.

d. Transportation: No major transportation problems were encountered during the operation.

11. SPECIAL TECHNIQUE AND TECHNIQUES: Some plows use a picture frame method of cutting. A large rectangular path is cut first then each succeeding rectangle gets smaller until the entire rectangle has been cut. Some plows can clear 4 times as much as a regular dozer due to the fact the Rome plows actually cut trees down instead of knocking them over.

12. CONCLUSIONS AND ANALYSIS:

a. Indications point to the fact that the over-all operation succeeded in temporarily disrupting the operations of the 8th Rear Services group, especially in the area of food supplies considering that 48 tons of rice were captured or destroyed.

b. The rice paddy areas along the Song Saigon, Thi Tinh stream and the smaller streams feeding it continued to be cultivated and harvested, by suspected VC. Although few personnel were sighted in the area, indications of this activity were continually present. A request for crop destruction of the rice in the Song Saigon - Thi Tinh River area was approved. Crop destruction of a large percentage of the rice in the area was accomplished in mid-November. However this area continued to be a lucrative VC rice supply source.

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c. It is strongly recommended that every avenue be investigated for the future crop destruction/CS contamination of this main VC rice supply source and that consideration be given to conducting S & D operations along the foliage bordering these areas.

d. The same plow effort, though difficult in some areas due to the marshy nature of the terrain, succeeded in pushing the jungle back from route 240 approximately 100 meters in both directions over 90% of its length in the Iron Brigade AO as well as considerably improving FSP's Lorraine I and Lorraine II. As a bonus to this effort, two additional unmaned FSP locations were prepared for future operations via XI 674 449 and XI 666 049.

e. The contact involving Company B 1-16 Inf on 19 October 1967 reemphasized the value of maintaining a local RIF capable of deploying immediately. The ability of Company D 1-16 Inf to rapidly deploy in to the vicinity of the FB to secure it for the withdrawal of Company C was a key factor to their security. They were on the ground in less than one hour after the order was given for their employment.

f. It was well established by both 1-16 Inf and 1-26 Inf elements which encountered base camps that VC bunker construction renders them safe from anything except a direct hit by an air-delivered delay fuse bomb or 155 mm artillery or larger with a delay fuse. Any other type support, ie, less than 155 mm artillery or LZ is ineffective. The only sure method of destruction of a complete base camp is with shaped charges set by troops on the ground.

g. Evacuation of rice from an enemy base or storage area located in triple canopy jungle is difficult. Three primary methods were used by the Iron Brigade for extraction of VC rice during Operation Shonmindeok II.

(1) If a vehicle could reach the storage area it moved the rice to a pickup zone for evacuation by R/W aircraft.

(2) If the trees in the area were of medium height or shorter a sling extension was used to reach through the trees and remove the rice by sling load.

(3) If neither of the above could be effected, an LZ was set into which a R/W aircraft could descend to pick up the rice. A sling extension was used in the interests of aircraft safety. If LZ cutting required more than one day, heavy H and I fires were placed in the area overnight to preclude enemy evacuation of the rice.

Frank E. Blakey
FRANK E. BLAKEY
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DOWNGRADED IN 3YR INTERVAL
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YRS
DDO DIR 5200.20

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