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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
 HEADQUARTERS, 23 NAVALIA 35TH INFANTRY  
 APO San Francisco 96202

10 September 1970

SUBJECT: Combat After Actions Report (U)

Commanding Officer  
 1st Brigade, 4th Inf Div  
 AFHQ: 63  
 APO San Francisco 96202

1. (G) Name of Operation: **WARRIOR PIERCE**
2. (G) Dates of Operation: **29 Jul - 27 Aug**
3. (G) Location of Operation: The general location of the operation was 66 kilometers ENE of CAMP RADCLIFF, in the LAO VALLEY.
4. (G) Command Headquarters:
  - a. 1st Brigade, 4th Inf Div located at LB UPLIFT.
  - b. 2d Battalion 35th Infantry forward command post located at FEB POWDER (RM636779).

5. (G) Key Personnel:

| POSITION        | NAME                         | PERIOD          |
|-----------------|------------------------------|-----------------|
| IN CO           | 1SG WILLIAM L. HARRISON, JR. | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN CO           | MAJ WILLIAM J. HARDENBURGH   | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S1           | 1SG KIM M. H. JOHNSON, III   | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S2           | CPT CHRISTOPHER L. JACOB     | 29 Jul - 4 Aug  |
| IN S2           | CPT WARD E. COOK             | 4 Aug - 27 Aug  |
| IN S3           | CPT JERRY E. CLARK           | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S1           | CPT DONALD R. KADRE          | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S3           | 1SG PATRICK J. GARNETT       | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S1 AIR       | CPT PATRICK J. KRAEMER, JR.  | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S200 NIA LBR | 1SG RICHARD A. WOODHULL      | 29 Jul - 11 Aug |
| IN S200 NIA LBR | 1SG EDWARD P. MURPHY         | 11 Aug - 27 Aug |
| A CO            | CPT MELVIN BAKER             | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| B CO            | CPT JACK R. VANHORNDOOL      | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| C CO            | 1SG RALPH V. JAMES           | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| D CO            | 1SG CLAUDE E. WHITE          | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| E CO            | 1SG THOMAS M. VAJER          | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |

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| POSITION         | NAME                     | PERIOD          |
|------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| REGON FIVE LBR   | 1LT GEORGE W. LANIER     | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| 4-2 MORT REG LBR | 1LT WILLIS M. MURKA      | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| A/4-42 ARTY CO   | CPT PAUL STEWART         | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| A/4-42 ARTY CO   | 1LT MICHAEL J. FITZGILLO | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |

**6. (c) Task Organization:**

| 1st Bn     | 2nd Bn |
|------------|--------|
| A/2-35 Inf | 1st Bn |
| B/2-35 Inf | 2nd Bn |
| C/2-35 Inf | 3rd Bn |
| D/2-35 Inf | 4th Bn |

**7. (c) Supporting Forces:**

Supporting artillery to include Troops in Contact, Night Fire, Quick Reaction Fire, and Defensive Targets, were provided by A/4-42 Arty in direct support and 2/A/1-92 Arty (155) in general support of 2-35 Inf.

Gunship support was provided on a mission request basis by 1st Bn, 4th Inf Biv.

Tactical Air Support was available on a pre-planned and/or immediate request basis through 1st Bn, 4th Inf Biv. Numerous pre-planned requests were submitted by and flown in support of this battalion.

Search/Rescue missions were available on a pre-planned basis through 1st Bn, 4th Inf Biv. Numerous Search/Rescue missions were flown for this battalion, however, none led to any significant findings by ground troops.

**8. (c) Intelligence:**

**8a. Terrain:** The terrain north of the An Lao Valley in the region known as the Flashback is largely composed of rugged hills with steep slopes, tapering off to moderate valleys and a few lowlands. There are secondary streams both intermittent and larger tributaries. In the northern section of the AO tributaries of the SONG AN LAO RIVER flow east and west and then cut to the south where they join the SONG AN LAO and flow into the AN LAO VALLEY. The vegetation is thick with a good deal of elephant grass three to four feet high. Although the area was covered with dense vegetation some cultivated areas were found.

