

# CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE TASK FORCE  
25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96355

AVDC-C-OP

14 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967  
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: See Distribution

## SECTION I (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General: During the reporting period, 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967, the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division terminated Operation PAUL REVERE IV, participated in Operation THAYER II, and participated in road security operations for a total of 92 consecutive days of combat operations. These operations were conducted in the following time phases:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Commenced</u>	<u>Terminated</u>
PAUL REVERE IV*	18 October 1966	31 December 1966
Road Security	23 December 1966	3 January 1967
THAYER II	3 January 1967	Operation continuing

The 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division has participated in 184 days of consecutive combat duty as of 31 January 1967.

### a. (C) Mission:

(1) The mission assigned the 3d Brigade TF for Operation PAUL REVERE IV was to maintain surveillance of the Republic of Vietnam/Cambodian border and areas east thereof, conduct ambushes, and block penetrations into the assigned area of operation.

(2) During the period 23 December 1966 to 3 January 1967, the mission was to assume responsibility for security of Highway 19 from Pleiku to BR250483 with one reinforced battalion.

(3) The mission for Operation THAYER II was to conduct offensive operations in the THAYER II area of operations (center of mass, BR8065).

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200-10

\*After Action Report; PAUL REVERE IV is attached as inclosure 1.

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b. (C) Operational area:

(1) The area designated for Operation PAUL REVERE IV was bounded by the Nam Sathay River in the west, Route 14 in the east, the east-west grid line YA-ZA 50 in the north, and the east-west grid line YV-ZV-AQ 60 in the south. The area of operation encompassed approximately 2040 square miles.

(2) The area designated for Operation THAYER II was as shown on inclosure 2 with center of mass at BR8065. The area of operation encompassed approximately 220 square miles.

c. (C) Control:

(1) The 3d Brigade TF was under operational control of 4th Infantry Division throughout the duration of PAUL REVERE IV and remained in that status on the security mission of Highway 19 until 030730 January 1967. The Brigade TF then came under operational control authority of 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) on Operation THAYER II and continued in that status throughout the remainder of the reporting period.

d. Task organization: Throughout the reporting period many units were placed under temporary operational control authority of the 3d Brigade TF for varying periods of time. The principal units of the 3d Brigade TF with commanders' names and dates of command and the major supporting and operational control authority units are as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division  
Colonel James G. Shanahan

1st Battalion, 14th Infantry

Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Proctor, Junior, 1 Nov - 1 Dec 66

Lieutenant Colonel William H. Miller, 1 Dec 66 - 31 Jan 67

1st Battalion, 35th Infantry

Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Kingston

2d Battalion, 35th Infantry

Lieutenant Colonel Philip R. Feir, 1 Nov 66 - 2 Jan 67

Lieutenant Colonel Clinton E. Granger, Junior, 2 - 31 Jan 67

C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry

Captain William S. Graf, 1 Nov 66 - 17 Dec 66

First Lieutenant Joseph Key Garner, Junior, 17 Dec - 10 Jan 67

Captain John P. Irving, III, 10 - 31 Jan 67

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3d Support Battalion (Provisional)  
Major Andrew H. Housand

Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion  
Captain Clarence H. Stetzinger, 1 Nov - 1 Dec 66  
Major John R. Hill, 14 Dec 66 - 31 Jan 67

40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)  
Second Lieutenant Robert W. Thackeray

52d Aviation Battalion (GS)

1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 25 Nov 66 - 5 Dec 66

1st Battalion, 22d Infantry (OCA 11 Nov 66 - 5 Dec 66)

CIDG, Plei Djereng (Atch 6 - 11 Dec 66)

2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (OCA 4 - 15 Dec 66)

1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry (OCA 15 - 23 Dec 66)

1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry (OCA 10 - 31 Jan 67)

2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry (OCA 26 - 31 Jan 67)

(a) Principal staff:

S1  
Major Ben G. Crosby, Junior, 1 Nov - 5 Jan 67  
Captain Brian J. McCarthy, 5 Jan - 25 Jan 67  
Major John D. Weil, 25 Jan - 31 Jan 67

S2  
Major Richard R. Russell, 1 Nov - 17 Dec 66  
Major Edgar Egeland, 17 Dec 66 - 31 Jan 67

S3  
Major James E. Moore, Junior, 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67

S4  
Major James S. Kirkpatrick, 1 Nov - 15 Dec 66  
Major John A. Joyce, 15 Dec - 31 Jan 67

S5  
Captain John Schmidt, III, 1 Nov 66 - 31 Jan 67

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**(b) Artillery supports:**

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, direct support 3/25  
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Holbrook

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (OCA 2/9,  
1 Nov - 3 Nov 66, GS 2/9 Arty)

Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (OCA 2/9,  
3 Nov - 3 Dec 66, GS 2/9 Arty)

Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (OCA 2/9,  
11 Nov - 4 Dec 66, DS 1/22 Inf)

Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (atch  
3 Dec 66 - 31 Jan 67, GS 2/9 Arty)

Battery A, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (atch 11 -  
19 and 27 - 31 Jan 67, DS 1/8 Cav)

Battery A, 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (atch 26 -  
31 Jan 67, DS 2/5 Cav)

During the period 3 - 31 January 1967, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was attached to the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry on Operation SAM HOUSTON.

e. **Brigade base camp security:** Throughout the period, the 3d Brigade TF maintained an adequate defensive posture to provide continuous security for its brigade base camp vicinity of Pleiku. The forces and organization established in OPLAN STEEL CLAW continued to be implemented throughout the reporting period. The Brigade TF will continue to incorporate refinements in this plan to enhance the defensive capabilities of the forces at the Brigade TF base camp.

f. (U) Operation PAUL REVERE IV conducted during the period 18 October 1966 to 31 December 1966 is covered in the After Action Report; PAUL REVERE IV attached as inclosure 1.

**2. (U) INTELLIGENCE:**

a. Enemy activities 1 November - 31 December 1966 are contained in After Action Report; PAUL REVERE IV attached as inclosure 1. Significant enemy activities 1 - 31 January 1967 were as follows:

(1) **General:** The beginning of this period coincided with the entrance of the 3d Brigade TF into THAYER II under the operational control authority of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The area of operation for the 3d Brigade TF was concentrated in the vicinity Suoi Ca Valley

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and the high ground west and east of the Suoi Ca, to the Song Con River. Elements of the 18th Regiment were believed to be in the 3d Brigade TF's area of operation. The weather encountered was adverse to friendly operations, particularly in the high terrain during the first week, however, ceilings and visibility increased toward the end of the reporting period.

(2) Significant activity in area of operation of the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Divisions:

(a) Since the introduction of the 3d Brigade TF into the area of operation vicinity Suoi Ca Valley, there had been a significant lack of activity in the eastern portion of this area. (This contradicted prisoner of war and Chieu Hoi reports that North Vietnamese Army units were located in the Bong Pass (BR845604) and Nui Xa Rong Mountain (BR813656).)

(b) Early in the operation (7 to 20 January 1967) contacts were with small groups only, the largest being a group of 12 who were engaged by the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry on 15 January 1967 in the vicinity BR695630. There appeared to be no large organized groups and indications were that elements of the 18th Regiment had broken down into small groups for the purpose of survival as well as escape and evasion.

(c) The capture of 7 telephones and 7 miles of wire (BR753654) on 9 January 1967, the discovery of the cave complex (BR740648) on 19 January 1967, and the capture of 3 radio antenna bases and 3-4 miles of wire (BR746614) on 25 January 1967, gave indications that the 3d Brigade TF had surprised the enemy and that he had hastily left these areas.

(d) Subsequent to the discovery of the cave complex at BR740648 by 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry on 19 January 1967 and as 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry moved south from the cave area along the ridgelines toward Hill 832 (BR729608) they were met with an increased volume of automatic weapons fire and stubborn enemy resistance.

(e) On 29 January 1967 vicinity of BR732603, Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry captured 6 Viet Cong, all of who were medical patients, left by their medics on 27 January 1967 in a cave area which had been identified from IPW reports as the Viet Cong Phu Cat District Dispensary.

(f) The Santa Fe Trail (BR780594 to BR650580) showed signs of extensive use from its eastern entrance to BR710598. From that point to its western outlet into Happy Valley there were few indications of use. However, 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry, in its operations to the north of the Santa Fe Trail, discovered numerous bivouac sites and bunker areas recently used. Indications were that the trail was used to BR710598 and then the enemy headed northwest.

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(g) The 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry noted a significant increase of activity along the Kon River including sightings of small groups, rafts, huts, bunkers, etc. The capture of a prisoner of war from 509th Training Battalion who stated that his unit had trained 2000 personnel during 1966 tied in with the captured Recruiting Plan for Binh Dinh Province for 1966. This plan called for the recruiting of 2000 personnel (including 250 women) of which 87% were to go to the Sao Vang Division and 13% to local province units. Indications were that the Kon River Valley is a rear service area for the 3d North Vietnamese Army Division and that the 18th Regiment was moving to that area. The documents also indicated the plan that the Viet Cong had for enlarging the popular intelligence structure (local agents), Viet Cong Order of Battle studies of friendly positions, increased training on US Claymore Mine, and equipment status report (reference 3d Brigade TF INTSUM NO 25 THAYER II ON 28 JAN 67).

(3) 1-5 January was primarily spent in moving to the forward location and establishing base command posts with the assigned units. No contact was made with Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army elements. Reports from units of the 1st Cavalry Division indicated that fairly good sized units were in the area with reports of fresh foxholes, bunkers, huts and civilian reports of Viet Cong movement.

