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OPERATIONAL REPORT

LESSONS LEARNED

**4TH
Infantry
Division**

31 JAN 1969



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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

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INCLOSURES

TITLE

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|----|--------------------------|
| 1. | ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE |
| 2. | KEY PERSONNEL |
| 3. | LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS |
| 4. | CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY |
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending
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SECTION 1 (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General.

a. During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation BINH TAY - MACARTHUR.

b. Organizational Structure. Task organization for Operation BINH TAY - MACARTHUR for the period is contained at Inclosure 1.

c. Key personnel. Commanders as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.

d. Mission.

(1) The general mission of the division during the reporting period was to conduct sustained, coordinated, and combined offensive operations to destroy enemy and local force units, destroy or neutralize enemy base areas, interdict high-speed infiltration routes, conduct operations wherever possible with ARVN and GVN agencies, and support GVN pacification efforts and civil programs.

(2) The specific missions of the 4th Infantry Division are to:

(a) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN border and destroy enemy (NVA/VC) units within the assigned area of operations.

(b) Block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAOS across the Central Highlands into the coastal provinces.

(c) Conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations.

(d) Destroy enemy base areas and supply installations.

(e) Detect and eliminate VIET CONG Infrastructure.

(f) Clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility.

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- (g) Support the Government of VIETNAM's Pacification and Resettlement Program.
- (h) Open, secure, and maintain land lines of communication.
- (i) Be prepared to deploy forces for relief/reinforcement of Camp Strike Forces, Regional and Popular Forces, critical signal sites, and sector/subsector headquarters within II Corps Tactical Zone.
- (j) Provide to I Field Force, VIETNAM, a battalion size reserve on order.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. General: In early November, division attention centered on the increased NVA use of the PLEI TRAP Road in southwest KONTUM Province. Operation DEADEND, conducted by CIDG elements and the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, successfully closed the road to vehicular traffic in late November, although foot traffic in the area has continued to date. During the same time period, a buildup of NVA forces was observed in Base Area 701 west of DUC CO, signifying that an enemy operation was possibly intended in the area. Occupation of FSB's MARY S (YA764326), KAREN (YA815309), JEAN (YA806233), JOAN (YA842280) and VERA (YA835172) apparently frustrated enemy intentions concerning DUC CO, and the hostile forces dispersed in late November without initiating a major ground action.

Enemy activity remained light throughout December, permitting the division to initiate offensive action in the latter part of the month against the NVA 95B Regimental base area in the DAK PAYOU (VC Valley) area of eastern PLEIKU Province. Although the enemy successfully avoided major contacts, 4th Infantry Division elements inflicted significant damage on the enemy logistical system by capturing and destroying large quantities of food and material. In late January, division and ARVN units made contact with the 24th NVA Regiment, supported by elements of the K-6 (also known as the 966) Battalion and K-31 Artillery Battalion, in the CHU PA Mountains area of western PLEIKU Province. Allied operations to date have resulted in significant enemy casualties, plus the discovery of large food and weapons caches in the area.

(1) KONTUM: Since early November, there has been extremely limited enemy activity in KONTUM Province. The majority of contacts with the enemy have involved VIET CONG LOCAL FORCE/MAIN FORCE units rather than NVA Forces. During November, activity was concentrated in the BEN HET-DAK TO area. The BEN HET Special Forces Camp and Fire Support Base 29 came under intense attacks by fire during the first two weeks of the month, but after the evacuation of FSB 29, the attacks were reduced to minor harassing actions against BEN HET. During the attacks on FSB 29 (YB839223), the enemy employed 100mm and 105mm artillery from within their CAMBODIAN sanctuary.

Enemy transportation units used the PLEI TRAP Road extensively in early November. Reconnaissance aircraft detected vehicular movement on several occasions with

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the most significant being a convoy consisting of 21 trucks and four tanks. Foot traffic, at times heavy, has continued through the area.

Activity throughout KONTUM Province during the month of December was extremely light. Enemy units were content to continue their mining activity along Highway 14 and to harass friendly installations in the KONTUM City area. The major enemy effort was directed toward gathering freshly harvested rice and resupplying their depleted supply caches. This activity was pre-empted by the seizure of over 15 tons of rice, in an area 20 kilometers north of KONTUM City, by units of the 4th Infantry Division.

VIET CONG activity increased during the month of January in the TANH CANH area and in the area approximately 20 kilometers north and northeast of KONTUM City. In the TANH CANH area the 304th Local Force Battalion conducted harassing attacks against hamlets and continued to assume a more aggressive role. Division units operating in the area approximately 20 kilometers north and northeast of KONTUM City made light, sporadic contact during the month, uncovering numerous food caches and bunker complexes. Captured documents identified this region as a base area of the 304th Local Force Battalion.

During late January, in an area approximately 20 kilometers southwest of the POLEI KLENG Special Forces Camp, activity increased due to the infiltration of a unit of unknown size. Friendly forces have thus far failed to identify this unit.

(2) PLEIKU: In early November, NVA forces massed in Base Area 701, across the CAMBODIAN border from DUC CO. Units of the 4th Infantry Division's 3d Brigade occupied FSBs MARY S (YA764326) and KAREN (YA815309), north of DUC CO, and FSB's JEAN (YA806233) to the west, JOAN (YA842280) to the east, and VERA (YA835172) to the south of DUC CO. Occupation of this key terrain made DUC CO a difficult target for any ground effort by hostile forces. The enemy did, however, employ 105mm artillery fire against FSB's JEAN (YA806233), JOAN (YA842280), and VERA (YA835172). In late November, the enemy abandoned his plans and apparently withdrew from Base Area 701.

VIET CONG local forces and NVA engineer units have harassed friendly units in the area west of PLEIKU City between Highways 509 and 19W throughout the reporting period. This harassment has consisted of small arms and RPG-2 fire, with some mining activity. On 27 November, a HOI CHANH, who had rallied near the Oasis, identified his unit as the K-25B Engineer/Sapper Battalion, which he stated had the mission of mining Highway 19W. However, the K-25B Battalion has apparently withdrawn from the area. During the past month, there have been very few minings and activity has been limited to harassment by sniper and RPG-2 fire from the X-45 Local Force Battalion.

Enemy local forces, sappers and artillery harassed Allied installations in the PLEIKU City area throughout the reporting period. Attacks by 122mm rocket fire have been supported by mortar fire and ground probes from local force and sapper units.

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In December, TASK FORCE WINNER flushed the 95B NVA Regiment out of the DAK PAYOU Valley, an area where it has traditionally operated. Under the initial thrust of US, ARVN and MSF units in the Valley, the enemy fled eastward leaving behind large amounts of rice and medical supplies. Although there were few contacts, the enemy's supply system was seriously disrupted.

During January, there has been a large buildup of forces in the CHU PA Mountain Region. The 24th NVA Regiment has moved from Base Area 702 and is now in contact with US and ARVN forces in the CHU PA Mountains. A HOI CHANH, who rallied on 31 January, stated that elements of the K-6 Battalion, B-3 Front (also known as the 966 Battalion) and the K-31 Artillery Battalion are supporting the 24th Regiment. The CHU PA has historically been a large supply area, and many large food and weapons caches have been uncovered.

(3) DARIAC: Contacts with enemy forces in DARIAC Province were light during the months of November, December and January. Most enemy elements in the area are of battalion size or smaller. The only indications of forces larger than battalion size are agent reports from the DUC LAP area in nearby QUANG DUC Province. These reports indicate the presence of as many as 8000 NVA, but corroborating information by other than agent sources has not been produced. Intelligence gained from prisoners and captured documents indicates that the 95C and 320th Regiment have moved to the III Corps Tactical Zone, leaving no known regimental or larger size force in the DUC LAP area.

During the entire three month period, the 155th Assault Helicopter Company, located at BAN ME THUOT City Field, was the subject of continual attacks by fire from 75mm recoilless rifles, 60mm and 82mm mortars. The units responsible for these attacks are believed to be the K-34 Artillery Battalion and the K-39 Infantry Battalion. Both of these units have been identified as a result of contacts approximately 35 kilometers south-southwest of BAN ME THUOT in late January.

Although it has not been positively identified, the K-25 Engineer Battalion is believed to be located east of BAN ME THUOT City, between Highways 14 and 21, with the mission of harassing and interdicting these highways.

The 301st LF Battalion also has not been identified but it is believed to be operating in an area approximately 21 kilometers north of BAN ME THUOT.

A PW captured in the early part of January gave the location of the 401st LF Battalion as being approximately 31 kilometers north-northeast of BAN ME THUOT.

In late December, a rallier, NGUYEN BA, indicated that there may be a new transportation regiment in NAM LYR Base Area. This returnee has changed his statement once and the validity of his information cannot be determined.

b. Estimated Enemy Composition, Strength, and Disposition as of 31 January 1969:

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
B3 Front HQ	500	Base Area 702
66th NVA Inf Regt	2000	Base Area 702
24th NVA Inf Regt	1800	NW PLEIKU Province
101D NVA Inf Regt	1800	Base Area 702
95B NVA Inf Regt	1600	PLEIKU-BINH DINH Border Area
40th NVA Arty Regt*	1200	Tri-border Area
E-301 Local Force Bn	300	Vic MEWAL Plantation
303d Local Force Bn	250	Eastern DARLAC Provir
304th Local Force Bn	300	North of KONTUM City
401st Local Force Bn	300	Base Area 238
H-15 Local Force Bn	100	DAK AYUNH River Area
X45 Local Force Bn	150	West of PLEIKU City
406th Sapper Bn	150	NE of KONTUM City
408th Sapper Bn	350	NE of PLEIKU City
K25 Sapper Bn	100	NE of BAN ME THUOT
K25B Sapper Bn	100	IA DRANG Valley
K37 Sapper Bn	200	CAMBODIA
K39 NVA Inf Bn	300	SW of BAN ME THUOT
966th NVA Inf Bn	250	Western PLEIKU Provir
Local Guerrillas	3000 (est)	
TOTAL	11,750	

*The 40th Arty Regt has four battalions with elements dispersed throughout the AO.

c. Significant Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Capabilities:

(1) General.

(a) Although NVA units appeared to be massing along the CAMBODIAN border in November, probably in preparation for a large scale attack in the DUC CO area, the enemy has generally adhered to the terror and harassment tactics which he reverted to in September and October. This regression to guerrilla warfare, conducted primarily by VC local force units, is probably the result of the severe punishment inflicted on NVA units when they attempted to engage in conventional warfare with Allied forces this summer.

(b) Numerous sightings were made of unidentified aircraft near LZ's JOAN (YA842280), CHARMAINE (YA998217), and LANETTA (YA852457) by both visual and electronic means. No tactical significance can be attached to the sightings at the present time. On specific occasions the aircraft sighted were identified as a Soviet K-18 (Hog) helicopter, a Yak 24 medium helicopter, and a Czech HC-2 trainer.

(2) Significant Changes in Tactics: The enemy has generally decreased his use of sapper attacks, which were prevalent in the period from August to October, and shifted his emphasis to widespread VC terrorist activities in the form of

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political assassinations and attacks on government controlled villages.

(3) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses (1 Nov - 31 Jan)

(a) Personnel:	KIA (BC)	218
	NVA CIA	7
	VC/VMC CIA	<u>35</u>
	TOTAL	260

(b) Weapons:	S/A	116
	C/S	<u>1</u>
	TOTAL	117

(c) Ammunition:	S/A rds	46,989
	C/S rds	151
	Grenades	456
	Mines	143

(d) Miscellaneous captured items:

Explosives	720 lbs
Documents	158 inches
Rice	123.9 tons
Salt	311 lbs

(e) Enemy facilities destroyed:

Structures	640
Fortifications	1,751

d. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action:

(1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) The 32d and 33d Battalions of the 40th Artillery Regiment, and field artillery units of the B3 Front are capable of conducting attacks by fire in the DAK TO, BEN HET and DAK SEANG areas using 100/105mm artillery, 122mm rockets, mortar and recoilless rifle fire.

(b) The 304th and 406th LF Battalions are capable of conducting mining operations along Highway 14 and small scale attacks and probes of villages and friendly installations in the KONTUM City area.

(c) The enemy is capable of improving the PLEI TRAP Road and using it to infiltrate regimental size units into the area west of POLEI KLENG and across the province to the KONTUM City area.

(d) The 24th NVA Regiment is capable of sustaining contacts in the CHU PA

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Mountain area, and appears capable of governing the time and place of contact. Upon withdrawal of friendly units from this area, the 24th NVA Regiment has the capability to regroup its forces and stage attacks against PLEIKU City.

(e) In the PLEIKU City area, the K-31 Artillery Battalion, supported by the 408th Sapper Battalion, can conduct attacks by fire, employing 122mm rockets.

(f) The 95B NVA Regiment, supported by the X-17 and X-18 Engineer Companies and other local force units, is capable of harassing vehicular traffic along Highway 19E, and can conduct attacks by fire and ground probes on friendly installations from SOUI DOI to AN KHE.

(g) In DARLAC Province, the enemy is capable of employing local force and NVA units in multi-battalion strength against BAN ME THUOT City and Allied installations. The enemy forces are capable of conducting attacks by fire employing 60mm mortars, 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, and 122mm rockets.

(h) In QUANG DUC Province, agent reports continue to indicate the presence of large enemy forces in NAM LYR base area in CAMBODIA, approximately 10 kilometers west of DUC IAP. Attacks during TET have been predicted by several sources, but the validity of these reports cannot be determined. It is highly probable, however, that enemy elements are present in the area and will eventually move into III Corps. Although the threat of attack against DUC IAP still exists, enemy action will probably be limited to attacks by fire, and probes by small ground forces.

(2) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

(a) Enemy units are vulnerable to artillery and air strikes when in bivouac or when massing for an attack.

(b) Enemy lines of communication are sufficiently extended to make them vulnerable to interdiction by LRP teams and/or small conventional units.

(c) Enemy logistics stored in established base areas are vulnerable to battalion size search and destroy operations.

(3) Probable Courses of Action:

(a) Conduct attacks by fire in the BEN HET - DAK TO and KONTUM City areas.

(b) Continue to harass Highway 14 by mining and sniper attacks.

(c) Increase infiltration of troops into the area west of POLEI KLENG.

(d) Increase terrorism, assassination, and small scale attacks in the TANH CANH and KONTUM City areas.

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(e) Intensify activity in eastern PLEIKU - western BINH DINH by increasing attempts to interdict Highway 19E.

(f) Continue to avoid contact with Allied forces in DARLAC Province and conduct limited attacks by fire on BAN ME THUOT City and Allied military posts.

(g) Continue terroristic activity and conduct propaganda lectures in outlying villages in DARLAC Province.

e. Counterintelligence.

(1) General: During the reporting period the 4th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) conducted aggressive field operations to deny use of main routes of communication to the VIET CONG Infrastructure (VCI), to deny VIET CONG intelligence agents access to Camp Enari, and to provide rapid small unit reaction to intelligence developed through MID resources. During CLEANSWEEP IV the unit conducted cordon and sweep operations of three villages. In these instances the MID provided both the cordon and the sweep forces. During operation CLEANSWEEP V, the MID cordoned and searched one village and established a checkpoint on Highway 14, with the support of the 12th ARVN MI Detachment. Together these two units screened 67 villagers and 597 travelers.

(2) Counterintelligence: Though continuing to conduct individual Special Agent operations, the Counterintelligence Section also launched a number of preplanned operations in which the entire section participated. Counterintelligence operations conducted during the reporting period accounted for 53 detainees. Of these, seven were classified Prisoners of War, and 15 were classified as Civil Defendants. The remainder were released as innocent civilians.

The operations of the individual US Special Agents from the Special Operations Branch, CI Section, resulted either directly or indirectly in the production of 41 agent reports, the capture of four PWs, and the discovery of a cache of 2,000 pounds of rice. The agent reports also alerted LE TRUNG District and PLEI DO LIM Sector to impending attacks by VC units.

The Security Branch, CI Section conducted 96 counterintelligence inspections of Division units during the quarter, contributing significantly to an overall improvement in the security of the division.

The Special Security Branch, CI Section established files on 421 direct hire indigenous employees on Camp Enari during the quarter, for a total of 1,750 indigenous employees registered on Camp Enari. In conjunction with the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS), the section conducted 18 background investigations one of which resulted in the neutralization of a VIET CONG who was working at Camp Enari. On 7 and 8 January 1969, in Operation GATECRASH II, 4th MID and MSS personnel checked the identification papers of 1,119 indigenous civilian employees entering Camp Enari. They found a total of 98 minor deficiencies in identification papers and corrected them on the spot. The ARVN MSS apprehended an additional 37

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individuals for using forged or transferred ID cards.

The CI Section, 4th MID, made several improvements in the conduct of cordon and search operations. By stationing the cordon force in the vicinity of the villages to be cordoned and having it cordon the village prior to 0500 hours, they sealed off the area before the villagers could leave. Once the search began, 4th MID personnel took a census of the village, photographing the inhabitants and attaching the name of each inhabitant to his photograph. During subsequent searches, the photographic file helped MID personnel separate newcomers from the regular inhabitants. By segregating the villagers by sex and age prior to interrogations, the CID Section is able to make cross checks on persons being interrogated and to play one detainee against another. Censuses taken during cordon and search operations include an enumeration of the rice and living huts in the village, an evaluation of their condition, and an inventory of animals, by type, in the village. A report of each census is included in an after-action report which is submitted to G2, and serves as a reserve of data for future operations in the same area.

The CI Section improved its operational effectiveness by establishing liaison with non-divisional intelligence agencies in PLEIKU. The Special Agent conducting liaison with US and ARVN agencies in PLEIKU has established a channel of communications which is both rapid, flexible, and responsive to immediate needs of the CI Section. The agent also conducts all Local Agency Files Checks in the PLEIKU area, thereby improving the effectiveness of the Security, Special Security, and Special Operations Branches of the Counterintelligence Section, 4th MID.

The CI Staff Officer, G2 supervises operations to identify VCI in the Division AO. The VC-VCI Officer coordinates with the numerous US and ARVN Intelligence agencies that operate in the Division AO, and in particular, those agencies that operate in PLEIKU.

(3) Interrogation of Prisoners of War:

(a) During the reporting period the interrogation of prisoners of war (IPW) Section, 4th MID, interrogated 218 Division detainees and provided the division G2 with intelligence derived from the interrogations. In addition, three NVA prisoners taken by Allied units were interrogated by the section. Of the 218 detainees, seven were NVA, 37 VC/VMC, 63 civil defendants, and six HOI CHANHS.

(b) Effective liaison has been established with the three other major interrogation facilities in the area: II Corps, 5th Special Forces Group, and PLEIKU Sector. Exchange of intelligence information was adequate for this reporting period. Cooperation continues to improve. All interrogation agencies pooled their resources in an effort to expedite interrogations and disseminate valuable tactical information.

(4) Imagery Interpretation: During the reporting period the Imagery Interpretation (II) Section of 4th MID produced 175 new items of intelligence value,

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including the identification of a defensive position which produced two secondary explosions when attacked by US aircraft. In December, a mosaic booklet prepared on the DAK PAYOU Valley was reproduced and distributed to units participating in TASK FORCE WINNER, thus giving the combat units a valuable up-date on terrain in the area of operations. The section's efforts have been hampered over the last three months by the failure of approximately 25 percent of the USAF photos to have the 60 percent forward overlap necessary for effective imagery interpretatic

(5) COMSEC: During the period 1 November to 31 January, COMSEC monitored a total of 200,205 radio and telephone transmissions and reported a total of 40 violations. This is an average of one violation per 3,900 hours of transmission. There has been a significant improvement in communications security during this quarter as opposed to the last quarter.

3. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

a. The following OPLANS/OPORDS were either prepared or published:

(1) OPLAN 24-68 (DEADEND-TOLLROAD-U CAN DUONG) dated 13 November 1968, Classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(2) OPORD 26-68 (CLEANSWEEP IV) dated 2 November 1968, directed Camp Enari Base Camp Defense Forces to conduct sweep/cordon and search operations in the Division TACR. This operation was terminated on 8 November 1968.

(3) OPLAN 27-68 (FLUSH) dated 17 November 1968, Classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(4) OPLAN 28-68 (CONG KILLER) dated 25 November 1968, Classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(5) OPLAN 29-68 (DEATH VALLEY-THUNG LUNG TU THAN) dated 29 November 1968, Classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(6) OPLAN 31-68 (GRISWOLD BLACK-LE LOI) dated 19 December 1968, Classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

b. Operations. The 4th Infantry Division continued Operation BINH TAY - MACARTHUR, which began on 12 October 1967. On 31 January 1969, the end of the reporting period, Operation MACARTHUR was terminated. Operation HINES begins 1 February 1969. A chronological summary of significant activities is at Inclosure 4

(1) On 18 November 1968, the 2d Brigade Headquarters moved from BAN ME THUOT East Field (AQ882017) to LZ MARY LOU (ZA228838) to begin operations in KONVUM and PLEIKU Provinces. On 25 November, the 2d Brigade began Operation DEADEND-TOLLROAD-U CAN DUONG to close the PLEI TRAP NVA Road running between YB726078 and YA747922. Division Engineers, accompanied by CSF companies and infantry companies of the 2d Brigade, destroyed bridges and culverts, cratered the road, and constructed three

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abatis, closing the road to vehicular traffic.

(2) On 25 December 1968, TASK FORCE WINNER, controlling two brigade CP's (four US infantry battalions, one ARVN infantry battalion and one MSF battalion) and a cavalry squadron, began search and clear operations in the DAK PAYOU Valley, south of FSB BLACKHAWK (BR032532) and in the mountains north of BLACKHAWK. Though the task force killed only 29 NVA/VC, it captured 22 tons of rice, 400 pounds of medical supplies, 30 pounds of documents, and considerable quantities of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

(3) On 20 January, the 1st Brigade Headquarters departed DAK TO, terminating 15 months of operations in KONTUM Province. From a new base at SUOI DOI (BR035535) the Brigade began operations in BINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces south of the MANG YANG Pass (BR2252).

c. Training.

(1) On 6 November 1968, the 4th Infantry Division established an RF/PF Leadership School to assist the Republic of VIET NAM and MACV Advisory programs in upgrading the RF/PF forces within II Corps Tactical Zone. The provinces of KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, QUANG DUC, KHANH HOA, and CAM RANH sent personnel ranging in rank from sergeant to captain to attend the 15 day course. Three courses have graduated 85 enlisted men and 50 officers. Areas of study include leadership skills, weapons, artillery adjustment, first aid, communication, and small unit tactics.