**8b. Weather:** The weather during the operation was generally good. On several days we experienced rain showers some which were heavy and once

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we experienced hail. But generally they did not prohibit flying. However, on several days inclement weather in AN KHE made it impossible for the aircraft to reach the AN LAO VALLEY thus resupply was not always timely. The temperature during the operation averaged about 85° F.

c. **Enemy Situation:** The area north of the AN LAO VALLEY was expected to produce support elements of the Third NVA Division. Specifically, the 509th Training Battalion, 500th Transportation Battalion, 600th Medical Battalion and the 403rd Sapper Battalion. Although no documentation was found to prove it, caches found by B Company of salt, cloth, pepper, and miscellaneous goods along with several cultivated fields indicated that the 500th Transportation Battalion was operating in the area. Three NVA/VN killed by B Company had papers indicating they had just been released from a dispensary believed to be an element of the 600th Medical Bn, and documents indicating they belonged to the 8th Bn formerly of the 22d Regt which is believed to be operating east of our AO. A Company also found a cache of mortar rounds including 82 82mm rounds and 71 60mm rounds and numerous charges and detonators. Several highspots were established and were the target of many incidents of harassing NVA/VN sniper fire. The employment of light organics and artillery as well as small arms did not seem to discourage the enemy snipers. There were also several incidents of resupply bins receiving ground-to-air fire and several aircraft receiving hits although none were downed and none suffered casualties. The enemy in the area were never seen in groups of more than 2-3 and there were few heavy trails in the area. Numerous bunkers and hootches were found both new and old as well as several storage cages. They were numerous punji fields and several punji pits found. Three booby-trapped 82mm mortars which appeared rather old and were found and destroyed in place.

**9. (G) Mission:**

a. On 29 Jul 70, 2-35 Inf initiates reconnaissance operations in the fishhook region of the AN LAO VALLEY.

b. On 6 Aug 70, 2-35 Inf initiates search and destroy operations in the fishhook region of the AN LAO VALLEY to locate and destroy elements of the 3rd NVA Division; specifically its forces, resources, and installations in assigned AO.

10. (G) **Concept of Operations:** Operation WAYNE PIERCE was initiated when 2-35 Inf conducted a convoy on 29 Jul from LE PONG to LE TWO BIE. Upon arriving at LE TWO BIE the Bn conducted CA's into multiple LA's with the Bn CP being established at FSB POWNER; B Co secured and began construction of FSB POWNER.

**11. (G) Execution:**

a. **A Company:** During the period 29 Jul - 4 Aug, A Co conducted extensive RIF operations. During the period A Co made one significant find when on 30 Jul, via BS563102, A Co found a hootch containing 88

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One mortar rounds, 71 (one mortar rounds, 64 mortar heads and 10 cans of detourments) A Co made contact with the enemy on three different occasions. All were of short duration and resulted in no significant casualties for either side. On 5 Aug, A Co established a highpoint at the highpoint and began search and destroy operations on 6 Aug. The highpoint location received sniper fire on four different occasions. Even though the location had been fired on with both light weapons located at the highpoint and artillery located at FSB FORTEN and swept repeatedly with negative findings, the fire continued to come from the same area. This sniper fire resulted in one friendly KIA. Numerous other contacts occurred with the enemy, the most significant of which occurred on 1400H Aug 70. A Co was engaged with an individual of 2/A engaged one individual inside a bunker with a 40 cal pistol, resulting in one NVA/VE KIA and one ARVN KIA. On 20 Aug, A Co was A/B from the field to FSB FORTEN and entered the security and training mission.

1st B Company: On 291400H Jul 70, B Co completed a CA into 1A via H6601151 and began extensive KIP operations in their assigned AO. B Co made no contacts and no significant findings during this phase of the operation.

