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ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE - TRAINING  
LESSONS LEARNED, HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION: (U)

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OACSFOR-OT-UT-701229  
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4th Inf Div

Nov '69-Jan '70

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**1 NOV - 31 JAN '70**

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (8 Jun 70)

FOR OT UT 701229

12 June 1970

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)**

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BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

  
ROBERT E. LYNCH  
Colonel, AGC  
Acting The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC-MH

12 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1. (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

a. General

(1) During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation DAN QUYEN-HINES.

(2) Organizational Structure. Task Organization, Operation HINES, 1 November 1969-31 January 1970, is set forth in Inclosure 1.

(3) Commanders and major staff as of the end of the reporting period are listed at Inclosure 2.

(4) Locations, coordinates for villages, I's and FSR's are listed at Inclosure 5.

(5) Mission. The 4th Division continued to pacify the GVN pacification programs by providing rapid reaction to deter enemy attacks against main installations and cities; secure the CAMBODIAN Border to interdict enemy infiltration routes to the GVN; securing lines of communications in the Division AO; coordinating liaison with the GVN forces and agencies; conducting offensive operations against NVA and local VC/VMC units and maintaining a capability to deploy one brigade with three battalions anywhere in VIETNAM. Due to the extensive area of operations (See Inclosure 2) 4th Division elements were employed in an economy of force role in the Central Highlands.

(6) Concept of Operation. At the start of the period 4th Division had one brigade on pacification operations in DARLAC Province; one brigade screening the populated area of BINH DINH Province, and one brigade operating in PLEIKU Province. Prior to the end of the period the brigade in DARLAC returned to Camp Radcliff and conducted operations in western BINH DINH against elements of the 3d NVA Division.

(a) Liaison with GVN: The 4th Division maintained continuous liaison with Headquarters, II Corps. The brigades maintained continuous

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liaison with the provinces in which they were operating. Battalions with a pacification mission maintained liaison with the district to which they were assigned.

(b) Reaction Forces: One infantry battalion was stationed in Camp Redcliff and was engaged in training, security and patrol activities. This battalion constituted the Division reserve and maintained one company on fifteen minute alert, prepared to reinforce 4th Division units, or if directed, relieve or reinforce GVN units.

(c) Highway Security: Highway 19E was secured by the mechanized infantry battalion and the tank battalion under Division control. Other routes were secured when necessitated by Division units operating in the area.

(d) Screening the CAMBODIAN Border and Interdiction of Infiltration Routes: The Division Armored Cavalry Squadron conducted screening operations north of PLEI DJERENG, to just south of PLEI ME interdicting the infiltration route through the PLEI TRAP Valley and the two infiltration routes north and south of PLEI ME. One infantry battalion screened the western approaches to Camp Enari in an arc along LZ APRIL, FSB OASIS and LZ PUMA.

(e) Pacification: The 1st Brigade conducted pacification in the southern DARLAC Province for the months of November and December 1969 and BINH DINH Province in January 1970. The 2d Brigade, operating in the AN LAO Valley of BINH DINH Province, was deployed in an area devoid of population. The 3d Brigade conducted pacification in PLEIKU Province.

(f) Swing Brigade: The 2d Brigade was deployed in the AN LAO Valley outside the normal AO of the 4th Division. This deployment was directed by IFFV and was intended to prevent movement of enemy forces into the populated portion of BINH DINH Province.

## b. Intelligence

(1) General: Enemy activity in PLEIKU and DARLAC Provinces increased during November. Elements of the 24th NVA Regiment continued their activity in the PLEI MRONG area with the 6th Battalion operating along Highway 14 between PLEIKU and KONTUM. A large scale sapper attack on LZ ST GEORGE south of Camp Enari resulted in 42 enemy KIA and the capture of two prisoners from the 408th Sapper Battalion. Numerous elements of the 95B Regiment deployed along Highway 19 west of the MANG YANG Pass to increase highway harassment and interdiction. Activity in DARLAC and QUANG DUC Provinces increased as enemy elements maintained heavy pressure on Special Forces Camps at BU PRANG and DUC LAP. In the BAN ME THUOT area 1st Brigade elements engaged forces of the 401st Sapper Battalion north of the city. The 301st Local Force Battalion stepped up interdiction and harassment of Highway 14. In BINH DINH Province activity remained light as the emphasis shifted to the AN LAO Valley where the 2d Brigade encountered units of the 3d NVA Division. Information from PW's and captured documents

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indicated that the 2d VC Regiment was deploying south to conduct operations in BINH DINH. In the AN KHE area, Camp Radcliff received a sapper attack resulting in extensive damage to aircraft, (19 helicopters damaged or destroyed) while local forces and 95B Regiment continued activity on Highway 19.

Enemy activity throughout the 4th Division AO decreased during December. Major units withdrew from the scenes of November contacts and concentrated on redeployment, resupplying, and retraining. B-3 Front units began withdrawing north from QUANG DUC Province back to their former AO's in CAMBODIA, west of PLEIKU and KONTUM Provinces. The 24th NVA Regiment remained out of contact in the CHU PA Mountains and the 631st Composite Battalion avoided friendly operations west of PLEIKU. In BINH DINH Province elements of the 2d VC Regiment continued deployment toward Base Area 226, encountering 2d Brigade units in sporadic contacts in the AN LAO Valley. Harassment and interdiction of the major lines of communication throughout the AO continued.

Activity began to increase in the first part of January as 3d NVA Division forces conducted ground probes and standoff attacks employing 122-mm rockets against allied installations in BINH DINH, and local VC/VMC forces harassed RF/PF units throughout PLEIKU Province. Following the brief upsurge in activity, major enemy units withdrew to base areas. Operations conducted by 1st and 2d Brigade elements against the 8th Battalion, 18th Regiment north of AN KHE may have pre-empted enemy plans to attack AN KHE during Tet. PW's captured in BINH DINH Province indicated that new units were moving into the area.

(2) BINH DINH: Enemy activity in BINH DINH Province was light during the month of November. TF BRAVO operating northeast of AN KHE and 2d Brigade forces in the AN LAO Valley encountered enemy forces of the 3d NVA Division infiltrating south from QUANG NGAI and northern BINH DINH into the QUANG NGAI/BINH DINH border area and Base Area 226. Activity with these elements consisted of either company or smaller size contacts and occasional standoff attacks on friendly units. Along Highway 19, the 95B Regiment stepped up activity with interdiction and attacks on convoys, fixed installations, and the pipeline.

Activity in December remained light and was characterized by small unit contacts. Elements of the 3d NVA Division continued to avoid contact with Division elements while deploying south. The 95B Regiment harassed and interdicted Highway 19 with sporadic mining but activity declined sharply during the last week of the month. Camp Radcliff and LZ ENGLISH were targets for standoff attacks on 12 December when they received a total of 12 rounds of 82-mm mortar. Documents and PW's captured throughout November and December confirmed intelligence estimates that elements of the 3d NVA Division were deploying south to BINH DINH Province. The 2d VC Regiment, whose former AO was in the AN LAO Valley area, was moving south into Base Area 226 while the 22d NVA

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Regiment was moving south from QUANG NGAI Province into the old area of the 2d Regiment. This realignment of forces enabled the 18th Regiment to deploy its elements along Highway 19 and around AN KHE.

The increased enemy activity in January reached a moderate level. In the first week, 3d NVA Division elements in the VINH THANH Valley conducted standoff attacks and ground probes against Highway 19, LZ HARD TIMES, and Camp Radcliff. Both Camp Radcliff and Recon, 1-69th Armor, operating on Highway 19 east of AN KHE, received 122-mm rocket attacks, marking the first time 122-mm rockets had been used in that area. Previously a cache of 122-mm rockets had been found in Base Area 226, but until the attacks, elements of the 18th Regiment were believed incapable of firing this weapon. Interdiction of Highway 19 continued as the 8th Battalion, 18th Regiment moved south from its AO and conducted operations against LZ SCHUELLER, friendly convoys and other installations along the highway from east of AN KHE to LZ SCHUELLER. Later in January, elements of the 8th Battalion, 18th Regiment and the 2d Regiment withdrew to avoid friendly operations. On 21 January, four NVA were captured by Company A, 24th Infantry. All had recently infiltrated into BINH DINH Province from NORTH VIETNAM in the 24th Infiltration Group, not previously identified, with an estimated strength of 480 men. The PW's became lost from the infiltration group before they were assigned to a unit. The presence of new units in the province and the redeployment of 3d Division forces indicated the enemy was putting renewed emphasis on controlling BINH DINH Province.

(3) PLEIKU: Activity in PLEIKU Province was light during all three months. In November, the 24th NVA Regiment continued activity in the PLEI MRONG area. Elements of the 24th NVA Regiment perpetrated harassing attacks along Highway 14, north of PLEIKU City, the most significant resulting in 43 NVA KIA by the 3d ARVN Cavalry and the identification of the 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment. After this heavy loss the 24th Regiment avoided contact, with only small harassing attacks on villages targeted against the pacification program, and one standoff attack on the PLEI MRONG Special Forces Camp. On the 6th of the month, elements of the 408th Sapper Battalion attacked LZ ST GEORGE south of PLEIKU. The abortive attack resulted in 42 NVA KIA. Elsewhere in the province, elements of the 95B Regiment deployed to the southwest of the MANG YANG Pass from their normal AO east of the pass resulting in increased interdiction of Highway 19 between PLEIKU and the MANG YANG.

Both the 24th NVA Regiment and the 631st Composite Battalion remained out of contact throughout the month of December. The enemy emphasis was on the villages as they continued their program of disrupting the pacification program. Local force elements conducted attacks on villages throughout the province and combined with elements of 95B Regiment for harassment of villages reconsolidating in the DAK AYUNH area. Interdiction of the major lines of communications, Highways 14 and 19, continued, highlighted by the destruction of Bridge 34, east of PLEIKU, by an enemy sapper unit on 4 December. A HOI CHANH from the C-90

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Sapper Company was rallied to the 1-35th Infantry on 19 December, led 4th Division forces to 13 different ammunition caches located west of Camp Enari between Highways 509 and 19W. These caches netted 178 B40 rounds, 148 B40 boosters, 152 60-mm mortar rounds, one 82-mm mortar round, 115 lbs of C-4, 148 lbs of TNT, with 600 blasting caps, 220 CHICOM grenades, 95 A1 grenades, 95 grenade detonators, and 50 mortar fuzes.

In PLEIKU Province enemy activity increased in the first part of January, following the upsurge in enemy initiated actions throughout the 4th Division Area. Scattered standoff attacks and small unit contacts with RF and PF forces characterized the activity. Sappers struck PLEIKU for the first time since November destroying 10-15 homes in one attack, and hitting the Intelligence Platoon compound in another. After the first week of the month, activity decreased as units prepared for the Tet Offensive. The K-6 Battalion, 24th NVA Regiment was identified in three contacts with ARVN elements north of PLEIKU City.

(4) KONTUM: The highpoint of enemy activity in KONTUM Province for the quarter was in November. Numerous attacks by fire occurred throughout the province as elements employed B40's, B41's, 60 and 82-mm mortars, 75-mm RR and 107 and 122-mm rockets. The largest attacks by fire, of up to 50 rounds of 82-mm mortar, were targeted against the Old DAK TO-TANH CANH area. Captured documents identified the K-20 Sapper Battalion and the 304th Local Force Battalion as the units responsible for the attacks in the TANH CANH area while elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment were believed responsible for rocket attacks on KONTUM City. In the last two weeks of November there were numerous mining incidents along Highway 14 north of KONTUM as the 406th Sapper Battalion and the 304th Local Force Battalion continued their interdiction of the highway. Dart sensor activations throughout the month indicated an increase in infiltration in the upper PLEI TRAP Valley area.

