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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION 35TH INFANTRY  
APO San Francisco 96262

24 July 1970

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (U)

Commanding Officer  
1st Brigade, 4th Inf Div  
APTE: US  
APO San Francisco 96262

1.(C) Name of Operation: WAYNE PAST

2.(C) Dates of Operation: 28 Jun - 14 Jul

3.(C) Location: The general location of the operation was 38 kilometers north of CAMP RADCLIFF.

4.(C) Control Headquarters:

a. 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division located at LZ ARMAGEDDON.

b. 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry forward Command Post located at LZ WHICH (ME495879).

5.(C) Key Personnel:

POSITION	NAME	PERIOD
BN CO	LTC WILLIAMS L. HARRISON, JR.	28 Jun - 14 Jul
BN XO	MAJ WILLIAM J. HARDENBURGH	28 Jun - 14 Jul
BN S1	1LT CLYDE R. WHITE	28 Jun - 14 Jul
BN S2	CPT KIRK W. LARSEN	28 Jun - 11 Jul
BN S2	CPT GILBERT JACOBS	11 Jul - 14 Jul
BN S3	MAJ EVERETT R. THOMAS	28 Jun - 7 Jul
BN S3	CPT JERRY S. CLARK	7 Jul - 14 Jul
BN S3 AIR	CPT PHILIP REARDEN	28 Jun - 14 Jul
BN S4	CPT BURL B. MAGEE	28 Jun - 14 Jul
BN S5	CPT HARRY M. WEISMANN	28 Jun - 5 Jul
BN SPT FMP LRR	1LT RICHARD A. WETHERELL	28 Jun - 14 Jul
A CO	CPT JERRY S. CLARK	28 Jun - 6 Jul
A CO	CPT MELVIN BANES	6 Jul - 14 Jul
B CO	CPT GILBERT JACOBS	28 Jun - 10 Jul
B CO	CPT JACK R. VANDERPOOL	10 Jul - 14 Jul
C CO	1LT RALPH W. JAMES	28 Jun - 14 Jul
D CO	1LT MARSHALL V. ERICKSON	28 Jun - 14 Jul

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POSITION	NAME	PERIOD
BN CO	CPT KIRK W. LARSEN	26 Jun - 14 Jul
RECON PIP LDR	1LT THOMAS M. WAJER	26 Jun - 30 Jun
RECON PIP LDR	1LT GEORGE W. LANIER	30 Jun - 14 Jul
4.2 MORTAR PIP LDR	1LT WILLIE M. MUSKA	26 Jun - 14 Jul
A/4-42 ARMY CO	CPT PAUL STEWART	26 Jun - 14 Jul
A/4-42 ARMY LG	CPT GORDAN CAMERON-STEWART	26 Jun - 14 Jul

6. (C) Task Organization:

A/2-35 Inf (OPCON IDOC 1 Jul - 8 Jul)	BN COH
B/2-35 Inf (OPCON IDOC 8 Jul - 14 Jul)	BN PIP/2-35 Inf
C/2-35 Inf (OPCON IDOC 26 Jun - 1 Jul)	4.2 MORT PIP/2-35 Inf
D/2-35 Inf	A/4-42 Arty (BS) SOG/C/4th Regt (BS)

7. (C) Supporting Forces:

a. Supporting artillery to include TIG, Night Fixes, Quick Reaction Fixes, and Defensive Targets, were provided by A/4-42 Arty in direct support of 2-35 Inf.

b. Gunship support was provided on a mission request basis by 1st BDE, 4th Inf Div, located at CAMP RADSLIY.

c. Tactical Air Support was available on a pre-planned and/or immediate request basis through 1st BDE, 4th Inf Div. Numerous pre-planned requests were submitted by and flown in support of this battalion.

d. SHOOPT/SCORPION missions were available on a pre-planned basis through S2, 1st BDE, 4th Inf Div. Numerous SHOOPT/SCORPION missions were flown for this battalion, however, none led to any significant findings by ground troops.