On 4 Aug, A Co CA'd into a new AO and established a highpoint via H6601151 with supporting fires from their organic 81mm mortar platoon. A Co had numerous instances of sniper and ground-to-air fire both at the highpoint location and at the locations of the individual platoons working within the AO. On 1000H Aug 70, via H6601151, a 1/3 occurred 3 enemy approaching his area from the south. A 81mm mortar was employed when the enemy was 1/3. The enemy was 1/3 in 1 NVA/VE KIA and 1 ARVN KIA plus numerous (wounded). On 15 Aug via H6601151, 2/3 discovered 2 holed containing 700 lbs of salt, 2 Puma sub-machine guns, 2 Singer sewing machine, plus various other miscellaneous items. Friendly casualties for the period were 2 WIA.

On 27 Aug, B Co conducted a FE/AL from the field to 1A HEAVEN and conveyed to CAPT RADCLIFF to begin a training stand down.

2nd B Company: On 291140H Jul 70, C Co completed a CA into 1A via H6601151 and departed into their assigned AO to begin KIP operations. On 5 Aug, C Co conducted a CA into a new AO and began search and clear operations. On 8 Aug, via H6601151, 1/3 found a holed containing one US M2 Machine, various miscellaneous ammunition and documents. All were evacuated to 820 Wt HUN located at 1A HPLIFF. C Co had only 4 instances of sniper fire during this period with negative enemy sightings. There were no friendly casualties during this period. On 21 Aug, C Co conducted a FE/AL to 1A HPLIFF and, on 22 Aug, conveyed to CAPT RADCLIFF to assume the mission of Civil Control Security under the control of 1A.

3rd B Company: B Co continued the mission of security and construction of FSB FORTEN until 20 Aug, when they CA'd to 1A via H6709163 and began search and destroy operations in their assigned AO. On 251530H Aug 70,

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1/3, via ~~REDACTED~~ observed and engaged 3 enemy (1 male and 2 female). Small arms fire was returned as artillery was engaged as blocking fire. A sweep of the area revealed one enemy KIA (male) and negative weapons. There were no friendly casualties.  
On 27 Aug, 2 Co conducted a FE/SE to LE HAVEN and conveyed to GMP ~~REDACTED~~ to begin a training stand down.

2/3 **Basic Mission:** During this operation, 2nd Bn 1st had the mission of conducting air operations to the southeast of ~~REDACTED~~ on 19/20 Aug 70. 2nd Bn 1st observed and initiated fire on one enemy position in one enemy area and one ~~REDACTED~~ area. 2nd Bn 1st was engaged with the enemy on two other occasions, however, neither resulted in casualties for either friendly or enemy forces.  
On 27 Aug, 2nd Bn 1st conducted a FE/SE to LE HAVEN and conveyed to GMP ~~REDACTED~~ to begin a training stand down.

100 (c) **Inventory:** ~~REDACTED~~ ~~REDACTED~~ yielded 2433 lbs of the following:

- |              |                         |
|--------------|-------------------------|
| 20 x mortars | 57 x bunkers            |
| 1 x 81 mm    | 51 x sleeping positions |
| 1 x 105 mm   | 5 x fighting positions  |
| 1 x 120 mm   | 3 x mines               |
| 1 x 160 mm   | 8 x tunnels             |
| 1 x 180 mm   | 5 x small pits          |
| 1 x 240 mm   | 1 x training camp       |
| 1 x 280 mm   | 4 x spider holes        |
| 1 x 300 mm   | 1 x sewing machine      |
| 1 x 360 mm   | 700 x lbs salt          |
| 1 x 420 mm   | 600 x lbs sugar         |
| 1 x 480 mm   | numerous documents      |
| 1 x 540 mm   | various other items     |

**100 (c) Administrative Matters:**

2/3 **Supply:** Battalion forward trains were located at LE HAVEN ~~REDACTED~~, with a forward resupply point consisting of ~~REDACTED~~ I and V maintained at LE HAVEN for emergency requirements. Daily resupply to all units in the field was attempted on a typical basis. Due to the irregularity of air craft, it hindered tactical operations and was discontinued.

2/3 **Maintenance:** Limited organizational maintenance was performed at the forward area and items requiring repair beyond battalion capability were transmitted to G Co 704th Maint.

