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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE TF, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96355

AFBIS-OP

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

TO: See Distribution

SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. (C) GENERAL: During the reporting period 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968 the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division participated in Operation Baker for 62 days, Operation Muscatine for 23 days and Operation Wheeler/Wallowa for 7 days for a total of 92 days in combat. The 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division has participated in 632 consecutive days in combat as of 31 January 1968.

a. Mission: The 3d Brigade's mission in Operation Baker was to assume responsibility within the Duc Pho AO for:

(1) Offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVA elements, Viet Cong main force, local force, and guerrilla units as well as the Viet Cong infrastructure.

(2) Provide convoy security in zone, and from Quang Ngai south on Hwy #1 to the Brigade AO.

(3) Be prepared to provide one rifle company on two hours notice, and an additional rifle company in an additional two hours, for employment anywhere in the Americal Division TAOR, on order.

(4) Be prepared to provide a company size reaction force to support the defense of Quang Ngai Airfield, on order.

(5) Support Revolutionary Development in the 3d Brigade AO.

(6) Conduct psychological operations in support of tactical operations and revolutionary development.

(7) Be prepared on 12 hours notice to provide one reinforced infantry battalion for employment anywhere in South Vietnam.

(8) Be prepared on an additional 12 hours notice to deploy the remainder of the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division anywhere in South Vietnam.

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2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

b. The 3d Brigade's mission in operation Muscatine was to assume responsibility for the southern 2/3 of the Muscatine AO for:

(1) Offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVA elements, Viet Cong main force, local force, and guerrilla units as well as the Viet Cong infrastructure.

(2) Assume responsibility for security and road clearing of Hwy #1 from BS623865 to BS633810.

c. The 3d Brigade's mission in operation Wheeler/Wallowa was to assume responsibility of the northern half of the Wheeler/Wallowa AO for:

(1) Offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVA elements, Viet Cong main force, local force, and guerrilla units as well as the Viet Cong infrastructure.

(2) Assume responsibility for providing security as required for the 39th Engr Bn repair mission on Hwy #535.

(3) Assume responsibility for security and road clearing of Hwy #1 from BT114497 to BT175418.

d. Operational Areas. (See Inclosure #1 for Duc Pho AO, Inclosure #2 for Muscatine and Wheeler/Wallowa AO's).

(1) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in the Duc Pho AO encompassed the majority of Duc Pho & Mo Duc Districts, Quang Ngai Province.

(2) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in Operation Muscatine encompassed Binh Son & Son Tinh Districts, Quang Ngai Province. X

(3) The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa encompasses Duy Xuyen, Que Son, and Duc Duc Districts in Quang Nam Province.

e. Task Organization: Principal units of the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division, with commanders names and dates of command, and the major supporting and operational controlled units are as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division  
Commander: Colonel George E. Wear (1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)

Deputy Commander: 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division  
LTC Alvin C Hadley (1 Nov 67 - 3 Nov 67)  
LTC Harold F. Bentz (28 Dec 67 - 31 Jan 68)

~~Confidential~~

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ADVVC-OP

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Executive Officer

LTC John D. Weil (1 Nov 67 - 12 Jan 68)  
LTC Melton H. Kunze (28 Jan 68 - 31 Jan 68)

1st Battalion, 14th Infantry

LTC Peter P. Petro (1 Nov - 8 Jan 68)  
LTC George L. Ball (9 Jan - 31 Jan 68)

1st Battalion, 35th Infantry

LTC Robert G. Kimmel (1 Nov 67 - 14 Nov 67, KHA)  
LTC William W. Taylor, Jr (15 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)

2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry

LTC Norman C. Tiller, Sr. (1 Nov 67 - 10 Dec 67)  
LTC William J. Livsey, Jr. (11 Dec 67 - 31 Jan 68)

2nd Battalion 9th Artillery

LTC Gerald B. Bobzien (1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)

C Troop, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cavalry

Cpt Richard A. Knudson, (1 Nov 67 - 14 Nov 67)  
Cpt Charles Van Horn (15 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)

3d Support Battalion (Prov)

Maj Robert R. Rutledge (1 Nov 67 - 14 Jan 68)  
Maj Harold J. Perry (15 Jan 68 - 31 Jan 68)

40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)

1LT Ery L. Davis (1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)

Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion

Cpt Arthur J. Panze, Jr. (1 Nov 67 - 5 Jan 68)  
Cpt Boyd A. Jones (6 Jan 68 - 31 Jan 68)

3d Brigade Aviation Company (DS)

Maj Wesley Sims (1 Nov 67 - 20 Nov 67)  
Maj Edward R. Castle, Jr. (21 Nov - 31 Jan 68)

Principal Staff:

S1

Cpt James L. Hughes (1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)

S2

Maj William Campbell (1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)

S3

Maj Edgar Egeland (1 Nov 67 - 14 Dec 67)  
Maj William P. Doyle (15 Dec 67 - 31 Jan 68)

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2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

S4

Maj John S. Anderson (1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)

S5

Cpt Converse B. Smith (1 Nov 67 - 31 Jan 68)

**2. INTELLIGENCE:**

a. General: During this reporting period, 1 November 1967 through 31 January 1968, enemy activity is categorized in three phases, based on the three separate areas of operation.

b. Phase One: 1 November 1967 - 2 January 1968, Duc Pho - Mo Duc area of operation. This phase began in the middle of the enemy's Winter Campaign that was designed to produce a propaganda left through a series of quick victories in order to bolster the morale of his followers. On the night of 30th October 1967, a Battalion size force attempted to destroy the bridge over the Song Ve River (BS695635) and was driven off by elements of the 2nd ARVN Division. As a result of a night ambush on 31 October 1967, a prisoner was captured that confirmed the fact that the 97th MF Bn, 2nd MF Regt attacked the Song Ve Bridge and was based in the Nui Lon Mountains (BS6747) and Song Ve Valley (BS6049). Airborne Personnel Detector missions (People Sniffer), agent reports and usual sightings confirmed the fact that the enemy had moved back into the mountains on the western border of the Brigade's reconnaissance zone. On 3 November 1967, the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted a ten day operation in the Song Ve Valley where it contacted small elements of the C-18 LF Company and scattered NVA food gathering parties. The ten day operation resulted in 25 enemy KIA, and the capture of 15 weapons.