(4) 6-13 January 1967: Units in the area of operation continued to locate signs of recent used and prepared positions, both defensive and protective. This period was marked by increased contact with enemy squad size units.

(5) 14-15 January 1967: Increasing numbers of cave and rock complexes were found. A Chieu Hoi from the 7th Battalion, 18th Regiment reported that the 18th Regiment was to move to the northwest for rest and reorganization.

(6) 19 January 1967: The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry located a large cave and rock complex that was to take the remainder of this period to explore and some 101,000 pounds of demolitions to destroy. During the destruction of this complex, several massive secondary explosions occurred. Approximately 10,500,000 \$VN piasters worth of bonds and vast amounts of documents outlining the economic and production structure of Binh Dinh Province as well as personnel rosters and equipment status reports were captured in the complex. It is believed that the caves were used as headquarters, medical facility and possibly an ammunition production plant by Binh Dinh Province Viet Cong.

(7) 26-31 January 1967: During this period, engagements continued to be small sporadic contacts with apparent enemy movement to the northwest.

b. Enemy successes: None.

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c. Statistical summary of enemy personnel and equipment:

(1) Personnel:

	<u>1 Nov - 31 Dec</u>	<u>1-31 Jan</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(a) KIA (BC)	495	226	721
(b) CIA	44	36	80
(c) Returnees	7		7
(d) Suspects	<u>53</u>	<u>    </u>	<u>53</u>
TOTALS	599	262	861

(2) Weapons:

	<u>1 Nov - 31 Dec</u>	<u>1-31 Jan</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(a) Small arms	56	41	97
(b) Automatic	70	13	83
(c) Crew served	<u>35</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>36</u>
(d) TOTALS	161	55	216

(3) Other equipments:

(a) Ammunitions:

	<u>1 Nov - 31 Dec</u>	<u>1-31 Jan</u>
<u>1.</u> Small arms	12,950	3,314
<u>2.</u> TNT	13½ lbs	15½ lbs
<u>3.</u> 81/82mm mort	119	
<u>4.</u> 60mm		20
<u>5.</u> Grenades	251	263
<u>6.</u> 12.7mm	3,000	

(b) Personal equipment:

	<u>1 Nov - 31 Dec</u>	<u>1-31 Jan</u>
<u>1.</u> Packs	147	106
<u>2.</u> Clothing sets	135	119

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	<u>1 Nov - 31 Dec</u>	<u>1-31 Jan</u>
3. Canteens	53	6
4. Web gear	6	14
5. Ponchos	18	26

(c) Miscellaneous:

	<u>1 Nov - 31 Dec</u>	<u>1-31 Jan</u>
1. Magazines	120	5
2. Flashlights	7	4
3. Medical equip	250 lbs	220 lbs
4. Binoculars	2	1

(d) Material destroyed:

	<u>1 Nov - 31 Dec</u>	<u>1-31 Jan</u>
1. Rice	11.5 tons	2.4 tons
2. Huts	395	106
3. Bridges	2	
4. Bunkers	524	301
5. Caves/tunnels	5	8
6. Foxholes	195	67
7. Boats/rafts	5/25	
8. Salt	1,225 lbs	3.3 tons
9. Grain	1,730 lbs	

3. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES:

a. Plans: The Brigade TF had contingency plans for the relief of CIDG camps of Plei Me, Plei Djereng, Due Co, and Dak Pek during PAUL REVERE IV.

b. Operations:

(1) Operation PAUL REVERE IV which had commenced at 181000 October 1966 concluded Phase I with the receipt of FRAGO 20-66, 4th Infantry

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Division, dated 1 November 1966. The 3d Brigade TF, under the operational control authority of the 4th Infantry Division, had been deployed east of the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. The concept called for a reorientation of the movement of the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 35th Infantry who were to shift their direction of movement from northwest to north and attack in zones, thus taking advantage of the ARC LIGHT strikes placed to the front of the advancing forces. A detailed chronological account of all facets of Operation PAUL REVERE IV is provided in after action report which is appended as inclosure 1.

(2) FRAGO 13-66, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, dated 230700Z December 1966 directed the 3d Brigade TF to assume responsibility for security of Highway 19 from Pleiku to BR250483 (Mang Yang Pass) with one reinforced infantry battalion. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry assumed this mission from 23 December 1966 to 2 January 1967, relieving the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, reinforced. This operation consisted of daily opening of the assigned portion of Highway 19, establishing strong points along the road, and aggressively patrolling the area for a considerable distance on both sides of the road. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was reinforced by Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and was supported by Battery A, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery during this period. At 021500 January 1967 the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry assumed responsibility for the highway security mission. They were reinforced by Company D, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and supported by Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. At 030730 January 1967, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry came under the operational control authority of the 4th Infantry Division and continued in this status throughout the remainder of the reporting period.

(3) Operation THAYER II:

(a) General: Operation THAYER II commenced 030730 January 1967 with the 3d Brigade TF reverting from the operational control authority of the 4th Infantry Division to the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Disposition of tactical units of the task force at the outset of the operation is as shown in inclosure 2.

(b) Period 3-6 January:

1. General: During this period the Brigade TF with two infantry battalions and supporting artillery deployed by road to the THAYER II area of operation and prepared to conduct offensive operations in the Suoi Ca Valley (center of mass: BR8065) for a period of approximately 3 weeks.

2. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: The Battalion conducted a tactical motor march from the Brigade task force base camp area to the forward assembly area vicinity of Phu Cat Rifle Range (BR906515),

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closing at 031735 January 1967. Accompanying the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry were HHC, 3d Brigade Task Force; 1st Platoon, C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry; and Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. Shortly after closing, security was established and the Brigade TF and Battalion's command posts became operational. On 4 January the Battalion conducted an air assault into its assigned area of operations and initiated offensive operations. The Battalion command post and fire base was established at Landing Zone SANTA (BR845716) with Company C (-) providing local security. Company A helilifted into Landing Zone MEADE, closing at 1715 hours and assumed the mission of providing security of the radio relay location. 2d Platoon, Company A remained at the Phu Cat Rifle Range to assist in the security of the Brigade TF command post. Company B (-) conducted a helilift into Landing Zone GAVIN (BR812696), closing at 1405 hours and assumed the mission of providing security for Battery A, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery and began search and destroy operations in the immediate vicinity of Landing Zone GAVIN. Company C (-) helilifted into Landing Zone SANTA, closed with the Battalion command post and fire base, and began conducting local patrols. The Battalion assumed OCA of Company B, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry at 051000 January 1967 and that company immediately began search and destroy operations north from Landing Zone GAVIN. At 061525 January, Task Force Irving (2d Platoon, Company A and 1st Platoon, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry) conducted a village search operation in the vicinity of BR865558. The operation was completed at 1625 hours with negative findings. The Reconnaissance Platoon began conducting search and destroy operations southwest of Landing Zone SANTA in the vicinity of BR812692.

3. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: On 4 January 1967 the Battalion made a tactical road march from Pleiku base camp to the forward assembly area at the Phu Cat Rifle Range, closing at 1715 hours, secured the area, and prepared to air assault into their assigned area of operation on the following day. On 5 January the Battalion CP, fire base, Reconnaissance Platoon and Company C (-) were helilifted into Landing Zone GAVIN, closing at 1600 hours. The Battalion command post was operational at 1000 hours. Company A and B air assaulted into the vicinity of BR811626 closing at 1230 hours where they branched out into search and destroy operations. At 1000 hours the Battalion assumed OCA of Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry who immediately initiated search and destroy operations in the vicinity of BR815646. On 6 January the Battalion command post and fire base was helilifted to Landing Zone TIP (BR791625) where they closed at 1620 hours.

4. 1st Platoon, C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry: Upon their arrival at the Phu Cat Rifle Range with 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry the platoon set up security around the Battalion command post area and conducted local patrolling action. On 6 January the platoon participated as a part of Task Force Irving in search and destroy operations in the vicinity of BR865558, returning to battalion base at night.

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5. During the remainder of the reporting period the platoon continued to provide security for the Brigade TF forward base of operations. Additionally, each day they provided security for the Republic of Vietnam National Police Civilian Check Point (BR861552) from 0700 to 1730 hours.

6. C Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry: On 3 January C Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry was placed in general support of the 3d Brigade TF and remained on call to the Brigade TF Commander throughout the remainder of the reporting period. They were deployed as screening forces and quick-strike search and destroy forces in areas where the commander deemed critical at the appropriate time.

(b) Period 7-17 January:

1. General: On 7 January in response to FRAGO 1-67, search and destroy operations in the Brigade TF became concentrated in the northwestern part of the area of operation as well as in the Suoi Ca Valley as efforts intensified toward capturing and destroying the 18th North Vietnamese Army Regiment. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols and ambushes were used extensively during this period. Provisions were also made during this period for the tactical security of Landing Zone HAMMOND.

2. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: During this period the Battalion oriented the search and destroy operations in a westerly direction within its area of operations with two companies combing the area of operation daily while one company provided security for the fire base at night. The three rifle companies rotated security and local patrolling duty at Landing Zone SANTA. The Reconnaissance Platoon conducted search and destroy operations in different areas throughout the entire area of operation during this period. On 7 January Company A was relieved of its security mission at Landing Zone MEADE. The Reconnaissance Platoon assumed this mission during the period 11-12 January. Company B was relieved in place by Company C who came under the operational control authority of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry effective 121015 January at ER747669. Company B thereupon returned to Landing Zone SANTA. From 14 to 17 January the Battalion acted as a blocking force to prevent enemy exfiltration to the east and northeast.

3. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: During this period the Battalion worked aggressively through their area of operation in a northwesterly direction making extensive use of IRRPs and ambushes. Frequent contact was made and after three days it appeared that small elements of enemy forces were attempting to exfiltrate the area. On 10 January Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was placed under the operational control authority of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and started moving on a multiple axis toward the vicinity of ER746766. Much of the Battalion's efforts were concentrated on the Oregon Trail area

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(see inclosure 3) which the enemy was using as an exfiltration route. In conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry's flushing out operation along the Oregon Trail, on 10 January the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry became under the operational control authority of the 3d Brigade TF to be employed as a blocking force at the western exit of the Oregon Trail. Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was replaced on 12 January by Company C, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry who assumed blocking positions and conducted search and destroy patrols in the vicinity of the eastern end of the Oregon Trail.

1. 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry: On 10 January the Brigade TF assumed operational control authority of the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry who was employed in the western portion of the Brigade TF of operation. Their four companies were positioned at strategic exit sites where they conducted local patrolling action by day and set up ambushes by night. Throughout the period the Squadron continued to conduct local search and destroy operations and to block enemy exfiltration to the west.

(c) Period 18-31 January:

1. General: 18-19 January was devoted primarily to the setting up of rallying points and conducting of Psychological operations to rally survivors of the 18th North Vietnamese Army Regiment while participating in the national CHIEU HOI Holiday on 19 January. During the remainder of the period, elements of the 3d Brigade TF concentrated their efforts toward: (1) Exploitation of massive underground complexes discovered in the vicinity of BR739649 and BR868614; (2) Search and clear operations in the Suoi Ca Valley area; and (3) Continuance of search and destroy operations directed at the 18th North Vietnamese Army Regiment.

2. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: On 19 January the Battalion conducted search operations in the Suoi Ca Valley in consonance with the CHIEU HOI Holiday program. On the same day the Security Platoon discovered an underground complex in the vicinity of BR863614. On 20 January, Company C returned to the operational control authority of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry whereupon the company was air lifted in to the vicinity of the rock complexes at BR739649. There they provided security and assistance to the engineers for the ensuing destruction of the complexes along with Company B. On 25 January Company B discovered another underground complex in the vicinity of BR744656 which was exploited for intelligence purposes and destroyed during the remainder of the reporting period (see paragraph 8, INTELLIGENCE). During this period platoon size elements provided security for Landing Zone HAMMOND and Battery B, 5th Battalion, 10th Artillery (BR845554). On 21 January the Battalion command post and fire base was moved to Landing Zone ILLINI (BR789669) closing at 1600 hours.

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3. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: During this period the Battalion continued to conduct search and destroy operations in the hill mass in its assigned area of operation. Numerous minor contacts were made as the battalion continued to flush out remnants of the 18th North Vietnamese Army Regiment. Ambush sites and blocking positions continued to be used in an attempt to pick off the exiting enemy, particularly in the Santa Fe and Oregon Trails areas. During the period 20-26 January, the Battalion assumed operational control authority of Companies A and D, 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry who were replaced by Companies B and C during that period. On 27 January the two companies from 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry CHOP 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and returned to parent unit; whereupon the 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry came under the operational control authority of the 3d Brigade TF.

4. 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry: On 19 January the Squadron (-) was released from under the operational control authority of the 3d Brigade TF. Companies A and D were placed under the operational control authority of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, whereupon they assisted with blocking and search and destroy operations in the western portion of the Santa Fe Trail area. On 24 January Company C replaced Company A under the operational control authority of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry. At 251135 January Company D engaged contact near a rock complex. C/S gas was used with no effect. Flame throwers were brought in and used resulting in heavy enemy casualties. That evening Company B replaced Company D under the operational control authority of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry. On 27 January Companies A and C reverted to the operational control authority of the 3d Brigade TF. During the remainder of the reporting period the squadron operated in the southern portion of the area of operation along the Santa Fe Trail.

5. 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry: On 26 January the 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry was placed under the OCA of the 3d Brigade TF with their command post and fire base located at the Vinh Thanh Special Forces Camp (BR614604). During the remainder of the period they were deployed as a blocking force at the western exits of the Oregon and Santa Fe Trails.

(d) The operational report period for 92 consecutive days ended with the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and Operation THAYER II continuing with sporadic, but significant contact. The kill ratio of friendly to enemy was 1:12.6 or 57 friendly KIA versus 721 enemy KIA.

c. (C) Training activities:

(1) The 3d Brigade TF Replacement Training Program continued to operate successfully. During the reporting period a total of 1740 personnel successfully completed the training program. The training,

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which is organized on a five day cycle, commences with orientation subjects, progresses through combat techniques of the individual soldier, small unit tactics, weapon battlesight firing, weapon familiarization firing, and culminates in a combat ambush patrol. The instruction presented in the training program emphasizes practical work which is applied at selected locations within the brigade perimeter and at the replacement training range. The combat ambush patrol is conducted beyond the confines of the brigade base camp in the adjacent brigade operational area. Reports from commanders of the units to which replacements have been assigned subsequent to the completion of their training attest to the value of the training and orientation and its marked success.

(a) Cadre: The Replacement Detachment Training Cadre consists of one officer and ten non-commissioned officers. Officers in charge during the reporting period were:

1. Captain Timothy Crotty, 1-21 November 1966.
2. Captain Leslie D. Umphress, 21 Nov - 14 Dec 66.
3. Captain Ronald G. Christian, 14 Dec 66 - 31 Jan 67.

(b) A training schedule reflecting subjects, time phases, training areas, and instructor requirements is attached as inclosure 4.

(2) Recondo training: During the reporting period 18 personnel of the 3d Brigade Task Force graduated from the MACV Recondo School. They were immediately assigned to the Brigade TF Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol. 15 personnel have attended the 4th Division Recondo Preparatory School.

d. Chemical: Riot control agent (CS gas) and white phosphorous grenades were employed to the maximum extent within the cave complex located vicinity BR738652. The use of the agent deep within the caves was minimized due to the difficulties of observing and fighting while wearing the protective mask. See lessons learned.

e. PSYWAR:

(1) PSYOPS appeals were directed at specific hamlets, villages, groups, and individuals. Utilizing the current intelligence situation the PSYOPS program supported the daily tactical situation.

(2) Ground teams and aircraft were coordinated during the tactical operation. Tapes and ground presentations were synonymous. Leaflets were dropped to support the loudspeaker broadcasts.

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(3) Personal contact with the population was utilized in distributing JUSPAO newspapers, GVN flags, and PSYWAR posters.

(4) Leaflet drops and loudspeaker tape appeals were accomplished utilizing U-10, UH-1D, and H-23 aircraft.

(5) Tape appeals were made by village chiefs urging the people of their villages not to support the Viet Cong and to evacuate areas which were under Viet Cong control.

(6) Summary of PSYWAR activities:

(a) Speaker/leaflet missions: 203.

(b) Leaflets dropped: 9,966,080.

(c) Ralliers: 8 NVA.

(d) Rallier exploitation: North Vietnamese Army ralliers made loudspeaker appeals from UH-1D aircraft, used as guides on operations, were exploited as ralliers through picture leaflets, and two made tape appeals.

f. Tactical air support statistics for the reporting period were as follows:

	FAC MISSIONS		COMBAT PROOFS	
	<u>REQ</u>	<u>FLOWN</u>	<u>REQ</u>	<u>FLOWN</u>
(1) 1-30 Nov 66	140	119	157	72
(2) 1-31 Dec 66	187	142	161	78
(3) 1-31 Jan 67	41	19	79	31
(4) Total	368	280	397	181
(5) % run	76%		46%	

g. Aviation: The aviation continued to function with the responsibility of broadcasting artillery advisories over UHF radio and operating a air traffic control center. During the quarterly period the brigade aviation section flew 904 hours, 1350 missions, 3251 sorties, and carried 2,244 passengers in organic helicopters. The U6A missions consisted of 92 sorties totaling 101 hours from 1 November to 7 January. Air mobile support was provided to the 3d Brigade TF by the 52d Aviation Company. Troop lifts, landing zone preparations, command and control capability and resupply missions were provided.

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## 4. LOGISTICS:

### a. Supply:

(1) Supply support of the Brigade TF continues to be accomplished through a combination of unit distribution and supply point distribution.

(2) Support of combat operations, although tailored to the demands of the specific tactical situation, has been accomplished utilizing two methods.

(a) During Operation PAUL REVERE IV, Class I, III, and V supply support was provided by Forward Support Element, Task Force Wells, of the 1st Logistical Command. Class II and IV resupply was accomplished through normal supply channels. Supply points to distribute Class I, III, and IV supplies were operated in the Brigade TF trains area by forward support elements of the 3d Support Battalion.

(b) All supply support during Operation THAYER II was provided by Forward Support Element, Task Force Wright, of the 1st Logistical Command. Class I, III, and V resupply was accomplished using the same methods as during Operation PAUL REVERE IV. Class II and IV supplies were requisitioned by tactical units through Brigade TF Supply Office (Forward) from the Qui Nhon Forward Supply Area, 1st Logistical Command.

(c) During both PAUL REVERE IV and THAYER II, support from Task Force Wells and Task Force Wright was outstanding.

### b. Transportation:

(1) The medium truck squad continues to be utilized primarily for long haul operations between Pleiku and Qui Nhon.

(2) The light truck squads are used primarily for Task Force troop haul vehicles and to support combat operations of the infantry battalion. The squads were used to move elements of the brigade from base camp to the area of operations, THAYER II.

