

UNITED STATES ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL

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31 July 1967

THE DEFENSE OF LANDING ZONE 10 ALFA BY TASK FORCE TYSON, 28 -  
29 MAY 1966, DURING OPERATION PAUL REVERE I, II CORPS TACTICAL  
ZONE, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. (PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF A COMPANY  
COMMANDER.)

Captain Anthony E. Bisantz

Career Course Class 2 - 67

Roster No 12, Advisory Group No 2

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## INTRODUCTION

### SYNOPSIS

"The strip was under six inches of water. In the gun pits around the field the flood was more than a foot deep. And the guns were there, five of them, five 12.7's, set to clean the skies of just such birds as these.

"Bravo had flown into the perfect deadfall - perfect, except for the absence of people. The NVA crews had quit their guns to get out of the wet. Bravo's people hopped to the guns and went into the perimeter around the air strip.

"That night the company was hit hard by a battalion of North Vietnamese, the same battalion that had been caught flat-footed by the arrival of Bravo in impossible weather and was now making a desperate bid to recover its guns. The fight raged through the night of 29 May and with the aid of the other battalion of the 35th flown from Oasis ended as a smash victory for TF Walker. It was not easy; the influx of 35th casualties taxed the capacity of the base hospital at Qui Nhon." (3:267)

Landing Zone Ten Alfa (not "Alpha") had not "once been a U.S. airstrip" (3:267); it was a jungle clearing about 170 meters wide and 300 meters long.

The water was about 16 inches deep, and in the gun pits about four feet deep.

Bravo Company, 2d Bn, 35th Inf had to fight for those guns, killing 30 NVA and capturing three within minutes of landing.

The big fight took place during the night of 28-29 May 1966 and during the day 29 May. It was fought by TASK FORCE TYSON.

## OPERATION PAUL REVERE I

Operation Paul Revere I started 10 May 1966. The 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier General Glenn Walker, operating independently out of its base camp at Pleiku, established a forward base at OASIS about 25 kilometers east of the Special Forces Camp at DUC CO. TF WALKER had the mission of screening the Central Highlands for the "...six to seven NVA regiments stacked up across the border in Cambodia..." (3:260) On 28 May the Brigade was deployed with the 1st Bn, 35th Inf far to the south of CHU PONG MOUNTAIN; 1st Bn, 14th Inf generally north of CHU PONG, in the IA DRANG VALLEY; and 2d Bn, 35th Inf in Area of Operation Number 11, south of PLEI DJERENG Special Forces Camp. (The entire area of operation for Operation Paul Revere was subdivided into smaller, numbered areas, e.g. Area of Operation (AO) Number 10, AO 11, AO 12, etc. Landing zones within each numbered AO were designated with an alphabetical suffix to the AO number, hence LZ 10A was the first landing zone used in AO 10, LZ 10B the second, etc.)

### SEIZURE OF LZ 10A

On 28 May B Company, 2d Bn, 35th Inf under Captain James Maisano was directed to make an airmobile assault into LZ 10A and patrol back eastward toward the battalion's base in AO 11. Because of the heavy morning ground fog which is common to the Central Highlands at that time of year, the landing did not take place until nearly 1100hrs. Through error, the artillery preparation planned in support of the landing was fired on the wrong landing zone. This may have been the most fortunate

mistake of the war as far as Bravo Company was concerned. It is believed that the majority of NVA forces around LZ 10A, immediately upon the start of the artillery preparation at the wrong LZ, deployed in that direction to engage the American forces who would land there following the artillery. At any rate, the NVA defending 10 ALFA were not prepared to receive B Company and, with the aid of tactical air strikes, were quickly routed, although at the cost of one platoon leader killed and about ten men wounded.

General Walker, immediately realizing the significance of the captured anti-aircraft weapons, ordered the shift of 1st Bn, 35th Inf into AO 10.

