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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 HEADQUARTERS, 3d INFANTRY DIVISION
 120 San Francisco Street

3 October 1970

SUBJECT: Contact After Action Report (U)

Commanding Officer
 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
 120 San Francisco Street

- 1) (U) Name of Operation: **WAVE FURRY**
- 2) (U) Dates of Operation: **8 Sep - 1 Oct**
- 3) (U) Location of Operation: The general location of the operation was 65 kilometers SSE of **CHU BANG**, in the **PHU THIEN** subsector, **South Vietnam**.

4) (U) Command Headquarters:

- a) 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division located at **CHU BANG**, **RVN**
- b) 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry forward command post located at **PHU THIEN**

5) (U) Key Personnel:

POSITION	NAME	PERIOD
IN 01	MSG EARL E. HENRY	8 Sep - 1 Oct
IN 02	MSG WILLIAM J. HARRINGTON	8 Sep - 1 Oct
IN 03	1LT RYAN E. E. JENNINGS III	8 Sep - 1 Oct
IN 04	1LT JAMES E. SINGLER	8 Sep - 25 Sep
IN 05	CPT FRANK G. HENRY	8 Sep - 1 Oct
IN 06	MSG GORDON GARNETT	8 Sep - 1 Oct
IN 07	1LT DAVID M. JONES	8 Sep - 1 Oct
IN 08	CPT ROBERT E. GARNETT	8 Sep - 19 Sep
IN 09	1LT EDWARD E. HENRY	8 Sep - 25 Sep
IN 10	1LT THOMAS G. HENRY	25 Sep - 1 Oct
A 01	CPT DAVID E. HENRY	8 Sep - 1 Oct
B 01	CPT JENNINGS E. HENRY	8 Sep - 1 Oct

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SUMMARY: Contact After Actions Report (C)

G 00	COL VAND R. COOK	8 Sep - 1 Oct
D 00	1LT OLIVER R. WHITE	8 Sep - 1 Oct
E 00	1LT THOMAS R. WAGNER	8 Sep - 1 Oct
FROM 1ST INF	1LT GEORGE W. LAYNE	8 Sep - 1 Oct
42ND INFANTRY 1ST INF	1LT WILLIAM R. MOORE	8 Sep - 1 Oct
A/4-42 ARMY CO	CPT PAUL STEWART	8 Sep - 1 Oct
A/4-42 ARMY LG	1LT MICHAEL J. FIVELLE	8 Sep - 1 Oct

(C) Task Organization: The Task Organization at the beginning of the operation was as follows:

A/2-35 Inf	IN CO	
B/2-35 Inf	BN CO	1/1A/42d Regt (IN)
C/2-35 Inf	42ND INFANTRY	1/1A/42d Regt (IN)
D/2-35 Inf	A/4-42 Arty (IN)	1/1A/42d Regt (IN)

From 20-25 Sep A/2-35 Inf became 42ND to 1ST INF. On 25 Sep 1/1A/42d Regt were returned to the control of their parent unit. The Task Organization remained intact throughout the remainder of the operation.

(C) Supporting Forces:

a. Supporting Artillery to include Troops in Contact, Night Fire, Quick Reaction Fire, and Defensive Targets were provided by A/4-42 Arty in direct support of 2-35 Inf.

b. Due to the distance of the area of operation from the command headquarters, ground support was provided on a stand-by basis at the training area in 1ST INF, 1ST INF.

c. Tactical Air Support was available on a pre-planned and/or immediate request basis through an Air Force Detachment located at 1ST INFANTRY. Numerous immediate requests were submitted by and three were flown in support of this battalion.

d. SNOWY/ROCKETS missions were available on a pre-planned basis through 1ST INF, 4th Inf Bn. There were three SNOWY/ROCKETS missions flown for this battalion; however, none led to any significant findings by ground troops.

(C) Intelligence:

a. Weather: As predicted before the start of the operation, the weather turned out to hinder air operations. Showers and thunderstorms occurred

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almost every afternoon. Thus, resupply was hampered. Ground fog was prevalent in the valleys and low areas every morning. High winds accompanied the thunderstorms.

b. Terrain: The terrain in this area was very rugged with many high ridges which tended to hinder communications. A large portion of the area of operations was covered with jungle and thick vegetation which made locating LRs for resupply and "bustoffs" difficult and in some cases impossible. The southern portion of the AO consisted of more rolling hills, with less vegetation. LRs were much easier to locate in this area.

c. Enemy: As predicted, elements of the PHU YEN Provincial Unit were discovered in this area. This was shown by documents and personal belongings taken from hootches and enemy KIA's. One detainee, captured by C Company, stated that a large element of the PHU YEN Provincial Unit was located not far from his place of capture.

Contacts during this operation were numerous and were made with groups of 2-5 individuals. The enemy was more aggressive in this area of operations than the enemy contacted by this battalion previously. The enemy employed numerous tactics, which included, ground-to-air fire, sniper fire, and the ambush. One unsuccessful attempt to destroy portions of the battalion was made on the trains area in PHU XUAN, fortunately the mortar rounds fell short of their marks.