8. (C) Intelligence:

a. Terrain and Weather: The area was a plateau with mountainous regions, but mainly rolling hills. There was triple canopy jungle with sparse under-growth and LZ's were scarce in certain areas. The weather was hot and humid, with scattered thunderstorms in the late afternoon and evening.

b. Enemy: Elements of the 3d NVA Div were believed to be in the AO. This was confirmed by the CIA of documents and one POW, from the 243rd Trans Bn, 240th Trans Regt, 3d NVA Div. There were numerous trails and huts in the area. Two main trails exist running generally NW to SSE, approximately 6 feet wide. The enemy has been using bicycles on these main trails as evidenced by 2 bicycles CIA and bicycles parts in the area.

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The enemy appears to be trying to evade contact in the zone, rather than leaving the area completely. This is most likely due to the fact that the enemy is mainly working on food production in the AO.

9. (C) Mission: 2-35 Inf continued aggressive search and destroy operations in AO SCHLITZ to locate & destroy 3d NVA Div HQ and rear service elements, locate and destroy enemy supply bases, and interdict enemy infiltration and supply routes.

10. (C) Concept of Operations: 2-35 Inf maintained the Bn CP at LZ WELCH with the companies operating in AO SCHLITZ; one company provided security for the Golf Course at CAMP RADCLIFF.

11. (C) Execution:

a. A Company: On 281025H Jun 70, via ER500918, 2/A sweep was moving north when one enemy was observed 30 meters to the NE. 2/A engaged the enemy with small arms and the enemy returned 5-5 rounds AK-47 fire. The enemy fled to the east and 2/A pursued using artillery as blocking fire. A heavy blood trail was found which disappeared after 75 meters. On 30 1107H Jun 70, via ER493922, 3/A, while on a sweep to the SE, observed one enemy 50 meters to the south. The enemy was engaged with small arms, but did not return fire. Pursuit to the east revealed a blood trail for 200 meters. The blood trail ended at a stream. On 1 Jul, A Co conducted an airlift to CAMP RADCLIFF to begin the Golf Course security mission. At 1224H on 8 Jul, A Co completed an airlift from CAMP RADCLIFF to LZ via ER410893. A Co departed the LZ to the east and resumed search and destroy operations. On 111700H Jul 70, at via ER429899, 1/A located a deserted anti-aircraft position, 15' in dia and 5' deep. Behind the gun position was a bunker, 20' long, 2' wide, w/2' overhanded. On 14 Jul, A Co conducted a PR/AL to LZ TWO BITS and began a stand-down in preparation for the next operation.

b. B Company: At the beginning of this reporting period B Co had the mission of security and training at PBB WELCH. On 2 Jun, B Co conducted a CA to LZ via ER410888 and began search and destroy operations in their assigned AO. On 030929H Jul 70, via ER415888, 2/B was sweeping to the NE when they observed 2 enemy 100 meters to the NE. The enemy were wearing green shirts and carried packs and 1 AK-47 rifle. The enemy was engaged with small arms fire and artillery was employed as the enemy fled to the ENE. A sweep of the area revealed negative findings. At 1354H, via ER414885, an ambush was initiated by 3/B on one enemy who was moving to the north. A claymore mine was set off when the enemy was 15 feet away. The results of the contact were 1 enemy WIA/POW and one AK-47 rifle CIA. Also captured were 3 letters which the enemy had been carrying. On 04 1335H Jul 70, via ER410883, an OP on LZ security for 3/B, observed one enemy, 30 meters to the west. The OP initiated small arms fire on the enemy, and a second enemy appeared and returned 7-10 rounds of AK-47 fire. The enemy then fled to the west. A sweep of the area revealed 1 enemy KIA and a heavy blood trail to the west. Friendly casualties were 1 WIA. At 1400H on 5 Jul, 2/B located a 750 lb bomb (M-117A1E1) at via ER

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41058970. An EOD team was called in through 1st BDE and the bomb was destroyed. On 8 Jul, B Co conducted a FE/AL to CAMP MADCLIFF to assume the Golf Course security mission.