## NARRATION

### THE FORMATION OF TF TYSON

A Company, 1st Bn, 35th Inf, commanded by Captain Anthony Bisantz, was the battalion reserve/reaction force at the time and was made immediately available for movement into LZ 10A, arriving about 1600hrs. By this time most of the action in the vicinity had ended, although about one kilometer to the east an armed helicopter was downed by ground fire. The crew was extracted by a sister ship and the aircraft burnt on impact so the hastily planned rescue mission of A Co was called off.

The few remaining hours of daylight were spent in organizing the defense of the LZ. A Company was placed under operational control of 2d Bn, 35th Inf. Major Wallace Tyson, the 2d, 35th's executive officer came into the LZ to assume command of the two companies and with him brought a heavy mortar section from each battalion and the remainder of B Co, 2-35. Captain Maisano had left his weapons platoon behind because of his original mission. As dusk fell the 28th, Task Force TYSON was organized as follows:

#### TASK FORCE CONTROL -

Major Tyson with one radio telephone operator

COMPOSITE HEAVY MORTAR PLATOON commanded by 1LT Clovis O. LaFond, heavy mortar platoon leader, 1st Bn 35th Inf, with two 4.2 mortars (one from each battalion).

A Company, 1st Bn, 35th Inf, with three rifle platoons and one weapons platoon with two 81mm. mortars. "Foxhole" strength was about 150 men.

and one weapons platoon with two 81mm mortars. The company's  
135  
fordole strength was about 110 men after the day's dead and  
wounded had been evacuated.

The position was organized with B Co defending the south  
half of the LZ, A Co - the north half, and all of the mortars  
located on the only piece of dry, reasonably firm ground in  
the LZ, a small circular area in the middle of B Co's sector.  
Each company retained control of its own organic mortars and  
Maj. Tyson controlled the 4.2inch mortars.

Due to the high water table throughout the area and the  
knee deep water in and around most of the LZ, it was virtually  
impossible for the troops to dig in. Any hole immediately  
filled with water. Instead they used the available daylight  
to construct crude breastworks of fallen logs, rocks, ammunition  
boxes filled with earth, and whatever other materials they could  
find. They also spent time emplacing M8A1 (Claymore) anti-  
personnel mines, trip flares, and cleared fields of fire for  
their weapons. The defensive line followed generally along  
the edge of the LZ and was located 15 to 20 feet into the  
forest surrounding the LZ.

Just prior to dusk artillery and mortar defensive con-  
centrations were adjusted around the perimeter. The concen-  
trations on the east side of the perimeter were fired by  
A Battery, 2d Bn, 9th Artillery (105mm Howitzer) which was  
located at the 2d Bn 35th Inf base in AO 11. As they were  
firing at almost maximum range (about 12000 meters) to reach  
our perimeter, the concentrations on the western side were  
fired by 175mm guns located at FUC CO (about 18000 meters  
to the south). Due to the thick vegetation and range dis-  
persion factors, all the artillery had to be adjusted by

rather than observation and as a result none of the concentrations were probably any closer than 250 meters to the perimeter.

Major Tyson completed checking the perimeter at dark, giving each company commander orders to maintain a 50% alert status until 0130hrs and a 100% alert status from 0130hrs to 1530hrs and again 50% alert until dawn. The moon rose early ~~on~~ the 28th and stayed bright until about 2300hrs when the clouds obscured it. <sup>About</sup> 0120hrs ~~on~~ the 29th the Listening Post located about 50 meters in front of the 2d Platoon of A company reported hearing noises of movement to their front. Everyone in the Task Force was alerted and mortars were fired into the area. A few minutes later they reported seeing movement to their right front, estimating it to be a company size unit. Following instructions each of the four men on the listening post opened full automatic fire with their M16 rifles and dropped back to the perimeter. Almost immediately the NVA initiated assault fire on the 3d Platoon's position along the east side of the perimeter.