On the 4th of November, the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry launched a thirty day operation in the heavily forested, mountain area in the Southwest portion of the Brigade's AO (BS7428) against elements of the 22d NVA Regt, 3d NVA Division. Captured documents and the PW's revealed that the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry had engaged support elements of the 22d NVA Regt to include the Signal, Reconnaissance, and Mortar companies, plus scattered elements of the 8th and 9th NVA Battalions of the 22d NVA Regiment. The operation terminated with 109 enemy KIA, 57 weapons captured, to include two 82mm mortars and 28 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. On or about 6 December 1967, the 22d NVA Regiment with two of its Battalions, withdrew from the mountains and moved into the lowlands of Binh Dinh Province (vic BS9108) where they were quickly engaged by the 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division and elements of the 22d ARVN Division. Within a fifteen day period, the 22d NVA Regiment had lost over 600 men. The 7th and 8th NVA Battalions along with regimental support companies sustained the bulk of the losses. The 9th NVA Battalion avoided contact. In December 1967, the 97th MF Battalion moved South and lost over 150 men to elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The remainder of this



2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

1 NOVEMBER 1967 - 2 JANUARY 1968 OPERATION BAKER  
 2 JANUARY 1968 - 24 JANUARY 1968 OPERATION MUSCATINE  
 24 JANUARY 1968 - 31 JANUARY 1968 OPERATION WHEELER/WALLOWA

	BAKER	MUSCATINE	WHEELER/WALLOWA
KIA	432	225	95
PW/NVA	6	0	0
PW/VC	48	11	1
CD	26	5	0
RETURNEES	16	0	0
SA	135	53	7
CS	2	1	0
SA AMMO	6275	12845	9
81/82MM MORT RDS	29	2	1
60MM MORT RDS	18	22	0
GRENS	236	236	6
TNT	37 LBS	0	150 LBS
B-40 HKTS	25	3	0
MINES	22	9	1
PACKS	102	3	4
CLOTHING SETS	102	7	1
WEB GEAR SETS	32	4	1
PONCHO	38	4	1
MAGAZINES	126	0	1
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT	58	28	0
RADIOS	2	1	0
HUTS	174	19	3
BUNKERS	130	1	75
CAVLS	12	0	2
TUNNELS	55	5	21
FOXHOLES	31	0	3
PUNJI PITS	15	0	0
RICE	10 TONS	21T	2700 LBS
SALT	0	300 LBS	0

3. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

a. Plans:

(1) During the period covered by this report, the 3d Brigade was responsible for planning the relief of elements of the 196th Infantry Brigade (LT) within a portion of the Muscatine AO effective 021200 January 1968.

(2) During the latter part of the reporting period, the 3d Brigade planned and conducted the relief of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Div in a portion of the Wheeler/Wallowa AO effective 261200 January 1968.

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

- (3) During the reporting period the 3d Bde sponsored the 11th Inf Bde (LT) and the 198th Inf Bde (LT) (See Inclosure #4)

b. Operations:

(1) General: The 3d Brigade continued with the mission assigned for operation Baker until 021200 January 1968. During this reporting period, elements of the 3d Brigade conducted search and destroy operations in their respective areas of responsibility with attachments from C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery. Contacts during the period were light and in some cases initiated by the enemy; however, in all cases the enemy force was defeated and enemy casualties were moderate to heavy. Friendly casualties were light. The 3d Brigade enemy/friendly killed in action ratio is a very respectable 22.5 to 1 for the entire reporting period. During Operation Muscatine, 021201 January 1968 to 261200 January 1968, searching for, locating, and destroying the enemy in tunnels and caves became a necessity for the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The most significant contact during Operation Muscatine occurred on 17 January and was a result of a combination of timely intelligence, thorough planning, and a combat assault which forced the enemy into an untenable position where he was destroyed by ground elements and armed helicopters. In addition to the normal objectives of an Infantry Brigade, the additional objectives of interdicting the enemy's supply routes and inhibiting his freedom of movement were established. These objectives were accomplished by continual H&I artillery fires, strategic location of firebases, and continual movement of troop elements in the field. By denying the enemy the ease of movement and the liberal amount of supplies he had become accustomed to, he was forced to disperse and operate in small elements. Consequently, the enemy was caused to spend more time foraging and this decreased his ability to attack in force. In both the Baker and Muscatine AO's, the concept of operations included an advance over suspected avenues of enemy movement and a methodical search for enemy personnel, caches, and fortifications. The objective was to deny the enemy use of the inhabited lowlands and thereby cut him off from his source of food, intelligence, labor and recruits. The general plan was to have infantry battalions establish firebases with the battalion command post and supporting indirect fire elements. One rifle company was employed to guard the firebase and conduct local operations while the remainder of the infantry elements conducted operations throughout the TAOR. After the enemy was found and fixed, all available firepower was brought to bear as the infantry advanced, methodically searching every enemy position. These procedures were continued during the initial phases of operation Wheeler/Wallowa, 261201 January 1968 to 312400 January 1968.

(2) 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: During the reporting period, the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry participated in Operation Baker in the Duc Pho area with the Battalion CP at "LZ THUNDER" (BS874323) and later in the Cat Mit Valley located at the headwaters of the An Lao River Valley in the 3d Brigade's Reconnaissance Zone. In January the Battalion moved with

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2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

the 3d Brigade Task Force and relieved elements of the 2d ROK Marine Brigade on the Batagan Peninsula. Operations were conducted in AO Grant during Operation Muscatine with the Battalion CP located at "LZ UPTIGHT" (BS731840). Upon the relief of AO Grant, the Battalion moved north on 25 and 26 January and entered Operation Wheeler/Wallowa; establishing a Battalion CP at "LZ COLT" (BS115327). During the reporting period the Battalion had many minor contacts and ambush engagements with a major contact occurring on 17 January. (A detailed explanation of the techniques employed is contained in inclosure #3).

(3) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the reporting period the Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in two TAOR's. During Operation Wheeler the Battalion, OPCON to the 101st Airborne Division, operated near Tam Ky, Republic of Vietnam with the Battalion CP located at "LZ MARY LOU" (BT132203). During Operation Wallowa, the Battalion CP was located at "LZ BALDY" (BT132453). The Battalion reverted to 3d Brigade control on 26 January when the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division assumed responsibility for the northern portion of the Wheeler/Wallowa AO. During the period 26 January - 31 January, no significant contacts occurred.

(4) 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the reporting period the Battalion conducted search and destroy operations in the Baker AO, the Muscatine AO, and the Wheeler/Wallowa AO. From 1 November to 18 December 1967 the Battalion CP was located at "LZ LIZ" (BS751436). On 19 December 1967 the Battalion became OPCON to the 198th Infantry Brigade (LT) and established a Battalion CP at "LZ SUE" (BS567877). From 9 January to 31 January the Battalion participated in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa, OPCON to the 196th Infantry Brigade (LT) with Battalion CP's at "Fire Support Base West" (AT990250) and at "LZ ROSS" (BT029341). Throughout the period the Battalion had many minor engagements with one moderate contact.

(5) 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry: From 19 January - 25 January, the 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry was OPCON to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. During this period the Battalion had no major contacts; however, there were numerous minor contacts and ambush engagements.