(2) The Kit Carson Scout training program continued. Because of extreme difficulty in recruiting men for the KCS program, the classes have been small. Units employing KCS personnel are having success, but urge more English language training. During the reporting period 10 Kit Carson Scouts completed the course.

(3) Long Range Patrol courses continued to produce well trained men to meet the division demand.

(4) Short courses dealing with the operation, maintenance, and employment of night vision devices were held for the instruction of brigade cadre.

(5) 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment:

(a) In the last portion of the quarter, the Training Detachment made plans to expand the replacement and LRP training programs. During the next quarter, replacement training periods will be 6 days in length and include an overnight combat exercise for all combat MOS's. The LRP training program has been expanded from 8 to 14 days to include overnight patrols.

(b) Replacement Training Section trained 4,821 enlisted men and 172 officer replacements.

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(c) One hundred eighty-two candidates graduated from the NCO Academy.

(d) Seventy-seven enlisted men, 21 of whom went on to graduate from the MACV Recondo Course, graduated from the LRP course.

(6) The ARVN/ROK/US Officer Exchange Program continued during November and December but was cancelled for the month of January. Reports from exchange personnel indicate a greater understanding of Allied forces in operation.

(7) Training Regulations:

(a) On 27 January 1969, 4th Infantry Division Training Regulation 350-5: Division Pre-Recondo School and MACV Recondo School, was superseded.

(b) On 12 November 1968, 4th Infantry Division Training Regulation 350-14: Aviation-Aircraft Maintenance Refresher Training, was published.

d. Research and Development. Several items of equipment were evaluated during this quarter. They included:

(a) Mine Roller: The mine-roller swept over 1,000 miles of road and detonated two mines causing no damage to vehicles or injury to personnel. The evaluation was completed. The 4th Engineer Battalion outlined several maintenance problems, but recommended adoption by the Army.

(b) Radio Camouflage Net: Fifty-one nets were issued to units in the division. The purpose of the net is to break up the outline of the man pack radio. As of the end of the reporting period, unit evaluation is incomplete.

e. Air Support:

(1) The following close air support missions were flown in support of Operation BINH TAY - MACARTHUR, 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69:

<u>TYPE MSN</u>	<u>REQ</u>	<u>FLOWN</u>	<u>SCORTIES</u>	<u>A1</u>	<u>B57</u>	<u>F4</u>	<u>A4</u>	<u>F100</u>	<u>C130</u>	<u>A37</u>	<u>ACA7</u>	<u>AG119</u>
FAC/PP	1599	761	1497	155	18	251	22	1051	0	0	0	0
FAC/IMM	357	220	437	34	7	118	8	270	0	0	0	0
CSS/PP	257	162	239	0	2	51	2	184	0	0	0	0
CSS/IMM	243	200	238	0	0	125	0	113	0	0	0	0
SPOOKY	56	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	0
MOONSHINE	21	17	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	0
SHADOW	44	44	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	44
TOTAL	2577	1454	2522	189	27	545	32	1613	0	0	67	44

(2) Bomb Damage Assessment:

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<u>TYPE MSN</u>	<u>EST</u> <u>KBA</u>	<u>BKRS</u>	<u>SEC</u> <u>FIRES</u>	<u>SEC</u> <u>EXPLO</u>	<u>AA/</u> <u>AW</u>	<u>MTR</u> <u>POSN</u>	<u>STRUC-</u> <u>TURES</u>	<u>FOX-</u> <u>HOLES</u>	<u>BRIDGES</u>	<u>RD</u> <u>CUTS</u>	<u>TR</u>
FAC/PP	105	176	75	61	11	4	22	70	20	84	0
FAC/IMM	47	69	37	34	18	2	2	3	3	21	1
CSS/IMM	0	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CSS/PP	0	0	4	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SPOOKY	20	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SHADOW	0	0	24	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	<u>172</u>	<u>245</u>	<u>147</u>	<u>138</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>1</u>

(3) B-52 Strikes (Arc Lights):

B-52's struck known base areas, infiltration routes, strong points and major NVA headquarters. Both primary and secondary strikes were delivered in support of Operation BINH TAY - MACARTHUR. The following figures show the number of B-52 strikes carried-out during the period 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69:

PRIMARY ARC LIGHT MISSIONS

TOTAL SORTIES

4TH INF DIV	29
II CORPS	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	<u>31</u>

171
<u>4</u>
<u>175</u>

SECONDARY ARC LIGHT MISSIONS

TOTAL SORTIES

4TH INF DIV	37
II CORPS	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	<u>37</u>

110
<u>0</u>
<u>110</u>

TOTAL ARC LIGHT MISSIONS

TOTAL SORTIES

4TH INF DIV	66
II CORPS	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	<u>68</u>

281
<u>4</u>
<u>285</u>

g. Psychological Operations:

(1) A total of 149,563,000 leaflets were dropped during the period, compared with 186,274,000 during the preceding period. Air and ground loudspeaker time amounted to 818 hours compared with 1,050 during the previous period. Two Audio-Visual Teams operated a total of 166 hours in support of civic actions and PSYOP activities. A Cultural/Drama Team from the 20th POLWAR Battalion (ARVN) performed three times in the DAK TO area to an audience of 4,000. The GVN NGUYEN TRAI Program was supported by 4th Infantry Division PSYOP and MEDCAP activities. Themes emphasized during the period included CHIEU HOI appeals, The Volunteer Information Program, 3d Party Program, TET Message, and a monthly calendar.

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(2) The division had a total of three HOI CHANH during the period.

(3) The Volunteer Information Program showed excellent results within the AO. The villagers of KON HONONS (ZB148449), DAK TO District, KONTUM Province, reported the location of over 30 road mines on Highway 14. Also, villagers continued to report VC movements.

(4) The bi-monthly newspaper, BINH MINH, continued to draw favorable comments from HOI CHANHs and other VIETNAMESE. The paper prints news stories on a variety of subjects, which are extracted from all available sources. Photographs and drawings are included. The newspaper is directed toward the NVA/VC because intelligence indicates that there has been a complete news blackout among the NVA/VC units in our area of operations. The local populace have also indicated interest in the paper.

(5) On 28 January 1969, the 4th Infantry Division, in accordance with plans formulated by JUSPAO, MACCORDS, and IFFV, initiated a PSYOP campaign for the 1969 TET season. The campaign was incorporated into the daily PSYOP missions and is being conducted in three phases:

(a) Phase I - Pre TET (18 January - 16 February 1969). This is a softening up period during which potential ralliers are constantly encouraged to rally in time to enjoy the TET holiday.

(b) Phase II - TET (17-19 February 1969). Peak dissemination of the material in Phase I.

(c) Phase III - Post TET (20 February - 2 March 1969). PSYOP materials in this phase will be designed primarily to reach VC/NVA troops who were able to leave their military units during TET and who may have an opportunity to rally to the GVN.

h. Chemical.

(1) The Division Chemical Section and the 43d Chemical Detachment continued to support combat operations within the division during the reporting period by employing riot control agents (RCA), supervising the defoliation program, operating and maintaining the division's Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD), rendering technical advice on use of flame munitions, operating a chemical ASP, and inspecting unit CBR readiness, equipment, and supply.

(2) Defoliation (TRAILDUST) missions increased significantly during the reporting period. The increase in TRAILDUST sorties can be largely attributed to the general improvement of flying weather during the dry season in the Central Highlands. Because grasses and crops are dormant during the dry season, ground and helicopter defoliation missions decreased. See inclosure 5 for a statistical summary of defoliation operations.

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(3) Because of increased emphasis on riot control agents (RCA) for combat support, as well as the increased availability of RCA munitions, CS operations increased. See inclosure 5 for a statistical summary of RCA operations.

(a) Bulk Riot Control Agent, CS. Employment of persistent CS increased during the reporting period. Persistent CS was used to contaminate terrain, infiltration routes, firing positions, bunkers, tunnels, and assembly areas. Bulk CS was also used to contaminate and thereby hinder removal of an abatis constructed in the PLEI TRAP Valley northwest of KONTUM.

1. XM-28 "Brown Bag" CS Dispenser. Nine dispensers were employed and evaluated during the reporting period. The lightweight and responsive system was found to be highly effective for terrain or obstacle contamination and was also highly practical in that personnel requirements were significantly reduced. Another advantage of the XM-28 is that it may be employed from a UH-1 aircraft in addition to a CH-47 helicopter. Response time for an XM-28 mission is 15 minutes compared to 1-1½ hours for drums.

2. Bulk CS Drums. The Chemical Section dropped 265 drums in support of division operations during the reporting period. The XM-295 Burster System was utilized for all of the drops and was found to be highly satisfactory with a dud rate of less than three percent. Drops were conducted at an average of 1200-1500 feet above the terrain and an airspeed of 60 knots.

(b) Nonpersistent CS. Riot Control Agent, CS, continued to prove effective in close combat support, firebase defense, and convoy security.

1. XM-15 CS Canister Clusters. During the reporting period 461 XM-15's were employed in support of combat operations. The munition disorients enemy personnel and forces them from protective shelters, increasing their vulnerability to conventional air and artillery fire.

2. XM-629 105mm CS Cartridge. Of the 550 rounds available only 65 have been employed to date. Seven rounds were destroyed on a forward fire base when a sling of ammunition received a direct hit from enemy mortar fire. Preliminary evaluation of the munition has proven satisfactory.

(4) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Employment. Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) operations continue to be centrally controlled from the division base camp. Detector operations now include gunships armed with flechette rockets and the XM-27 CS dispenser. The team consists of one APD LOH, one chase LOH, and two AH-IG Cobra gunships. The team conducts the normal APD mission and remains on standby for instant response to enemy targets as they are acquired through intelligence sources. Thirty-two APD missions were conducted in November, 32 in December, and 43 in January.

4. (C) Logistics

a. General.

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(1) Action was completed on 128 Reports of Survey with 39 currently pending final action. Thirty-seven Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved and 221 Combat Loss Reports were processed.

(2) Emphasis continued on utilization of LLOC throughout the Division Area of Operations for the resupply of all classes of supply. Backup means of resupply continued to be ALOC.

b. Supply and Services.

The following figures represent cumulative support data for support activities of the 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion at all locations in the Division Area of Operations.

(1) Division Supply Office:

(a) Requisitions received	18,087
(b) Requisitions passed	4,617
(c) Requisitions filled	10,173
(d) Total due out releases	5,289

(2) Class I:

(a) Average headcount issues	14,689
(b) Average number of units:	

Camp Enari	40
FSB Oasis	21
FSB Mary Lou	21
FSE Blackhawk	7
FSB SUOI DOI	11

(3) Class III issues (total):

(a) JP-4	2,613,500
(b) MOGAS	1,448,800
(c) DIESEL	2,051,400
(d) AVGAS	145,800
(4) Baths	3,330

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(5) Graves Registration:

(a) Human remains processed	50
(b) Personal property shipments processed	109

(6) Bulk supplies issued at forward support elements:

(a) Class I

A Rations	509,641
C Rations	208,848
Sundry Packs	6,576
IRPs	24,771

(b) Class III

JP-4 (gal)	1,897,500
AVGAS (gal)	93,000
MOGAS (gal)	567,500
DIESEL (gal)	1,038,900

(c) Class IV

Sandbags	2,659,400
Concertina (bales)	238
Barbed wire (rolls)	973
5' Pickets	15,849
8' Pickets	32,007
3' Pickets	21,321

(7) The US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class III and V in support of operations:

(a) Class III

	<u>Quantity</u>
Fighters	878,461 gals
B-52's	1,329,230 gals

(b) Ordnance

	<u>Qty (each)</u>	<u>Weight (s/t)</u>
Bombs	8,678	2,765
CBU	571	154
Napalm	1,951	726.6
Rockets	501	91.4

(c) Delivered by fighters and AC-47 (Spooky)

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<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Qty (each)</u>	<u>Weight (s/t)</u>
20mm	310,640	77.7
7.62mm	1,130,000	565

(d) Delivered by B-52's

<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Weight (s/t)</u>
Bombs	288	5,901

c. Transportation Services.

(1) During this period there were 468 convoys with a total of 34,090 vehicles.

(2) Aircraft Support.

(a) Total cargo tonnage moved by dedicated air: 276.6

(b) Total passengers moved by dedicated air: 6,970

(c) Total cargo tonnage moved by special mission air: 13.6

(d) Total passengers moved by special mission air: 3,949

(3) The hold baggage section at Camp Enari processed 697 pieces consisting of 32.1 short tons.

(4) Aircraft Control Operations.

Aircraft control operations are controlled by DTO with one NCO for C-130 type aircraft at PLEIKU and one NCO for C-7A type aircraft at Hensel Army Airfield.

(5) Retrograde of unserviceable items increased substantially. The 4th S&T Battalion evacuated 1,093 short tons with a total value of \$2,022,934.00. This compared with 54 short tons evacuated during the preceding reporting period.

d. Material Readiness.

(1) The Division CMMI Team completed nine formal inspections during this period. The inspections point out the need for continued command interest and supervision of pertinent maintenance records and PLL documents.

(2) A detailed staff study was made of the aircraft maintenance structure of the division. The present TO&E configuration will not be changed. All divisional aircraft sections will continue to be responsible for their own operator and

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(7) The Daily Roadside Spot Inspection Program continued. Inspection reports indicate that operator maintenance is less than satisfactory. To improve this condition, a division policy was established requiring units to TI all vehicles prior to dispatch.

e. Maintenance Support.


(1) Three forward support companies, the Base Camp Maintenance Support Company and the Aircraft Maintenance Company provided maintenance support and supply of spare parts for all divisional and attached elements.

(2) Emphasis is placed on repair by forward maintenance companies with back up contact teams provided by Headquarters and Company A, 704th Maintenance Battalion.

(3) Job orders completed by divisional maintenance:

(a) Tanks	112
(b) APCs	184
(c) VTRs	20
(d) Wheeled vehicles	765
(e) Heavy engineer equipment	32
(f) Artillery	90
(g) Generators	324
(h) Small Arms	1384
(i) Instruments	496
(j) Signal-Repaired	2963
(k) Signal-Evacuated	281
(l) Aircraft	462
(m) Aircraft Components	1350
(4) Repair parts requisitions processed and level statistics:	
(a) Total requisitions received	35,168
(b) Total ASL requisitions received	29,323

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organizational maintenance. Company E, 704th Maintenance Battalion provides direct support maintenance.

(3) The repair parts status has improved slightly since the last quarter. The supply responsiveness to low priority requisitions is better, yet 40 percent of all PLL lines are still at zero balance. Improper review of Record of Demand Cards and lack of follow-up action have been cited as the reasons for this percentage. PI clerks and supervisors were sent to the Project Counter PLL course at LONG BINH.

(4) A Material Readiness Assistance Team (RAT) was requested from USARV and visited the division during the months of November and December. The team assisted divisional units in the review and correction of discrepancies in areas related to maintenance and supply, i.e., Property Books, TAERS Records, and PLL Procedures. The team provided each unit with a copy of their inspection check lists. Excess property was discovered during the visit and it was properly accounted for. The team requested a report on the disposition instructions. The RAT visit assisted the division, but the additional paperwork generated and reports requested diminished the overall effectiveness.

(5) A vehicle reduction study was conducted during this period. It was determined that units could operate effectively with fewer vehicles. The new operating allowances should reduce the problems incident to maintenance, spare parts shortages, and consumption of POL products. The reduction is as follows:

<u>TYPE VEHICLE</u>	<u>TYPE UNIT</u>	<u>TO&E AUTH</u>	<u>CURRENT OPERATING ALL</u>
1/2 Ton, Utility	HMB DIVARTY	19	10
" " "	105mm How Bn	35	18
" " "	8" How Bn	19	12
" " "	Inf Bn Hq	23	17
" " "	Inf Bn	31	10
" " "	Inf Bn (Mech)	24	17
" " "	Avn Bn	12	10
" " "	MP Co	45	25*
" " "	Med Bn	22	19
" " "	S&T Bn	19	16
" " "	Maint Bn	30	25
" " "	Sig Bn	82	74
3/4 Ton, Cargo	HMB DIVARTY	29	17
" " "	105mm How Bn	31	16
" " "	8" How Bn	24	16

*MP Company has been augmented with 29 V-100 Commando Cars (XM 706).

(6) The operational readiness rates for all categories of equipment improved during the period. The high operational readiness rate can be attributed to accurate initial analysis of malfunctions and immediate action on parts requisition. In addition, the Weekly Deadline Report (DA Form 2406) has proven to be a effective management tool.

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(c) Total ASL issued	15,051
(d) Total receipts	15,076
(e) Total due-out releases	22,093
(f) Total passing orders	12,354
(g) Total replenishment requisitions	8,714
(h) Total warehouse denials	5,459
(i) Total transactions posted	72,832
(j) Total lines on ASL	18,060
(k) Total lines zero balance	11,809
(l) Zero balance percent	66%
(m) Demand Accommodation	83%
(n) Demand Satisfaction	51%

(5) Retrograded Items: 411 vehicles.

(6) One contact team provided support to units at BAN ME THUOT. Two teams supported units at Blackhawk and DUC CO.

f. Medical Service.

(1) The Division medical battalion provided medical support.

	<u>HQ & Co A</u>	<u>Co B</u>	<u>Co C</u>	<u>Co D</u>
(a) Patients seen	8,419	1,968	2,631	2,184
(b) Patients admitted	480	288	328	621
(c) Patients returned	314	35	113	146

g. Logistics - Operation MACARTHUR.

(1) Logistical support continued to be provided for forward elements of the division by Forward Support Elements (FSE) from Division Support Command, by Forward Support Activity (FSA) facilities from the 45th General Support Group and by 1st Log Command units located at CAM RANH Bay.

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(2) During this period the 1st Brigade moved from KONTUM Province and began operations in eastern PLEIKU Province and western BINH DINH Province. FSA DAK TO terminated operations on 25 January 1969. 1st Brigade is presently supported by an FSE from the Division Support Command at SUOI DOI and limited assets provided by 1st Log Command. FSE provides Class I, III, IIIA, II and IV fast moving items, barrier material, graves registration and bath service to the brigade.

(3) The Division Support Command operates FSE MARY LOU in support of 2d Brigade units operating in the KONTUM area. FSE provides Class I, III, IIIA, II and IV fast moving items and barrier material. Another Class IIIA point is located at KONTUM City Airfield operated jointly by the 45th General Support Group and the 57th Aviation Company and provides both AVGAS and JP-4. The 1st Log Command ASP, located at LZ MARY LOU, provides graves registration service. The 45th General Support Group provides bath and laundry service.

(4) FSE Oasis continued to provide support for 3d Brigade units operating in the western PLEIKU Province area. This FSE provides Class I, bulk and packaged Class III, IIIA, V, barrier material and graves registration. The 1st Log Command provides bath and laundry services. FSE provides customer service and bulk Class IIIA, AVGAS and JP-4. A rearm and JP-4 refuel point was established at PLEI DJERENG with resupply mainly out of FSE Oasis.

(5) An FSE from 1st Log Command continues to provide support for 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry located in the BAN ME THUOT area. It is augmented by FSE elements from the Division Support Command. FSA provides Class I, III, IIIA and V plus fast moving Class II and IV items, barrier material, general supplies, and bath and laundry services. Personnel and equipment from FSE augment the FSA Class I breakdown point, graves registration service, and transportation services. FSA BAN ME THUOT is supported directly from 1st Log Command facilities located at CAM RANH Bay.

(6) During the last seven days of the period a shortage of penprime and all classes of fuel occurred as a result of the interdiction of the PLEIKU-QUI NHON pipeline and the damage of a bridge. Reserves of Class III stocks under 45th General Support Group allowed tactical operations to continue uncurtailed.

5. (C) Military Civic Action Program.

a. TAOR: The Good Neighbor Program continues to be effective in the TAOR. Through continued consolidation, the number of hamlets decreased from 58 to 41. Consolidations were as follows:

(1) 1st Brigade Sector.

PLEI PHAM HO (AR854336)
PLEI LE ANH (AR824324)
PLEI GYUM (AR818325)

} consolidated at PLEI HLU KLAN (AR840329)

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PLEI KHOIH JET (AR810330)
PLEI MONU TAT (AR820300)
PLEI BRENG (AR823297)
PLEI LE LANN (AR820320) } consolidated at PLEI BRENG (AR823297)

PLEI PHAM KLEO (AR892291)
PLEI PHAM KOL (AR875284)
PLEI KO DRAH (AR899292) } consolidated at PLEI KLAN (AR892294) with PLEI PHAM NGOL to be added later

(2) 2d Brigade Sector.

PLEI OLAN (AR833346) moved to PLEI CHI TEH (AR840377)

PLEI HO DOK (AR884433)
PLEI GROI (AR898534)
PLEI WET (AR897434)
PLEI DUR (AR906427) } consolidated at PLEI BREL DOR (AR895438)

(3) Division Artillery Sector.

PLEI HO LANG (AR802277)
PLEI HO KNINH (AR802266)
PLEI HO BOA (AR833230)
PLEI HO GLAO (AR820255)
PLEI TOTT TAU (AR822219) } consolidated at PLEI HO BY (AR822247)

(4) Division Support Command Sector.

PLEI GAO MONU (1) (ZA211382) and PLEI GAO MONU (2) (AR225385) moved together on their own initiative.

Enemy activity in the TAOR increased. On 28 December 1968, PLEI GAO received a ground attack supported by mortars and B-40 rockets. A sweep revealed one NVA KIA, one RPG-2, one B-40 rocket, three hand grenades and several blood trails. At OLLAH on 15 January, the civic action team compound at PLEI PHAM KLAH (AR892293) came under ground attacks from 20 to 30 probable NVA. Results were one NVA KIA, one AK-47 CIA and no friendly casualties.

Kidnappings increased sharply during the reporting period. Eleven chiefs and 61 other villagers were kidnapped. This compared with a total of nine kidnappings during the previous quarter. In addition, one PF soldier was assassinated and one interpreter was beaten.

