CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE TASK FORCE
25th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96355

UNCLASSIFIED

AVDC-C-OP

15 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: See Distribution

Section 1

Significant Organization Activities

(C) 1. (U) General: During the reporting period 1 May through 31 July 1966, the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division terminated Operation LONGFELLOW, participated in and terminated Operation PAUL REVERE I. Operation LONGFELLOW was terminated 1 May.* The period 2 May through 9 May was used to plan and prepare for Operation PAUL REVERE I which commenced 10 May and terminated 31 July 1966.

a. (C) The area designated for Operation PAUL REVERE I was approximately 90,000 meters long and 57,000 meters wide. Specific boundaries of the AO were the Cambodian border in the west, Route 14 on the east, the east-west grid line YA-ZA 50 in the north, and the east-west gridline YV-ZV-AQ 60 in the south.

b. (C) The assigned mission was to maintain surveillance of the Cambodian border and areas east thereof, conduct ambushes and block penetrations into the assigned area of operation. A primary area of interest was designated as the area forming a triangle generally from the Ya Lop River and the Cambodian border (YA8327) to Plei Me U.S. Special Forces Camp (ZA1605) and Duc Co U.S. Special Forces Camp (YA8424) to the Cambodian border (YA6526).

c. (U) The initial task force troop strength did not permit occupation of positions that would provide complete surveillance of the Cambodian border in the assigned area of operation, let alone enable the task force to conduct search and destroy operations in rear areas east of the Cambodian border. A system of "leapfroging" or "checkerboarding" was adopted from one area of operation to another without a set pattern. Initially, infantry battalion task forces were used in search and destroy operations to clear areas in proximity of the brigade

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

* After Action Report Operation LONGFELLOW was submitted as Inclosure #6 to previous Operational Report of Lessons Learned, dated 28 June 1966

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

forward base of operations to ensure that areas east of the Cambodian border were free of large enemy concentrations. These task forces were then moved into position oriented on the Cambodian border. Infantry battalion task forces were formed with a direct support artillery battery, an engineer squad and armor support where trafficability permitted. Throughout the operation, the brigade task force has been supported by an aviation battalion consisting of two to four airmobile companies in a general support mission with priority of effort to the brigade task force.

d. (C) Because of the large area of operation assigned in the mission, a system of numerically designating 10,000 meter squares was adopted for command and control purposes and ease of identification (Incl 1). This system has proven effective when used in conjunction with cataloging landing zones in numerically designated AO. It has provided a ready reference for identification of areas throughout the assigned area of responsibility.

e. (C) The task organization of the 3d Brigade Task Force during PAUL REVERE I with the commanders, dates of command, and units participating is as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division
Brigadier General Glenn D. Walker

1st Battalion, 14th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Proctor, Junior

1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. Callanan, 10 May - 15 June
Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Kingston, 16 June - 31 July

2d Battalion, 35th Infantry
Lieutenant Colonel Philip Feir

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery
Lieutenant Colonel Saul A. Jackson, 10 May - 9 July
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Holbrook, 10 July - 31 July

3d Support Battalion (Provisional)
Major Herbert C. Evans, 10 May - 21 July
Major Andrew H. Housand, 22 July - 31 July

Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor
Captain Richard R. Russell, 10 May - 1 June

1st Battalion, 69th Armor
Lieutenant Colonel R.J. Fairfield, Junior, 1 June - 31 July
(Closed Pleiku 19 May - operational 1 June)

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry
Captain Will E. Duffer, 10 May - 22 July
Captain William S. Graf, 23 July - 31 July

Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion
Captain James VDZ Brown, 10 May - 30 June
Captain Clarence H. Stetzinger, 1 July - 31 July

52d Aviation Battalion (GS)

A Troop, 1/9 Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division (OCA)
10 May - 11 June

Battery A, 1/30 Artillery (Atch)

6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (-) (One btry 175mm and one btry 8 inch howitzer) (Atch)

3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment, CRID (OCA)
9 June - 31 July

Project Delta (DS)
23 May - 18 June

2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division (OCA), 2 June - 9 June
(Company A, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 24 May - 28 May)
(2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 29 May - 9 June)
(2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, 2 June - 10 June)

2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division (OCA)
30 July - 31 July

Company C, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor
OCA to 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division from 10 July to 29 July for Operation HENRY CLAY.