(6) Troop C, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry: During the reporting period the Troop was employed in several cavalry roles, i.e., screening, strong points, convoy security, etc.

(7) C Company, 4th Engineer Battalion:

(a) General: During the Quarter 1 November 1967 to 31 January 1968, Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion continued to support the 3d Brigade Task Force with combat engineer support in the area of operations and with construction and maintenance support at "LZ BRONCO" and "LZ BALDY".

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

## (b) Operations: (LZ BRONCO)

- 1 Clearing landing zones.
- 2 Destruction of enemy caves, tunnels, bunkers, and defense positions.
- 3 Construction, maintenance, and clearing of defensive perimeters.
- 4 Mine clearing
- 5 Technical assistance in construction of field fortifications.

## (c) Operations: (LZ BALDY)

- 1 Construction and maintenance of Brigade forward base.
- 2 Helipad construction and maintenance.
- 3 Maintaining a water supply point.
- 4 Penneprime distribution.
- 5 Mine clearing.
- 6 Road construction.

## (8) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery:

(a) General: During the period 1 November 1967 to 2 January 1968, the mission of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was direct support of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division on Operation Baker. Battery A was OPCON to the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division and 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division in Operation Wheeler/Wallowa in direct support of the 1-35th Infantry. Battery B was in direct support of the 1-14th Infantry, and Battery C was in direct support of the 2-35 Infantry.

1 Additional artillery units which were under the operational control (OPCON) of this Battalion were as follows:

2 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155mm) from 1 November to 2 January with the mission of Reinforcing.

(1) Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8" - 175mm) was OPCON to the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery during this period.

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(2) One searchlight section from Battery G, 29th Artillery was also attached to the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery for this period.

b Battery A, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery (105mm) from 30 December to 2 January with the mission of Reinforcing.

(b) During the period 2 January through 25 January traditional missions continued in the following AO's.

1 Battery A - Operation Wheeler/Wallowa.

2 Battery B - Operation Muscatine.

a During the 11 January through 25 January Battery G, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery was OPCON to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery with the mission of Reinforcing.

3 Battery C - Operation Muscatine 2 January - 11 January.

a During the period 11 January through 25 January Battery C became OPCON to the 196th Infantry Brigade (LT) in operation Wheeler/Wallowa.

(c) During the period 25 January through 31 January the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery continued the mission of direct support to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in support of Operation Wheeler/Wallowa. Battery A was in direct support of the 1-14th Infantry, Battery B was in direct support of the 4-35th Infantry and Battery C was in direct support of the 2-35th Infantry.

1 additional artillery units available to this Battalion were as follows:

a Battery C, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm) 25 January to 31 January with the mission of GSR.

b Battery B, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8" - 175mm) 25 January to 31 January with the mission of GSR.

c Battery G, 29th Artillery (2 searchlight sections), 25 January to 31 January attached to the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery.

d Battery W, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (U.S. Marines, 155mm) 25 January to 31 January with the mission of GSR.

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(4) The following is a summary of the missions and number of rounds fired during the reporting period:

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	<u>OBS MSN</u>	<u>RDS</u>	<u>MSN</u>	<u>RDS</u>	<u>H&amp;I TGTS</u>	<u>RDS</u>
NOV	387	6957	830	3268	785	1231
DEC	187	3515	664	1885	747	3119
JAN	<u>318</u>	<u>5883</u>	<u>785</u>	<u>7232</u>	<u>696</u>	<u>5062</u>
TOTAL	892	16355	2279	12435	2130	9412

ARVN SUPPORT      ROUNDS FIRED

NOV	---	---
DEC	---	---
JAN	<u>75</u>	<u>1605</u>
TOTAL	75	1605

(9) Aviation:

(a) During the quarter the Brigade Aviation section flew a total of 1214 hours, 2934 sorties, and carried 1722 passengers. Of the total OH-23G flying time, 639 hours and 405 sorties were flown on scout operations. The section recorded 57 confirmed enemy KIA's and 27 weapons either captured or picked up by the ground troops. Three aircraft were damaged by mortars. Six aircraft were damaged by enemy ground fire and five crewmen were wounded.

(b) Tactical Air Support statistics for the reporting period are as follows:

	<u>FAC MISSIONS</u>		<u>COMBAT SKY SPOTS</u>	
	<u>Req</u>	<u>Flown</u>	<u>Req</u>	<u>Flown</u>
NOV	148	69	55	33
DEC	95	31	48	40
JAN	<u>15</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	258	113	104	73

(10) Chemical: During the reporting period personnel detection missions and CS-1 drum drop missions were greatly reduced because of monsoon weather which produced cloud cover in mountainous target areas. The following chemical activities were conducted by the Brigade:

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(a) Use of CS grenades on a daily basis by ground troops and the Brigade Aviation Section in support of tactical operations.

(b) Employment of CS grenades by military police to control civilians in base camp areas.

(c) Five (5) CH-47 Sorties were flown with CS-1, 55 gallon drum drops. A total of 5,600 pounds of CS-1 Riot Control Agent was expended on suspected enemy supply routes.

(d) Five Personnel Detection Missions were flown, two of which were with OH-23 helicopters.

(11) Training: During the reporting period 3d Brigade TF personnel graduated from the following schools:

<u>SCHOOL</u>	<u># GRADUATED</u>
3d Brigade NCO Preparatory School	140
4th Division NCO School	33
Brigade replacement Training	465
4th Division Pre-Recondo School	6
MACV Recondo School	5

#### 4. LOGISTICS:

a. General: The 3d Support Battalion (PROV) has primary responsibility for logistical support of the Brigade. General support was provided by FSA (Task Force McDonald) until 26 January 1968 when the Brigade moved to LZ BALDY. At that time, TM FRAZIER assumed responsibility for general support of the Brigade. The Brigade continues to use its requisitioning, shipping and receiving actions concerning Class II and IV items and repair parts. Repair parts requisitions are passed through our general support maintenance activity, the 188th Maintenance Battalion at Chu Lai. All other requisitions are delivered by courier to Qui Nhon Depot. Supply and Maintenance support for elements of the Brigade rear detachment at Pleiku base camp is provided by the 4th Infantry Division.

b. Supply:

##### (1) Class I

a. Prior to the Brigade moving to LZ BALDY, all items were provided by FSA with distribution made to the Brigade Class I yard for storage and issue. Ration breakdown for all units at LZ BRONCO was accomplished by the 3d Support Battalion (PROV). Perishables were stored in two 1½ ton refrigeration vans and four 600 cubic feet refrigerators. After moving to LZ BALDY, 3rd Support Battalion (PROV) assumed responsibility of the

12  
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2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Class I yard including ration breakdown and distribution to all units:

## (b) Class I issues for reporting period:

A Rations	546,000
C Rations	262,324
LRRP Rations	16,147

## (2) Class II and IV:

(a) Depot ships directly to our activity address code through the Brigade Supply Officer, to a Class II and IV storage and distribution area. This was made possible by the opening of a supply account enabling all organic, attached and opcon units to requisition and draw directly from the Brigade Supply Officer, rather than returning to a distant base camp.