(3) During Operation THAYER II, an Air Force C7A was utilized daily from Pleiku to HAMMOND Air Field to transport mail, replacements, R and R leave, emergency leave, and critical supply items.

### c. Equipment:

(1) During January the XML48, 40mm Grenade Launcher was received and issued to units of the brigade.

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(2) The Alarm Set, Anti-Intrusion, AN/GSS-9, will be issued to units of the Brigade TF in February 1967.

(3) The 3 gallon capacity rubber water container (air drop-able) has proven to be excellent for water resupply in the jungle terrain of Vietnam.

(a) Recommend a greater quantity be released to units.

(b) Recommend the container be painted a camouflage color to blend with the terrain.

d. Medical:

(1) Number of patients treated by 3d Brigade Clearing Station, 2843.

(2) Number of battle injuries treated: 174.

(3) Number of disease cases treated: 2347.

(4) Number of non-battle injuries treated: 327.

(5) DUSKOFF (medical air evacuation) support continues to be outstanding.

e. Statistics:

(1) Class I:

(a) A rations: 807,310.

(b) C rations: 199,044.

(2) Class III:

(a) Mogas: 320,500 gallons.

(b) Diesel: 267,000 gallons.

(3) Class V:

(a) 40mm: 15,814 rds.

(b) 81mm: 15,332 rds.

(c) 4.2": 12,061 rds.

(d) 105mm: 61,909 rds.

(e) 90mm: 683 rds.

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5. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. General:

(1) Major emphasis consisted of short term civic action assistance to villages and hamlets. The Brigade TF civil affairs team worked with military intelligence personnel, PSYOPS ground teams, National Police, sector and sub-sector personnel, and infantry units in support of the tactical operation.

(2) GVN representation accompanied the CA/PSYOPS teams into remote areas whenever possible. Vietnamese military personnel were always utilized in village operations. In many of the villages the GVN image and information concerning the GVN was brought to the villagers for the first time.

(3) Joint operations with the National Police in conducting civilian check points during the month of January 1967, revealed to be of tremendous value in control of the civilian population. A total of 16 operations resulted in increasing the number of Vietnamese carrying their identification cards and the apprehending of 13 Viet Cong.

b. Summary:

(1) Total operations: 106.

(2) Medical treatment:

(a) Sick call: 2420.

(b) Dental hygiene: 98.

(c) Evacuated for further treatment: 14.

(d) Soap demonstrations: 1.

(e) Razor and lather demonstrations: 1.

(f) A doctor accompanied the CA/PSYOPS teams on 11 operations and a dentist on 7 operations.

(3) Public works:

(a) Playground set in Plei Brel.

(b) Assistance in well capping project.

(c) Assistance in construction of water storage tanks for the Pleiku Provincial Hospital.

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(d) Two spillways constructed.

(4) Commerce: During this reporting period the brigade hired 1058 laborers at 50 \$VN per day. The laborers were utilized in road clearing and filling of sandbags for a total of 36 days.

(5) Public welfare:

(a) Sports equipment donated to the school at Plei Brel.

(b) 153 Montagnards from 13 villages were provided with transportation to Pleiku to shop. There were 6 trips made which were particularly effective.

(c) An ARVN cultural platoon held 3 shows for the Montagnards of six villages and the personnel of the 3d Brigade TF command post (forward).

(d) Four missionaries were assisted on visits to six Montagnard villages.

(e) The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry established a Friendship Program with the village of Plei Ksor Nhol.

(f) Hot meals were provided for 1600 refugees by the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

(6) Government and education:

(a) Ten village signs have been erected.

(b) GVN flags have been erected in the villages of Plei Doch, Plei Toun, Plei Toun Brieng, Plei Chorr, and Plei Ho Bo.

(7) Refugee assistance: There have been 412 Montagnards and 209 Vietnamese who have fled Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army control and were given refugee assistance.

(a) Montagnard:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PRESENT VILLAGE</u>	<u>FORMER VILLAGE</u>
76	Plei Chorr	Plei Djereng Blo
15	Plei Ya Bio	Plei Hluh
79	Plei Del	Plei Chom
52	Plei Del	Plei Hluh
123	Plei Ho Bo	Plei Yome
15	Plei Djereng	Unk
52	Plei Ho Bo	Plei Ech

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(b) Vietnamese:

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PRESENT VILLAGE</u>	<u>FORMER VILLAGE</u>
209	Phu Cat	Cat Son, Cat Hiep

(c) Supplies and assistance rendered to refugees:

1. Canned goods: 72 cases.
2. Clothing: 1400 pieces.
3. Blankets: 100 each.
4. Soap: 25 cases.
5. Rice: 250 bags, 15 lbs each.
6. Salt: 10 bags, 5 lbs each.
7. Shovels: 3 each.
8. Bulger Wheat: 280 lbs.
9. Tobacco: 13 cartons.
10. Candy: 10 lbs.

(d) Remarks:

1. The Montagnard refugees have adjusted well to their new locations. They have begun to construct homes and desire to remain in their present locations.

2. Upon arrival, both the Montagnard and Vietnamese refugees were suffering from malnutrition, fatigue, and were in generally poor medical condition. They have responded well to the medical treatment and the use of soap. They are receptive to the GVN and are happy to have escaped the detention imposed by the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. They have been helpful in offering information in aspects of PSYWAR and its effectiveness.

(8) Additional information:

(a) The Military Police of the 3d Brigade Task Force provided food and soap to two villages.

(b) The village chief of Plei Toun was invited for supper by the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.

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UNIT	AUTH			ATCH			ASG PLUS ATCH			PDY		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
HHC, 3d Bde TF	34	9	240	0	0	0	45	10	526	40	9	472
Co D, 65th Engr	6	0	216	0	0	9	6	0	240	6	0	232
Co D, 725th Maint	8	0	95	4	1	13	13	4	297	12	4	286
Co B, 25th Med Bn	8	0	80	4	1	9	12	0	98	12	0	94
C Trp, 3/4 Cav	5	0	179	0	0	11	6	0	164	5	0	153
1/35 Inf	37	2	790	0	0	51	36	2	788	36	2	711
2/35 Inf	37	2	790	3	1	52	39	2	753	36	2	692
1/14 Inf	37	2	790	1	0	54	36	2	799	34	2	742
2/9 Arty	38	3	452	3	0	24	41	4	460	39	4	444
14th PIO Det	2	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	5	1	0	5
40th Inf Plat, Scout Dog	1	0	26	0	0	0	1	0	22	1	0	22
TOTAL	213	18	3661	15	3	223	237	24	4152	222	23	3853

(2) The task force strength fluctuated daily during this period. The following are periodic strength figures:

DATE	ASSIGNED			PRESENT FOR DUTY		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
10 Nov	233	14	3519	244	14	4160
20 Nov	235	16	3545	246	20	4182
30 Nov	223	16	3599	240	18	4074
10 Dec	212	18	3965	211	14	4032
20 Dec	241	16	4183	190	16	3672
30 Dec	235	18	4309	197	16	3974
10 Jan	208	19	4116	200	15	3932
20 Jan	214	18	3944	214	18	3751
30 Jan	235	18	4309	197	16	3974

(3) Replacements received:

	NOVEMBER							TOTAL
	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	
25th Med Bn	0	0	0	4	1	1	18	24
HHC, 3d Bde TF	0	3	1	1	3	5	48	61
1/14 Inf	0	1	0	4	2	4	101	112
1/35 Inf	0	1	1	3	2	5	73	85
2/35 Inf	0	0	1	1	4	1	30	37
2/9 Arty	0	0	0	0	1	1	18	20
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	2	1	4	1	8	16
Co D, 725th Maint	0	0	0	0	8	13	14	35

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DECEMBER

	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC, 3d Bde TF	0	0	2	3	2	5	26	38
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	0	6	6	31	43
1/35 Inf	0	0	1	2	6	4	43	56
2/35 Inf	0	0	2	1	0	0	15	18
2/9 Arty	0	0	2	0	0	2	16	20
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	4
Co D, 725th Maint	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	5
C/3/4 Cav	0	0	0	1	5	4	5	15
25th Med Bn	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	6

JANUARY

	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHC, 3d Bde TF	0	3	0	4	6	13	27	53
1/14 Inf	0	1	0	9	9	4	47	70
1/35 Inf	0	0	2	5	4	6	37	54
2/35 Inf	0	0	4	4	1	4	23	36
2/9 Arty	0	0	2	10	8	6	31	57
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	1	7	3	3	2	16
Co D, 725th Maint	0	0	2	6	3	5	30	46
C/3/4 Cav	0	0	0	5	3	4	4	16
25th Med Bn	0	0	0	4	6	4	20	34

(4) The number of friendly casualties for November, December and January are as follows:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>WIA DIED OF WOUNDS</u>
57	193	0	1

(5) Number of emergency leaves:

	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY
HHC, 3d Bde TF	0	4	2
1/14 Inf	3	1	0
1/35 Inf	3	4	4
2/35 Inf	0	3	6
2/9 Arty	1	2	3
Co D, 65th Engr	1	2	1
Co D, 725th Maint	0	1	0
25th Med Bn	0	0	0
14th PIO	0	0	0

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(6) Personnel who departed for separation:

	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY
HHC, 3d Bde TF	7	19	11
1/14 Inf	9	21	45
1/35 Inf	10	30	15
2/35 Inf	11	32	47
2/9 Arty	8	22	24
Co D, 65th Engr	3	2	3
C/3/4 Cav	4	13	9
Spt Bn (S&T)	7	20	7
25th Med Bn	3	7	4

(7) To date the unit has not received replacements for certain highly skilled personnel who have departed the command. These shortages are most prevalent in the 11B and 13B MOS categories.