US forces combined with territorial forces, caused the enemy to depart the area. This was evidenced by many hootch complexes of recent use which were found throughout the area. One large complex, found by B Company, appeared to be a sapper and medical training area.

Friendly operations in the area yielded 19 enemy KIA's, 1 enemy detainee, and numerous hootch and bunker complexes, all of which were destroyed. Bunkers and some hootch complexes were destroyed by immediate and pre-planned air strikes with ground elements and Gv troops assisting in KIA.

9. (c) Mission: 2d Bn 55th Inf was given the mission to move on 090600H Sep 70 to PHU YEN-PHU BEN border region; conduct a G/A into assigned AO to locate

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and destroy PHU YEN Provincial Unit. To interdict infiltration corridor passing through assigned AO; establish linkmen with GVN/ROK; and plan and conduct combined operations with PHU TUY Territorial Forces.

10. (C) Concept of Operations: This operation was conducted in 4 phases:

a. Phase I: Deployment Phase: On 060000 Sep 70, the advance party departed for PHU XUAN, and established combat trains and prepared trains area for the arrival of Bn(-) on 080000H Sep 70. Bn (-) departed for PHU XUAN, and established an initial staging base and prepared to combat assault on order.

b. Phase II: Assault Phase: On 090000H Sep 70, B Co(-) G/A'd into assigned AO and established security for NCB WASHINGTON. A Co G/A'd into AO Red and began search and clear operations. C Co G/A'd into AO Blue, established a patrol base and began interdiction, by ambushes, of the infiltration corridor and trails. D Co conducted a G/A into AO White and began search and clear operations. Ron Plt conducted a G/A into their assigned AO and began RIF operations.

c. Phase III: Combined Operations Phase: All units conducted combined operations with PHU TUY Territorial Forces.

d. Phase IV: Withdrawal Phase: All elements withdrew from the field on 1 Oct and conducted a convoy move to CAMP RADCLIFF on 2 Oct.

11. (C) Executions:

a. A Company: On 091122H Sep 70, A Co completed a GA from PHU XUAN to LE via BQ757713 and departed the LE to the west to begin search and clear operations in their assigned AO. A Co conducted extensive sweep operations in the assigned AO. Numerous hutch complexes were located, however, no enemy sighting were made during the first period of the operation. On 19 Sep, A Co extracted from the field and on 20 Sep moved by convoy to CAMP RADCLIFF to assume the mission of Golf Course security under the control of IDCC. On 23 Sep, A Co moved by convoy to PHU XUAN, and, on 24 Sep, G/A'd to LE via BQ725632 and resumed search and clear operations in their new AO.

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On 25 Sep 70, 1/A located a hootch complex containing various maps dated 1967 plus documents and drawings of various types of booby-traps. All were evacuated to 52, 1st HMM. On 26 Sep, via HQ721579, 1/A located a large hootch complex consisting of 35 hootches and 25 bunkers. The area contained materials which appeared to be used for training of sappers. The area had been used within the last 7 days by an undetermined number of individuals. A Co made no further significant findings and had no enemy sightings for the remainder of the operation. On 1 Oct, A Co conducted a final extraction from the field to PHU XUAN.

B Co Company: On 090930H Sep 70, B Co(-) completed a C/A to LH via HQ670706 and assumed the mission of security and construction of PHU WASHINGTON. One platoon remained at PHU XUAN to provide security for the train area. On 18 Sep, B Co(-) conducted a C/A to LH via HQ743657 and began search and clear operations in their assigned AO. 2/B remained at the train as security. On 190700H Sep 70, via HQ746691, 3/B received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from SEL HQ745643. Artillery was employed. A sweep of the SEL was sent out at 0800H and at 0930H via HQ743647, the sweep made contact with an estimated 3-4 enemy. Fire was initiated by the sweeping element and the enemy fled to the south after returning AK-47 fire. A sweep of the contact area revealed 1 enemy KIA and 1 AK-47 rifle. B Co(-) had one further contact on 28 Sep, via HQ787757, when 2 enemy initiated fire on the point element of 1/H. The enemy were 15 meters away when fire was initiated. Small arms fire was returned as the enemy fled to the east. The results of the contact were 1 friendly KIA and unknown enemy casualties. B Co(-) made no further significant findings and were extracted on 1 Oct.

C Co Company: On 091310H Sep 70, C Co(-) completed a C/A from PHU XUAN to LH via HQ734736, and began extensive search and clear operations in their assigned AO. 3/C remained at PHU XUAN to assist in securing the train area. On 141356H Sep 70, via HQ735634, a sweep from 2/C ran into a linear ambush with a grenade booby-trap to trigger it. When the booby-trap failed to go off, the enemy initiated the ambush and fled to the east. Results of

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the ambush were 5 friendly VHA's and 1 friendly KIA. On 230945H Sep 70, via HQ727645, 1/8 located a bunker complex and after pulling back to employ artillery moved into the complex to search it. Upon entering the complex enemy personnel emerged from the bunkers. 1/8 initiated fire upon the enemy resulting in 5 enemy KIA's and 1 enemy VHA/detainee. Also found in the village were one M-4 Carbine, one .32 cal pistol, and one US Springfield rifle. C Co(-) continued search and clear operations with one platoon securing the train area and one platoon securing the NVA. No further contacts or findings were made during this operation and C Co(-) was extracted from the field on 1 Oct.