(b) The Brigade continues to make extensive use of the airstrip at Duc Pho which aids the functioning of the logistical train, bringing quick delivery of personnel and necessary items of equipment.

## (3) Class III

(a) At LZ BRONCO, Task Force McDonald provided wholesale issue of all types of fuel. Storage capacity was increased to 871,000 gallons on 5 December after completion of the tank farm. At LZ BALDY, all fuels are wholesale issued by 3d Support Battalion (PROV). Storage capacity is 100,000 gallons. At firebase Ross, POL is issued by 3d Support Battalion (PROV).

(b) POL issues report period (gallons): JP4 (887,000) - AV gas (94,000) - MO gas (448,000) - Diesel (447,000).

## (4) Class IV:

(a) At LZ BRONCO, Task Force McDonald operated the ASP and was supported from Qui Nohn and on occasion from Chu Lai. Since moving to LZ BALDY, TM FRAZIER operates the ASP. Resupply of Class IV originates from Chu Lai. Storage space limits stockage objectives to a 5 day supply of most items.

## (5) Class V issues for the reported period:

AVDDC

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968.

155mm HE	57,875
105mm HE	63,055
4.2" HE	12,302
81mm HE	18,454

(6) Transportation:

(a) Two (2) light truck squads and one (1) medium truck squad from the 3d Support Battalion (PROV) support the Brigade units at LZ BALDY.

(b) Air Force C-123 aircraft provided a scheduled airlift between the Brigade at Duc Pho and its rear detachments at Pleiku. Since moving to LZ BALDY, air lifts have been provided by Americal Division Transportation Office. The 4th Infantry Division Transportation Office has provided flights on request from the 3d Brigade rear detachment at Pleiku. TMA Chu Lai is in the process of scheduling missions between Pleiku and LZ BALDY. During the report period, the following air movement record was compiled:

(a) Sorties:	326
(b) Passengers:	6949
(c) Cargo:	113 tons

(7) Medical:

(a) "D" Co, 4th Medical Battalion provides immediate medical support for the Brigade. Excellent evacuation support was given by the 498th Medical Company, Air Ambulance, and by the Air Force evacuation teams. While at LZ BRONCO, D Co evacuated patients to the 2d Surgical Hospital in Chu Lai and to the 67th and 85th Evacuation Hospitals in Qui Nhon. Since 20 January 1968 "D" Co has moved to LZ BALDY and is getting evacuation support from the 54th Medical Company. There is no Air Force evacuation team. Patients are sent to 2d Surgical Hospital in Chu Lai and Naval Station Hospital in Da Nang.

(b) Medical Statistics for reporting period:

Disease Patients	4,430
Battle Casualties	206

14  
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927622  
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AVDDC-OP

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Non-battle casualties	<u>591</u>
Total	5,227
Patients admitted to ward	1,346
Patients evacuated to hospitals	1,189
Patients returned to duty	2,900

## 5. CIVIL AFFAIRS

a. General: Priority of effort was directed towards the following four areas: Public health and sanitation, public education, refugee relief, and civic construction. All projects were designed to be short range and high impact in nature. All projects requested by GVN officials and all work was performed by indigenous personnel. US personnel and units participating in civic action were the 3d Brigade S-5 section; 4th AA Platoon, 29th Civil Affairs Company; and the subsector MACV advisory team. GVN agencies included four RDC Teams; GVN refugee relief personnel, VIS personnel, and a culture drama team.

### b. Public health and sanitation:

#### (1) Medcap results:

<u>a</u> Sick call	11,846
<u>b</u> Dental	181
<u>c</u> Baths for children	672

(2) GVN health workers trained 6

(3) Latrines constructed 4

(4) Public health films shown 9

(5) Duc Pho hospital was fitted with screen doors and windows.

### c. Public education:

(1) Construction of two elementary schools was completed. ( 5 classrooms).

(2) Work continued on two elementary schools. (9 rooms)

(3) 200 school kits were distributed.

1. 15

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927622

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2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(4) 17 classrooms of school furniture were built.

(5) 12 hours of English classes were taught weekly. Total student participation 270.

(6) 50 General Walt scholarships were administered.

d. Refugee relief:

(1) 800 housing units were initiated in 3 separate camps. Units are 50% complete.

(2) 38 loads of foodstuffs were distributed to supplement the CORDS food program.

(3) The sanitary fill was operated by three camps on a rotating basis and the salvage lumber utilized to build homes and start several small woodcraft shops.

(4) 200 refugees were given steady employment producing rock which was used to upgrade the base camp road network.

(5) An additional 200 refugees were employed daily within the camp filling sandbags, building bunkers, digging drainage ditches, etc.

(6) Transportation was provided CORDS to assist moving the food and materials provided the District through civilian channels.

e. Civic construction:

(1) One market was constructed in Sa Huynh (BS924223).

(2) Six entrance gates were built on approaches to schools and public buildings.

(3) Construction on six wells were completed.

(4) A refugee reception center was initiated.

(5) Poles and wire were procured for the rural electrification program.

f. Psywar:

(1) Psychological operations included leaflet drops, ground and aerial speaker missions (both live and taped).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDC

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(2) Leaflet drops and aerial speaker missions were accomplished using C-47, O-2, and UH-1D aircraft. Ground missions were accomplished with a 250 watt speaker.

(3) Armed propaganda personnel were available; however, their effectiveness and potential was not realized because of a lack of requests from the battalions to utilize the team in the field.