(8) Accounting for personnel in hospitals remains a problem, but is improving significantly. The Brigade TF has placed liaison NCOs in each hospital to facilitate accounting for evacuees.

c. Morale:

(1) Morale in the 3d Brigade TF continues to be excellent. Mail service and post exchange service improved considerably. Religious services have been adequate for all faiths.

(2) Mail:

- (a) Money orders and fees: \$1,462,893.07.
- (b) Money orders issued: 21,926.
- (c) Stamp value sold: \$23,510.10.
- (d) Total MPC collected: \$1,488,031.11.
- (e) Total number of officers at APO: 1.
- (f) Total number of EM at APO: 20.
- (g) Total number served: 4397.

(3) R and R:

(a) Allocations received and utilized:

	RECEIVED	UTILIZED		
		OFF	WO	EM
November	253	16	4	195
December	189	9	0	150
January	341	11	1	213

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(b) R and R allocations by area and number of standby:

	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>STANDBY</u>
BANGKOK	121	19
HAWAII	103	30
HONG KONG	131	9
KUALA LUMPUR	39	58
MANILA	34	4
PENANG	47	64

(c) Promotion allocations:

	NOVEMBER					
	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
HHC, 3d Bde TF	0	0	0	5	15	25
1/14 Inf	0	0	1	14	21	79
1/35 Inf	0	0	2	8	10	50
2/35 Inf	0	0	1	14	31	40
2/9 Arty	0	0	0	6	11	22
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	4	6	10
3d Spt Bn	0	0	0	7	11	25
C/3/4 Cav	0	0	0	9	7	12
TOTAL	0	0	4	68	115	271

	DECEMBER					
	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
HHC, 3d Bde TF	1	0	0	5	19	26
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	7	16	44
1/35 Inf	0	0	2	4	6	30
2/35 Inf	0	0	0	3	8	40
2/9 Arty	0	0	0	6	9	26
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	1	10	14
3d Spt Bn	0	0	1	7	12	12
C/3/4 Cav	0	0	0	4	6	12
TOTAL	1	0	3	38	91	198

	JANUARY					
	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
HHC, 3d Bde TF	0	1	1	6	15	25
1/14 Inf	0	0	0	6	26	65
1/35 Inf	0	0	0	3	10	50
2/35 Inf	0	0	2	4	14	60

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	<u>E-9</u>	<u>E-8</u>	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>
2/9 Arty	0	0	0	10	18	48
Co D, 65th Engr	0	0	0	1	10	14
3d Spt Bn	0	0	0	5	7	12
C/3/4 Cav	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	0	1	4	36	112	286

(5) Awards presented:

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Purple Heart	34	38	8
Air Medal	16	6	6
Air Medal w/V	0	0	2
Army Commendation Medal	5	11	28
Army Commendation Medal w/V	1	0	0
Bronze Star	2	24	7
Bronze Star w/V	1	12	7
Legion of Merit	5	0	0
Soldiers Medal	0	0	0
Silver Star	1	0	2
Distinguished Service Cross	0	2	1
Distinguished Flying Cross	0	1	0

(6) Quarterly reenlistment report:

Eligible reenlistment:

	<u>1st term RA</u>			<u>Career RA</u>			<u>AUS</u>		
	<u>ELIG</u>	<u>REENL</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>ELIG</u>	<u>REENL</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>ELIG</u>	<u>REENL</u>	<u>%</u>
Nov	21	3	14%	18	15	83%	68	0	0%
Dec	17	7	41%	13	6	46%	89	0	0%
Jan	<u>21</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>36.14%</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1.35%</u>
TOTAL	59	18	22.72%	40	30	75%	222	1	0.005%

7. ARTILLERY:

a. General:

(1) During the period of 1 November 1966 to 26 December 1966 the mission of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was direct support of the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division on Operation PAUL REVERE IV. Battery A was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry; Battery B was in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry; Battery C was in direct support of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry; and Battery D (Provisional) was in direct support of base camp, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division.

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(a) Additional artillery units were under the operational control (OPCON) of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery during this period. These units reinforced the fires of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery in an outstanding manner. They fired in support of the infantry in contact, fired blocking fires, answered immediate fire request on SPAR and SPIDER reports, and greatly enhanced extensive H & I program. These units and the period that they were under the OPCON of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery areas listed below:

1. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, OPCON to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, 1 November to 3 November 1966 with the mission of GS.

2. Battery C, 5th Battalion, 16 Artillery was OPCON 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery from 3 November to 3 December 1966, with the mission of GS. Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery was OCA 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery from 3 December 1966 to 3 January 1967 with the mission of GS.

(b) From 11 November to 4 December, Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was OPCON to the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery and Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was OPCON to 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery continued in direct support of 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry during this period while Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery had the mission of direct support of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry which was OPCON to the 3d Brigade TF.

(2) During the period 27 December to 3 January, the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (-) was in direct support of base camp, 3d Brigade at Pleiku. Maximum time was allocated to equipment maintenance and to training newly assigned personnel. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery had the mission of direct support of 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry in securing Highway 19 east of Pleiku.

(3) During the period 3 January to 31 January the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (-) had the mission of direct support of the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division in support of Operation THAYER II. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was in direct support of 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was in direct support of 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry. Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was attached to the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry which was OPCON to the 4th Infantry Division.

(a) During this period several additional units were attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. These units fired reinforcing fires in support of infantry units in contact, fired blocking fires, and fired on SPAR and SPIDER reports. The units and periods that they were attached to 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery are listed below:

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1. Battery B, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery, 3 January to 31 January with the mission of GS to 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery.

2. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery, 11 January to 19 January, and 27 January to 31 January with the mission of DS to the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry.

3. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, 26 January to 31 January with the mission of DS to 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry.

(b) During this period Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was attached to 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry on Operation SAM HOUSTON.

b. Operations:

(1) The beginning of this quarter found the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery continuing Operation PAUL REVERE IV with the mission of direct support of the 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division which was under the OPCON of the 4th Infantry Division. The fires from the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery and attached units resulted in 176 KIA (BC), 300 KIA (est), 23 WIA (confirmed), ten mortars silenced, and two machine-guns silenced.

(2) From 26 December to 2 January, Battery B, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery had the mission of direct support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry who were securing Highway 19 east of Pleiku. On 2 January, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was attached to the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. Battery C and the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry relieved Battery A and the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry in place on 2 January and continued the mission of road security for the remainder of the quarter. The results of artillery fires for this period is unknown.

(3) From 15 December to 30 December 1966, the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, supported three ARVN and CIDG task forces: Task Force LUAT, and Task Force MRONG. The 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery, furnished these task forces an artillery liaison section and provided additional fire support from organic and OPCON batteries. Results of artillery fired in support of these task forces are unknown.

(4) During the period of 3 January to 31 January, the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was in direct support of 3d Brigade TF, 25th Infantry Division on Operation THAYER II with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). The 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery coordinated requests for additional fires with the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. The results

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of artillery fires from the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery and attached units for this period were as follows: 17 KIA (BC), 7 bunkers destroyed, 1 tunnel destroyed, and 1 mortar silenced.

8. OTHER:

a. Engineer:

(1) General: During the quarter 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967, Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion continued in support of the 3d Brigade TF providing both combat engineer support in the area of operation and construction at the Brigade TF base camp.

(2) Operations:

(a) Support in the area of operations consisted mostly of landing zone clearing. However, other combat engineer support was provided such as enemy bunker destruction, cave destruction, preparation of defensive perimeters, and helipad construction. During Operation PAUL REVERE IV, a combat engineer platoon was attached to each of the three infantry battalions. Initially during Operation THAYER II, two engineer squads were provided to the battalions. Upon discovery of the cave complex in the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry's area of operations a full platoon was provided.

1. The caves encountered in the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry's area of operations on Operation THAYER II consisted of large granite boulders randomly placed by nature. In all cases erosion had created natural caverns extending up and down the streambeds for distances of 150 to 200 meters and as many as three levels deep. These caverns were used by the enemy for various purposes.

2. The method employed for the destruction of the caves was the use of large quantities of explosives placed in crevices between boulders and in the open spaces in the lower levels. The effect of the use of this method was to fragment the large boulders and displace them thus rendering them useless. In some cases entrances were sealed by the fragmentation and displacement of large boulders.

3. A typical quantity of explosives detonated at one time was 6,000 pounds. One shot of 10,000 pounds was detonated. The following explosives were used: TNT, military dynamite, tetrytol, shaped charges and composition CA. The total quantity used in the cave complex in the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry area of operations was 106,000 pounds. The bulk of this explosive was transported to the site by Chinook with a 70 to 100 ft sling.

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4. Initially the acetylene tunnel destruction apparatus was tried. This apparatus, designed for tunnels in cohesive soils, was not effective in the caves due to its venting to the atmosphere.

(c) During Operation PAUL REVERE IV and THAYER II, the engineers established water points at the Brigade TF forward area.

(e) Brigade TF base camp support included the construction of semi-permanent buildings for the Brigade TF. This work is being done on a self-help basis with engineer technical assistance. Layout, siting, and concrete work is being done by the engineer company. Materials for vertical construction are prefabricated by the engineer company for the using unit. Also the engineer company continued to provide water for the units at Brigade TF base camp.

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SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

L. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. Item: Rotational hump.

