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Chronological Summary of Significant Events (U) (cont)

1515 hr, loc of contact area of B/1-22, 2d Bde S5 dropped 120,000 Chieu Hoi leaflets, and prov two hr abn speaker time, along the SCUI KOM RIVER vic B/1-22.

1600 hr, BR598788, 2D/1-22 obsr one indiv dressed in green fatigues, NVA boots w neg wpn 50 m to their N. 2D empl SA, claymores, and arty resulting in one NVA KIA.

2110 hr, BR589844, 2A/1-22 rec one ChiCom gren fr one indiv 25 m to their south. 2A rtn SA and gren resulting in one US WIA (slight).

2125 hr, BR596826, 3B/1-22 had two trip flares func 25 m to their south. 3B empl claymores and SA. Est 1-2 indiv rtn fire w ten rd AK-47 fire. 3B swept area finding one NVA KIA.

2150 hr, BR596826, 3B/1-22 rept mov to south. 3B empl claymores resulting in two NVA KIA and one NVA WIA. Wounded indiv died prior to extraction. En dresses in green fatigues and Ho Chi Minh sandals.

2235 hr, BR596826, 3B/1-22 rept mov to south. 3B empl claymore, resulting in one NVA KIA dressed in green fatigues.

Results of 1-22 contact w est bn size elm of repl pers fr 0831, 20 Jun to 2400, 21 Jun: 29 NVA KIA; three NVA POW's, 13 AK-47's, 46 AK-47 magazines; 46 ChiCom gren, 1,900 rd AK, six rd 9mm, 103 rucksacks, 100 lb rice, 25 lb docu, 15 lb med sup, 40 entrenching tools, 30 pith helmets, and a large amt of fld gear, CIA. One US was KIA and three WIA.

22 JUN - 0045 hr, BR596826, 3B/1-22 rept mov 30 m to N. 3B empl claymores and SA. Swept area finding one NVA KIA wearing green fatigues and Ho Chi Minh sandals.

0940 hr, BR599819, 2B/1-22 rept mov 100 m to their southwest, by est ten indiv. 2B empl SA, arty and gunships. En fled west. One US WIA (slight) by frd M-79 schrapnel. Swept area finding one AK-47.

1040 hr, BR612814, Rcn/1-22 had plt ldr and one other indiv WIA by punji stakes.

1100 hr, BR353637, C/1-12 had one US WIA by punji stake.

1245 hr, BR594817, 1B/1-22 obsr three indiv 20 m to their N. One wore blue short, green shirt, others wore green fatigues,

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Chronological Summary of Significant Events (U) (cont)

neg head gear or ft gear. 1B empl SA resulting in two NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA. Third indiv fled N. 1B cont sweep w neg findings.

2d Bde S5 prov two hr abn evening speaker time and six hr gnd speaker time to contact area of B/1-22.

1520 hr, BR363639, 3C/1-12 obsr four indiv 150 m to their east. 3C empl SA. En rtn two rd SKS fire and fled south. 3C swept area finding one SKS CIA, three mtyd baskets, and hv blood trail which they fol 500 m east before losing.

1550 hr, BR615817, Rcn/1-22 rec one indiv Chieu Eoi w neg wpn. Hoi Chanh evac to CPR.

23 JUN - 1015 hr, BR597827, 3B/1-22 found one indiv KBA. He was wearing green fatigues w neg wpn.

1140 hr, BR355638, 3C/1-12 obsr one indiv wearing green fatigues 50 m to their northeast on an 18 in south west- north east trail. 3C empl SA. Indiv fled northeast. 3C fol blood trail 200 m before it dissipated.

1224 hr, LZ TERRACE rec 4-5 rd AK sniper fire fr 1500 m to southwest fr est one indiv. D empl M60, 81mm mort and arty w unk results.

1225 hr, vic FSB NIAGARA, Bulldog 23 obsr two indiv wearing khakis and carrying unk type wpn 800 m west. D empl 50 cal, 81 mm mort and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1555 hr, BR384736, Bulldog 24 rec 6-8 rd gnd to air fire fr 800 m east-northeast, rec one hit while cdt resup for 1-12. Arty empl. SEL swept w neg findings.

24 JUN - 0902 hr, BR597837, 3E/1-22 engaged one indiv wearing green fatigues 20 m to their southwest w SA. Swept area, found one NVA KIA and one ChiCom gren CIA.

1505 hr, BR398735, 1E/1-12 found one NVA in green fatigues KBA. Indiv had fermented 6-7 days.

25 JUN - 1555 hr, BR597792, 2D/1-22 rec 15 rd sniper fire fr est one indiv. Empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1735 hr, BR597827, 3E/1-22 rec approx 50 rd AK fire fr 100 m south resulting in one US KIA. Believed to be fr two indiv who fled south. 3B empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.



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Chronological Summary of Significant Events (U) (cont)

- 26 JUN - 0935 hr, BR533945, Rcn/2-35 rec approx 25 rd AK fire fr 100 m to their west fr est four indiv. Rcn rtn SA, and empl arty. En fled to northeast. Rcn swept area at 1420 hr, found area w 300 punji stakes resulting in three US WIA by punji stakes, plt ldr was one of the WIA's.
- 1415 hr, BR363613, 2C/1-12 engaged two indiv 10 m to their west resulting in one NVA KIA, wearing khakis, and Ho Chi Minh sandals, one SKS, one US gren, 60 lb unpolished rice CIA. 2d en fled N. 2C cont sweep w neg fur findings.
- 27 JUN - 1630 hr, BR556829, Gladiator 24, in C/1-22 LZ, rec 20 rd AK SA fire fr est two indiv 250 m west. Gladiator 24 rec two hits. C empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.
- 1830 hr, BR362602, C/1-12 rec 20 rd SA fire 50 m southwest. C empl SA. Indiv fled to west. Swept area w neg findings.
- 1907 hr, BR556829, C/1-22 obsr 1-2 indiv 250 m northwest. Unable to detm unif or wpn. C empl SA and arty swept area w neg findings.
- 28 JUN - 1031 hr, BR514640, B/1-12 had three US WIA by punji stakes, one of which was GO B co.
- 1140 hr, LZ TERRACE 1-22, rec 30 rd AK fire fr 900 m to their south. Empl SA, 81mm mort, 4.2 in mort, and arty.
- 1225 hr, LZ TERRACE, 1-22 rec four rd 60mm mort fr 1300 m south. All rd impacted outside peri. 1-22 empl air strikes and arty. 2D/1-22 cdt aslt N of SEL vic BR556765. 2D in sweep toward SEL, had one US WIA by pressure type booby-trap. Swept area w neg findings.
- 1340 hr, BR367602, C/1-12 rec approx 25 rd SA fire fr 200 m south. Empl arty, swept area w neg findings.
- 1624 hr, BR598792, Rcn/1-22 rec 20-25 rd AK fire fr 200 m south. Empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.
- 29 JUN - 1015 hr, BR483485, 2A/1-22 obsr two indiv 150 m to their south w wpn. 2A empl 81mm mort. Swept area w neg findings.
- 1520 hr, FSB ANGLEDDON, D/1-12 obsr three indiv (one turning a claymore around to face peri). Empl SA and 81mm mort. Swept area found two NVA/VC KIA, and one Mauser CIA. Found blood trail, empl tracker tm, fol trail 100 m northeast where it dissipated.


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Chronological Summary of Significant Events (U) (cont)

- 1540 hr, BR564827, 1C/1-22 amb heard mov 15 m to their N. Amb empl claymore and arty. Swept found one NVA/VC KIA.
- 1610 hr, BR564827, 1C/1-22 obsr one indiv 25 m to their N. Empl SA resulting in one NVA KIA.
- 1630 hr, ER363597, 1c/1-12 amb obsr one indiv 15 m to their N. Empl SA. Swept area found NVA/VC KIA.
- 30 JUN - 1435 hr, ER 372602, 1C/1-12 obsr one indiv 40 m to their west-southwest w SKS. 1C empl SA. Swept, fol hv blood trail which dissipated.
- 01 JUL - No significant events.
- 02 JUL - 0950 hr, BR360607, 1C/1-12 engaged four indiv 75 m west. Indiv were mov on a north-south trail, fled to N. 1C swept w neg findings.
- 1118 hr, BR639734, 3A/3-12 init and exch SA w est 8-10 indiv 25 m southwest. Indiv wore black pajamas and green fatigues, soft hats, and one radio, rucksacks and AK-47's. Empl arty and air strikes. Indiv fled southwest. Swept, found two en KIA, one map and one pistol CIA.
- 1355 hr, LZ TERRACE rec 5-10 rd AK fire fr 500 m southeast. Empl SA and 4.2 mort w unk results.
- 1522 hr, BR631744, A/3-12 init amb w 7-8 indiv 30 m east. Indiv rtn fire and fled east. A obsr one AK-47 and one SKS. Swept area w neg findings.
- 03 JUL - 1405 hr, BR564782, Rcn/1-22 rec 20-25 rd sniper fire fr 400 m northeast. Rcn empl SA, 4.2 mort and arty. Swept area w neg findings.
- 04 JUL - 1045 hr, BR554821, 1C/1-22 obsr and engaged one indiv 100 m to their west w SA resulting in one NVA/VC KIA.
- 05 JUL - 1155 hr, LZ TERRACE rec 30 rd SA fire fr 800 m south. Arty empl w unk results.
- 06 JUL - 0925 hr, BR604749, A/3-12 obsr 3-4 indiv w wpn 300 m to their N. Empl SA and arty. Swept, found blood trail, fol and dtn one NVA/VC WL.
- 1331 hr, BR413741, 2A/1-22 obsr one indiv w wpn 100 m to their south. Empl SA and arty. Swept are w neg findings.



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Chronological Summary of Significant Events (U) (cont)

1506 hr, BR617766, 1B/3-12 obsr three indiv hiding in tall grass 35 m to their south. 1B empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

07 JUL - 1020 hr, IZ TERRACE rec 40 rd aw fire fr 800 m south. 1B/1-22 empl 81mm mort, 4.2 mort and .50 cal w unk results.

08 JUL - 0825 hr, IZ TERRACE rec 30 rd SA fire fr 700 m south. 1B/1-22 empl .50 cal, 81mm mort, 4.2 mort and arty w unk results.

1020 hr, BR362611, 1D/1-12 obsr one indiv 25 m to their west. Empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1140 hr, IZ TERRACE again rec 20 rd AK fire fr 700 m west. Empl .50 cal, 81mm and 4.2 mort, and arty w unk results.

1610 hr, BR557737, 1D/1-22 obsr one indiv 50 m to their west. Empl SA and arty resulting in one NVA/VC KIA and one AK-47 CIA.

