

Xtra

HEADQUARTERS  
2D BATTALION, 9TH ARTILLERY  
"THE MIGHTY NINTH"  
APO US Forces 96225

TLDAB-3

11 Apr 66

SUBJECT: After Action Report "Operation Lincoln"

TO: Commanding Officer  
1st Air Cav Div Arty  
ATTN: S3  
APO US Forces 96490

1. Operation Lincoln.

2. Control or command headquarters: 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery attached to 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Div. 3d Brigade under operational control 1st Air Cav Div for Operation Lincoln.

3. Dates of operation: 311200 Mar 66 to 071200 Apr 66 at which time this unit returned to base camp.

4. Location: 3d Brigade base moved from Buon Brieng to Duc Co for Operation Lincoln. From there the units operated generally to the north and east of Chu Pong mountain.

5. Intelligence: During this units participation in Operation Lincoln very little intelligence was obtained, the only significant activity was an encounter on the Cambodian border of a small force in bunkers.

6. Mission: 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Div conducted search and destroy operations in assigned area of operations.

7. Execution:

a. Operations:

(1) On 31 Mar 66 the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery moved from Buon Brieng with the 3d Brigade to Duc Co. This move was made by convoy less Btry A elements which moved to Duc Co by CH 47.

(2) On 1 Apr 66, Btry A moved by CH 47 to YA 802080 to support search and destroy operations by the 1/14th Inf near the Cambodian border. In this position A Btry and 1/14th Inf received approximately 60 mortar rounds on the morning of 3 Apr 66 causing 1 KIA and 3 WIA from this battalion. Counter mortar fire was immediately returned in the general azimuth from which the rounds were fired and no further mortaring was received. However no positive results could be determined. ARA was requested and was on station in approximately 20 minutes but was not used because target could not be identified.

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(3) On 1 Apr 66, C Btry moved by CH 47 to YA 936052 to support search and destroy operations by 1/35th Inf. No significant activities occurred in this position. On 3 Apr 66 at the request of 1st Air Cav Div Arty, C Btry fired a preparation on LZ X-Ray.

(4) On 3 Apr 66, A Btry moved to YA 815094 using tanks as prime movers and the remainder of the equipment was moved by CH 47. The same day B Btry and Headquarters (-), consisting of operations and battalion FDC, moved to YA 816095 and were co-located with A Btry and 1/14th Inf battalion CP.

(5) On 4 Apr 66, A and B Btry fired a preparation for LZ 2 prior to occupation by 1/35th Inf. And then C Btry moved by CH 47 to YA 834062 by CH 47 and was co-located with the 1/35th Inf CP.

(6) No significant activities occurred until the afternoon of 5 Apr 66 when an H 23 received small arms fire from vic YA 792082. Coordination between a ground observer and an air observer brought immediate heavy fire of 347 rounds on the area. Results were 3 KIA, 6 WIA, 5 bunkers destroyed and two secondary explosions. ARA was also requested and used against this area.

g. On 6 Apr 66, headquarters elements and A Btry returned to Duc Co by CH 47. At 1630 more activity was observed in vicinity of previously fired bunker area. B Btry fired and results were one confirmed KIA.

(7) On 7 Apr 66, B and C Btry returned to Duc Co and then the entire battalion motor marched to base camp.

b. Positions occupied.

Btry	Coordinates	Date Occupied	Means of Occupation	Sorties	Distance
HQ	YA838250	31 Mar-7 Apr 66	Surface		37 km
A	YA842250	31 Mar-1 Apr 66	Surface & Air	9	Air 52 km Surface 175
B	YA840242	31 Mar-3 Apr 66	Surface		175 km
C	YA839242	31 Mar-1 Apr 66	Surface		175 km
A	YA802080	1 Apr-3 Apr 66	Air	13	18 km
C	YA936052	1 Apr-4 Apr 66	Air	10	20 km
HQ(-)	YA815095	3 Apr-6 Apr 66	Air	3	17 km
A	YA815094	3 Apr-6 Apr 66	Air & Surface	5	2 km
C	YA834062	4 Apr-7 Apr 66	Air	10	8 km
B	YA816095	3 Apr-7 Apr 66	Air	11	17 km
HQ(-)	YA838250	6 Apr-7 Apr 66	Air	3	17 km
A	YA842250	6 Apr-7 Apr 66	Air	9	17 km
B	YA840242	7 Apr 66	Air	11	17 km
C	YA839243	7 Apr 66	Air	11	22 km
HQ, A B & C	Base Camp	7 Apr 66	Surface		68 km

NOTE: First positions indicated are where units moved to after Operation Garfield.