During the month of December enemy activity decreased. Mining incidents continued along Highway 14 with B-40 rounds being used as mines for the first time in KONTUM Province. Enemy initiated activity increased briefly in the BEN HET area during the first of the month, possibly in an effort to take the pressure off units infiltrating north of the Special Forces Camp. The Dart sensor system continued to show infiltration in the BEN HET-PLEI TRAP area. The most significant incident for all forces occurred on 6 December in the vicinity of FSB FOXTROT, where a Command and Control helicopter from the 24th STZ was shot down by small arms fire resulting in 11 friendly KIA.

Action in KONTUM Province during the month of January was very light except in the DAK PEK area where Special Forces units made contact with platoon and company size elements. Infiltration remained the primary concern as evidence of the enemy's return to KONTUM mounted. On 9 January a photo mission showed evidence of extensive vehicle traffic in the PLEI TRAP Valley, vicinity YB 724070, the first such sign since April 1969, and Dart sensor activations remained heavy.

(5) DARLAC/CANG DUC: Enemy activity in DARLAC Province increased over the previous months. As in the past, BAN ME THUOT City and the

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immediate areas north and south of the city continued to be harassed by the enemy. In November, contact with the enemy in DARLAC increased as the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division forces relieved ARVN units north and south of BAN ME THUOT and made several contacts with suspected 401st Sapper Battalion elements in the vicinity of the MEWAL Plantation. In addition, interdiction and harassment of Highway 14, north of BAN ME THUOT, increased as elements of the 301st Local Force Battalion were targeted against the highway. Activity in the BU PRANG and DUC LAP areas reached its peak in November as elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment, 56th NVA Regiment, and 28th NVA Regiment were identified in attacks directed against Special Forces camps and supporting ARVN outposts.

During December, the activity in the BU PRANG/DUC LAP areas decreased as the enemy withdrew into CAMBODIA and began moving north. Enemy casualties during the two month offensive totaled over 1,500 as ARVN ground troops, supported by US artillery and air power, foiled the enemy's attempt to overrun the BU PRANG Special Forces Camp. In the 1st Brigade AO, aggressive operations uncovered numerous caches belonging to the 401st Sapper Battalion north of BAN ME THUOT, and to the K-394 Composite Battalion in their base area south of the city. US initiated contacts kept enemy elements on the defensive, effectively deterring their efforts to disrupt the pacification program.

In January, the ARVN forces redeployed into their DARLAC Province areas of operation as enemy pressure ceased in the BU PRANG/DUC LAP areas and 4th Infantry Division troops returned to PLEIKU and BINH DINH. Enemy activity increased when ARVN forces resumed their operations around BAN ME THUOT. ARVN elements received numerous attacks by fire and were engaged in small unit contacts throughout the month. The increase in activity against the ARVN forces exemplified the enemy's intentions of discrediting the ARVN forces in the eyes of the people.

(6) Estimated enemy composition, disposition, and strength as of 31 January 1970:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>PROBABLE LOCATION</u>
3d NVA Division Headquarters	2,400	Northern BINH DINH
2d VC Regiment	900	Northern BA 226
18th NVA Regiment	1,300	BA 226
22d NVA Regiment	900	BINH DINH/QUANG NGAI
90th Engineer Battalion	200	Northern BINH DINH
200th Air Defense Battalion	150	Northern BINH DINH
300th Artillery Battalion	250	Northeastern BA 226
400th Sapper Battalion	250	North of TAM QUAN
500th Transportation Battalion	Unknown	Unknown
511th Training Battalion	Unknown	Unknown
600th Medical Battalion	125	Unknown
700th Field Hospital	Unknown	Unknown
B-3 Front Headquarters	1,000+	Unlocated in CAMBODIA
250th Transportation Group	750	DARLAC
40th Artillery Regiment Headquarters	300	Tri-Border Area

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30th Battalion/40th Arty Regt	200	Unknown
32d Battalion/40th Arty Regt	210	Unknown
33d Battalion/40th Arty Regt	240	Unknown
41st Battalion/40th Arty Regt	210	Unknown
42d Battalion/40th Arty Regt	210	Unknown
46th Battalion/40th Arty Regt	210	Vic AR 8697
74th Battalion/40th Arty Regt	210	Unknown
K-16 Tank Battalion/40th Arty Regt	240	Unknown
UI Arty Bn (37 mm AA/40th Arty Regt)	250	Unknown
UI Arty Bn (105 How/40th Arty Regt)	250	Unknown
24th NVA Regiment	900	CHU PA
28th NVA Regiment	1,400	Unknown
66th NVA Regiment	1,250	Unknown
95B NVA Regiment	625	BA 202
H-15 Local Force Battalion	200	East of Camp Enari
K-20 Sapper Battalion	150	Vic ZB 0636
K-25A Engineer Battalion	300	Unknown
K-25B Engineer Battalion	250	Unknown
K-28 Sapper Battalion	150	Unknown
K-37 Sapper Battalion	300	Unknown
X-45 Local Force Battalion	200	SW of Camp Enari
94th Group	200	Vic AS 9358
301st Local Force Battalion	200	NE of MEWAL Plantation
304th Local Force Battalion	210	Vic ZB 1124
K-394th Composite Battalion	720	Vic ZU 2583
401st Sapper Battalion	275	MEWAL Plantation
406th Sapper Battalion	400	Vic AR 7999
408th Sapper Battalion	300	ENE of PLEIKU
631st Composite Battalion	300	Southern CHU PRONG
Infra Structure	11,306	
Guerilla Forces	2,000	
TOTAL ENEMY FORCES	32,391+	

## (7) Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques:

(a) Exploitation of a PW provided the following information on enemy security procedures. When platoon size VC/VMC units are located in mountainous regions, four two-man OP's/LP's are established to provide circular perimeter security, each within eyesight of the other's OP's and the main force. If US or ARVN troops on the ground are heard or observed, a hand signal or runner alerts the main force and other OP's. The unit will then fractionalize into three or four-man groups and disperse in all directions, excluding the direction of the approaching US/ARVN. The groups will reassemble at a known point many kilometers away. If aircraft are heard or observed in the area, particularly LOH's working at treetop, the past SOP for all VC/VMC personnel had been to freeze under overhead concealment lying face down and not moving until the aircraft are no longer heard. If the unit was discovered, then the unit fractionalized and dispersed when approached or fired upon by US/ARVN ground troops. Unit locations are usually chosen where overhead concealment is plentiful and can be maintained even though brush may be depressed and separated by rotors of treetop-level LOH's.

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(b) A change has taken place in the construction of VC/VNC/NVA on concealment from aircraft flying overhead. In the past it was established that the enemy attempted to go unobserved from aircraft by lying flat on the ground placing their hands behind the head, thereby creating a "T" shape on the ground with skin on their hands and forearms often exposed. This technique was easily detected from the air. Recently a source demonstrated the following position presently used. When aircraft are heard or observed the enemy takes up crouching positions placing their hands and forearms under their chest, and their head toward the ground. Source stated that the enemy also utilizes foliage to cover headgear and backs. When the source demonstrated the technique it was remarkable in that he reduced his size to such an extent that he would be very hard to observe or detect from the air, especially if he were using body camouflage.

(c) In operations during November in the PLMI WRONG area, Division forces noted a new VC signalling technique. As friendly forces approached a VC controlled village, a kite was raised and flown over the village. The kite remained over the village until the friendly unit passed through the area and then it was taken down. After moving three hundred meters past the village the friendly unit began to receive heavy fire from an enemy force. Two days later the incident repeated itself. In addition, other friendly elements in the area noted similar incidents while operating in the same vicinity.

(d) A HOI CHANH from the 408th Sapper Battalion stated that his company had employed field telephones during the attack on LZ ST GEORGE. The HOI CHANH stated that the attacking force was broken down into three main teams, each with a different objective. To insure that close coordination was maintained between the attacking forces, field telephones were utilized during the attack. This is the first report the Division has received of enemy units employing field telephones to maintain close coordination during an attack.

(e) On 26 December 1969, vic ZA 207960, an 815th Engineer mine-sweep team and a 14th ARVN Cavalry element found two B-40 rounds used as mines. The mines were located 20-30 meters on the west side of Highway 14N. One round was visually detected and the other was found with a mine detector. The B-40 rounds were placed on their side and were electrically detonated with pressure firing device and battery. This is the first time B-40 rounds have been known to be used as mines in KONTUM Province.

(f) On 4 January 1970, the 18th NVA Regiment employed 122-mm rockets in attacks on Camp Radcliff and an element of 1-69th Armor on the Highway east of AN KHE. Although a cache of 122-mm rockets was found during November operations in Base Area 226, this was the first known instance of the rocket being employed in this area. Since it was previously believed that the 18th Regiment did not possess the capability to fire the 122-mm rocket, these incidents indicate the 18th Regiment has received replacements or additional troops with rocket training.

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(g) The artillery LNO for a battery of the 2-9th Artillery working on the F-2 net, FM frequency 57.95, had been receiving override from a foreign language station. On 190343Z January 1970, while adjusting 1 smoke round during a fire mission for C/2-35th Infantry, 17 km west northwest of VINH THANH, an unknown station entered the net in ENGLISH and said "bring it in, bring it in". This is the first instance of imitative deception on US nets in this area.

(h) Since 1 January 1970, contact with villagers in and around the Division Tactical Area of Responsibility has revealed a noticeable change in villagers' willingness to discuss either enemy activity or possible enemy plans, particularly including plans for TET 1970. This change may be attributed to a degree of success in known enemy propaganda concerning American troop withdrawals and enemy reprisals against local villagers known to support GVN and American forces. Rumors concerning troop withdrawals continue to reinforce enemy propaganda efforts.

(8) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses:

(a) Personnel:	KIA (EG)	554
	NVA CIA	38
	VC/VMC CIA	<u>11</u>
	TOTAL	603

(b) Weapons:	S/A	247
	C/S	18
	TOTAL	265

(c) Ammunition:	S/A rounds	54,731
	C/S rounds	1,292
	Grenades	695
	Mines	1,336

(d) Miscellaneous Captured Items:

Explosives	768 lbs
Documents	173,390 pgs
Rice	180,942 lbs
Salt	6,435 lbs

(e) Enemy Facilities Destroyed:

Structures	331
Fortifications	891

(9) Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action:

(a) Capabilities

1 The 2d and 22d Regiments of the 3rd NVA Division have the

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capability to conduct multi-battalion size attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas in the AN LAO Valley and PHU MY area of BINH DINH Province.

2 The 18th NVA Regiment of the 3d NVA Division has the capability to conduct multi-battalion size attacks against allied installations, base camps, and populated areas supported by their organic 122-mm rockets. They can also interdict Highway 19 from BINH KHU to East of AN KHE.

3 The 90th and 400th Engineer/Sapper Battalions operating in support of the 3d Division have the capability of conducting sapper attacks against allied installations and populated areas in the AN LAO Valley and PHU MY area.

4 The 200th Air Defense Battalion has the capability to support 3d Division elements against allied aircraft with 12.7-mm AA weapons.

5 The 300th Artillery Battalion has the capability to support 3d Division operations with 75-mm recoilless rifles and 120-mm mortars.

6 The 40th Artillery Regiment, with its artillery battalions, is capable of conducting standoff attacks utilizing RR, 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, 107-mm, 122-mm, and 140-mm rockets, 85-mm guns, and 105-mm howitzers throughout KONTUM and PLEIKU Provinces.