The rice harvest in the TAOR, carried out under the protection of Company C, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry, was completed during the second week of December. Little or no rice was lost to the VIET CONG.

b. PLEIKU Province:

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(1) The 3d Brigade continued civic action responsibility along Route 19W and in the PLEI MRONG area.

(2) The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry continued civic action along Highway 19 from PLEIKU City to the MANG YANG Pass. On 24 December 1968, consolidation of seven hamlets near Blackhawk Fire Base began. LE TRUNG District plans to administer this project.

(3) PLEIKU Province has established a refugee center north of PLEIKU City to house people removed from the DAK DOA Valley. Additionally, the Province has established a consolidated village near PLEI RING DE to house the people evacuated from the IA DRANG Valley area southwest of CATECKA Tea Plantation.

c. KONTUM Province: While operating in the DAK TO area, the 1st Brigade continued civic action in the DAK TO and DAK SUT Districts.

d. DARLAC Province: 2d Brigade continued civic action in the area around BAN ME THUOT until 17 November 1968, when they displaced to LZ MARY LOU, near KONTUM. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, remaining near BAN ME THUOT, has placed emphasis on the renovation of a GVN dispensary which was destroyed during the TET Offensive. The project was completed and has left a favorable impression with the people of the area.

e. Nation Building Program:

(a) Government:

1. The Division Good Neighbor Council House was used for only one meeting, conducted in December by Sector Yellow. However, the chiefs of all the Sectors met within their respective Sectors during the quarter. In the future, each Sector and/or consolidated village will have its own council house.

2. During the reporting period 11 chiefs were kidnapped. The kidnappings were an attempt on the part of the VC to disrupt the consolidations, which continued on schedule. New chiefs will not be elected until perimeters are built and Popular Forces have been trained and equipped, possibly by 1 March.

3. PLEIKU Province provided labor and material during December and January to construct a cement and tin VIETNAMESE Information Service (VIS) reading room at PLEI GAU. It is staffed by one VIS representative who commutes daily between PLEIKU and PLEI GAO.

(b) Education: The division chaplains have continued to donate funds to hire teachers within the TAOR. Additionally, they have agreed to provide funds to hire another teacher in Sector Black. Though none of the teachers employed by the division meet the requirements established by the GVN, they provide a lasting service to the children in the area.

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(2) Development of the Standard of Living:

(a) Water Supply: Consolidations within the TAOR have water points near each village. In addition, funds are to be spent to hire professional well diggers. CORDS, IFFV, has allocated two windmills to this command with a delivery date of 90 plus days.

(b) Animal Husbandry: A team with a horse and pack saddle has visited all the villages in the TAOR, demonstrating the use of horses as beasts of burden. A few villagers have accepted the idea of using horses for more than status symbols, but the program is still not a success. Further exposure of the pack saddle is necessary.

(c) Health Program:

1. PLEIKU Province Hospital has completed inoculation of the inhabitants of Sectors Black and Blue against plague and cholera.

2. The MEDCAP II program continues to receive enthusiastic acceptance in the TAOR and throughout the AO. There were 64,425 MEDCAPS in the TAOR and 47,591 in the forward areas. The only drawback to the program is educating the people to accept modern medicine entirely, and to discard the medicine man. There are still educated MONTAGNARDS who use medicine men.

3. The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry trained seven MONTAGNARDS to become medics. The training program started in October and ended on 16 December. The aidmen subsequently took a GVN test, passed it, and now are paid by the GVN to practice.

(d) Assistance to PLEIKU Province:

1. Ten trucks, two CH-47 helicopters and 400 rice bags were given to the 24th STZ during their operation in the DAK DOA Valley. These items of equipment were used to transport people, rice and personal possessions from the DAK DOA Valley to the YA-LOU Refugee Center.

2. During December, the 4th Engineers constructed a road and leveled ground for the refugee village constructed adjacent to PLEI RING DE. Helicopters, rice bags, barbed wire, and pickets were supplied to PLEIKU Province to support the resettlement of personnel from the IA DRANG River area. Additionally, one rifle battalion was inserted into the area to provide a security screen for the operation.

3. The division is supporting the Clean-Up Campaign by policing the villages within the TAOR and the LOC's connecting all Division elements.

(e) Peoples' Self Defense Forces: Eighty-seven men from Village Number 14 are undergoing training. This is the first authorized PSDF in the TAOR; others will be organized within the coming month. LE TRUNG District issued forty weapons to Village Number 14 on 29 January 1969.

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f. Statistical Summary of Civic Action:

(1) Construction:

<u>PROJECTS</u>	<u>BUILT</u>	<u>REPAIRED</u>
Dwellings	183 (J), 5	1474(J), 26
Roads (km)	26	29
Dispensaries	1(J), 5	14
Market Place	1	0
Schools	5	12
Latrines	14	3(J)
Bridges	6(J)	2
Bunkers	172(J), 24	20(J), 65
Fence (km)	1.3	.30
Spillways	5(J), 4	2(J)
Bulletin Boards	2(J), 4	2(J)
Ovens	2	0
Cattle Pens	157(J), 35	3
Defense Perimeter (km)	6.4	1
Wells	2	0
Flagpoles	14	0
Playgrounds	4(J), 9	1(J)

Note: (J) indicates joint project.

(2) Health:

MEDCAPS - 112,016
Youth Health - 18,663
DENTCAPS - 131
Rabies Immunization - 150
Health Items - 3,735 pounds

(3) Services:

Food - 20,980
Clothing - 5,503
Cement - 3,847
Tin Sheets - 527
Lumber - 93,381 board feet
Paint - 113 gallons
Rope - 110 feet
Nails - 630 pounds
Barbed Wire - 3,362 bales
Sand Bags - 125,000 each
Engineer Stakes - 8,527 each

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Rice - 196,472 pounds

g. Intelligence Collected as a Result of Civic Action:

(1) 9 December 1968. A BAHNAR tribesman turned in three M26 hand grenades and four magazines of M16 ammunition to the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry.

(2) 5 January 1969. The villagers of PLEI HO BY informed the CA team that a VC platoon was operating near their village. They gave the names of the platoon leader and his executive officer.

(3) 7 January 1969. A BAHNAR tribesman informed the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry of the location of a mine.

(4) 17 January 1969. Two VIETNAMESE boys led the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry to the location of ten 60mm mortar rounds.

(5) 18 January 1969. A MONTAGNARD boy led elements of Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry to a mine.

(6) 28 January 1969. The villagers of PLEI KIAHE NGOL informed CA team of VC entering three villages on the periphery of Sector Yellow.

6. (C) PERSONNEL:

a. (C) Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Beginning of Reporting Period (1 Nov 68)

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
(a) Authorized - organic units	1,111	185	16,402	17,698
Authorized - attached units	<u>49</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>942</u>	<u>1,027</u>
TOTAL	1,160	221	17,344	18,725
(b) Assigned - organic units	1,142	157	16,826	18,125
Assigned - attached units	<u>45</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>851</u>	<u>933</u>
TOTAL	1,187	194	17,677	19,058

(2) End of reporting period (31 Jan 69)

(a) Authorized - organic units	1,113	194	16,370	17,677
Authorized - attached units	<u>49</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>942</u>	<u>1,027</u>
TOTAL	1,162	230	17,312	18,704
(b) Assigned - Organic units	1,252	162	16,970	18,385
Assigned - attached units	<u>48</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>929</u>	<u>1,010</u>
TOTAL	1,300	196	17,899	19,395

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b. (C) Replacements: A total of 438 officers and 4,342 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period, division losses were 213 officers and 2,983 enlisted personnel. Emergency leaves processed during the reporting period totalled 431.

c. (U) Promotions: A total of 6,911 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

d. (C) Casualties:

UNIT	HOSTILE			NON-HOSTILE		
	DEAD	MISSING	WOUNDED	DEAD	MISSING	INJURED
1st Bde	17	0	146	3	0	61
2d Bde	7	0	66	2	0	51
3d Bde	23	8	149	2	0	38
DIVARTY	1	0	16	2	0	33
DISCOM	1	0	5	1	0	12
2-1st Cav	1	0	32	4	0	20
1-10th Cav	1	0	28	2	0	17
1-69th Armor	2	0	38	3	0	13
4th Engr	2	0	8	1	0	14
4th Avn	0	0	2	1	0	2
124th Sig Bn	0	0	0	0	0	4
HHC 4th Inf Div	1	0	0	0	0	5
4th MP Co	1	0	2	0	0	3
4th Admin Co	0	0	1	0	0	1
Scout Dog	0	0	0	0	0	1
E, 58th	0	0	1	0	0	6
4th MI	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	57	8	494	21	0	281

e. (U) Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Decorations Awarded

	NOV	DEC	JAN
Distinguished Service Cross	0	1	2
Silver Star	14	11	17
Legion of Merit	4	5	3
Distinguished Flying Cross	5	3	1
Soldier's Medal	1	3	11
Bronze Star (Valor)	85	62	68
Army Commendation (Valor)	76	94	23
Air Medal (Valor)	25	4	1
Bronze Star (Service)	144	133	186
Army Commendation (Service)	913	519	1,267
Purple Heart	56	155	163
TOTAL	1,820	1,511	2,218

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(2) Badges	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Combat Infantryman Badge	909	559	1,474
Combat Medical Badge	71	71	80
Aircraft Crewman Badge	2	84	15
Miscellaneous Badges	<u>19</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>21</u>
TOTAL	1,001	740	1,590

f. (U) Reenlistments: 165 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The extension/enlistment breakdown was as follows: First Term RA Reenlistments: 34; AUS enlistments: 37; RA extensions: 4; AUS extensions: 2.

g. (U) Postal:

(1) Money Order Sales: \$3,784,050.85

(2) Parcel Post and Postal Fees: \$77,125.27

(3) Incoming Mail: 33,960 sacks and 2,492 pouches. Daily average: 373 sacks and 27 pouches.

(4) Outgoing Mail: 5,433 sacks and 2,047 pouches. Daily average: 59 sacks and 22 pouches.

(5) Number of mail days: 91

h. (U) Special Services:

(1) The 4th Infantry Division was visited by the following USO Shows:

Martha Raye	Gypsy Rose Lee
Joey Bishop	1969 Pro Football Unit #2
Major League Baseball Caravan	The Jimmy Snow Show
Major League All-Star Special	Daniel and the Models
The Sig Sokowitz Show	Johnny Green and the Green Men
Football Coaches of the Year	

(2) R&R quotas received were 4,298 out-of-country and 722 in-country.

(3) A total of 120 movies circulated within the Division.

i. (U) Chaplain Activities:

<u>DENOMINATION</u>	<u>NO. OF SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Roman Catholic	1,239	32,119
Protestant	1,388	34,483
Jewish	32	333
Memorial Services	34	5,215

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j. (U) Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order:

General Courts-Martial: 8
Special Courts-Martial: 161
Summary Courts-Martial: 42

k. (U) Health:

(1) The general health of the command during the quarter remained at a satisfactory level.

(2) Malaria was again the most significant medical problem in the division. In November, malaria rates reached the highest level in 1968: there were 251 cases, including 89 cases of Vivax. Rates fell in December and January, with 157 cases reported in January, 68 of these being Vivax. Because of seasonal factors, malaria generally reaches highest levels in November and December. It is anticipated that malaria rates will continue to decrease in the next quarter.

(3) In December a urine testing program was initiated throughout the division to determine the effectiveness of malaria prophylaxis in units. Samples tested indicated that up to 50% of the personnel in some units were not taking chloroquine primaquine pills even though their malaria rosters were signed. By the end of January every battalion had men trained to perform the urine test. The information provided by these tests should be useful to commanders in enforcing more effective malaria discipline.

(4) In a few instances personnel have illegally added certain duty limitations to permanent profiles. The Division Surgeon has instituted a program whereby all permanent profiles awarded by the staff of the 71st Evacuation Hospital are presented before the 4th Medical Battalion profile board, with the Division Surgeon as the approving authority. This system should alleviate the problem of profiles with false entries, such as, "No KP, no guard duty."

7. (C) Engineer.

a. General. During the reporting period, the 4th Engineer Battalion (Combat) continued combat support of units assigned and attached to the division. Each of the four line companies operated in direct support of a brigade for a least part of the quarter. As of 31 January, Companies B, C and D were in direct support of the 1st, 2d and 3d Brigades, respectively. Company A was in general support. Company E (Bridge) supported the division with tactical bridging, transportation, and assistance in base camp projects. Headquarters and Headquarters Company continued in general support, providing the line companies with heavy equipment, water purification units and Rome Plows (bulldozers used for clearing strips along roads and around firebases). In late November elements of the 4th Engineer Battalion, in conjunction with CSF units and under operational control of the 2d Brigade, conducted a major road interdiction operation in the PLEI TRAP Valley.

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b. Operations.

(1) Until 21 January 1969, Company A provided direct support to the 1st Brigade. In late November a reinforced platoon participated in the PLEI TRAP Valley operation under operational control of Company C. Beginning 10 December 1968, the Company split to support brigade operations in both the DAK PAYOU (VC) Valley and the DAK TO area. On 21 January, when the 1st Brigade departed DAK TO, Company A returned to Camp Enari and began general support of the division.

(2) Company B provided direct support to the 2d Brigade in the BAN ME THUOT area until 20 November. When the brigade moved to KONTUM, Company B, less one platoon, returned to Camp Enari to serve in general support. During the reporting period, the company's major project was the erection of 38 revetments at Hensel Army Airfield. On 21 January, Company B, including the platoon that had remained at BAN ME THUOT, moved to Fire Support Base Blackhawk in support of the 1st Brigade. Presently, the Company is developing Blackhawk and providing direct support to the 1st Brigade's maneuver battalions.

(3) Until 19 November 1968, Company C was in general support to the Division. The Company then moved to LZ MARY LOU to support the 2d Brigade. In November, one platoon accompanied three CFS companies into the PLEI TRAP Road. The other two platoons supported the PLEI TRAP operation by clearing Fire Support Base 20 and Fire Support Base SWINGER. Between 30 November and 2 December these platoons accompanied the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry onto the road. During the reporting period the company cleared a total of five new firebases. In addition the company has cleared fields of fire and built protective berms for POL points and artillery positions. Since 13 January, one platoon of Company C has been supporting the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry's construction of SUPER Firebase near BAN ME THUOT.

(4) Company D continued direct support of the 3d Brigade. The company cleared ten new fire support bases and conducted 117 mine sweeps. Engineer elements supporting search and clear operations destroyed 529 enemy bunkers. In December, one platoon moved to the DAK PAYOU Valley to support operations of TASK FORCE WINNER. The company's construction projects at the 3d Brigade CP, LZ Oasis, included rebuilding all of the bunkers.

(5) Company E supported the division with tactical bridging. The company installed six M4T6 floating bridges and 15 armored vehicle launched bridges. In addition, the company assisted base camp development by pouring 25 concrete pads and continuing construction of a helicopter maintenance building. The armored vehicles of the battalion, including a tank fitted with a mine rolling device (see paragraph 3d (a) above) were consolidated under Company E's control. The armor of Company E assisted in convoy security, mine sweep security and CLEANSWEEP operations.

(6) Twice during the reporting period, the 4th Engineer Battalion provided the command element and supporting elements of the 4th

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Provisional Battalion. On 15 and 16 November and again on 16-18 January the Provisional Battalion conducted sweeps of the DAK AYUNH River Valley east of Camp Enari.

8. (C) ARMY AVIATION OPERATIONS.

Operational Totals were as follows:

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Sorties	9,499	11,234	13,003	33,736
Hours	2,472	3,199	3,573	9,244
Troops Lifted	7,408	12,076	15,790	35,274
Tons of Cargo	328,000	528,000	886,400	1,742,400
Ammo Expended:				
7.62mm	506,000	411,664	529,750	1,742,400
2.75 Rockets	881	553	1,698	3,132
40mm	728	550	3,357	4,635
Results:				
Avn Pers KIA	0	0	0	0
Avn Pers WIA	3	0	1	4
Aircraft Damaged	3	3	6	12
Aircraft Destroyed	3	0	1	4

9. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

a. Annual General Inspections of six divisional units were conducted along with four courtesy inspections in preparation for unit AGIs.

b. No complaints were received during the reporting period. One-hundred thirty requests for assistance were received during this period.

10. (U) SIGNAL.

a. General. Installation of multichannel VHF communications remained the 124th Signal Battalion's chief activity in support of division operations. Elements of the VHF Platoon and Support Platoon were consolidated into a jump platoon for mobile support of brigade or task force operations.

b. Operations.

(1) On 20 November 1968, when the 2d Brigade moved from BAN ME THUOT to KONTUM, the Forward Area Signal Center Platoon (FASCP) supporting the brigade returned to Base Camp. A team equipped with an AN/MRC-112 four-channel VHF system remained at BAN ME THUOT to support the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. On 22 November, the team incorporated an AN/GRC-142 radio teletype into its communication system.

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(2) On 25 November a FASCP departed Camp Enari to support 2d Brigade operations in KONTUM Province.

(3) On 22 December the jump platoon deployed to LZ Blackhawk to support TASK FORCE WINNER. The team returned to base camp on 4 January 1969.

(4) On 19 January 1969 an FASCP advance party arrived at the 1st Brigade's new CP at SOUI DOI and began installing an AN/MRC-69 (12 channel VHF) system.

11. (U) INFORMATION ACTIVITIES.

a. During the reporting period 18 correspondents visited the division. Subjects covered ranged from strictly hometown material to 4th Infantry Division combat operations. Included were representatives of the Washington Post, the Observer (Hq, MACV), the Army Reporter (Hq, USARV), Troy Daily News (Troy, Ohio), Southern Newspaper Syndicate, Overseas Weekly, AP, UPI, KMTV (Omaha, Nebraska), and CBS News. Several free lance correspondents and a photography team from the Southeast Asia Pictorial Center also visited the division. The Commanding General personally briefed three of the correspondents.

b. Five hundred eighteen new members joined the 4th Infantry Division Association during the reporting period, bringing total memberships in the 4th Infantry Division to 7,859. Contributions to the 4th Infantry Division Scholarship Fund were \$77,876.39, bringing total contributions to \$170,292.24.

c. The Radio Television Section continued to produce programs for the Army Hour and Pacific Report, and a weekly news wrap-up which is broadcast countrywide on the AFVN network. The section also supplied programming to the AFVN Radio Network's Unit of the Day program. Similar programs for local radio and television featured the activities, missions and accomplishments of 4th Infantry Division units. Closer liaison with the AFVN Network increased the quantity and quality of AFVN's coverage of the Division.

d. For the third consecutive quarter the 4th Infantry Division led all other units in USARV in production of Home Town News Releases. With 11,000 DA Forms 1526 the division led not only all USARV units, but all US Army units worldwide.

e. During the quarter the Information Office produced five Command Information Fact Sheets for the division. Their subjects ranged from narcotics to income tax. A rewritten version of the brochure, The Famous Fighting Fourth Division in Vietnam, is ready for publication.

f. Thirteen editions of the Ivy Leaf appeared during the period. The newspaper contained three new command information columns, one by the Division Command Sergeant Major, one by the Division Chaplain, and one by the Division Career Counselor. The use of special feature layouts enhanced the professional quality of the Ivy Leaf and encouraged increased publicity for the 4th Infantry Division in civilian and military news publications.

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SECTION 2 (C) LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. (U) Personnel - None.

2. (C) Operations.

a. (C) EMPLOYMENT OF STAY-BEHIND FORCES IN ENEMY BASE AREAS:

OBSERVATIONS: When US forces discover enemy complexes that show signs of recent use, they usually destroy the complexes and keep moving.

EVALUATION: When a freshly constructed camp or bunker complex is found, an effective technique is for the unit to continue on its mission, leaving the camp unmolested but stationing a squad size Bushmaster or small ambush force in the area for a 48 hour period. On several occasions, by using this technique, stay-behind forces have inflicted casualties on the enemy when they returned to their camps.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That stay-behind forces be employed near hastily abandoned enemy camps, or wherever the enemy is known to be operating, but where he persistently avoids contact.

b. (C) PLANNING CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS:

OBSERVATION: The planning and execution of the cordon phase of a village cordon and search operation at night is similar to the preparation and conduct of a night attack.

EVALUATION: The guidance established in FM 7-11 for conduct of a night attack was used in the planning and execution stages of a cordon and search operation. Initially several reconnaissance patrols observed the village from various sides. They made sketches and consolidated them until a master copy was perfected. Two reconnaissance patrols were sent to find an overland route to the village which could be used at night with a minimum of noise. Certain members of these patrols were to be part of the quartering party on the night of the mission. Once the objective was sketched and the route was chosen, a thorough briefing was given to the troops concerning light and noise discipline, rules of engagement, and actions at the objective. In the execution phase, the quartering party moved out in late afternoon to make final reconnaissance for positioning troops in the cordon. Other patrols (SRPs) were positioned along the route for security. Additionally the mortar section fired H&I fire on the flanks of the route for security and to cover noise made during movement. The quartering party met the company at the release point and led the troops into position under cover of darkness. The cordon was in place almost an hour prior to sunrise and surprise was complete.

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RECOMMENDATION: That planning and execution of a cordon and search operation should parallel planning and execution of a night attack.

c. (C) EMPLOYMENT OF SHORT RANGE PATROLS IN CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS:

OBSERVATION: Cordons are usually detected before they are completed or are so extended that the enemy can slip through them and escape.

EVALUATION: An outer screen of SRPs placed in critical locations prior to the cordon:

- (a) Permits surveillance of movement to and from the village.
- (b) Can intercept individuals evading the cordon.
- (c) Covers possible gaps in the cordon.

RECOMMENDATION: That units employ SRP teams during cordon and search operations especially when cordoning large villages or those requiring an extended cordon.

d. (U) INFORMING RF/PF UNITS OF CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS:

OBSERVATION: Units conducting cordon and search operations risk accidental engagement with friendly forces within the village to be searched.

EVALUATION: Cordon and search operations of villages protected by RF/PF units risk engagement of friendly forces if the RF/PF units are not aware of the operation. Alerting any units beforehand will cause compromise of the mission and negate the value of the operation.

RECOMMENDATION: Units conducting cordon and search operations should be provided with mobile psychological warfare teams to inform RF/PF units of the presence of friendly troops once the cordon is complete. This should prevent an accidental engagement of forces.

e. (U) USE OF AERIAL LOUDSPEAKERS IN CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS:

OBSERVATION: Innocent civilians are often alarmed by the sudden appearance of US troops conducting cordon and search operations. They attempt to hide or escape, thereby complicating the operation.