1615 hr, BR619731, B/3-12 obsr seven indiv 1400 m N. Empl arty and gunships w unk results.

09 JUL - 1040 hr, BR616753, 2B/3-12 rec 10-15 rd SA fire fr 150 m to their northeast. Empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1326 hr, IZ TERRACE rec 50 rd SA fire fr 700 m south. Empl 81mm mort, 4.2 mort and arty. At 1420 hr, IZ TERRACE again rec 20 rd SA fire fr same SEL. Empl 81mm and 4.2 mort, and arty w unk results.

10 JUL - 1425 hr, BR355612, D/1-12 rpt that Gladiator 10 rec eight rd SKS gnd to air fire fr 200 m southeast. The acft rec one hit. D empl SA and arty. At 1550 hr D(-) was sweeping toward SEL w another elm fr D securing the IZ. At that time the IZ rec 7-8 rd 60mm mort impacting 150 m northeast of the IZ. SEL for mort fire was in same vic as init SEL. D again empl arty. D cont sweep finding two bunkers and a trail running east-west on ft wide. Bunkers dest.

11 JUL - 0830 hr, IZ TERRACE rec 7-8 rd SA fire fr 700 m south. Neg empl due to D co's mov toward SEL.

0910 hr, IZ TERRACE again rec 30 rd AK-47 fire along w .51 cal fire fr 700 m south. Again neg rtn fire was empl due to D co's loc.

12 JUL - 1040 hr, BR360613, D/1-12 obsr seven en w unk type wpn 150 m

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to their N. D empl gunships and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1224 hr, BR368761, 2A/1-12 while mov on fresh trail to the west, pt elm obsr flash believed to be muzzle flash 75 m to their front. Pt man empl SA, swept area and found one elderly mtyd female KIA.

1300 hr, BR565775, Rcn/1-22 found shallow grave w one NVA KBA, three weeks old.

1300 hr, BR567777, Rcn(-)/1-22 found shallow grave w one NVA KBA, three weeks old.

13 JUL - 0608 hr, BR566774, Rcn(-)/1-22 rec 20 rd AK-47 fire and three ChiCom gren fr est 4-5 indiv. 40 m N. Empl claymore, SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1623 hr, BR358608, 3D/1-12 rec 20-30 rd SA fire fr est two indiv 75 m southwest. Empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

14 JUL - 0915 hr, BR573744, 2D/1-22 rec 75-100 rd SA fire fr 100 m south. Empl 4.2 mort, SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

15 JUL - 0745 hr, BR565826, 3B/1-22 rec 10-15 rd AK fire fr 150 m south. Empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1117 hr, BR565815, 2B/1-22 obsr mov 15 m to their west. Obsr two en w AK-47's fleeing west. Empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1519 hr, BR365613, D/1-12 rec five rd 60mm mort, impact 25 m northwest (three duds), fr SEL 500 m southwest. Empl arty and gunships. Swept area w neg findings.


16 JUL - 1330 hr, BR565824, 3B/1-22 obsr two en 150 m to their northeast. Empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1400 hr, BR566963, 3D/1-14 obsr 4-6 en 30 m to their south. Empl SA and arty. 3D rec 30 rd AK rtn fire. Swept area, found two en KIA and cptr one AK-47 and two full AK-47 magazines.

1520 hr, BR569817, 2B/1-22 amb obsr two en 75 m to their southeast wearing khaki shirts w neg wpn. Amb sprung prematurely by dog handler. Swept area w neg findings.

17 JUL - No significant events.

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Chronological Summary of Significant Events (U) (cont)

18 JUL - No significant events.

19 JUL - 0930 hr, BR591757, D/1-22 found two huts. One cntn grave of one male body kd by SA, 3-4 weeks old.

1000 hr, BR549889, 1A/1-14 rec 30-40 rd AK fire fr 50 m north-west resulting in one US WIA. Empl SA and gunships. Swept area w neg findings.

1020 hr, BR570821, 2B/1-22 init contact w three indiv in a bunker complex 30 m to their northeast. Neg rtn fire. 2B empl arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1130 hr, BR549889, 1A/1-14 init contact w two indiv on trail 50 m to their northwest. Neg rtn fire. 1A empl arty. Swept finding blood trail. Tracker tm inserted w neg fur findings.

1134 hr, BR538816, 3C/1-22, init contact w two en 25 m to their southwest. 3C empl SA and arty. Swept finding blood trail, fol trail, found one en KIA and cptr one US cbn w full 30 rd magazine.

1514 hr, BR319750, 3A/1-12 obsr one mtyd 100 m to their south in open. Mtyd walked into woodline to east, rtn walking pt for three NVA/VC in green fatigues w AK-47's and rucksacks. Sniper w 3A engaged en at 100 m. En fled east. 3A swept, found two rucksacks. Neg arty empl.

1530 hr, BR543982, B/1-14 init contact w one en w unk type wpn 35 m to their south. En rtn three rd SA and fled south. B swept area w neg findings.

20 JUL - 1540 hr, BR545893, 1A/1-14 obsr two en w unk type wpn 200 m to their northwest. 1A empl SA and 81mm mort. Swept area w neg findings.

21 JUL - 0918 hr, BR505990, Rcn/1-14 rec 20 rd AK-47 fire fr 50 m east resulting in one US WIA. Rcn empl SA, 4.2 mort and arty. Rcn swept area w neg findings.

1000 hr, and 1105 hr, LZ TERRACE rec ten rd SA fire fr 700 m south. 2B/1-22 empl SA and arty w unk results.

1109 hr, BR549889, Gladiator 299 in spt of A/1-14 hit stump at 1A's LZ and crashed resulting in seven US WIA. Left was blown in place.

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1510 hr, LZ TERRACE, 2B/1-22 obsr one indiv believed to be carrying an SKS 900 m to their northeast. 2B empl arty. En fled south.

22 JUL - 1235 hr, BR621778, 1C/1-22 obsr one indiv w neg wpn mov into a rock formation 50 m west. 1C empl arty. Swept area w neg findings.

23 JUL - 0715 hr, BR637773, 2C/1-22 mech amb detonated resulting in one en KIA, and cptr one AK-47 w magazine, 51 rd AK-47 ammo and rucksack.

1057 hr, BR635775, 2C/1-22 init contact w one en 50 m N. Empl SA and arty. Swept, found one AK-47, one rucksack and a hv blood trail. 2C fol blood trail, obsr one indiv 50 m to their east. Empl SA. Swept area w neg findings.

1330 hr, BR288668, B/7-17 Cav obsr four en w wpn and rucksacks. Gunships exp w unk results. At 1350 hr, B obsr six more en w wpn and rucksacks. Gunships exp resulting in one en KIA. At 1535 hr, 3A/1-12 inserted fr FSB UTE to BR297659. 3A found one en KIA, and cptr one pistol, three rucksacks and some docu.

1350 hr, BR547885, 1A/1-14 rec 50 rd AK-47 fire fr three en 50 m to northeast and northwest resulting in three US WIA. 1A empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1355 hr, BR520636, D/1-10 Cav obsr 4-5 indiv. Gunships exp resulting in one en KIA.


1455 hr, LZ TERRACE, 2B/1-22 obsr one indiv 800 m southeast. Empl arty w unk results.

1500 hr, BR547885, 1A/1-14 obsr mov 50 m to their northeast and northwest. 1A empl SA. Neg rtn fire. One US WIA fr frd fire.

1500 hr, BR560892, Hornet 11/2d Bde obsr two en 100 m northwest of A(-)/1-14. Hornet 11 empl M60 and gunships resulting in one en KIA.

1810 hr, BR297659, 2A/1-12 obsr one en 50 m to their west. 2A empl SA resulting in one en KIA and one AK-47 CIA.

24 JUL - 0745 hr, BR295666, A(-)/1-12 while cdt sweep of SEL of 23 Jul contact area found one en KIA in green fatigues and rucksack.



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Chronological Summary of Significant Events (U) (cont)

0918 hr, BR558909, 1D/1-14 rec 10-15 rd SA fire fr 200 m northwest resulting in one US WIA. 1D empl SA, arty and gunships. Swept area w neg findings.

0925 hr, BR619953, 3B/1-14 rec 30-50 rd SA fire fr 75 m N. 3B empl SA. Swept area w neg findings.

0935 hr, BR619953, 3B/1-15 rec one ChiCom gren fr 20 m to their northeast. 3B empl SA and arty. En fled N. Swept area w neg findings.

1010 hr, BR583818, 1B/1-22 obsr two en 10 m to their west. 1B empl SA and arty. Swept area, found one en KIA w docu.

1230 hr, BR281659, B/7-17 Cav obsr one hut and rec gnd to air fire fr 80 m west causing forced landing at BR288659, result in total loss of acft. Neg US cas. Crew extracted.

1345 hr, BR292656, B/7-17 Cav obsr 15-20 indiv and rec SA gnd to air fire w neg hits. Gunships exp resulting in six en KIA. KIA's cfm by Cav LOH at low hover.

1350 hr, BR288658, B/7-17 Cav obsr unk no indiv in bunker and hut complex. Empl arty and air strike at 1420 hr. Cav LOH cdt a bomb dam assessment ofm four en KIA by arty, six en KIA by air strike, ten bunkers and five huts dest.

1420 hr, BR292659, B/7-17 Cav obsr 15 indiv running south along ridge line. Empl arty, obsr rd on tgt resulting in est ten en KBA.

1445 hr, IZ LOUIS, C/1-14 obsr one indiv 400 m south of peri. Empl SA and 81mm mort. Swept area w neg findings.

1510 hr, BR470636, D/1-10 Cav rec unk no SA gnd to air fire w neg hits.

1515 hr, BR465644, D/1-10 Cav obsr 5-6 indiv lv a bunker. Gunships exp and rec unk amt of rtn gnd to air fire resulting in one hit in underside of gunship. The Aero Rifle Plt was inserted at 1540 hr and init contact w unk no indiv resulting in two en KIA and cptr one SKS and 14 indiv ident as VMC. At 1720 hr the Aero Rifle Plt found 200 lb rice and 120 rd SA ammo in a hut.

1520 hr, IZ UTE, CP/1-12 obsr one indiv 700 m to their southeast. Empl arty. Swept area w neg findings.