#### NIGHT DEFENSE

The defense of LZ TEN ALFA had begun. Why the NVA attacked that night and all through the next day is open to question. Maybe, as S.L.A. Marshall suggests, they wanted to recover their valuable machine guns (all of which were in new condition). Perhaps they thought they could overrun the small American force in the LZ, or finally, perhaps they were covering the withdrawal of a larger force. Whatever their reason, the NVA pressed their attack with a fanaticism that awed, but never overcame, the defenders.

The 3d Platoon's listening post caused the NVA to prematurely trigger their attack while they were still 70 to 80 meters from the perimeter. The 3d Platoon's listening post was directly in the path of the enemy and was immediately pinned down. The fire team leader on the LP gave orders to withdraw to the perimeter. The 3d Platoon meanwhile had demonstrated excellent fire discipline, holding their fire as the ineffective NVA fire swept over their heads. A characteristic of the fight that night and all the next day was that the NVA heavy machine guns, which they normally use with devastating effectiveness, often fired high - sometimes seven to eight feet above the ground. The American forces capitalized on this the next day, moving frequently under the enemy's "grazing" fire at a low crouch.

Three of the four men on the 3d Platoon listening post returned safely to the perimeter. The enemy assault formation continued forward and came into view of the men of the 3d Platoon. On order they opened fire and quickly broke up the enemy assault. After the initial firing slacked off, Lt. C'Comer, the 3d Platoon leader who was getting his baptism of fire, accompanied by the fire team leader from the LP, crawled forward of the perimeter in an attempt to find the missing man. They found him, seriously wounded, and dragged him back inside the perimeter. Their safe return seemed to signal another enemy assault, this one better organized than the last. The enemy leaders could be heard, haranguing their soldiers, forcing them to attack. This assault was preceded by about a 20 round mortar barrage which impacted behind the 3d Platoon, at the edge of the LZ, causing no casualties. This time the enemy

advanced to within hand grenade range. After several minutes of intense small arms firing and exchanges of hand grenades, the NVA were again forced to withdraw.

During all this A Co's mortars had been delivering steady fire into the area in front of the 3d Platoon. The Heavy Mortar Platoon had been firing at a greater range, attempting to knock out the NVA mortars. Battery A, 2-9 Arty had started firing battery volley fire as soon as the attack started, adjusting back and forth in the area in front of the 3d Platoon. They were to fire over 650 rounds in support of TF TYSON that night - an awful lot of work for five artillery pieces. The artillery support is even more impressive when one considers that the battery position came under small arms and mortar attack at the same time the attack was launched on THE ALFA. Many of the cannoners were wounded manning their guns in defence of a unit 12 kilometers away.

About 0350hrs the enemy attacked again, and was again driven off. By this time mortar ammunition was running low and the mortars had to slow down their rate of fire. Friendly casualties were miraculously low. Only about four had been wounded, and one of these was the man from the listening post. The enemy again reorganized, and about 0400hrs launched his final and almost successful attack of the night. After the firefight had raged for several minutes, again at a hand grenade throwing range, Lt. O'Connor informed the company that he had received word from his right flank that the NVA had penetrated the perimeter at the company's coordinating point with Bravo Company. Leading a fire team, he moved along the perimeter to that point and linked up with a patrol coming the other way from B Co. The mortars fired two illuminating rounds to light up the perim-

eter and make sure no enemy troops had infiltrated the perimeter. Lt. O'Conner's group killed several NVA right at the gap in the lines. The NVA evidently hadn't known where they were; at any rate they had failed to exploit their advantage. The gap had been created by squad leaders in both companies repositioning their men without coordinating.

By 0430hrs all firing except for the artillery had dwindled to sporadic exchanges of a few rounds. 81mm mortar high explosive ammunition was dangerously low, A Company having only 24 rounds left, and B Company - 12 rounds. This was carefully hoarded in preparation for the enemy's next attack. The attack never came. Instead the early morning fog formed; this coupled with the tactical situation decided against bringing in the medical evacuation and resupply helicopters until after first light. The remainder of the night passed quietly. The 3d Platoon of A Company, who had almost exclusively borne the brunt of the night's fighting, had one killed and four wounded. Bravo Company had two men seriously wounded and two slightly wounded.

