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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 HEADQUARTERS, 2ND BATTALION 35TH INFANTRY
 APO San Francisco 96262

23 May 1970

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

Commanding Officer
 2nd Brigade, 4th Inf Div
 ATTN: S-5
 APO San Francisco 96262

1.(C) Name of Operation: BINH TAY 1.

2.(C) Dates of Operations: 6 May - 13 May.

3.(C) Locations: The general location of the operation was 65 Kilometers west of PLEIKU, RVN, in the SE SAN RIVER VALLEY of CAMBODIA.

4.(C) Control Headquarters:

a. 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division located at NBW PLEI DJERENG.

b. 2-35 Inf forward Command Post located at LZ CONQUER.

6.(C) Key Personnel:

POSITION	NAME
BN CO	LTC WILLIAMS L. HARRISON, JR.
BN XO	MAJ WILLIAM J. HARDENBURCH
BN S-1	1LT ROBERT P. BOSKING
BN S-2	1LT BRUNO JACSMANN
BN S-3	MAJ EVERETT R. THOMAS
BN S-3 AIR	1LT PHILIP R. RUSS
BN S-4	1LT JOHN M. HAYDEN
BN S-5	CPT HARRY M. WEISMANN
BN SPT PLT LDR	1LT MICHAEL D. MACMANN
A CO	CPT JERRY S. CLARK
B CO	1LT BERT L. JACOB
C CO	CPT BURL D. MAGEE
D CO	CPT DAVID B. O'BRIAN
E CO	CPT EMILIO GUTIERREZ

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KNOWN PLT LDR
 4.2 MORTAR PLT LDR
 A/4-42 ARTY CO
 A/4-42 ARTY LO

1LT THOMAS M. WAJER
 2LT WILLIS M. MURKA
 CPT PAUL STEWART
 CPT GORDAN CAMERON-STUART

6. (C) Task Organization:

A/2-35 Inf
 B/2-35 Inf
 C/2-35 Inf
 D/2-35 Inf

BN COB
 BGN PLT/2-35 Inf
 4.2 MORT PLT/2-35 Inf
 A/4-42 Arty (DB)
 PLT/C/4th Engr (DB)

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Supporting artillery to include TIG, Night Fire, Quick Fire, and Defensive Targets, were provided by A/4-42 Arty at FEB CONQUER.

b. Gunship support was provided on a mission request basis by 2nd BDE located at NEW PLEI DJERENG.

c. Tactical Air Support was available on a pre-planned and/or immediate request basis through 2nd BDE, 4th Inf Div. Numerous pre-planned requests were submitted by this battalion.

d. KNIGHT/SCORPION missions were available on a pre-planned basis through S-2, 2nd BDE, 4th Inf Div.

8. (C) Intelligence:

a. Terrain: The terrain consisted of gently rolling hills with many open areas. With the small streams almost dried up, water was not readily available. The weather was unusually hot with no significant precipitation.

b. Enemy Situation: It was estimated that a refitting station would be located in the area with accompanying supply and training facilities. The K-37 Sapper Bn is known to have frequented this area, but was not expected to be there at that time. It was expected that the enemy would evade if possible.

c. Large enemy housing and storage complexes were found. However, all of these were food storage; no equipment, weapons, or munitions caches were found. A total of 359 huts, 41,950 lbs of rice, and 200 lbs of salt were found and destroyed. 113 bunkers were found, but, due to the small amount of time allotted to the mission, most of these were not destroyed. A training area, complete with mock concertina, and several huts believed to be classrooms were also destroyed. The enemy departed the area at the approach of friendly forces. Only two, one of whom was KIA and one

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of whom (an elderly woman) was captured, came in contact with friendly units. Other contacts consisted mainly of sniper fire. The commanders on the ground judged, from the signs they found, that the enemy had evaded to the north and west. Numerous additional complexes could be seen from the air. These could not be exploited however, due to the limited time available. It is estimated that a substantial number of facilities and supplies were not destroyed. The enemy will probably reoccupy, rebuild, and continue to develop the same area. Although his resources were damaged significantly, it is estimated that sufficient supplies remain to sustain the cadre and production workers in the near future.