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## 8. Commanders:

- a. Battalion Commander: 1st Col Saul A Jackson.
- b. HH&S Btry: Capt Carl Morin.
- c. A Btry: Capt John Ferguson Jr.
- d. B Btry: Capt Frederick Rice.
- e. C Btry: Capt John Oliver.

9. Task organization: 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was direct support 3d Brigade, 25th Inf Div for entire operation. 3d Brigade was under operational control 1st Air Cav Div from 311200 Mar 66 to 071200 Apr 66.

## 10. Narrative summary:

a. Most of the artillery firing during our participation in Operation Lincoln were H&I's, preparations and heavy firing against a bunker area which was our only significant target.

b. The VT fuzes were used primarily on LZ preparations and a mixture of PD and delay fuzes were used in the tree line surrounding the LZ's. All of the time fuzes were used as either PD or for firing direct fire around a position area.

c. Smoke was fired as the last round of a preparation to indicate to the Air Force and Army Aviation that the artillery preparation was finished. It was also used as the initial round on close in fires, particularly defensive concentrations.

d. White phosphorous were used on H&I's with the intention of starting fires along likely routes. It was never used on preparation to insure that fires were not started.

## 11. Supporting forces:

a. Aerial rocket artillery was requested 030200 Apr 66 because of mortar firing at A Btry position (YA802080). Aircraft were at the location in approximately 20 minutes. No rounds were expended at this time because the mortars could not be located.

## b. Air support:

DATE	TYPE A/C	COORDINATES	RESULTS
31 Mar 66	2A1E	AQ 032828	2 structures
1 Apr 66	2A1E	YV 298705	3 KBA
	2A1E	YA 935052	LZ preparation
	2A1E	YA 795076	No BDA
	2F4C	YA 794085	No BDA



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<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>
2 Apr 66	2A1E	YA 790085	2 structures damaged
	2A1E	YA 782071	6 structures destroyed, 5 damaged
3 Apr 66	2A1E	YA 783100	10 structures destroyed
	2A1E	YA 785062	No BDA
	2A1E	YA 795075	4 structures destroyed, 4 damaged
	2A1E	YA 795075	No BDA
5 Apr 66	2A1E	YA 796080	No BDA
	2A1E	YA 813077	3 structures destroyed, 1 explosion
	2A1E		

12. Results:

a. Enemy losses (from artillery).

- (1) KIA (BC): Four (4).
- (2) WIA: Six (6).
- (3) Structures: Seventeen (17).
- (4) Bunkers: Seven (7).
- (5) Secondary explosions: Two (2).

b. Friendly losses (artillery unit).

- (1) KIA: one (1).
- (2) WIA: Three (3).

NOTE: All losses were combat casualties caused by incoming mortar rounds via coordinates YA 302080.

13. Administrative matters:

a. Maintenance: Continuous technical inspections and command emphasis on maintenance resulted in all surface moves being completed without any breakdown of vehicles.

b. Transportation: Temporary use of CH 47's greatly increased our mobility and the transition was easily accomplished due to the outstanding support from the 228th Transportation Battalion.

c. Communications: A "scrambler" was temporarily loaned to this unit for Operation Lincoln but could not be used due to technical difficulties.

14. Special equipment and techniques: Although this unit does not have sufficient nets and slings to air lift the batteries externally

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the batteries were able to move internally by CH 47. We found that it is not difficult for a conventional 105mm howitzer battery to move sufficient personnel and equipment by air and perform its primary mission for a sustained period.

15. Commanders' analysis.

This operation was our first experience in Vietnam in working with a headquarters other than the Brigade to which the battalion is attached. (Even though it was for a very short period it was a profitable experience which indicated the professional competence of members of the 1st Air Cav Div Arty.) The cooperation and assistance that we received was outstanding. Loaning us the Beehive round for the operation was only one indication of this support. It was our first opportunity to use aerial rocket artillery and we were impressed with its responsiveness and fire power. To the best of our knowledge there were no problems encountered in fire control, fire request or reporting. ✓

16. Statistical data.

a. Artillery ammunition expenditures: 2123 HE, 35 Ill, 186 WP, 44 Smoke.

b. Fuzes: 1207 PD, 412 Delay, 142 Time, and 362 CWT.

c. Missions by type: Preparation - 3; TOT - 3; H&I - 323; live targets - 4; other - 65; Total - 398.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*William L. Pryor*  
WILLIAM L. PRYOR  
Capt, Arty  
Adjutant