#### DAY DEFENSE

As dawn broke the fog started to lift in the area, however, the MEDEVAC helicopter at Brigade Base remained grounded by fog at that location. The 3d Platoon was directed to move forward on line to sweep the battlefield of the previous night. This they did, finding numerous dead NVA soldiers, weapons and equipment. After Lt. O'Conner had moved forward about 200 meters, he asked for assistance in conducting the sweep. Lt. Light, commanding the 1st Platoon on the west side of the

perimeter, was directed to bring half of his platoon across the LZ to assist the 3d Platoon. The two units linked up and continued to sweep eastward.

After they had moved forward another 200 meters, Lt. O'Connor reported finding a stack of 20 enemy bodies along side an intermittent stream. At this time the MEDEVAC ship arrived and the wounded were loaded aboard. Just as the loading was completed, firing started east of the perimeter in Bravo Company's sector. Lt. O'Connor was ordered to immediately pull back to the perimeter with Lt. Light. The order was acknowledged and they started to move back. The enemy fire in B Company sector increased but was not yet of major proportion. Suddenly an intense firefight broke out in the area in front of A Company, and radio contact with Lt. O'Connor was lost.

Lt. Kelsey, commanding the 2d Platoon, was ordered to bring the major part of his platoon to the 3d Platoon's sector. At this time O'Connor's location was not known precisely, so Kelsey was told to move east in an attempt to find him. Almost immediately Kelsey and his men engaged in a firefight with about 50 NVA who were advancing toward Bravo Company's position. Simultaneously Lt. Light crawled to the company commander and told him that O'Connor and about 15 men were pinned down by a large enemy force. Light too had been pinned down and wounded in the head, but by crawling for about 100 meters had managed to get back to the perimeter.

Kelsey was ordered to break off engagement and move north to assist O'Connor. Guided by Lt. Light, Kelsey's platoon quickly overwhelmed the enemy force; killing about 20 in the process. O'Connor's group had been hit hard with seven men being killed initially, and eight or ten others pinned down by a heavy

machine gun only 20 feet away.

Kelsey's men covered the evacuation of the dead and wounded, and enemy material (which included a CHICOM AM radio, one heavy barrel machine gun on wheels, two light machine guns and numerous AK47 ASSAULT GUNS). No time was taken to search the enemy dead as the situation in Bravo Company's sector was rapidly deteriorating and it was imperative to re-establish the perimeter. The enemy's main assault began just about the time Kelsey got to the perimeter. Kelsey's men stopped where they were, roughly at a right angle to the perimeter and started firing at the flank of the attacking enemy. They maintained this position the rest of the day delivering flanking, enfilade fire against the NVA. As the enemy took cover from Bravo Company's fire to their front by crouching behind anthills and trees, Kelsey's men kept picking them off from the side.

The assault on the southeast side of the perimeter, in Bravo Company's sector, had not been affected by the engagements of O'Conner and Kelsey, and the enemy rapidly closed to within hand grenade range. The mortars, which were located in the open about 35 meters behind the perimeter were out of action almost immediately as the fire of the NVA cut down the crews anytime they manned their guns. Unable to man their tubes, the mortarmen became riflemen, some crawling forward on their stomachs to reinforce the line, others firing from their own positions.