Discussion: The majority of the 3d Brigade TF personnel arrived in Vietnam during the month of January 1967. This presented the problem of rotating and replacing most of the brigade task force personnel within a one month period. Curtailments were granted rather than using involuntary extensions to smooth out the rotational hump. As a result, one-half of the Brigade TF personnel rotated in December and one-half in January. During the period the assigned strength dropped below the authorized level. However, by late January authorized officer strength was regained. Replacements for enlisted losses of date have failed to bring the total to pre-hump strength.

Observation: Although the hump period was spread out over a 2 1/2 month period, it still exists. To help smooth it out as much as possible, replacements should be requisitioned up to three months in advance of the hump period.

b. Item: Transportation to CONUS.

Discussion: In December the US Air Force began flying Brigade TF personnel directly from Pleiku to CONUS. Difficulty was experienced in requesting an accurate number of seat allocations. Especially in January, the Brigade TF fell considerably short in filling seat allocations. This was due to the Christmas drop, hospitalizations and extensions. The Brigade TF was able to give a large number of personnel Christmas drops because other units in this area failed to utilize their seat commitments. The new extension policy with the special thirty day leave greatly increased the number of extensions.

Observation: A log should be maintained of Brigade TF hospitalizations, and allowances should be made for voluntary extensions and curtailments. When this is accomplished, advance planning will facilitate more accurate programming for utilization of seat allocations for departing personnel.

c. Item: Junior non-commissioned officers.

Discussion: During the reporting period only 60% of the non-commissioned officers losses were replaced by personnel of like grade. This is partially offset by the enthusiasm and esprit of the young men who make up the bulk of the enlisted personnel of the battalion; however, enthusiasm is not a complete substitute for experience.

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Observation:

(1) Some of the shortage of non-commissioned officers has been alleviated by the more rapid promotion of selected individuals. This lends the additional prestige to a young man to enable him to better control his contemporaries, and creates a competitive situation where the young non-commissioned officer makes unusual efforts to master the professional and technical qualifications for more advanced grades. While not a complete substitute for experience, the system of rapid promotion does lessen the impact of non-commissioned losses.

(2) The lack of experience has also been mitigated by a 3d Brigade TF NCO School initiated 15 November 1966. This is a course of intensive instruction lasting for a period of two weeks. Graduates of the school have exhibited an increased capability to perform as non-commissioned officers, more than justifying their losses from a tactical unit for the two week period. The course stresses not only the practical problems of the infantry but places special emphasis on the requirements for aggressive leadership.

d. Item: Personnel with medical limitations on duty.

Discussion: All units have some personnel that are medically unfit for duty in a rifle company or similar tactical unit and many of these individuals can be absorbed in assignments within the battalion; however, a simplified system for reassignment of personnel with long-term medical limitations, or a greater authorization for overstrength to permit the unit to maintain full combat effectiveness would materially enhance unit effectiveness.

Observation: If the personnel accounting system were modified to exclude personnel with medical limitations from the present for duty strength, a more realistic statistical picture of unit capabilities would be reflected in current reports.

e. Item: Personnel in aviation section utilized for artillery advisory duties.

Discussion: During PAUL REVERE IV and THAYER II, the Brigade TF Aviation Section was above TOE strength in enlisted personnel. These personnel were necessary to perform the additional missions given the section of providing artillery advisories for the area of operations and controlling local air traffic.

Observation: Providing artillery advisories for aircraft in the area of operation is a vital requirement for operations conducted in Vietnam. This requirement can be met with personnel working for the

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Brigade TF aviation section. The problem has never been squarely faced in the CONUS training environment as the artillery fire has never been "live". Trained controller personnel with equipment to augment the brigade aviation section, would greatly assist in this problem.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. Item: Mobile operations centers:

Discussion: A requirement exists for an "operations center" in an infantry battalion. This can be resolved by a number of expedient means ranging from full tracked CP vehicles through elaborate bunkers and including the conventional expedient of a person operating a flashlight. However, in order to provide a secure, airtight, illuminated working area other expedients have been developed which offer considerable promise.

Observation: The 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry has developed an "AMITOC" (Air Mobile Instant Tactical Operations Center). It is made of two CONEX containers welded together with all necessary radio communications equipment, shock-mounted, inside on the operation's side and an intelligence map mounted on one wall, and working area for the S2, S3, and operation NCO on the opposite side. Built in cabinets, cupboards, telephone racks and files facilitate orderly operations. Light is provided by the vehicle headlight mounted in overhead brackets. Power for lights and radios is supplied from a top-mounted battery rack which is recharged by a generator sandbagged in a place that is a short distance from the AMITOC. Brackets provide immediately available stands for antennas, and an external terminal board permits easy communications facilities. A ladder welded in place on one side permits easy access to the top of the AMITOC, and cables attached to the top of the AMITOC simplify movement by air. Movement in a CP area where wheeled vehicles are available can be accomplished by the wrecker organic to the infantry battalion and the AMITOC can be lifted into isolated LZs by a CH47. The total weight of the AMITOC, including two generators and all equipment mounted is approximately 5200 pounds. Operations personnel to man the facility can be moved as passengers inside the CH47 that moves the TOC. The facility becomes operational approximately three minutes after being placed in an LZ thus facilitating command and control. Additional protection is provided by sandbagging the sides and top. This can be accomplished without hindering operations inside the AMITOC. Additional workspace and an area for issuing orders, conducting briefings and similar activities is provided by a canvas extension on a wood and steel frame work. The extension has sides to provide light-proof working space; or the sides can be extended during daylight hours to provide convenient access and daylight.

b. Item: Marking LZs and perimeters.

Discussion: A requirement exists for simple field

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expedient illuminated marking system to mark helicopter landing zones at night and to make perimeters for aircraft at night.

Observation: A simple expedient can be made using an artillery cannister filled with gasoline placed at the corners of the LZ or the limits of the perimeter. It can be ignited by a trip flare attached to the stake over the cannister. Such a marking flare will burn for approximately 20 minutes.

c. Item: Operations within rock formations.

Discussion: Attacking the enemy within a cave is extremely difficult. Since the enemy inhabits the cave he knows where the passages lead and has the advantage of interior lines of communication in his reinforcing capability. Additionally, he has a defense plan based on a detailed reconnaissance, knowing well in advance what avenues of approach must be used by his opponents. The attacker has no way to make a recon except by fire. As it appears, the advantage is on defense; however, there are several advantages that accrue to the attacker. The attacker being on the offensive has the initiative and freedom to choose where and when to attack. Secondly, the attacker has a significant psychological advantage in that the defender harbors a great fear of being entombed alive. The final result will depend mostly on the quality of the individuals fighting the engagement.

Observation: Maximum exploitation of the psychological effect on the enemy was employed by using a small portable loudspeaker encouraging the enemy to come out or be buried alive. In spite of the total lack of reconnaissance, which was extremely difficult to the extent of the rock complexes and total darkness inside, the unit attacked the rock complex from many openings by using small elements (less than fire team size) under four men operating independently but with a common mission. Little use can be made of demolition or fragmentary grenades once a team is within the cave, as the explosives have an equal effect on both friendly and enemy. The demolitions and fragmentary grenades effect the eardrums. Therefore, the battle within the cave rock complex returns to the most primitive of fights: man against man using pistols at ranges of two and three feet. Here control and leadership is difficult and the will of the individual becomes the dominant factor. Training and discipline are the only factors that can influence the action within a rock complex.

d. Item: Organization of rock complex fighting teams.

Discussion: The technique of rock complex fighting requires detailed planning and violent execution similar to the technique developed by the US Army for destruction of a fortified area. The main difference in the attack of a cave complex and the attack of a fortified area lies in the intelligence field for in a cave complex a reconnaissance is impossible.

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Observation: Rock complex fighting teams of three or four men were organized and normally led by an experienced NCO. One man was the point and responsible for leading the way as well as security to the front. The second man in line, normally the leader, provided observation and security to the flanks. The rear man secured the rear and was the guide in case a rapid withdrawal became necessary. The lead man carried a large flashlight used to investigate cracks and crevices that exist drew immediate fire from the enemy. Training and practice in the attack of a rock complex are absolute necessities for successful accomplishment of the mission.

e. Item: Use of non-toxic agent (CS) within an underground complex.

Discussion: CS agent is extremely effective in dislodging the enemy from the numerous hiding places within a cave. If the enemy is there, the CS will cause him to reveal his position if not cause him to come completely out of hiding. The employment of the "Mighty Mite" proved unsuccessful in this cave complex due to its vast size and numerous egresses. There was no way to seal the cave effectively to insure penetration of the agent when using the "Mighty Mite". Drafts and air currents were unpredictable and frequently hindered rather than helped the "Mighty Mite" pump the agent into the lower portion of the rock cavities. Also, the agent, CS, is lighter than air and this physical property caused it to drift to the upper portions of the rock complexes.

Observation: Recommend the development of a non-toxic agent heavier than air which would settle into the lower cavities of a multi-level rock complex.

f. Item: Use of hand grenades within rock formations.

Discussion: All hand grenades can be effectively used at rock formations entrances but, once the team is under ground the hand grenade is not practicable. The hand grenade cannot be thrown within the restricted area of the rock complex. If thrown, the effect on friendly and foe alike is chaotic.

Observation: Hand grenades can be employed while the soldiers are outside the caves but once inside only non-fragmentation grenades can be used such as white phosphorous and CW, and these must be used with extreme caution. The best technique is to employ them around corners or down in crevices.

g. Item: Use of M18A1 Antipersonnel Mine (Claymore) within the underground complex.

Discussion: The claymore can be effectively employed deep within the cave because it is command detonated. The team can vacate the

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areas; thereby, saving the effects of the blast for the enemy. Most frequently the claymore is employed when entering the cave complex to insure no sniper is waiting the first soldier to silhouette himself against the light background of the underground complex.