c. C Company: At the beginning of this reporting period, C Co had the mission of Golf Course security at CAMP RADCLIFF. On 1 Jul, C Co conducted an airlift from CAMP RADCLIFF to LZ via BR505923 and began search and destroy operations in their assigned AO. On 041705H Jul 70, via BR480937, 2/C received 4-5 rounds of sniper fire from the NE. Artillery was employed, however, a sweep revealed that the enemy fled to the N. On 051242H Jul 70, while set up in a defensive perimeter at via BR494922, an OP observed one enemy crawling towards the perimeter from the south. The OP initiated small arms fire when the enemy was 30 meters from him. There was no return fire and a sweep revealed negative findings. On 8 Jul, 1/C found 100 fighting and sleeping positions at via BR479938. On 10 Jul, C Co conducted an airlift to PSE WELCH to begin the security and training mission. On 14 Jul, C Co closed PSE WELCH and conducted an air lift to LZ TWO BITS to begin a stand-down in preparation for the next operation.

d. D Company: On 011225H Jul 70, via BR410886, 1/D sweep moving to the north observed 2-3 enemy 30 meters to the N. The pointman for 1/D initiated small arms fire and received 15-20 rounds AK-47 fire from the enemy. Artillery blocking fire was employed, however, a sweep revealed that the enemy had fled to the north. On 2 Jul, D Co conducted an air-lift to FSB WELCH to begin the security and training mission. On 9 Jul, D Co conducted CA's into multiple LZ's and resumed search and destroy operations. At 1421H, via BR467947, 1/D sweep to the SE, observed 1 hootch. Three enemy emerged from the hootch as the sweep approached. 1/D initiated small arms fire on the enemy, who fled to the north. 1/D pursued the enemy, however, they had no further contact with the enemy. On 101735H Jul 70, while moving to their ambush location, via BR449945, 3/D pointman observed 2 enemy moving to the west. When the enemy was 150 meters away the pointman initiated small arms fire and the enemy fled to the E. Artillery blocking fire was employed, however, a sweep revealed negative findings. On 14 Jul, D Co conducted a FE/AL to LZ TWO BITS to begin a stand-down in preparation for the next operation.

e. Recon Plateon: At the beginning of this reporting period, Recon Plt was in a stand-down posture at FSB WELCH in preparation for Recende School to begin on 1 Jul. On 1 Jul, Recon Plt began Recende School under the instruction of K/75th Rangers, and graduated on 12 Jul.

12(C) Results: Operation WAYNE FAST yielded the following results:

11 x contacts	1 x tunnel
1 x NVA/VC KIA	200 x fighting positions
1 x NVA/VC WIA/POW	100 x sleeping positions
2 x AK-47 rifles	1 x cooking area
1 x SKS rifle w/o bolt	1 x anti-aircraft position
1 x 120mm mortar rd	1 x 750 lb bomb (M-117A1E1)

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3 x AK-47 magazines  
25 x hatchets  
20 x bunkers  
7 x bridges

3 x bycycles  
numerous medical supplies  
numerous documents  
various misc equipment

13. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Supply: Battalion forward trains were located at LZ ARMAGEDDON, and a forward resupply point for emergency Class I and V was maintained at the forward fire base.

b. Maintenance: Limited organizational maintenance was performed at the trains area, and items requiring repair beyond battalion capability were transferred to C Co, 704th Maint.

c. Treatment of Casualties: Battalion Aid stations were located at both the rear area and forward fire base. Due to triple canopy jungle in the area of operation, a majority of the casualties had to be extracted with the jungle penetrator of the "Dustoff" helicopters. All casualties were evacuated to 17th Field Hospital at CAMP RADCLIFF.

d. Transportation: The availability of aircraft for resupply and operations was not a problem; however, bad flying weather very frequently caused delay.

e. Communications: The only communications problem occurring during this operation was due to terrain and weather. This problem was alleviated by relaying between units.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: The GRC/163 Multiplex radio provided continuous 4-channel communications with HDE and the rear area in CAMP RADCLIFF.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. During the period of this operation only two companies were available for tactical operations in the field; the other two companies were securing the fire base and the Golf Course. The Ban Fit was in training. Because of the security missions the companies were rotated from the field weekly. This rapid rotation noticeably improved the operations of the units in the field; they appeared much more rested and aggressive.

b. The battalion concentrated on interdicting two major NW to SE trail networks. This was successfully accomplished by ambushing the trails, the use of stay-behind ambushes and conducting sweeps parallel to the trails.

JERRY S. CLARK  
CPT, Infantry  
S3

Downing  
McLain  
EOD Unit

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