The enemy attack soon spilled over into Alfa Company's sector and practically the whole eastside of the perimeter was under attack. As soon as the initial firing had started the artillery had again been called and again started its battery volley fire, moving north and south in front of the perimeter in 50 and 100yd. increments. A team of armed helicopters came

on station about 0800hrs and added their support to the defenders, coordinating their firing passes with the artillery. Also at this time a Forward Air Controller arrived at the LZ in an O1E and began circling, awaiting the arrival of tactical air support aircraft. Two A1Es carrying rockets, napalm and 20mm cannon arrived about 0900hrs. The FAC guided them through the low flying clouds on a "dry" pass over the LZ. They climbed out, circled, and immediately came back on a strafing run which was very effective causing an immediate slowdown in the rate of enemy fire. The FAC informed us that they would drop napalm on their next pass. A few minutes passed and then one of the Skyraiders broke out of the clouds and headed for the LZ from the exact opposite direction from which he had come before, and released two napalm tanks directly over the mortar position. These tanks impacted directly into the Task Force command post putting it temporarily out of action. Of approximately 15 men in and around the CP, none were killed and only two were seriously ~~injured~~ <sup>injured</sup> B Co's 1st Sgt and Senior medic. <sup>7</sup> Six others were slightly burned. The knee deep water in the LZ had served to muffle the detonation of the napalm and also offered protection to the men in the CP group. Several had merely submerged in their water filled <sup>slit</sup> ~~slit~~ trenches as the napalm struck; others, though hit by the burning fuel, quickly rolled in the water extinguishing the flames and suffered only minor burns. The FAC was informed of the accident and was able to divert the second fighter before it dropped its napalm. The cause of the accident was later determined to be a combination of factors encompassing marginal visibility and pilot error.

By 1000hrs the enemy had launched four full scale attacks against the perimeter, each time getting to within hand grenade

range before being repulsed. As happened the previous night, each attack was preceded by loud shouting and screaming. At one time the NVA set up an 82mm mortar in direct view of A Company's CP group, who were actually on the perimeter. Two men were assigned responsibility for the weapon and spent the next two hours killing each NVA who attempted to go near the mortar. By this time friendly casualties had begun to mount and small arms ammunition was running low. The north and west side of the perimeter, already low in numbers, had sent all but a bare minimum of their ammunition across the LZ to A Company headquarters from where it was distributed down the line. An extra machine gun from A Company's 1st Platoon was also brought across to strengthen the defense. A resupply helicopter had been standing by awaiting a lull in the fighting which never came, finally when informed that the situation was critical, the pilot volunteered to go in with the resupply. Accompanied by two gunships to give suppressive fire, the resupply was made and a few of the more seriously wounded were evacuated. The resupply was expensive however. One of the gunships was hit by ground fire and had to circle back and crash land in the LZ. The crew escaped the burning helicopter seconds before it blew up. While all this was going on the enemy launched another assault. This too was beaten back as the fresh ammunition supply helped to increase the friendly rate of fire.

#### REINFORCEMENT

By 1100hrs it appeared the enemy had given up trying to overrun the perimeter. He had not withdrawn from the battlefield however, as any careless movement along the line attracted enemy

the rest of the 1st Bn, 35th Inf, which had been standing by at the airstrip at DUC CO. The first lift arrived about noon bringing in the Battalion CO, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kingston, the S-3, Major Frederick C. DeLisle, and C Company commanded by Captain Alvino Cortez. As each lift of aircraft made its approach into the LZ the entire east side of the perimeter opened up with full automatic fire, paying particular attention to the trees from which the helicopter crewman had reported receiving fire. This tactic was evidently successful as no further aircraft were downed by small arms fire.

The build-up continued rapidly with little enemy opposition until about 1400hrs when the LZ was hit with a mortar attack. <sup>four</sup> helicopters were unloading at the time and immediately took off. One of the helicopters flew directly over one of the exploding mortar rounds and settled directly back into the LZ. The other three escaped. Before the last enemy round had detonated, the mortars in the LZ began firing counter battery fire. A radio telephone operator on the east side of the perimeter had heard the enemy mortar fire and quickly adjusted A Company's mortars into the area.

Following this incident the remaining resupply was done "on the fly" with individual aircraft touching down for only a few seconds at a time.