Observation: Claymores must be placed in well concealed positions within the underground complex and sufficient wire provided to allow the team to withdraw to a safe location outside the cave area. Additionally, the claymore should be "booby-trapped" to prevent the enemy from disarming it while the team is withdrawing to safe areas. This can be accomplished by burying a fragment grenade beneath the claymore and placing a taught wire between the two so that any movement of the claymore causes the hand grenade to explode. Further, the blasting cap wire must be tied around the claymore tightly to prevent the enemy from removing the electric cap. Lastly, the team must move rapidly to safe area and detonate the mine before the enemy has time to disarm it. Time fuzes cannot be used to detonate claymores under these conditions. Claymores are effective but they cannot insure the enemy will not be awaiting your arrival.

h. Item: Use of demolition within the underground rock complex.

Discussion: The most effective method of underground rock complex destruction is through the utilization of demolitions. Great quantities of explosives, nearly 75 tons were required to destroy the underground rock complexes which were found in the 3d Brigade TF AO. Transportation of the explosives proved to be a most difficult logistical problem. Maximum use was made of small satchel charges by tossing them into the cave entrance then exploding the charge.

Observation: When underground rock complex destruction is required a great quantity of explosives will be necessary to break the vast amount of rocks that support the cave and the entrance. The transportation problem was solved by using a CH47 helicopter with a 100 foot sling which transported the explosives directly to the rock complex entrance where the demolition was to take place. The explosives were emplaced and exploded. The technique used was to throw the small satchel charge device into the rock complex while a soldier stood by with a claymore firing device. No sooner did the charge fall to the ground than it was exploded with the firing device preventing the enemy from tampering with it.

i. Item: Use of individual weapons within an underground complex.

Discussion: Due to the size of the M60 machine gun and noise it created, it was impossible to use the weapon in the caves. The identical problem exists with the M14 rifle. The XM16E1 proved to be somewhat better than either of the other two weapons due to its light weight and compact size; however, in the case of all weapons with a high muzzle velocity the ricochets were so frequent and so dangerous that our soldiers were reluctant

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to use them. The best weapon by far proved to be the caliber .45 automatic pistol. Since the ranges at which most kills were made was in the neighborhood of a few feet, there was little need for accuracy. The tremendous stopping power of the caliber .45 pistol at close ranges more than once literally blew the enemy down as well as killing him.

Observation: Since the caliber .45 pistol has an extremely low muzzle velocity and a very heavy slug there was little chance of a ricochet hitting the firer. The big disadvantage was the report from the pistol often stunned the firer, momentarily preventing a good second shot. For future operations of this nature silencers should be developed for personnel working in such close quarters.

j. Item: M56 load bearing equipment.

Discussion: The M56 load bearing equipment with the pack attached has proved entirely unsatisfactory in this operation. The pack rides in the saddle of one's back, a most uncomfortable position. The pack will not carry the necessary comforts that a field soldier requires in order to get the little rest he is allowed. The pack, the gear and its numerous straps and buckles frequently become entangled in the vines of the jungle causing the wearer great frustration and anxiety, in addition to the noise he makes untangling it.

Observation: In this type of operation, we could do well to take a lesson from the enemy, who are living in the field and transport their equipment on their backs. The pack used by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army soldier is well made of durable material, light weight, unencumbered by unnecessary straps and buckles and most of all, it will carry the necessary items a soldier requires in the field. It is by far the favorite field pack and used by many of our soldiers. Another advantage of this type pack is the capability of the soldiers to drop it with only a shrug of his shoulders whereas the US pack cannot be dropped without also dropping his pistol belt and ammo.

k. Item: Installation of trip flares.

Discussion: Trip flares do provide early warning providing they are properly installed. The tension release for the trip flare does not work well as the wire can be pulled several inches and sometimes a foot or two before the flare will fire. No enemy, however clumsy, would trip such a flare let alone cut a wire with such tension on it. The best method of installation is having a loose wire with a pin in only one of the restraining holes. Keeping the wire low and concealed in the grass as well as concealing the trip flare prevents the enemy from locating the device. A disadvantage to this method of installation is that the down draft of helicopters and movement of small animal discharge the flares. However, it is

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infinitely better to have many discharged at the wrong time than to have one that failed to fire at the right time.

Observation: Maximum training in the proper installation of trip flares, removing the flares in the morning and reinstalling them at twilight insures that they will function properly when needed.

l. Item: Communication equipment within the command and control ship.

Discussion: Not all of the helicopters assigned as command and control ships had organic communications equipment available for use by the passengers. This lack of organic communications created a need to substitute additional equipment to provide ground commanders means of communicating with their units while airborne. A PRC/25 with short antenna was initially employed to fill this communication gap but was found inadequate, because of limited range and power output. An expedient antenna was then designed using a UG-255 antenna connection, length of shielded cable and length of WD-1 wire appropriate to the frequency band being used. This antenna unit was taped to the skids of the helicopter and passed through the door of the aircraft to the radio. This system provided improved communications but did not fulfill the needs of the airborne commander.

Observation: A new system was then designed which proved to be the most satisfactory, employing two AN/VRC 16 radios with the whip antenna and matching units from a 3/4 ton truck. The matching units and antenna were mounted on a 2" X 8" plank and suspended between the skids of the helicopter. A coaxial cable was run from the radios to the power supply of the helicopter.

m. Item: The need exists for an issued M79 ammunition carrying vest.

Discussion: The M79 grenadiers normally an amount in excess of 50, 40mm rounds. The basic load of 18 rounds is insufficient. The grenadiers devised all sorts of methods of carrying the extra rounds. One unit adopted a vest made from jungle fatigues with sewn M79 grenade bandoliers. This vest has enough pouches for 24 to 30 rounds; with additional rounds being carried in a claymore bag. By using the grenade bandoliers as pouches facilitates the rapid reloading of the rounds.

Observation: A standard M79 ammunition vest, lightweight should be devised and issued to M79 grenadiers.

n. Item: Power saws to be utilized in clearing of landing zones.

Discussion: The lack of natural landing zones in the area

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of operations necessitated clearing numerous small landing zones and several large battalion base landing zones. The small power saws available were seldom sturdy enough to accomplish the task.

Observation: Heavy duty power saws should be brought into a landing zone. They can be used to enlarge it after a one-ship landing zone has been cut with smaller saws, or blown with demolitions.

o. Item: There is a need for increasing the availability of composition C-4 explosive.

Discussion: A great amount of explosives are required to assist in clearing the large trees and stumps from landing zones. Composition C-4 is now the standard Army explosive but there has been sufficient supply.

Observation: An effort should be made to increase the availability of composition C-4 explosive.

p. Item: There is a need for an improved smoke grenade.

Discussion: In the dense jungle the standard issue smoke grenade will not penetrate jungle canopy. On those occasions when the smoke grenade does penetrate it has drifted so badly that it is not reliable to mark friendly positions. The white phosphorous hand grenade generates sufficient smoke so that it is visible almost immediately.

Observation: While numerous improved methods of marking positions are available; the standard issue smoke grenade should be improved to make it a more reliable device for marking positions.

q. Item: Use of fuze VT against enemy snipers.

Discussion: In one area of operations, Landing Zone LANE, the supported infantry encountered heavy sniper fire from enemy soldiers tied in the tops of trees. Fuze Quick or Delay was found to be ineffective since the round would burst below the snipers. Upon suggestion from the battery FOC, the forward observer began using Fuze VT, high angle, it proved to be very successful.

Observation: During enemy contact where snipers in trees are encountered, an effective method of utilizing supporting artillery is with Fuze VT, high angle, carefully adjusted in front of the advancing infantry.

r. Item: Coordination with supported units in contact.

Discussion: To facilitate processing calls for fire from

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the supported infantry companies, the DS artillery battery should operate a radio on the supported infantry battalion command net. This procedure gives the battery FDC prior warning, a general direction in which to lay the battery, the approximate coordinates of the target, and facilitates quicker reaction to fire support requirements. The battery alerted by this means may also enter the company net to receive fire missions from the platoon leaders when an artillery forward observer is not immediately available.

Observation: Utilization of additional radios on the supported infantry nets has enabled this unit to provide quicker reaction to calls for fire from infantry units.

g. Item: Artillery adjustment in precipitous terrain.

Discussion: Certain precautions should be taken when firing artillery fire in precipitous terrain. When switching from shell smoke to shell HE then should be no correction made. Once a shell HE is located on the ground the adjustment of artillery fires may continue.

Observation: Each individual concerned with the adjustment of artillery fire must be aware of the range difference between shell smoke and shell HE. Shell HE will travel further than shell smoke when fired with the same data.

h. Item: Aerial Observation.

Discussion: It is mandatory that an aerial observer establish and maintain contact with the ground element requesting fire to locate the position of all friendly troops in the vicinity of the desired target area.

Observation: It is imperative that friendly units clearly mark their positions on the ground by a readily identifiable visual means. When more than one friendly troop unit is located in the proximity of the target area a distinctly different identifying object for each group must be used.

i. Item: Command and control helicopters.

Discussion: Command and control ships are not equipped with either an additional helmet or the means whereby the battalion commander can plug into the ship's radio intercom system with a helmet of his own. At present the battalion commander is required to carry his own PRC/25 on board, or, install an AN/VRC 46 in the aircraft. Frequently, command and control ships are switched. This requires removal of radios and antennas rigs whenever a switch is made.

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3. (C) Training and Organization.

a. Item: Fear of white phosphorous grenades.