f. (C) Security for the brigade base camp was provided by one infantry platoon, one 4.2 inch mortar and three 81mm mortars from each organic infantry battalion. The 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery provided three 105mm howitzers. One infantry battalion also provided a rifle company as the brigade reserve/reaction force in the vicinity of the brigade forward base of operation. This procedure was modified 10 June when IFFV directed that one infantry battalion remain in the brigade base camp at Pleiku as the IFFV reserve/reaction force. This released the rifle platoon, 4.2 inch mortar and the 81mm mortars of the infantry battalions for use in the field. IFFV requirement for one infantry battalion to remain in the brigade rear base was lifted 12 July and the brigade base security reverted to the initial plan (Operation IRON HAND).

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

2.(C)Personnel:

a.(U)General: The brigade strength increased substantially during this period. The remainder of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor joined the task force 19 May 1966.

b.(C)Unit strength:

(1) As of 31 July 1966 the strengths of units of the task force were as follows:

UNIT	AUTH			ATCH			ASG PLUS ATCH			PDY		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
HHC, 3d Bde	24	6	95	12	2	199	47	7	390	43	6	376
Co D, 65th Engr Bn	6	0	220	0	0	0	4	0	198	4	0	189
3d Spt Bn (Prov)	7	0	127	7	0	135	7	0	135	6	0	133
Co D, 725th Main	4	1	95	0	0	0	4	2	89	3	2	86
Co B, 25th Med Bn	8	0	80	2	0	3	11	0	78	10	0	76
C Trp, 3/4 Cav	5	0	178	0	0	0	4	0	205	3	0	178
1/35 Inf	37	2	790	0	0	0	37	2	837	33	2	738
2/35 Inf	37	2	790	0	0	0	37	2	879	36	1	708
1/14 Inf	37	2	790	0	0	0	32	2	932	25	2	831
2/9 Arty	37	3	450	0	0	0	33	3	463	32	2	434
1/69 Armor	30	3	534	0	0	0	31	3	600	31	3	558
	232	19	4149	21	2	337	247	21	4806	226	18	4307

(2) The task force strength fluctuated daily during this period. The following are periodic strength figures:

MAY

	ASSIGNED			PRESENT FOR DUTY		
DATE	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
5 May	221	20	4130	213	19	3961
12 May	208	18	3886	214	20	3957
19 May	231	21	4372	216	18	4066
26 May	261	24	5136	247	21	4840
31 May	257	21	5050	237	17	4595

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

JUNE

DATE	ASSIGNED OFF	WO	EM	PRESENT FOR DUTY OFF	WO	EM
2 June	260	21	5160	244	16	4730
9 June	263	21	5143	248	18	4748
16 June	258	21	5035	238	17	4588
23 June	259	21	5006	240	17	4510
30 June	254	21	4912	231	17	4406

JULY

DATE	ASSIGNED OFF	WO	EM	PRESENT FOR DUTY OFF	WO	EM
7 July	248	22	4828	230	19	4405
14 July	247	22	4803	226	18	4441
21 July	250	22	4823	239	18	4337
28 July	246	21	4801	232	18	4314
31 July	247	21	4709	229	18	4310

(3) Replacements received:

MAY

	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	1	0	5	4	34
1/14	0	1	1	1	3	14	137
1/35	0	0	0	2	4	10	144
2/35	0	0	0	0	2	8	114
69th	0	0	0	0	2	1	12
65th	0	0	1	0	1	1	12
Spt Bn	0	0	0	0	1	2	4
2/9	0	0	1	0	1	1	12
TOTALS	0	1	4	3	19	41	469

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

JUNE

	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	0	1	3	1	6
1/14	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
1/35	0	0	0	0	1	1	4
2/35	0	0	0	0	1	1	7
69th	0	0	0	2	0	4	2
65th	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
SptBn	0	0	0	0	3	3	3
2/9	0	0	0	0	1	1	4
TOTALS	0	0	0	4	9	13	27

JULY

	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	0	1	0	2	7
1/14	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
1/35	0	0	0	3	7	2	9
2/35	0	1	0	2	1	0	0
69th	0	0	0	1	5	4	21
65th	0	0	0	0	2	0	3
Spt Bn	0	0	0	0	4	2	4
2/9	0	0	0	2	5	4	21
TOTALS	0	1	1	9	24	15	66