d. D Company: On 091156H Sep 70, D Co completed a C/A from PHU XUAN to LH via HQ729665 and began extensive search and clear operations in their assigned AO. On 141330H Sep 70, via HQ729763, 3/D was moving to the NE when 1 enemy engaged them with an estimated 3 rounds of AK-47 fire from 15 meters to the NE. Small arms fire was returned as the enemy fled to the north. A sweep of the area revealed a blood trail which 3/D followed for approximately 100 meters when it disappeared. D Co continued sweep operations finding numerous bootcamps and bunkers in the area. All appeared to have been vacated within the last week. One area, via HQ713752, appeared to be a sapper training area. Also found in this area were numerous medical supplies. D Co made no significant contacts for the remainder of the operation and, on 1 Oct, they were extracted from the field.

e. Recon Platoon: On 091425H Sep 70, Recon Plt conducted a C/A from PHU XUAN to LH via HQ670773 and departed to the west to begin recon operations in their assigned AO. Recon Plt had no contacts and made no significant findings while operating in the AO. On 20 Sep, Recon Plt was given the mission of securing a hipshoot for two 81mm mortars and one platoon of 105mm howitzers at via HQ753917. On 1 Oct, Recon Plt was extracted with the hipshoot and moved to PHU XUAN to prepare for a convey move to CAMP BADCLIFF on 2 Oct.

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2. Territorial Forces: Combined Operations were conducted with the 402nd, 501st, 790th and 770th Companies of the RVN 4th Territorial Forces. The battalion provided a TLF to act as liaison at PHU TUC. Communications were maintained with the Territorial Forces operating in the field at all times. On 261400Z Sep 70, via HQ690790, a patrol from the 790th Co initiated contact on an estimated 2 enemy. The contact lasted for 5 minutes with the patrol employing artillery blocking fire. The enemy fled to the NW with the patrol employing fire and maneuver. A sweep of the area revealed a heavy blood trail. The Territorial Forces made numerous contacts and destroyed many hootches and bunkers. They also conducted several KIA's.

12. (U) Results: Operation WAYNE FORD yielded 2-35 Inf the following results:

18 x contacts	1 x US airplane
19 x enemy KIA's	6 x US Hand-grenades
1 x detainee	6 x NVN Protective Masks
2 x AK-47 rifles	133 x hootches
1 x M-1 Garbine	88 x bunkers
1 x .32 cal pistol	2 x caves
1 x Springfield rifle	1 x bridge
4 x AK-47 magazines	15 x fighting positions
1 x Garbine magazine	50 x lbs corn
1 x M-16 magazine	40 x lbs rice
1 x 109mm rd	numerous documents
1 x 82mm rd	various medical supplies
43 x AK-47 rds	numerous misc supplies and equipment

19. (U) Logistics:

- a. Resupply: Battalion trains were located at PHU XIAN, RVN with a forward resupply point for emergency Class I and V located at FOB WASHINGTON.
- b. Medical Services: Battalion Aid Stations were located at both the rear area in CAMP RADCLIFF and the forward fire base. 4th Med provided

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an aid station at the train area in PHU XUAN for routine dustoffs. Higher priority casualties were evacuated to QUIN NHON. A "dustoff" helicopter remained on station at PHU XUAN during the entire operation.

13. **Transportation:** Transportation to and from PHU XUAN was provided by 8th Group. The availability of aircraft for resupply and operations was not a problem, however, bad flying weather frequently caused delays in normal operations.

14. **Communications:** Numerous communications problems arose. Communications with 1st BN was affected mainly by the distance to the AM. At times it was impossible to maintain communications with BN. Communications problems with the elements in the field was mainly caused by terrain. It was necessary to establish one permanent relay site with other relay sites established as the need arose.

14. (C) **Special Equipment and Techniques:** A radio-teletype was used extensively and with much success throughout the entire operation. Because of the lack of secure capabilities with 1st BN, this proved to be an invaluable asset during the operation.

15. (C) **Commanders Analysis:** The mission of this BN was to locate and destroy the PHU XUAN Provincial Unit. It cannot be conclusively determined how successful we accomplished this mission. We do know that we located elements of the provincial unit, and uncovered some of their training areas. Delta Company found and destroyed what was believed to be the Provincial Hospital training complex. Many of the KIA's and captured documents identified the PHU XUAN Provincial Unit or elements of it.

For many in the BN it was their first opportunity to work with Vietnamese forces. Their performance could not be judged on any scale. But based on the material captured and the structures destroyed I would qualify their performance on highly favorable terms.

The success of any mission depends on how well the mission is accomplished, therefore, we could conclude that we failed. This is not the case as we did kill many local VU, who are hard to replace, and we did find his safe areas. But from an operational viewpoint we learned a lot about the BN, as

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Many of the officers and men were newly assigned. From the experience gained on this operation the 1st is now ready and much better prepared to accomplish any task assigned to it.

**WILLIAM H. HARRIS
1st, Infantry
Commanding**

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