7 The K-16 Tank Battalion (PT-76) has the capability of conducting armor attacks in KONTUM and PLEIKU Provinces along the CAMBODIAN Border.

8 The 95B Regiment is capable of conducting up to battalion size attacks against fire support bases, isolated camps, and populated areas in the VC Valley area and harassing and interdicting Highway 19 from AN KHE to PLEIKU.

9 The K-20, K-28, and K-37 Sapper Battalions are capable of conducting sapper attacks on GVN and US installations in KONTUM and PLEIKU Provinces and of mining major lines of communications throughout the two provinces.

10 The K-25A and K-25B Battalions are capable of building trail networks, fortifications, and artillery positions. They can also conduct up to company size attacks on allied installations and rural areas.

11 The 94th Group is capable of conducting ground and mortar attacks against allied installations and populated areas in northeastern KONTUM.

12 The 301st Local Force Battalion is capable of conducting multi-company size ground, mortar, and RR attacks on allied installations and populated areas in north central DARLAC Province. They can also interdict Highway 14 north of BAN ME THUOT City.

13 The 304th Local Force Battalion can conduct company size attacks

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in the TANH CANH DIEN BINH area and interdict Highway 14 from KONTUM City north to DAK TO.

14 The K-394 Composite Battalion is capable of conducting ground, mortar, and 122-mm rocket attacks on allied installations and populated centers in the BAN ME THUOT City area.

15 The 401st Sapper Battalion is capable of conducting multi-company size mortar and sapper attacks on BAN ME THUOT City and allied installations and populated areas north of BAN ME THUOT.

16 The 406th Sapper Battalion is capable of conducting sapper attacks on allied outposts and hamlets around KONTUM City.

17 The 408th Sapper Battalion can conduct company size sapper attacks supported by mortar and possible rocket fire against allied installations and populated centers in PLEIKU Province.

18 The 631st Composite Battalion is capable of launching multi-company size attacks supported by 82-mm mortars and 122-mm rockets on allied installations, outposts, and populated areas west and north of PLEIKU City.

(b) Enemy Vulnerabilities:

1 Enemy units are vulnerable to airstrikes and artillery fire when in bivouac or massing for an attack.

2 Enemy munitions and food caches are vulnerable to allied search and clear operations.

3 Enemy lines of communication are sufficiently extended to make them vulnerable to interdiction by allied operations.

4 Enemy movement is vulnerable to airborne personnel detection and sensor devices.

5 The enemy is vulnerable to psychological operations due to low morale, heavy personnel losses, and shortages of food and medical supplies.

(c) Probable Courses of Action:

1 Enemy forces are expected to end the current lull in enemy initiated activity with a Tet Offensive targeted against population centers, GVN and US installations, and lines of communication throughout the Division AO. Following Tet, activity will be aimed at discrediting the ARVN forces and gaining control of the people.

2 In BINH DINH Province, the 22d Regt and the 2d Regt will conduct operations against friendly installations and local villages and hamlets in the AN LAO Valley and the PHU MY area respectively, in an effort to disrupt the pacification program and gain control of the prosperous eastern BINH DINH region.

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3 The 18th NVA Regiment will conduct operations in the AN KHE/  
VINH THANH area targeted against allied installations and Highway 19.

4 Local forces, operating in support of the BINH DINH Provincial  
Committee, will continue harassment and psychological warfare against  
the villages and hamlets especially in the coastal districts of PHU MY  
and PHU CAT.

5 In PLEIKU Province, the 24th NVA Regiment will continue opera-  
tions north of PLEI MRONG by conducting ambushes on Highway 14 and at-  
tacks by fire on friendly installations in the PLEI MRONG area.

6 The 631st Composite Battalion will employ 122-mm rockets in  
attacks by fire against allied installations around PLEIKU City.

7 The 408th Sapper Battalion will conduct sapper attacks against  
allied installations in the PLEIKU area and continue terrorist activities  
in the city itself.

8 The 95B Regiment will continue its interdiction of Highway 19  
east of PLEIKU by conducting squad to company size attacks against  
bridges, strong points, pump stations, and convoys. Harassment of vil-  
lages in the DAK AYUNK area will continue as the Regiment attempts to  
protect this lucrative source of supply.

9 Local forces will continue interdiction of lines of communication  
and harassment of local villages attempting to disrupt the pacification  
program and strengthen VC control of the province.

10 KONTUM Province could become the focal point of enemy activity  
in South VIETNAM in the coming three months as major NVA units of the B-3  
Front align for a confrontation with ARVN forces. The 66th NVA Regiment,  
the 28th NVA Regiment, and elements of the 40th Artillery Regiment, all  
recently returned from the battle at BU PRANG/DUC LAP, are expected to  
conduct large scale operations supported with heavy artillery against  
selected Special Forces Camps, ARVN installations, and ARVN outposts  
throughout the province.

11 The K-20 Sapper Battalion and the 304th Local Force Battalion  
are expected to conduct sapper and harassing attacks against GVN and US  
installations in the DAK TO and TANH CANH regions.

12 The 406th Sapper Battalion, with artillery support from the 46th  
Battalion of the 40th Artillery Regiment, will conduct sapper attacks on  
KONTUM City.

13 Other local force units will conduct platoon to company strength  
harassing attacks in the DAK SEANG, DAK PEK, PLATEAU GI, and MANG BUK areas.

14 In DARLAC Province, the K394 Composite Battalion, believed to  
be regrouping after participating in the offensive against DUC LAP, will  
resume sporadic mortar and rocket attacks against BAN MA THUOT.

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15 The 401st Sapper Battalion will resume mortar and sapper attacks against friendly installations in BAN ME THUOT City and continue harassment of villages north of BAN ME THUOT aimed at disruption of the pacification program.

16 The 301st Local Force Battalion will conduct operations against friendly villages in the BUON HO area and interdict Highway 14 north of BAN ME THUOT.

(10) Military Intelligence Activities

(a) General: During the past quarter, the 4th Military Intelligence Company (MIC) provided Counterintelligence (CI), Imagery Interpretation (II), and Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW) support to the Division. Emphasis was placed on the close coordination and frequent exchange of information between 4th MIC units and G2. A daily G2 situation briefing for all G2 related activities and the frequent exchange of ideas and information during these briefings greatly enhanced the production, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence material.

(b) Counterintelligence: The activities of the CI Section during the reporting period continued to include preplanned operations against small local force units and individuals with the majority of the CI effort being devoted to increasing the number of agent sources within the Tactical Area of Responsibility. An operation is continually conducted to screen all indigenous employees working at Camp Enari. The highly successful operations resulted in the identification and neutralization of 46 VC and VCS during the quarter. The emphasis placed on internal security and security of classified material continues, with repeated unannounced inspections plus inspections of unit burn areas used to destroy classified material.

(c) Interrogation of Prisoners of War: Close cooperation was maintained between the IPW Section and G2, as well as the units in the field, during the last quarter. The advantages of tactful exploitation and close rapport with detainees were amply displayed in IPW's successful interrogation techniques. During the period 19 December 1969-31 January 1970, the IPW Section completely exploited an NVA soldier by employing tactful questions and establishing a true rapport. The NVA was transformed from an arrogant, uncooperative prisoner to a valuable individual who led interrogation teams to 13 ammunition caches. IPW's successes with this, and other detainees and their timely and accurate translation of captured documents greatly facilitated the production of intelligence.

(d) Imagery Interpretation Section: During the quarter the II Section continued to be a valuable asset to the Division G2. Mosaics, photo readouts, and overlays were produced during November of the cultivated areas in the DAK AYUNH and IA DRANG areas. An analysis was made of Base Area 202 with overlays of hard targets, trails, cultivation, and potential LZ's prepared from readouts of Air Force and Mohawk

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aerial photography and prints made of the known LZ's in the area. Coordination was made with the G3 to prepare CBU targets in the PLEI TRAP Valley. In the GIA LAI Province Committee area, NW of AN KHE, consolidation overlays and potential LZ's were developed. Two of the bigger projects were mosaics of the TAOR for DIVARTY and LZ BLACKHAWK for 2-8th Infantry (Mech). II also collaborated with the IPW Section in a project designed to develop trail information for prospective ambush sites.

c. Operations and Training Activities

(1) Operations

(a) The 4th Infantry Division was disposed as shown on Map 1, Inclosure 4, at the beginning of this reporting period.

(b) 1st Brigade: Operation WAYNE BREAKER, which commenced on 18 October, continued with the 1-8th Infantry and 3-8th Infantry providing security and conducting operations in the SONG BA River Valley until 11 November 1969. Continuous small unit patrolling coupled with intensive pacification efforts and training of the local force units denied needed support to enemy units operating in and adjacent to Base Area 226. Enemy action until 11 November was light and generally consisted of scattered harassment by small units and infrequent incidence of ground-to-air fire. On 11 November the 1st Brigade was redeployed to the BAN ME THUOT area and commenced Operation SPRAGINS WHITE with the 1-14th and 2-35th Infantry battalions and assumed operational control of the 3-506th Airborne Brigade. The mission was security and pacification north and south of BAN ME THUOT City and security of Highway 21 east of the city. Contact was sparse until 24 November when the enemy initiated four separate incidents. At 0330 at AQ 890226, C/1 14th Inf in its night laager received six B-40 rounds and small arms fire from an unknown enemy force. Artillery supported on the suspected enemy location; the enemy withdrew immediately. Results were seven US MIA. At 0640 at AP 785940, the command post of the 2-35th Infantry received eight rounds of 75-mm recoilless rifle fire. There were no casualties or damage. At 1220 at ZU 247888, the third platoon of A/2-35th Infantry on reconnaissance in force operation received small arms and B40 fire from an unknown size enemy force. The second platoon reinforced and the company initiated a cordon and search operation on a village resulting in four suspects detained. These individuals were turned over to the ARVN for further interrogation. Small unit actions during operation SPRAGINS WHITE in November resulted in three enemy killed. The continued movement of small US units throughout the area disrupted enemy plans for attacks on BAN ME THUOT City and interdiction of adjacent highways while larger assaults were taking place in the BU PRANG-DUC LAP area. The 1st Brigade utilized every opportunity to initiate or improve the training of RF/PF units in or adjacent to the area. These training programs coupled with combined operations significantly increased the combat readiness of the VIETNAMESE forces involved.

During December there were numerous contacts northeast of BAN ME THUOT that forced the enemy north of the MEWAL Plantation and away from

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the city. On 113000 December vicinity AQ 899299, P-Comp/1-14th Infantry engaged two individuals with small arms. Contact was broken immediately and a sweep of the contact area revealed three dead NVA and two AK-47's. During the five day period, 22-26 December, 2-35th Infantry uncovered several large ammunition caches totalling four AK-47's, one SKS, one M-16, one CHICOM machinegun, one shotgun, seventeen grenades, three claymores, six RPG rocket launchers, eighty-five RPG rounds, 195 mortar rounds, fifteen M-79 rounds, five 107-mm rocket rounds, 300 rounds of M-60 ammunition and other miscellaneous equipment. Contacts throughout the month resulted in a total of twelve enemy killed. Several cordon and search operations were conducted. The most significant occurred on 16 December vicinity AP 784378 when C/2-35th Infantry had eighteen MONTAGNARDS CHIEU HOI. A few minor incidents occurred along the BAN ME THUOT resupply route, Highway 14S; the enemy was unsuccessful in his attempt to interrupt the normal flow of supplies from PLEIKU to BAN ME THUOT. Operation SPRAGINS WHITE was terminated on 30 December with the departure of all Division elements after being relieved in place by ARVN forces.