(4) The number of casualties for May, June and July were:

KIA	WIA	MIA	WIA DIED OF WOUNDS
66	320	2	9

(5) Number of emergency leaves:

	MAY	JUNE	JULY
HHC, 3d Bde	2	4	1
1/14	5	2	5
1/35	4	4	5
2/35	2	4	5
69th	2	2	6
65th	3	0	2
Spt Bn	0	0	1
2/9	3	0	1
TOTALS	21	16	26

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(6) Number of personnel returned for separation:

	MAY	JUNE	JULY
HHC, 3d Bde	2	2	5
1/14	24	11	9
1/35	14	22	24
2/35	9	17	6
69th	10	13	18
65th	10	3	7
Spt Bn	18	20	10
2/9	12	4	5
TOTALS	99	92	84

(7) Accounting for personnel in hospitals remains a problem area, but it is improving significantly.

(a) A liaison NCO was sent to both the 85th Evacuation Hospital at Qui Nhon and the 8th Field Hospital at Nha Trang to provide daily information regarding the brigade's assigned personnel in those hospitals.

(b) Considerable emphasis was placed on purifying the brigade strength records by requesting orders on personnel who have been hospitalized and evacuated out of the country.

(8) To date we have still not received replacements for certain highly skilled personnel who have departed the command for separation.

c. (U) Morale in the 3d Brigade Task Force continues to be excellent. Mail service and post exchange service have improved considerably. The use of a new APO number has resulted in a shorter delivery time from the point of origin to the addressee. Religious services have been adequate for all faiths.

(1) Mail:

(a) Number of bags received: 4261.

(b) Number of bags dispatched: 2244.

(c) Total stamp value sold: $17,438.20.

(d) Total value of money orders sold including fee: $14,457,922.11.

(e) Dates mail was not received:

1. May: 0

2. June: 24th

3. July: 13th, 15th, 18th, 21st, and 30th.

(2) R and R allocations:

(a) The allocated spaces for R and R are adequate for the needs of the brigade task force except for allocations to Hawaii.

(b) The monthly allocations were as follows:

	MAY	JUNE	JULY
HHC, 3d Bde	11	14	29
1/14	34	45	59
1/35	39	48	61
2/35	47	38	59
69th	17	38	50
65th	14	10	12
Spt Bn	15	14	18
2/9	23	23	31
TOTALS	200	230	319

(3) Promotion allocations:

	MAY					
	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	0	0	3	10
1/14	0	0	0	0	9	8
1/35	0	1	2	0	6	7
2/35	0	1	1	0	2	0
69th	0	0	0	0	2	3
65th	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spt Bn	0	0	0	0	2	3
2/9	0	0	0	0	5	0
TOTALS	0	2	3	0	29	31

JUNE

	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	5	1	8	17
1/14	0	3	6	3	12	18
1/35	1	1	5	0	2	18
2/35	0	1	7	0	0	10
69th	0	0	2	6	8	26
65th	0	0	3	0	5	6
Spt Bn	0	0	3	2	2	5
2/9	0	0	2	1	0	0
TOTALS	1	5	33	13	37	100

JULY

	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4
HHC, 3d Bde	0	0	1	6	22	34
1/14	0	0	1	4	9	20
1/35	0	1	1	4	9	14
2/35	0	0	3	10	10	20
69th	0	0	3	9	40	20
65th	0	0	1	2	8	12
Spt Bn	0	0	1	5	3	24
2/9	0	0	1	3	10	10
TOTALS	0	1	12	43	111	154

(4) Awards and decorations:

(a) During this period the brigade was given authority to award the bronze star medal, army commendation medal, air medal and purple heart medal.

(b) The award of bronze star, army commendation, air and purple heart medals has been hampered by the nonavailability of the medals and certificates.

(5) Reenlistment:

(a) The brigade reenlistment program is undergoing a complete revamping in hopes of increasing the number of personnel who reenlist.

(b) Reenlistments for the period:

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

1. RA enlistments (career): 21

2. RA reenlistments (1st term): 6

3. AUS reenlistments: 0

d. (U) Miscellaneous:

(1) During this period the brigade assumed resposnibility for booking transportation out of Tan Son Nhut, RVN, for those being rotated or separated.

(2) Receiving assignment instructions for personnel scheduled to rotate is presently a major problem area. Every effort is being made to insure that personnel are properly reported for reassignment.