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- 1550 hr, BR284654, B/7-17 Cav and Cider O1 FAC obsr est 30-40 en mov south into woodline, empl arty and air strike at 1625 hr. Resulting in six en KIA by arty, eight KIA by air strike, cfm by cav LOH at low hover.
- 1620 hr, BR285651, B/7-17 Cav obsr est 12 indiv mov south. Gunships exp resulting in eight KIA, cfm by cav LOH at low hover.
- 25 JUL - 1030 hr, BR318657, 3C/1-12 obsr two VMC and one NVA walking south on a north-south trail. 3C empl SA at 25 m, resulting in one VMC KIA, wearing loin clo, who was walking pt for NVA, and one VMC WIA. The one NVA fled on trail. 3C pursued, empl SA. Resulting in one NVA KIA, wearing pith helmet, green fatigues and rucksack.
- 1400 hr, BR612951, 1B/1-14 rec 10-15 rd SA fire fr 100 m N. Resulting in one US WIA. 1B empl SA and 81mm mort. Swept area w neg findings.
- 1625 hr, BR547889, 1A/1-14 rec 20 rd AK fire fr 200 m east. 1A empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.
- 1835 hr, BR544885, 3A/1-14 init contact w two indiv 50 m to their west. Neg rtn fire. There was one en KIA, wearing black pajamas and rucksack.
- 1910 hr, BR587816, Recon sniper tm/1-22 init contact w one en 50 m to their N. En was obsr crawling toward their pos. Neg rtn fire. Swept found one AK-47 CIA, hit by SA. Cont sweep w neg fur findings.
- 1935 hr, BR598967, 3B/1-14 had a mech amb detonate and rec 10 rd AK fire fr unk dis and dir. Empl SA, swept and found one en KIA, w neg wpn, in black pajamas. Believed to be other indiv in area. 3B cont sweep in AM.
- 26 JUL - 0802 hr, BR598967, 3B/1-14 swept area where amb detonated on 25 JUL, found four en KIA (three by amb, one by SA), while cptr two AK-50's, four full magazines, one M-26, and one NVA rucksack.
- 1405 hr, BR280655, B/1-12 rept one Gladiator lift acft crashed in PZ due to power failure. Resulting in seven US inj. Acft ext. at 1535 hr.
- 27 JUL - 1000 hr, BS529001, 3C/1-14 obsr one en in black pajamas w AK-47, 30 m to their northwest. OP empl SA, w 3 rd rtn fire. Swept area w neg findings.



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Chronological Summary of Significant Events (U) (cont)

1300 hr, BR586818, sniper tm/1-22 obsr two en, 60 m to their south. Sniper tm empl SA and arty. Swept found one M-1 cbn CIA.

28 JUL - 1305 hr, BR621783, sniper tm/1-22 obsr one en w unk type wpn 50 m to their northwest. Sniper tm empl SA, swept found 10 lb bag of rice w two bullet holes in it. En fled to northwest.

1610 hr, BR588722, 3A/1-22 rec five rd 60mm mort impacting 30 m to their N fr 200 m to their northeast, resulting in one US WIA (slight). 3A empl 4.2 in mort. Swept area w neg findings.

29 JUL - 0825 hr, BR626795, 1C/1-22 obsr one en w unk type wpn, 40 m to their northwest. 1C empl SA and arty. Swept area w neg findings.

1656 hr, BR623790, 1C/1-22 had a mech amb detonate resulting in one en KIA, one AK-47 w 30 rd AK, and several docu CIA.

30 JUL - 0713 hr, BR589722, A/1-22 rec 20 rd SA fire fr 100 m west. A empl SA and 4.2 in mort. Swept area w neg findings.

1555 hr, BR290548, 3B/1-12 rec unk am of auto wpn fire fr est sqd sized en force. Resulting in one US KIA. 3B empl SA, arty and gunships. Swept area w neg findings.

31 JUL - 1445 hr, BR 619791, C/1-22 had a mech amb detonate, resulting in one en KIA, one AK-47, 60 rd AK ammo, and numerous docu CIA.

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY (BINH TAY #1)

1. (C) Summary of Personnel and Equipment Losses

US KIA	43
US WIA	118
NVA KIA	212
NVA CIA	7
Weapons and Equipment	
CS Weapons	20
SA Weapons	859
Rice CIA	591 tons
Structures Destroyed	2,157
Ammunition	10,797 Rounds SA
	717 Rounds Mortar
	141 Rounds Recoilless Rifle
	612 Grenades
	224 Rounds B-40

2. (C) Casualty Causes

a. Friendly Casualties

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
Ground Contact (Frnd Initiated)	9	18
Ground Contact (Enemy Initiated)	20	65
Ground Contact at an LZ	1	9
Sapper Attack	2	6
Ground to Air Fire	6	8
Non-Battle Casualties	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>
Total	43	118

b. Enemy Casualties

Air Cavalry	30
Tac Air/B-52	48
C/75 Ranger	16
Ground Contact	118
Artillery	<u>UNDIM</u>
Total	212

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC-MH

20 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division
Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. General

(1) During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation DAN QUYEN-HINES.

(2) Organizational Structure. Task Organization, Operation HINES, 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970, is set forth in Inclosure 1.

(3) Commanders and major staff as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.

(4) Locations, coordinates of villages, LZ's, and FSB's are listed at Inclosure 5.

(5) Mission: The 4th Infantry Division conducted operations to support GVN pacification programs; to locate, pursue and destroy VC/NVA elements attempting to disrupt pacification; to screen routes of infiltration along the CAMBODIAN border; to locate and destroy enemy resources, installations and command facilities in CAMBODIA, and to secure the major LOC within its area of operation.

(6) Concept of Operation: At the beginning of the period, the division had one brigade operating to the north of Camp Radcliff targeted against the GIA LAI Provincial unit, and one brigade was operating to the south in the DAK PAYOU Valley against the 95B Regiment. CAMBODIAN border screening operations were conducted preliminary to division operations in CAMBODIAN Base Area 702. In support of ARVN operations in CAMBODIA the division provided the support of two infantry battalions in the PLEI TRAP Valley. Highway 19, the major LOC in the division area of operation, was secured with a minimum of one cavalry squadron, and one brigade began an IFTV directed mission in eastern BINH DINH Province in support of the pacification effort.

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b. Intelligence

(1) General

(a) Enemy activity in BINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces during May consisted of scattered sapper attacks, attacks by fire, and attacks against lines of communication. These offensive actions were taken to weaken and delay allied operations being conducted in enemy base areas located in CAMBODIA. Sapper attacks and attacks by fire were conducted against division support elements and Highway 19 was interdicted on both sides of PLEIKU in an effort to retard the movement of men and supplies. In Base Area 702, enemy resistance to 4th Infantry Division operations ranged from non-existent to moderate. According to documents captured in CAMBODIA, the enemy had warning as early as 17 March 1970 of the probability of friendly operations, and had moved much of his stockpile of supplies deeper into CAMBODIA. Contacts were fought with stay-behind elements and with enemy units guarding supplies that had not been withdrawn. Several large caches and medical facilities showed that even with prior warning the enemy had not been able to remove his troops and supplies to safety.

(b) During June, enemy activity was light in both BINH DINH and PLEIKU Provinces. Division elements operated in Base Area 202 against the 95B Regiment and north of AN KHE against elements of the 3d NVA Division. Enemy forces avoided contact with division units and concentrated on resupply and the disruption of pacification. There were two large engagements during the month, one in each of the operational areas which resulted in over 50 enemy killed, three captured and one HOI CHANH. Enemy activity decreased in all forms after its highpoint of the previous month.

(c) In July, activity in BINH DINH Province remained light while increasing in PLEIKU Province to a moderate level. Enemy activity in both provinces indicated that large numbers of replacements were being infiltrated to various units in the division area of operation. North of AN KHE, three infiltration groups were identified, while CIDG units in the PLEI ME area engaged a fourth. Division units were targeted against these groups, plus the 95B Regiment, the 2d Regiment, and elements of the 3d NVA Division. In BINH DINH Province the enemy generally continued to avoid contact, but in PLEIKU a moderate increase began the latter part of the month with attacks by fire against several major installations.

(2) PLEIKU

Activity in PLEIKU Province was moderate during May as 4th Infantry Division and allied units launched operations into enemy sanctuaries in CAMBODIA. Division elements experienced ground to air

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fire and met sporadic contact during the initial landings in CAMBODIA. During the remainder of the operation, enemy elements attempted to avoid US forces. Several large medical facilities were found, over 500 tons of rice was captured, and on 12 May, a weapons cache containing over 800 weapons was found. After 4th Division units withdrew from the CAMBODIAN phase of the operation, ARVN rangers made contact with a large enemy force in a regimental size base camp, resulting in over 40 NVA soldiers being killed and 2000 mortar and 500 B-40 rocket rounds being captured. On 24 May, the ARVN rangers engaged a large enemy force, resulting in 31 enemy KIA and one prisoner. To the south, in Base Area 701, ARVN units captured three 75mm pack howitzers, eleven 75mm RR and numerous small arms. A PW captured in this base area identified the 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment as being located there and told of a "K7" Battalion, 24th Regiment which had been formed in September 1969. Operations conducted by the 4th Division in the lower PLEI TRAP Valley after withdrawing from CAMBODIA resulted in 17 NVA killed in a number of engagements.

In the vicinity of PLEIKU City, the K631st Composite Battalion attacked the city with 122mm rockets, and 82mm mortars, and in addition interdicted Highway 19 west of the city with attacks by fire. On 4 May, LZ OASIS received 32 rounds of mixed 75mm RR and 82mm mortar fire. To the east of the city, LE TRUNG District Headquarters received 107mm rockets twice.

Action in PLEIKU Province remained light during June, as division elements operated in Base Area 202 against the 95B Regiment. The most significant incident occurred when D/1-14th Inf observed 70 enemy soldiers crossing an open field. Artillery, gunships, and tactical air were employed in support of the ground unit resulting in 28 enemy killed. To the east of the base area, a cache was found containing a 57mm RR, a 60mm mortar and ammunition for both weapons. Activity along Highway 19 decreased as allied troops withdrew from CAMBODIA. The largest incident occurred west of PLEIKU where the 2d Battalion (Mech), 8th Infantry was probed in a night location by an unknown size enemy force. Employing organic weapons, the alert 2-8th killed two NVA, and while sweeping the next morning found many blood trails leading away from the area.

Activity increased during July as enemy forces attacked RF/PF forces to the north and west of PLEIKU City, and the 95B Regiment and K631st Composite Battalion were identified southwest of PLEIKU. In the PLEI MRONG area, RF's engaged an unknown size enemy force. While sweeping after the contact, four VMC and four 122mm rockets were captured. The rockets were intended for the artillery company of the 408th Sapper Battalion. To the southwest of PLEIKU in the PLEI ME area, CIDG forces engaged small enemy forces throughout the month. PW's and captured documents identified these enemy troops as the 2201 Infiltration Group.

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Other PW's and documents identified the K1 Battalion, 95B Regiment and the K631st Battalion. These units will conduct joint operations in that area in the future. On 16 July, Camp Enari received 23 rounds of mixed 122mm rocket and 82mm mortar fire from the south and southwest. At the same time a village to the south of Camp Enari received 75mm RR fire. The next night the CIDG camp at PLEI ME received 82mm mortar fire. Along Highway 19, both east and west of PLEIKU City, enemy activity was light and limited to mining incidents and harassing fire.

