

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE TASK FORCE
25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96355

AVDC-C-OP

1 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report for PERSHING

THRU: Commanding General
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
APO 96490
ATTN: AVDA-GT

TO: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
ATTN:-- AVF-GC-TNG
APO 96350

1. (U) IDENTIFICATION OF OPERATION: PERSHING
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: Operation PERSHING commenced 120700H February, 1967 and terminated 191200H April 1967.
3. (C) LOCATION OF OPERATION: The area designated for Operation PERSHING included sandy shorelines and coastal plains as well as mountainous areas rising precipitously from near sea level to 700 meters or more. The Nui Mieu Mountain Area with center of mass at BR9875 rises from near sea level to 600 meters. The Crescent area includes the flat coast plain between the Nui Mieu Mtns to the south, the Cay Giap Mtns (BR9389) to the north, the South China Sea to the east and the high ground from BR9276 to BR8887 to the west; Hwy 1 bisects the Crescent area. The 506, Kim Son, and Soui Ca Valleys are located with center of masses BR 8480, BR7381, and BR8065 respectively.
4. (U) CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division, APO San Francisco 96355.
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Colonel James G. Shanahan.
6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION:

INCLOSURE 2

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a. Commanders:

- (1) Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

Colonel James G. Shanahan

Lieutenant Colonel Rodney B. Gilbertson, Deputy
Commander, 1 March - 19 April

- (2) 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel William H. Miller

- (3) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry

Major James E. Moore

- (4) 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry

Lieutenant Colonel Clinton E. Granger Junior

- (5) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Holbrook

- (6) C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry

Captain John P. Irving III

- (7) 3d Support Battalion (Provisional)

Major Andrew H. Housand, 12 Feb - 18 Feb 1967

Major Robert R. Rutledge, 18 Feb - 19 April 1967

- (8) Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion

Captain Arthur J. Pansze Junior

- (9) 40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

First Lieutenant Robert W. Thackeray

b. Principal Staff:

- (1) S1 Major John D. Weil

- (2) S2 Major Edgar Egeland

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(3) S3 Major E. P. Houben

(4) S4 Major John A. Joyce

(5) S5 Captain John Schmidt III, 12 - 19 Feb 67

Major John W. Schneider, Junior, 19 Feb - 19 Apr 67

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. (C) Tactical air support was provided by 7th USAF and utilized by the 3d Brigade TF as indicated.

Inclusive dates of operations	<u>FAC Missions</u>		<u>Combat Proofs</u>	
	<u>Request</u>	<u>Run</u>	<u>Request</u>	<u>Run</u>
(1) 12 Feb - 28 Feb	36	23	40	11
(2) 1 Mar - 31 Mar	102	68	59	14
(3) 1 Apr - 19 Apr	45	37	31	11
(4) Total	183	128	130	36
% Run	70%		28%	

b. (C) Aviation Support: The 52d Combat Aviation Battalion supported the 3d Brigade TF with the 119th Assault Helicopter Company, 12 Feb - 28 March 1967, and the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion with the 174th Assault helicopter company 28 March - 19 April 1967. Troop lifts, landing zone preparation command and control capability and resupply missions were provided.

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d. During the period 12 February - 19 April 1967, the mission of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was direct support of the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division, under the OPCON of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on Operation PERSHING.

(1) Battery A, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

(2) Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, during the period 13 February - 14 April 1967. On 14 April 1967 Battery B was attached to the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, and had the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, under the OPCON of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

(3) Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was attached to the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, with the mission of direct support of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, under the OPCON of the 4th Infantry Division on Operation SAM HOUSTON during the period 13 February - 2 April 1967. On 15 April 1967, Battery C was attached to the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, under the OPCON of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on Operation LE JEUNE.

(4) Battery D (Provisional), 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, was formed on 2 March 1967 by taking four 105mm Howitzer sections and necessary personnel and equipment from Headquarters and Service Battery, Battery A, and Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. Battery D had the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, for the period 2-16 March 1967. On 16 March 1967 Battery D was dissolved, to be reformed on 17 March in the same manner and given the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, for the period 17 March - 3 April 1967 Battery D was again dissolved.

(5) Additional artillery attached to or under the OPCON of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period is listed below.

(a) Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16 Artillery, was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 13 February - 18 April 1967 with the mission of general support of the 3d Brigade TF.

(b) Battery A, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm-towed) (52d Artillery Group), was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 14 February - 26 March 1967 with the mission of general support of the 3d Brigade TF.

(c) Battery C, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (105mm-towed) (52 Artillery Group) was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 22 February - 2 March 1967 with the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.

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(d) Battery D (Provisional) (155mm-towed), 2d Battalion, 17th Artillery (I Field Force Vietnam Artillery), was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 28 March - 8 April 1967 with the mission of general support of the 3d Brigade TF.

(e) Battery B, 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 15 - 18 April 1967 with the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)), under the OPCON of the 3d Brigade TF.

(f) One searchlight, Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight) (I Field Force Vietnam Artillery), was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery during the period of 18 February - 18 April 1967, with the mission of providing illumination of the 3d Brigade forward base camp and surrounding area.

(g) Two sections M42 (40mm AA-SP), Battery C, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW-SP) (52d Artillery Group), were attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 24 March - 18 April 1967 with the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

One squad M55 (Quad .50), Battery C, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery was attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period 24 March - 18 April 1967 with the mission of direct support of the 1st Bn, 11th Infantry, (24 March - 9 April); DS 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry (9- 18 April). Two sections M42 (40mm AA, SP), Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery, were attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, during the period of 9 - 18 April 1967 and were under the OPCON of the Support Command, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), for defense of LZ HAMMOND.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. General - As in THAYER II the 3d Brigade TF continued under the operational control of the First Cavalry Division (AM) during Operation PERSHING.

(1) Beginning at the South China Sea in the vic of the CAY GIAP Mountain Range (vic BR9390) the Brigade area of operations extended generally west into the 506 Valley (vic BR8875). Following the high ground to the west of the SUOI CA Valley (vic BR8065) the boundary stretched south until it met the PHU MY - BINH KHE border, (vic 7460). The NUI MEUI Mountain range (vic BR0060) was located at the extreme southern portion of the AO. This terrain in the area is similar to that of THAYER II with sandy shoreline, coastal plains, and mountainous terrain rising as high as 700 meters.

(2) The weather encountered was generally favorable for friendly offensive operations, however, heavy concentrations of ground fog during the early morning hours favored enemy movements.

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b. Enemy disposition - At the beginning of Operation PERSHING the enemy remained fragmented and dispersed from the NE end of the Oregon Trail (BR7365) to the vic of the Kon River rest area. Some elements of the 18th Regiment may have been located in the high ground vic the Kim Son Valley area, and west of the 506 Valley.

(1) It was believed that elements of the 22d Regiment to include the 7th, 8th, and 9th battalions along with Regiment Headquarters was located directly to the north of the 3d Brigade TF area of operation.

(2) Intelligence indicated that the E2B (50th Battalion) remained in the Nui Ba Mountains, while the E210 (52d Battalion) was probably located in company-size units in the high ground south of the Oregon and Sante Fe trail. Other local force VC companies were located throughout the Nui Mieu/Crescent Areas.

c. Significant activity in the area of operations of the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

(1) During the early days of Operation PERSHING (12-25 February) it became obvious that elements of the 18th NVA Regiment would attempt to re-establish operations in the Cat-Son Long Dinh area. This evidence was supported by information obtained from one Rallier and one POW, both from the 124th Mortar Co, 18th Regiment. Enemy contact remained light. Between 18 and 21 February contact increased in the southern SUOI CA Valley indicating that the 18th Regiment had indeed attempted to re-enter the SUOI CA-CAT SON area.

(2) Enemy contact showed a marked increase between 25 February and 5 March. Numerous contacts were reported in the Kim Son Valley. One of the contacts resulted in the capture of documents that revealed letter box numbers of Headquarters, 2d VC Regiment, the 1st company of the 97th Battalion, 2d VC Regiment and the 95th Battalion of the 2d VC Regiment. There was a definite increase of mining incidents along Highway 1 and terrorist activities, such as the ambush of an innocent civilian and the murder of a Vietnamese politician. From these indications it was concluded that preparations for the dry season campaign of the 3d NVA Division had begun. Sniping, mining, and other terrorist activities were expected to continue with intentions to disrupt the Revolutionary Development Program within Phu My/Phu Cat Districts.

(3) The first major contact of Operation PERSHING occurred at 1005 hours on the 6th of March when B 1/35th Infantry encountered an estimated Battalion size force, vic BR968880. A fast moving battle developed which continued until after dark. Documents captured during the battle confirmed that contact had been with the 9th Battalion, 18th Regiment. As a result of this battle, 84 bodies were counted and numerous weapons and equipment were captured.

(a) An NVA Prisoner of War captured after contact was made, stated that the 7th and 8th Battalions, of the 18th NVA Regiment were located in the vicinity of 506 Valley (BR8480) in the process of reorganizing.

(b) It was believed that the remnants of the 9th Battalion would attempt to move west and rejoin the main body of the 18th Regiment.

(4) The remainder of this period (06-31 March) was characterized by light sporadic contact with 1 to 5 individuals. Numerous booby traps were found indicating a harassing attempt to slow and hamper the advance of US Forces while the enemy refitted.

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(5) During the remaining days of Operation PERSHING (1-19 April) the 18th NVA Regiment became increasingly active. It was believed that after TET the 18th Regiment began assembling company size units in order to secure rice and to be resupplied with ammunition and equipment. It was also estimated that the 18th Regiment received some replacements during the previous months. Contacts by both U. S. and ARVN units with elements of the 18th Regiment demonstrated that they had a plentiful supply of small arms ammunition. Additional intelligence sources indicated that the 18th Regiment was at a greater strength than before and were working closely with local guerrilla forces, however, it was believed that the 18th Regiment would continue to avoid any major engagement.

(6) Operation PERSHING concluded without significant contact with the enemy, with 3d Brigade TF elements experiencing only sniper and harassing fire from 1-3 individuals when encountered.