(4) Summary:

(a) Leaflets dropped	25,240,000
(b) Aerial speaker time	34 hours
(c) Ground speaker time	270 hours
(d) Rallyers	7
(e) Leaflets made	8
(f) Tapes made	32

6. PERSONNEL

a. Unit Strength:

(1) As of 31 January 1968, the strengths of the units of the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division were as follows:

	<u>AUTH</u>		<u>ASG &amp; ATTACH</u>			<u>PDY</u>			
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
HHC Bde	24	4	102	32	5	187	28	4	155
1-14 Inf	45	2	924	43	2	829	42	2	809
1-35 Inf	45	2	924	43	2	849	43	2	820
2-35 Inf	45	2	924	44	2	827	44	2	808
2-9 Arty	37	3	450	37	2	412	34	2	401
C-4th Engr	5	0	142	5	0	130	5	0	130
B/704 Maint	4	2	113	4	0	99	4	0	97
D/4 Med	8	0	83	6	0	66	6	0	59
C/1-10 Cav	5	0	179	5	0	169	5	0	169
40th SD	1	0	26	1	0	27	1	0	27
14th PIO	2	0	3	2	0	3	2	0	3
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>3870</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3597</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3476</b>

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AVDDC

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

(2) The 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division strength fluctuated daily during this period. The following are periodic strength figures:

<u>ASSIGNED</u>				<u>FDY</u>			
DATE	OFF	WO	EM	DATE	OFF	WO	EM
1 Jan	223	14	3595	1 Jan	215	14	3435
8 Jan	224	14	3595	8 Jan	215	14	3435
15 Jan	221	11	3596	15 Jan	211	10	3449
22 Jan	222	12	3591	22 Jan	214	11	3478
29 Jan	226	13	3630	29 Jan	222	12	3528

(3) The number of friendly casualties for Nov, Dec, Jan are as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>WIA - DIED OF WOUNDS</u>
ORGANIC UNITS:	29	179	5

(4) Number of Emergency Leaves:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
HHC Bde	5	2	2
1-14 Inf	7	3	3
1-35 Inf	5	8	4
2-35 Inf	6	5	2
2-9 Arty	4	0	0
C-1/10 Cav	0	1	2
C/4 Engr	0	0	2
D-4 Med	2	1	0
40th IPSD	0	0	1
B/704 Maint	0	0	1
	<u>30</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>17</u>

(5) Personnel Departed for PCS and ETS

NOV	798
DEC	939
JAN	657

b. Morale: Morale continues to be excellent within the command.

(1) Mail

(a) Number of bags received: 9,167

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AVDDC

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

- (b) Number of bags dispatched: 4,356
- (c) Total value of money orders sold: \$1,113,635.56
- (d) Total stamp value sold: \$14,706.90
- (e) Mail was not received on the following dates:

NOV 2, 3, 10, 22, 25  
 DEC 8  
 JAN 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 31

(2) R & R

(a) Out of country allocations were sufficient to satisfy the needs of the command.

(b) Monthly out of country allocations were as follows:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
HHC 3d Bde	32	27	18
1-14 Inf	54	54	44
1-35 Inf	46	55	46
2-35 Inf	44	51	48
2-9 Arty	27	24	22
3d Spt Bn	5	9	15
C/1-10 Cav	11	12	13
40th IPSD	0	0	5
	219	232	211

c. Promotion Allocations:

	<u>NOVEMBER</u>					
	E-4	E-5	E-6	E-7	E-8	E-9
1-14 Inf	59	138	32	0	0	0
1-35 Inf	95	148	35	0	0	0
2-35 Inf	68	152	36	0	0	0
2-9 Arty	0	41	0	0	0	0
40th IPSD	4	3	0	0	0	0
14th PIO	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHC 3d Bde	0	0	0	0	0	0

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AVDDC

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

DECEMBER

	E-4	E-5	E-6	E-7	E-8	E-9
1-14 Inf	80	113	36	0	0	0
1-35 Inf	95	148	45	0	0	0
2-35 Inf	40	143	43	0	0	0
2-9 Arty	9	38	48	0	0	0
40th IPSD	1	3	0	0	0	0
14th PIO	0	1	0	0	0	0
HHC 3d Bde	0	0	0	0	0	1

JANUARY

1-14 Inf	101	149	55	0	0	0
1-35 Inf	61	101	34	0	0	0
2-35 Inf	131	155	49	0	0	0
2-9 Arty	70	29	12	0	0	0
40th IPSD	0	0	0	0	0	0
14th PIO	0	0	0	0	0	0
HHC 3d Bde	0	0	0	0	0	0

(3) Awards Presented:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Distinguished Service Cross	0	0	0
Distinguished Service Medal	0	0	0
Silver Star Medal	17	3	0
Legion of Merit	1	0	1
Distinguished Flying Cross	1	1	0
Soldiers Medal	0	0	0
Bronze Star with "V"	48	9	2
Bronze Star Medal	50	6	0
Air Medal	66	7	1
Army Commendation with "V"	34	8	1
Army Commendation Medal	67	27	6

f. Reenlistment:

	<u>NOV</u>		<u>DEC</u>		<u>JAN</u>		Percent
	elig	reenl	elig	reenl	elig	reenl	
Last Prior Service RA (Career)	3	3	1	1	3	3	100%

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

	<u>NOV</u>		<u>DEC</u>		<u>JAN</u>		
	elig-reenl	elig-reenl	elig-reenl	elig-reenl	elig-reenl	Percent	
Last Prior Service (1st Term)	5	3	1	1	3	3	70%
Last Prior Service (AUS)	12	4	18	5	21	3	23.6%
	20	10	22	8	26	8	64.5%

SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS .

Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (C) Personnel: NOT USED

2. (C) Intelligence:

a. Item: Use of Vietnamese National Police, village and hamlet officials, and military intelligence informants in combat operations.

Discussion: American units have successfully used National Police and village officials during combat operations. However, skilled interpreters are needed to convey the US Commanders objectives. A thorough briefing is necessary and should include identity of the area of operations, command relationships, and objectives to be attained by the National Police and village officials. Inhabitants within the AO should be interrogated in detail to determine which are innocent civilians and which are Viet Cong.

Observation: A thorough briefing of National Police and village officials is a necessary prerequisite before employing them with US units.

b. Item: NVA bunkers and static observation points.

Discussion: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols operating on ridges where there is low scrub vegetation or high single canopy should be especially watchful for bunkers and fortified OP's. These installations are located where they have a commanding view and excellent fields of fire on both sides of the ridge.

Observation: Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols should be extremely careful to avoid detection when patrolling ridges. If they are engaged by personnel manning fortified positions, the best course of action is to withdraw and report the bunker location to a higher unit.

c. Item: Movement of Long Range Patrol.

Discussion: When patrolling in relatively open or high single canopy terrain a loose diamond formation is usually more effective than a file formation. A loose diamond formation with 4 to 6 meters between personnel has been found to be the best formation for immediate reaction to enemy contact. More firepower can be achieved to the front without sacrificing firepower to the flanks. A 180° break of contact can be made by the point disengaging through the center of the diamond

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

when the flanks reverse directions. In jungle or heavy vegetation; however, a file formation is most desirable for maintaining control and leaving little sign of movement through the area.

Observation: The diamond formation has proven to be best suited for long range patrols unless the vegetation is so dense that a file formation is required.

d. Item: Use of aircraft with OH-23 helicopters on Scouting Missions.