On 4 January the 1st Brigade commenced operations in and adjacent to Base Area 226. In response to a two company attack on the PF elements at VINH THANH, the 1-8th Infantry made a combat assault into the area closely followed by three additional battalions. Numerous small unit contacts occurred throughout the month and it was evident by the number of weapons and equipment captured that tactical surprise was achieved. Elements of both the 2d VC and 18th NVA Regiments were encountered and total results were twenty three enemy KIA, eight PW's, eighteen detained and one HOI CHANH. Enemy equipment losses included five automatic weapons, four 60-mm mortars, one 82 mm mortar, one 57 mm recoilless rifle, six RPG-2 and two RPG-7 captured. The continuous small unit actions of the 1st Brigade prevented enemy elements from coordinating attacks against the populous AN KHE area or moving east into the BINH DINH pacification areas. The largest single contact occurred on 8 January just north of Highway 19 at BR 22479. The 1-69th Armor, while attempting to link up with a downed LOH, engaged a well dug-in enemy company. Gunships, artillery and tactical air supported as infantry and additional armor reinforced. The four and a half hour contact resulted in two US KIA and seventeen wounded while enemy losses were eleven KIA, one CHICOM 11-mm machinegun, one AK-47, thirty five satchel charges and twelve 60-mm mortar rounds. The proximity of this contact to the highway indicated that the contact preempted a major enemy attempt to ambush a convoy or conduct substantial interdiction of that vital line of communication.

(c) 2d Brigades Operation PUTNAM WILDCAT continued through November with the 1-12th and 1-22d Infantry battalions screening the high ground east of the AN LAO Valley in support of pacification efforts by ARVN and 173d Airborne Brigade forces along the heavily populated coastal regions. Utilizing numerous small unit patrols and ambushes, the units interrupted and disorganized NVA and VC attempts to infiltrate into the pacification regions.

On 3 November vicinity BR 704056, A/1-22d Infantry observed thirteen

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individuals bathing in a stream. Gunships were requested and expended in the area. While sweeping the area, A Company was engaged by an estimated enemy company. Gunships, artillery and tactical air supported. Contact broke at 2000. Results were friendly two KIA, and two WIA while the enemy sustained three KIA, one CIA, and lost three AK-47's. On 14 November two platoons from A/1-22d Infantry were inserted into the vicinity of BS 820060 at 1330 in response to ground-to-air fire received by C/7-17th Cavalry. At 1420 the Aero rifle platoon was inserted 500 meters to the south. At 1605 both units were in contact; the Aero rifle platoon with a squad size element and A/1-22d Infantry with an estimated NVA company. The enemy broke contact with the Aero rifle platoon at 1645 without friendly casualties. Artillery and gunships supported A Company until 1830 when the enemy broke contact. The results were friendly one KIA and four WIA; enemy losses were two KIA and one detained.

Numerous brief but productive contacts with small enemy elements occurred during December. The infantry units, operating mostly in platoon size elements, engaged the enemy on seventeen different occasions resulting in thirty-three enemy KIA and six detained. One machinegun, six small arms and six B40 rounds were captured.

During the first half of January, the 2d Brigade continued the screening mission in the AN LAO Valley. Small unit operations from company sized patrol bases produced numerous contacts and were particularly effective in employing artillery and mortars on long range sightings. The failure of any enemy elements to infiltrate and disrupt the pacification areas attests to the success of the brigade screening mission. Operation PUTNAM WILDCAT terminated on 18 January with the following results: US: Thirteen KIA, forty-two WIA; Enemy: ninety-seven KIA, six PW's, two RPG-7's, three pistols and one CHICOM radio captured.

The 2d Brigade initiated operation PUTNAM POWER on 21 January targeted against the 18th NVA Regiment in Base Area 226. Tactical surprise was achieved with simultaneous airmobile assaults into divergent locations; the 1-12th Infantry with B/4-42d Artillery, established FSB SHERIDAN while combat assaulting the rifle companies into multiple LZ's in southern Base Area 226 to locate and destroy enemy forces and facilities; the 1-22d Infantry established its fire base at LZ HARD TIMES and combat assaulted its maneuver elements into multiple LZ's, orienting its search and destroy operations astride the OREGON Trail. Enemy elements which had operated freely within the base area appeared disorganized and confused by the sudden influx of troops. Frequent small unit contacts and meeting engagements occurred as enemy elements sought sanctuary in other locations. Air cavalry units continually forced the enemy out of their usual complexes of huts and bunkers, forcing them toward friendly ground units. Operation PUTNAM POWER was terminated on 30 January and redesignated PUTNAM SHARK. The total results of Operation PUTNAM POWER were two US KIA and eighteen WIA; sixteen enemy were KIA and two detained. Thirteen weapons and seventy-one RPG rounds were captured.

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Operation PUTNAM SHANK was only two days old at the end of the reporting period, with five enemy KIA and 3.5 tons of rice captured.

(d) 3d Brigade: Operation GREENE BULLET continued until 19 November with the 1-35th Infantry and 3-12th Infantry battalions searching the CHU PA Mountains. Although enemy units avoided combat during the entire operation, the presence of Divisional forces in the area denied enemy forces the capability of supplying in the CHU PA area. Total results of the operation were: US: three KIA, forty seven WIA; Enemy: forty-three KIA, fifty-one B40 rounds and fifty grenades captured.

At the conclusion of Operation GREENE BULLET, the forces were re-deployed with the 1-35th Infantry initially reinforcing 2-8th Infantry (Mech) in Operation HODGES BLACK in the PLEI MRONG area, then being joined by the 3-12th Infantry. Operation HODGES BLACK evolved into GREENE BEAR under 3d Brigade control on 20 November.

In the PLEI MRONG area contact was at a moderate level during the first half of November. On 2 November at 0720 vicinity ZA 091738, A/2-8th Infantry (Mech) and 1/C/1-69th Armor were engaged by an estimated enemy platoon size force using small arms and B40 fire. This short, 20 minute, but violent action resulted in one US KIA and eleven WIA, with the enemy losing nine KIA. On 6 November at 0305 while in a night laager at ZA C77742, A/2-8th Infantry (Mech) received four B40 rounds. Organic weapons fire was returned and a SPOOKY aircraft supported resulting in three enemy KIA. Again on 23 November, A/2-8th Infantry (Mech) received B40 and small arms fire at 0420 vicinity ZA 069710. Artillery and SPOOKY supported with D/1-35th Infantry reinforcing. Contact broke at 1430 and resulted in five enemy KIA. At the termination of Operation HODGES BLACK, US losses were sixteen KIA and fifty-two WIA with enemy losses at 113 KIA. The continuous contact in the PLEI MRONG area disrupted enemy plans for interdiction of Highway 14 and coordinated attacks on PLEIKU, KONTUM or US and ARVN installations in the area. The continued destruction of fortifications in the area denied the enemy a safe passage and a staging area for offensive operations to the east. The introduction of additional infantry into the area under Operation GREENE BEAR lessened NVA activity appreciably in the area.

The other areas of the 3d Brigade, which included the security and pacification of THANH AN, PHU NHON, and LE TRUNG Districts, had light, sporadic contacts during the month. A major ground action occurred at 0300 on 6 November at AR 854144 when the command post of the 1-14th Infantry at FSB ST GEORGE was attacked by an estimated reinforced enemy sapper company employing small arms, B40's and satchel charges. Nine US were KIA and twenty-four WIA while the enemy sustained forty-two KIA, two detained, and eleven AK-47's, nine RPG launchers and sixty-one satchel charges captured. Otherwise the 3d Brigade, supported by patrols of K-75 Infantry (Rangers) concentrated on operations against local forces and the infiltration routes and supply caches that service NVA units in PLEIKU Province.

Operation GREENE BEAR continued into December with enemy action

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remaining at a moderately low level. The security and pacification mission in THANH AN, PHU NHON and LE TRUNG Districts, together with the RF/PF training program, continued to progress well. The continuous small unit patrolling, coupled with the intense pacification efforts, substantially curtailed the enemy's capability to operate effectively in and around the PLEIKU/Camp Enari area. Activity throughout the brigade area of operations was scattered and characterized by an occasional brief contact with small enemy forces. The most significant action occurred on 14 December vicinity ZA 115798 when 2/B/3-12th Infantry engaged a squad size force with automatic weapons, M-79's and artillery. A sweep of the area netted five NVA KIA.

The 3d Brigade continued to screen the western approaches to the Camp Enari/PLEIKU TAOR's with the 3-12th Infantry and 1-10th Cavalry during January. Enemy action was light with one notable exception. On 25 January elements of the 1-10th Cavalry while mine sweeping the road between Firo Base MEREDITH to PLEI DJEBENG were engaged by an estimated enemy platoon twenty meters from the road. In the immediate reaction to the ambush, the cavalry's main body and security element, employing all organic weapons, swept over the enemy positions. The contact lasted thirteen minutes and resulted in fifteen enemy KIA, one detainee, nine AK-47's, one SKS, one 9-mm pistol, one 60-mm mortar, one RPG-2, and assorted mortar and small arms ammunition. The screening mission of the 1-10th Cavalry precluded any large scale movement of enemy forces from CAMBODIA or mountain sanctuaries along the border. The 3-12th Infantry interrupted enemy plans in their area with the assistance of an NVA raider. The HOI CHANH, who enjoyed the hospitality and care of FVMAF after being wounded in a contact on 4 January led infantrymen to cache sites on thirteen different occasions. In all 182 B40 rounds, 152 60-mm mortar rounds, ninety-seven anti-tank grenades, 278 lbs of explosives and other assorted items of military hardware were extracted from the various sites.

(e) Division Controlled Operations: On 11 November with the departure of the 1st Brigade, the continuing requirement for pacification and security in the AN KHE area, as well as the need for Highway 19 security dictated the formation of TASK FORCE BRAVO with the 1-8th and 3-8th Infantry battalions. The 1-8th and 3-8th Infantry continued operation WAYNE BREAKER with minor contact until 15 November at 2235 when a highly trained sapper unit destroyed nineteen aircraft at Camp Radcliff. Security of that installation was immediately reinforced with 3-8th Infantry. This attack prompted the rotation of one infantry battalion to Camp Radcliff to conduct training and provide perimeter defense. On 25 November, the 1-8th Infantry changed to the operational control of the 3d Brigade for operations southeast of Camp Enari. Operation HARTLE GREEN continued with the 1-69th Armor securing Highway 19. On 16 November the battalion was put under the operational control of TASK FORCE BRAVO with no change in mission. During November, enemy elements concentrated on the interdiction of the highway and harassment of convoys. Quick reaction by security units and supporting aircraft and artillery prevented substantial loss of any convoy elements to enemy ambushes. The availability of armored vehicle launch bridges

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and swift engineer support denied the enemy the ability to halt traffic for any length of time. At 102247 at BR 321463, Highway 19 was cut by a crater 15 feet wide and 3 feet deep across the entire road. An armored vehicle launch bridge was emplaced at first light. The same night at 2346 at BR 202409, A/1-69th Armor found another crater 10 feet in diameter and 5 feet deep. An armored vehicle launch bridge was also emplaced at first light with little effect on traffic. At 110625 at BR 096553 the third platoon of A/1-69th Armor received heavy small arms fire, two rounds of 60 mm mortar and one round of B40 fire. The platoon returned fire with all organic weapons and taking a sweep of the suspected enemy location, three suspects were detained and turned over to LE PHUNG District Headquarters for further interrogation. At 140915 at BR 097551, a 1st Logistics Command convoy received small arms and B40 fire from the south. C/1-69th Armor reacted with tanks at 0930. Three POL tankers received medium damage with no casualties. At 1020 the same convoy again received small arms and B40 fire. One additional POL tanker was hit causing light damage. At 161845 vicinity BR 144534 another 1st Log Comd convoy was harassed, resulting in one POL tanker destroyed. Incidents continued until 24 November when the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) (-) with C/1-69th Armor assumed responsibility for the highway from Fleiku Defense Sector to the MANG YANG Pass and the 1-69th Armor (-) with A/2-8th Infantry (Mech) reverted to the east from MANG YANG Pass to the ROK boundary. The additional forces plus the employment of CBU42 mine barriers north and south of the highway resulted in a significant decrease in incidents since 22 November. The mine barriers severely restricted the enemy's efforts to interdict Highway 19. The additional mobility of the 2-8th Infantry (Mech) ground forces in areas previously inaccessible to tanks contributed greatly to denying the highway as a target for enemy forces.