(3) BINH DINH

Enemy activity in BINH DINH Province was light during May as 4th Division units conducted operations in CAMBODIA. Enemy actions consisted of harassing actions against lines of communication and against the 4th Infantry Division base camp at Camp Radcliff. During this period Camp Radcliff received two attacks by fire and two sapper attacks. On 11 May, the camp received 18 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and on 16 May received eight additional rounds. The two sapper attacks were targeted against the 704th Maintenance Battalion and resulted in damage to vehicles and buildings. Upon return from CAMBODIA, elements of the 2d Brigade deployed north of AN KHE to operate against the C2/407th Sapper Battalion. The only enemy initiated incident during the operation was an attack by fire against LZ KIOVA consisting of ten rounds of 60mm mortar fire.

Activity decreased in BINH DINH during June as units from the 2d Brigade engaged an infiltration group and killed 29 enemy, captured three and one HOI CHANH. The PW's identified their unit as the 2d Training Regiment, and documents captured at the site of the contact identified the infiltration group as the D1122 Group. Food caches found during the month totaled 45,948 pounds of rice. A clothing storage area also was found containing 500 pounds of clothes including several ROK and US uniforms. On 30 June, elements of the 1-14th Infantry discovered a large NVA base camp that was believed to have been a 3d NVA Division Headquarters due to the complexity and variety of the structures found. It was estimated to have been used within the previous two days by 300-400 people. Enemy activity against US fire support bases consisted of harassing and small arms fire and one 60mm mortar attack against LZ TERRACE. Along Highway 19, interdiction attempts were light except for a contact on 20 June in the ROK area of operation that resulted in several US vehicles being damaged or destroyed.

During July, enemy units in BINH DINH Province generally continued to avoid contact with the 4th Infantry Division, and placed their emphasis on the food procurement, resupply, and disruption of pacification. The largest action of the month occurred on 23-24 July when aviation elements spotted an unknown size enemy force. Artillery, gunships, tactical air, and maneuver elements of the 4th Infantry Division were

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employed which resulted in 43 enemy killed. The enemy carried documents that identified them as members of the 1126 Infiltration Group. On 6 July a PW was captured as he was leading replacements to the 50th LF Battalion. Documents captured at the same time as the PW identified his replacements as being from the D1122 Infiltration Group, the same group that was engaged by the 1-22d Infantry in June. Other documents captured during the month told of a 230 man group that would cross "a highway" on 10 July on their way to PHU YEN Province. Later in the month, two deserters from an infiltration group were captured and they identified their group as the 250th Infantry Battalion. This evidence indicates that the enemy may be making a major effort to build up his units prior to September, possibly for a new offensive.

(4) Estimated enemy composition, disposition, and strength as of 31 July 1970:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
3d NVA Division Headquarters	2400	Northern BINH DINH
12th Regiment	1310	Base Area 226
2d VC Regiment	950	Northern BA 226
500th Transportation Battalion	350	North of BA 226
95B Regiment	700	Base Area 202
X-45 LF Battalion	200	Southwest of Camp Nhari
408th Sapper Battalion	300	Northeast of FLEIKU
H-15 LF Battalion	200	East of Camp Nhari
243d Trans Battalion	300	Northwest of AN KHE
K631st Composite Battalion	300	West of FLEIKU
Infra Structure	4235	
Guerilla Forces	1000	
Total Enemy Forces	12245+	

(5) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques

(a) A PW captured in FLEIKU Province has indicated that the K1 Battalion, 95B Regiment is to interdict Highway 19 west of FLEIKU. This is a new mission for the K1 Battalion, and in an area further north than this battalion normally operates. The same PW has stated that the K631st Composite Battalion will work with the K1 Battalion in some future operations in unknown locations.

(b) During operations in CAMBODIA, it was noted that most LZ's had huts on them and fences built around them. It was later proven that the enemy had built these huts to make US forces believe that these areas were inhabited. Actually only two LZ watchers would live in the huts and report any attempted insertions on their LZ.

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(6) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses

(a) Personnel:	KIA (BC)	380
	NVA CIA	13
	VC/VMC CIA	4

(b) Weapons:	SA	880
	CS	41

(c) Ammunition:	SA rounds	15,372
	CS rounds	1,430
	Grenades	761
	Mines	158

(d) Miscellaneous Captured Items:

Rice	590.5 tons
Documents	397,460 pages

(7) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probably Courses of Action:

(a) Capabilities

1 The 2d VC Regiment, 3d NVA Division, has the capability to conduct multi-battalion sized attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas in the PHU MY District.

2 The 12th Regiment, 3d NVA Division, has the capability to conduct multi-battalion attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas supported by 122mm rockets. They can also interdict Highway 19 from AN KHE to the coast.

3 The 95B Regiment is capable of conducting up to battalion sized attacks against Highway 19, fire support bases, and GVN villages.

4 The 408th Sapper Battalion is capable of conducting multi-company size sapper attacks supported by 107mm rockets, and attacks by fire against allied and GVN installations in the PLEIKU area.

5 The K631st Composite Battalion is capable of conducting multi-company attacks supported by mortars, recoilless rifle, and 122mm rockets, and attacks by fire against allied installations, villages, and lines of communication west of PLEIKU City, and upon the city itself.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities

1 Enemy units are subject to airstrikes, and artillery fire while moving, in bivouac, or massing for an attack.

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- 2 Enemy munitions and food caches are vulnerable to allied search and clear operations.
- 3 Enemy movement can be detected by airborne and ground sensor devices.
- 4 Enemy bivouac sites can be located by airborne personnel detection and red haze detection devices.
- 5 Enemy lines of communication are overextended and subject to interdiction by allied forces.
- 6 Low morale, personnel losses, and shortages of food and medical supplies provide an excellent climate for psychological warfare operations.

(c) Probable Courses of Action

- 1 The enemy will probably continue to attempt to resupply, replace, and retrain his personnel in preparation for possible offensives in the fall.
- 2 The 2d Regiment will probably move to the VINH THANH Valley area to receive replacements and conduct retraining.
- 3 The 12th Regiment will probably continue to interdict Highway 19 east of AN KHE, disrupt pacification, and possibly attempt to procure food in the PHU CAT area.
- 4 Local forces in BINH DINH will probably continue to harass the pacification program and conduct psychological operations against allied units.
- 5 In FLEIKU Province, the K631st Composite Battalion will probably continue attacks by fire against friendly installations and harassment of villages and RF/PF forces.
- 6 The 408th Sapper Battalion will probably continue its attacks against FLEIKU City and LE TRUNG District Headquarters.
- 7 The 95B Regiment will probably continue to interdict Highway 19 between AN KHE and FLEIKU and possibly harass GVN villages in conjunction with local force units.
- 8 Local force units will probably continue harassment of lines of communication, providing intelligence for main force units, and disrupting pacification.

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(8) Military Intelligence Activities

(a) General: During the quarter, the 4th Military Intelligence Company provided Counterintelligence, Imagery Interpretation, Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Order of Battle support to the division. This included maximum effort in intelligence collection and production prior to the CAMBODIAN operation and general support during the course of those operations.

(b) Counterintelligence: The operations of the CI Section during the quarter included targeting individuals and small local force units, increasing the VIP Program, and developing agent sources within the Camp Radcliff area. Continual operations were carried on to screen all indigenous employees at all 4th Division base camps and to develop agent sources within these employees.

(c) Interrogation of Prisoners of War: Accurate and timely information was provided the division by the effective interrogation of prisoners of war and the accurate translation of captured documents by the IYW Section. The section was also able to provide detailed information through the skillful exploitation of prisoners and HOI CHANHS. This was particularly noticeable during the operation in CAMBODIA, where the information gained by these interrogations and translations resulted in many tactical targets being found and destroyed.

(d) Duffelbag Operations: During the last three months the Duffelbag program has continued to increase sensor coverage along Highway 19 and in the Camp Radcliff TAOR. During this period a complete sensor system was emplaced around the Golf Course Army Airfield and aviation personnel were trained in the employment of the sensors. Technical support was also given to the 1st Logistical Command to assist that organization with the employment of sensors.

(e) G2 Air Reconnaissance: The G2 Air Section has provided continual support for the division with VR, airborne personnel detection, red haze and photo missions. Close coordination with the Imagery Interpretation Section has given the field commander timely and accurate photographic coverage of an operational area. Photographic studies prepared of the major areas of enemy activity have provided increased intelligence on enemy operational areas, his tactical procedures and subsistence methods. A study of Red Haze readings has established that early morning missions provide the greatest accuracy.

(f) Order of Battle Section: An automatic data processing system developed by the Order of Battle Section has allowed the storage and instant recall of thousands of hard intelligence facts. Since it became operational during the latter part of May, the system has provided useful and timely information not only to the G2 section, but to the G3 and G5

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division staff sections and battalion S2 and S3 sections and LRRP teams. Current usage has averaged over one and a half times a day and has been steadily rising since its conception. In addition the section has provided timely and accurate analyses of enemy movement, trends, and capabilities.

(9) Weather Forecasting

(a) Support provided

1	Hourly weather observations	3000
2	Special weather observations	420
3	Routine scheduled forecasts and amendments	305
4	Planning forecast issued to select staff agencies twice daily	180
5	Aircraft accident reports (Summary of existing weather at the time)	10
6	Monthly climatology reports for II MR	3
7	Out of station briefings conducted at request of staff agencies	30
8	Telephone requests for weather information	3500
9	Area climatology summaries and special area of long range forecasts	10
10	Climatology briefings and safety briefings to aviation companies	6

(b) The most significant operational problem occurred during BINH TAY #1 when approaching monsoons placed a severe limitation time on operations being conducted in CAMBODIA.

c. Operations and Training Activities

(1) Operations

(a) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 1, Inclosure 4, at the beginning of this reporting period.

As the period began, both brigades were disposed and involved in two major operations. The 1st Brigade was operating in the DAK PAYOU (VC) Valley area while the 2d Brigade was working to the north of

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AN KHE targeted against the GIA LAI Provincial unit. On 2 May both brigades received warning orders to cease operations and prepare to redispense their forces in preparation for a major operation in CAMBODIA.