(7) SUMMARY OF ENEMY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES:

(a) <u>PERSONNEL:</u>	<u>PERSHING</u>
<u>1</u> KIA (BC)	251
<u>2</u> CIA	334
<u>3</u> Returnees	29
<u>4</u> Suspects	0
(b) <u>WEAPONS:</u>	
<u>1</u> Small Arms	78
<u>2</u> Crew served	7
(c) <u>OTHER EQUIPMENT:</u>	
<u>1</u> AMMO:	
<u>a</u> Small arms	20,114
<u>b</u> 81/82mm Mortar	2
<u>c</u> 60mm Mortar	8
<u>d</u> Grenades	27
<u>e</u> TNT	16

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2 PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT:

<u>a</u> Packs	98
<u>b</u> Clothing sets	67
<u>c</u> Canteens	2
<u>d</u> Web gear	22
<u>e</u> Ponchos	23

3 MISC:

<u>a</u> Magazines	72
<u>b</u> Flashlights	4
<u>c</u> Medical equip	43 lbs
<u>d</u> Radios	1

4 MATERIAL DESTROYED:

<u>a</u> Huts	135
<u>b</u> Rice	9.7 tons
<u>c</u> Bunkers	1605
<u>d</u> Tunnels	22
<u>e</u> Foxholes	88
<u>f</u> Boats	7
<u>g</u> Salt	6.1 tons

5 MATERIAL CAPTURED

<u>a</u> Rice	17.3 tons
<u>b</u> Salt	11.8 tons

9. (c) MISSION

a. General:

(1) Reference OPORD 6703 (PERSHING) (U), Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Div (AM), dated 111310H Feb 67.

(a) Occupy assigned AO on D - Day.

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(b) In cooperation with the 22D ARVN Div forces, provide security protection in general support of RD operations in the PHU MY Area by conducting reconnaissance and surveillance patrolling and search and destroy operations within bde AO.

(c) Secure communications complex at AL MEADE commencing on D - Day.

(d) Continue to provide one company OPCON Spt Cmd for physical scety of LZ HAMMOND.

(e) Responsible for tactical security of LZ HAMMOND.

(f) Be prepared to conduct Quick Strike raids within the BONG SON Plain or along the BINH DINH- QUANG NGAI Provincial border north and northwest of BONG SON with up to 4 Bns.

b. Specific missions, less those of minor importance, were as follows:

(1) Reference: FRAGO 7044-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 12 February 1967.

(a) In cooperation with 22d ARVN Div Forces prov close scety protection in general support of RD operations.

(b) Assume responsibility for the conducting of search and destroy opns in the Crescent Plain area when the Marine TF is not operating in that area.

(c) Cont to secure communications complex at LZ MEADE.

(d) Cont to prov one company OPCON Support Command for physical security of HAMMOND.

(e) Continue responsibility for tactical security of LZ HAMMOND

(f) Conduct periodic recon operations in the western portion of AO to prevent buildup of enemy forces in that area.

(g) Release OPCON one plat, C Trp, 3/4 Cav to 2d Bde on 12 Feb 67.

(2) Reference: FRAG 7044-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 13 February 1967.

(a) Assume responsibility for securing LZ HAMMOND, Effective 1400H Feb 67.

(b) Secure FSA until stocks are depleted.

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(3) Reference: FRAGO 7046-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 15 Feb 67.

(a) Relieved of responsibility for security of LZ HAMMOND effective 160800 Feb 67.

(b) Relieved responsibility for security LZ MEADE.

(4) Reference FRAGO 7050-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 18 Feb 67.

(a) Provide contact team (liaison with comm) to PHU MY Districe Forces guarding PHU MY Bridge NLT 18 Feb 67.

(5) Reference FRAGO 7050-3, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 19 Feb 67.

(a) Continue current mission in assigned AO.

(b) Conduct search and destroy operations in the NUI MIEU area.

(c) Be prepared to assume AO and mission of 3d Bde, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

(6) Reference FRAGO 7051-3, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile), dated 20 Feb 67.

(a) Assume responsibility for conducting operations in coordination and cooperation w/Vietnamese Marine TF eff 201300H, Feb 67.

(7) Reference FRAGO 7053-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 22 Feb 67.

(a) Assume OPCON one plat, C/3/4 Cavalry from 2d Bde on 23 Feb 67.

(b) Release from requirement to provide contact team at PHU LY Bridge eff 22 Feb 67.

(c) Effective 230600H Feb cdt daily mine sweep of Hwy 1 between coord BR930752 and BR915839. Mine sweep will be completed NLT 0800. Time of completion will be reported ADE.

(8) Reference FRAGO 7054-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 23 Feb 67.

(a) Execute OPLAN 12-67 (SCATTER) (U) eff 231200H Feb 67.

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(b) Condition amber will be in eff at ENGLISH/(BONG SON) until otherwise indicated by this headquarters.

(9) Reference FRAGO 7057-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 26 Feb 67.

(a) Open hwy 506 to dry weather class 32 traffic from BR918720 to BR803834.

(9) Reference FRAGO 7067-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 8 March 67.

(a) Relieved of responsibility for conducting operations in the CAY GIEP Mtns/Eastern Crescent Area eff 09 March 1967.

(10) FRAGO 7072-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 13 March 1967.

(a) Coordinate operations in southern NUI MIEU with 41st ARVN Regiment.

(11) FRAGO 7079-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 19 March 1967.

(a) Assume responsibility for search and destroy operations in the Crescent AO in coord and cooperation with units of 22d ARVN Div.

(12) FRAGO 7082-1, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 23 March 1967.

(a) Continue present missions.

(b) Assume responsibility within AO for tactical scty of LZ HAMMOND. Coordinate with 41st ARVN Regt for tactical security of LZ HAMMOND within 22d ARVN Division AO.

(c) Assume OPCON of base defense security company (-) at LZ HAMMOND from DISCOM for daylight operations only. Co (-) will return to LZ HAMMOND NLT 1800H each day.

(d) Assume responsibility for protective fires for security of LZ HAMMOND.

(e) Provide Arty LNO team to DISCOM to coordinate fires for security of LZ HAMMOND.

(f) Coordinate with CRID to provide protective fires by ROK Arty units vic LZ HAMMOND.

(g) Conduct frequent "show" of power demonstrations vic LZ HAMMOND (include ROK Arty).

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(b) Implement extensive interdiction fires vic LZ HAMMOND (include ROK Arty).

(13) Reference FRAGO 7103-2, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry (Airmobile) dated 13 Apr 67.

(a) Deploy one bn to LE JEUNE on 15 April; OPCON 2d Bde on arrival. Reassume OPCON this bn o/a 25 April 67.

(b) Assume OPCON 1 bn 2d Bde on 15 April; return OPCON to 2d Bde on departure from PERSHING AO o/a 25 April 1967.

(c) Be prepared to deploy bde (-) to LE JEUNE AO a/o 25 April 1967 and close entire bde in LE JEUNE AO NLT 30 April 1967.

(d) Be prepared to assume responsibility from 2d Bde o/a 25 April 1967.

(14) Reference FRAGO 7103-3, Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) dated 13 April 1967.

(a) Commence clearing civilians from 506 valley beginning 16 April 1967. Coordinate with Division G5 for disposition of displaced civilians.

10. (C) Concept of Operation:

(a) General: Operation PERSHING commenced 120700H February 1967 with the 3d Brigade TF extending its operation from its present AO as shown in inclosure 4, under the operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The operation terminated 191200H April 1967 with the 3d Brigade TF assumption of responsibility for the LE JEUNE AO.

(b) Period 12 - 17 Feb 1967: 3d Brigade TF initiated operation PERSHING on 12 February 1967 by assuming screening positions along the western SUOI CA and eastern KIM SON Valleys and providing security in general support of Revolutionary Development (RD) operations in the PHU MY Area. Brigade CP was located at LZ BRONCO BEACH. 1/14th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the SUOI CA Valley, provided security for LZ MEADE (1 plat), B 5/16 Arty (1 plat), and LZ HAMMOND (1 Co). 1/35 Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the NUI MIEU Area, Crescent Area, and 506 Valley. 1/35 Infantry Battalion (-) helilifted from vic southern SUOI CA Valley to vic LZ UPLIFT and established the Battalion CP/FSB at that location.

(c) Period 18 - 28 February: Brigade CP displaced to LZ UPLIFT closing 181030H February 1967. On 20 and 21 February Co A, 1/14 Infantry Battalion had a sporadic contact vic BR8059 resulting in 11 NVA KIA and 6 small arms captured, (4-AK47, 2-SKS). Co B, 1/14 Infantry Battalion on 26 February engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results 7 NVA KIA.

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(d) Period 1 - 9 March 1967: On 1 March Recon plat and Co A 1/35th Infantry contacted an unknown size enemy force vic BS890775 (See inclosure 1).. On 4 March 1967 1/35th Infantry Battalion initiated operation "CHECKMATE" in the Crescent Area. 1/35th Infantry displaced the Bn CP/FSB to LZ ANCHOR (BR943844) on 6 March 1967. Heavy engagement with an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions was made by B Co, 1/35 Infantry Battalion at 061440H March 1967 vic BR968880. Contact with enemy was maintained throughout the afternoon with employment of 5 companies and elements of C 1/9 Cav. (See inclosure)

(e) Period 10 - 20 March 1967: On 10 March 67 D/65th Engrs began road repair operations, Road 506, 1/14th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the IRON TRIANGLE (center of mass BR7975), lower SUOI CA Valley and its western approaches. On 15 March 1967, 2 companies, 1/35 Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in southern NUI MIEU area in coordination and cooperation with 41st Regiment (ARVN). Co C, 1/14th Infantry Battalion on 20 March 1967 at vic BR800572 engaged unknown size enemy forces. Results: 2 VC KIA, 5 VC WIA/CIA.

(f) Period 21 - 31 March 1967: 1/14 Infantry Battalion on 21 March 1967 conducted platoon size search and destroy operations in the Crescent Area and the southern PHU MY Area in coord with elements of the 22d ARVN Div. On 22, 23, and 24 March 1/14th Infantry Battalion conducted Hammer and Anvil operations to entrap and destroy enemy elements in the SW portion of 41st ARVN Regt AO, vic BR829613 and the hill mass adjacent to the eastern side of the SUOI CA Valley respectively. On 26 March 1967, 1/35th Infantry Battalion and C 1/9 Cavalry initiated screening operations and Cat flights in the vicinity of the Eastern Crescent Beach Area, over the DAM-TRA-O-Lake, and the Eastern PHU MY Area in coordination and cooperation with the elements of the 22d ARVN Div. On 31 March 1967, assault plat 1/14 Infantry Battalion at vic BR872607 contacted unknown size enemy force. Results: 7 enemy KIA, 1 crew-served (1 BAR), 4 SA weapons captured (1 AK-47, 1 M-1 Rifle, 2 US Carbines, 1 US KIA).