The 1-10th Cavalry continued Operation KRAMER WHITE. On 1 November at 1130 vicinity YA 835190, 2/C/1-10th Cavalry made contact with an estimated enemy company. The contact was reinforced overland by A Troop and D Troop supported by gunships. Contact lasted until 1310 resulting in four enemy KIA. At 1055 on 20 November vicinity YA 049128, D/1-10th Cavalry observed several individuals in the open carrying weapons. Organic gunships expended and the aero rifle platoon was inserted to sweep the area. Ten NVA KIA were found along with thirteen rucksacks, one SKS, fifteen B40 rounds and 103 CHICOM grenades. Other contacts in the area of operations during the month were light and sporadic. The destruction of numerous fortifications and bunkers throughout the area denied the use of many way stations to enemy units attempting to infiltrate from CAMBODIA to the east. The mobility of the cavalry squadron restricted the use of many former high speed avenues of approach into the populated highland regions and even further to the eastern coastal regions. This economy of force measure enabled the Division to place additional emphasis and combat power in critical areas without surrendering the ability to hinder the flow of men and material to main force enemy units.

The 1-69th Armor and 2-8th Infantry (Mech) continued the mission of road security along Highway 19 from Camp Enari to the eastern limit of the Division area of operation. The flow of convoys along this critical resupply route went relatively uninterrupted during December because of minimal enemy action. Operation KRAMER WHITE continued with the 1-10th

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Cavalry. The capabilities for wide area coverage, rapid mobility, and quick reaction were employed to the maximum. As well as conducting detailed surveillance of enemy routes of approach and assembly areas, the air cavalry was also employed as a reaction force responding to intelligence reports and enemy contacts. On several occasions during the month, the 1-10th Cavalry was able to sight and bring fire upon enemy elements. A fifteen day operation was conducted by A/7-17th Cavalry in conjunction with K-75th Infantry (Ranger) Company targeted against enemy elements attempting to interdict Highway 19 from the north and south. On 23 November at 1117 vicinity AR 933035, A/7-17th Cavalry after observing and firing on two individuals, inserted an aero rifle platoon which swept the area and found two NVA killed by gunships and two graves of NVA killed by a K-75 LRP Team 22 in an earlier contact. The Long Range Patrols from K-75 continued to make small contacts the remainder of the month and obtained considerable information of intelligence value. The employment of the K-75 Infantry (Ranger) Company with the air cavalry proved to be an optimum use of available resources. The air cavalry has the organic lift and gunship resources necessary for the insertion and extraction of the teams as well as being immediately responsive to support in the event of contact or intelligence developed. A much larger area can be covered with the LRP teams acting as an extension of the eyes and ears of the air cavalry.

January was relatively quiet for the highway 19 security forces. The 2-8th Infantry (Mech) during their highway security mission west of the MANG YANG Pass began employing one rifle company in small unit ambushes south of the highway. The mechanized forces were primarily used as dismounted infantry with the personnel carriers as a means of transportation to drop off stay behind ambushes. This method of employment proved effective in the DAK AZUMI River Valley where more than twenty-two tons of polished and unpolished rice were discovered and evacuated. This discovery had a substantial effect on the enemy's re-supply capabilities for units directed to interdict the highway. The line of communication west of the MANG YANG Pass was quiet with no significant actions other than a few mining incidents and occasional sniper fire.

(2) The following OPLANS and OPORD were published during the reporting period:

(a) OPLAN 39-69, dated 25 December 1969, classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(b) OPLAN 6-70, dated 23 January 1970, classified CONFIDENTIAL. PHASE II. This plan implements IFFV OPLAN 104-70, the Pro Tet Defense of Populated Areas.

(c) OPORD 40-69, dated 1 January 1970, classified CONFIDENTIAL. This plan discussed Base Camp and TAOR Defense Plan.

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(3) Air Support

(a) Sorties:

November	376
December	499
January	490
TOTAL	1,365

(4) Training: The 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment trained a total of 4,270 US enlisted men, 376 officers, and 212 VIETNAMESE enlisted men during the reporting period.

(a) The Non-Commissioned Officer Comba' Leadership Course graduated 74 students.

(b) The replacement committee trained 4,079 enlisted men and 376 officers.

(c) The Pre-Secondo School graduated 44 students.

(d) The Special Training Section trained 53 snipers.

(e) The Patrolling Section trained and graduated 20 enlisted men.

(f) The Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, received a 14 day reconnaissance course. Thirty-three personnel attended this training.

(g) The RF/PF and Kit Carson Scout Programs continued. RF/PF graduated 180 students and 32 Kit Carson Scouts graduated.

(5) Chemical

(a) The Division Chemical Section continued to function in the dual role of staff section, and an operating section. With the 43d Chemical Detachment OPCON, Division Chemical supported combat operations during the period through extensive aerial and ground employment of Riot Control Agents (RCA), aerial and ground employment of standard defoliants and diesel fuel for control of vegetation and crop destruction, and operated and maintained the Division's Airborne Personnel Detector equipment. Technical advice was rendered on the use of flame field munitions and inspections were conducted on unit CBR readiness, equipment and supply. The chemical ASP continued to operate in support of the Division.

(b) TRAILDUST defoliation missions increased over the previous reporting period, whereas helicopter defoliation was almost non-existent. The increase in TRAILDUST missions was due to the favorable weather conditions in KONTUM and PLEIKU Provinces. The PLEI TRAP Valley was the primary target area.

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1. The lack of standard defoliants prohibited helicopter spray operations of any magnitude. Diesel fuel was aerially sprayed on several base camp perimeters. At this time results from using diesel fuel as a substitute have not been fully evaluated.

2. Political clearance for use of defoliants continues to be difficult to obtain.

(c) Riot Control Agent (RCA) munitions were used extensively in direct support of combat troops and played a vital role in the destruction and demoralization of enemy targets detected and located by Special Intelligence. Persistent and non-persistent RCA was employed throughout the division area of operation in support of ground troops, prepping, H&I artillery fires and to block enemy withdrawal routes from contact areas.

1. The amount of micropulverized persistent CS employed during the period increased slightly over the last period. The dry season in the Central Highlands increased the long term effectiveness of persistent CS. The Chemical Section employed 1383/55 gallon drums of persistent CS against targets in the PLEI TRAP Valley, CHU PA and CHU PRONG Mountains, VC Valley and just north of AN KHE. Drums were employed by air drop from CH-47 helicopters to contaminate infiltration routes, bunkers, tunnels, and assembly and living areas to deny their use to the enemy. The use of detonating cord, plastic explosive M4, and 15 second delay fuzes to burst the drums was discontinued due to new aircraft safety regulations. Only the new XM925 Fuze, Burster and Drum system can be used for the aerial employment of CS drums.

2. Non-persistent CS was employed extensively from the air using the XM15 (M158R2) CS Canister Cluster. These were used against suspected enemy locations in conjunction with artillery and air strikes. A total of 793 XM15 munitions were employed during the period.

3. Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) operations are no longer centrally controlled by Division. The 4th Aviation Battalion SCORPION Team now supports the brigades, receiving briefings and debriefings from the brigade S-2 rather than the Division G2. One APD is still operated by the 1st Bde on a daily basis. The 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry and 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry now use the APD in conjunction with their hunter-killer scout missions. An increase in effectiveness has resulted from the above changes with greater exploitation being made upon intelligence gathered. A total of 366 missions were conducted during the period for a total of 384 hours. Each APD machine is sent to the 147th Light Equipment Maintenance Company in LONG BINH after 50 hours of operation. Much less down time has resulted since implementing of the program.

(d) Training and evaluation continues on the new XM191 Multishot Portable Flame Weapon. Tactical use of the weapon has been minimal up to this point. It appears that the weapon is too heavy and bulky to be carried in the Central Highlands. On one occasion the weapon was air lifted to a contact area for use against an enemy held bunker complex. However, the dense jungle in the area would not permit an adequate

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line of fire for the weapon.

(6) Research and Development

(a) Disposable Insulated Food Container

1 The Division evaluated the disposable food container during January 1970. The item is a disposable replacement for the mermite can. Divisional units readily accepted the container and believe that it should be standardized for issue. The container enabled units to feed hot meals to troops in the field when the back haul of mermite cans would be significant problem. Being a small, self-contained unit, the container may be transported by a LOH. Consequently, units may feed hot meals to field troops who are inaccessible to the UH1D.

2 The only major problem is that the cardboard container loses its strength and ability to insulate when it becomes wet. To remedy this situation, the container could be sprayed with a liquid plastic or wrapped in waterproof paper.

(b) XM191 Multi-Shot Flame Weapon (ENSURE 263)

1 Generally, the Divisional units accept the XM191; however, due to its weight, infantry troops employ the weapon on an on-call basis. An incendiary round should be developed for the LAW to provide a weapon that infantry troops would be willing to carry.

2 The Division has determined that the XM191 is a substitute for the portable flame thrower. The XM191 is lighter and has greater range.

d. Logistics

(1) Emphasis continued on utilization of land lines of communications (LLOC) throughout the Division's area of operation for movement of all classes of supply. Good weather throughout the period precluded any significant problems to overland movement. Air lines of communications (ALOC) were utilized in the relocation of combat battalions on several occasions but received little utilization in resupply operations.

(2) Elements of the 45th General Support Group and the 593d General Support Group of QUI NHON Support Command and Logistical Support Agency BAN ME THUOT of CAN PANH BAY Support Command continued to provide logistical support to the 4th Infantry Division. Support was generally provided by consolidated LSA/FSE (Logistical Support Agency/Forward Support Element) operations as brigade bases were habitually collocated with a 1st Logistical Command LSA.

(3) At Camp Radcliff (AN KHE) support was provided by an LSA of QUI NHON Support Command and a forward support element operated by the 4th S&T Battalion. Continuous support was provided to elements of the 1st Brigade throughout the period. In mid-January 2d Brigade moved from LZ ENGLISH area to AN KHE. With two brigades being supported

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from Camp Radcliff, the majority of logistical support passed off from LSA to the Divisional FSE. The LSA did continue to provide certain support such as provision of Class I, III and V supplies; Graves Registration; and laundry service. Greatly increased supply support in the area of Class II & IV was provided by the FSE. Maintenance support was provided by two US Maintenance Companies of the 704th Maintenance Battalion.

(4) In early November, a two battalion task force, under operational control of the 1st Brigade, was deployed to BAN ME THOUT. The mission of the force was to relieve ARVN battalions in the BAN ME THOUT area so that they might be employed against the NVA threat in the BU PRANG-DUC LAP area. The 1st Brigade remained at BAN ME THOUT until late December and during the entire period the brigade was logistically supported by a combination LSA/FSE operation. The LSA was operated by CAM RANH BAY Support Command and provided supply Classes I, III, IV and V to the 1st Brigade. The LSA also provided Graves Registration and backup maintenance support. Class II and VII supplies were provided by the FSE along with bath service.