(3) Correspondence is frequently delayed because it is being erroneously addressed to the CG, 25th Infantry Division, Cu Chi. In many cases this makes suspense dates impossible to meet.

(4) Requisitions on some blank forms have taken an unwarranted amount of time to fill. There are presently no pay vouchers in this brigade.

(C) 3. (C) INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

a. (U) General: The intelligence function involves the correlation of several sources to produce indicators of possible enemy activities or courses of action. The sources taken as entities are not in themselves productive. When analyzed in concert, however, these sources can give sound indications of possible locations, dispositions, and movement patterns of enemy forces. It must be emphasized that in the highlands environment, it is virtually impossible to find the enemy by intelligence resources alone in terms of six digit coordinates, but it is possible to determine the most fruitful areas for operations which may produce contact to a relatively reliable degree. The basic sources of information are analyzed below.

b. (U) Aerial Visual Surveillance: Aerial visual surveillance has proven to be both a collector of indicators of enemy activity and an important economy of force element to complement ground patrolling. An aerial reconnaissance plan is established based on areas of interest, and flown in consonance with operational plans. The optimum is to utilize the same observer in the same area of interest over a five to seven day (or longer) period. By doing this, the observer becomes thoroughly familiar with the terrain and can readily recognize changes which in turn become indicators. The observer must be briefed and debriefed by the S2 Air, and the results of his observations posted to maps for each flight flown.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

c. (C) Radio Research Unit Reports: Radio Research Unit reports are considered "hard" intelligence at the time collected. Considerations must be given to the fact that this type target is transitory and any direct action against these targets must be immediate if they are to be considered objectives in themselves. If a lack of resources precludes immediate attack, these sightings can still be effectively correlated to other indicators in determining possible disposition and locations of enemy forces. This, of course, is the tactical value of the reports; the strategic value of information gathered by this agency is not analyzed at the brigade level.

d. (C) Airborne Electronic Surveillance: The two major facets of this source are SLAR and IR. Of the two, the IR provides the most meaningful indicators. During the dry season (particularly when the natives are in the burn phase of the "slash and burn" agrarian technique) IR is almost neutralized, but for the most part this system provides sound, reliable collateral. The program for utilization of IR must be planned in consonance with operational contingencies, and for meaningful results should cover the same areas for three to six days to determine patterns that may be emerging.

e. (U) PW Interrogation Results: Very little information worthy of immediate tactical exploitation has been obtained from PWs. However, this source is the core of the OB collection program. In addition to OB information, PW reports are invaluable for determining enemy routes, equipment, health, morale and esprit, strengths, and possible future plans. Certainly, the reliability of the information is directly related to the reliability of the PW as a source. However, as more PWs are interrogated, the results can be weighed against previous experience and reliable conclusions can be drawn.

f. (U) Agent and Informer Reports: Agents and informers have not proven very reliable in themselves. However, when treated objectively and in consonance with other information they can be used as collateral, and the probability of the report being accurate can be analyzed.

g. (U) Statistics on enemy losses: Inclosure #2.

(C) 4. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. (U) General: The 3d Brigade Task Force deployed from Pleiku to its area of operation 10 May 1966. The brigade forward base of operations was initially located at OASIS (ZA1027). The task organization at that time was: 2d Battalion 35th Infantry, Company B 1st Battalion 69th Armor, A Troop 1st Squadron 9th Cavalry, and the brigade headquarters. Due to adverse weather conditions, other brigade elements were not able to be introduced into their assigned areas of operation.

b. (C) Period 11 May - 24 May 1966.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(1) General: During this period of operation PAUL REVERE I, the brigade's efforts were oriented toward searching rear areas to ensure that they were free of large enemy concentrations. Operations were conducted generally on a north and south line advancing westward toward the Cambodian border. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was assigned AO 29, the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was assigned AO 46, and C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry with one company of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was assigned AO 38. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry minus and Company B, 1/69 Armor were in reserve at the brigade forward base of operation. During daylight hours they conducted search and destroy operations in the surrounding areas. A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry conducted extensive surveillance missions in the southern portion of the brigade area of operation. 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was used in direct support of the infantry battalions. Artillery GS and/or reinforcing 2d Battalion 9th Artillery was positioned at Duc Co and Plei Me with two tubes of 175mm and 8 inch at each location. 155mm howitzers were employed at Duc Co.