Discussion: Whitephosphorous hand grenades are extremely effective anti-personnel weapons, markers (the smoke will rise rapidly through a jungle canopy), and screening agent. However, many replacements do not appear to adequately understand the capabilities and limitations of the weapons, and are afraid to use it.

Observation: The WP hand grenade is extremely effective, especially against personnel at night. It has a remarkable psychological effect on an enemy and is limited only by the knowledge of, and confidence in the grenade. Training in the use of the WP hand grenade has been conducted in this unit attain understanding and confidence.

b. Item: Night operations.

Discussion: Many new replacements, and some of the troops with a considerable amount, of experience, have voiced the opinion that "the night belongs to the enemy". If this defensive thinking is pursued, the saying can well become true.

Observation: Confidence and skill in night operations can be attained with training and positive leadership. Continued emphasis on night ambush and night movement is necessary both in training prior to assignment to Vietnam and after assignment to this unit.

c. Item: Artillery Fire Direction Training.

Discussion: Due to a lack of replacement 13E10 personnel it has become necessary to develop a training program for artillery fire direction personnel. By consolidating the block of instructions normally given 13E10 trainees, a four week training program has been developed. Using the base camp provisional battery fire direction personnel as instructors, carefully selected personnel are trained in fire direction techniques and procedures.

Observation: To maintain effective fire direction centers at both battalion and battery level a constant training program has been pro en adequate. Trainees must be carefully selected using GI, score, mathematical aptitude, scores, and education level as a guide.

4. (C) Intelligence:

a. Item: Enemy Tactics.

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Discussion: Contact with the enemy during the early portion of THAYER II was sporadic and primarily with small groups. These contacts were characterized by short fire fights which were quickly broken. Toward the end of January contacts in the southern portion of the AO were marked by an increased use of AW and increased tendency to stay and fight. In addition two separate incidents occurred in late January when the enemy probed friendly positions.

Observation: An attempt by the enemy to avoid contact had been predicted in being close to key installations or HQ elements, of the enemy. Probes of friendly positions were probably made as decoys in an attempt to allow these elements to escape.

b. Item: Terrain.

Discussion: The terrain in the AO included both a coastal plain of up to 30 meters above sea level and rugged mountains rising to 975 meters above sea level. The coastal plain was open and provided excellent fields of fire as well as landing zones. The mountains on the other hand were heavily forested in most places with a thick undergrowth which limited fields of fire and hampered movement, but provided excellent cover and concealment. Numerous rock outcroppings were discovered, which provided natural caves and caverns that the enemy had improved and expanded.

Observation: Several caves-cavern complexes were located and subsequently destroyed. Additional search in detail will be required to locate and destroy the almost countless possibilities that exist in the AO.

c. Item: Organization of Intelligence.

Discussion: This Brigade TF has found it necessary to establish a system at this level for organizing, recording and disseminating intelligence in each AO. The system we have used in the past is as follows: Boundries are designated by recording 10 grid square by 10 grid square areas and assigning a designator to each square example: YA6050, YA7050, YA6060, YA7060, might be numbered as 509, the one to the East 510 etc.). The S2 Brigade TF then extracts all known intelligence from his available sources, past and present enemy activities, trails, terrain, LZ's, cxt for each area. He then records and disseminates this information down to the battalions. Our experience has shown the use of this system proved to be a simple and efficient method of quickly identifying areas of intelligence interest.

Observation: This system could be adopted at Field Force level for more pinpoint cataloging. Coupled with a modern data processing machine recording system this system would be of invaluable service to the ground commander who would receive with the order to move to a new

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area, a compilation of pinpoint data of the past and present enemy activities in the area of interest.

d. Item: Use of POWs to identify enemy KIA.

Discussion: The confirmation of certain enemy officers killed can be of extreme intelligence value.

Observation: Prisoners taken during contact can be useful in identifying enemy remains.

e. Item: Shortage of Interpreters within the units.

Discussion: The rifle companies often operate independently. There has been numerous times when an interpreter was needed immediately to exploit tactical information, and to call NVA and VC to surrender. However, there exists a critical shortage of available interpreters.

Observation: A determined effort should be made to produce enough qualified interpreters as so that one could be assigned to each rifle company, two to battalion headquarters, and one to the strike platoons.

f. Item: Aerial photography.

Discussion: The use of helicopters as a tactical vehicle to move troops long distances about the battlefield has created an urgent requirement for responsive aerial photography of landing zones and small areas of immediate tactical interest. A system is needed which will produce air photos, not for interpretation, but to supplement existing maps. The time from initiation of the requirement to conduct of an operation may be only a few hours.

Observation: A Polaroid camera or some similar system, which will make a photo about 4 x 5 inches is needed. Pictures can be taken during initial reconnaissance; and be ready for use afterward when orders are prepared.

g. Item: Map scales.

Discussion: The large areas assigned as areas of operations for units as small as a battalion, and in some cases, a company, is extremely large, and may well encompass the area covered by eight or more map sheets in 1:50,000 scale. Such maps are unwieldy.

Observation: Maps on a scale of 1:100,000 would be very useful in operations involving helicopter assaults or long moves.

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h. Item: Employment of the Counter-Mortar Radar to Protect Friendly Positions.

Discussion: The counter-mortar radar is able to scan only a 1/15 mile sector at any one time. If it is set up inside the friendly perimeter it can only cover 1/15 of the surrounding area at any one time. However, if the radar is set up at a range of 6000 meters from the friendly position, it can cover the friendly position and will be able to pick up any mortar rounds that fall on or near the position.

Observation: The Counter-Mortar radar can protect a friendly position best when it can observe the friendly position from a range of approximately 6000 meters.

i. Item: Employment of AFO's during turbulent weather.

Discussion: Normally, AFO's observe artillery fires from or O-1 aircraft. However, during turbulent weather, O-1's have great difficulty positioning the observer so that he can accomplish his mission. On the other hand, turbulence effects on OH-23 are much less.

Observation: OH-23's have been used for aerial observation during extremely turbulent weather in order to provide maximum artillery support.

5. (C) Other.

a. Item: Employment of CS Agent.

Discussion: During Operation THAYER II, many different means of dispersing CS Agent have been used. The "baseball" M25A2, CS1, riot hand grenade, has been used in rock complexes as well as the M7A1 CS tear gas grenade. Also CS powder has been utilized after engineer demolition teams have closed rock complexes entrances.

Observation: It is recommended that the M7A1 CS tear hand grenade be used, instead of M25A CS1 riot hand grenade (baseball type), to be effective even though it is more convenient to carry and throw. The M7A2, CS, tear, hand grenade gives off more agent and creates a high concentration of agent in desired areas.

b. Item: Landing Zone Clearing by use of explosives.

Discussion: When clearing and IZ for a battalion size unit in heavily wooded terrain such as that found during Operation PAUL REVERE IV, large quantities of explosives are required. If the battalion CP with its supporting artillery unit moves into the IZ before major clearing operations are completed a safety hazard results. With personnel in the area

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explosives can not be used as effectively, causing a delay for the LZ clearing operations.

Observation: Larger LZ's can be prepared in a shorter time if explosives can be used without danger to personnel.

c. Item: Coordination for use of local labors.

Discussion: Any type of village civil affairs project which involves the use of village labor must be wholeheartedly endorsed by the village chief. If the chief is not present at the time of the proposal of the project the village, the task will not accomplished. The village chief is the key individual.

Observation: Insure coordination of civil affairs projects with village chief prior to instituting any program involving local labor.

d. Item: Control of gifts and handouts.

Discussion: When conducting village civil affairs operations it is necessary to control handouts and gifts. If the civil affairs team or units involved are too generous, the village will develop an attitude of "sit around and wait" until handouts are distributed.

Observation: Accomplish all work before distributing handouts.

e. Item: Civil affairs project completions.

Discussion: The policy of completing one self help project before initiating another helps motivate the village concerned as well as the adjoining villages in supporting the civil affairs self-help operations.

Observation: Complete one self-help civil affairs project before starting another.

f. Item: Utilization of the PRC/74 on Long Rang Reconnaissance Patrols.

Discussion: Employment of the LRRP entails additional communication problems due to the requirement for concealment, isolation, mobility and long rang transmitter/receiver capabilities. The PRC/74 was chosen to fill this need because of its long range air wave qualities.

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Observation: The organic power for the PRC/74, consisting of seventy (70) BA/30 batteries, proved to be too heavy and too bulky for employment with a LRRP mission. A field expedient power supply was developed utilizing two BA/386 batteries connected in series-parallel. Electrical wire was soldered to the lead-in wire from the battery connector unit and run to the terminals of both batteries. The two batteries were taped together and fastened to the base of the radio unit. Use to date has raised several questions concerning the feasibility of continued employment of the PRC/74 in this role. The difficulty in adjusting and duct this activity in complete darkness and silence.

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
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Part II, Recommendations

1. Recommend the observations noted in Part I, Section 2, above, be considered appropriate.
2. Recommend the following items be considered noteworthy of immediate command attention:
  - a. Items 2c, d, and f: Tactical Operations within underground rock complexes.
  - b. Item 2e: Use of non-toxic agent within underground rock complexes.
  - c. Item 2g: Use of M18A1 Antipersonnel Mine (Claymore) within an underground rock complex.
  - d. Item 2h: Use of demolitions within an underground rock complex.

  
JAMES G. SHAFARIAN  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

4 Incl:

- 1 - After Action Report; PAUL REVERE IV
- 2 - 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division AO as of 4 Jan 67
- 3 - 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division AO as of 31 Jan 67
- 4 - Replacement Training Schedule

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