(5) The 2d Brigade continued operations in the AN LAO Valley with logistical support being provided by the LSA/FSE operation at LZ ENG LISH. The LSA augmented by the 4th S&T personnel provided Class I, III, IIIA and V supplies with the FSE providing Class II & IV support and bath service. Graves Registration and laundry service were provided by the LSA.

(6) Direct support maintenance and medical companies have habitually been employed in direct support of brigade task forces.

(7) Transportation Services: During the reporting period there were 2,793 convoys with a total of 20,351 vehicles. Company B, 4th Supply and Transport Battalion hauled supplies to FSE's from the Company's base at Camp Enari. Company B also augmented Divisional units with vehicles for unit moves, as required.

(8) Medical Services: The 4th Medical Battalion, with Companies B, C, and D supporting the 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades respectively and Company A supporting Camp Enari, provided the following services during the quarter:

	<u>PATIENTS SPEN</u>	<u>PATIENTS ADMITTED</u>	<u>RETURNED TO DUTY</u>
TOTALS	14,154	1,008	448

(9) Materiel Readiness: During the reporting period, the operational readiness of this Division improved as more emphasis was placed on organizational maintenance of equipment at the unit level. The operational readiness rate of combat vehicles has improved steadily during the period as a result of increased maintenance awareness on the part of unit commanders. The OR (Operational Readiness) of these vehicles is expected to increase even more during the next period as the proposed increased rate of filter exchange program is put into effect.

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A program of infantry battalion standdowns was implemented during the reporting period to help improve the readiness posture of these units. One battalion at a time is brought in from the field for 24 days of recuperation. During this period, intensive maintenance is performed on all organizational equipment, both by unit personnel and by contact teams from the 288th Maintenance Battalion.

(10) Maintenance Support: Headquarters and A Company (Main Support), 704th Maintenance Battalion continued its role of providing direct support maintenance for Camp Phari units, backup direct support for the battalion forward support companies, supply of Class IX (repair parts), and retrograde of material. 704th Maintenance Battalion forward support companies continued to support the 1st, 2d and 3d Brigades. Company B (Transportation Aircraft Maintenance) located at Camp Phari, continued its aircraft direct support maintenance mission. Emphasis is placed on repair by forward maintenance companies with supplementary contact teams provided by Headquarters and A Company, 704th Maintenance Battalion.

(11) Administrations: Action was completed on 195 reports of Survey with 25 currently pending final action. 34 Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved and 394 Combat Loss Reports were processed.

## a. Civilian Affairs

### (1) Civic Action

(a) TAOR: The civic action teams and the villages in which they reside have experienced fewer significant attacks and ambushes than in the previous two quarters. This is felt to be largely due to the increased patrolling and ambush activity of the Popular Force platoons in the Division TAOR, plus the recent requirements for civic action teams to travel with at least two vehicles. Frequent contacts have been made by the PF platoons at PLBT PHAM GE, PLBT HO BY and PLBT KI TAN NGOL while patrolling or reacting to local intelligence. PLBT CHAM MEH has moved from the PLBT BO consolidation to the former site of the hamlet (AR 805411). Coordination is now being made to obtain barrier materials and weapons to make PLBT CHAM MEH defensible. The goal is to recruit, organize and train twenty-five SON THON Revolutionary Development cadre from this hamlet. PLBT PANG (AR 789228) has moved into the PLBT HO BY consolidation and the initial integration of this hamlet seems to be going well as indicated by twenty-two of the newly recruited SON THON cadre group (70 man total) comprised of volunteers from PLBT PANG.

(b) The IR-5 rice is being grown in four villages in the TAOR this winter. Several villages in the TAOR were automatically excluded because of or through lack of adequate water resources during the dry season while other villages having water were unwilling to change their traditional life patterns by planting a second rice crop. However, the rice at PLBT PHAM GE has been in the ground for approximately six weeks and is doing very well, and the low night temperatures which had been the main point of concern seem to have no adverse effects on any

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of the four plots. It appears at this time that at least eight of the original farmers that were introduced to the rice last summer will continue with IR-5 production either this winter, or starting again next summer (in those villages lacking water during the dry season). It is expected that as the increased yields, shorter growing period, and greater resistance to wind damage is demonstrated by these innovative farmers, the benefits of the IR-5/8 varieties will dictate large scale acceptance and use by the MONTAGNARD peoples of this area.

(c) LE TRUNG District, with the support of the village civic action team, has recruited and sent to training an additional PF platoon from PLEI LE ANH. This platoon will return approximately 1 April 1970, and will significantly strengthen the defensive posture of the village. Also, a seventy man SON THON Revolutionary Development cadre group was recruited and sent to training from PIET HO BY. Upon this group's return the PIET HO BY will have a strength of one hundred twenty-four defenders composed of PF, SON THON and PSDP and will greatly strengthen GVN's position in this critical area near the LE TRUNG-PHU NHON boundary.

(d) The GVN Agricultural Service in PLEIKU in conjunction with the Ethnic Minorities Ministry has continued to distribute fish fingerlings and fruit tree saplings to raise the quality of life in the MONTAGNARD Villages of the TAOR--using the transport and communication assets of the Division to help coordinate the program and distribute the commodities. The Agricultural Ministry has also provided valuable advice and support in the purchase of garden seeds that have been distributed with growing instructions to nearly every family in the TAOR.

(e) The ARVN CA NCO program is ending its second phase during which they have been fully integrated with members of the Division's civic action teams and staff sections. Starting 15 February 1970, these ARVN will form the nucleus of ARVN civic action teams that will fully VIETNAMIZE the TAOR civic action effort during the period 15 February-15 April 1970. There are currently forty-three ARVN civic action trained non-commissioned officers assigned to the Division.

(f) The MONTAGNARD Medic Training Program is progressing well with twenty-nine students from the TAOR, and the two students from AN THU District in BINH DINH. The program of instruction has been established by the Ministry of Health and is locally administered by Captain (Doctor) Can and Mr. Su'u, respectively, the hospital head and Public Health Chief of PLEIKU Province. The graduation date is tentatively set for 5 March 1970, and the twenty-nine MONTAGNARD trainees will become SON THON cadre, and lead the VIETNAMIZATION of the dispensary and public health programs in the TAOR. As SON THON medical cadre, they will be eligible to draw health kits and other medical supplies from the PLEIKU Hospital. A second round of plague shots similar to the program executed last September-October has begun with the people of one village and a hamlet receiving a total of four hundred ten inoculations. It is expected that between 8,000 and 10,000 will receive plague shots prior to the complete VIETNAMIZATION of the TAOR in April. The vaccine and health workers

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administering the units are all from the PLEIKU Province hospital staff, and it is hoped that this program will continue and eventually expand when the MONTGOMERY medical and ARVN civic action teams assume the civic action responsibilities for the villagers.

(g) The medical chief of the 4th Engineer Battalion Team at PLEI CAO THONG has just completed a two kilometer long 2½ inch pipe aqueduct that furnishes PLEI CAO THONG with a continuous flow of pure water. The two windmills received late during the last reporting period have been successfully assembled and are currently functioning. In both cases, water storage tank systems are partially completed.

(h) Civic action in PLEIKU outside of the TAOR has largely consisted of MEDCAP's and short term, high impact projects such as the 1-10th Cavalry civic action team aiding the repair of the schoolhouse roof at KON CHARA, coordinating the cutting of sandalwood in the MANG YANG Pass by the people of PLEI KROT KHOIT and KON CHARA, supervising and coordinating the prompt payments of solution and claims as such situations develop. Most of the civic action of this nature occurred in the PLEI MRONG area with the 2-8th Infantry (Mech), the 3-12th Infantry in the LZ OASIS-ESB PUSA vicinity, and the villages along and near Highway 19E from LE TRUNG District Headquarters to the MANG YANG by both the 1-10th Cavalry and the 2-8th Infantry (Mech).

(i) During the reporting period the division has also honored LE TRUNG District's and PLEIKU Province's request to assign a civic action team to the VIETNAMESE initiated and sponsored consolidated village of PLEI KO TU. The 1-12th Infantry civic action team has been given the mission of doing civic action at this new consolidation, and will work on a daily visitation basis until 20 February, when the VIETNAMIZATION of PLEI BREL DOR, their current village, is completed. At that time the 1-12th Infantry civic action team will relocate to LE TRUNG District Headquarters and will continue their civic action role at PLEI KO TU until 15 April 1970. Initial contacts have already been made, and the team now visits PLEI KO TU daily from PLEI BREL DOR, and has established priorities for programs and projects. They have also initiated two of the projects - improving the village defense plan/barriers and recruitment of a Village People's Self Defense Force. The sponsoring of a school and establishment of a dispensary will quickly follow.

(j) The major civic action effort in BINH DINH Province has occurred in the populated portion of AN TUC District. Principal areas of support have been in the areas of MEDCAP's, school support (expendable items) and fish fingerlings for newly created fish ponds. With the change of assignment of the teams presently working in PLEIKU to BINH DINH, the scope and quantity of civic action in BINH DINH will greatly increase. It is anticipated that all teams employed in support of the BINH DINH Pacification and Development Plan 1970 will be employed as mobile teams and will reside in 4th Infantry Division and/or MACV installations.

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## (2) ARVN Dependent Housing

**Significant Activities.** During the reporting period little progress has been made in the ARVN Self-Help Dependent Housing Program. The major problem is the lack of construction material. Lumber, cement and tin roofing are critical items and are not available. The revised IFFORCEV goal for the Division is to provide material for a total of sixty-eight units. To date, forty-three units have been completed and fifteen are under construction. Of the latter, one ten family unit is approximately eighty per cent completed.

## (3) Psychological Operations

(a) During the period 15 through 30 November 1969, the 3d Brigade conducted an intensive face-to-face PSYOPS campaign along Highway 14 south between the Division TAOR and PHU NHON to deny the enemy the support of the local populace. A campaign was simultaneously initiated to encourage the NVA to rally to the GVN, thus reducing infiltration across Highway 14 between PLEIKU and PHU NHON. Three CHIEU HOI rally stations were set up at coordinates AR 828189, AR 847148, and AR 875097 along with twenty-one signs giving directions to their locations. Special leaflets and loudspeaker appeals were employed all along the infiltration routes explaining the campaign and giving specific instructions on where and how to approach the rally stations. There were no HOI CHANHNS attributed directly to this campaign. The 3d Brigade PSYOP and CA teams worked along with the team from 201st POLWAR Co., 20th POLWAR Bn and the 4th Division Radio/visual team to visit 8-9 hamlets daily giving face-to-face lectures, performing "MORAP"s, giving haircuts, showing movies, distributing newspapers, posters, soap, candy and other items.

During the conduct of the campaign enemy activity significantly lessened and considerable cooperation was received from the people in the area. Enemy activity did increase after the conclusion of the campaign, but the CA team continued to be warmly received when they went into the hamlets. There was significant progress made among the villagers in the area.

(b) As of 1 January 1970, the cultural drama team that had been used to support PLEIKU Province was disbanded due to the curtailment of JUSPAO funds. There are no plans in the immediate future to reorganize the team.

(c) The weekly meetings held by the PLEIKU PSYOP Coordinating Committee were discontinued during the latter part of November due to the rotation of personnel who were regularly attending. There are plans to re-establish these meetings because of the important role they play in coordination and integration of PSYOP programs between the various agencies who regularly exchanged ideas for the improvement of the PSYOP effort in PLEIKU Province.