EVALUATION: The cordoning force can use aerial loudspeakers to control the villagers and assure them that no harm will befall them. Once the cordon is in place, loudspeakers can announce the presence of US troops and the purpose of the cordon and search.

RECOMMENDATION: That units consider the use of aerial loudspeakers in operations requiring contact with civilians.

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g. (U) SUBSTITUTE FOR THE M106A1 MORTAR CARRIER:

OBSERVATION: Replacement M106A1 mortar carriers are practically impossible to obtain.

EVALUATION: M548 cargo carriers can be used as substitutes for M106A1 mortar carriers. The crew removes the mortar from the carrier and ground mounts it for firing. The M548 carries large amounts of ammunition and supplies.

RECOMMENDATION: That when M106A1 mortar carriers are unavailable, M548 cargo carriers be used in their place.

3. (U) Training.

a. CLOSE ARTILLERY ADJUSTMENT:

OBSERVATION: Commanders at all levels from squad leader to battalion commander are not experienced in, or conditioned to, the employment of close artillery support.

EVALUATION: When in close contact with the enemy, commanders usually request helicopter gunship fire support before they call for close artillery support. In most cases, available artillery firepower greatly surpasses that possible with gunships. Such a reluctance to employ a valuable weapon indicates lack of training in a necessary professional skill.

RECOMMENDATION: That unit training in VIETNAM provide all commanders and leaders the opportunity to adjust artillery fire close to their position and gain confidence in this means of fire support.

b. MARKSMANSHIP:

OBSERVATION: Good marksmanship is essential to effective combat operations. There have been numerous instances in the Division where poor marksmanship prevented effective engagement of enemy forces.

EVALUATION: Ranges can be constructed at each fire base and by utilizing the known distance type range all personnel can confirm or obtain their zero. The "jungle lane" or field firing range is effective in developing quick kill firing techniques. All rifle platoon weapons, to include the M16, M79, and M60 can be fired on this range. These ranges are fairly easy to design and construct.

RECOMMENDATION: That all units attempt to construct these relatively simple ranges around their firebases to enable their personnel to conduct marksmanship training and practice.

4. (C) Intelligence.

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a. (C) SATURATION OF AN AREA WITH LRPS

OBSERVATION: In preparation for extensive combat operations in the DAK PAYOU Valley, the 4th Infantry Division employed an extensive Long Range Patrol screen covering suspected enemy infiltration routes.

EVALUATION: The results of this operation demonstrated the advantages of saturating an area with numerous LRP teams as compared to the standard practice of dispersing LRPs widely throughout the AO. The LRP screen, concentrated in an area of 300 square kilometers, accounted for four confirmed enemy KIA, five probable KIA, five probable KIA, numerous enemy weapons, munitions, documents and tons of enemy foodstuffs captured or destroyed. Additionally, the LRP screen monitored enemy activities and movement along the infiltration routes, giving the Division clear intelligence on which to conduct its offensive operations.

RECOMMENDATION: That LRP teams be employed in area saturation operations when the tactical situation permits.

b. (C) ENEMY EXPLOITATION OF ESTABLISHED ALLIED BOUNDARIES:

OBSERVATION: Enemy forces remain just beyond fixed AO and province boundaries to avoid contact.

EVALUATION: Contacts have been made and base areas uncovered when units have swept beyond their normal AO. PW's have revealed that their units remain just beyond a known AO boundary or along the province boundaries, where they believe they are safe from Allied operations.

RECOMMENDATION: That TAOR and other semi-permanent AO boundaries be periodically changed to catch enemy units just beyond the boundaries, and that friendly units conduct operations along province boundaries.

5. Logistics.

a. (U) MODIFICATION OF TANK ENGINE OIL COOLER LINES:

OBSERVATION: Oil cooler lines on M48A3 tank engines fail at excessive rates.

EVALUATION: Within a period of three months, one tank required replacement of eleven oil cooler lines because of leaks in the flexible portion of the lines. Replacements in these quantities are difficult to obtain through normal supply channels. Experience has indicated rigid sections can be brazed into the lines, replacing the leaky flexible sections. Of seven modified lines which have been installed, none have failed.

RECOMMENDATION: That maintenance personnel apply the modifications described above when repairing leaky oil cooler lines.

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b. (U) VENTILATION FOR ENGINES OF M48A3 TANKS:

OBSERVATION: Leaves and debris in engine compartments have caused several tank fires. Also, engines are overheating because of poor engine ventilation.

EVALUATION: Small leaves and pieces of brush are sucked through tank grill doors and accumulate in engine compartments.

RECOMMENDATION: That a $\frac{1}{2}$ inch wire screen, similar to that mounted on the grill of the M113A1 APC, be installed on the grill doors of all tanks, VTRs and AVLBs, and that crewmen clean the grill doors frequently and insure that hull inspection plates are in place.

c. (U) DAMAGE TO M113A1 ENGINES:

OBSERVATION: Inspection of M113A1 engine blocks has revealed scoring of the cylinder walls.

EVALUATION: Damage of this type occurs because air filters become contaminated quickly in extremely dusty conditions. Required daily servicing of air filters is not sufficient to prevent contamination and engine failure.

RECOMMENDATION: That each APC carry two air filters, and that these filters be rotated several times a day, preferably after every four to six hours of operation under dusty conditions.

d. (U) FALSE OIL PRESSURE READINGS:

OBSERVATION: Several OH6A helicopters have entered field maintenance because their gauges indicated high oil pressure.

EVALUATION: Inspection revealed that neither oil pump malfunction nor cockpit gauge failure were to blame. The pressure gauge sending unit had failed. The sending unit can be tested by attaching a direct pressure line. If the gauge reads within the operational limits of 90 PSI to 130PSI, yet the cockpit gauge reads high, then the sending unit probably has a malfunction.

RECOMMENDATION: That units submit an equipment improvement report (EIR) on each helicopter that develops this failure, thus providing justification of a redesigned sending unit.

e. (U) PROTECTING GENERATOR FUEL FROM CONTAMINATION:

OBSERVATION: Many generator breakdowns result from carburetor failure.

EVALUATION: The usual cause of carburetor failure is contaminated fuel. When fuel drums are set on the ground, water condenses inside the drums and the fuel becomes contaminated.

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AVDDH-GC-MH

15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

RECOMMENDATION: That all fuel drums be supported off the ground, that a petcock be installed in the bottom of each fuel drum so that accumulated water can be drained out, and that lines running to generators be installed so that their bottom ends are approximately two inches from the bottom of the tanks. This arrangement will prevent water from entering generator carburetors.

6. (U) Organization - None.

7. (C) Tactical Cover and Deception.

a. (C) DECEPTIVE TECHNIQUES OF LRP INSERTION:

OBSERVATION: Enemy reconnaissance elements often observe helicopter-borne insertions of US troops, especially LRP insertions.

EVALUATION: A LRP is particularly vulnerable to harassment or attack immediately after insertion. If two or three helicopters feint several insertions, and if the LRP members lie on the floor of the helicopter and remain hidden until the instant they disembark, the enemy has less chance of discovering them.

RECOMMENDATION: That deceptive measures such as these be employed during helicopter-borne insertions of small elements.

b. (C) TWO AMBUSHES IN ONE NIGHT:

OBSERVATION: After an ambush, a US patrol usually withdraws and adjusts artillery or mortar fire into the area of contact. The patrol usually returns at first light and sweeps the area to determine results of the ambush.

EVALUATION: The enemy is apparently aware of this habit. When ambushed, he usually withdraws, waits for a few hours, and then returns to the kill zone to recover his casualties and equipment. Knowing this, ambush patrols can prepare to engage the enemy again in the same kill zone. (See Inclosure 4, Significant Activities, summary for 1 Jan 69.)

RECOMMENDATION: That units consider this technique when conducting ambushes against squad or platoon size elements.

8. (U) Engineer.

OBSERVATION: Engineer units have had difficulty moving 48-foot-long dirt-filled helicopter revetments without damaging them.

EVALUATION: A sling for lifting dirt-filled revetments can be constructed from a standard piece of M4T6 bridge balk, two 25-ton low boy tandem pieces, four lengths of chain and four hooks. (See illustration, Appendix 1).

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RECOMMENDATION: That when required to move helicopter revetments, units use the device described above.

5 Inclosures

1. Organization Structure
2. Key Personnel
3. Abbreviations
4. Chronological Summary of Significant Activities
5. Chemical Operations

Donn R. Pepke
DONN R. PEPKE
Major General, USA
Commanding

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

DISTRIBUTION:

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- 1 - Comdt, C & GS College
- 1 - Comdt, Armor Sch
- 1 - Comdt, Arty Sch
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- 1 - CO, 52d Arty Gp
- 1 - CO, 52d Cmbt Avn Bn
- 2 - CO, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
- 2 - CO, 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div
- 2 - CO, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
- 1 - CG, 173d Abn Bde
- 2 - CO, DIVARTY
- 2 - CO, DISCOM
- 2 - CO, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav
- 2 - CO, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav
- 2 - CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
- 1 - CO, 1st Bn, 8th Inf
- 1 - CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf
- 1 - CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
- 1 - CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf
- 1 - CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
- 1 - CO, 1st Bn, 14th Inf
- 1 - CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf
- 1 - CO, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
- 1 - CO, 2d Bn, 35th Inf
- 1 - CO, 5th Bn, 16th Arty
- 1 - CO, 6th Bn, 29th Arty
- 1 - CO, 4th Bn, 42d Arty
- 1 - CO, 2d Bn, 9th Arty
- 2 - CO, 4th Engr Bn
- 2 - CO, 124th Sig Bn
- 1 - CO, 4th S&T Bn
- 1 - CO, 4th Med Bn
- 1 - CO, 704th Maint Bn
- 2 - CO, 4th Avn Bn
- 1 - CO, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav
- 1 - Chief of Staff, 4th Inf Div
- 1 - ACofS, G1
- 1 - ACofS, G2
- 1 - ACofS, G3
- 1 - ACofS, G4
- 1 - ACofS, G5
- 1 - TACP (ALO), 4th Inf Div
- 1 - Comdt, 4th Inf Div Repl Tng Det
- 1 - Chemical Officer
- 1 - Provost Marshal
- 1 - IG
- 10 - CO, 29th Mil Hist Det
- 1 - AG File

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APPENDIX 1

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. (C) Task Organization as of 31 October 1968 with supporting artillery:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
C/2-1 Cav
6-29 Arty (-) DS
C/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29
D/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29
A/1-92 Arty GSR 6-29
B/6-14 Arty GS
A/4 Engr
TACP

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-12 Inf
2-35 Inf
1-10 Cav (-)
4-42 Arty (-) DS
B/2-9 Arty DS 2-35
B/5-16 Arty GSR 4-42
C/1-92 Arty GS
B/5-22 Arty GS
B/4 Engr
TACP

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf (-)
3-8 Inf
1-14 Inf
1-22 Inf
1-35 Inf
1-69 Armor (-)
A/1-10 Cav
C/1-10 Cav
2-9 Arty (-) DS
C/4-42 Arty DS 1-22
C/6-29 Arty GSR 2-9
A/5-16 Arty GSR 2-9
A/3-6 Arty DS 2-8
B/1-92 Arty GSR 2-9
A/6-14 Arty GS
C/6-14 Arty GS
C/7-15 Arty GS
D/4 Engr
TACP

Division Troops

C/2-8 Inf
2-1 Cav (-)
7-17 Cav (-)
A/5-22 Arty GS
4 Engr (-)

2. (C) Effective 1 Nov, A/3-6 Arty GS PLEIKU Defense. Effective 2 Nov B/3-6 Arty DS 2-8 Inf.

2. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 92-37-67 eff 5 Nov:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: C,D/3-8 Inf

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: C,D/3-8 Inf

4. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 93-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: C,D/3-8 Inf eff 11 Nov.

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: C,D/3-8 Inf

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: D/1-10 Cav eff 13 Nov

Division Troops

RECEIVE: D/1-10 Cav

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5. (C) Effective 14 Nov:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

Division Troops

RECEIVE: D/7-17 Cav

RELEASE: D/7-17 Cav

6. (C) Effective 15 Nov, 4th Provisional Battalion: Three provisional companies consisting of Division Base Camp elements. B/3-6 Arty DS to Prov Bn 15 Nov, returned DS 2-8 Inf 16 Nov.

7. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 94-37-67 eff 16 Nov:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: 1-12 Inf W/DS Arty
RELEASE: 1-10 Cav (-)

RECEIVE: 1-10 Cav (-)

Division Troops

RECEIVE: 1-12 Inf W/DS Arty
RECEIVE: B/1-10 Cav

8. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 95-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: A,D/1-22 Inf

RELEASE: 2-35 Inf W/DS Arty eff 18 Nov

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: C/1-10 Cav

RELEASE: C/1-10 Cav eff 18 Nov
RELEASE: D/1-22 Inf eff 18 Nov
RELEASE: D/7-17 Cav eff 18 Nov
RELEASE: Recon/1-14 Inf eff 18 Nov
RELEASE: A/1-22 Inf eff 19 Nov

RECEIVE: D/7-17 Cav

RECEIVE: Recon/1-14 Inf

RECEIVE: 1-12 Inf W/DS Arty

Division Troops

RECEIVE: 2-35 Inf (separate AO)

RELEASE: 1-12 Inf W/DS Arty eff 19 Nov

Also, effective 18 Nov:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: B/4 Engr
RECEIVE: C/4 Engr
RELEASE: B/5-22 Arty GS
RECEIVE: C/6-14 Arty GS

RELEASE: C/6-14 Arty GS

Division Troops

RELEASE: C/4 Engr

RECEIVE: B/4 Engr

RECEIVE: B/5-22 Arty GS BAN ME THUOT AO

9. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 96-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: A, D/1-22 Inf eff 20 Nov RECEIVE: A, D/1-22 Inf

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

Division Troops

RECEIVE: B/1-10 Cav

RELEASE: B/1-10 Cav eff 21 Nov

10. (C) Also, effective 20 Nov:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: 7-17 Cav (-)

RECEIVE: A/3-6 Arty DS 1-10 Cav

RELEASE: C/1-92 Arty

Division Troops

RELEASE: 7-17 Cav (-)

C/1-92 Arty GS PLEIKU Defense. Also, C/3-6 Arty entered AO, GS PLEIKU Defense.

11. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 97-37-67:

2 Bde, 4th Inf Div

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: Sct & mortar 2-8 Inf

RECEIVE: Recon & mortar 1-14 Inf

RELEASE: Recon & mortar 1-14 Inf
eff 24 Nov

DSA, II Corps

RELEASE: Sct & mortar 2-8 Inf eff 23 Nov

12. (C) Effective 25 Nov C/1-92 Arty GS 2d Bde.

13. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 98-37-67:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: 7-17 Cav (-) eff 2 Dec

RELEASE: 1-22 Inf (-) W/DS Arty eff 2 Dec

RELEASE: D/7-17 Cav eff 6 Dec

RELEASE: A/1-10 Cav eff 3 Dec

RECEIVE: 1-22 Inf (-) W/DS Arty

RELEASE: 1-10 Cav (-) W/DS Arty eff 5 Dec

RECEIVE: 1-10 Cav (-) W/DS Arty

RELEASE: 2-8 Inf (-) W/DS Arty eff 6 Dec

RECEIVE: 2-8 Inf (-) W/DS Arty

Division Troops

RECEIVE: 7-17 Cav (-)

14. (C) Effective 2 December, C/4-42 Arty GS 2d Bde, (from DS 1-22). Also:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: A/1-92 Arty GSR 6-29 eff
4 Dec

RECEIVE: A/1-92 Arty GS

RECEIVE: B/1-92 Arty GSR 6-29

RELEASE: B/1-92 Arty GSR 2-9 eff 5 Dec

15. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 99-37-67 eff 9 Dec:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

Division Troops

RELEASE: C/1-10 Cav

RECEIVE: C/1-10 Cav (OPCON 2-35)

16. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 100-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: 1-22 Inf
RELEASE: 3-12 Inf eff 9 Dec

RELEASE: 1-22 Inf (-) eff 8 Dec and A/1-22 Inf eff 11 Dec

Division Troops

RECEIVE: 3-12 Inf

17. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 101-37-67 eff 13 Dec:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: 3-8 Inf
RECEIVE: 3-12 Inf w/DS Arty

RECEIVE: D/1-10 Cav

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

Division Troops

RELEASE: 3-8 Inf

RELEASE: D/1-10 Cav
RELEASE: 3-12 Inf w/DS Arty

On 13 Dec, C/6-29 Arty departed 3d Bde AO, became GS Camp Enari Defense.
On 14 Dec, C/6-29 Arty arrived in 1st Bde AO, DS 3-8 Inf.
On 15 Dec, C/4-42 Arty arrived in 1st Bde AO, DS 1-8 Inf.

18. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 102-37-67 eff 16 Dec:

2-35 Inf (separate AO)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: C/1-10 Cav

RECEIVE: C/1-10 Cav

Also, effective 16 Dec, C/4-42 Arty DS 1-22 Inf (1st Bde AO).

19. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 103-37-67 eff 19 Dec:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

Division Troops

RELEASE: C/1-10 Cav

RECEIVE: C/1-10 Cav

Also, effective 19 Dec:

2-8 Inf (2d Bde)

Division Troops

RECEIVE: C/2-8 Inf

RELEASE: C/2-8 Inf

20. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 104-37-67 eff 21 Dec:

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Division Troops

2-35 Inf (separate AO)

RELEASE: C/1-10 Cav

RECEIVE: C/1-10 Cav

21. (C) Effective 22 Dec:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: A/1-92 Arty GSR 6-29

RELEASE: A/1-92 Arty GS

On 24 Dec, one plat A/1-92 Arty returned to GSR 4-42 (DS 2d Bde). Also, A/4-42 Arty departed ARVN AO, became GS Camp Enari Defense.

22. (C) Organization of TASK FORCE WINNER, 25 Dec 68, created in FRAGO's 105-37-67 and 106-37-67:

TASK FORCE WINNER

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
C/2-1 Cav
6-29 Arty DS
C/4-42 Arty DS 1-22
C/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29
D/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29
A, B/1-92 Arty (-) GSR 6-29
B/6-14 Arty GS
A/4 Engr
TACP

2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf
1-10 Cav (-)
4-42 Arty (-) DS
A, B/3-6 Arty DS
B/5-16 Arty GSR 4-42
Plat A/1-92 Arty GSR
C/1-92 Arty GS
C/6-14 Arty GS
C/4 Engr
TACP

Co E/20 Inf (IRP)

2-1 Cav
2-1 Cav (-)
A/5-22 Arty GS TF WINNER

DIVISION CONTROL

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-35 Inf

1-14 Inf
1-35 Inf
1-69 Armor (-)
2-9 Arty (-) DS
A/5-16 Arty GSR 2-9
A/6-14 Arty GS
C/7-15 Arty GS
D/4 Engr
TACP

2-35 Inf
C/1-10 Cav
B/2-9 Arty DS
B/5-22 Arty GS in BAN ME THUOT AO

Division Troops

7-17 Cav (-)
4 Engr (-)

23. (C) Effective 27 Dec:

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1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: 3-12 Inf w/DS Arty

RECEIVE: 3-12 Inf w/DS Arty

Also, effective 27 Dec, A/4-42 Arty arrived in TF WINNER AO, DS 3-47 ARVN. Effective 28 Dec, C/3-6 Arty DS 1-10 Cav. Effective 29 Dec, A/3-6 Arty GS PLEIKU Defense.

24. (C) Effective 29 Dec:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-1 Cav

RELEASE: C/2-1 Cav

RELEASE: B/2-1 Cav

RECEIVE: B/2-1 Cav

RECEIVE: C/2-1 Cav

25. (C) Effective 03 Jan 69, C/1-92 Arty (-) GS 24th STZ.

26. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 107-37-67:

Effective 04 Jan 69, TASK FORCE WINNER was dissolved.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: 3-12 Inf w/DS Arty

RELEASE: 3-12 Inf w/DS Arty

RECEIVE: E/20 Inf (LRP)

RELEASE: 1-12 Inf w/DS Arty eff 05 Jan

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: 1-12 Inf w/DS Arty

27. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 108-37-67 eff 04 Jan 69:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: Plat E/20 Inf (LRP)

RECEIVE: Plat E/20 Inf (LRP)

28. (C) Effective 06 Jan:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: Plat C/1-92 Arty GS

RECEIVE: Plat C/1-92 Arty GSR 2-9

29. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 109-37-67 eff 10 Jan:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: 1-8 Inf (-) w/DS Arty

RECEIVE: 1-8 Inf (-) w/DS Arty

30. (C) Effective 13 Jan 69, A/4-42 Arty GS Camp Enari Defense.

31. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 110-37-67, eff 16 Jan:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: 1-10 Cav (-) w/DS Arty

RECEIVE: 1-10 Cav (-) w/DS Arty

32. (C) Effective 16 and 17 Jan, 4th Provisional Battalion: Three provisional companies consisting of Division Base Camp elements. A/4-42 Arty DS.

33. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 111-37-67, eff 17 Jan:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: 2 Plats E/20 Inf (LRP)

RECEIVE: 2 Plats E/20 Inf (LRP)

Also, effective 17 Jan:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-1 Cav

RELEASE: A/1-14 Inf

RECEIVE: A/1-14 Inf

34. (C) Effective 18 Jan:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: Plat C/1-92 Arty GS

RECEIVE: Plat C/1-92 Arty GS

35. (C) Effective 19 Jan, A/4-42 Arty GS 2d Bde, A/1-92 Arty GS PLEIKU Defense.

36. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 112-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RECEIVE: 1-8 Inf (-) w/DS Arty

RELEASE: 1-8 Inf (-) w/DS Arty eff 20 Jan

RELEASE: 1-22 Inf w/DS Arty eff 20 Jan

RECEIVE: 1-22 Inf w/DS Arty

RELEASE: B/2-1 Cav eff 21 Jan

RECEIVE: B/2-1 Cav

37. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 113-37-67 eff 21 Jan:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: B/1-8 Inf
RELEASE: Plat E/20 Inf (LRP)

RECEIVE: 2 Plats E/20 Inf (LRP)

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-1 Cav

RELEASE: Plat E/20 Inf (LRP)
RECEIVE: A/1-14 Inf

RELEASE: A/1-14 Inf
RECEIVE: B/1-8 Inf

Also, effective 21 Jan:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

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RECEIVE: B/4 Engr
RELEASE: A/4 Engr
RELEASE: B/1-92 Arty GSR 6-29
RELEASE: B/6-14 Arty GS

RECEIVE: B/1-92 Arty GSR 4-42
RECEIVE: B/6-14 Arty GS

Division Troops

RELEASE: B/4 Engr
RECEIVE: A/4 Engr

38. (C) Effective 22 Jan: A/1-92 Arty GS 3d Bde. Effective 24 Jan:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: C/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29

RECEIVE: C/5-16 Arty GSR 2-9

39. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 114-37-67 eff 25 Jan:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: 3-12 Inf w/DS Arty

RECEIVE: 3-12 Inf w/DS Arty

40. (C) Effective 27 Jan:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

RELEASE: D/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29

RECEIVE: D/5-16 Arty GSR 4-42

41. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 115-37-67 eff 28 Jan:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

I FFORCEV

RELEASE: E/20 Inf (IRP)

RECEIVE: E/20 Inf (IRP)

42. (C) Task Organization of 31 January 1969 with supporting artillery:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf (-)
3-8 Inf
6-29 Arty (-) DS
B/4 Engr
TACP

2-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
B/2-1 Cav
4-42 Arty (-) DS
B/6-29 Arty DS 3-12
B/3-6 Arty DS 2-8
B/5-16 Arty GSR 4-42
D/5-16 Arty GSR 4-42
B/1-92 Arty GSR 4-42
B, C/6-14 Arty GS
C/4 Engr
TACP

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-12 Inf
1-14 Inf
1-35 Inf
1-69 Armor (-)
1-10 Cav (-)
2-9 Arty (-) DS
B/4-42 Arty DS 1-12

Division Troops

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C/3-6 Arty DS 1-10
A, C/5-16 Arty GSR 2-9
A, C/1-92 Arty GS
A/6-14 Arty GS
C/7-15 Arty GS
D/4 Engr
TACP

2-35 Inf
C/1-10 Cav
B/2-9 Arty DS 2-35
2-1 Cav (-)
B/1-8 Inf
A, B/5-22 Arty GS
7-17 Cav (-)
4 Engr (-)

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KEY PERSONNEL

Key personnel by position as of the end of the reporting period.

Pepke, Donn R.	MG	CG, 4th Inf Div
Irzyk, Albin F.	BG	ADC-A
Schaefer, Frederick A. III	BG	ADC-B
McChrystal, Herbert J. Jr.	COL	Chief of Staff
Mickel, Woodburn J. Jr.	LTC	ACofS, G1
Thomann, Charles E.	LTC	ACofS, G2
Kirwan, Robert L.	LTC	ACofS, G3
Brandt, Leo M.	LTC	ACofS, G4
Vacant		ACofS, G5
Fiscus, James E.	MAJ	Deputy G5
Rumbaugh, Earl E. Jr.	LTC	DPC
Clinton, Frederick C.	LTC	AG
Anker, Don C.	LTC	IG
Peck, Darrell L.	LTC	SJA
Lewis, George N.	LTC	Surg
Russell, Donald N.	LTC	PM
Gillespie, John W.	LTC	Cml Off
Childers, John C. Jr.	LTC	Fin Off
Leaming, Vaughn F.	LTC	Chap
David, Donald D.	MAJ	IO
Wilson, John S.	MAJ	Ammo Off
Edmiston, Charles H. Jr.	MAJ	Trans Off

1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division

Knight, Hale H.	COL	CO
English, Don C.	LTC	XO
Sheehan, Albert J.	MAJ	S3

2d Bde, 4th Infantry Division

Duquemin, Gordon J.	COL	CO
Haralson, Browning R.	LTC	XO
Lieber, Albert C.	MAJ	S3

3d Bde, 4th Infantry Division

McClellan, Stan L.	COL	CO
Keenan, Arthur P.	LTC	XO
Hutchison, Hugh F. Jr.	MAJ	S3

Inclosure 2

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Division Artillery

Williams, Virgil H.	COL	CO
Rogers, Guy A.	LTC	XO
Hayward, Barton M.	LTC	S3

Division Support Command

Abernathy, William C.	COL	CO
Sapp, Alfred G.	LTC	XO
Whedbee, John S. Jr.	MAJ	S3

Battalions

Buckner, Allen M.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 8th Inf
Thoreson, David P.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf
Hickey, Pennell J.	LTC	CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
Carter, Robert H.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf
Larkin, Richard X.	LTC	CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
Lander, Robert B.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 14th Inf
Daniels, John L.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf
Buckner, Garrett D.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
Sulenski, Joseph S.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 35th Inf
Renick, Roderick D. Jr.	LTC	CO, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav
Miller, Richard A.	LTC	CO, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav
Reuter, Robert M.	LTC	CO, 7th Sqdn, 17th Cav
Sheridan, Stan R.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
Maurer, William W.	LTC	CO, 6th Bn, 29th Arty
Fronczak, Edward L.	LTC	CO, 4th Bn, 42d Arty
Wiles, Richard I.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 9th Arty
Weathersby, Russell A.	LTC	CO, 5th Bn, 16th Arty
Powers, George F. Jr.	LTC	CO, 4th Avn Bn
Heiberg, Elvin R. III	LTC	CO, 4th Engr Bn
Lewis, George N.	LTC	CO, 4th Med Bn
Porter, Vernon R.	LTC	CO, 4th S&T Bn
Ball, Duard D.	LTC	CO, 704th Maint Bn
Rolya, William I.	LTC	CO, 124th Sig Bn

Separate Companies and Detachments

Dimeo, Richard S.	CPT	CO, HHC, 4th Inf Div
McNiff, John J.	MAJ	CO, 4th Admin Co
Broce, Robert A.	LLT	CO, 4th MP Co
Chambers, James A.	MAJ	CO, 4th MI Det
Pavia, Richard J.	MAJ	CO, 29th Mil Hist Det

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ABBREVIATIONS

List of abbreviations used in text (local, common usage, standard Army).

AA	Anti-Aircraft
AFB	Air Force Base
AFRS	Armed Forces Radio Service
AGI	Annual General Inspection
ALOC	Air Line of Communication
AO	Area of Operations
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APD	Airborne Personnel Detector
ARP	Aero Rifle Platoon
ARVN	Army Republic of Vietnam
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASR	Ammunition Supply Rate
A/V	Audio/Visual
AVLB	Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
AW	Automatic Weapon
BC	Body Count
CA	Civic Action, Combat Assault
CAS	Close Air Support
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
C&C	Command and Control (Aircraft)
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CI	Counterintelligence
CIA	Captured in Action
CMIT	Combined Mobile Instruction Team
CMTT	Combined Mobile Training Team
CORD	Council on Revolutionary Development
CP	Command Post
CS	Tear Gas
CSF	Camp Strike Force
CSS	Combat Sky Spot
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DS	Direct Support
DTOC	Division Tactical Operations Center
EDP	Equipment Deadlined for Parts
ERP	Engineer Rappelling Platoon
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FO	Forward Observer
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
FSA	Forward Support Area
FSB	Fire Support Base
FSE	Forward Supply Element
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces

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GRRREG	Graves Registration
GS	General Support
GSR	General Support Reinforcing
Gunship	Armed UH-1 Helicopter
GVN	Government of Vietnam
Hawkeye Team	Four Man Hunter-Killer Team
HE	High Explosive
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction
Headhunter	O-1E Aircraft Used for Visual Reconnaissance
Hook	CH-47 "Chinook" Helicopter
ICC	Installation Coordination Center
I FORCEV IFFV	I Field Force, Vietnam
JUSPAO	Joint US Public Affairs Office
KBA	Killed by Air
KIA	Killed in Action
LF	Local Force
LOH	Light Observation Helicopter
LP	Listening Post
LRP (formerly LRRP)	Long Range Patrol
LLOC	Land Line of Communication
LZ	Landing Zone
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MF	Main Force
MI	Military Intelligence
MIA	Missing in Action
MSF	Mobile Strike Force
MSR	Main Supply Route
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NCS	Net Control Station
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVAC	North Vietnamese Army Captive
OB	Order of Battle
OP	Observation Post
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
PF	Popular Force
PKSAC	Pleiku Sub-Area Command
POLWAR	Political Warfare (ARVN)
POW, PW	Prisoner of War
PP	Preplanned
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RATT	Radio Teletype
RCA	Riot Control Agent

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RD	Revolutionary Development
Red Ball	Emergency Requisition for Part to Remove Major Item from Deadline
RF	Regional Force
RIF	Reconnaissance in Force
RL	Rocket Launcher
RRC	Radio Research Company
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
SA	Small Arms
Slick	UH-1 Helicopter Used Primarily for Air Lift
SLAR	Side Looking Airborne Radar
Snatch	Sudden Apprehension of Suspect Person
SP	Self Propelled
Spooky	Air Force Minigun Armed AC-47 Flaeship
SRP	Short Range Patrol
SSB	Single Side Band (Radio Transmission Mode)
STZ	Special Tactical Zone
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TACR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOT	Time on Target
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
USSF	United States Special Forces
VC	Viet Cong
VCC	Viet Cong Captive
VETCAP	Veterinary Civic Action Program
VMO	Viet Montagnard Cong
VMCC	Viet Montagnard Cong Captive
VR	Visual Reconnaissance
VT	Variable Time
VTR	Vehicle, Tank Recovery
WIA	Wounded in Action
WP	White Phosphorous

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

OPERATION BINH TAY - MACARTHUR

1 November. At 1528H, 1st Brigade LRP 1H, operating near YB815194, received a heavy volume of small arms fire from an enemy force of unknown size. Gunships expended in the area and the LRP was extracted. Results were 2 US WIA and enemy casualties unknown.

2 November. Shortly before 0655H, near ZA056224, a tiger attacked and killed one member of a SRP from Company A, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry. The victim had been on watch while the other members of his team slept.

At 0855H, Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed 10 NVA near ZA021094, and received a heavy volume of ground fire. One LOH crewman was killed. Gunships expended in the area and Company D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted a sweep. Results included 10 NVA KIA, two small arms, 29 packs, 660 lbs of rice, five 82mm mortar rounds, 11 antitank mines and 16 grenades CIA.

At 1235H, a LOH belonging to Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received intense small arms fire from the vicinity of YB818292. Results were 2 US WIA.

At 1340H, a patrol from Company D, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry exchanged small arms fire with five NVA near YB826285. The patrol killed one NVA as he fled from a bunker. Two platoons of D/3-12 attempted to sweep the area but came under heavy fire from automatic weapons. The platoons withdrew and artillery bombarded the area with unknown results. US losses were 2 KIA and 8 WIA.

Between 1655H and 1900H, NVA mortar crews bombarded Fire Support Base 29, YB839223, held by Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, with 135 rounds of 120mm mortar. Results were four US WIA, one mortar pit, two POL blivets and two water trailers destroyed. Artillery and tactical air hit suspected enemy mortar positions with unknown results.

3 November. At 1212H, Company D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry exchanged small arms fire with an enemy force in bunkers near ZA018100. Artillery supported Company D. Results were one NVA KIA, one AK47 CIA, two US KIA and two US WIA.

At 1347H, Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry exchanged small arms fire with an enemy force at YB827284. One US soldier was wounded. Gunships of Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry expended in the area with unknown results. At 1530H, C/3-12 swept a bunker complex in the same vicinity, finding three dead NVA. During the sweep, two additional US personnel were wounded.

At 1620H, Company B, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry exchanged fire with an enemy force of unknown size. Results were one US WIA, enemy casualties unknown.

At 2320H, the 2d Brigade Civic Action Team, riding in a $\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck at AR840377, received small arms fire. The jeep was wrecked and two members of the team wounded.

4 November. At 0921H, Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found one decomposed NVA body near YU864787. At 1410H, while moving to its night location,

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a SRP from Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry encountered an enemy force of unknown size near YA801162. In the exchange of small arms fire three US personnel were wounded; one M16 and one pack were lost. With artillery support, the SRP broke contact at 1420H.

Between 1628 and 2100H, Fire Support Base 29 (YB838221) received in excess of 100 rounds of mixed artillery, 75mm recoilless rifle, and 82mm mortar. Eighty-eight rounds impacted inside the perimeter, wounding six US personnel. Artillery and tactical air hit suspected enemy locations with unknown results.

5 November. At 1540H, Company D 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found two NVA bodies near YU812765.

6 November. At 1145H, 3d Brigade LRP 3D, operating near YA914183, observed five to ten individuals wearing green fatigues. A FAC and Headhunter directed airstrikes and artillery into the area. At 1415H, after receiving small arms fire the LRP was extracted. During the extraction, a door gunner observed and killed one NVA. A Headhunter observed one NVA killed by air.

At 1415H, Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found one decomposed NVA body near YU803756.

7 November. At 1305H, a patrol from Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, determined it was being followed, set up an ambush near YB801207, observed and engaged five NVA. In the exchange of fire one US soldier was killed. Enemy casualties are unknown.

At 1515H, a 2½ ton truck belonging to Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit an anti-tank mine located near ZA067309. One US soldier was wounded.

8 November. At 0825H, an APC belonging to Company B, 2d Battalion (Mechanized) 8th Infantry hit a mine. Five US personnel were wounded.

Base Camp Units conducted Operation CLEANSWEEP IV in the Division TAOR. At 1235H, near ZA164253, two members of the 4th Engineer Battalion were injured when they stepped on punji stakes.

At 1900H, LRP 4C, operating near YA983038, reported enemy apparently attempting to surround them. Gunships responded and the LRP was extracted. Results were two US WIA.

9 November. No significant contacts.

10 November. Standoff attacks on Fire Support Base 29, YB839223, held by Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, resulted in four US WIA. One attack, at 1115H, consisted of nine 82mm mortar rounds; the other, at 1307H, consisted of thirteen 75mm recoilless rifle rounds.

At 1720H, while moving to its night location, a SRP from Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with approximately ten NVA near YA809173. The enemy broke contact at 1724H, leaving one US KIA and two US WIA.

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11 November. At 0700H, near YA780223, a SRP from Company D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was ambushed by approximately 10 NVA using automatic weapons and claymores. Three US soldiers were killed and one escaped unharmed.

Between 0945 and 1825H, Fire Support Base 29 received approximately 125 rounds of mixed 75mm recoilless rifle, 82mm mortar and possibly 100mm artillery. Fighter-bombers, gunships (Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry) and artillery engaged suspected enemy positions with unknown results. US losses were two WIA, one 106mm recoilless rifle destroyed, and unknown amounts of artillery, mortar and small arms ammunition destroyed.

At 1200H, a SRP from Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, operating near YU858801, found one decomposed NVA body, a notebook, a medical kit and some pictures.

At 2330H, an unknown number of sappers attacked LZ OASIS, ZA114275. The enemy employed 30 to 40 hand grenades, satchel charges, B40 and B41 rockets. Third Brigade employed small arms, automatic weapons, tanks, artillery and Spooky against the sappers. Results were nine NVA KIA, 10 US WIA, a $\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck destroyed, a $\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck damaged, three enemy small arms and miscellaneous grenades and explosives CIA.

12 November. At 1500H an armored personnel carrier belonging to Company A, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry struck a mine buried in the road near ZA085246. Three US troops were wounded and the APC damaged. When a tank from Company A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor pulled alongside, it also hit a mine, sustaining damage to its suspension system.

13 November. From 0040 to 0235H, Fire Support Base VERA, YA834178, held by Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, received approximately 40 rounds of 60mm mortar and a ground probe from an NVA force of unknown size employing small arms and hand grenades. Results were six NVA KIA, four AK47's and one B-40 rocket launcher CIA. From 0710H to 1645H, FSB VERA received in excess of 200 rounds of 82mm mortar and four 122mm rockets. US losses were five KIA, 38 WIA, one truck destroyed and one truck damaged.

Between 0726 and 1837H, Fire Support Base JEAN, YA808233, held by Companies C and D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, received an intense attack by fire. The enemy employed 75mm recoilless rifles, 82mm mortar and twenty-four 122mm rockets. Gunships, tactical air and artillery fired on enemy mortar and troop positions with unknown results. US losses were one killed and three wounded.

At 1515H, a helicopter belonging to Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received ground fire. The door gunner observed and killed one NVA.

14 November. Between 1547 and 1805H, Fire Support Base VERA, YA834178, received fire from 75mm recoilless rifles, 82mm mortars, 122mm rockets, and 105mm Chicom howitzers. Total incoming was approximately 60 rounds. Tactical air and artillery hit suspected enemy locations with unknown results.

15 November. At 0817H, near BQ004363, two members of Troop B, 1st Squadron,

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10th Cavalry were wounded when a B-40 rocket hit the APC on which they were riding. Gunships expended on suspected enemy positions with unknown results.

At 0905H, Hawkeye 4D, operating near YA746922, observed two NVA and engaged them with grenades and small arms. One US soldier was wounded.

At 1130H, an armored personnel carrier belonging to Company B, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry hit an antitank mine buried in the road at ZA200220. Six US troops were wounded and the APC was damaged.

At 1712H, near YA736051, automatic weapons opened fire on a helicopter as it was extracting IRLP 4E from an LZ. One of the IRLP members was wounded. Gunships and fighter-bombers expended in the area with unknown results.

16 November. At 2300H, a five-ton POL truck belonging to 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine buried in Highway 19W near YA890263. Two US troops were wounded.

17 November. At 1616H, helicopters of Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, flying near YA789105, received heavy fire from automatic weapons. One Cobra crewman was wounded. Air strikes and artillery directed into the area produced a secondary explosion with a column of black smoke 500 to 600 feet high.

18 November. No significant contacts.

19 November. At 0800, a grenade exploded near IRLP 3C's position, ZA029132. One IRLP member was wounded. The IRLP observed four individuals 15 meters away and took them under fire. Gunships expended in the area with unknown results.

At 0850H, IRLP HLB observed approximately a platoon of NVA near YA742943. When two NVA point men approached within 50 meters, the team opened fire, killing the two NVA. Two team members were slightly wounded by enemy fire. Gunships expended in the area and the IRLP was extracted.

20 November. At 1730H, a tank belonging to Troop C, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and a 3/4 ton truck belonging to the 299th Engineer Battalion both hit antitank mines near ZA032927. Both vehicles were damaged and two US troops were wounded.

At 2145H, near YA793447, a sniper fired one shot at an element of Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, wounding one US soldier.

21 November. At 1400H, a SRP from Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, operating near ZA014271, pursued and captured an individual who had detected their positions. The man, though armed, had dropped his weapon and attempted to flee.

At 1400H, an M548 resupply vehicle belonging to the 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry hit an antitank mine buried at ZA 067201. Three US troops were wounded and the vehicle was damaged moderately.

22 November. At 0910H, near YU861786, Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry

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found an NVA bunker complex containing miscellaneous small arms ammunition, equipment and the remains of three NVA.

At 0950H, an armored personnel carrier belonging to Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a metallic mine buried in Highway 512 near YB909271. The explosion split the APC's hull and wounded one US soldier.

Between 1720 and 1830H, Fire Support Base VERA, YA833178, received approximately 25 rounds suspected to be 100mm artillery, and 16 rounds of 82mm mortar. Nine US personnel were wounded. Artillery fired on suspected enemy locations with unknown results.

Between 1800 and 1855H, Fire Support Base JEAN, YA808233, received 15 to 20 rounds of 82mm mortar and 10 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle. One US soldier was wounded. Artillery fired on suspected enemy locations with unknown results.

23 November. At 1548H, near YA962388, an APC from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry struck an antitank mine. Results were two US WIA, one track blown off and the vehicle's hull damaged.

At 1755H, a SRP from Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, operating near YU824761, shot and killed two NVA who had approached their position. The SRP moved immediately to a new location and continued its mission.

24 November. At 1043H, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, operating near YA783205, exchanged small arms fire with four or five enemy. One US soldier was wounded. A sweep of the area produced no results.

25 November. At 1855H, IRP 2E, operating near YA868889, reported movement of an enemy force of unknown size. A Headhunter adjusted artillery into the area, producing six NVA KIA. Spooky arrived in the area at 1950H and expended with unknown results.

26 November. At 0100H, four B-40 rounds impacted in the vicinity of the 3d Platoon, Company C, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry, ZA166399. Two rounds hit an APC, causing heavy damage and wounding five US personnel. The platoon returned fire with caliber .50 and M60 machineguns, then swept the area with negative findings.

27 November. At 1345H, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, operating near ZA022234, flushed three VMC from the brush and took them under fire, killing one.

28 November. No significant contacts.

29 November. At 1643H, near YU818772, a Bushmaster ambush from Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry fired on an estimated reinforced squad of NVA, killing one. The enemy broke contact immediately and fled. The Bushmaster recovered one AK-47, two grenades and miscellaneous field equipment, then continued on its mission.

At 1712H, a platoon of Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, operating near

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ZA043221, came under automatic weapons fire. One US soldier was killed. The platoon returned fire and swept the area, capturing ten packs but finding no enemy.

30 November. At 1755H, a squad size Bushmaster ambush, posted by Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry at YU835790, made contact with an estimated company of NVA. Mortars and artillery supported the Bushmaster. Contact broke at 1835H, with seven NVA KIA, two US KIA and two US WIA.

1 December. At 0820H, a squad of 3d Platoon, Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, patrolling near YU827769, exchanged small arms fire with an enemy force of unknown size. Contact broke immediately. Results were one US KIA, enemy casualties unknown. Artillery and 4.2 inch mortars (employing CS munitions) fired in support of the US squad.

At 1035H, a tank from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit an antitank mine buried near ZA043432. The explosion blew off four road wheels and wounded one US soldier.

At 1100H, an armored personnel carrier belonging to Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine buried in the side of the road at BRO07508. Eight US and eight ARVN personnel were wounded. The APC's track and hull were damaged.

At 1145H, LRP 2G, operating near YB738054, made contact with three NVA armed with AK-47's. The LRP killed two NVA, then evaded to the south and called in artillery on the contact area.

At 1545H, a 3/4 ton truck from Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, traveling alone on Highway 19W, was hit by a B-40 rocket and fire from automatic weapons. Two US troops were wounded and the vehicle sustained moderate damage.