2/3 **Treatment of Casualties:** Battalion aid stations were maintained at both the main area and forward fire bases. All casualties were evacuated to B Medical Detachment located at LE HAVEN. Casualties requiring additional treatment were evacuated to 67th Field Hospital at QUIN NHON.

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1. **Transportation:** The availability of aircraft for operations was not a problem. However, due to bad flying weather in AN HMM and no access to aircraft from other locations, resupply was immediate.

2. **Communications:** Existing communications problems were due to terrain and weather. These problems were alleviated by relaying between units.

14. (d) **Special Equipment and Techniques:** Periods of instruction on use and employment of mechanical substitutes were given to individuals of each unit in the battalion. Numerous mechanical substitutes were employed each night to broaden the area of coverage and to intensify enemy movement during hours of darkness.

15. (d) **Communication Analysis:** The enemy continues to operate in small units and groups of personnel. Documents have continuously passed out. Most of the problems in this battalion were of enemy groups of 100 individuals. Based on the nature of the enemy threat, the battalion conducted small unit activities of equal sized elements. Many platoons did not operate as part of the enemy unit. This seemed to be the most effective way of conducting small unit activities using numerous tactics. The difficulty of locating small elements tended to create apprehensions of a enemy present causing our soldiers to relax his vigilance. Furthermore, as friendly soldiers were killed, by and large, the operation was a success as the enemy could not control itself in this area. The enemy had to subordinate his movement at night, thus preventing more knowledge on his ability to operate. Reported contacts with elements of the 100th Supply Co, 100th Base Co, and 100th Med Co did not materialize. Reliance of units operating in the field was very low. It is not highly inefficient. Two more reports were required to the HMM Hqs. There were unnecessary reports to H4 which the H4 can do nothing about. If reports were meaningful and action was being taken to assist the H4, it would see no problem. On many instances the HMM Hqs wanted to employ platoons which is not a HMM function. The HMM commands Hqs not platoons. Once all of these problems were ironed out the operation went smoothly.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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 MAJ, Infantry  
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION 35TH INFANTRY  
APO San Francisco 96262

10 September 1970

**SUBJECT: Combat After Actions Report (U)**

Commanding Officer  
1st Brigade, 4th Inf Div  
ACTN: 83  
APO San Francisco 96262

- 1. (C) Name of Operation: WAYNE PIERCE
- 2. (C) Dates of Operation: 29 Jul - 27 Aug
- 3. (C) Location of Operation: The general location of the operation was 60 kilometers ENE of CAMP RADCLIFF, in the LAO VALLEY.
- 4. (C) Command Headquarters:
  - a. 1st Brigade, 4th Inf Div located at LS UPLIFT.
  - b. 2d Battalion 35th Infantry forward command post located at FCB POWDER (RM636179).

5. (C) Key Personnel:

| POSITION       | NAME                          | PERIOD          |
|----------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| IN CO          | 1SG WILLIAMS L. HARRISON, JR. | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN XO          | MAJ WILLIAM J. HARDENBERGH    | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S1          | 1LT KIM M. M. JOHNSTON, III   | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S2          | CPT CHRISTOPHER L. JAGGERS    | 29 Jul - 4 Aug  |
| IN S2          | CPT WARD E. COOK              | 4 Aug - 27 Aug  |
| IN S3          | CPT JERRY E. CLARK            | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S4          | CPT EUGENE M. MACHIN          | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S5          | 1LT PATRICK E. CASSETY        | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S5 AIR      | CPT ROBERT E. KRANZKE, JR.    | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| IN S5F FLE LDR | 1LT RICHARD A. WINTERHILL     | 29 Jul - 11 Aug |
| IN S5F HLT LDR | 1LT EDWARD F. MOOREY          | 11 Aug - 27 Aug |
| A CO           | CPT MELVIN BAILEY             | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| B CO           | CPT JACK R. VANHORNPOCK       | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| C CO           | 1LT RALPH W. JAMES            | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| D CO           | 1LT GLENN R. WHITE            | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| E CO           | 1LT THOMAS M. WAJER           | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |

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**SUBJECT: Combat After Actions Report (U)**

| POSITION          | NAME                      | PERIOD          |
|-------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| REGON FIVE LRR    | 1LT GEORGE W. LANIER      | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| 4.2 MONT FIVE LRR | 1LT WILLIE M. NUSKA       | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| A/4-42 ARTY CO    | CPT PAUL STEWART          | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |
| A/4-42 ARMY LQ    | 1LT MICHAEL J. FITZGILLIS | 29 Jul - 27 Aug |

**6. (c) Task Organization:**

|            |                          |
|------------|--------------------------|
| A/2-35 Inf | IN COM                   |
| M/2-35 Inf | RON FIVE/2-35 Inf        |
| C/2-35 Inf | 4.2 MONT FIVE/2-35 Inf   |
| B/2-35 Inf | A/4-42 Arty (28)         |
|            | 2/A/1-92 Arty (155) (28) |

**7. (a) Supporting Forces:**

Supporting artillery to include Troops in Contact, Night Fire, Quick Reaction Fire, and Defensive Targets were provided by A/4-42 Arty in direct support and 2/A/1-92 Arty (155) in general support of 2-35 Inf.

Gunship support was provided on a mission request basis by 1st BDN, 4th Inf Div.

Tactical Air Support was available on a pre-planned and/or immediate request basis through 1st BDN, 4th Inf Div. Numerous pre-planned requests were submitted by and flown in support of this battalion.

SMOKE/SCORPION missions were available on a pre-planned basis through 1st BDN, 4th Inf Div. Numerous SMOKE/SCORPION missions were flown for this battalion, however, none led to any significant findings by ground troops.

**8. (a) Intelligence:**

**1. Terrain:** The terrain north of the An Lao Valley in the region known as the Fishback is largely composed of rugged hills with steep slopes, tapering off to moderate valleys and a few lowlands. There are secondary streams both intermittent and larger tributaries. In the northern section of the AO tributaries of the SONG AN LAO RIVER flow east and west and then out to the south where they join the SONG AN LAO and flow into the AN LAO VALLEY. The vegetation is thick with a good deal of elephant grass three to four feet high. Although the area was covered with dense vegetation some cultivated areas were found.

**2. Weather:** The weather during the operation was generally good. On several days we experienced rain showers some which were heavy and once

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we experienced hail. But generally they did not prohibit flying. However, on several days inclement weather in AN KHE made it impossible for the aircraft to reach the AN LAO VALLEY thus resupply was not always timely. The temperature during the operation averaged about 85° F.

c. Enemy Situation: The area north of the AN LAO VALLEY was expected to produce support elements of the Third NVA Division. Specifically, the 509th Training Battalion, 500th Transportation Battalion, 600th Medical Battalion and the 403rd Sapper Battalion. Although no documentation was found to prove it, caches found by B Company of salt, cloth, pepper, and miscellaneous goods along with several cultivated fields indicated that the 500th Transportation Battalion was operating in the area. Three NVA/VN killed by B Company had papers indicating they had just been released from a dispensary believed to be an element of the 600th Medical Bn, and documents indicating they belonged to the 8th Bn formerly of the 224 Regt which is believed to be operating east of our zone. A Company also found a cache of mortar rounds including 88 82mm rounds and 71 60mm rounds and numerous charges and detonators.

Several hipshoots were established and were the target of many incidents of harassing NVA/VN sniper fire. The employment of light organics and artillery as well as small arms did not seem to discourage the enemy snipers. There were also several incidents of resupply bins receiving ground-to-air fire and several aircraft receiving hits although none were downed and none suffered casualties. The enemy in the area were never seen in groups of more than 2-3 and there were few heavy trails in the area. Numerous bunkers and hootches were found both new and old as well as several storage caches. They were numerous punji fields and several punji pits found. Three booby-trapped 81mm mortars which appeared rather old and were found and destroyed in place.

