

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION, 35TH INFANTRY
“Cacti Blue”
APO San Francisco 96355

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding Officer
3d Bde TF, 25th Inf Div
ATTN: S3 Plans
APO San Francisco 96355

1. Name of Operation: Operation Baker
2. Dates of Operation: 211800H Apr 67 - 110659H May 67
3. Location: Quang Ngai Provence; Mo Duc and Duc Pho Districts
4. Command and Control Headquarters
 - a. LTC Clinton E. Granger, Jr., CO, 2d Bn 35th Inf
 - b. CPT S.L.C. Barcena, CO, A Company, 2d Bn 35th Inf
 - c. CPT Ralph B. Walker, CO, B Company, 2d Bn 35th Inf
 - d. CPT James R. Lanning, CO, C Company, 2d Bn 35th Inf
 - e. CPT William G. Strunck, CO, C Company, 2d Bn 34th Armor
 - f. CPT Ronald Penn, CO, C Troop, 3d Sqdn 4th Cav
 - g. CPT Richard E. Dwinnel, CO, C Battery, 2d Bn 9th Arty
 - h. 1LT Homer Krout, Plt Ldr, Reconnaissance Platoon , 2d Bn, 35th Inf
5. Task Organization:
 - a. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
 - b. Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
 - c. Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
 - d. Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
 - e. Troop C, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry
 - f. Company C, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor
 - g. Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (DS)
6. Intelligence:

The Duc Pho and Mo Duc Districts are, and have been, not only a refuge, but also a food supply source for the Viet Cong Main Force Units and NVA units to the west in the foot hills. The populous of the area remain VC sympathizers and provide shelter and early warning from ARVN and US troops.

Almost every village or hamlet in the district is honeycombed with tunnels. Each of the hamlets is fortified with bunkers and trench lines. These hamlets are capable of hiding up to one platoon or more of enemy troops.

The small peninsula in the central east portion of Duc Pho District has been the hot spot of our AO. During the reporting period there were many instances of reported suspected enemy CP's in the northern section of the peninsula. Also there were more ground-to-air fire incidents in there than any other section of the AO.

The Song Tra Cau river valley to the west of the plains area is a natural avenue of movement by both VC main force and NVA units. Since US forces have come into the area, the VC/NVA units have had to restrict their movement to mainly the hours of limited visibility. However, random night operations such as ambushes and patrols have hampered the VC/NVA in this area.

7. Mission:

The mission of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry TF was to conduct search and destroy operations in their assigned area of operations.

8. Execution:

21 April 67, at 211800H, 2/35 Inf TF ended operation LeJeune and commenced Operation Baker, with three organic rifle companies and one troop of armored cavalry attached. Disposition of units were as follows:

a. 2-35 Inf TF CP	LZ Montezuma
b. A/2-35 Inf	LZ Shoup
c. B/2-35 Inf	LZ Guadalcanal
d. C/2-35 Inf	BS837364
e. C/3-4 Cav	LZ Guadalcanal

In addition to the major units described above, the battalion had a squad size outpost on LZ Tripoli to control the sea coast inlet vic BS8540 equipped with a 106RR and attached quad 50. A platoon from Company A manned LZ Semper to reinforce RF/PF company assigned to guard two ARVN 105mm howitzers.

During the reporting period the 2-35 Inf TF conducted search and destroy operations in their assigned AO. On 4 May 1967, the Battalion CP displaced from LZ Montezuma to LZ Liz, vicinity BS755431. On 7 May 1967, Company C, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor was attached to the battalion. The addition of this company commanded by CPT Strunck, and reinforced with a platoon from C/2-35, provided a fast reacting element on the peninsula. On the same day, B/2-35 was placed OPCON to B/1-9 Cav.

During Operation Baker, there were no significant contacts. However, there were three or four reported small contacts each day. These contacts were normally with small groups of three or four each and resulted in one or two enemy killed a day. One of the

major problem areas encountered was finding the individual weapon of the enemy killed. The area was dotted with spider holes, rice paddy and hedgerows. These proved excellent areas for the hiding of weapons.

The 2-35 Inf TF conducted saturation patrolling during the day and ambushes and patrolling during the night. These activities disrupted enemy activity and restricted their movement.

In addition, several large caches of rice were found and evacuated to Mo Duc or Duc Pho District Headquarters. Indigent personnel were airlifted from their respective districts to bag and evacuate the rice. This practice freed the units to further search the cache area, leaving a security force behind for the work party.

9. Results:

a. Enemy Losses

(1) Personnel

KIA	46
WIA	7
CIA	8
VCS (Det)	415

(2) Weapons

b. Friendly Losses

KIA	5
WIA	17
NBI	6
Total Losses	28

FOR THE COMMANDER

sic James T. Hennessey, Jr.
JAMES T. HENNESSEY, JR.
1LT, Infantry
Adjutant