The redispense of forces began with the 3-506th Airborne Battalion of the 1st Brigade, which was operating in the DAK PAYOU Valley area, airlifting from LZ MATTIE to Camp Radcliff. The 1-12 Inf (-), 1-22 Inf, and 2-35 Inf of the 2d Brigade also began their moves into Camp Radcliff. On 4 May, the 3-12th Inf, operating in the DAK PAYOU Valley area, with 1st Brigade elements reverted to division control, and returned to Camp Radcliff to begin base camp security operations. In addition, the 1st Brigade tactical command post airlifted to NEW FLEI DJERENG, while the remaining elements of its command post group and the 3-506 Airborne Battalion convoyed overland to Camp Holloway near FLEIKU. The 1-14th Inf moved overland and closed on LZ MEREDITH, and then prepared to continue to move overland the next day to NEW FLEI DJERENG, where it would begin its combat assault. The 3-8th Inf remained at Camp Radcliff and continued preparations for the operation.

The redispense of forces continued through 6 May with 2d Brigade elements occupying LZ MEREDITH, LZ JACKSON HOLE, and LZ OASIS. The 3-8th Inf of the 1st Brigade convoyed overland on 5 May from Camp Radcliff and closed LZ MEREDITH preparing to combat assault on 6 May.

All aircraft on 5 May, D-Day, were dedicated to the single lift of one battalion at a time. This involved the use of some sixty lift ships to first move the 3-506th Airborne Battalion to its objective area. The first aircraft into the LZ received heavy ground to air fire. Because no suitable alternate LZ was available, the mission had to be aborted due to time and distance factors.

In spite of airstrip congestion at NEW FLEI DJERENG, control factors, dust, and an inadequate number of refuel/rearm points, three major attempts were made on 5 May to insert the 3-506th. LZ's finally used were located at YA 413537 and YA 415545. By the end of D-Day (5 May), only one battalion with supporting elements was operational in CAMBODIA. Because there had been little time to pre-position all elements forward for multiple assaults, the short time span did not make any allowances for imperfections in the execution phase.

On 6 May the 1st Brigade continued to insert its forces into CAMBODIA. Enemy fire severely hampered the insertion of the 3-8th Inf, and airstrikes were unable to suppress the enemy fire. However, after the insertion of only sixty men in an alternate LZ, one helicopter was shot down. Another try was made, however, resulting in two damaged aircraft. Throughout the remainder of the day the 1-14th Inf fared somewhat better and was able to insert 75% of its troops, which completed the brigade activities of 6 May. The 1st Brigade completed the balance

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of its moves on 7 May with twelve aircraft. The 2d Brigade used the other 48 lift ships to move its three battalions (1-12, 1-22, and 2-35) into their fire bases. They experienced no significant enemy contacts during the remainder of the lift.

Ground and air operations conducted against the enemy in CAMBODIA were generally light to moderate actions. The contacts resulted in some 212 enemy KIA. (See Inclosure 6).

Several significant cache discoveries were also made during the course of this operation. Elements of the 3-506 Abn Battalion for instance, found a huge rice cache of approximately 500 tons and a weapons and ammunition cache containing over 800 individual weapons. (See Inclosure 6).

Even though the major tactical effort was completed on 16 May 70 with the extraction of the division elements from CAMBODIA, because of ARVN operations that were continuing in Base Area 702, both the 3-8th and 3-506th Infantry Battalions established fire bases in the FLEI TRAP Valley. This provided contingency fire support just east of the CAMBODIAN border for the ARVN battalions which continued to operate in the vicinity of the cache sites discovered earlier by the 3-506 Airborne Battalion.

(b) Division Controlled Operations

During May, the 2-8th (Mech) Inf conducted operations west of Highway 14, between FLEIKU and KONTUM. The battalion conducted operations north of AN KHE, east and west of Highway 508 in the first part of June and moved west to operate between FLEIKU and the CAMBODIAN border in the latter part of June. During July the battalion conducted operations south of AN KHE down Highway 2E, east and west of the SONG BA River.

The first week in May the battalion continued to clear and secure Highway 14 from FLEIKU to KONTUM with its command post at LZ RIPPLE. Two companies were employed to strong point the road and to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in the area adjacent to the highway. During the hours of darkness the companies set ambushes and augmented the bridge defenses of the 1-6th RF Company by deploying mounted squads at bridge sites. A third company with two platoons dismounted conducted search and clear operations and saturation ambushing to the northwest of FLEIKU. No significant contact was made with the enemy during this period.

On 4 May the battalion assumed the mission of securing the road from Junction Highway 19 west and Highway 14 to NEW FLEI DJERENG. Each company mineswept the road and positioned strong points in that portion of the road assigned to it.

On 8 May the 2-1st Cavalry relieved the battalion of its road security mission and the battalion then set up a command post at NEW

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PLEI DJERENG and secured that logistical base. A third company conducted dismounted reconnaissance in force operations west of NEW PLEI DJERENG. D/7-17th Cav (attached) and A/2-1st Cav (OPCON) mineswept and secured other lines of communication surrounding NEW PLEI DJERENG. Convoy escorts were provided when required.

(c) Division Artillery

1 1st Brigade: The 1st Brigade, supported by the 6-29th Arty, conducted operations against elements of the 95B Regiment in Base Area 202 (VC Valley). The operation was initiated in April 1970, and on 1 May, Task Force Pursuit of the 101st Airborne was on LZ MATTLE with three howitzers at LZ BIG WINDY. B/6-29th Arty, in direct support of the 3-12 Infantry was on LZ DORIS, A/6-29th Arty and C/6-29th Arty were at Camp Radcliff making final preparations for the airlift into the base area. The next day the brigade received a warning order to prepare for an assault into CAMBODIA on 5 May. The 3-506th Infantry of Task Force Pursuit became OPCON to the 1st Brigade, D/2-320 Arty OPCON 6-29th Arty on 3 May, and D/2-320 Arty and B/6-29th Arty airlifted to Camp Radcliff from their locations in VC Valley. On 4 May the 6-29th Arty tactical command post moved overland to NEW PLEI DJERENG to provide coordination for the planned operation.

D/2-320 Arty was airlifted with the 3-506 Abn from Camp Holloway to LZ CURANSE in CAMBODIA. On 6 May, C/6-29th Arty airlifted from NEW PLEI DJERENG to LZ DRAGON. Meanwhile, the advance party from A/6-29th Arty combat assaulted to the vicinity of grid YA 488639, and began fighting to secure the area for a fire base for the 3-8th Infantry. The company commander of C/3-8th Infantry was killed in the action, and the battery commander of A/6-29th Arty took command of the company, organized a defense for its position, called in artillery and sent out patrols. A/6-29th Arty suffered two WIA and C/6-29th Arty supported the ensuing contact with close-in artillery fire until the next morning when the enemy fled the area. On the following day, A/6-29th Arty airlifted from LZ MEREEDITH to LZ PHILLIPS, where it joined its advance party.

Orders were received the second week in May to withdraw from CAMBODIA, but 4th Division Artillery would continue to provide artillery support for two ranger battallions (ARVN) that continued to operate in the base area, from two fire bases occupied to the east of the border in the PLEI TRAP Valley.

On 17 May D/2-320 Arty airlifted with the 3-506 Abn from LZ WILDCAT to NEW PLEI DJERENG where it chopped to Task Force Pursuit control for an airlift by C-130 to BAN ME THUOT. C/6-29th Arty airlifted from NEW PLEI DJERENG to LZ WILDCAT to provide artillery fire support for Operation BINH TAY #2, and B/6-29th Arty convoyed from Camp Radcliff

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to NEW FLEI DJERENG to provide artillery support to the 1st Brigade tactical command post at NEW FLEI DJERENG. As ARVN operations closed in the base area on 25 May, A/6-29th Arty airlifted from LZ SCOTT to NEW FLEI DJERENG, C/6-29th Arty airlifted from LZ WILDGAT to NEW FLEI DJERENG, and A/1-92 Arty airlifted to NEW FLEI DJERENG where it returned to the 52d Arty Group control, terminating Operation BINH TAY #2.

After a brief standdown, the 1st Brigade received a new mission to search and clear suspected staging and headquarters areas of the 95B Regiment in the DAK PAYOU Valley area. The brigade concept of operation was to encircle the objective areas with battalion size forces and send a one company sweep through the objective area. Initially the 3-12th Infantry and 1-14th Infantry were working in the northern portion of Base Area 202 with the 3-8th Infantry in the southeast portion of Base Area 202. The artillery fire support plan called for one 105mm battery to be located at LZ BUCKEYE, one 105mm battery and a platoon of 155mm howitzers at LZ DORIS. The 6-29th Arty tactical command post relocated to LZ BLACKHAWK to facilitate command and control of the operation. By 1 June B/6-29th Arty had moved overland from Camp Radcliff to LZ BLACKHAWK and was airlifted to LZ BUCKEYE. On 2 June one platoon of A/1-92 Arty arrived by convoy at LZ BLACKHAWK and became GSR to the 6-29th Arty, and A/1-92 Arty then airlifted to LZ DORIS. A/5-16th Arty (-) at LZ ACTION became GSR to the 6-29th Arty while A/6-29th Arty moved overland from Camp Radcliff to LZ ACTION and airlifted to LZ NUTMEG. The first week of June was characterized by minor readjustments to ORCON artillery elements, and scattered enemy actions.

By 23 June the operation terminated and B/6-29th Arty returned to LZ BLACKHAWK where it spent the night before convoying to FLEIKU to provide support of Operation BINH TAY #4 and the GVN elections in eastern BINH DINH Province. On 26 June, C/6-29th Arty convoyed from LZ BLACKHAWK to LZ U-LIFT where it chopped to the control of the 173d Airborne Brigade to participate in Operation BINH TAY #4, in the PHU MY area. The GVN elections were held on 27 June and elements of the 1st Brigade were sent to populated areas to ensure minimum hostilities during the elections. The 3-8th Infantry went to the PHU MY District with C/6-29th Arty located at LZ U-LIFT and ORCON to the 173d Airborne Brigade.

The last week in June saw the 1st Brigade begin operations in the AN LAO Valley directed against elements of the 3d NVA Division. As the 2-35th Infantry chopped to control of the 1st Brigade with A/4-42 Arty on LZ WELCH OFCON to 6-29th Arty, one platoon of C/1-92 Arty (155mm towed) at LZ WELCH became GSR to the 6-29th Arty. A/6-29th Arty moved overland from Camp Wilson to Camp Radcliff and chopped to the control of 4-42d Arty. On 1 July the 6-29th Arty tactical command post moved overland to LZ ARMAGEDDON to facilitate better control of artillery fires.

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Operations continued to the northwest of Base Area 226 during July with minor readjustments of supporting artillery units.