#### 9. (C) Mission:

a. On 29 Jul 70, 2-35 Inf initiates reconnaissance operations in the fishhook region of the AN LAO VALLEY.

b. On 6 Aug 70, 2-35 Inf initiates search and destroy operations in the fishhook region of the AN LAO VALLEY to locate and destroy elements of the 3rd NVA Division; specifically its forces, resources, and installations in assigned AO.

10. (C) Concept of Operations: Operation WAYNE PIERCE was initiated when 2-35 Inf conducted a convoy on 29 Jul from IE PONY to IE TWO RITE. Upon arriving at IE TWO RITE the Bn conducted CA's into multiple IE's with the Bn CP being established at FSB POWDER; D Co secured and began construction of FSB POWDER.

#### 11. (C) Execution:

a. A Company: During the period 29 Jul - 4 Aug, A Co conducted extensive RIF operations. During the period A Co made one significant find when on 30 Jul, via BS563102, A Co found a hootch containing 88

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Since mortar rounds, 71 60mm mortar rounds, 64 mortar bombs and 19 cans of incendiaries. A Co made contact with the enemy on three different occasions. All were of short duration and resulted in negative casualties for either side. On 5 Aug, A Co established a highpost via NS624328 and began search and destroy operations on 6 Aug. The highpost location received sniper fire on four different occasions. Even though the location had been fired on with both light cannons located at the highpost, and artillery located at FSB POWDER and swept repeatedly with negative findings, the fire continued to come from the same SSG. This sniper fire resulted in one friendly WIA. Numerous other contacts were made with the enemy, the most significant of which occurred on 141600H Aug 70 via NS731118, when an individual of 2/A engaged one individual inside a bunker with a 45 cal pistol, resulting in one NVA/VE KIA and one AB-47 GMS. On 20 Aug, A Co was A/L from the field to FSB POWDER and assumed the security and training mission.

1st B Company: On 291400H Jul 70, B Co completed a CA into LS via NS624328 and began extensive KIP operations in their assigned AO. B Co made no contacts and no significant findings during this phase of the operations.

On 4 Aug, A Co GAB into a new AO and established a highpost via NS624328 with supporting fires from their organic 81mm mortar platoon. A Co had numerous instances of sniper and ground-to-air fire both at the highpost location and at the locations of the individual platoons working within the AO. On 101730H Aug 70, via NS627229, an SF for 1/A observed 3 enemy approaching him from the south. A Claymore mine was employed when the enemy was 2 feet away resulting in 3 NVA/VE KIA and 3 AB-47 rifles GMS plus numerous documents. On 15 Aug via NS624328, 2/A discovered 2 hoeshoes containing 700 lbs of salt, 2 French submachine guns, 1 Singer sewing machine, plus various other miscellaneous items. Friendly casualties for the period were 2 WIA.

On 27 Aug, B Co conducted a FE/AL from the field to LS HEAVEN and conveyed to CAMP RADCLIFF to begin a training stand down.

2nd B Company: On 291146H Jul 70, B Co completed a CA into LS via NS624328 and departed into their assigned AO to begin KIP operations. On 5 Aug, B Co conducted a CA into a new AO and began search and clear operations. On 8 Aug, via NS635188, 1/A found a hoeshoe containing one US M2 machine, various miscellaneous ammunition and documents. All were evacuated to 825 1st BUN located at LS UPLIFF. B Co had only 4 instances of sniper fire during this period with negative enemy sightings. There were no friendly casualties during this period. On 21 Aug, B Co conducted a FE/AL to LS UPLIFF and, on 22 Aug, conveyed to CAMP RADCLIFF to assume the mission of Golf Course Security under the control of IDGCS.

3rd B Company: B Co continued the mission of security and construction of FSB POWDER until 20 Aug, when they GAB'd to LS via NS709163 and began search and destroy operations in their assigned AO. On 251520H Aug 70,

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1/2, via HET08143, observed and engaged 3 enemy (1 male and 2 female). Small arms fire was returned as artillery was employed as blocking fire. A sweep of the area revealed one enemy KIA (male) and negative weapons. There were no friendly casualties.  
On 27 Aug, B Co conducted a FE/AL to LS HEAVEN and conveyed to GMP RADCLIFF to begin maintaining stand down.