(2) This operational posture was maintained through 24 May with light contact and insignificant enemy activity. Elements advanced toward the west until 24 May when the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was employed in AO 27, the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was employed in AO 52 and 53, C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry was employed in AO 37 and A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry continued to provide surveillance and reconnaissance of the Cambodian border.

(3) During this period the brigade accounted for 7 VC and 2 NVA killed in action. Discoveries of caches and enemy structures were insignificant.

c. (C) Period 25 May - 9 June 1966.

(1) General: During this period of operation PAUL REVERE I, the 3d Brigade Task Force had its most significant encounter with North Vietnamese Army forces. Elements of the brigade task force had heavy contact with two North Vietnamese Army regiments and was reinforced by the 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division in an attempt to cut off the escape of North Vietnamese Army units into Cambodia.

(2) Late on the afternoon of 24 May, the brigade was notified that 250 CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Group) from Plei Djereng were under attack by an estimated two battalions of NVA in the vicinity of YA760470. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted an air assault 25 May into AO 3 where search and destroy operations were conducted without enemy contact. Operations were shifted south to AO 11 27 May. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry base camp at YA865366 (AO 11) was probed by

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

an estimated NVA Company 280515 May. The same morning Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted a heliborne assault into AO 10.

(3) Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry came under intense attack when initial elements landed in landing zone 10A 281055 May. The company was able to secure the landing zone and the remainder of the unit closed at 1430 hours and joined the action. Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was also directed into landing zone 10A late in the afternoon of 28 May and both companies were placed under command of the executive officer of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. The ensuing fire fight lasted approximately forty hours.

(4) Prisoners, documents and captured equipment substantiated the fact that both enemy contacts were regimental in size; the 33d NVA Regiment in AO 11 and the 66th NVA Regiment in AO 10. CG, IFFV, provided additional forces to prevent the exfiltration of the enemy toward the Cambodian border. The 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division closed the 3d Brigade Task Force forward base area 30 May and conducted a combat assault into AO 2 31 May. The 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division with the 2d Battalion, 12 Cavalry closed into Duc Co U.S. Special Forces Camp 1 June. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry conducted a combat assault into AO 18 2 June. The 3d Brigade Task Force was designated TASK FORCE WALKER and assumed operational control authority of the 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division 1 June 1966.

(5) The balance of 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry closed into AO 10 from AO 45 30 May and the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry continued to pursue the enemy in AO 11. Both infantry battalions conducted intense saturation patrolling operations throughout their areas with negative contact, but gained positive evidence of the losses the enemy suffered. The 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry continued search and destroy operations in AO 2 moving into AO 1, 9, and 10 with negative results. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry conducted search and destroy operations in AO 18 and conducted a combat assault into AO 12, 4 and 10 with negative results. Closing the ring around the NVA units was hampered by the lack of suitable landing zones in the northwest portion of the task force area of operation. It soon became apparent that NVA units had been sucessful in their flight to Cambodia.

(6) Enemy losses during this period were heavy as was his loss of equipment. Two hundred and seventy-eight NVA troops were killed in action. Five 12.7mm anti-aircraft weapons, thirty-six machine guns, forty-six rifles, four radios, one hundred and thirty hand grenades and various other equipment were captured in AO 10 alone.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(7) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry with Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor continued its surveillance, ambushing and blocking mission along the Cambodian border in AO 27 and 36 throughout the period. During the heavy contact in the north, there were numerous light probing attacks in these areas. An infantry battalion has been positioned in AO 27 and 36 (vicinity of the Chu Pong Mountain complex and the Ia Drang River) continously since 21 May.

(8) The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor minus became part of the 3d Brigade Task Force closing Pleiku from Cu Chi 19 May. The battalion became operational and joined operation PAUL REVERE I 1 June. A Troop, 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry Division supported tactical operations in AO 10 and 11 as well as continuing its surveillance mission in the southern part of the PAUL REVERE I area of operation.

(9) C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry was withdrawn from AO 37 25 May due to heavy rainfall that reduced its trafficability. It returned to the brigade forward base of operations at OASIS as a reserve/reaction force. C Troop became OCA of the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry in AO 11 30 May. It returned to the brigade base camp 8 June as the reserve/reaction force for surface employment.