2. 2d Brigade: During the first week in May 1970, the 2d Brigade with the 4-42d Arty in support, initiated operations with three infantry battalions with their direct support artillery batteries north of AN KHE against the GIA LAI Provincial units, only to be extracted suddenly when notice was received of the pending operation in CAMBODIA. A/4-42 Arty with the 2-35th Infantry airlifted from LZ RAQUEL to Camp Radcliff on 4 May, and then moved overland by convoy to LZ MEREDITH, southwest of Camp Enari on 6 May. B/4-42 Arty with the 1-12th Infantry moved overland by convoy from LZ AQUARIUS to Camp Radcliff on 4 May, and moved again by convoy to LZ OASIS on 5 May. C/4-42 Arty airlifted with the 1-22d Infantry from LZ NIAGARA to Camp Radcliff on 3 May, and on 5 May, C/4-42 Arty with the 1-22d Infantry moved by Air Force C-130 to FLEIKU Air Force Base and then moved overland on 6 May to LZ JACKSON HOLE. Operation BINH TAY I went into effect, and the 2d Brigade and 4-42 Arty established tactical command and operations centers at NEW PLEI DJERENG in conjunction with supporting elements. On 7 May the 2d Brigade was combat assaulted with three battalions of infantry and its respective direct support artillery batteries into multiple LZ's in Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA. A/4-42 Arty with the 2-35th Infantry combat assaulted from LZ MEREDITH to LZ CONQUEST. B/4-42 Arty and the 1-12th Infantry combat assaulted into LZ INVASION while C/4-42 Arty with the 1-22d Infantry combat assaulted into LZ SPEARHEAD. The 2d Brigade was targeted against enemy elements, installations, and facilities of the B-3 Front and the 24th NVA Regiment. On 12 May the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42 Arty were relocated by air assault into LZ COMMANCHE in the vicinity of YA 431635 with the 1-12th Infantry reverting to 1st Brigade control and B/4-42 Arty reverting to 6-29th Arty control. The 2d Brigade ceased operations in CAMBODIA on 14 May with the 1-22 Inf, 2-35th Inf, and their supporting artillery batteries being airlifted to NEW PLEI DJERENG. By the 16th, the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42 Arty, which had been OPCON to the 1st Brigade, airlifted to NEW PLEI DJERENG, reverting back to the 2d Brigade and the 4-42d Arty control respectively. All 2d Brigade supporting elements, maneuver battalions, and supporting artillery then moved overland to Camp Radcliff for a standdown and began preparations for future operations in BINH DINH Province.

Operation FUTNAM PARAGON was initiated on 18 May 1970 with the 2d Brigade inserting three infantry battalions to the north and west of Camp Radcliff to conduct offensive operations targeted against the C/2-407th Sapper Battalion and the GIA LAI Provincial headquarters in their known areas of operation. Emphasis was placed on small unit operations with ranger and recondo techniques used to the maximum. On 18 May the 1-22d Infantry (-) combat assaulted into multiple LZ's in its assigned area of operation with the command post and 4.2 mortars at LZ CHIPPEWA. However, C/4-42 Arty remained at Camp Radcliff

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providing responsive fires for IDGC and other elements of the 1-22d Infantry. On 21 May the 2-35th Infantry with A/4-42 Arty established a fire base at LZ WARRIOR and combat assaulted three companies into multiple LZ's in the area of operations. The 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42d Arty established a fire base at LZ KIOWA, and once again the 4-42d Arty had under its control its three organic firing batteries.

By 2 June the 2d Brigade had shifted its attention to elements of the GIA LAI Provincial headquarters further to the north of Camp Radcliff. In response to this, the 1-22d Infantry with C/4-42d Arty airlifted into LZ BAXTER. On 4 June, 1C/1-92 Arty (two tubes) of 155 airlifted from FSB BLACKHAWK to LZ BLACKHAWK to provide added support to the planned operations. In response to significant findings by the K-75 Rangers, the 1-12th Infantry combat assaulted into multiple LZ's to the west of LZ BAXTER. The command post of the 1-12th Infantry and B/4-42d Arty airlifted from LZ KIOWA to LZ CHEYENNE on 8 June.

The second week of June, the 2d Brigade received OFCON of the 2-8th Mech with the mission to provide road security along Highway 508 for engineering efforts on Hill 666. The battalion established its command post at LZ ARMAGEDDON with B/5-16th Arty in direct support. Consequently, B/5-16th Arty became OFCON 4-42d Arty effective 9 June. On 20 June, the 2-8th Mech was given the mission of road security from PLEIKU to DUC CO, as a result the brigade released OFCON of the 2-8th Mech and 4-42d Arty released OFCON B/5-16th Arty. The 2d Brigade continued to conduct offensive operations to the north of Camp Radcliff and to interdict the lines of communication between the GIA LAI Provincial headquarters and the 3d NVA Division. The lack of available air assets necessitated that all moves utilize overland routes as much as possible to conserve helicopter assets.

On 28 June the 2d Brigade released the 2-35th Infantry to 1st Brigade control and received OFCON 3-12th Infantry with its command post at LZ CHALLENGE. Consequently, the 4-42d Arty released A/4-42d Arty to 6-29th Arty OFCON and received OFCON B/6-29th Arty. C/1-92 Arty became GSR 6-29th Arty and 1A/1-92 Arty GSR 4-42d Arty.

The division now had two brigades targeted against the infiltration routes of the 3d NVA Division along the SUOI KON River and the GIA LAI Provincial unit along the SONG BA River, plus the C/2-407th Sapper Battalion to the northwest of Camp Radcliff. Command post/1-12th Infantry and B/4-42d Arty were repositioned at LZ UTE on 1 July to provide the necessary control and artillery coverage for the new 2d Brigade area of operation along the SONG BA River. Two tubes of D/5-16th Arty moved overland from Camp Radcliff to LZ ARMAGEDDON on 1 July to provide mutual support for LZ UTE and additional fire support for 2d Brigade maneuver elements. Command and control elements at the 2d Brigade and 4-42d Arty displaced to LZ ARMAGEDDON.

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During the remainder of July, 2d Brigade elements continued to conduct offensive operations to interdict the 3d NVA Division, GIA LAI Provincial headquarters and C/2-407 Sapper Battalion.

3 The 1-10th Cavalry, under division control, had the mission of securing Highway 19 from the AN KHE Pass to the PLEIKU sector boundary. The 5-16th Arty, in addition to its general support mission, provided two liaison sections and one 155mm SP battery in direct support. In early May, C/5-16th Arty was in direct support to the 1-10th Cavalry, with three tubes at LZ SCHUELLER and three tubes at LZ BLACKHAWK. On 28 June, B/5-16th Arty moved three tubes to LZ ACTION and three tubes to LZ BLACKHAWK and assumed the direct support mission. The following day, C/5-16th Arty moved from LZ BLACKHAWK to LZ SCHUELLER to Camp Radcliff and resumed its general support mission. Operations of the 1-10th Cavalry throughout the reporting period consisted of posting security forces and reacting to enemy harassing attacks on Highway 19.

4 The 2-8th Mech performed a number of missions under division control during the reporting period. The 5-16th Arty provided a liaison section, three forward observation parties, and a 155mm SP battery in direct support. A/5-16th Arty (-) (four tubes) was in direct support at LZ RIPLE. On 4 May, the 2-8th Mech received the mission to secure the road network from PLEIKU to NEW PLEI DJERENG and to secure the LSA complex at the latter location in support of the deployment of the division into CAMBODIA. In response, A/5-16th Arty (-) moved to LZ BURGESS to continue direct support. The remaining tubes joined the battery from Artillery Hill on 9 May. The 2-8th Mech was given a contingency mission to make a mechanized sweep into Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA, and A/5-16th Arty made the necessary preparations to accompany the battalion, but the mission was not executed.

On 17 May, the 2-8th Mech was sent to the PLEIKU Rocket Box. A/5-16th Arty (-) (two tubes) moved to LZ TRACER to provide artillery support. By 2 June, the 2-8th Mech assumed the mission of securing TL508 and the engineer work parties at LZ ARMAGEDDON. B/5-16th Arty moved six tubes to LZ ARMAGEDDON to provide artillery support. From 9-20 June 1970, the battalion was under the OTCON of the 2d Brigade and B/5-16th Arty was OTCON to the 4-42d Arty. On 21 June the 2-8th Mech returned to the highlands to provide security for QL19 from PLEIKU to DUC CO. B/5-16th Arty accompanied the battalion and established firing positions at LZ MEREDITH and LZ OASIS. The battalion returned to Camp Radcliff on 28 June and B/5-16th Arty moved to LZ BLACKHAWK and LZ ACTION to assume the mission of direct support to the 1-10th Cavalry. On 2 July the 2-8th Mech initiated operations south of Camp Radcliff targeted against the 95B Regiment and C/5-16th Arty moved to LZ SOPAR to provide direct support.

On 2 June the battalion moved into the area north of AN KHE along

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Highway 508, and assaulted into LZ RED with the mission of conducting dismounted reconnaissance in force operations during daylight hours and saturation ambushes at night. The remainder of the battalion moved by tactical road march to FSB ARMAGEDDON. After reaching the fire base, Company C prepared itself for its assigned mission of securing engineer units moving to Hill 666 in the vicinity of BR 398689.

On 20 June the battalion moved west toward XLEIKU to secure Highway 19W from traffic control post 31 to the CAMBODIAN border.

On 29 June the battalion moved to Camp Radcliff and conducted stand-down activities until 2 July when it moved to its new area of operation south of AN KHE by tactical road march. The battalion worked its assigned area of operations by conducting reconnaissance in force operations during daylight hours, ambushing at night, and providing security for the water point located in the vicinity of LZ SOPER.

(1) Armored Cavalry Operations

The 1-10th Cavalry was primarily responsible for convoy security of Highway 19. This was accomplished by establishing a series of observation points located on key terrain features. Selection of these OP's was based upon maximum observation of the highway fields of fire and likely enemy avenues of approach. Each OP was manned by a tracked vehicle with a series of platoon (minus) bases being established at critical bridges requiring 24 hour surveillance. During the hours of darkness all bridge sites were physically manned or ambushed to prevent enemy destruction. These night ambushes employed night observation devices in addition to the mechanical ambush apparatus. Enemy interdiction of the highway was reduced by conducting sweeps up to platoon size along the highway and into areas of suspected activity. The squadron air cavalry troop assisted in the highway security mission by conducting aerial reconnaissance of suspected enemy locations. In addition the troop performed the normal fire support and interdiction role assigned to air cavalry.

(e) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 2, Inclosure 4, at the end of the reporting period.

(2) Summary of OILANS and OFORDS published:

(a) Background Information

1. Toward the end of April, the division began preparing to initiate operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units located northwest of AN KHE, and to continue operations against the 3d NVA Division in Base Area 226 along the SONG CON River.

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2 OPLAN 15-70, 19 April 1970, prepared the division for operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units. D-Day for implementation was tentatively set for 24 April 1970.