2 December. At 1420H, as tanks of Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor were conducting a sweep near ZA05372, a booby trap grenade fell from a tree and exploded on top of a tank, wounding the tank commander. At 1755H, near ZA003369, the explosion of a B-40 rocket wounded another man from B/1-69. The company then came under small arms fire. Contact continued until 1845H, with B/1-69 employing 90mm main guns as well as tank machineguns. At 2000H, with Spooky on station employing flares, A and B/1-69 swept the area with negative findings.

3 December. At 0830H, Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, while conducting a sweep near YB966178, found 10 foxholes, fresh drag marks, and the remains of one NVA.

4 December. At 1215H, near ZB152135, a 1/2 ton truck from Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade hit a mine buried under the blacktop surface of Highway 14. One US soldier was killed and three were wounded. The vehicle was destroyed.

At 1723H, near YU831717, a Bushmaster patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found a bunker complex and one NVA killed two or three months previously.

5 December. At 1340H, Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found three badly decomposed NVA bodies near YU815770.

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At 1345H, Company B, 2-35 found one dead NVA, apparently a victim of the Bushmaster ambush on 30 November.

6 December. No significant contacts.

7 December. No significant contacts.

8 December. At 2345H, explosions and fire partially destroyed a JP 4 refueling point at 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Headquarters, BRO37534. One 3000 gallon fuel blivet, one 2000 gallon fuel blivet, fifteen 500 gallon blivets and all connecting hoses were destroyed.

9 December. At 1430H, Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed numerous foxholes and about 20 bunkers. The Scout Section of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor swept the area, destroyed the positions and found graves containing two VC KIA.

10 December. At 1304H, the 1st and 2d Platoons, Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, operating near AR923741, exchanged small arms fire with three or four enemy. One US soldier was wounded. At 1320H, the Platoons again made contact, wounding and capturing one NVA who died before he could be evacuated. At 1350H, near AR929728, the same two platoons made contact with an enemy force of unknown size. Gunships expended in the area. A sweep revealed nine NVA KIA. At 1610H, as A/1-22 was closing to a pickup zone, three NVA fired on the company and fled, leaving one US KIA.

11 December. At 0920H, Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, patrolling near AS783172, found 26 booby traps made of bamboo devices of burlap cord and aimed to strike passersby low in the leg. One booby trap injured a US soldier. The other traps were disarmed without incident.

At 1403H, Company A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, and the Scout Section, 1-69, received B-40 rocket fire from the vicinity of YA962367 and small arms fire from the village of PLEI YA PON (YA956367). An APC, hit by a B-40, sustained moderate damage and one US soldier was slightly wounded. The armor returned fire, then cordoned the village. A search revealed five villagers slightly wounded and one VMC KIA.

At 1550H, near AR929728, Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found a fresh grave containing one NVA KIA, apparently killed earlier in the day when gunships of Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry expended in the area.


12 December. No significant contacts.

13 December. No significant contacts.

14 December. At 2130H, near AR805435, four members of Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry were wounded when four unidentified missiles, possibly rifle or hand grenades, exploded near the vehicle that they were securing. The cavalrymen fired on suspected enemy locations with unknown effect.

15 December. At 1915H, LRP 1A, operating near YB977105, received a burst

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of AK-47 fire. One team member was wounded. The LRP evaded but lost communications. At 2400H, the wounded man died. The LRP left his body behind and continued to evade.

16 December. At 0750H, a Headhunter aircraft reestablished communication with LRP 1A. Shortly thereafter, the LRP was extracted. A volunteer LRP team and tracker team recovered the dead team member and were extracted at 1A55H.

At 1218H, LRP 3C observed three NVA and several MONTAGNARD women and children. The NVA were wearing khakis and pith helmets and carrying assorted weapons. The team fired on the NVA, killing two and capturing one M-1 carbine. At 1356H, the team was extracted.

At 1825H, Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, in a night lager at ZA 006353, received small arms fire and rifle grenades. The company returned fire and swept the area with negative findings. Results were one US and one CSF interpreter WIA.

17 December. At 1600H, LRP 4C exchanged small arms fire with two VC near YB959172, killing one VC. The team then moved to YB966169 and linked up with the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry.

18 December. At 1625H, LRP 1B, operating near YB845205, employed a claymore against three NVA who had spotted the team's position. Two of the NVA were killed. The LRP evaded and was extracted at 1705H.

19 December. No significant contacts.

20 December. At 0855H, Base Camp Patrol 31, from DISCOM, exchanged small arms fire with approximately 20 enemy near ZA167423. One US soldier was wounded. After gunships expended, the patrol swept the area with negative findings.

At 1100H, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found several natural caves and a cooking area near BR178294. A sweep of the area disclosed caches of ammunition, weapons and rice. During the sweep the company came under small arms fire from an estimated 20 to 25 NVA. One US soldier was killed and three were wounded. The Company returned fire, then withdrew while gunships, 81mm mortars and an airstrike hit the area. The company returned, swept the area, and determined that the enemy had fled. Captured enemy caches contained one AK-47, six SKS, 72 rounds of 82mm mortar, 102 rounds B-40, 29 rounds 75mm recoilless rifle, 155 small Chicom grenades, 40 sticks of Chicom TNT, 7 reels of commo wire and 50 bushels of rice.

21 December. At 1030H, near BR178292, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found a cooking and sleeping area consisting of 35 huts and several bunkers with overhead cover. In the same area they found one complete 82mm mortar and a wounded NVA. The Company destroyed the huts and bunkers and evacuated the prisoner and mortar.

At 2325H, an OP of Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, located at ZB137064, observed four men armed with AK-47's approach to within 10 meters. The OP engaged the intruders with small arms. The enemy returned fire and fled. One US soldier was wounded.

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22 December. At 0840H, a mine sweep team from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry made contact with four to eight individuals, possibly an NVA sapper team, who employed small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rockets. Gunships supported the mine sweep team, killing one NVA.

At 1420H, near BQ014352, an armored personnel carrier of Troop C, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, providing convoy security from PLEIKU to BAN ME THUOT, received one round of B-40 rocket fire resulting in moderate damage to the APC and two US KIA. The convoy returned fire and gunships expended in the area with unknown results.

23 December. At 0235H, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, located at ZA029933, received eight to ten rounds of 60mm mortar fire. Two US troops were wounded. Artillery fired on suspected enemy locations with unknown effect.

At 1525H, an element of Company A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor observed one individual fleeing from a village. Though ordered to halt, the man continued to run. The Scout Platoon shot him dead.

24 December. No significant contacts.

25 December. At 1135H, LRP 32, Company E, 20th Infantry (LRP), had heavy movement around their position. They exchanged small arms fire with approximately eight NVA at a distance of five to ten meters, then evaded and requested assistance. At 1345H, a reaction force composed of the 2d Platoon, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was inserted. Meanwhile, LRP 32 exchanged small arms fire with a second group of enemy, wounding and capturing one NVA. The reaction platoon linked up with LRP 32 at 1400H, and swept the area with no further contact or sightings. The wounded NVA was evacuated but died en route.

At 1400H, two men of the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, clearing a landing zone near BR158275, were wounded when a booby trapped grenade exploded.

26 December. No significant contacts.

27 December. At 0047H, a Base Camp Patrol, from DISCOM, operating near ZA192414, heard movement all around their location. Shortly thereafter, the patrol came under fire from small arms and 60mm mortars. The patrol returned fire and received support from gunships and a flareship. At 0110H, contact broke. Results were one US KIA and one US WIA. At dawn the patrol swept the area and found a fresh blood trail. A tracker team followed the trail to within 150 meters of PLEI POO XOI, ZA188404. A cordon and search of the village, conducted by a reaction force and a team from the 4th MI Detachment, produced no results.

Between 1000 and 1500H, Companies B, C and D and the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, and the National Police cordoned and searched the New Life Hamlet of QUANG NHIEU, AQ835175. Results were 24 HOI CHANHS (all on the Black List) and 59 detainees (37 on the Black List) evacuated to BAN ME THUOT.

At 1030H, ships of Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, conducting reconnaissance

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near BR250318, received ground-to-air fire. One LOH took two hits; the occupants were uninjured. Gunships expended in the area and, at 1040H, the Aero Rifle Platoon was inserted. The Platoon swept the area, detaining 30 suspects, including two who were wounded. During the sweep, the platoon engaged two VC in a bunker, killing them both. Other results were 700 pounds of rice destroyed and miscellaneous military equipment captured.

At 1345H, LRP 1G, operating near YB843182, watched an NVA approach their position, then killed him in an exchange of small arms fire. The LRP evaded, then requested assistance. The Aero Rifle Platoon of Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry were inserted. They swept the area with negative findings.

At 1620H, LRP 2D, operating near BR003933, reported movement near their location and requested air support. Fighter aircraft, Headhunters and gunships all received ground-to-air fire from the area, but took no hits. Three airstrikes and three sets of gunships hit suspected enemy locations. During the strikes four members of the LRP were wounded, apparently when a rocket fell short of its target. The Aero Rifle Platoon of Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was inserted to evacuate the LRP. At 2205H, extraction was complete.

28 December. At 0300H, a Division Base Camp Civic Action team in the village of PLEI GAO, ZA236376, received a ground probe from an enemy force of unknown size employing small arms and B-40 rockets. Four members of the CA team were wounded. Artillery and gunships responded; the contact broke at 0435H. A reaction force from Camp Enari swept the area and found one NVA KIA and an RPG-2 rocket launcher.

29 December. At 1045H, a SRP from Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, in position at AR954688, observed two VC closing on the SRP's location. The team opened fire, killing both VC and capturing their SKS rifles.

At 1120H, LRP 4I, Company E, 20th Infantry (LRP), operating near BR033202, observed from nine to twelve individuals with AK-47's moving toward their position. The LRP opened fire at a distance of five meters. Gunships arrived on station and expended with unknown results. At 1155H, the enemy broke contact and fled. The 1st Platoon, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry swept the area with negative findings. Results were one NVA KIA and three US (LRP) WIA.

At 1520H, LRP 1A, located at YA889212, engaged and killed one NVA. The team evaded, but continued to hear movement and smell strong body odors. Artillery fired on suspected enemy positions with unknown results. At 1645H, the LRP was extracted.

At 1610H, LRP 43, located at BR091181, exchanged fire with three NVA, killing one. Gunships expended in the area, accidentally wounding two team members. The LRP was extracted at 1700H.

30 December. No significant contacts.

31 December. No significant contacts.

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1 January. At 0115H, an element of Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, in position near AQ878212, ambushed an estimated seven individuals. The ambush employed claymores, M-60 machineguns, M-79 grenade launchers and M-16's. They then remained in position after movement ceased. At 0345H, the patrol detected movement and again executed its ambush. A sweep at dawn revealed four VC KIA, three AK-47's, one M2 carbine, six packs and two sets of US dog tags. A tracker team followed a blood trail out of the area, and at 1210H, near AQ880211, captured one lightly-wounded suspect.

At 1145H, an element of Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, patrolling near BR174389, observed four individuals to their rear and engaged them with small arms fire. Gunships of Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry provided support. Contact broke at 1210H, when the enemy fled. Results were one NVA KIA, two US WIA (slight), one AK-47 and one Soviet RPD light machinegun CIA.

At 1145H, a member of the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry disappeared while making a tactical stream crossing. A search of the area, YA728500, was unsuccessful in locating him.

2 January. At 1020H, Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry conducting a sweep near BR158278, exchanged small arms fire with three individuals. Results were one US WIA (slight), two NVA KIA, one AK-47 and one M1 carbine CIA. At 1115H, a stay-behind force from the 1st Platoon C/3-8, located at BR158300, exchanged small arms fire with four individuals, killing one NVA and capturing one AK-47.

3 January. No significant contacts.

4 January. At 1030H, Headhunter aircraft observed three individuals on the PLEI TRAP Road near YB735058. Artillery fired into the area, killing two NVA.

At 1100H, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, operating near YB948176, made contact with ten to fifteen individuals employing small arms, automatic weapons, and a white phosphorus grenade. The platoon returned fire and received artillery support. Contact broke at 1125H, leaving one US soldier dead and four wounded. Enemy casualties could not be determined. The 3d Platoon, B/1-22, conducted a combat assault to reinforce the Reconnaissance Platoon. Gunships and airstrikes hit suspected enemy locations. A tracker team attempted to follow blood trails, but without success.

At 1545H, near ZA032228, Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry opened 18 graves reported earlier by the 2d Battalion, 42d ARVN Infantry. They found 18 NVA bodies, apparently killed by artillery one to two months previously, and miscellaneous ammunition and field gear.

5 January. At 0800H, a SRP from Company C, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry came under fire from approximately 12 individuals. The SRP returned fire with small arms and a claymore. The team then broke contact and evaded. Results were one US WIA and enemy casualties unknown.

At 0915H, LRP H1C, operating near YB988312, shot and killed two individuals armed with AK-47's who had approached within 175 meters of their location. The LRP evaded and continued its mission.

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At 1600H, Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, operating near BR037193, fired on eight to ten individuals at a range of 300 meters. The enemy returned fire. Company A, 3-12 position itself as a blocking force. Gunships and artillery fired on suspected enemy locations. Contact broke at 1715H, leaving one US WIA and enemy casualties unknown. At 1638H, Company C, 3-12, located at BR022195, encountered another enemy force at a range of 50 meters. Results of this fire fight were one VC KIA and one SKS CIA. In addition, the company detained five MONTAGNARDS (two men, two women and a child) and evacuated them for questioning.

6 January. At 0855H, Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body lying in a crater near ZB232099.

At 1050H, a LOH of the 4th Aviation Battalion received small arms fire as it was departing LZ PUMA (ZA095232). The LOH took four hits, resulting in one US WIA. The LOH landed safely at LZ OASIS.

At 1800H, LRP P44, operating at AR782136, an area they believed to be an enemy base camp, made contact with an enemy force of unknown size. They killed two NVA and captured one. Gunships of the 4th Aviation Battalion were on station at 1825H. The 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry combat assaulted into the area to reinforce the LRP. At 2040H, the Platoon, the LRP and the prisoner were extracted. After the extraction, Spooky expended in the area.

At 2056H, a patrol of the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, located at ZB173074, fired on two individuals at a range of five meters. At 2140H, they heard movement in the same direction and employed a claymore. The next day the Reconnaissance Platoon and Company A, 1-8, swept the area and found two dead NVA and two AK-47's.

7 January. At 0655H, during a cordon and search of PLEI BROCH, ZA078477, men of the 3d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed five to ten individuals with weapons enter the village. The Platoon fired on the enemy who fled. Results were one NVA KIA, two NVA WIA/CIA, one M2 carbine, one 7.62mm pistol and miscellaneous NVA and US equipment CIA.

At 1140H, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, operating near BR165315, received small arms fire from an estimated 10 to 12 enemy at a range of 300 meters. The company returned fire and adjusted artillery against the enemy position. Contact broke at 1210H, with three US troops wounded. The Company swept the area with no findings.

At 1407H, the Aero Rifle Platoon, Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry, inserted near AR785137, found five dead NVA, believed killed 6 January during LRP P44's contact, and 15 packs, a bunker complex, an AK-47, a helmet and some documents.

At 1530H, at ZB229099, Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found one dead NVA, apparently killed by napalm, one AK-47, miscellaneous clothing and field gear, and some documents.

Also at 1530H, near BR098160, LRP 26 adjusted artillery against approximately 10 individuals 500 meters from their position. Results were three VC KIA and two possible secondary explosions.

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At 1830H, a listening post of Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, located at ZB231096, received fire from an unknown direction, resulting in two US WIA. Artillery fired into the area with unknown results.

At 2215H, while moving to establish a cordon of a village, the 3d Platoon, Company C, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry detected movement and set up a hasty ambush near ZA155726. At 2235H, the Platoon came under small arms fire from a range of 200 meters. Two US soldiers were wounded. The platoon returned fire with unknown results.

8 January. At 1225H, Company C, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), operating near ZA135720, came under fire from an M-79 grenade launcher. Seven rounds impacted in the area, wounding one US soldier slightly. The Company returned fire and swept the area, but found no sign of the enemy.

At 1235H, the Aero Rifle Platoon, Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, inserted near AS815065, made contact with six to eight NVA. Gunships and artillery supported the ARP and the enemy fled, leaving behind two NVA KIA and five pounds of documents. There were no friendly casualties.

9 January. At 0910H, LRP 3A and the 2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, sweeping an area where LRP 3A had had contact on 8 January (YA854650), received small arms fire from approximately 10 enemy. The US troops returned fire and gunships expended. Contact broke at 0915. Results were two US KIA and three US WIA.

At 0955H, LRP 11, operating near AR929143, observed approximately 10 NVA and engaged them with small arms. The team evaded to high ground. At 1140H, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was inserted and swept the area, finding one NVA KIA, one SKS, one rucksack containing documents, and one wounded NVA whom they took prisoner. The platoon also found and destroyed a ton of rice. At 1650H, LRP 11 and the reaction force were extracted.

10 January. At 0930H, as Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was conducting a combat assault into an LZ at YA935585, a man stepped on a cluster bomb unit (CBU) planted in the LZ as a booby trap. He and another man were wounded. An explosive ordnance disposal team swept the LZ and found five more CBUs emplaced as mines.

At 1915H, the perimeter of 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, YA934578, held by Companies B and D, came under 75mm recoilless rifle fire followed by a ground probe. Contact broke at 1940H. One US soldier was wounded.

At 1400H, LRP 32, operating near BRO21113, exchanged small arms fire with three or four individuals 25 meters from their position. They killed one VC, then evaded. Gunships expended in the area and at 1518H, the team was extracted.

11 January. At 1055H, elements of Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, operating near AS832064, shot and killed one VMC, then recovered one SKS, a stethoscope, a syringe and personal letters from the body.

At 1315H, a 5 ton truck of Headquarters Company, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, while spraying diesel fuel in the cleared strip of Highway 19E, BRO29510, hit a mine

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believed to have been a 155mm artillery round. The truck was destroyed and one US soldier was wounded.

At 2032H, Hawkeye 1C, operating near YB859139, heard movement 200 meters and then 75 meters from their location. The team adjusted artillery on the suspected enemy position. At 2110H, the team again heard movement around their position, and at 2114H, two grenades exploded near their position and two bursts of small arms fire raked the area. One team member was wounded. The LRP evaded and gunships expended in the area. At 2327H, the LRP was extracted.

12 January. At 1010, elements of Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, conducting a sweep near AS782059, fired on two NVA, killing one and capturing one AK-47, one SKS and a rucksack containing documents.

At 1015H, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found one NVA body hidden under brush at YB949167. They estimated that the NVA had been killed in Recon 1-22's contact of 4 January.

Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and elements of the National Police conducted a cordon and search of PLEI TO BUR TIH, ZA117829. At 1315H, 15 villagers became HOI CHANHS. One of them claimed to be a VC squad leader. In addition, the National Police detained four suspects.

At 0955H, elements of Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry conducting aerial reconnaissance near YA843647, observed approximately a company of enemy moving northwestward. Gunships expended in the area and received heavy ground-to-air fire but took no hits. Fighter-bombers struck the area with unknown results. At 1220H, the Aero Rifle Platoon of Troop C was inserted, followed at 1245H by the 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and at 1417H by the 3d Platoon, Company C, 1-35. These forces swept the area, received sporadic fire from automatic weapons, and found one NVA KIA. Between 1710H and 1834H all elements were extracted.

At 1555H, the point element of Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, patrolling near AS843096, exchanged small arms fire with two individuals. One US soldier was wounded. At 1610H, the company exchanged fire with three more individuals. Gunships expended on suspected enemy locations. The enemy broke contact and fled. Enemy casualties could not be determined.

13 January. Between 0105 and 0519H, radar of 2d Battalion, 9th Field Artillery at LZ Charmaine detected 16 unidentified flying objects.

At 0825H, Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, conducting a sweep at YA963422, received small arms fire. The tanks returned fire and artillery fired on suspected enemy locations. A sweep of the area revealed one VC KIA and one SKS CIA.

At 1155H, Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, operating near BR155280, observed seven NVA wearing green uniforms. In the ensuing exchange of fire one US soldier was wounded. Apparently there were no enemy casualties.

At 1400H, Company B, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry, operating near

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AR948687, exchanged semiautomatic fire with six to nine individuals. Gunships expended on the enemy location. Results were one NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA.

14 January. At 1130H, a V-100 command car, escorting a convoy to DAK TO, hit a mine on the north side of the road at ZB153135. One US soldier was killed and one wounded. The vehicle sustained moderate damage.

15 January. At 0140H, a Civil Affairs team in the village of PLEI PHAN KLAH (AR892293) received small arms and mortar fire from an estimated platoon size force. The team returned fire and the enemy fled. Spooky expended on the routes of withdrawal. A sweep produced one VC KIA and one AK-47 CIA.

At 0300H, a Shadow aircraft observed a Russian Yak-24 medium transportation helicopter. It was flying at an altitude of 300 feet at grid YA6654. Upon being sighted, the aircraft dropped to treetop level and disappeared.

At 1150H, Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed 15 individuals in black pajamas near BR195225. Gunships expended and the ARP of Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was inserted. They found 9 VC KIA.

At 1225H, a platoon from Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed several individuals moving on a trail at YA939596. The platoon set up an ambush and killed two VC.

At 1624H, a Cobra gunship of Troop C, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received ground-to-air fire, crashed and burned. The ARP of Troop C was inserted to secure the downed Cobra. At 1800H, the ARP made contact with a force of unknown size. Three platoons of Troop D were inserted and fighting continued. Spooky and artillery hit suspected enemy locations during the night.

16 January. At 0950H, three platoons from the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry combat assaulted into the area of contact to reinforce C/7-17. A sweep after contact broke revealed hasty fortifications and pools of blood. Friendly casualties were five KIA and 21 WIA. Known enemy losses were six NVA KIA.

At 1158H, an APC from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine buried on the side of the road at ZAL48472. The explosion blew a road wheel off the APC and wounded one US soldier.

17 January. At 1215H, Company A, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry, operating near AR 48705, exchanged small arms fire with 7 to 8 individuals. Airstrikes hit suspected enemy positions. Results were two US WIA and enemy casualties unknown.

18 January. At 0213H, elements of Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, located at AS835118, observed two individuals west of their perimeter who employed grenades and B-41 fire. Perimeter guards returned the fire. The individual carrying the RPG7 was hit. A round in his launcher exploded, killing him and the other VC. Friendly casualties were one US KIA and seven WIA.