Discussion: Use of the O1-E aircraft with a qualified aerial observer in conjunction with a scouting team of OH-23 helicopters has proven to be a valuable intelligence asset during the reporting period. The O1-E flying at a higher altitude can observe a larger area and detect movement and suspected enemy locations that require further investigation. The location is then marked with a smoke rocket and the scout team takes the area under close reconnaissance. If enemy are sighted they are taken under fire by machineguns mounted in the OH-23.

Observation: A team of OH-23 helicopters and a O1-E Bird Dog aircraft have proven effective in gathering intelligence information as well as finding and engaging enemy in hidden positions.

e. Item: Response to MID reports.

Discussion: Operations in relatively pacified areas of operation require extensive use of intelligence reports to completely eliminate hamlet guerrillas from the AO.

Observation: Operations must be directed at the hamlet infrastructure to prevent enemy activity in relatively secure or pacified areas. This unit has conducted operations directed at the hamlet infrastructure by utilizing good intelligence information provided by MID personnel. As reliable information was gathered by MID personnel successful operations were planned.

3. (C) Operations:

a. Item: Close air support.

Discussion: Air Force Tac-Air has not been extensively employed by battalion size units during this period for two reasons:

(1) Enemy contact has usually been at very close quarters to VN civilians in populated areas or to US troops. Use of Tac-Air might have resulted in US troops and VC civilian casualties.

(2) Helicopter gunships; however, have been employed extensively. They were found to be more responsive and could give the pinpoint accuracy needed for the close contact normally found in the Bde's AO.

Observation: Helicopter gunships are very effective when units are in close contact with the enemy. Direct communication with the gunship versus relaying through FAC to tactical aircraft facilitates a flexible response to a rapidly changing close contact.

b. Item: Use of the E-8 CS Tactical Launcher and CS grenades.

Discussion: There has been no opportunity to employ these devices in a combat situation and to evaluate their effectiveness; however, they have been

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2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

put into perimeter defense positions. Test firings show that adequate coverage of any target area is obtained. Wind direction is a prime factor in the employment of these dispensers. In offensive operations, CS grenades have been very effective in routing the enemy and suspected enemy from bunkers and holes.

Observation: CS (Riot Control Agent) is an asset in both offensive and defensive situations. Its continued use will enhance the effectiveness of combat operations.

c. Item: Effectiveness of night operations.

Discussion: Night operations were conducted against Viet Cong elements to keep them from moving at night. Ambushes are effective, but greater psychological results can be obtained by moving small elements throughout a selected AO.

Observation: Interrogation of prisoners has revealed that night operations have a demoralizing effect on the Viet Cong and prevent them from moving freely at night to collect taxes and propagandize the population.

d. Item: Operation of the AN/VRC-12 series of radios with a Yagi antenna.

Discussion: This unit has operated a two-station special purpose FM net. The two stations were separated in such a manner that terrain would not permit operation of a net utilizing the AN/VRC-12 series of radios with RC-292 antennas. It was decided to try a folded dipole (Yagi antenna) at each station instead of the RC-292. The efficiency of this antenna enabled reliable FM voice communication to be conducted between the two stations utilizing the RT-524. The directional characteristics of the Yagi limits net configuration to two stations.

Observation: Employment of the Yagi antenna with the present series of FM radios provides more economical (i.e. elimination of relays) long range FM voice communications.

e. Item: Effectiveness of the new D and E companies (Infantry Battalion).

Discussion: The addition of these units has increased the combat effectiveness of the Infantry Battalion. The extra rifle company (D company) gives the Battalion greater flexibility. E Company, composed of the combat elements of Headquarters Company (i.e. Recon Platoon and 4.2" Mortar Platoon) can be more effectively controlled.

Observation: The reorganized Infantry Battalion can concentrate on combat operations with the lettered companies and rely on Headquarters Company for the necessary administrative and maintenance functions.

f. Item: Need for penneprine distribution equipment.

Discussion: The application of penneprine or similar dust palliative is a major engineer task in Vietnam. Adequate distribution equipment is not available to combat engineer companies and battalions. Currently, distribution is accomplished with improvised applicators which are both awkward and inefficient. A large capacity, truck-mounted distributor (800 gallons or larger) is needed.

Observation: Present equipment available for dust palliative distribution is unsatisfactory. Necessary applicators should be included in the TOE's of Engineer Units.

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

g. Item: Use of OH-23 helicopters for Personnel detection missions.

Discussion: Two test missions were flown using a modified manpack personnel detector in an OH-23 Helicopter. The purpose of the test was to determine if the OH-23 could be used for detection "Beagle" missions. The OH-23's were employed in pairs with one ship carrying two door gunners. When the detector indicated the presence of personnel on the ground, the area was searched and any enemy was taken under fire. More "Beagle" missions will be conducted in future operations.

Observation: Personnel detection (Beagle) missions were successful and were found to be valuable in locating the enemy in areas inhabited by civilian personnel.

h. Item: Infusion of Popular Force Personnel into US Units during combat operations.

Discussion: Popular Force personnel were infused at the squad and fire team level; keeping them in pairs and separated in the file by two or more US soldiers. Two interpreters were available and were utilized during these operations. Upon completion of the days operation, Popular Force personnel were reassembled into their own platoon organization and released at predesignated points. At this time, the US Units would emplace stay behind ambushes to prevent compromise of their positions. All attempts to integrate Popular Force personnel into these ambushes were negated by the Popular Force Commander, who daily stated his personnel had other missions to perform during the hours of darkness.

Observation: A major problem area was the lack of communication even though two interpreters were available. This problem was particularly noticeable when contact was made. Squad leaders had great difficulty in making PF personnel understand what needed to be done. A lack of discipline resulting from the absence of a chain of command was observed in the platoons that worked with this unit; however, the presence of US Advisors favorably effected the performance of PF units. PF units were extremely effective during search operations; however, when contact was made they did not demonstrate a working knowledge of the principles of fire and maneuver. PF personnel were more than eager to return fire but hesitant to make any forward movement.

i. Item: Combined US, RF/PF operations.

Discussion: The best method of conducting combined US, RF/PF operations is to employ the US Units as the cordon and to use the RF/PF Unit to perform the search.

Observation: The most successful combined operations have been conducted when advisors were present to co-ordinate the RF/PF search element with the overall operation plan. Without the assistance of advisors and interpreters, the RF/PF Units lack discipline and do not search thoroughly.

j. Item: Radio consoles for command and control helicopters.

Discussion: Command and control aircraft utilized by this unit are not always equipped with radio consoles. Standard consoles are effective and allow close coordination during combat assaults or combat operations. Jury-rigged consoles are a poor substitute, due to the lengthy installation time which may preclude utilizing the Command and Control aircraft for other missions such as medevac, re-supply, and evacuation of dead.

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

Observation: Command and Control helicopters should be equipped with consoles to provide more reliable communications with tactical units on the ground and to prevent loss of time while installing jury-rigged consoles.