3 Task Organization prior to implementation of OPLAN 15-70:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-12 Inf	3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf
TF Pursuit	1-22 Inf	2-8 Inf (Mech)
3-506 Abn	1-14 Inf	1-10 Cav
C/7-17 Cav	2-35 Inf	
C/75 Rangers		

4 On 27 Apr 70, FRAGO 29-70 implemented 15-70 with D-Day effective 30 April 70. FRAGO 29-70 required the following changes:

a 2d Brigade close out FSB JOHN HENRY and ARNOLD TRAIL and deploy 1-14 Inf and 3-8 Inf to LZ HARD TIMES, CHOP to 1st Brigade on arrival. 1st Brigade then deploy 1-14 Inf and 3-8 Inf to Camp Radcliff for 48 hour standdown. On 3 May, 1st Brigade CA 1-14 Inf and 3-8 Inf into an AO to conduct operations against GIA LAI Provincial units.

b No change in mission or organization was outlined for other divisional units.

5 On 1 May 1970, FRAGO 30-70 was issued to implement OPLAN 15-70, and to delineate specific missions and responsibilities of divisional units. Basically, the FRAGO accomplished the following:

a It caused a realignment and redistribution of division forces to accomplish the mission.

b It committed the 1st Brigade to operations with one infantry battalion against GIA LAI Provincial units 40 kilometers northwest of Camp Radcliff. This was a change from the two battalion force originally envisioned. However, K/75 Ranger was tasked to provide the bulk of its assets to the GIA LAI Provincial units' area. 1st Brigade received OPCON 1-10 Cav plus its area of operation and a security mission along Highway 19E. The 1st Brigade was now operating both north and south of Highway 19E against the 95B Regiment and GIA LAI Provincial units.

c The 2d Brigade continued operations northeast of AN KHE against the 3d NVA Division. The 1-12 Inf (-) was released from division control and given to the 2d Brigade.

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d Task Organization envisioned as of 4 May 1970:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
TF Pursuit	1-12 Inf (-)	2-8 Mech
3-8 Inf	1-22 Inf	C/1-12 Inf
3-12 Inf	2-35 Inf	K/75 Ranger
1-14 Inf		
1-10 Cav		

e 2-8 Mech continued to secure Highway 14N.

(b) On 3 May 70, 4th Inf Div received the IFFV FRAGO initiating operations in CAMBODIA, with D-Day set for 5 May. The division had received a warning order on the evening of 2 May and had begun planning that night so on 3 and 4 May all battalions were extracted from the field and began movement to staging areas. On 4 May OFORD 16-70 (BINH TAY #1) was published. Following are the salient features of that O:ORD:

1 Task Organization

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	3-12 Inf
1-14 Inf	1-22 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-506 Abn	2-35 Inf	2-1 Cav
		1-10 Cav
		K/75 Ranger
		C/75 Ranger
		7-17 Cav

2 Mission: On 5 May 1970, the Division conducted search and destroy operations in northern Base Area 702.

3 The concept called for the entire division, less one battalion (3-12 Inf), the cavalry squadron, (1-10), and K/75 Rangers to deploy into CAMBODIA, or be in direct support of operations in CAMBODIA. On 16 May, the task organization was as follows:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	3-12 Inf
1-14 Inf	1-22 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-506 Abn	2-35 Inf	2-1 Cav
C/75 Ranger		1-10 Cav
		K/75 Ranger

The division had released OFCON 7-17 Cav to IFFV. OFORD 17-70, published on 13 May, outlined all of the above.

(c) While the bulk of the division was deployed into CAMBODIA, the

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3-12 Inf and K/75 Rangers continued operating in the division permanent area of responsibility. FRAGO 31-70 deployed the 3-12 Inf (-) southwest of Camp Radcliff to conduct search and clear operations against the X17 VC Engineer Company, which was operating against the DONG CHU resettlement center. The operation commenced on 7 May with the 3-12 Inf (-) moving overland into the area of operation. The 1-10 Cav continued to secure Highway 19E. K/75 Rangers continued to deploy teams generally north and northwest of Camp Radcliff to gather information and intelligence on enemy locations and disposition.

1 On 17 May 70, IFFV FRAGO 33-70 was published. It deployed the 3-506 Abn and one troop (A) of the 2-1 Cav to BAN ME THUOT, releasing OPCON of that unit to IFFV upon arrival. This was accomplished on 19 May. Additionally, the 3-12 Inf was deployed to NEW FLEI DJERENG to replace the 3-506 Abn with the 1st Brigade receiving OPCON of that unit. This was accomplished on 18 May 1970.

2 On 18 May, the 2d Brigade commenced search and clear operations north of Camp Radcliff against the C2 Company, 407th NVA Sapper Battalion, after a four day standdown at Camp Radcliff. This mission was given to the brigade in OPORD 17-70. The brigade initiated the operation with the 1-22 Inf but was not able to immediately insert its remaining battalions because of a contingency mission given to the division by IFFV.

3 On or about 18 May the division received a contingency mission from IFFV, to be prepared to deploy two infantry battalions to eastern BINH DINH Province to relieve ARVN elements which might be committed to CAMBODIA. To this end, OPLAN 18-70 was published on 21 May. Although the OPLAN remained in effect for approximately seven to ten days, it was never implemented, as the requirement never arose.

(d) On 23 May 1970, OPLAN 19-70 was published. Its purpose was to outline division operations after the termination of BINH TAY #1, scheduled for 25 May 1970. The following concept was envisioned:

1 2-1 Cav and C/75 Ranger revert to OPCON of IFFV after termination of BINH TAY #1 and close out of NEW FLEI DJERENG.

2 2-8 Mech terminates operations vicinity FLEIKU and return to Camp Radcliff.

3 1st Brigade extracts all elements from the FLEI TRAF Valley and NEW FLEI DJERENG; deploys to Camp Radcliff for a four day standdown and initiates operations in VC Valley against the 95B Regiment. (BA 202).

4 The 2d Brigade continues operations against the C2 Company,

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407th Sapper Battalion (NVA) and prepares for operations against GIA LAI Provincial units.

5 The 2-8 Mech, after standdown at Camp Radcliff, initiates operations to secure engineer work parties upgrading Highway 508 and constructing a forward operating base on Hill 666.

6 The 1-10 Cav continues present mission securing Highway 194.

7 Task organization as outlined in OPLAN 19-70:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-12 Inf	1-22 Inf	1-10 Cav
1-14 Inf	2-35 Inf	K/75 Ranger

(e) On 24 May 1970, FRAGO 34-70 was published. Basically, it implemented OPLAN 19-70 as outlined below:

1 C/75 Ranger was released from OCON 1st Brigade to IFFV.

2 K/75 Ranger initiated its mission of gathering intelligence against GIA LAI Provincial units.

3 It gave the 2d Brigade a be prepared mission to assume the 2-8 Mech mission of securing Highway 508 and Hill 666. This was based on the fact that the 2-8 Mech might remain in the vicinity of PLEIKU longer than originally envisioned.

(f) On 28 May, FRAGO 35-70 was published. It further clarified the execution of OPLAN 19-70 and gave the 1st Brigade a D-Day for operations against the 95B Regiment of 1 June. It deployed the 2-8 Mech from PLEIKU to Camp Radcliff and relieved the 2d Brigade of the be prepared mission along Highway 508 and Hill 666. D-Day for the 2-8 Mech was set at 2 June 70. Also, effective 30 May 70, 2-1 Cav (-) was released from OCON 4th Division to IFFV. Essentially, with the initiating of operations in Base Area 202, by the 1st Brigade on 1 June, the division was almost in the same posture as it was prior to CAMBODIAN operations, except that the 2-8 Mech was now available for operations in the division area of operations.

(g) On 31 May, FRAGO 36-70 was published assigning C/7-17 Cav a direct support mission to the 1st Brigade and D/1-10 Cav a direct support mission to the 2d Brigade. C/7-17 Cav became OCON to the division on 1 June 1970.

(h) On 6 June, FRAGO 37-70 was published tasking the 2d Brigade to initiate operations along the PLEIKU/BINH DINH/KONTUM boundary with

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the 1-12 Inf, against the GIA LAI Provincial units. It also changed the priority of K/75 support from the GIA LAI area of operation to the 1st Brigade in Base Area 202 effective 8 June 1970.

(i) On 8 June, FRAGO 38-70 was published giving the 2d Brigade OICON of the 2-8 Mech, its area of operation, and mission. This was done to facilitate control in the area of operations between the 2d Brigade and the 2-8 Mech.

(j) FRAGO 39-70 was issued on 11 June deploying one platoon from the 2d Brigade to the 1-10 Cav to assist in securing MONTAGNARD villages approximately two kilometers east of LZ SCHUELLER. This action was accomplished on 12 June.

(k) On 13 June FRAGO 40-70 was published. Its purpose was to initiate operations against LOC's of the 3d NVA Division in northern BINH DINH Province. The mission was given to the 2d Brigade and in effect was a continuation of its current operations with orientation more towards the northern parts of the division area of operation. The 2d Brigade still retained the requirement for operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units, and for security of the engineer effort along Highway 508. To accomplish the mission, two infantry battalions would be deployed basically along the SONG CON River infiltration corridor, while one infantry battalion and the mechanized battalion continued operations against the GIA LAI Provincial units. The 1st Brigade continued operations in Base Area 202 with three infantry battalions.

(1) On 15 June 1970, FRAGO 41-70 was published so as to intensify operations along Highway 19E with patrols and ambushes, in an attempt to identify routes of movement across the highway, and destroy enemy elements operating along the Highway. The following missions were outlined in the FRAGO:

1 The 1st Brigade was reoriented to operate just south of Highway 19 between LZ SCHUELLER and LZ ACTION. Rcn/3-8 Inf was placed OFCON to the 1-10 Cav.

2 The 1-10 Cav would increase ambush and patrol activity by employing Rcn/3-8 Inf, sniper teams, and aero rifle platoons in this role.

3 K/75 Ranger release OICON two sniper teams to 1-10 Cav and conduct reconnaissance and interdiction in an area just north of the 1-10 Cav area of operation, northwest of LZ SCHUELLER with a minimum of five teams.

4 The 2d Brigade continued its present mission north of Camp Radcliff.

(m) On 20 June FRAGO 42-70 was published, deploying the 2-8 Mech

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on road security mission between the intersection of Highway 19W and Highway 14, and the CAMBODIAN border. This was in support of ARVN operations across the border. (BINH TAY #4).

(n) On 23 June FRAGO 43-70 was published, redeploying forces to provide further support for BINH TAY #4 and for GVN elections. The following missions were outlined in the FRAGO:

1 The 1st Brigade terminates operations in VC Valley (Base Area 202); deploys one rifle company to LZ OASIS and releases OI'CON to 2-3 Mech; deploys one infantry battalion (-) to relieve ARVN of security mission in the PLEIKU Rocket Box. This was all in support of BINH TAY #4. Additionally, deploy two infantry battalions vicinity PHU MY District on 27 June, release OI'CON to 173d Abn Brigade. (Only one battalion, 3-8, was actually deployed). The purpose of this mission was to provide security for GVN elections on 28 June. Also one rifle company was given OI'CON to the 1-10 Cav. This also was in support of planned 1-10th Cav security operations for elections in AN TUC District.