(d) Two of the six Kit Carson Scouts selected by the Division PSYOP section to be trained in the conduct of Psychological Operations were

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enrolled in the Armed Propaganda Team School at VUNG TAU. The scouts received five days of basic military training and twenty-three days of political training from 15 December 1969 to 12 January 1970. These Scouts will be controlled by the Division PSYOP section and will be employed in conjunction with PSYOP and civil affairs assets.

(c) In the early part of the reporting period the Division PSYOP section received a 1,000 watt loudspeaker system which was mounted on a portable frame enabling it to be effectively employed from both a helicopter (UH-1H) or a 3/4 ton truck. Mounted on a truck, the speaker can be employed against suspected or confirmed enemy locations, preferably from a high terrain feature. The only disadvantage is that camouflage and security are necessities. Mounted in a helicopter flying from 1,500 to 2,000 feet above the ground, the system can be used effectively against or for any audience desired. So far the Division has employed the speaker against enemy forces around LZ ENGLISH, VC Valley, infiltration routes along Highway 14, and was used several times to broadcast PSYOP messages to both MONTAGNARD and ethnic VIETNAMESE audiences. This loudspeaker system has proven to be an invaluable asset to the Division's PSYOP effort, and will continue to be so in the future.

f. Personnel

(1) Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period (1 Nov 69)

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>FM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized-organic units	1,119	195	16,485	17,799
Assigned-organic units	1,101	199	16,237	17,637

(b) End of Period (31 Jan 70)

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>FM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized-organic units	1,112	203	16,492	17,807
Assigned-organic units	1,124	175	16,373	17,672

(2) Replacements: The Division received a total of 312 officer and 4,588 enlisted replacements. During the same period, 205 officers and 3,558 enlisted men rotated out of the Division.

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## (3) Casualties:

UNIT	HOSTILE			NON-HOSTILE		
	Wounded	Dead	Missing	Wounded	Dead	Missing
1st Bde	50	7	0	17	2	0
2d Bde	266	25	0	31	1	0
3d Bde	96	23	0	36	7	0
DIVARTY	18	3	0	34	2	0
DISCOM	25	1	0	20	0	0
1-10 Cav	29	4	0	10	1	0
1-69 Arm	54	4	0	17	0	0
DIVISION TRPS	21	2	0	23	4	0
K-75	<u>11</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	570	79	0	210	18	0

(4) Morale and Personnel Services: Awards and Decorations during the period were presented as follows:

<u>DECORATION AWARDED</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Silver Star	53	88	16
Distinguished Flying Cross	29	11	2
Soldiers Medal	11	13	1
Bronze Star (Valor)	184	319	298
Bronze Star (Service)	383	550	317
Air Medal (Valor)	16	26	10
Air Medal (Service)	608	615	414
Army Commendation (Valor)	152	180	120
Army Commendation (Service)	1,669	1,547	1,075
Purple Heart	209	78	129
TOTAL	<u>3,414</u>	<u>3,427</u>	<u>2,382</u>

<u>BADGE</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>
Combat Infantry Badge	404	947	737
Combat Medical Badge	72	33	146
Aircraft Crewman Badge	30	13	4
Mechanics Badge	26	14	35
Drivers Badge	58	14	11
Operator Special Equipment Badge	0	0	1
TOTAL	<u>590</u>	<u>1,021</u>	<u>934</u>

(5) Promotions: A total of 5,107 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-7</u>
NOV	3,392	1,025	56	21
DEC	484	422	58	39
JAN	<u>152</u>	<u>391</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>25</u>
TOTAL	<u>4,028</u>	<u>1,838</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>85</u>

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(6) Reenlistments: There were a total of 227 reenlistments during the reporting period; First Term RA Reenlistments: 111; AUS Enlistments: 116.

(7) Health

(a) A study concerning the large number of skin disease visits and disability showed that units employing command emphasis in personal hygiene and insisting on uniform resupply have been able to decrease the magnitude of these problems. Also the use of daily foot checks by medics enabled early disease to be treated before it becomes serious enough to require evacuation.

(b) It is obvious by the drastic reduction in malaria that increased emphasis on personal protective measures and pill discipline coupled with skillful use of the urine testing program is effective in eliminating malaria in high epidemic areas such as the Central Highlands.

h. Army Aviation Operations

(1) Operational totals of the 4th Aviation Battalion were as follows:

	TOTALS
HOURS	18,781
SORTIES	48,216
PAX	61,488
TONS	1,064

i. Inspector General

(1) 4th Division Annual General Inspections of seven divisional units were conducted along with four courtesy inspections in preparation for the unit's Annual General Inspection.

(2) No complaints were received during the reporting period. Two hundred fifteen requests for assistance were received during this period.

j. Signal

(1) General: Operational activities continue to focus upon providing multichannel communication in support of the Division and its elements.

(2) Operations:

(a) LZ ENGLISH: One MRC-54 located at HON CONG Mountain continues to provide a VHF relay between 50 patch at Camp Enari and 2d Brigade at LZ ENGLISH. On 7 December 1969, one MRC-69 and operators were relieved at PLEI MBONG to rejoin the 2d FASCP at LZ ENGLISH. On 30 January 70, elements of the 2d FASCP were relieved from operations at LZ ENGLISH due to the relocation of the 2d Brigade.

(b) LZ SCHUELLER: On 3 December 1969, two MRC-112 were installed; one at AN KHE and one at LZ SCHUELLER to provide telephone communications

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(c) Division TOC: On 26 January 1970, Secure Voice and RTT Communication were installed between the Division TOC at AN KHE and Camp Enari. In addition three hot lines were installed.

(d) LZ MEREDITH: Communications were continued at LZ MEREDITH until 27 January 1970. All systems were terminated on this date. On 12 November one MFC-60 was relieved at LZ MEREDITH and joined the 3d FASCP at BAN ME THUOT.

(e) LZ OASIS: On 1 November 1969, communications center personnel and equipment moved from LZ OASIS to Camp Enari where a new communications center was built. On 10 November 1969, all communications support was terminated at LZ OASIS and the 3d FASCP moved to BAN ME THUOT.

(f) BAN ME THUOT: On 3 November 1969, communications center personnel and equipment were committed to support the Division 1st Brigade at BAN ME THUOT. On 16 December 1969, the 3d FASCP at BAN ME THUOT was tasked to provide normal communications support to MACV Headquarters and the 459th Signal Battalion. This was due to a fire at BAN ME THUOT in which the 459th Signal Battalion lost equipment. On 29 December 1969, the battalion was relieved of its commitment at BAN ME THUOT. All personnel and equipment returned to Camp Enari.

#### k. Information Activities

##### (1) News Media Correspondents

(a) During the period 1 November 1969-30 January 1970, a total of 12 news correspondents visited the Division covering a variety of subjects ranging from pure hometown and human interest material, to the Division's active combat and pacification operations. Included in the news media personnel were representatives from Associated Press, United Press International, The Overseas Weekly, Newsweek, The Washington Star, the Newark News, and The Troy (Ohio) Daily News. Military correspondents from The Army Reporter, (USARV), and The Typhoon, (IFFV) also visited the Division. One free-lance writer visited the Division during this period.

##### (2) Hometown News Release Program

(a) The 4th Infantry Division continues to lead all other units in the U.S. Army in the number of hometown news releases submitted. During the period, 7,422 DA forms 1526 were processed and forwarded to the Hometown News Center (HTNC). This is an increase of almost 600 over the previous reporting period.

(b) A total of 673 hometown interview audio tapes were prepared by the Information Office and processed through the HTNC. A significant portion of these were special tapes pertaining to Thanksgiving and Christmas greetings.

##### (3) Command Information Program

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(a) During the reporting period, emphasis was shifted from preparing fact sheets, to reproducing those prepared by higher headquarters for distribution within the Division. Six fact sheets were distributed including one on redeployment which was revised by USARPV, and distributed throughout the Division on a basis of one per man.

(b) In January, the name of the Division newspaper, the Steadfast and Loyal, was changed to The Ivy Leaf, reverting to the traditional name of the paper. There were 13 issues published during the reporting period. The Ivy Leaf was awarded first prize in the USARPV Annual Journalism Awards Competition for 1969. It was selected as the best newspaper in Vietnam.

(4) Quarterly Publications: During the reporting period, the second issue of Esprit was distributed and received wide acclaim both within the Division and from other units. The third issue (Spring) was also completed and sent to Tokyo for publication. Esprit won second prize in the magazine competition in the USARPV Annual Journalism Awards Competition for 1969.

#### (5) Public Information

(a) The Public Information Section released a total of 3,348 stories and 1,821 photographs directly to civilian news media. This is an increase over the previous period and reflects the continued emphasis on this program.

(b) During the first two months of the reporting period, the 4th Division led all other Division size units in the amount of coverage given in The Army Reporter, The Observer and Stars & Stripes. During the month of January, a drastic reduction was noted. Investigation revealed the material was not being received. Revised delivery procedures have corrected this deficiency and an increase to the previous level can be anticipated.

## 2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED, COMMANDER'S EVALUATIONS, OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### a. Personnel

#### (1) Casualty Reporting

(a) Observation: Reporting procedures for casualties failed in passing information to the rear for forwarding to higher headquarters in a reasonable time.

(b) Evaluation: On several occasions, notification of intermediate and rear areas of casualties and data pertaining thereto was unreasonably delayed. In addition to unavoidable use of radio nets for tactical purposes only, coordination between personnel in forward administrative sections and personnel in the tactical operations center was lacking, so that the first available opportunity to obtain requisite personal and circumstantial data was delayed, in some cases for several hours.

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SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 January 1970, PCS GSFOR 65 (R2) (U)

(c) Recommendation: Personnel on the admin/log radio net should monitor (via auxiliary speaker) the tactical radio net, gathering what circumstantial data they can from that source, and utilizing hails in combat to obtain the remaining requisite information through admin/log channels, all the while relaying the existing information to rear areas as rapidly as possible.

## (2) Recommendation for Awards

(a) Observation: During this period it was noted that numerous recommendations for awards were returned due to lack of clarity in the narrative descriptions and proposed citations describing the same act. Several awards were either downgraded or disapproved for the same reasons.

(b) Evaluation: Awards recommendations have not been properly checked prior to dispatch to insure that all pertinent facts had been included in the recommendations (i.e. number of enemy, intensity of contact, results of contact etc.) and to insure that the narrative description of actions and the proposed citation agree in their description of events. In addition, statements of witnesses to action create some confusion as to what actually occurred due to the fact that no two individuals see the incident the same. This contributes to the discrepancies in awards recommendations.

(c) Recommendation: That every attempt be made to reconcile differences in witness statements and to determine which information is most accurate prior to submission of awards. Commanders should thoroughly check their awards recommendations for completeness of DA Form 157-R and insure that narrative description agrees completely with the proposed citation for awards.

## (3) Late Submission of Awards Recommendations

(a) Observation: Numerous recommendations for awards were submitted as much as three months after the date of action.

(b) Evaluation: Awards recommendations were submitted after long delays due to lack of knowledge of awards procedures on the part of junior leaders, breakdown in communications between forward and rear elements, and failure of forward elements to take appropriate action due to tactical situation. When additional information and witness statements are needed in these cases, they are difficult to obtain because witnesses to the act have departed the command. As a result, deserving individuals do not receive proper recognition through lack of information and non-availability of witnesses.

(c) Recommendation: That all junior leaders be thoroughly briefed on awards policy and procedures and that every effort to determine from after action debriefings and after action reports if any possible act of valor occurred be made.

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Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RGS CSFOR 65 (R2) (U)

b. Intelligence

(1) HOI CHANGS

(a) Observation: HOI CHANGS are of value only when properly exploited.

(b) Exploitation: A HOI CHANG can lead friendly units to cache sites and enemy locations, but only when used before the enemy has time to react to his capture by removing stores and shifting positions.