At 1000H, near YA999219, a B-40 rocket hit a tank of the 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, wounding four US soldiers. The tankers returned

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fire, but the enemy escaped, leaving no casualties.

At 1150H, a SRP from Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, operating near AQ882363, fired on an individual carrying an SKS rifle. They wounded the man and took him prisoner.

At 1130H, Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, located at YA959607, received fire from the northwest of their position. The company returned fire and the enemy fled. Results were 2 US WIA and enemy casualties unknown. At 1250H, a platoon from Company B, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry while on convoy escort, received small arms fire and one B-40 rocket. The platoon returned fire and the enemy fled in an unknown direction. Friendly casualties were one US KIA and two US WIA. Enemy casualties are unknown.

19 January. The 2d Battalion, 9th Field Artillery radar at LZ Charmaine sighted numerous unidentified flying objects. A circling UFO was seen at grids ZA100271 to ZA079222 to ZA009231. A blinking red light could be seen, but no engine noises were heard. At 0500H, a UFO landed at YA975267. Artillery was employed. At 0615H the UFO took off and then landed at YA964276. Artillery was employed again. A sweep of the area produced nothing.

At 1000H, near YA934692, Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry exchanged fire with a force of unknown size. Gunships expended on enemy positions. Contact broke, was reestablished and then broke again as the enemy fled to the northwest. One US soldier was wounded.

At 1010H, the 2d Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry made a contact with an estimated five to ten individuals at ZA140167. Contact broke immediately. Results were one US KIA, three US WIA and enemy casualties unknown.

At 1650H, a tank from Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor hit a booby trap hanging from a tree at YA 3368. Three US soldiers and two CSF were wounded.

20 January. At 0945H, LRP 36, operating near AS835118, observed two individuals wearing green fatigues, camouflaged hats and carrying weapons. The team detonated a claymore mine, killing one NVA. The team retrieved his AK-47. Gunships expended on suspected enemy locations to the south of the contact area. At 1300H, a platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry reinforced the LRP and made contact with 10 NVA. Small arms fire was exchanged, artillery and gunships hit the area, and the enemy fled with unknown casualties.

21 January. At 1045H, a platoon from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry made contact with a VC squad near YA810505. A B-40 round detonated on the antenna of an APC, wounding six US soldiers. The enemy evaded with no known casualties.

Also at 1045H, Company D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, operating near YA939685, made contact with an enemy force of unknown size. Gunships expended on enemy positions. At 1140H, the enemy employed 60mm mortars. Sporadic small arms fire continued all afternoon. Results of the action were two US KIA, 14 US WIA and one NVA KIA.

22 January. At 0750H, near YA947678, Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry,

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while enroute to link up with Company D, 1-35, came under small arms and mortar fire from an enemy force of unknown size. Gunships and artillery supported the US troops. Company A linked up with Company D at 1025H. From 1040 to 1210H, the units received B-40 and mortar fire from the west southwest. Gunships and artillery attacked suspected enemy locations. Throughout the afternoon, as the units tried to cut out a LZ, sporadic enemy fire continued. Friendly casualties were one KIA, and one WIA. Enemy casualties could not be determined.

At 1437H, elements of Company A, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, operating near YA900715, observed and killed one NVA.

23 January. At 0930H, a platoon from Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, operating near AQ930359, shot and captured one NVA.

At 1020H, the 1st Platoon, Company C, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 8th Infantry, operating near ZA158706, exchanged fire with 10 to 14 VC 25 meters from their position. Two VC were killed, one AK-47 and two SKS were captured.

At 1130H, LRP 34, in position at AS846184, employed claymore mines and small arms against eight MONTAGNARDS armed with bolt action rifles. The enemy returned fire and fled, leaving behind six dead. Again, near AS857183, the team exchanged fire with two NVA carrying Soviet carbines. One NVA was killed. During the action, three LRP team members were injured by punji stakes.

At 1235H, LRP 2G, operating near YA922798, received one round of sniper fire, wounding one team member. The team returned fire, but the enemy evaded.

At 1451H, Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, operating near YA934617, observed two NVA cross a trail. The US troops opened fire, wounding and capturing one NVA.

In a contact at 1600H, LRP 1B killed one NVA. While attempting to retrieve the NVA's weapon, the team came under small arms fire from an estimated six to eight enemy. The LRP returned fire, evaded, called gunships in on the area, and was extracted.

At 1820H, a Dustoff helicopter, extracting wounded of Companies A and D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry from an LZ at YA948678, was hit by a B-40 rocket. The helicopter crashed and burned, killing seven US soldiers.

24 January. At 1500H, while LRP 44 was attempting an insertion at AS806149, ground-to-air fire killed one team member. The insertion was aborted.

In an exchange of fire at 1625H, LRP 31, operating near AS875057, killed one NVA and captured one AK-47. One LRP member was wounded.

25 January. At 1750H, near AS917077, LRP 23 observed 20 to 25 individuals moving toward their location. The LRP employed claymores and automatic weapons, killing one NVA. The team then evaded and was extracted.

26 January. At 1630H, two platoons of Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry observed two individuals near AQ843453 and engaged them with small arms fire.

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The enemy fled, leaving one NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA.

At 1921H, IRP 1D, operating near BR193393, exchanged small arms fire with four NVA armed with AK-47's. The team withdrew, set up a claymore, and employed it against an NVA who came within range, killing him.

27 January. At 2005H, incoming 82mm mortar rounds wounded two members of the 2d Platoon, Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, located near AR933479. The platoon swept through suspected enemy locations, but found nothing.

28 January. The 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry reported an attempt at imitative communications deception. At 1050H, someone speaking broken English entered the command net and attempted to divert helicopter support.

At 1230H, a SRP from Company C, 3-12 Infantry, located near ZA022764, received small arms fire from six to eight individuals 75 meters south of their location. The team returned fire and the enemy fled. Two team members were killed and two wounded.

At 1345H, while investigating a mining incident near ZA195978, a member of Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry stepped on a second mine and was killed. Another US soldier was wounded.

At 1550H, near YA955162, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry exchanged fire with an enemy force of unknown size. Results were one US KIA and one US WIA.

At 1635H, Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, operating near ZA057165, received automatic weapons fire from approximately a squad of enemy. The company returned fire and called for artillery support. The enemy fled with unknown casualties. One US soldier was wounded.

29 January. At 1445H, Hawkeye 1B made contact with four or five enemy near BR182405. In the exchange of fire one US soldier was wounded. Gunships expended in the area and the enemy fled.

At 1750H, near BR229380, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry employed 81mm mortar fire against suspected enemy locations. A short round wounded two US personnel.

30 January. At 0945H, the 2d Platoon, Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, located at BR255367, heard movement 50 meters to the southeast of their position and employed small arms fire. The platoon swept the area and captured one wounded NVA and an AK-47.

At 1235H, near BRO97197, Hawkeye 1A observed 5 individuals wearing loin cloths, web gear, packs and carrying M1 rifles. The team engaged the enemy with small arms fire and killed 1 VMC. The enemy returned fire and fled. One M1 rifle was captured. At 1730H, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, operating near YA865475, came under fire from two or three enemy who employed B-40 rockets and automatic weapons. A B-40 round hit a fuel cell of an APC causing extensive damage and one US WIA. The cavalry returned fire and the enemy fled.

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CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

1. (C) TRAILDUST MISSIONS:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>SORTIES*</u>
3 Nov 68	AQ9940 to AQ9954	3
3 Nov 68	YU9985 to ZU0793 to ZU1493	3
3 Nov 68	YB7905 to YB8317 to YB8321	4
4 Nov 68	ZB1464 to ZB1576	3
5 Nov 68	YB8222 to YB8428 to YB8725	3
6 Nov 68	YB8105 to YB8507 to YB9507	3
9 Nov 68	YB7804 to YB8204 to YB8607 to YB9507	3
9 Nov 68	YA8124 to YA7423	5
9 Nov 68	YB7725 to YB8221	3
12 Nov 68	YA8024 to YA7423	3
16 Nov 68	YA6578 to YA6581 to YA7387	3
17 Nov 68	YB7729 to YB8223 to YB8426 to YB8726 to YB8828	6
18 Nov 68	YA6773 to YA6478 to YA6382 to YA7087	3
19 Nov 68	YB7803 to YB8203 to YB8506 to YB9506	3
20 Nov 68	YB7304 to YB7818 to YB7823	3
22 Nov 68	YB7725 to YB8221 to YB8524 to YB8724 to YB9027	3
25 Nov 68	YB7804 to YB8504 to YB8506 to YB9506	3
7 Dec 68	YA6973 to YA6564 to YA6555	3
7 Dec 68	YA6373 to YA6064 to YA6055	3
8 Dec 68	YB7727 to YB8223 to YB8425 to YB8725 to YB8927	3
10 Dec 68	YA6273 to YA6478 to YA6382 to YA7178	3
13 Dec 68	YB7405 to YB7918 to YB7293	3
13 Dec 68	YA6873 to YA6564 to YA6555	3
14 Dec 68	YA6373 to YA6580 to YA6481 to YA7287	3
16 Dec 68	YB8908 to YB8201 to YB8294 to YB8091	3
19 Dec 68	YB7727 to YB8223 to YB8425 to YB8725 to YB8927	3
21 Dec 68	YB7504 to YA7590 to YB7286	3
26 Dec 68	YA6487 to YA6578 to YA6581 to YA7287	3
27 Dec 68	YA6373 to YA5965 to YA5955	3
28 Dec 68	YB8809 to YB8101 to YA8195 to YA7991	3
28 Dec 68	YA6373 to YA6478 to YA6482 to YA7287	3

Inclosure 5

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31 January. Between 0035 and 0120H, radar of the 2d Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, at LZ Charmaine, detected four unidentified flying objects. A blinking white beacon was visible.

At 0200H, Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry at 0200 detected approximately 100 NVA moving southeast up a draw in the vicinity of YA902658. The company engaged the enemy force with small arms. The enemy dispersed and fled without returning fire. SRPs in the area adjusted artillery on suspected routes of withdrawal. Company B swept the area at dawn and found one NVA KIA.

In a contact at 0905H, Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry, operating near AQ918362, killed one NVA and captured an SKS and an M1 carbine.

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31 Dec 68	YB8863 to YB8446	3
1 Jan 69	YB7404 to YB7490 to YB7086	3
2 Jan 69	YB7304 to YA7390 to YB7087	3
2 Jan 69	YA6173 to YA6589	2
5 Jan 69	YA6473 to YA6164 to YA6155	3
8 Jan 69	YB7904 to YA7990 to YA7381	3
9 Jan 69	YB8709 to YB7101 to YA7795 to YA7991	3
10 Jan 69	YA8030 to YA7526 to YA7026 to YA7930 to YA7627	3
11 Jan 69	YB7304 to YA7390 to YA7087	3
12 Jan 69	YA6689 to YA6273	3
13 Jan 69	YB8362 to YB8047	3
14 Jan 69	YB7404 to YA7490 to YA7187	3
14 Jan 69	YB7944 to YB7841 to YB7827	3
15 Jan 69	YB8562 to YB8145	3
18 Jan 69	YB7604 to YA7690 to YA7487	3
19 Jan 69	YA6889 to YA6473	3
20 Jan 69	YB7404 to YB7918 to YB7923	6
21 Jan 69	YB7703 to YA7789 to YB7687	3
22 Jan 69	YB8662 to YB8245	3
23 Jan 69	YA6473 to YA6164 to YA6155	3
23 Jan 69	YB8778 to YB8362	3
24 Jan 69	YB9462 to YB8045	3
24 Jan 69	YB8610 to YB8001 to YA8095 to YA7892	3
25 Jan 69	YA7089 to YA6673	3
26 Jan 69	YB8762 to YB8446	3
28 Jan 69	YB7945 to YB7841 to YB7827	3
28 Jan 69	YB8662 to YB8246	3
29 Jan 69	YA6373 to YA6064 to YA6055	3
31 Jan 69	YB7805 to YB8217 to YB8222	3
31 Jan 69	YA6373 to YA6064 to YA6055	3

*Note: Each sortie (C-123 Aircraft) sprays 1000 gallons of defoliant (orange).

2. (C) CROP DESTRUCTION:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>TYPE CROPS</u>	<u>HECTARES</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>
19 Jan 69	BR122272-140280 BR119295-132306	Rice, Beans	12	White	100

3. (C) PERIMETER DEFOLIATION:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>
1 Nov 68	3d Bde	YA7632	UH-1	White	100
1 Nov 68	3d Bde	YA8316	UH-1	White	100
1 Nov 68	5th SF	ZA1606	UH-1	White	150
2 Nov 68	5th SF	YA8646	UH-1	White	100

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 ON *1/18*

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>AGENTS</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>
2 Nov 68	3d Bde	YA8130	UH-1	White	100
6 Nov 68	Division	AR7936	UH-1	White	200
19 Nov 68	2d Bde	YA8396	UH-1	White	100
23 Nov 68	3d Bde	YA7632	UH-1	White	100
24 Nov 68	Division	AR8047	UH-1	White	300
24 Nov 68	2d Bde	YA8396	UH-1	White	100
25 Nov 68	2d Bde	YB8208	UH-1	White	100
26 Nov 68	Division	AR7837	UH-1	White	200
1 Dec 68	Division	AR7936	UH-1	White	500
11 Jan 69	2-1 Cav	BR041562	UH-1	White	100
20 Jan 69	2-1 Cav	BR159505-071564	UH-1	White	200
31 Jan 69	Division	AR817364-815328	UH-1	White	200

4. (C) ROADSIDE DEFOLIATION:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>
4 Nov 68	2-1 Cav	AR9649-BR2052	UH-1	White	950

5. (C) RIOT CONTROL AGENT (RCA OPERATIONS):

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MUNITION</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>
1 Nov 68	YA9911	XM-15	9	UH-1
1 Nov 68	ZA0011	XM-15	2	UH-1
1 Nov 68	YA9308-9406	XM-28	1	UH-1
1 Nov 68	YA9406-9405	XM-28	1	UH-1
2 Nov 68	YB7817	XM-15	8	UH-1
2 Nov 68	YB8128	XM-15	8	UH-1
2 Nov 68	ZA0209	XM-15	2	UH-1
3 Nov 68	YB8129	XM-15	2	UH-1
3 Nov 68	YB8328	XM-15	2	UH-1
3 Nov 68	YB7723	XM-15	4	UH-1
3 Nov 68	YA8323	XM-15	4	UH-1
3 Nov 68	ZA0516	XM-15	2	UH-1
4 Nov 68	YB8019	XM-28	1	UH-1
4 Nov 68	YB7821	XM-15	2	UH-1
5 Nov 68	YB8119	XM-15	15	CH-47
5 Nov 68	YB7921	XM-15	15	CH-47
8 Nov 68	YA993044	XM-15	8	UH-1
8 Nov 68	YA963590	XM-15	8	UH-1
9 Nov 68	YA9804-9803	XM-28	1	UH-1
10 Nov 68	YB772210	XM-15	2	UH-1
10 Nov 68	YB787204	XM-15	3	UH-1
11 Nov 68	YB819222	XM-15	8	UH-1
14 Nov 68	ZA0336	XM-15	1	UH-1
14 Nov 68	ZA0335	XM-15	6	UH-1
14 Nov 68	ZA0435	XM-15	1	UH-1
14 Nov 68	ZA0435	XM-28	1	UH-1

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MUNITION</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>
14 Nov 68	YA7820	XM-28	1	UH-1
14 Nov 68	YA7616	XM-15	10	UH-1
15 Nov 68	YA7616	XM-15	10	UH-1
15 Nov 68	YA7617	XM-15	3	UH-1
15 Nov 68	YA7913	XM-15	1	UH-1
16 Nov 58	YA6525	XM-15	1	UH-1
16 Nov 68	YA7814	XM-15	4	UH-1
17 Nov 68	YA8788	XM-15	2	UH-1
17 Nov 68	YA6374	XM-15	2	UH-1
17 Nov 68	YA7692	XM-15	2	UH-1
17 Nov 68	YA6362	XM-15	2	UH-1
17 Nov 68	YA6362	XM-15	2	UH-1
18 Nov 68	ZA0748-0848	XM-15	8	UH-1
19 Nov 68	YA6825	XM-15	3	UH-1
19 Nov 68	YA6728	XM-15	3	UH-1
20 Nov 68	ZA0112-0211	CS-1 Drum	20	CH-47
23 Nov 68	YA7387	XM-15	2	UH-1
24 Nov 68	YA7678	XM-15	8	UH-1
25 Nov 68	YA6881	XM-15	1	UH-1
25 Nov 68	YA6381	XM-15	1	UH-1
26 Nov 68	YA7813	CS-1 Drum	20	CH-47
26 Nov 68	YA8690-8588	XM-28	1	UH-1
26 Nov 68	YA8690	XM-15	1	UH-1
28 Nov 68	YA0638	XM-15	1	UH-1
30 Nov 68	YA9862	XM-15	4	UH-1
2 Dec 68	ZA0598	XM-15	8	UH-1
2 Dec 68	YA8865	XM-15	2	UH-1
2 Dec 68	YA9934	XM-15	2	UH-1
2 Dec 68	YB9513	XM-15	2	UH-1
2 Dec 68	YB9918	XM-15	6	UH-1
2 Dec 68	YB7503	XM-28	1	UH-1
3 Dec 68	YA6361	XM-15	2	UH-1
3 Dec 68	YB7503	XM-28	1	UH-1
5 Dec 68	YB7503	XM-28	1	UH-1
5 Dec 68	YB7503	CS-1 Drum	20	CH-47
6 Dec 68	YA6062	XM-15	1	UH-1
6 Dec 68	YA6162	XM-15	2	UH-1
6 Dec 68	YA6061	XM-15	2	UH-1
7 Dec 68	ZA0536-0535	CS-1 Drum	20	CH-47
7 Dec 68	ZA0434-0534	CS-1 Drum	20	CH-47
12 Dec 68	ZV218946	CS-1 Drum	20	CH-47
12 Dec 68	ZV218942	XM-15	1	UH-1
13 Dec 68	YB759071	XM-15	1	UH-1
13 Dec 68	YB768073	XM-15	2	UH-1
14 Dec 68	YA653926	XM-15	3	UH-1
15 Dec 68	ZA032534	XM-15	2	UH-1
15 Dec 68	ZA032534	XM-15	2	UH-1
15 Dec 68	ZA031530	XM-15	2	UH-1
17 Dec 68	BR130403	XM-15	4	UH-1
21 Dec 68	YA713268	XM-15	3	UH-1
21 Dec 68	YA734262	XM-15	2	UH-1

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MUNITION</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>
22 Dec 68	BR257247	XM-15	3	UH-1
22 Dec 68	BR257251	XM-15	3	UH-1
22 Dec 68	YA708515	XM-15	2	UH-1
23 Dec 68	AR922297	XM-15	1	UH-1
23 Dec 68	AR923281	XM-15	1	UH-1
23 Dec 68	AR919282	XM-15	2	UH-1
24 Dec 68	AR784335	ES-1 Drum	4	UH-1
24 Dec 68	BQ002379	XM-15	3	UH-1
7 Jan 69	YA821038	XM-15	1	UH-1
7 Jan 69	YA820036	XM-15	1	UH-1
7 Jan 69	YA819033	XM-15	1	UH-1
7 Jan 69	YA818030	XM-15	1	UH-1
7 Jan 69	YA818028	XM-15	1	UH-1
7 Jan 69	YA860037	XM-15	2	UH-1
7 Jan 69	YA895036	XM-15	1	UH-1
10 Jan 69	YA822813	XM-15	2	UH-1
10 Jan 69	YA825815	XM-15	1	UH-1
10 Jan 69	YA827807	XM-15	1	UH-1
10 Jan 69	YA794824	XM-15	2	UH-1
12 Jan 69	BR173297-183293	CS-1 Drum	20	CH-47
12 Jan 69	YA843647	XM-15	4	UH-1
13 Jan 69	AS815062-815068	CS-1 Drum	40	CH-47
14 Jan 69	YA816634	XM-15	1	UH-1
14 Jan 69	YA854690	XM-15	1	UH-1
14 Jan 69	YA867619	XM-15	1	UH-1
14 Jan 69	YA845600	XM-15	1	UH-1
15 Jan 69	YA705531	XM-15	2	UH-1
16 Jan 69	YB7503	CS-1 Drum	40	CH-47
18 Jan 69	BR013704-016704	CS-1 Drum	20	CH-47
19 Jan 69	YA862595	XM-27	1	AH-1G
19 Jan 69	YA693893	XM-27	1	OH-6A
21 Jan 69	YA765660	XM-15	1	OH-6A
22 Jan 69	AR815646	XM-15	3	OH-6A
23 Jan 69	YA7502	CS-1 Drum	20	CH-47
23 Jan 69	YA7502	CS-2 Drum	20	CH-47
23 Jan 69	ZB080385	XM-15	1	OH-6A
23 Jan 69	ZB102403	XM-15	1	OH-6A
23 Jan 69	ZB083421	XM-15	1	OH-6A
24 Jan 69	AR815690	XM-15	3	OH-6A
27 Jan 69	YA639698	XM-15	40	CH-47
28 Jan 69	YA925677	XM-15	50	CH-47
30 Jan 69	YA955605-963605			
	YA955590-963590	XM-15	25	UH-1
31 Jan 69	YA898641	XM-15	3	UH-1
31 Jan 69	YA715547	XM-15	4	OH-6A

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC-MH

15 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

SECTION 1 (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General.

a. During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation BINH TAY - MACARTHUR.

b. Organizational Structure. Task organization for Operation BINH TAY - MACARTHUR for the period is contained at Inclosure 1.

c. Key personnel. Commanders as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.

d. Mission.

(1) The general mission of the division during the reporting period was to conduct sustained, coordinated, and combined offensive operations to destroy enemy and local force units, destroy or neutralize enemy base areas, interdict high-speed infiltration routes, conduct operations wherever possible with ARVN and GVN agencies, and support GVN pacification efforts and civil programs.

(2) The specific missions of the 4th Infantry Division are to:

(a) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN border and destroy enemy (NVA/VC) units within the assigned area of operations.

(b) Block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAOS across the Central Highlands into the coastal provinces.