(g) Period 1 - 19 April 1967: On 3 April 1967 1/14th Infantry Battalion CP helilifted to LZ TIP. On 3 April 1967 2/35th Infantry Battalion conducted tactical road march from Fleiku Base Camp to forward assembly area vic LZ HAMMOND, released from OPCON 4th Infantry Division upon arrival. On 4 April 1967 2/35th Infantry Battalion CP/FSB closed LZ ILLINI, commenced search and destroy operations in upper SUGI CA Valley region. 1/14th Infantry Battalion continued conducting search and destroy operations in the southern PHU MY Area in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN). 1/35th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the northern Crescent Area and southern CAY GIEP Area. On 15 April 1967, 1/14 Infantry Battalion airlifted by C130 aircraft to the vic CHU IAI, Attached to 196th Light Infantry Brigade. On 15 April 1967, 2/35th Infantry Battalion airlifted by C7A and CH47 aircraft to vic DUC PHO, OPCON 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). On the same day 1/5 Cavalry airlifted to 3d Brigade TF AO, OPCON 3d Brigade on arrival, conducted search and destroy operations in the SUOI CA Valley and adjoining hill masses. During the period 17 - 19 April 1967, elements of 3d Brigade TF deployed by sea and air to LE JEUNE AO vic DUC PHO. On April 1967 3d Brigade TF assumed missions in LE JEUNE AO relieving 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) effective 1200 hrs; at that time 3d Brigade TF was relieved of missions in PERSHING AO by 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

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(h) The operation ended with the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The kill ratio of friendly in operation PERSHING to enemy was 1 : 14.7 or 14 friendly versus 251 enemy KIA.

11. (C) EXECUTION

a. Period 12 - 17 February 1967:

(1) 1/14th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the SUOIC CA Valley. Provided security for LZ MEADE (recon plat), LZ BRONCO BEACH (reinforced squad Co A), B/5/16 Artillery (assault plat) and LZ HAMMOND (Co A). At 121330H Assault Platoon engaged 2 enemy at vic BR878570 Results 2 VC KIA. On 141005 February 1967, 3d plat Co B at BR704649 contacted 4 VC. Results: 2 VC KIA, 1 US Carbine CIA. Co A (-) Combat Assaulted to BR774580 on 16 February 1967 then conducted search and destroy operations NE. At 1545 hrs engaged 2 VC at BR777586. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 US Carbine CIA.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion: Conducted search and destroy operations in NUI MIEU Area, Crescent Area, and 506 Valley. Battalion (-) helilifted from vic southern SUOIC CA Valley to vic LZ UPLIFT. Co A helilifted from LZ TIP (BR790625) to LZ UPLIFT (BR923754) on 121000 February 1967. Co B remained at LZ PIN (CRO22718), supporting RD operations, and conducted search and destroy operations. Co C closed LZ UPLIFT on 121708 hrs. On 14 February 1967 Co A (-) patrolled NW of LZ UPLIFT to vic BR892775. At 0930 hrs at BR893771 made contact with 4 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA. At 1000 hrs at BR905774 made contact with 3 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA. At 1330 hrs engaged unknown size enemy force at BR892775. Results: 2 NVA KIA, 1 AK-47 CIA. At 1435 hrs at BR891774 made contact with 1 VC. Results: 1 VC KIA.

(3) 2/35th Infantry Battalion: OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop(-) OPCON 4th Infantry Division, 1st platoon (-) OPCON 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile). 2 Scout sections provided security for LZ BRONCO BEACH.

(5) LRRP

<u>LRRP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS</u>
3B	12 February 1967	BR836581
3B	14 February 1967	BR818580
3A	14 February 1967	BR860508
3A	16 & 17 February 1967	BR853754
3B	16 February	BR859571

b. Period 18 - 28 February 1967:

(1) 1/14th Infantry Battalion: Co C on 18 February at BR703623 during search and destroy operations NW from LZ MONKEY, located a complex of 513 bunkers. All bunkers were destroyed by D/65th Engineers. At 192010 February Co A contacted 8 VC vic BR818583. Artillery was called in. On 202100 February at BR804580 Co A contacted estimated 15 - 20 NVA. Results: 5 NVA KIA, 2 small arms CIA (2 AK47). Co A, on 22 February, while conducting search and destroy operations along the eastern Sante Fe Trail Area, at 0445 hrs made contact with 4 enemy vic BR805592. Results: 4 NVA/CIA, 4 small arms CIA (2AK47, 2 SKS). At 0755 hrs swept area of contact found 1 NVA KIA, another enemy attempted to evade friendly forces.

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Results: 1 NVA KIA. Co A on 23 February continued to conduct deliberate search and destroy operations and employ numerous tactical ambushes along the eastern portion of the Sante Fe Trail. On 26 February, Co B (-) extended its search and destroy operations into the lower KIM SON Valley Area. At 1600 hrs at BR692778 Co B (-) contacted 12 - 18 NVA. Results: 5 NVA KIA, 1 Chicom Carbine CIA. At 1725 hrs at BR670763 made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Results: 2 enemy KIA.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion continued to provide close security protection in general support to Revolutionary Development Operations in the PHU MY area by conducting search and destroy operations and recon and surveillance patrols in the NUI MIEU area, the Crescent area, and in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN). Co B provided blocking forces, while elements of the 2d Battalion, 41st Regiment conducted a sweep toward the blocking position from the SW. On 25 February D Co, 5/7 Cavalry was placed under the OPCON of the 1/35th Infantry Battalion with the mission to provide security for LZ UPLIFT. On 26 February Co A established blocking positions on the hill mass to the west of the Crescent Area in coordination with ARVN Marine TF Bravo (Operation SONG THAN) in western plains of Crescent area. Co A and recon plat continued in blocking positions on 27 February in coordination with Operation SONG THAN to block exfiltration of enemy forces to the west.

(3) 2/35th Infantry Battalion OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON to the 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon was released from OPCON of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on 23 February. 1st platoon provided security LZ UPLIFT and LITTS Airfield and with assistance of D/65th Engineers conducted daily road clearing operations on Highway 1.

(5) D/65th Engineers conducted mine sweeping operations along Hwy 1 during the period 23 - 28 February between 0600 hrs to 0800 hrs daily. On 26 February D/65th Engineers commenced construction of aircraft revetments at LZ UPLIFT and continued to clear fields of fire at LZ UPLIFT. The Bde Engineer conducted a thorough recon of road 506 in preparation for road repair operations.

(6) LRRP

<u>LRRP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION OF SURVEY OPERATIONS</u>
3A	18 February	BR846756
3B	19 February	BR749733
3B	19 February	BR758698
3A	20, 21 February	BR901765
3A	22, 26 February	BR865808
3B	22, 26 February	BR835588

c. Period 1 - 9 March 1967:

(1) 1/14th Infantry Battalion: Co A on 1 March continued to conduct search and destroy operations and daylight ambushes in SUOI CA Valley and along eastern Sante Fe Trail. At 1015 hrs at BR783580 Co A loc est 3-4 tons salt, which was extracted to PHU CAT District. On 4 March Co C conducted search and destroy operations along 3 axes to the east entering the westward portion of the "IRON TRIANGLE" (center of mass BR8074). Assault platoon on 8 March conducted a

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combat assault at BR854603, established a blocking force as elements of the 41st ARVN Regiment swept SW.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion: Recon platoon on 1 March conducted search and destroy operations from BR901765 in a northerly direction along eastern edge of 506 Valley. At 1403 hrs at BR886775, Recon platoon contacted unknown size enemy force. Results: 7 NVA KIA, 4 small arms captured (2AK-47, 2AKS), and 3 US KIA, and 5 US WIA. On 4 March 1967 1/35th Infantry Battalion initiated Operation "CHECKMATE" conducting search and destroy operations in the western and northern Crescent Area. A/2/5 Cavalry helilifted to LZ UPLIFT 051605 March, OPCON 1/35th Infantry Battalion to provide security LZ UPLIFT. Co B on 061440 March at BR968880 became heavily engaged with an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions. The contact resulted in the commitment of 5 companies and one Cavalry Blue Team. Results: 84 enemy KIA; 5 crew-served, (3LMG, 1 RPG-2, 1 RPG), 15 small arms weapons CIA (1 M-79, 6 SKS, 3 AK-47, 4 M-16, 1 US Carbine), US Losses 5 KIA, 18 WIA. Operation "CHECKMATE" terminated 091110 March.

(3) 2/35th Infantry Battalion continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon provided security of LZ UPLIFT during the hours of darkness. During daylight hours the 1st plat conducted clearing operations along Highway 1, provided security force for LITTS airfield, and provided security for engineer for road repair operations, road 506. On 6 March 5 APC's the 1st platoon provided security at LZ ANCHOR (BR940849) for the 1/35th Infantry Battalion forward CP and A/2/9 Artillery FSB. On 080715 March an APC of the 1st platoon C/3/4 Cavalry hit a mine on Highway 1 vic BR923825. Results: 3 US KIA, APC destroyed (2 WIA - D/65th Engineers). On 090845 March, at vic BR926823 located a mine (2 - 105mm artillery shells) on Highway 1 road clearing operations. Results: mine destroyed.

(5) IRRP

<u>IRRP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS</u>
3B	1 March	BR735654
3B	2-6 March	BR732648
3A	7-9 March	BR798594

(6) Remark: On 040930 March persistent CS agent was dispersed to cause the enemy to be canalized into an area of surveillance for IRRP 3A.

d. Period 10 - 20 March 1967

(1) 1/14 Infantry Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations in IRON TRIANGLE area (center of mass BR7975), lower SUOI CA Valley and its western approaches, and the lower KIM SON Valley. On 141100 hrs Co A and recon platoon reacted to an intelligence report of a suspected enemy CP located BR793612. Recon plat C/A and Co A conducted 3 pronged envelopment of the objective; negitave results for the operation. At 201121 March vic BR800572, Co C engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results: 2 VC KIA, 5 VC WIA/CIA.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in 506 Valley and adjoining hill masses with two companies. One company provided security for engr road repair operations, road 506 and provided security for LZ UPLIFT. On 12 March three companies conducted combat assaults into the western Crescent area to act as a screening force for possible enemy infiltration west from area of contact in 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division's (Airmobile) AO. Three companies and C 1/9 Cavalry Blue Team conducted cordon and search operations throughout the western Crescent area. 1/35th Infantry Battalion (-) consisting of the Battalion Forward CP and Companies B and C were placed under the OPCON of 2d Bde, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) effective 121600 March, then released from the OPCON of 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) effective 131200 March. A/1/7 Cavalry was OPCON to the 1/35th Infantry Battalion during the period 12-16 March with the mission of providing security for LZ UPLIFT and providing security for D/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506. On 16 March Co C conducted search and destroy operations along the western side of the NUI MIEU Mountain in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN).