At 1300hrs B Co, 1st Bn, 35th Inf commanded by Captain Timothy J. Crotty had been lifted into LZ 10B, about 2.5kilometers northwest of LZ 10A. Their landing was unopposed and the company patrolled southeast, joining the Battalion in LZ 10A about 1600hrs. As they moved into their sector of the perimeter, the enemy launched his last and most damaging mortar attack. This attack

of approximately 18 to 20 rounds was ~~not~~ directed against the LZ, but against the perimeter, which, due to the increased forces in the LZ, was <sup>W</sup>not located about 50 meters into the wood line from the edge of the LZ. The mortars impacted directly on the battered 3d Platoon of A Company causing 15 casualties, only six of which were serious enough to warrant immediate evacuation.

Thus ended the Battle of 10ALFA which "... drew the strategic gaze increasingly toward the possibilities of the troubled zone short of the Cambodian border." (3:268)

#### SUMMARY

The next few days were spent in burying the enemy dead, policing the battlefield and searching for the enemy. An abandoned enemy regimental size base camp complete with prisoner of war compound was found one kilometer southeast of the LZ. Although no significant enemy contact was made, three enemy soldiers were captured. Two of them had been seriously wounded and abandoned by their comrades, the third was just lost and had set up his sleeping hammock within 300 meters of the LZ. He was captured during one of the regular morning "sweeps" of the perimeter.

The Battle for LZ 10ALFA was a significant victory for TF WALKER. Friendly losses were:

16 KIA

90 WIA (12 of whom remained present for duty)

2 UH1 helicopters destroyed

4 UH1 helicopters damaged



## ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

The Battle for LZ 10ALFA was unusual in that NVA forces attacked a substantial U.S. force without making their usual elaborate battlefield preparations and rehearsals. The enemy's actions were more reminiscent of the CHICOM tactics of the Korean war than the semi-guerrilla tactics he normally employs in this area. Also unusual was the length of the engagement, 16 hours, versus the average of about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  hours. (1:1) The ways and wherefores of the enemy's reasons for the attack will probably remain forever a matter of speculation.

The NVA tactics, both at night and during the day, remained consistent in their inflexibility. Each assault came over the same ground and from the same direction as the previous one. This cost him dearly during the daylight phase of the attack as the defenders were able to "draw down" on the west side of the perimeter to reinforce the east side. This was a calculated risk on the part of the company and task force commanders which met with success. A single limited attack from the west would have put a severe strain on the defensive line and probably required a major reshuffling of forces within the perimeter.

The firing battery in support of TF TYSON was located to the east almost 12 kilometers away which is the approximate maximum range of the 105 howitzer. As the enemy was attacking from the east the defensive perimeter was directly on the gun-target line along which the greatest dispersion of fire could be expected. This discouraged the adjustment of fire close to the perimeter until the situation became so critical as to warrant the acceptance of friendly casualties from our own

supporting fire. In this particular instance no casualties resulted although the artillery was adjusted to within 100 meters of the defensive line. Perhaps the range dispersion characteristics of 105 rounds fired at maximum range have been overemphasized in training.

The value of listening posts close to the perimeter in heavily vegetated terrain has been the subject of much discussion. Those opposed to this practice say that such close in listening posts do not give adequate warning, and, in the event of enemy attack, prevent the defenders from effectively firing until the members of the LP return to the perimeter. They argue that LPs should be used, but at ranges greater than 300 meters, and do not make any provision for the LPs return to the perimeter. The standard operating procedure (SOP) in A Company and B Company was that fire team size LPs would be positioned forward of each platoon at a distance from which they could be detected from the perimeter when moving about during daylight hours. This distance usually worked out to between 30 and 50 meters. The purpose of the SOP was to effectively double the distance from the perimeter at which a large enemy force could be detected. The primary mission of the LP was early warning and secondarily, within its capabilities, delay through the adjustment of indirect fire weapons and small arms fire. The fire team leader on the LP had the authority to withdraw the LP when he accomplished his primary mission of early warning. In this particular engagement the 2d Platoon's LP performed its mission and returned safely to the perimeter, while the <sup>3d Platoon</sup> ~~3d Platoon~~'s LP was temporarily pinned down by the enemy. In retrospect, the 3d Platoon's LP should probably have been ordered to withdraw as soon as

2d Platoon's LP had reported detecting the enemy's presence. However, at the time it appeared that the enemy threat was coming from the north and not the east, and additional security from other attacking forces would be gained by leaving the LP in position.