(c) Conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations.

(d) Destroy enemy base areas and supply installations.

(e) Detect and eliminate VIET CONG Infrastructures.

(f) Clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility.

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- (g) Support the Government of VIETNAM's Pacification and Resettlement Program.
- (h) Open, secure, and maintain land lines of communication.
- (i) Be prepared to deploy forces for relief/reinforcement of Camp Strike Forces, Regional and Popular Forces, critical signal sites, and sector/subsector headquarters within II Corps Tactical Zone.
- (j) Provide to I Field Force, VIETNAM, a battalion size reserve on order.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. General: In early November, division attention centered on the increased NVA use of the PLEI TRAP Road in southwest KONTUM Province. Operation DEADEND, conducted by CIDG elements and the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, successfully closed the road to vehicular traffic in late November, although foot traffic in the area has continued to date. During the same time period, a buildup of NVA forces was observed in Base Area 701 west of DUC CO, signifying that an enemy operation was possibly intended in the area. Occupation of FSB's MARY S (YA764326), KAREN (YA815309), JEAN (YA806233), JOAN (YA842280) and VERA (YA835172) apparently frustrated enemy intentions concerning DUC CO, and the hostile forces dispersed in late November without initiating a major ground action.

Enemy activity remained light throughout December, permitting the division to initiate offensive action in the latter part of the month against the NVA 95B Regimental base area in the DAK PAYOU (VC Valley) area of eastern PLEIKU Province. Although the enemy successfully avoided major contacts, 4th Infantry Division elements inflicted significant damage on the enemy logistical system by capturing and destroying large quantities of food and material. In late January, division and ARVN units made contact with the 24th NVA Regiment, supported by elements of the K-6 (also known as the 966) Battalion and K-31 Artillery Battalion, in the CHU PA Mountains area of western PLEIKU Province. Allied operations to date have resulted in significant enemy casualties, plus the discovery of large food and weapons caches in the area.

(1) KONTUM: Since early November, there has been extremely limited enemy activity in KONTUM Province. The majority of contacts with the enemy have involved VIET CONG LOCAL FORCE/MAIN FORCE units rather than NVA Forces. During November, activity was concentrated in the BEN HET-DAK TO area. The BEN HET Special Forces Camp and Fire Support Base 29 came under intense attacks by fire during the first two weeks of the month, but after the evacuation of FSB 29, the attacks were reduced to minor harassing actions against BEN HET. During the attacks on FSB 29 (YB839223), the enemy employed 100mm and 105mm artillery from within their CAMBODIAN sanctuary.

Enemy transportation units used the PLEI TRAP Road extensively in early November. Reconnaissance aircraft detected vehicular movement on several occasions with

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the most significant being a convoy consisting of 21 trucks and four tanks. Foot traffic, at times heavy, has continued through the area.

Activity throughout KONTUM Province during the month of December was extremely light. Enemy units were content to continue their mining activity along Highway 14 and to harass friendly installations in the KONTUM City area. The major enemy effort was directed toward gathering freshly harvested rice and resupplying their depleted supply caches. This activity was pre-empted by the seizure of over 15 tons of rice, in an area 20 kilometers north of KONTUM City, by units of the 4th Infantry Division.

VIET CONG activity increased during the month of January in the TANH CANH area and in the area approximately 20 kilometers north and northeast of KONTUM City. In the TANH CANH area the 304th Local Force Battalion conducted harassing attacks against hamlets and continued to assume a more aggressive role. Division units operating in the area approximately 20 kilometers north and northeast of KONTUM City made light, sporadic contact during the month, uncovering numerous food caches and bunker complexes. Captured documents identified this region as a base area of the 304th Local Force Battalion.

During late January, in an area approximately 20 kilometers southwest of the POLEI KLENG Special Forces Camp, activity increased due to the infiltration of a unit of unknown size. Friendly forces have thus far failed to identify this unit.

(2) PLEIKU: In early November, NVA forces massed in Base Area 701, across the CAMBODIAN border from DUC CO. Units of the 4th Infantry Division's 3d Brigade occupied FSBs MARY S (YA764326) and KAREN (YA815309), north of DUC CO, and FSB's JEAN (YA806233) to the west, JOAN (YA842280) to the east, and VERA (YA835172) to the south of DUC CO. Occupation of this key terrain made DUC CO a difficult target for any ground effort by hostile forces. The enemy did, however, employ 105mm artillery fire against FSB's JEAN (YA806233), JOAN (YA842280), and VERA (YA835172). In late November, the enemy abandoned his plans and apparently withdrew from Base Area 701.

VIET CONG local forces and NVA engineer units have harassed friendly units in the area west of PLEIKU City between Highways 509 and 19W throughout the reporting period. This harassment has consisted of small arms and RPG-2 fire, with some mining activity. On 27 November, a HOI CHANH, who had rallied near the Oasis, identified his unit as the K-25B Engineer/Sapper Battalion, which he stated had the mission of mining Highway 19W. However, the K-25B Battalion has apparently withdrawn from the area. During the past month, there have been very few minings and activity has been limited to harassment by sniper and RPG-2 fire from the X-45 Local Force Battalion.

Enemy local forces, sappers and artillery harassed Allied installations in the PLEIKU City area throughout the reporting period. Attacks by 122mm rocket fire have been supported by mortar fire and ground probes from local force and sapper units.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 4th Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

In December, TASK FORCE WINNER flushed the 95B NVA Regiment out of the DAK PAYOU Valley, an area where it has traditionally operated. Under the initial thrust of US, ARVN and MSF units in the Valley, the enemy fled eastward leaving behind large amounts of rice and medical supplies. Although there were few contacts, the enemy's supply system was seriously disrupted.

During January, there has been a large buildup of forces in the CHU PA Mountain Region. The 24th NVA Regiment has moved from Base Area 702 and is now in contact with US and ARVN forces in the CHU PA Mountains. A HOI CHANH, who rallied on 31 January, stated that elements of the K-6 Battalion, B-3 Front (also known as the 966 Battalion) and the K-31 Artillery Battalion are supporting the 24th Regiment. The CHU PA has historically been a large supply area, and many large food and weapons caches have been uncovered.

(3) DARLAC: Contacts with enemy forces in DARLAC Province were light during the months of November, December and January. Most enemy elements in the area are of battalion size or smaller. The only indications of forces larger than battalion size are agent reports from the DUC LAP area in nearby QUANG DUC Province. These reports indicate the presence of as many as 8000 NVA, but corroborating information by other than agent sources has not been produced. Intelligence gained from prisoners and captured documents indicates that the 95C and 320th Regiment have moved to the III Corps Tactical Zone, leaving no known regimental or larger size force in the DUC LAP area.

During the entire three month period, the 155th Assault Helicopter Company, located at BAN ME THUOT City Field, was the subject of continual attacks by fire from 75mm recoilless rifles, 60mm and 82mm mortars. The units responsible for these attacks are believed to be the K-34 Artillery Battalion and the K-39 Infantry Battalion. Both of these units have been identified as a result of contacts approximately 35 kilometers south-southwest of BAN ME THUOT in late January.

Although it has not been positively identified, the K-25 Engineer Battalion is believed to be located east of BAN ME THUOT City, between Highways 14 and 21, with the mission of harassing and interdicting these highways.

The 301st LF Battalion also has not been identified but it is believed to be operating in an area approximately 21 kilometers north of BAN ME THUOT.

A PW captured in the early part of January gave the location of the 401st LF Battalion as being approximately 31 kilometers north-northeast of BAN ME THUOT.

In late December, a rallier, NGUYEN BA, indicated that there may be a new transportation regiment in NAM LYR Base Area. This returnee has changed his statement once and the validity of his information cannot be determined.

b. Estimated Enemy Composition, Strength, and Disposition as of 31 January 1969:

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
B3 Front HQ	500	Base Area 702
66th NVA Inf Regt	2000	Base Area 702
24th NVA Inf Regt	1800	NW PLEIKU Province
101D NVA Inf Regt	1800	Base Area 702
95B NVA Inf Regt	1600	PLEIKU-BINH DINH Border Area
40th NVA Arty Regt*	1200	Tri-border Area
E-301 Local Force Bn	300	Vic MEWAL Plantation
303d Local Force Bn	250	Eastern DARLAC Provir
304th Local Force Bn	300	North of KONTUM City
401st Local Force Bn	300	Base Area 238
H-15 Local Force Bn	100	DAK AYUNH River Area
X45 Local Force Bn	150	West of PLEIKU City
406th Sapper Bn	150	NE of KONTUM City
408th Sapper Bn	350	NE of PLEIKU City
K25 Sapper Bn	100	NE of BAN ME THUOT
K25B Sapper Bn	100	IA DRANG Valley
K37 Sapper Bn	200	CAMBODIA
K39 NVA Inf Bn	300	SW of BAN ME THUOT
966th NVA Inf Bn	250	Western PLEIKU Provir
Local Guerrillas	3000 (est)	
TOTAL	11,750	

*The 40th Arty Regt has four battalions with elements dispersed throughout the AO.

c. Significant Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Capabilities:

(1) General.

(a) Although NVA units appeared to be massing along the CAMBODIAN border in November, probably in preparation for a large scale attack in the DUC CO area, the enemy has generally adhered to the terror and harassment tactics which he reverted to in September and October. This regression to guerrilla warfare, conducted primarily by VC local force units, is probably the result of the severe punishment inflicted on NVA units when they attempted to engage in conventional warfare with Allied forces this summer.

(b) Numerous sightings were made of unidentified aircraft near LZ's JOAN (YA842280), CHARMAINE (YA998217), and LANETTA (YA852457) by both visual and electronic means. No tactical significance can be attached to the sightings at the present time. On specific occasions the aircraft sighted were identified as a Soviet K-18 (Hog) helicopter, a Yak 24 medium helicopter, and a Czech HC-2 trainer.

(2) Significant Changes in Tactics: The enemy has generally decreased his use of sapper attacks, which were prevalent in the period from August to October, and shifted his emphasis to widespread VC terrorist activities in the form of

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political assassinations and attacks on government controlled villages.

(3) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses (1 Nov - 31 Jan)

(a) Personnel: KIA (BC) 218
NVA CIA 7
VC/VMC CIA 35
TOTAL 260

(b) Weapons: S/A 116
C/S 1
TOTAL 117

(c) Ammunition: S/A rds 46,989
C/S rds 151
Grenades 456
Mines 143

(d) Miscellaneous captured items:

Explosives 720 lbs
Documents 158 inches
Rice 123.9 tons
Salt 311 lbs

(e) Enemy facilities destroyed:

Structures 640
Fortifications 1,751

d. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action:

(1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) The 32d and 33d Battalions of the 40th Artillery Regiment, and field artillery units of the B3 Front are capable of conducting attacks by fire in the DAK TO, BEN HET and DAK SEANG areas using 100/105mm artillery, 122mm rockets, mortar and recoilless rifle fire.

(b) The 304th and 406th LF Battalions are capable of conducting mining operations along Highway 14 and small scale attacks and probes of villages and friendly installations in the KONTUM City area.

(c) The enemy is capable of improving the PLEI TRAP Road and using it to infiltrate regimental size units into the area west of POLEI KLENG and across the province to the KONTUM City area.

(d) The 24th NVA Regiment is capable of sustaining contacts in the CHU PA

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Mountain area, and appears capable of governing the time and place of contact. Upon withdrawal of friendly units from this area, the 24th NVA Regiment has the capability to regroup its forces and stage attacks against PLEIKU City.

(e) In the PLEIKU City area, the K-31 Artillery Battalion, supported by the 408th Sapper Battalion, can conduct attacks by fire, employing 122mm rockets.

(f) The 95B NVA Regiment, supported by the X-17 and X-18 Engineer Companies and other local force units, is capable of harassing vehicular traffic along Highway 19E, and can conduct attacks by fire and ground probes on friendly installations from SOUI DOI to AN KHE.

(g) In DARLAC Province, the enemy is capable of employing local force and NVA units in multi-battalion strength against BAN ME THUOT City and Allied installations. The enemy forces are capable of conducting attacks by fire employing 60mm mortars, 82mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles, and 122mm rockets.

(b) In QUANG DUC Province, agent reports continue to indicate the presence of large enemy forces in NAM LYR base area in CAMBODIA, approximately 10 kilometers west of DUC LAP. Attacks during TET have been predicted by several sources, but the validity of these reports cannot be determined. It is highly probable, however, that enemy elements are present in the area and will eventually move into III Corps. Although the threat of attack against DUC LAP still exists, enemy action will probably be limited to attacks by fire, and probes by small ground forces.

(2) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

(a) Enemy units are vulnerable to artillery and air strikes when in bivouac or when massing for an attack.

(b) Enemy lines of communication are sufficiently extended to make them vulnerable to interdiction by LRP teams and/or small conventional units.

(c) Enemy logistics stored in established base areas are vulnerable to battalion size search and destroy operations.

(3) Probable Courses of Action:

(a) Conduct attacks by fire in the BEN HET - DAK TO and KONTUM City areas.

(b) Continue to harass Highway 14 by mining and sniper attacks.

(c) Increase infiltration of troops into the area west of POLEI KLENG.

(d) Increase terrorism, assassination, and small scale attacks in the TANH CANH and KONTUM City areas.

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(e) Intensify activity in eastern PLEIKU - western BINH DINH by increasing attempts to interdict Highway 19E.

(f) Continue to avoid contact with Allied forces in DARLAC Province and conduct limited attacks by fire on BAN ME THUOT City and Allied military posts.

(g) Continue terroristic activity and conduct propaganda lectures in outlying villages in DARLAC Province.

e. Counterintelligence.

(1) General: During the reporting period the 4th Military Intelligence Detachment (MID) conducted aggressive field operations to deny use of main routes of communication to the VIET CONG Infrastructure (VCI), to deny VIET CONG intelligence agents access to Camp Enari, and to provide rapid small unit reaction to intelligence developed through MID resources. During CLEANSWEEP IV the unit conducted cordon and sweep operations of three villages. In these instances the MID provided both the cordon and the sweep forces. During operation CLEANSWEEP V, the MID cordoned and searched one village and established a checkpoint on Highway 14, with the support of the 12th ARVN MI Detachment. Together these two units screened 67 villagers and 597 travelers.

(2) Counterintelligence: Though continuing to conduct individual Special Agent operations, the Counterintelligence Section also launched a number of preplanned operations in which the entire section participated. Counterintelligence operations conducted during the reporting period accounted for 53 detainees. Of these, seven were classified Prisoners of War, and 15 were classified as Civil Defendants. The remainder were released as innocent civilians.

The operations of the individual US Special Agents from the Special Operations Branch, CI Section, resulted either directly or indirectly in the production of 41 agent reports, the capture of four PWs, and the discovery of a cache of 2,000 pounds of rice. The agent reports also alerted LE TRUNG District and PLEI DO LIM Sector to impending attacks by VC units.

The Security Branch, CI Section conducted 96 counterintelligence inspections of Division units during the quarter, contributing significantly to an overall improvement in the security of the division.

The Special Security Branch, CI Section established files on 421 direct hire indigenous employees on Camp Enari during the quarter, for a total of 1,750 indigenous employees registered on Camp Enari. In conjunction with the ARVN Military Security Service (MSS), the section conducted 18 background investigations one of which resulted in the neutralization of a VIET CONG who was working at Camp Enari. On 7 and 8 January 1969, in Operation GATECRASH II, 4th MID and MSS personnel checked the identification papers of 1,119 indigenous civilian employees entering Camp Enari. They found a total of 98 minor deficiencies in identification papers and corrected them on the spot. The ARVN MSS apprehended an additional 37

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individuals for using forged or transferred ID cards.

The CI Section, 4th MID, made several improvements in the conduct of cordon and search operations. By stationing the cordon force in the vicinity of the villages to be cordoned and having it cordon the village prior to 0500 hours, they sealed off the area before the villagers could leave. Once the search began, 4th MID personnel took a census of the village, photographing the inhabitants and attaching the name of each inhabitant to his photograph. During subsequent searches, the photographic file helped MID personnel separate newcomers from the regular inhabitants. By segregating the villagers by sex and age prior to interrogations, the CID Section is able to make cross checks on persons being interrogated and to play one detainee against another. Censuses taken during cordon and search operations include an enumeration of the rice and living huts in the village, an evaluation of their condition, and an inventory of animals, by type, in the village. A report of each census is included in an after-action report which is submitted to G2, and serves as a reserve of data for future operations in the same area.

The CI Section improved its operational effectiveness by establishing liaison with non-divisional intelligence agencies in PLEIKU. The Special Agent conducting liaison with US and ARVN agencies in PLEIKU has established a channel of communications which is both rapid, flexible, and responsive to immediate needs of the CI Section. The agent also conducts all Local Agency Files Checks in the PLEIKU area, thereby improving the effectiveness of the Security, Special Security, and Special Operations Branches of the Counterintelligence Section, 4th MID.

The CI Staff Officer, G2 supervises operations to identify VCI in the Division AO. The VC-VCI Officer coordinates with the numerous US and ARVN Intelligence agencies that operate in the Division AO, and in particular, those agencies that operate in PLEIKU.

(3) Interrogation of Prisoners of War:

(a) During the reporting period the interrogation of prisoners of war (IPW) Section, 4th MID, interrogated 218 Division detainees and provided the division G2 with intelligence derived from the interrogations. In addition, three NVA prisoners taken by Allied units were interrogated by the section. Of the 218 detainees, seven were NVA, 37 VC/VMC, 63 civil defendants, and six HOI CHANHS.

(b) Effective liaison has been established with the three other major interrogation facilities in the area: II Corps, 5th Special Forces Group, and PLEIKU Sector. Exchange of intelligence information was adequate for this reporting period. Cooperation continues to improve. All interrogation agencies pooled their resources in an effort to expedite interrogations and disseminate valuable tactical information.

(4) Imagery Interpretation: During the reporting period the Imagery Interpretation (II) Section of 4th MID produced 175 new items of intelligence value,

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including the identification of a defensive position which produced two secondary explosions when attacked by US aircraft. In December, a mosaic booklet prepared on the DAK PAYOU Valley was reproduced and distributed to units participating in TASK FORCE WINNER, thus giving the combat units a valuable up-date on terrain in the area of operations. The section's efforts have been hampered over the last three months by the failure of approximately 25 percent of the USAF photos to have the 60 percent forward overlap necessary for effective imagery interpretatic

(5) COMSEC: During the period 1 November to 31 January, COMSEC monitored a total of 200,205 radio and telephone transmissions and reported a total of 40 violations. This is an average of one violation per 3,900 hours of transmission. There has been a significant improvement in communications security during this quarter as opposed to the last quarter.

3. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES.

a. The following OPLANS/OPORDS were either prepared or published:

(1) OPLAN 24-68 (DEADEND-TOLLROAD-U CAN DUONG) dated 13 November 1968, Classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(2) OPORD 26-68 (CLEANSWEEP IV) dated 2 November 1968, directed Camp Enari Base Camp Defense Forces to conduct sweep/cordon and search operations in the Division TAOR. This operation was terminated on 8 November 1968.

(3) OPLAN 27-68 (FLUSH) dated 17 November 1968, Classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(4) OPLAN 28-68 (CONG KILLER) dated 25 November 1968, Classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(5) OPLAN 29-68 (DEATH VALLEY-THUNG LUNG TU THAN) dated 29 November 1968, Classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(6) OPLAN 31-68 (GRISWOLD BLACK-LE LOI) dated 19 December 1968, Classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

b. Operations. The 4th Infantry Division continued Operation BINH TAY - MACARTHUR, which began on 12 October 1967. On 31 January 1969, the end of the reporting period, Operation MACARTHUR was terminated. Operation HINES begins 1 February 1969. A chronological summary of significant activities is at Inclosure 4

(1) On 18 November 1968, the 2d Brigade Headquarters moved from BAN ME THUOT East Field (AQ882017) to LZ MARY LOU (ZA228838) to begin operations in KONTUM and PLEIKU Provinces. On 25 November, the 2d Brigade began Operation DEADEND-TOLLROAD-U CAN DUONG to close the PLEI TRAP NVA Road running between YB726078 and YA747922. Division Engineers, accompanied by CSF companies and infantry companies of the 2d Brigade, destroyed bridges and culverts, cratered the road, and constructed three

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abatis, closing the road to vehicular traffic.

(2) On 25 December 1968, TASK FORCE WINNER, controlling two brigade CP's (four US infantry battalions, one ARVN infantry battalion and one MSF battalion) and a cavalry squadron, began search and clear operations in the DAK PAYOU Valley, south of FSB BLACKHAWK (BR032532) and in the mountains north of BLACKHAWK. Though the task force killed only 29 NVA/VC, it captured 22 tons of rice, 400 pounds of medical supplies, 30 pounds of documents, and considerable quantities of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

(3) On 20 January, the 1st Brigade Headquarters departed DAK TO, terminating 15 months of operations in KONTUM Province. From a new base at SUOI DOI (BR035535) the Brigade began operations in BINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces south of the MANG YANG Pass (BR2252).

c. Training.

(1) On 6 November 1968, the 4th Infantry Division established an RF/PF Leadership School to assist the Republic of VIET NAM and MACV Advisory programs in upgrading the RF/PF forces within II Corps Tactical Zone. The provinces of KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, QUANG DUC, KHANH HOA, and CAM RANH sent personnel ranging in rank from sergeant to captain to attend the 15 day course. Three courses have graduated 85 enlisted men and 50 officers. Areas of study include leadership skills, weapons, artillery adjustment, first aid, communication, and small unit tactics.

(2) The Kit Carson Scout training program continued. Because of extreme difficulty in recruiting men for the KCS program, the classes have been small. Units employing KCS personnel are having success, but urge more English language training. During the reporting period 10 Kit Carson Scouts completed the course.

(3) Long Range Patrol courses continued to produce well trained men to meet the division demand.

(4) Short courses dealing with the operation, maintenance, and employment of night vision devices were held for the instruction of brigade cadre.

(5) 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment:

(a) In the last portion of the quarter, the Training Detachment made plans to expand the replacement and LRP training programs. During the next quarter, replacement training periods will be 6 days in length and include an overnight combat exercise for all combat MOS's. The LRP training program has been expanded from 8 to 14 days to include overnight patrols.

(b) Replacement Training Section trained 4,821 enlisted men and 172 officer replacements.

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