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A/2/12 Cav was under the OPCON of 1/35th Infantry Battalion during the period 16-19 March with the mission of providing security for LZ UPLIFT and providing security for D/65th Engineer Road Repair operations, road 506. On 17 March Co B conducted search and destroy operations along three axes in the SE NUI MIEU area in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN). At 1629 hrs, BR 954696, Co B received sniper fire which developed into an engagement of an enemy force of unknown size. Results: 1 enemy KIA, 2 small arms CIA (1 AK-47, 1 M-1 rifle). Companies B and C continued to conduct search and destroy operations on 19 March in the southern NUI MIEU Area in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN).

(3) TF RUTLEDGE became operational 121600 March; task organization consisted of Co A, 1/35th Infantry Battalion, A Troop, 1/7 Cavalry and recon platoon 1/35th Infantry Battalion. Co A 1/35 Infantry Battalion conducted village search operations in western Crescent Area and established numerous squad sized ambushes vic BR9079. A Troop (-) 1/7th Cavalry continued to provide security for LZ UPLIFT while one platoon provided security for D/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506. Recon platoon 1/35th Infantry Battalion provided security for the 4.2" mortar platoon FSB at LZ CORRAL, and conducted search and destroy operations along hill mass to the east. TF RUTLEDG was dissolved 131200 March 1967, and its elements reverted to their parent units.

(4) 2/35th Infantry Battalion continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(5) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON to the 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon provided security LZ UPLIFT during hours of darkness. During daylight hours, the 1st platoon continued to provide security for LITTS Airfield and provided security for D/65th Engrs road repair operations, road 506. 1st platoon was OPCON to the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) during the period 121035 - 121540 March, reverted and returned to LZ UPLIFT 121925 March to provide night security. On 16 March, 5 APC's were given the mission to reinforce security of FSB, LZ IVY. On 19 March, 3 APC's provided a blocking force during the morning village search operations conducted by Co A. 1/35 Infantry Battalion at BR925780.

(6) D/65th Engineers conducted road repair operations, road 506, and continued to improve the defensive perimeter of LZ UPLIFT.

(7) LRRP

<u>LRRP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS</u>
3A	10 March	BR803585
3B	10- 13 March	BR867767
3A	12- 13 March	BR735650
3B	15- 20 March	BR887779
3A	16- 17- 18 March	BR792692
3A	19- 20 March	BR775770

e. Period 21-31 March

(1) 1/14 Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the SUOI CA Valley and its western approaches. On 22 March, 3 companies and recon platoon deployed in the SW portion of 41st Regiment (ARVN) AO, conducted

Hammer and Anvil operations to entrap and destroy enemy elements suspected to be existing west from the previous day's contact with elements of the 41st Regiment (ARVN). Recon plat established blocking positions (Anvil) while 3 companies (hammer) swept N toward blocking positions. At 1517 hrs, BR857604, Co B engaged 3 enemy, results: 2 enemy KIA, 2 US Carbines CIA. On 23 March, 3 Infantry companies and 2 platoons conducted Hammer and Anvil operations to entrap and destroy a suspected enemy CP located vic BR829613. Companies B, C, and C 1/35th Infantry Battalion (Hammer) swept W on multiple axes across the hill mass adjacent to the SUOI CA Valley, with recon plat and 3d plat Co A establishing blocking positions (Anvil) at BR816613 and BR815618 respectively; Negative results for the operation. On 24 March, 4 companies, recon plat and assault plat conducted Hammer and Anvil operations intended to search out and destroy suspected enemy locations in the hill mass adjacent to the eastern side of the SUOI CA Valley. Negative results for operation. On 261855 March at BR845596 elements of Co B observed possible enemy movement. Artillery was called into the area. Searched at first light. Results: 7 enemy KIA. On 28 March 1/14th Infantry Battalion conducted CAT flights in coordination with 41st Regiment (ARVN) over the southern-eastern portion of the NUI MIEU area. Co A conducted search and destroy operations E in the lower SUOI CA Valley to vic BR853605 when at 301635 March 6 enemy were engaged. Results: 3 enemy KIA. Assault platoon conducted search and destroy operations SW from LZ IVY and at 311025 March, BR872507, received Small arms and automatic weapons fire from unknown size enemy force, friendly forces returned fire. Contact was broken 1150 hrs. Results: 7 enemy KIA, 1 crew/served, (1BAR) 4 small arms CIA (1-AK47, 1 M-1 rifle, 2 US Carbines), 1 US KIA.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy in the 506 Valley. On 23 March Co A thoroughly searched the southern NUI MIEU Area vic BR973696 in response to intelligence report of a suspected enemy CP at that location. The operation was conducted in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN) with negative results. On 28 March the 1/35th Infantry Battalion conducted CAT flights in coordination with 22d Arvn Division along the eastern Crescent and eastern NUI MIEU Area in coordination and cooperation with the 40th Regiment (ARVN).

(3) 2/35 Infantry Battalion continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division. 1st plat provided security for D/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506, continued to provide security for LITTS airfield, and provided security for LZ UPLIFT during the hours of darkness.

(5) D/65th Engineers continued to conduct road operations, road 506; road work was completed 31 March 1967.

(6) LRRP

<u>LRRP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS</u>
3B	22 - 24 March	BR864769
3A	21 - 30 March	LZ SANTA
3B	25 - 27 March	BS878782
3A	27 - 30 March	BR888824
3B	30 - 31 March	CRO05749
3C	31 March	BR873787

f. Period 1 - 19 April 1967

(1) 1/14th Infantry Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations and village search and clear operations in the SUOI CA Valley and its western approaches and in the southern PHU MY Area in coordination with the 41st Regiment (ARVN). Assault plat on 020817 April conducted CA vic BR915585 and swept NE along the northern bank of the river, in coordination with Capital ROK Infantry Division sweep along southern banks of the river.

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At 0910 hrs vic BR934584 1 enemy KIA; at 1127 hrs vic BR928585 1 enemy KIA, 1 enemy CIA/WIA, 1 enemy CIA. On 041100 April BN CP was airlifted to LZ TIP. A/2/12 Cav was placed under the OPCON of 1/14 Infantry Battalion for daylight operations 061530 April. One scout section, 1st platoon C 3/4 Cavalry was under the OPCON of 1/14 Infantry Battalion 5-6 April and conducted sweep operations along LU SIEM GIANG River with elements of the Battalion. 1st platoon (-) C 3/4 Cavalry OPCON 1/14 Infantry Battalion 7-13 April conducted village sweeps and search and destroy operations with elements of the Battalion. On 15 April, 1/14 Infantry was airlifted by C-130 aircraft to Chu Lai, OPCON on arrival to 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations in the NUI MIEU Mountains area and Crescent Area in coordination and cooperation with elements of the 22d ARVN Division. Co B, on April, conducted Hammer and Anvil operations along the eastern Crescent beach Area. A 2/5 Cavalry OPCON 1/35th Infantry Battalion 1-2 April conducted search and destroy operations vic BR989751. D/1/5 Cavalry OPCON 1/35th Infantry Battalion 2-4 April conducted search and destroy operations vic BR993760. Co A on 4 April established blocking positions vic BR9577 in coordination with a sweep to the south conducted by the 1st Battalion, 40th Regiment (ARVN). On 5 April the TAC CP and FSB was inserted at LZ ANCHOR. At 1955 hrs a large explosion occurred in the CP area which was estimated to be either a time or command detonated 250 pound bomb. Results: 4 US WHA. Co A on 6 April established blocking positions vic BR960920 to BR982913 in coordination and cooperation with the 4th Battalion, 40th Regiment (ARVN) operation to the north. On 11 April the TAC CP/FSB was extracted to LZ UPLIFT. On 19 April the 1/35 Infantry Battalion deployed by air to the LE JEUNE AO.

(3) 2/35th Infantry Battalion continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division until 4 April when the Battalion conducted a road march from base camp/Pleiku to LZ HAMMOND and was released from OPCON 4th Infantry Division upon closure. On 5 March the Battalion CP/FSB and Co A closed LZ ILLINI and the Battalion commenced search and destroy operations in lower KIM SON Valley, SUOI CA Valley and adjoining hill masses. On 15 April the entire Battalion was airlifted by C7A and CH-47 aircraft to the LE JEUNE AO, OPCON on arrival to the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON to 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon provided security for LZ UPLIFT during hours of darkness and provided security for S/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506, during daylight hours. During the period 5-8 April one scout section was OPCON 1/14th Infantry Battalion. 1 Scout team provided security for LZ UPLIFT. On 18 April C Troop (-) conducted convoy movement from base camp/ Pleiku to holding area vic Qui Nhon, released from OPCON 4th Infantry Division upon closing area. 1st platoon on the same day conducted a road march from the PERSHING AO to Qui Nhon and reverted to the control of C Troop. The Troop commenced deployment by LST to the LE JEUNE AO on 20 April.

(5) D/65th Engineers continued to improve defensive perimeter of LZ UPLIFT. Deployment to the LE JEUNE AO by LST commenced on 18 April 1967.

(6) LRRP

LRRP	DATE	SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
3A	1-4 April	BR853596
3B	1-2 April	CRO10750
3C	1-2 April	BR870798
3B	7-8 April	LZ SANTA
3A	7-9 April	LZ ILLINI
3C	7-8 April	BR864774
3C	9-11 April	BR802612
3D	9-11 April	BR850801
3B	12-13 April	LZ SANTA
3C	12-13 April	BR833618

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12. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Logistics:

(1) Supply:

(a) No major supply problem existed during Operation PERSHING. The 3d Brigade TF was supported with all classes of supplies by the Forward Support Area. TF WRIGHT/HARTSELL of the 1st Logistical Command. Supply points to distribute class I, II, III and IV supplies were operated by the 3d Brigade TF trains area by forward support elements of the 3d Support Battalion, 3d Brigade TF.