4. (C) Logistics: Not Used.

5. (C) Civil Affairs:

a. Item: Interpreter for HB (2 man loudspeaker) Psychological Warfare Team.

Discussion: The HB Psychological Warfare Team attached to this Brigade does not have an assigned interpreter who is trained in psychological operations. This necessitates substituting an interpreter from other sources who is not trained in the techniques of psychological warfare. Consequently, the effectiveness of the team is greatly reduced.

Observation: Each HB team should have a psychological operations trained interpreter assigned to it from the resources of the psychological operations battalion.

b. Item: O-2 aircraft aerial loudspeaker missions.

Discussion: Interrogation of POW's and Hoi Chanh indicate that speaker missions from the O-2 aircraft flown in excess of 1500' altitude are not understandable. This observation is further substantiated by interpreters and GVN troops who were placed on specific targets as test personnel. Numerous recommendations that O-2 aircraft broadcast at an altitude of 1500' have been forwarded through channels.

Observation: O-2 loudspeaker missions should be flown at an altitude of 1500' since the experience of this Brigade indicates that the present program is ineffective.

*George E. Wear*  
 GEORGE E. WEAR  
 Colonel, Infantry  
 Commanding

4 Incl:

1. Overlay of Baker AO
2. Map of Muscatine and Wheeler/Wallowa AO's
3. Combat After Action Report of 17 Jan 68, Battle of Phu Nhieu
4. Sponsor Program

Distribution:


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DCG, USARV	3	CO, C/4TH ENGR	1
CG, IFFV	2	CO, HHC 3/4TH	1
CG, AMERICAL DIV	2	CO	1
CG, 4TH INF DIV	1	DCO	1
CG, 1ST CAV DIV	1	XO	1
CO, 1-14TH INF	1	S1	1
CO, 1-35TH INF	1	S2	1
CO, 2-35TH INF	1	S3	1
CO, 2-9TH ARTY	1	S4	1
		S5	1

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Reference: Map, Edition 1, Kontum, Vietnam, JOG (G) 1501 ND 49-5, 1:250,000.



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
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S O U T H

MUSCATINE

THUAN HOA QUANG NGAI



2 February 1968

## SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

1. Name of Operation: Battle of PHU NHIEU.
2. Date of Operation: 170800H to 171800H January 1968.
3. Location: PHU NHIEU (1) Hamlet, Quan Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, RVN.
4. Command and Control Headquarters:
  - a. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry. This operation was coordinated with an operation by the 1st Battalion, 52nd Infantry.
  - b. Reporting Officers:
    - (1) LTC George L. Ball, CO 1-14th Inf.
    - (2) CPT Albert D. Carter CO A/1-14th Inf.
    - (3) 1LT Bruce G. Shipley CO B/1-14th Inf.
    - (4) CPT Robert R. Vaughn CO C/1-14 Inf.
    - (5) CPT Harold E. Sells CO D/1-14 Inf.
    - (6) 1LT Terry E. Bender kcn Plat/1-14th Inf.
5. Task Organization:
  - a. Company A, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.
  - b. Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.
  - c. Company C, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.
  - d. Company D, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.
  - e. Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.
6. Supporting Forces:
  - a. Artillery fire support was provided by B Btry, 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery and A Btry, 3rd Battalion, 18th Artillery. Although only 85 rounds of 105mm ammunition were expended during the LZ preparation after an unexpected change in the landing zone, the fire was characterized by a high degree of accuracy and flexibility.

Inclosure 3

2 February 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

B. The 123rd, 174th, and 176th Assault Helicopter Companies provided aerial surveillance, troop lift, and armed helicopter support. In addition, HHC, 3d Brigade Aviation Section provided OH-23 observation helicopter (armed) support. The armed helicopters and the OH-23's operated under the control of airborne and ground commanders.

c. 3d Brigade Aviation Section OH-23's were armed with two (2) M-60 machineguns each and furnished the ground commanders with suppressive fires and immediate information on the enemy's location, movement, and weapons capabilities. They engaged and killed a total of seven (7) VC.

#### 7. Intelligence:

Intelligence reports received during the planning stages for the search and destroy operation to be conducted on 17 January 1968, indicated that the 95th LF Company was operating in the hills, vic BS692875. On 14 January 1968, the Binh Son District Headquarters reported that the 95th LF Company was located in An Thinh (2) Hamlet, BS725896. Based on this information, An Thinh (2) was designated as the objective area. The 95th Company was reported to have a strength of 100 men equipped with 81mm mortars, 2 LMG's and assorted small arms. It was anticipated that when US forces entered the area the enemy would hide in the ditches and hedgerows and fire on the advance elements. As US forces closed on the village, the enemy was expected to withdraw and try to evade to the north or south along the coast and hide in the many bunkers and holes within An Thinh. A combat assault was planned on the high ground about three and one half kilometers from the objective, An Thinh (2). Elements from A and B Companies, 1st Battalion 52nd Infantry were to occupy blocking positions along the beach and the high ground north of An Thinh (2). Elements designated for the combat assault were B Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry and the Reconnaissance Platoon 1-14th Infantry. The initial contact was initiated by VC employing BAR and LMG fire on A/1-52nd Infantry at approximately 0815H. Because of this contact, a new landing zone was selected, closer to the objective area. The elements on the landing zone did not receive any contact. However, as the Reconnaissance Platoon moved 200 meters to the southeast they received automatic weapons fire and several M-79 rounds or hand grenades. The enemy was hiding in trench lines concealed by thick hedgerows along trails and villages, and the Battle of PHU NHIEU ensued. Almost immediately, the enemy troops were observed from the air by an aerial observer in an armed OH-23 helicopter. OH-23's engaged the enemy at hedgerow level and inflicted many casualties and created a great deal of confusion among the enemy. As the maneuver elements of B Company, and the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry engaged the confused enemy, the VC became disorganized and fled from the area of contact to hide in the many bunkers and hedgerows in the vicinity of PHU NHIEU (1), PHU NHIEU (2) and PHU NHIEU (3). The Battle of PHU NHIEU then became one of searching the hamlets, house by

3 - 2

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2 February 1968

house, hedgerow by hedgerow, and bunker by bunker. The enemy had to be flushed from their hiding places or killed in them. In the action there were eight prisoners taken; among them an acting plat leader. Interrogation of these prisoners indicated that the enemy had elements of four Local Force Companies involved in the Battle of PHU NHIEU. The units identified were the 95th LF Company, P31 LF Company, 21st LF Sapper Company and the T18th LF Company. The total approximate strength of the enemy units engaged in the Battle of PHU NHIEU was 240 men. The prisoners stated they were in the PHU NHIEU area to train for an attack on an unknown area, possibly an RD Hamlet, in the vicinity of PHU NHIEU within the next ten (10) days. The many documents found on the enemy bodies and in the area of contact verified the units involved in the battle were subordinates to the Binh Son Viet Cong District Headquarters. The intelligence reports that were received in the planning for this operation were considered accurate and timely. This information was sufficient to insure that the friendly elements around PHU NHIEU were deployed in a position that contributed to the overall success of the operation. The results of this successful operation are reflected in PAR 10C.