2 The 2d Brigade continued missions against the 3d NVA Division and GIA LAI Provincial units.

3 The 2-8 Mech, reinforced with one rifle company, continued to secure Highway 19W from the intersection of Highway 14 to the CAMBODIAN border.

(o) On 26 June FRAGO 44-70 was published giving the 1-10th Cav the mission of conducting screening operations northeast and southwest of AN TUC to prevent enemy interference in GVN elections on 28 June.

(p) On 26 June OFLAN 20-70 was published. It was designed to reorient divisional operations after security operations for BINH TAY #4 and GVN elections were completed. Basically, it committed both brigades to operations north of Camp Radcliff against GIA LAI Provincial units, the 3d NVA Division and its rear elements. Also, it reassigned forces of the division within the two brigades. Following is a summary of the OFLAN:

1 Task Organization

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
1-14 Inf	3-12 Inf	1-10 Cav
2-35 Inf	1-22 Inf	K/75 Ranger

2 2d Brigade: Continues present mission against GIA LAI and LOC's of the 3d NVA Division. Release OI'CON of 2-35 Inf to 1st Brigade and receive OI'CON of 3-12 Inf upon its arrival from PLEIKU. The 2d Brigade

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was also given the mission of coordinating security, quartering and operations of support activities at ARMAGLADDON since both forward brigade headquarters were to be stationed there. Basically, the combat mission of the 2d Brigade did not change.

3 The 1st Brigade, which had deployed all its combat elements to support BINH TAY #4 and GVN elections, except one infantry battalion, was committed to operate north of the 2d Brigade units, to locate and destroy the 3d NVA headquarters and rear service elements. It received OFCON 2-35 Inf from the 2d Brigade to accomplish its mission and would receive OFCON 3-8 Inf upon its closure to Camp Radcliff from THU MY District. Following are the actions required by OPLAN 20-70:

a. 1-10 Cav continue security operations along Highway 19W.

b. 2-8 Mech release OFCON the one rifle company which had been attached for security of Highway 19W. (B/3-12 Inf).

c. 3-12 Inf, under division control, redeploy from LBIKU to Camp Radcliff and CHOP to the 2d Brigade on arrival.

(q) On 27 June FRAGO 45-70 was published executing OPLAN 20-70. D-Day was set for 28 June 70. There were no major changes from those envisioned in the OPLAN. 2-8 Mech was to move overland to Camp Radcliff on 28 June and receive a three day standdown prior to initiating operations in VC Valley.

(r) On 27 June 70, OPLAN 21-70 was published outlining the mission and concept of operation for 2-8 Mech deployment against the 95B Regiment and local force units south of AN KHE.

(s) On 1 July, FRAGO 46-70 was published implementing OPLAN 21-70. No changes from the OPLAN were listed.

(t) On 2 July, the 4th Infantry Division received a message from CG, IFFV, alerting it to deploy one brigade to eastern BINH DINH Province to attack a number of targets. One of the missions was to deploy one rifle company to vicinity of CAM RANH Bay to operate in the DONG BO, a mountain overlooking the installation. On 8 July, FRAGO 47-70 was published, assigning this mission to the 2d Brigade. The company (B/1-22) was deployed on 8 July, and returned on 11 July.

(t) On 11 July, FRAGO 48-70 was published, returning the flame platoon to its parent unit (2-8 Mech). The flame platoon had been augmenting security along Highway 508 OFCON to the 2d Brigade.

(u) To meet the mission assigned the 4th Infantry Division by the Commanding General, IFFV, OPLAN 22-70 was published on 13 July 70. It

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outlined the following mission and concept of operation:

1 Task Organization for the operation:

<u>1st Bde</u>	<u>2d Bde</u>	<u>Div Trps</u>
3-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	2-8 Mech
3-12 Inf	1-14 Inf	1-10 Cav
2-35 Inf	1-22 Inf	K/75 Ranger

2 The 1st Brigade was to deploy its three infantry battalions into the western portion of northeast Base Area 226 in cooperation with the 40th ARVN Regiment, which would deploy two infantry battalions into the eastern portion of northeastern Base Area 226. This was to be a combined operation to locate and destroy elements of the 3d NVA Division operating in the area. It also took advantage of a GRID operation being conducted in southern Base Area 226.

3 The 2d Brigade would continue operating north of Camp Radcliff with the mission of interdicting the LOC's and infiltration corridors of the 3d NVA Division along the SONG CON River and SONG BA River. The 2d Brigade was assigned specific objective areas in which to operate which would complement the 1st Brigade and 40th ARVN Regiment operations.

4 No change in operational status was outlined for the 2-8 Mech nor the 1-10 Cav.

5 Tentative date for the operation was 17 July 1970.

(v) On 13 July, FRAGO 49-70 was published to accomplish repositioning of forces of the 1st and 2d Brigades. Basically, it implemented the task organization in OPLAN 22-70, and deployed 1st Brigade units to LZ TWO BITS for a three day standdown prior to the start of the operation.

(w) On 14 July 70, FRAGO 50-70 was published implementing OPLAN 22-70. There were no changes from the OPLAN except that one troop (-) from the 1-10 Cav was deployed to PHU CAT to conduct screening operations in conjunction with the GRID operation in southern Base Area 226. D-Day for OPLAN 22-70 was set for 17 July and the operation was initiated on that day. The troop (-) 1-10 Cav deployed on 20 July.

(x) On 23 July, FRAGO 51-70 was published directing the mission and concept for Phase II of 1st Brigade operations. It deployed two battalions of the 1st Brigade into the northern NUI MIEUS in cooperation with the 40th ARVN Regiment, which would be operating in the southern NUI MIEUS, and also with the 173d Abn Brigade and 41st ARVN Regiment, which would occupy blocking positions. This was a continuation of the operation in northeastern Base Area 226, and it commenced on 28 July. Additionally, one battalion of the 1st Brigade was deployed into the

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FISHHOOK area to conduct recon operations. It was assigned four specific objective areas to recon, generally along the I MR/IIMR boundary. The 2d Brigade also was given one objective in the same general area, just west of the FISHHOOK, in which to conduct reconnaissance operations. These operations continued through the end of July.

(y) On 30 July FRAGO 52-70 was published redeploying C Troop (-) 1-10 Cav back to Camp Radcliff and placing it ONCON to the 2-8th Mech for operations in the vicinity of Base Area 202.

(z) Operational names throughout the period:

1 PARK SILVER: 1-10 Cav; security of Highway 19E from PLEIKU defensive boundary to GRID border continuing throughout the period.

2 BAIRD SILVER: 2-8 Mech; security of Highway 14 from PLEIKU to KONTUM and security of FSB WEIGT DAVIS. Terminated on 4 May 70.

3 CHEADLE BLUE: 2-8 Mech; search and clear operations in PLEIKU Rocket Box northeast and west of PLEIKU. Commenced on 15 May and terminated on 28 May 70.

4 ROBERTSON WHITE: 2-8 Mech; security of engineer work parties along Highway 508 and Hill 666. Commenced on 1 Jun 70 and terminated on 9 June 70.

5 WRIGHT BLUE: 2-8 Mech; security of Highway 19W from intersection of Highway 19W and Highway 14 to CAMBODIAN border. Commenced on 23 June 70 and terminated on 28 June 70.

6 BRANDLES BLUE: 2-8 Mech; search and clear operations against the 95B Regiment in VC Valley. Commenced on 2 July and is continuing.

7 FREDENDALL GOLD: 2-1 Cav; security of Highway 19W from PLEIKU to NEW PLEI DJERENG. Commenced on 18 May and terminated 30 May 70.

8 WAYNE WIND: 1st Brigade and TF Pursuit; operations against the 95B NVA Regiment in VC Valley (Base Area 202). Terminated 4 May.

9 WAYNE JUMP: 1st Brigade; northwest of NEW PLEI DJERENG in the PLEI TRAF Valley in support of ARVN operations in northern Base Area 702. Commenced on 16 May and terminated on 26 May 70.

10 WAYNE HURDLE: 1st Brigade; search and clear operations in VC Valley (Base Area 202). Commenced on 1 June and terminated 26 June 70.

11 WAYNE FAST: 1st Brigade; search and clear operations against elements of the 3d NVA Division to include headquarters and rear

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elements located 40 kilometers north of Camp Radcliff. Commenced on 28 June and terminated on 14 July 1970.

12 WAYNE SPAN: 1st Brigade; search and clear operations in north-eastern Base Area 226 in cooperation and coordination with the 40th ARVN Regiment and the 173d Abn Brigade and search and clear operations in northern NUI MIEUS in cooperation and coordination with the 40th ARVN Regiment, 41st ARVN Regiment, and the 173d Abn Brigade. Commenced on 17 July and is continuing.

13 PUTNAM PLATEAU: 2d Brigade; search and clear operations 40 kilometers north of Camp Radcliff against elements of the 3d NVA Division. Terminated on 4 May 70.

14 PUTNAM PARAGON: 2d Brigade; search and clear operations north of Camp Radcliff against the C2 Company of the 407th NVA Sapper Battalion, GIA LAI Provincial units, and LOC's of the 3d NVA Division. Commenced on 18 May and is continuing.

15 BINH TAY #1: All divisional units involved in operations in northern Base Area 702 or support operations from VIETNAM in Base Area 702. Operation initiated to destroy enemy forces, supplies, installations, and resources of the B-3 Front. Commenced on 5 May and terminated on 16 May 1970.

(3) Chemical Activities


(a) The 4th Division Chemical Section and the 43d Chemical Detachment supported extensive aerial and ground employment of Riot Control Agents, aerial and ground employment of diesel fuel for control of vegetation, and operated and maintained the division Airborne Personnel Detectors. Technical advice was rendered on the use of flame field expedients and inspections were conducted on CBR readiness, equipment and supplies. The chemical ammunition supply point continued to operate in support of the division.

(b) There were no defoliation or crop destruction operations during the period due to the nonavailability of defoliation agent, and no cleared areas for crop destruction. The only vegetation control program was conducted on Camp Radcliff using diesel fuel.

(c) Riot Control Agent munitions were used extensively in support of combat troops and played a vital role in the destruction and demoralization of enemy targets and troops detected and located by special intelligence. Persistent and non-persistent riot control agents were employed throughout the division area of operation in support of ground troops, artillery fires, and to block enemy withdrawal routes from contact areas.


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4th Infantry Division Area of Operation



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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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CAMP RADCLIFF

AN KHE



3-12



3-506

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
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