(2) (U) Transportation:

(a) The truck squads continued to be utilized for line haul between the base of operation and the Forward Support Area.

(b) An Air Force C7A was utilized daily to transport replacements, R&R, ETS, emergency leave, mail and critical supply items from base camp to the Area of Operation. C7A statistics:

1	Sorties Flown:	454
2	Passengers:	5,083
3	Cargo:	181,623 lbs

(3) On 15 February 3D Brigade TF moved from BRONCO BEACH by organic vehicle 30 km to LZ UPLIFT.

(4) (C) New Equipment

(a) The 3d Brigade TF has received all M16E1 Rifles to replace M14's Rifle and 90 per cent turn in of the M-14's has been completed.

(b) 100 CAR 15 Submachine guns were received and issued to units in the 3d Brigade TF for test and evaluation.

(5) Medical

(a) Number of patients treated by 3d Brigade TF clearing Station: 2482

(b) Number of disease cases: 2,133

(c) Number of Battle casualties: 161

(d) Number of non battle casualties: 213

(6) Statistics:

(a) Class I:

1	A Rations:	588,668
2	C Rations:	152629

(b) Class III

1	Mogas	205,077 gal
2	Diesel	154,572 gal
3	JP4	616,658 gal

(c) Class V

1	40MM	13,340 Rds
2	81MM HE	18,090 Rds
3	4.2" HE	10,050 Rds
4	105MM HE	38,900 Rds

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b. Personnel

(1) (C) Total number of casualties suffered by elements of the 3d Brigade TF during Operations PERSHING were as follows:

(a) UNIT	1/14	1/35	2/35	3/4	2/9	HHC	D/65
1 KIA	2	10	1	3	1	-	-
2 WIA	22	50	2	-	6	1	9

(b) Total

1 KIA - 17

2 WIA - 90

13. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. Civil Affairs/ Psyops activities during the reporting period (12 February - 19 April 1967) continued throughout the base camp area as well as in the area of operations. The Brigade S5 section worked with Military Intelligence personnel, PSYOPS Team, MACV subsector personnel, National Police, GVN officials and Infantry units in support of tactical operations.

b. GVN representatives accompanied the Civil Affairs and PSYOPS Team whenever possible, to insure maximum impact on indigenous personnel. In many areas, this was the first exposure to the GVN for the people of the rural areas.

c. Civil Affairs Area of operation was in the Binh Dinh Province (PHU CAT and PHU MY Districts).

d. Summary:

(1) Total MEDCAP Operations:

(a) Sickcall: 4,648 Personnel treated

(b) Dental Hygiene: 56 Personnel treated

(c) Baths for Children 142 Children bathed

(d) A doctor accompanied the CA/PSYOPS Team on 19 operations

(2) Public Works:

(a) Playground set at DIEM TIEU refugee hamlet.

(b) Well dug at DIEM TIEU refugee hamlet.

(c) Market place (3 buildings) at MY THO.

(d) Highway 506 from HOAI AN to Highway #1 was repaired by D/65th Engineers and opened to traffic 31 March 1967.

(e) 50 rolls of concertina and 20 rolls of straight barbed wire were provided to PHU MY District for the construction of hamlet defense in the Revolutionary Development program.

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(3) Public Welfare:

(a) 9½ tons of captured rice were returned to district officials for redistribution.

(b) 120 pounds of captured salt was distributed.

(c) The new market at MY THO hamlet in PHU MY district was officially opened on 8 April giving the people of Eastern PHU MY district a place to trade and improve their economy.

(4) Government and Education:

(a) 2 village bulletin boards have been erected at MY THO and DIEM TIEU.

(b) GVN flags were presented to the village chiefs of MY THO and DIEM TIEU.

(5) Refugee Assistance:

(a) A total of 1,177 refugees were relocated from areas controlled by VC and NVA to refugee centers in PHU MY district.

(b) The following supplies and assistance was given to the refugees.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
1 Rice	18,780 lbs
2 Salt	120 lbs
3 Clothing	330 lbs
4 Tobacco	24 cans
5 Candy	725 bags
6 Canned goods	144 cases
7 Bread	1,069 loaves

(c) Remarks:

1 Refugees in the PHU MY District suffered from many diseases, principally pneumonia, tuberculosis, and glaucoma. The children suffered from Exczema. MEDCAP missions were specifically arranged to help the newly located refugees.

2 The refugees problem in PHU MY District is considerable, with approximately 20,000 presently in the centers. Only 52% of the heads of families were gainfully employed. The camps themselves are generally overcrowded and lack for sanitary facilities. Efforts are being made by the US, ARVN and GVN agencies to alleviate the condition.

(2) Psychological Operations:

(a) General: Psychological Operations were used in the 3d Brigade TF in coordination with tactical operations to exploit weaknesses, demoralize, and inform enemy forces of US intentions.

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(b) Ground loudspeaker missions were used in coordination with battalion operations.

(c) Aerial loudspeakers were utilized U-10 aircraft.

(d) Operations:

1 Leaflets dropped	9,236,090
2 Speaker time	104 hrs
3 Hoi Chanhs	29

14. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) ITEM: Stay behind ambushes:

DISCUSSION: The enemy in the PERSHING AO established a pattern of trailing US units on search and destroy operations. When this pattern was discovered the companies began employing squad sized stay behind ambushes. This tactic has proved extremely successful. The ground commander must carefully select the area, paying close attention to available cover and concealment.

OBSERVATION: Unit commanders should encourage the use of stay behind ambushes, and on occasion consider reversing his direction of march and move back into an area already searched.

(2) ITEM: Clearing of defoliated areas:

DISCUSSION: During Operation PERSHING numerous attempts were made to burn a large dry-wooded defoliated area by utilizing air strikes (napalm), WP grenades, artillery (WP), and dropping 55 gallon drums of napalm out of CH47, then trying to ignite it upon impact on the ground with tracer rounds and thermite grenades from gunships. All attempts occurred during 1400-1800 hrs, the hottest and driest period of the day; all attempts were unsuccessful.

OBSERVATION: A successful system/SOP should be developed so as guidance can be given for successful accomplishment of clearing defoliated areas for tactical aerial and ground observation.

(3) ITEM: Enemy snipers.

DISCUSSION: It has been found that the VC employ snipers and booby traps concurrently. Personnel attempting to maneuver against a sniper (s) have encountered booby traps and/or mines along trails, cuts in hedgegroves and rice paddy dikes.

OBSERVATION: When maneuvering against sniper fire, keep maneuver elements off of trails and obvious approaches into the area from which the fire is emanating.

(4) ITEM: Field expedient night vision aids.

DISCUSSION: Quite often night operations require aids to assist the leader in maintaining control. At times illumination, reflectors and other man made items are not available.

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
OBSERVATION: Decaying bamboo has proven to contain a luminous substance. A small piece of this material placed on the back of the helmet assists in maintaining control during the hours of darkness.

(5), ITEM: Maneuvering while taking part in search and destroy operations.

DISCUSSION: The guerrilla enemy very seldom stands & fights. In most instances he attempts to avoid contact by moving to one flank or the other. He also will follow a searching unit in order to avoid being discovered.

OBSERVATION: Frequent changes in direction to include doubling back has quite often enabled friendly units to engage enemy who would have normally been passed by.

b. Commander's Comments: In Operation PERSHING the 3d Brigade TF, in coordination with elements of the 22d ARVN Division, successfully accomplished its assigned mission of providing close security protection in general support of revolutionary development (RD) operations by conducting reconnaissance and surveillance patrols and search and destroy operations both in and around PHU MY area. Throughout the operation, an elusive but determined enemy repeatedly attempted to infiltrate the PHU MY area to disrupt RD and defeat ARVN forces controlling the area, with the apparent ultimate goal of regaining control of the population and vital rice harvests of the area. US and ARVN forces, however made tremendous strides both psychologically and tactically, through the use of well planned and executed FSYOPS and Civil assistance programs, superior fire power, air and land mobility, and coordinated US/ARVN operations. As a result, when the 3d Brigade TF left the PERSHING AO on 19 April 1967, the GVN movement in the PHU MY area had developed into a well established, progressive program.


JAMES G. SHANAHAN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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SUBJECT: Inclosure 1 (MAJOR CONTACTS, 1 March and 6 March 1967)
Combat After Action Report for FERSHING

1. Battle of 1 March 67:

a. Units involved: Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and Co A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

b. Mission: The Recon Platoon was on a search and destroy operation moving from east to west along the ridge line vic BR890775. Co A was on a search and destroy operation moving south on three axes vic BR877780.

c. Terrain: The terrain in the area was characterized by a high ridge line, sparsely vegetated in most areas along the crest with deep, densely vegetated draws and underbrush between the crest and the low ground.

d. Enemy: No known enemy units were reported in the area prior to the fire fight. The enemy has been known to use vegetated portions of the ridge for routes of movement from north to south.

e. Synopsis of actions:

(1) At 1330 hours, 1 March, the Recon Platoon was moving from east to west along the south side of the Crescent Ridge. Since the platoon was south of the top of the ridge, the movement was characterized by traversing of cross compartments. The platoon was in a column with point and flank security.

(2) At 1345 hours, the platoon reached a stream bed at BR889777. The point man heard movement on the higher ground to the west and then spotted several NVA. The point opened fire and the enemy returned the fire from prepared positions. The enemy had several automatic weapons and at least one machine gun.

(3) The platoon leader moved his platoon on line and maintained a heavy volume of fire to the front. Attempts to flank the enemy were fruitless since the machine gun (s) on higher ground prevented movement out from the cover of the rocks in the streambed. At this time the platoon was engaged at a range of 20 meters.

(4) The platoon leader called for fire support. The battalion commander decided to use gunships for fire/support due to the close quarters fighting. Co A was ordered to move south and east as rapidly as possible to cut off exfiltration routes. The recon plat was placed OPCON to Co A. Blocking fires by artillery were fired for the area south of the contact (an area characterized by dense vegetation and a cliff).

(5) Gunships were employed (4 ships) to fire on the area of contact. The Recon Platoon Leader directed the fire to within twenty meters of his own troops. After the first two runs, the firing by the enemy failed to let up. Two more runs were made and reduced the enemy volume of fire. The Recon Plat continued to fire at the enemy throughout the period.