25 Recon Platoon: During this operation, Recon Plt had the mission of conducting RE operations to the southeast of FIB PLYMOUTH. On 191000Z Aug 70, Recon Plt observed and initiated fire on one enemy position in one enemy EA and one EA with 82mm. Recon Plt made contact with the enemy on two other occasions, however, neither resulted in casualties for either friendly or enemy forces.  
On 27 Aug, Recon Plt conducted a FE/AL to LS HEAVEN and conveyed to GMP RADCLIFF to begin a training stand down.

125 (C) Results: Operation MAINE FIERCE yielded 2-35 of the following results:

- |                         |                           |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| 42 x contacts           | 57 x bunkers              |
| 6 x G/A fire            | 51 x sleeping positions   |
| 6 x enemy KIA           | 5 x fighting positions    |
| 4 x enemy rifles        | 5 x weapons               |
| 1 x enemy rifle         | 6 x tunnels               |
| 1 x US M2 Garand        | 5 x small pits            |
| 1 x F42 sub-machine gun | 1 x training camp         |
| 20 x 82mm mls           | 4 x spider holes          |
| 71 x 60mm mls           | 1 x single sewing machine |
| 61 x mortar heads       | 700 x lbs salt            |
| 10 x enemy detonators   | 600 x lbs sand            |
| 5 x booby-traps         | multiple documents        |
| 85 x hatches            | various misc. items       |

**135 (C) Administrative Matters:**

a. Supply: Battalion forward trains were located at LS NORTH ENGLISH, with a forward resupply point consisting of Class I and V maintained at LS POWNER for emergency requirements. Daily resupply to all units in the field was attempted on a trial basis. Due to the irregularity of air craft, it hindered tactical operations and was discontinued.

b. Maintenance: Limited organizational maintenance was performed at the train area and items requiring repair beyond battalion capability were transferred to G Co 704th Maint.

c. Treatment of Casualties: Battalion aid stations were maintained at both the rear area and forward fire bases. All casualties were evacuated to B Medical Detachment located at LS UPLIFT. Casualties requiring additional treatment were evacuated to 67th Field Hospital at QUIN NHON.

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d. **Transportation:** The availability of aircraft for operations was not a problem. However, due to bad flying weather in AN KHM and no access to aircraft from other locations, resupply was irregular.

e. **Communications:** Existing communications problems were due to terrain and weather. These problems were alleviated by relaying between units.

14. (g) **Special Equipment and Techniques:** Periods of instruction on use and employment of mechanical ambushes were given to individuals of each sub unit in the battalion. Numerous mechanical ambushes were employed each night to broaden the area of coverage and to interrupt enemy movement during hours of darkness.

15. (h) **Commander's Analysis:** The enemy continues to operate in small 3-5 man groups as captured documents have continually pointed out. Most of the sightings by this battalion were of enemy groups of 3-5 individuals. Based on the nature of the enemy threat, the battalion conducted small unit ambushes of squad sized elements. Many platoons did not operate as part of the company net. This seemed to be the most effective way of combating small enemy units using numerous trails. The difficulty of locating small elements tended to create apprehensions of no enemy present causing our soldiers to relax his vigilance. Furthermore, as friendly soldiers were killed, by and large, the operation was a success as the enemy could not travel freely in this area. The enemy had to concentrate his movement at night, thereby reducing some limitations on his ability to operate. Expected contacts with elements of the 30th Sapper Bn, 500th Tank Bn, and 600th Med Bn did not materialize. Resupply of units operating in the field was spotty is not highly inefficient. Too many reports were required to the HHC HQ's. There were unnecessary reports to S4 which the S4 can do nothing about. If reports were meaningful and action was being taken to assist the Bn, it would see no problem. On many instances the HHC HQ's wanted to employ platoons which is not a HHC function. The HHC commands Bn's not platoons. Once all of these problems were ironed out the operation went smoothly.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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 THE NATIONAL ARCHIVE  
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 MAJ, Infantry  
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