Battlefield searches or "sweeps" are SOP in Viet Nam whenever the tactical situation permits. Since the enemy had broken contact at 0430hrs, the 3d Platoon's sweep forward of the lines would appear justified and as they were deployed in a line formation they were tactically well disposed to take care of any activity to their front. However, when firing started on their right flank and they were ordered to return to the perimeter, they bunched up and, due to their closeness to the perimeter and haste to return, failed to insure proper flank security. The painful results of this lapse in security are obvious.

The actions of the 2d Platoon in maneuvering to relieve the 3d Platoon members who were pinned down <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ a classic example in small unit leadership. Lt. Kelsey led his platoon under fire, engaged a larger enemy force in a firefight, then, under orders, disengaged and maneuvered in another ~~direction~~ to relieve 3d Platoon and cover its withdrawal to the perimeter - a perfect display of maneuver control and fire discipline.

The Battle of LZ 10A <sup>is</sup> ~~was~~ an excellent example of a hastily organized perimeter defense in secondary rain forest.

## LESSONS LEARNED

1. NVA tactics are rigid and once committed to a plan of attack they will not vary it.

2. Close in listening posts are invaluable in providing early warning and disrupting enemy attacks.

3. Any unit should maintain all around security at all times, even when moving over ground which had recently been crossed and is located within a hundred meters of friendly positions.

4. Good fire discipline is essential to the success of a prolonged perimeter defense.

5. NVA forces frequently employ their mortars at very close ranges. Counter mortar fires should be planned at these ranges as well as further out. Small arms fire from the defensive line will sometimes silence these mortars.

KEY PERSONNEL

CO TF TYSON MAJ Wallace S. Tyson  
(Executive Officer, 2d Bn, 35th Inf)

COMPOSITE HEAVY MORTAR PLATOON LEADER 1LT Clovis O. LaFond  
(Hvy Mtr Plat Ldr, 1st Bn, 35th Inf)

B Company, 2d Bn, 35th Inf (Cacti)

CO	CPT James R. Maisano (WIA)
1st SGT	1SG Harry C. Miller (WIA)
1st Plat Ldr	2LT Robert Ponder
2d Plat Ldr	2LT Robert Palmer
3d Plat Ldr	2LT Michael Glynn (KIA)
WPNS Plat Ldr	2LT Raymond Pollard
Arty FO	2LT James Brothers

A Company, 1st Bn, 35th Inf (Cacti)

CO	CPT Anthony E. Bisantz
1st SGT	1SG Talino Gaison
1st Plat LDR	2LT Everette Light (WIA)
2d Plat Ldr	2LT James Kelsey
3d Plat Ldr	2LT Larry O'Comer (WIA)
WPNS Plat Ldr	2LT James Coleman
Arty FO	2LT Robert Williams (WIA)

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

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
# MAPC - DAY DEFENSE



REGIMENTAL BASE  
~~SIZE AT POSITION~~  
~~400 METERS~~

An arrow points downwards from the text.

LANDING ZONE 10 ALFA  
281700-290600 MAY 1966



0 100 200 300  
METERS

- Secondary Rain Forest
- NVA ATTACK ROUTE
- Approximate Trace of Defensive Line
- Listening Post
- 81 mm Mortar
- 4.2" Mortar

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LANDING ZONE 10 ALFA  
281700-290600 MAY 1966