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(6) As the enemy fire diminished (1500 hrs) the Recon Plat attempted to ~~move~~ forward with some success. One enemy round hit a WP grenade carried ~~on~~ a soldier's harness. The explosion killed one and wounded 3.

(7) The Recon Plat was ordered to hold its advance at 1515 since Co A was then 200-300 meters away closing in on three axes to link up at the contact area. The artillery was used to block exfiltration to the south.

(8) Contact was broken at approximately 1530 hrs.

(9) Results:

a. US Losses: 3 KHA, 5 WHA

b. Enemy losses: 7 NVA KIA,

Captured: 2 AK-47, 2 SKS.

2. Battle of Hoa Tan, 6 March 1967.

a. Unit involved:

Blue Team, 1/9 Cavalry

Co A, 2/5 Cavalry

Co A, 1/35 Infantry

Co B, 1/35 Infantry

Co C, 1/35 Infantry

Co B, 2/5 Cavalry

Btry A, 2/9 Artillery (DS - 1/35 Infantry)

b. Missions: The mission of all units initially was search and destroy or security. C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry was the support of the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division. Co A 2/5 Cavalry was the security company at LZ UPLIFT. Co A and Co B, 1/35 Infantry were conducting a village search of Chua Trieu - Son (BR857943). Co C, 1/35th Infantry was OPCON to 1/14th Infantry and conducting an operation in the Upper Suoi Ca Valley region. Co B, 2/5 Cavalry was located at LZ ENGLISH. A Btry, 2/9 Arty was DS 1/35th Infantry at LZ UPLIFT.

c. Terrain: The area of contact is characterized by flat rice paddies with palm groves and hedgerows around the villages. The village of Hoa Tan is surrounded by rice paddies, and further to the north, west, and south by low hills.

d. Enemy: No enemy forces were known to be in the contact area on 6 March 1967. No previous contacts had been made in the Hoa Tan area.

e. Synopsis of action:

(1) At approximately 0720 hours, 6 March 1967, a gunship, C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry spotted a military age male standing near a bunker vic BR972879. The gunship landed to apprehend the VCS, received fire, and was forced to land on a sand bar at DK980880.

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(2) The Blue Team, C/1/9 Cavalry was inserted at approximately 0735 hours to develop the situation in the area of contact. The platoon became heavily engaged with enemy in bunkers vic BR972879. (0830 - 0900 Hours).

(3) One platoon, Co A, 2/5 Cavalry was airlifted to a blocking position on the hill vic BR970880 and touched down at 1030 hours. On landing the platoon received automatic weapons fire and suffered one WIA. The platoon was OPCON to C 1/9 Cavalry.

(4) Co A, 2/5 Cavalry was alerted to send the remainder of the company to the contact area at 1045 hours. The CO, 1/35 Infantry was alerted to move Co A and Co B, 1/35th Infantry from their village search operation to encircle the Hoa Tan area and was directed to assume control of the area.

(5) Co A, 2/5 Cavalry completed its move to the blocking position by approximately 1130 hours. The Blue Team maintained sporadic contact throughout this period and several gunship strikes were called on the bunker positions in an attempt to neutralize the enemy.

(6) By 1130 hours, Co A and Co B, 1/35th Infantry were moving northeast (by foot) to the contact area. Co A sent one platoon by ground to secure LZ ANCHOR (BR942853) so that A battery, 2/9 Arty could be displaced from LZ UPLIFT. The contact area was at maximum range for the 155MM Arty Battery at LZ UPLIFT.

(7) Co B, 1/35th Infantry moved astride the road to a position vic BR967875, Arriving at that location at 1300 hours. At that point, the company split into two columns with the 1st and 3d platoons maneuvering to the southeast, then north, into the area of contact of the Blue Team. The Company minus, consisting of the 2d and 4th platoons, preceded towards the town of Hoa Tan.

(8) Co A, minus the platoon at LZ ANCHOR, moved through the saddle at BR952878 to occupy blocking positions north and west of Hoa Tan along the high ground. The company's move would, in effect, seal off the area since Co A, 2/5 Cavalry had blocked to the north.

(9) The CO, 1/35th Infantry assumed control of all forces in the area at approximately 1330 hours upon the completion of an air strike being conducted by CO, C/1/9 Cavalry. The Blue Team was extracted and placed on standby.

(10) As elements of Co B, 1/35th Infantry advanced along the finger at BR974876, they came under heavy automatic weapons fire at approximately 1400 hours. Gunships were used in support.

(11) Co B (-) approached the town of Hoa Tan on two axes and initiated contact with enemy occupying bunkers, and spider holes, and trenches. To the east on the finger, the 1st and 3d platoons withdrew a short distance to call for additional gunship support from C/1/9 Cavalry.

(12) As the afternoon progressed, the action of the 1st and 3d platoons continued to be characterized by sporadic contact. The Company (-) became more heavily engaged within the village of Hoa Tan. The enemy positions were well concealed and constructed. The enemy allowed some elements to pass and then came up from spider holes to fire on US Troops from the rear.

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(13) By 1600 hours the blocking force of Co A was in position and the 105 Battery (A/2/9) had closed LZ ANCHOR. The use of artillery at that time however was not feasible in the contact area. Blocking fires were used to the North of Co A, 1/35th Infantry position. Gunships from C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry and the 119th Avn Co were used to give close support to Co B, 1/35th Infantry.

(14) At 1545 hours, Co C, 1/35th Infantry was airlifted into LZ's vic BR977930 and moved south to blocking positions along the ridge from BR960920 southeast to BR977907. The company closed at dusk.

(15) Co B, 2/5 Cavalry was airlifted into blocking positions vic BR958900. The Blue Team was inserted at BR971900. These two units were placed OPCON to 1/35th Infantry on touchdown and were giving blocking missions.

(16) At 1630 Hours, the B company Commander, 1/35th Infantry was wounded and subsequently evacuated by the Battalion CO. The company was still engaged at close quarters in the fortified village and the use of supporting fires was hampered by the proximity of the friendly troops and blocking forces. Accordingly, B Co minus withdrew to positions along the road east of the village so that additional casualties could be evacuated and ammo resupply could be effected. The 1st and 3d platoons also withdrew 100 meters south for the same reason.

(17) Contact was broken at approximately 1900 hours. Co B was ordered to blocking positions - one at BR976876, the other at BR975875. At this point, A Battery, 2/9 Artillery began an intensive program to neutralize the fortified village and block escape routes.

(18) Throughout the night of 6-7 March Artillery was fired. At 0800 on 7 March, after six - battery volleys, B Co 1/35th Infantry attacked along the same axes and met only light resistance. Co A, 1/35th Infantry moved to the low ground just west of the village to afford better support. Co B, 1/35th Infantry cleared the town and began to police the battlefield.

f. Results:

(1) Enemy losses: 84 NVA KIA, 3 IMG, 1 RPG 2, 1 RPD, 1 M-79, 6 SKS, 3 AK-47's, 4 M-16, 1 US Carbine, 3 57MM RR rounds, 7 60MM mortar rounds, 1 flare pistol, 28 grenades, misc packs, documents, and ammunition.

(2) Documents recovered indicate the enemy unit was the 9th Battalion, 16th NVA Regiment. It is believed at least two enemy companies were involved in the battle.

(3) US Losses:

Co B, 1/35th Infantry - 3 KHA, 10 WHA

A Btry, 2/9 Arty - 1 KHA

C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry - 1 KHA, 5 WHA

A Co, 2/5 Cavalry - 3 WHA

g. Comments: This battle is typical of actions in fortified villages. Both the Blue Team and Co B, 1/35th Infantry were engaged in close quarters. The battle area was encircled to prevent escape. In this action, however the company withdrew periodically to utilize gunship and air support. Artillery when available after the displacement, was employed to the maximum extent possible to "soften" up the village. By chance, Co B, 1/35th Infantry was wearing armored vests on 6 March a fact which saved at least five lives. This is a good example of the "hammer and anvil" techniques.

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At 0910 hrs vic BR934584 1 enemy KIA; at 1127 hrs vic BR928585 1 enemy KIA, 1 enemy CIA/WIA, 1 enemy CIA. On 041100 April BN CP was airlifted to LZ TIP. A/2/12 Cav was placed under the OPCON of 1/14 Infantry Battalion for daylight operations 061530 April. One scout section, 1st platoon C 3/4 Cavalry was under the OPCON of 1/14 Infantry Battalion 5-6 April and conducted sweep operations along LU SIEM GIANG River with elements of the Battalion. 1st platoon (-) C 3/4 Cavalry OPCON 1/14 Infantry Battalion 7-13 April conducted village sweeps and search and destroy operations with elements of the Battalion. On 15 April, 1/14 Infantry was airlifted by C-130 aircraft to Chu Lai, OPCON on arrival to 196th Light Infantry Brigade.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations in the NUI MIEU Mountains area and Crescent Area in coordination and cooperation with elements of the 22d ARVN Division. Co B, on April, conducted Hammer and Anvil operations along the eastern Crescent beach Area. A 2/5 Cavalry OPCON 1/35th Infantry Battalion 1-2 April conducted search and destroy operations vic BR989751. D/1/5 Cavalry OPCON 1/35th Infantry Battalion 2-4 April conducted search and destroy operations vic BR993760. Co A on 4 April established blocking positions vic BR9577 in Coordination with a sweep to the south conducted by the 1st Battalion, 40th Regiment (ARVN). On 5 April the TAC CP and FSB was inserted at LZ ANCHOR. At 1955 hrs a large explosion occurred in the CP area which was estimated to be either a time or command detonated 250 pound bomb. Results: 4 US WHA. Co A on 6 April established blocking positions vic BR960920 to BR982913 in coordination and cooperation with the 4th Battalion, 40th Regiment (ARVN) operation to the north. On 11 April the TAC CP/FSB was extracted to LZ UPLIFT. On 19 April the 1/35 Infantry Battalion deployed by air to the LE JEUNE AO.