(c) Recommendation: When a HOI CHANG comes under US control, he should be exploited as soon as his physical condition and preliminary interrogation allows. During his initial handling, every effort should be made to win his confidence so that he will willingly lead US forces to enemy cache sites and locations.

(2) Detailed Information

(a) Observation: Too frequently the infantry company commander does not have the detailed information needed to enable him to fully exploit his area of operations.

(b) Explanation: In the last minute rush of moving to a new area, the infantry company commander, the man who actually controls the ground searches, does not get detailed information on the new area. The Bn S-2 does not always have the information available.

(c) Recommendation: Good success has come from preparing an overlay of past contacts, cache sites, and fortifications during the planning stages of an operation. This area study can then be forwarded to the Bn S-2 in sufficient time to enable him to give the infantry company commander a quick briefing using visual aids showing past enemy patterns. This gives the company commander a better picture of the situation.

(3) Marking by Smoke

(a) Observation: Occasionally after a unit pops smoke and it is identified by an aircraft, a second smoke appears nearby.

(b) Evaluation: The enemy can and does monitor our frequencies and will attempt to lure aircraft within small arms range.

(c) Recommendation: Units should rigorously adhere to the approved procedure of popping smoke and letting the pilot identify the color, then confirming the identification. Use of other signal devices such as signal mirrors should also be considered. Units can also deny the enemy easy knowledge of frequencies by keeping the canvas cover flap down over vehicle mounted radios while passing through populated areas.

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(4) IRRP Insertions

(a) Observation: In areas of heavy enemy concentration, the enemy observes recon team insertions (such as IRRP insertions), and sends elements to locate them.

(b) Evaluation: The enemy has adopted the tactic of seeking out small reconnaissance elements such as IRRP teams, to attack the element or to direct other enemy units away from that area.

(c) Recommendation: False insertions over a large area can deceive the enemy as to the team's exact location and make the task of locating the team that much harder for the enemy.

(5) Exploitation of a HOI CHANH Through a VP/Photo Mission

(a) Observation: Because of the numerous trails in Zone 4, Gia Lai Province NW of Pleiku City, choosing good ambush sites is difficult.

(b) Evaluation: 4th Inf Div IPW and II Sections recently collaborated on a VP/photo mission with the help of a HOI CHANH familiar with the area. With 35-mm hand held photographs using wide angle and telephoto lens, the HOI CHANH was able to select enemy corridors of movement and known cache sites. The photos, along with pertinent comments of the HOI CHANH and IPW personnel, were provided to commanders of units in the Zone 4 area enabling the establishment of ideal ambush sites.

(c) Recommendation: There should be continuous coordination between the II and IPW Sections to ensure exploitation of any available intelligence sources.

c. Operations

(1) Mining Incidents

(a) Observation: A natural response to a mine incident is for personnel and vehicles to gather around the contact to render aid.

(b) Evaluation: In many cases, this action has caused additional casualties where mines were employed in pairs or groups. Uninjured personnel in a vehicle which hits a mine should render immediate first aid as necessary. Under no circumstances should a large number of personnel or other vehicles converge on the scene of the incident.

(c) Recommendation: Movement of all other personnel and vehicles must cease until the immediate area has been cleared using probing techniques or mine detectors. Further convoy movement in the area should be preceded by a mine sweep team and flank security to prevent activations of command detonated mines.

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SUBJECT: [redacted] 4th Infantry Division  
[redacted] 21 January 1970. RGS CSFOR.65 (R2) (U)

## (2) Detection of Fortifications and Caches

(a) Observations: The enemy is a master at camouflage and deception making detection of fortifications and caches extremely difficult.

(b) Evaluations: The tactic of long marches to cover a large AO in a relatively short time frame makes the camouflage and deceptive techniques of the enemy more effective.

(c) Recommendations: That the technique of assigning a one kilometer square area of operation to each platoon on a search and clear operation is an effective method to systematically search the area. Platoons send out an average of four squad-sized sweeps in each platoon area of operation and concentrate on searching stream banks and possible cache sites.

## (3) Road Security Tactics

(a) Observation: Enemy activity along Highway 19E is concentrated against the strong points.

(b) Evaluations: A stationary strong point gives the enemy an opportunity to plan ambushes and harassing attacks well in advance.

(c) Recommendations: Strong point sights should vary by at least 100 meters daily. Additionally, strong points should rotate frequently and recon their immediate area and nearest woodline before moving into a position.

## (4) Puff Markers

(a) Observations: Use of smudgepots to outline the general traces of a fire base perimeter is helpful to helicopter gunships, flare ships, and "shadow" aircraft.

(b) Evaluation: On a fire base, 155-mm ammo canisters filled with thickened fuel and trip flare igniters were placed on the outside edge of the perimeter. Several did not function, making it necessary to use trip flares and M-79 flares to define the perimeter for pilots. This was inefficient and consumed a large quantity of pyrotechnics. Reason for failure of this system was deterioration of plastic weatherproofing, contamination of canisters with dirt and water; or angle of pull wire to safety pin on the trip flare was too sharp and could not be pulled. Pilots unable to discern perimeters will have less effective fire or will create a hazard to friendly personnel.

(c) Recommendation: Thickened fuel should be used and the canister placed in a vertical position and buried nearly flush to the ground, only the bulbous end left exposed. Frequent checks must be conducted to be certain that the protective covers have not been punctured to admit water and dirt. The trip flare should be near the top of the canister so that a straight line pull from the bunker can be made on the trip wire. The trip flare can be attached to a wooden or metal stake placed inside the canister.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 January 1970, HCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

## (4) Rotation of Companies

(a) Observation: Rotation of companies for fire support base security has proved to be very effective.

(b) Evaluation: The rotation of companies to provide fire support base security kept the morale of the units at a high level and increased the effectiveness of maintenance of personnel and organic equipment. The method of regularly rotating companies aided the battalion surgeon in combating jungle rot and other diseases associated with sustained periods in the rain forests. Perhaps the greatest advantage of rotating companies for fire base security was in the area of training. All companies were given classes in medical evacuation techniques, FO procedures, ambush tactics, and patrolling. Additionally, a demonstration of artillery special ammunition characteristics and capabilities was given, and the soldier had the opportunity to confirm the zero of his individual weapon. The optimum period of time for a company to remain on a battalion fire base appears to be seven days.

(c) Recommendation: That companies be rotated through battalion-sized fire support bases approximately every seven days in order to maintain maximum effectiveness within the battalion.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics

## (1) Penneprime Pads During Dry Season

(a) Observation: Lack of a penneprime pad at fire bases has halted resupply by CH-47 Chinook.

(b) Evaluation: Resupply to fire bases by CH-47 at times has been halted because a penneprimed "hook" pad had not been prepared. A penneprimed "hook" pad should have a high priority in the construction of fire bases during the dry season.

(c) Recommendation: If a fire base is going to be resupplied by CH-47 during the dry season, a high priority should be given to pennepriming a "hook" pad early in the fire base construction.

g. Communications

## (1) FM Secure Voice

(a) Observation: The requirement was to provide FM Secure Voice over a distance of approximately 70 kilometers, from Camp Enari across the MANG YANG Pass to Camp Radcliff. This was accomplished utilizing an RT-524 and AS-2169/G Log Periodic Antenna.

(b) Evaluation: While it is generally desirable to have omni-directional

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antennas, the highly directional log periodic antenna will provide a point to point FM radio net capitalizing on the high gain of the antenna. The directivity coupled with secure voice encryption devices provides reliable secure point to point communications.

(c) Recommendation: That when a secure point to point circuit normally exceeding the parameters of FM radio is needed and area coverage is not needed, that the AS-2169/G Log Periodic Antenna and AB-301/G Mast Base be tried.

(2) 292 Antenna

(a) Observations: Units operating in triple canopy jungle and mountainous terrain often experience difficulty in maintaining good comms with both higher and lower echelons.

(b) Evaluation: During operations north of AN KHE, companies constantly were experiencing difficulty in communicating with their platoons and with the battalion TOC due to the dense foliage. Artillery forward observers temporarily lost comms with the DS battery thus causing a time lag by having to relay through other stations in the field. Units were issued 292 antennas minus the mast sections and this helped alleviate the problem.

(c) Recommendation: That each unit be required to carry two 292 antennas to be used in the unit CP for either of the two organic nets and for the fire request net.

h. Material

(1) XM191

(a) Observation: The new XM191 multishot flame weapon system was found to be more versatile, more effective, and easier to maintain than the old M-9 series back pack flame throwers.

(b) Evaluation: The new multishot flame weapon was used against bunkers and natural rock formations in the AN LAO Valley area during Operation PUTNAM WILDCAT. It was found to be very effective to place flame inside caves at distances in excess of 100 meters. It was found to be very accurate and easy to operate. The four round capability enables the firer to adjust his aiming point on subsequent shots. The only possible drawback to the weapon system is the back blast which is similar to that of the M-72 LAW.

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(c) Recommendations: That all back pack flame throwers be replaced by the XM191 multishot flame weapon as soon as possible.

i. Other: None.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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RICHARD A. RUHMANN

CPT, AGC

Asst AG

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CSFOR Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

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1-TACP (ALO), 4th Inf Div  
1-CO, 4th Inf Div Repl Tng Det  
1-Provost Marshal  
1-IG  
10-CO, 29th Mil Hist Det  
1-Chemical Officer  
1-AG File

AVFA-GC-HIST (12 Mar 70) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division,  
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS, CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO S.F. 96350 30 MAR 1970

TO: Commanding Officer, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DST,  
APO S.F. 96375

This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-Lessons Learned and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*David M. McKenzie*  
DAVID M. MCKENZIE  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

CF:

2 - ACSFOR, DA  
1 - CG, 4th INF DIV (LESS ORLL)

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AVHGC-DST (12 Mar 70) 2a Ind

12 APR 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-05 (R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference items concerning "Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques", page 7-8, paragraph 1b(7)(a) through (e); "Military Intelligence Activities", page 13, paragraph 1b(10)(a) through (d); "Airborne Personnel Detector", page 22, paragraph 1c(5)(c)3; and "Detailed Information", page 35, paragraph b(2): items have been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Intelligence", page 35, paragraph b(1): concur. Units are encouraged to react immediately to exploit information obtained during interrogation of HOI CHANH. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

c. (C) Reference item concerning "Intelligence", page 35, paragraph b(3): concur. Units must observe OFSEC/COMSEC at all times. Thorough prior planning for operations will greatly enhance adherence to procedures. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Intelligence", page 35, paragraph b(3): concur. Units should employ every means possible to deny the enemy of knowledge of the exact area of insertion of LRRPs. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Intelligence", page 36, paragraph b(5): concur. There is need for correlation of intelligence information obtained from many sources available (HOI CHANH - Human Source) and intelligence agencies (i.e., II and IPW). Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons. No action by DA or USARPAC is recommended.

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AVHCC-DST (12 Mar 70) 2d ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

f. (U) Reference items concerning "Mining Incidents", page 36, paragraph c(1); "Road Security Tactics", page 37, paragraph e(3) and "FM Secure Voice", page 38, paragraph g(1): These items have been extracted for possible inclusion in the next issue of Tips for Commanders.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "XM 191", page 39, paragraph h(1). ACTIV is presently conducting an informal evaluation of the XM 191. The evaluation is scheduled to be completed in April 1970; it will address the BOI of the XM 191 and possible replacement of the back pack flamethrowers. It would be premature to implement the above recommendation at this time. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
L. D. MURRAY  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

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4th Inf Div

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GPOP-DT (12 Mar 70) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned 4th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96553 21 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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