9. (C) 2-35 Inf repositioned its forces and initiated search and destroy operations on 7 May 70, in AO CONQUER to locate, capture, and/or destroy enemy forces, installations, and facilities.

10. (C) Concept of Operations: The initiation of the operation was conducted in two phases.

a. Phase I: At 060700H May 70, Bn moved by convey from CAMP RADCLIFF to LZ MERIDETH. Bn trains continued the move to NEW PLEI DJERENG.

b. Phase II: At 070600H May 70, A, B, C, & D Companies, Bn TOC, and Ron platoon conducted CA into AO CONQUER and began search and destroy operations. 4.2 Mortar platoon conducted an airlift to LZ CONQUEST to begin support mission for the Bn. (Annex A)

11. (C) Execution: On 7 May 70, 2-35 Inf began operations by establishing the battalion CP at FSB CONQUER (YA600400).

a. A Co: On 7 May 70, A Company assumed the mission of security of FSB CONQUER. Upon CA'ing into the LZ, A Co found a hootch containing 2000 lbs of rice. A Co sent sweeps around the perimeter of the fire base. On 10 May 70, 2/A found 3 hootches containing 2 tons of rice. On the same day 1/A found a hootch containing 3 tons of rice in 250 lb bags. On 111742H May 70, A Co conducted a CA from FSB CONQUER to LZ via YA514399, and began search and destroy operations in their AO. On 120926H May 70, via YA514404, 3/A sweep was checking an old hootch when the security man observed 2 individuals 50 meters to the north. The security man engaged the enemy with small arms and the enemy fled to the west. A sweep of the area revealed Ho Chi Minh sandal prints. On 13 May, A Co conducted a FE and AL to NEW PLEI DJERENG and conveyed to CAMP RADCLIFF to begin stand-down in preparation for upcoming operations.

b. B Co: On 071732H May 70, B Company completed a CA from LZ MERIDETH into LZ CHEETAH and departed to the north to begin search and destroy operations in their AO. On 081354H May 70, via YA595402, B Co OP observed 2 enemy 30 meters to the south moving to the south. The OP engaged the enemy with small arms fire. The enemy returned fire and fled to the south. A sweep of the area revealed negative findings. Results of the contact were 1 friendly KIA. On 101515H May 70, via YA580404, 3/B found a village consisting of 25 hootches and 4 fighting positions. The village was

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capable of housing 100 individuals. On 11 May 70, B Company conducted a FE and AL to FST CONQUER to assume the mission of security and construction, and, on 13 May, B Co conducted a FE to NEW PLEI DJERENG and conveyed to CAMP RADCLIFF to begin stand-down in preparation for upcoming operations.

c. C Co: On 7 May 70, C Company conducted a CA into LZ LION and departed to the west to begin search and destroy operations in their AO. At 1525H, via YA598400, C Co found a village consisting of 25 hootches and livestock. On 080854H, via YA591406, 1/C observed one enemy 50 meters to the north moving to the east. The enemy was engaged by small arms and light organics resulting in 1 enemy KIA. On 081146H May 70, via YA586407, 2/C detained an 80 year old woman who was extremely sick. The woman was evacuated to 2nd RDE at NEW PLEI DJERENG. On 120853H May 70, via YA589421, C Company point man was approaching a hootch. When the point man was approximately 20 meters away two enemy fled to the northeast. The point man engaged the enemy with small arms, however, a sweep revealed negative findings. On 13 May 70, C Company conducted a FE to NEW PLEI DJERENG and conveyed to CAMP RADCLIFF to begin a stand-down in preparation for upcoming operations.