(3) 2/35th Infantry Battalion continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division until 4 April when the Battalion conducted a road march from base camp/Pleiku to LZ HAMMOND and was released from OPCON 4th Infantry Division upon closure. On 5 March the Battalion CP/FSB and Co A closed LZ ILLINI and the Battalion commenced search and destroy operations in lower KIM SON Valley, SUOI CA Valley and adjoining hill masses. On 15 April the entire Battalion was airlifted by C7A and CH-47 aircraft to the LE JEUNE AO, OPCON on arrival to the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON to 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon provided security for LZ UPLIFT during hours of darkness and provided security for S/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506, during daylight hours. During the period 5-8 April one scout section was OPCON 1/14th Infantry Battalion. 1 Scout team provided security for LZ UPLIFT. On 18 April C Troop (-) conducted convoy movement from base camp/Pleiku to holding area vic Qui Nhon, released from OPCON 4th Infantry Division upon closing area. 1st platoon on the same day conducted a road march from the PERSHING AO to Qui Nhon and reverted to the control of C Troop. The Troop commenced deployment by LST to the LE JEUNE AO on 20 April.

(5) D/65th Engineers continued to improve defensive perimeter of LZ UPLIFT. Deployment to the LE JEUNE AO by LST commenced on 18 April 1967.

(6) LRRP

<u>LRRP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS</u>
3A	1-4 April	BR853596
3B	1-2 April	CRO10750
3C	1-2 April	BR870798
3B	7-8 April	LZ SANTA
3A	7-9 April	LZ ILLINI
3C	7-8 April	BR864774
3C	9-11 April	BR802612
3D	9-11 April	BR850801
3B	12-13 April	LZ SANTA
3C	12-13 April	BR833618

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12. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Logistics:

(1) Supply:

(a) No major supply problem existed during Operation PERSHING. The 3d Brigade TF was supported with all classes of supplies by the Forward Support Area. TF WRIGHT/HARTSELL of the 1st Logistical Command. Supply points to distribute class I, II, III and IV supplies were operated by the 3d Brigade TF trains area by forward support elements of the 3d Support Battalion, 3d Brigade TF.

(2) (U) Transportation:

(a) The truck squads continued to be utilized for line haul between the base of operation and the Forward Support Area.

(b) An Air Force C7A was utilized daily to transport replacements, R&R, ETS, emergency leave, mail and critical supply items from base camp to the Area of Operation. C7A statistics:

<u>1</u>	Sorties Flown:	454
<u>2</u>	Passengers:	5,083
<u>3</u>	Cargo:	181,623 lbs

(3) On 15 February 3D Brigade TF moved from BRONCO BEACH by organic vehicle 30 km to LZ UPLIFT.

(4) (C) New Equipment

(a) The 3d Brigade TF has received all M16E1 Rifles to replace M14's Rifle and 90 per cent turn in of the M-14's has been completed.

(b) 100 CAR 15 Submachine guns were received and issued to units in the 3d Brigade TF for test and evaluation.

(5) Medical

(a) Number of patients treated by 3d Brigade TF clearing Station: 2482

(b) Number of disease cases: 2,133

(c) Number of Battle casualties: 161

(d) Number of non battle casualties: 213

(6) Statistics:

(a) Class I:

<u>1</u>	A Rations:	588,668
<u>2</u>	C Rations:	152629

(b) Class III

<u>1</u>	Mogas	205,077 gal
<u>2</u>	Diesel	154,572 gal
<u>3</u>	JP4	616,658 gal

(c) Class V

<u>1</u>	40MM	13,340 Rds
<u>2</u>	81MM HE	18,090 Rds
<u>3</u>	4.2"HE	10,050 Rds
<u>4</u>	105MM HE	38,900 Rds

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b. Personnel

(1) (C) Total number of casualties suffered by elements of the 3d Brigade TF during Operations PERSHING were as follows:

(a) UNIT	1/14	1/35	2/35	3/4	2/9	HHC	D/65
<u>1</u> KIA	2	10	1	3	1	-	-
<u>2</u> WIA	22	50	2	-	6	1	9

(b) Total

1 KIA - 172 WIA - 9013. (C) CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. Civil Affairs/ Psyops activities during the reporting period (12 February - 19 April 1967) continued throughout the base camp area as well as in the area of operations. The Brigade S5 section worked with Military Intelligence personnel, PSYOPS Team, MACV subsector personnel, National Police, GVN officials and Infantry units in support of tactical operations.

b. GVN representatives accompanied the Civil Affairs and PSYOPS Team whenever possible, to insure maximum impact on indigenous personnel. In many areas, this was the first exposure to the GVN for the people of the rural areas.

c. Civil Affairs Area of operation was in the Binh Dinh Province (PHU CAT and PHU MY Districts).

d. Summary:

(1) Total MEDCAP Operations:

- (a) Sickcall: 4,648 Personnel treated
- (b) Dental Hygiene: 56 Personnel treated
- (c) Baths for Children 142 Children bathed
- (d) A doctor accompanied the CA/PSYOPS Team on 19 operations

(2) Public Works:

- (a) Playground set at DIEM TIEU refugee hamlet.
- (b) Well dug at DIEM TIEU refugee hamlet.
- (c) Market place (3 buildings) at MY THO.
- (d) Highway 506 from HOAI AN to Highway #1 was repaired by D/65th Engineers and opened to traffic 31 March 1967.
- (e) 50 rolls of concertina and 20 rolls of straight barbed wire were provided to PHU MY District for the construction of hamlet defense in the Revolutionary Development program.

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(3) Public Welfare:

(a) 9½ tons of captured rice were returned to district officials for redistribution.

(b) 120 pounds of captured salt was distributed.

(c) The new market at MY THO hamlet in PHU MY district was officially opened on 8 April giving the people of Eastern PHU MY district a place to trade and improve their economy.

(4) Government and Education:

(a) 2 village bulletin boards have been erected at MY THO and DIEM TIEU.

(b) GVN flags were presented to the village chiefs of MY THO and DIEM TIEU.

(5) Refugee Assistance:

(a) A total of 1,177 refugees were relocated from areas controlled by VC and NVA to refugee centers in PHU MY district.

(b) The following supplies and assistance was given to the refugees.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
<u>1</u> Rice	18,780 lbs
<u>2</u> Salt	120 lbs
<u>3</u> Clothing	330 lbs
<u>4</u> Tobacco	24 ctas
<u>5</u> Candy	725 bags
<u>6</u> Canned goods	144 cases
<u>7</u> Bread	1,069 loaves

(c) Remarks:

1 Refugees in the PHU MY District suffered from many diseases, principally pneumonia, tuberculosis, and glaucoma. The children suffered from Exczema. MEDCAP missions were specifically arranged to help the newly located refugees.

2 The refugees problem in PHU MY District is considerable, with approximately 20,000 presently in the centers. Only 52% of the heads of families were gainfully employed. The camps themselves are generally overcrowded and lack for sanitary facilities. Efforts are being made by the US, ARVN and GVN agencies to alleviate the condition.

(2) Psychological Operations:

(a) General: Psychological Operations were used in the 3d Brigade TF in coordination with tactical operations to exploit weaknesses, demoralize, and inform enemy forces of US intentions.

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(b) Ground loudspeaker missions were used in coordination with battalion operations.

(c) Aerial loudspeakers were utilized U-10 aircraft.

(d) Operations:

1	Leaflets dropped	9,236,090
2	Speaker time	104 hrs
3	Hoi Chanh	29

14. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) ITEM: Stay behind ambushes:

DISCUSSION: The enemy in the PERSHING AO established a pattern of trailing US units on search and destroy operations. When this pattern was discovered the companies began employing squad sized stay behind ambushes. This tactic has proved extremely successful. The ground commander must carefully select the area, paying close attention to available cover and concealment.

OBSERVATION: Unit commanders should encourage the use of stay behind ambushes, and on occasion consider reversing his direction of march and move back into an area already searched.

(2) ITEM: Clearing of defoliated areas:

DISCUSSION: During Operation PERSHING numerous attempts were made to burn a large dry-wooded defoliated area by utilizing air strikes (napalm), WP grenades, artillery (WP), and dropping 55 gallon drums of napalm out of CH47, then trying to ignite it upon impact on the ground with tracer rounds and thermite grenades from gunships. All attempts occurred during 1400-1800 hrs, the hottest and driest period of the day; all attempts were unsuccessful.

OBSERVATION: A successful system/SOP should be developed so as guidance can be given for successful accomplishment of clearing defoliated areas for tactical aerial and ground observation.

(3) ITEM: Enemy snipers.

DISCUSSION: It has been found that the VC employ snipers and booby traps concurrently. Personnel attempting to maneuver against a sniper (s) have encountered booby traps and/or mines along trails, cuts in hedgerows and rice paddy dikes.

OBSERVATION: When maneuvering against sniper fire, keep maneuver elements off of trails and obvious approaches into the area from which the fire is emanating.

(4) ITEM Field expedient night vision aids.

DISCUSSION: Quite often night operations require aids to assist the leader in maintaining control. At times illumination, reflectors and other man made items are not available.

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combat assault at BR854603, established a blocking force as elements of the 41st ARVN Regiment swept SW.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion: Recon platoon on 1 March conducted search and destroy operations from BR901765 in a northerly direction along eastern edge of 506 Valley. At 1403 hrs at BR886775, Recon platoon contacted unknown size enemy force. Results: 7 NVA KIA, 4 small arms captured (2AK-47, 2AKS), and 3 US KIA, and 5 US WIA. On 4 March 1967 1/35th Infantry Battalion initiated Operation "CHECKMATE" conducting search and destroy operations in the western and northern Crescent Area. A/2/5 Cavalry helilifted to LZ UPLIFT 051605 March, OPCON 1/35th Infantry Battalion to provide security LZ UPLIFT. Co B on 061448 March at BR968880 became heavily engaged with an unknown size enemy force in fortified positions. The contact resulted in the commitment of 5 companies and one Cavalry Blue Team. Results: 84 enemy KIA; 5 crew-served, (3LMG, 1 RPG-2, 1 RPG), 15 small arms weapons CIA (1 M-79, 6 SKS, 3 AK-47, 4 M-16, 1 US Carbine), US Losses 5 KIA, 18 WIA. Operation "CHECKMATE" terminated 091110 March.

(3) 2/35th Infantry Battalion continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division.