8. Mission:

A/1-14th Infantry and C/1-14th Infantry were to conduct screening missions on the high ground west of the original landing zone. A/1-52nd(-), and B/1-52nd Infantry (-), and D/1-14th Inf were assigned missions of establishing blocking positions. Later D/1-14th Infantry received a change of mission to conduct search and destroy operations and conduct a village sweep.

9. Concept of Operation:

a. B/1-14th Infantry and the Rcn Plat were to conduct a combat assault to an LZ vic BS693880 and conduct search and destroy operations on 2 axis to the east of Objective 1 (An Thinh, 2), vic BS730892. (See Annex A). D/1-14th Infantry conducted a combat assault on 160845H Jan 68, to an LZ vic BS878857 and conducted search and destroy operations on the Batangan Peninsula. They established blocking positions vic BS738877 and BS730880 at 170800H Jan 68. A/1-14th Infantry and C/1-14th Infantry were given missions to conduct screening missions vic BS655865 and BS685835 overlooking exfiltration routes from the area of expected contact. A/1-52nd Infantry(-) occupied blocking positions along with B/1-52nd Infantry(-) along the northern boundary of AO GRANT vic BS729898, BS725896, and BS708888.

10. Execution:

a. Based on available current intelligence, a plan was formulated to combat assault suspected enemy locations. Blocking positions were selected by 1st Bn, 52nd Inf in conjunction with this plan. Complete coordination was

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2 February 1968

finalized prior to the combat assault of B/1-14th and Rcn Platoon.

b. At 170815H Jan 68 vic BS725895 (An Think, 1), A/1-52nd reported receiving BAR and LMG fire. Due to ~~the~~ immediate tactical situation, the LZ for Bravo Company was changed at 170830H Jan 68 to a location recommended after a hasty aerial reconnaissance by the Battalion S2. ~~at the same time,~~ the Battalion CO was briefing the flight leaders and the Battery Commander on the conduct of the operation at LZ UPTIGHT. The ground forces, artillery fire support, airlift aircraft, as well as the supporting armed helicopters responded quickly to the last minute change in the landing zone.

c. Upon entering the landing zone, all maneuver elements deployed according to the original plan. At this time, "Aloha" OH-23 aircraft entered the area of operation after being briefed at the Battalion TOC on LZ UPTIGHT. The Reconnaissance Platoon moved from the landing zone as planned and made contact in a hedgerow south of the LZ. They received two grenades from the hedgerow. "Aloha" immediately moved to the area of contact. Enroute to the area "Aloha" C6 and C4 observed numerous VC running in a trench line south of PHU NHIEU vic BS713884. They immediately engaged the enemy with M-60 MG's. Armed helicopter support of the combat assault immediately joined them and placed accurate suppressive fires on the enemy. Bravo Company and the Reconnaissance Platoon continued execution of the original plan and closed quickly with the VC located in the trench line. Upon entering the enemy trench line The Rcn platoon found numerous bunkers which would take considerable time to clear by physically entering each bunker. Realizing the time necessary to eliminate each bunker, LTC Ball placed the Delta 30 Platoon OPCON to Bravo Company and gave them a mission of blocking vic BS723877. Plans were made to lift the Delta 20 Platoon from LZ UPTIGHT to a secure LZ on the beach to link up with Delta 10 and sweep An Think (1). Bravo 6 took operational control of Delta 30.

Artillery support during the entire combat operation was limited due to the close proximity of friendly units and numerous aircraft over the contact area.

Close fighting along the trench line and hedgerow took a drastic turn as many of the enemy broke from the trench system into the open. They were immediately engaged by elements of B/1-14th and killed. Captives were used as tunnel rats. Exploitation of the tunnels continued throughout the day and the objective area was swept by elements of the Delta Company. The 3d Platoon of Delta reverted to its parent unit. Bravo Company continued police of the battle field until dark and set up a Company perimeter on the nearest defensive terrain. All companies were alerted for movement along trails in the area. Battlefield police continued on 18 January, and all bunkers were re-entered and destroyed. The results of the days of contact were very significant and are as follows:

3 - 4

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2 February 1968

FRIENDLY LOSSES

3 US WIA

ENEMY LOSSES

80 VC KIA

7 VC POW

1 CD/POW

ENEMY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

10 US M1 Cal 30 Rifles

7 US M1 Cal 30 Carbines

4 US M2 Cal 30 Carbines

4 US BAR Cal 30

1 M-79 Grenade Launcher

1 Thompson SMG Cal 45

2 MAT 49 SMG

1 NVR 50 SMG

4 AK-47 Assault Rifles

2 Pistols Cal 45

137 Chicom Hand Grenades

16 60mm Mortar Rounds

2000 Rounds Cal 30 Ammunition

500 Rounds Cal 7.62 Short Ammunition

500 Rounds Cal 30 Carbine Ammunition.

100 Rounds Cal 45 Ammunition

50 Rounds 9mm Ammunition

3 B-40 Rockets w/fuses


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DECLASSIFIED

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DATE 3/11/88 BY K.M. HANA

AO GRANT  
17-18 JAN 68



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDF-GC (2 Feb 68)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period 31 January 1968 (U)

DA, HQ, Americal Division, APO San Francisco 96374

3 MAR 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the 3d Brigade TF,  
4th Infantry Division.

2. (U) This headquarters concurs with the observations and comments  
contained in the report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl  
ns

KAZUTO KAWABATA  
Capt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED  
INCLOSURE

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and will be removed from the system by 5200.10

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by K.M. NARA 2/18

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3-29

22

AVHCC-DST (2 Feb 68) 2d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 9 MAR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division (AJ5A) as indorsed.
2. Concur with report as indorsed. Report is considered adequate.
3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

4 Incl  
nc

C. S. NAKATSUBASA  
Captain, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:  
HQ 3d Bde TF, 4th Inf Div  
HQ Americal Div

MFR: ORLL was not staffed due to lack of significant unresolved problem areas.

ACTION OFFICER: CPT ARNOLD - LBN 4485

CH DST DIV	<i>SM</i>
CH MS BR	
CH DOUT BR	<i>Red 8 Mar</i>
CH TWS BR	
A/O	<i>John 8 Mar</i>

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED  
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

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COL HAYWARD, ACOFS, G3 RECORD COPY - RETURN TO AVHCC-DST

*227247*