d. D Co: On 7 May 70, D Company completed a CA into LZ PANTHER and departed to the northeast into their AO to begin search and destroy operations. On 080827H May 70, via YA600409, D Co found a village consisting of 43 hootches, 1 church, and 20 bunkers. Inside the village was found 1500 lbs of rice. At 1256H, via YA602409, 3/D found a hootch containing 2000lbs of unpolished rice. At 1545H, via YA627413, 1/D received 15 rounds of small arms sniper fire from via YA627413. Heavy organic fire was returned and a sweep of the area revealed negative findings. On 111750H May 70, via YA536393, D Co sweep to the south observed 10-12 individuals to the east approximately 300 meters. Enemy opened up on the sweep with an estimated 500 rounds of AK-47 and automatic weapons fire and fled to the east. Small arms and artillery were employed, however, a sweep of the area revealed negative findings. There were no friendly casualties. On 13 May 70, D Company conducted a FE and AL to NEW PLEI DJERENG and conveyed to CAMP RADCLIFF to begin a stand-down in preparation for upcoming operations.

e. Recon Platoon: On 7 May 70, Recon platoon conducted a CA from LZ MERIDETH to LZ CONQUER and moved overland to the southwest into their AO to begin RIF operations. On 081025H May 70, via YA600395, Recon platoon found a hootch containing 2000 lbs of uncut rice. At 1216H, via YA605388, Recon found a village consisting of 35 hootches and 20 bunkers. On 111012H May 70, via YA589390, Recon platoon found a village consisting of 23 hootches and 12 bunkers. On 120852H May 70, via YA579386, Recon platoon found 3 storage hootches containing 1 ton of unpolished rice. At 1311H, via YA565395, Recon plt found a training area consisting of 23 hootches w/bunkers inside, 2 classrooms with blackboards, wood mockups of B-40 rockets, and an obstacle course. On 13 May 70, Recon platoon conducted a FE and AL to NEW PLEI DJERENG and conveyed to CAMP RADCLIFF to begin a stand-down in preparation for upcoming operations.

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12.(C) Results: The operation yielded the following results:

1 x enemy KIA	720 x rds AK-47 ammunition
1 x detainee	25 x rds SKB ammunition
21 x tons rice	2 x 2.75mm rockets
200 x lbs salt	3 x .51 cal rds
359 x hootches	5 x axes/bows
113 x bunkers	1 x AK-47 cleaning kit
1 x flint-lock rifle	1 x AK-47 bayonet
10 x villages	numerous documents
1 x hospital complex	medical supplies
1 x training area	numerous rice supplies
1 x mess area	

13.(C) Administrative Matters:

a. Supply: Battalion trains was located at NEW PLEI DJERENG, and a forward resupply point for emergency Class I and V was maintained at FSB CONQUER. To enable UH-1 helicopters more time to resupply the elements in the field, at least one internal OH-47 sortie was resupplied to the fire base each day.

b. Maintenance: Limited organizational maintenance was performed at the trains area, and items requiring repair beyond battalion capability were transferred to C Co 704th Maint.

c. Treatment of Casualties: Battalion aid stations were located at both the trains and forward fire base. Due to the open area of operations the jungle penetrator was required only once during this operation.

d. Transportation: The availability of aircraft for resupply and operations was not a problem. Vehicles for the convoy to LA MERIDITH were supplied by 54th Trans Det and 4th S&T Bn.

e. Communications: No communications problems occurred during this operation.

14.(C) Special Equipment and Techniques: The GRC/163 Multiplex radio was experimented with with great success on FSB CONQUER. The radio provided 4-channel communications with HDE and the rear area in CAMP RADOLIFF.

15.(C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Enemy Situation: As predicted by the intelligence estimate, the enemy had been using the SE SAN RIVER VALLEY as a base area/food production area. Numerous Montagnard villages dotted the country-side, and one NVA/VC training area was discovered. Trail signs and warm campfires indicated that the enemy had moved out to the north and west just prior to our arrival.

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b. Tactics Employed: Company-sized search and destroy formations characterized the entire operation. Because of the time required to burn hootches and destroy large quantities of rice and because of the short duration of the operation, a majority of the villages in the AO were not exploited. A more realistic approach to the Battalion's AO would have been ambushing the multiple well-used trails.

WILLIAMS L. HARRISON, JR.
LTC, Infantry
Commanding

ANNEXES:

A - Operation Overlay

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