(4) C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry: Troop (-) continued OPCON 4th Infantry Division. 1st platoon provided security of LZ UPLIFT during the hours of darkness. During daylight hours the 1st plat conducted clearing operations along Highway 1, provided security force for LITTS airfield, and provided security for engineer for road repair operations, road 506. On 6 March 5 APC's the 1st platoon provided security at LZ ANCHOR (BR940849) for the 1/35th Infantry Battalion forward CP and A/2/9 Artillery FSB. On 080715 March an APC of the 1st platoon C/3/4 Cavalry hit a mine on Highway 1 vic BR923825. Results: 3 US KIA, APC destroyed (2 WIA - D/65th Engineers). On 090845 March, at vic BR926823 located a mine (2 - 105mm artillery shells) on Highway 1 road clearing operations. Results: mine destroyed.

(5) IRRP

<u>IRRP</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS</u>
3B	1 March	BR735654
3B	2-6 March	BR732648
3A	7-9 March	BR798594

(6) Remark: On 040930 March persistent CS agent was dispersed to cause the enemy to be canalized into an area of surveillance for IRRP 3A.

d. Period 10 - 20 March 1967

(1) 1/14 Infantry Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations in IRON TRIANGLE area (center of mass BR7975), lower SUOI CA Valley and its western approaches, and the lower KIM SON Valley. On 141100 hrs Co A and recon platoon reacted to an intelligence report of a suspected enemy CP located BR793612. Recon plat C/A and Co A conducted 3 pronged envelopment of the objective; negative results for the operation. At 201121 March vic BR800572, Co C engaged an unknown size enemy force. Results: 2 VC KIA, 5 VC WIA/CIA.

(2) 1/35th Infantry Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in 506 Valley and adjoining hill masses with two companies. One company provided security for engr road repair operations, road 506 and provided security for LZ UPLIFT. On 12 March three companies conducted combat assaults into the western Crescent area to act as a screening force for possible enemy infiltration west from area of contact in 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division's (Airmobile) AO. Three companies and C 1/9 Cavalry Blue Team conducted cordon and search operations throughout the western Crescent area. 1/35th Infantry Battalion (-) consisting of the Battalion Forward CP and Companies B and C were placed under the OPCON of 2d Bde, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) effective 121600 March, then released from the OPCON of 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile) effective 131200 March. A/1/7 Cavalry was OPCON to the 1/35th Infantry Battalion during the period 12-16 March with the mission of providing security for LZ UPLIFT and providing security for D/65th Engineers road repair operations, road 506. On 16 March Co C conducted search and destroy operations along the western side of the NUI MIEU Mountain in coordination and cooperation with the 41st Regiment (ARVN).

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(6) As the enemy fire diminished (1500 hrs) the Recon Plat attempted to ~~move~~ forward with some success. One enemy round hit a WP grenade carried ~~at~~ a soldier's harness. The explosion killed one and wounded 3.

(7) The Recon Plat was ordered to hold its advance at 1515 since Co A was then 200-300 meters away closing in on three axes to link up at the contact area. The artillery was used to block exfiltration to the south.

(8) Contact was broken at approximately 1530 hrs.

(9) Results:

a. US Losses: 3 KHA, 5 WHA

b. Enemy losses: 7 NVA KIA,

Captured: 2 AK-47, 2 SKS.

2. Battle of Hoa Tan, 6 March 1967.

a. Unit involved:

Blue Team, 1/9 Cavalry

Co A, 2/5 Cavalry

Co A, 1/35 Infantry

Co B, 1/35 Infantry

Co C, 1/35 Infantry

Co B, 2/5 Cavalry

Btry A, 2/9 Artillery (DS - 1/35 Infantry)

b. Missions: The mission of all units initially was search and destroy or security. C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry was the support of the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division. Co A 2/5 Cavalry was the security company at LZ UPLIFT. Co A and Co B, 1/35 Infantry were conducting a village search of Chua Trieu - Son (BR857943). Co C, 1/35th Infantry was OPCON to 1/14th Infantry and conducting an operation in the Upper Suoi Ca Valley region. Co B, 2/5 Cavalry was located at LZ ENGLISH. A Dtry, 2/9 Arty was DS 1/35th Infantry at LZ UPLIFT.

c. Terrain: The area of contact is characterized by flat rice paddies with palm groves and hedgerows around the villages. The village of Hoa Tan is surrounded by rice paddies, and further to the north, west, and south by low hills.

d. Enemy: No enemy forces were known to be in the contact area on 6 March 1967. No previous contacts had been made in the Hoa Tan area.

e. Synopsis of action:

(1) At approximately 0720 hours, 6 March 1967, a gunship, C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry spotted a military age male standing near a bunker vic BR972879. The gunship landed to apprehend the VCS, received fire, and was forced to land on a sand bar at BR980880.

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(2) The Blue Team, C/1/9 Cavalry was inserted at approximately 0735 hours to develop the situation in the area of contact. The platoon became heavily engaged with enemy in bunkers vic BR972879. (0830 - 0900 Hours).

(3) One platoon, Co A, 2/5 Cavalry was airlifted to a blocking position on the hill vic BR970880 and touched down at 1030 hours. On landing the platoon received automatic weapons fire and suffered one WIA. The platoon was OPCON to C 1/9 Cavalry.

(4) Co A, 2/5 Cavalry was alerted to send the remainder of the company to the contact area at 1045 hours. The CO, 1/35 Infantry was alerted to move Co A and Co B, 1/35th Infantry from their village search operation to encircle the Hoa Tan area and was directed to assume control of the area.

(5) Co A, 2/5 Cavalry completed its move to the blocking position by approximately 1130 hours. The Blue Team maintained sporadic contact throughout this period and several gunship strikes were called on the bunker positions in an attempt to neutralize the enemy.

(6) By 1130 hours, Co A and Co B, 1/35th Infantry were moving northeast (by foot) to the contact area. Co A sent one platoon by ground to secure LZ ANCHOR (BR942853) so that A battery, 2/9 Arty could be displaced from LZ UPLIFT. The contact area was at maximum range for the 155MM Arty Battery at LZ UPLIFT.

(7) Co B, 1/35th Infantry moved astride the road to a position vic BR967875, Arriving at that location at 1300 hours. At that point, the company split into two columns with the 1st and 3d platoons maneuvering to the southeast, then north, into the area of contact of the Blue Team. The Company minus, consisting of the 2d and 4th platoons, preceded towards the town of Hoa Tan.

(8) Co A, minus the platoon at LZ ANCHOR, moved through the saddle at BR952878 to occupy blocking positions north and west of Hoa Tan along the high ground. The company's move would, in effect, seal off the area since Co A, 2/5 Cavalry had blocked to the north.

(9) The CO, 1/35th Infantry assumed control of all forces in the area at approximately 1330 hours upon the completion of an air strike being conducted by CO, C/1/9 Cavalry. The Blue Team was extracted and placed on standby.

(10) As elements of Co B, 1/35th Infantry advanced along the finger at BR974876, they came under heavy automatic weapons fire at approximately 1400 hours. Gunships were used in support.

(11) Co B (-) approached the town of Hoa Tan on two axes and initiated contact with enemy occupying bunkers, and spider holes, and trenches. To the east on the finger, the 1st and 3d platoons withdrew a short distance to call for additional gunship support from C/1/9 Cavalry.

(12) As the afternoon progressed, the action of the 1st and 3d platoons continued to be characterized by sporadic contact. The Company (-) became more heavily engaged within the village of Hoa Tan. The enemy positions were well concealed and constructed. The enemy allowed some elements to pass and then came up from spider holes to fire on US Troops from the rear.

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1 March 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report for PERSHING

(13) By 1600 hours the blocking force of Co A was in position and the 105 Battery (A/2/9) had closed LZ ANCHOR. The use of artillery at that time however was not feasible in the contact area. Blocking fires were used to the North of Co A, 1/35th Infantry position. Gunships from C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry and the 119th Avn Co were used to give close support to Co B, 1/35th Infantry.

(14) At 1545 hours, Co C, 1/35th Infantry was airlifted into LZ via vic BR977930 and moved south to blocking positions along the ridge from BR960920 southeast to BR977907. The company closed at dusk.

(15) Co B, 2/5 Cavalry was airlifted into blocking positions vic BR958900. The Blue Team was inserted at BR971900. These two units were placed OPCON to 1/35th Infantry on touchdown and were giving blocking missions.

(16) At 1630 Hours, the B company Commander, 1/35th Infantry was wounded and subsequently evacuated by the Battalion CO. The company was still engaged at close quarters in the fortified village and the use of supporting fires was hampered by the proximity of the friendly troops and blocking forces. Accordingly, B Co minus withdrew to positions along the road east of the village so that additional casualties could be evacuated and ammo resupply could be effected. The 1st and 3d platoons also withdrew 100 meters south for the same reason.

(17) Contact was broken at approximately 1900 hours. Co B was ordered to blocking positions - one at BR976876, the other at BR975875. At this point, A Battery, 2/9 Artillery began an intensive program to neutralize the fortified village and block escape routes.

(18) Throughout the night of 6-7 March Artillery was fired. At 0800 on 7 March, after six - battery volleys, B Co 1/35th Infantry attacked along the same axes and met only light resistance. Co A, 1/35th Infantry moved to the low ground just west of the village to afford better support. Co B, 1/35th Infantry cleared the town and began to police the battlefield.

f. Results:

(1) Enemy losses: 84 NVA KIA, 3 IMG, 1 RPG 2, 1 RPD, 1 M-79, 6 SKS, 3 AK-47's, 4 M-16, 1 US Carbine, 3 57MM RR rounds, 7 60MM mortar rounds, 1 flare pistol, 28 grenades, misc packs, documents, and ammunition.

(2) Documents recovered indicate the enemy unit was the 9th Battalion, 16th NVA Regiment. It is believed at least two enemy companies were involved in the battle.

(3) US Losses:

Co B, 1/35th Infantry - 3 KHA, 10 WHA

A Btry, 2/9 Arty - 1 KHA

C Troop, 1/9 Cavalry - 1 KHA, 5 WHA

A Co, 2/5 Cavalry - 3 WHA

g. Comments: This battle is typical of actions in fortified villages. Both the Blue Team and Co B, 1/35th Infantry were engaged in close quarters. The battle area was encircled to prevent escape. In this action, however the company withdrew periodically to utilize gunship and air support. Artillery when available after the displacement, was employed to the maximum extent possible to "soften" up the village. By chance, Co B, 1/35th Infantry was wearing armored vests on 6 March a fact which saved at least five lives. This is a good example of the "hammer and anvil" techniques.