(10) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry in AO 27 and 36 7 June. The 14th Infantry closed into the brigade forward base of operations at OASIS. The 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division conducted a search and clear operation to the north of OASIS with the 1st Battalion 35th Infantry, the 1st Battalion 14th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, 8 June. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was positioned along Highway 19 to block enemy units being pushed south by the infantry battalions. This operation consisted of the 1st Battalion 14th Infantry in AO 5, the 1st Battalion 35th Infantry and the 2d Battalion 12th Cavalry in AO 4. All advanced to the south on line. This operation was concluded 10 June with minor enemy contact.

(11) The 2d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry with the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry was released from OCA TASK FORCE WALKER 9 June 1966. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry was released 10 June 1966.

d. (C) Period 10 June - 22 June.

(1) General: During this period the 3d Brigade Task Force continued its mission of surveillance, ambushing and blocking. Significant contact occurred in AO 27 and 36 north of the Chu Pong Mountain and in the Ia Drang River Valley.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

(2) The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry returned to the brigade base camp 10 June and assumed the mission of the IFFV reserve/reaction force. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry maintained its surveillance, ambush and blocking positions along the Cambodian border in AO 27 and 36. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry conducted a combat assault into AO 28, 29 and 37 on a "back-tracking" mission to search these areas for enemy activity. Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry with the Scout Platoon, 69th Armor under their OCA, moved from the brigade forward base of operation at OASIS to AO 28. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor minus located Company B at Duc Co, Company C at Plei Me and Company A and the battalion headquarters at the brigade forward base of operations. C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry remained at the brigade base camp. A Troop, 1st Battalion, 9th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division was released from OCA 3d Brigade Task Force 10 June and returned to its parent organization.

(3) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry continued search and destroy operations in AO 28, 29, and 37 through 15 June with insignificant enemy contact. Several enemy structures were located and destroyed. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry conducted a combat assault into AO 52 16 June to continue search and destroy operations. Each infantry company left stay back ambush patrols in AO 29 and all patrols had contact the following day with VMC entering the "vacated" AO.

(4) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry with Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, under their OCA, continued the surveillance, ambush and blocking mission in AO 27 and 36 with daily minor NVA contact through 18 June. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry had moderate contact with one platoon of the NVA 19 June. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry had visual sightings of small NVA forces commencing 200745 June. Supporting artillery and mortars were utilized throughout the morning hours. At 1500 hours, the reconnaissance platoon pursued four personnel of the NVA across an open area and were pinned down by automatic weapons and small arms fire. It appeared that the reconnaissance platoon had been drawn into extensively prepared positions approximately 700 meters from the Cambodian border. Elements of Companies A and B and C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry were utilized to extricate the reconnaissance platoon. Estimates of enemy strength during this action vary from a reinforced rifle company to a battalion. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry continued to have observations of small groups of the NVA 21 June. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was replaced in AO 27 and 36 by the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry 22 June, returned to the brigade base camp as IFFV reserve/reaction force.

(5) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry continued search and destroy operations in AO 52 with negative enemy contact. Numerous enemy

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

positions and caches (80 rounds of 75mm recoilless ammunition) were discovered. The 3d Brigade Task Force forward base of operation displaced from OASIS to WAIKIKI north of Plei Me U.S. Special Forces Camp (ZA1811) 21 June.

(6) The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor continued to provide security for the brigade forward base of operation. Company C joined the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry as IFFV reserve/reaction force at the brigade base camp. C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry continued operations in AO 27 OCA of 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

e. (C) Period 23 June - 2 July.

(1) General: During this period surveillance of the Cambodian border continued with one infantry battalion remaining in the Chu Pong Mountain - Ia Drang River Valley area, and another infantry battalion conducting search and destroy operations in the southern portion of the brigade area of operation. Once again elements of the North Vietnamese Army came across the border and engaged elements of the brigade. One contact was significant in that the enemy force was estimated to be at least a battalion.

(2) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry conducted search and clear operations in AO 53 and subsequently covered AO 54, 62, and 72. This battalion had insignificant enemy contact throughout the period; however, it did locate several enemy caches and contacted an NVA carrying party with 4500 rounds of 7.62mm small arms ammunition.

(3) The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry continued its screening and surveillance mission along the Cambodian border with C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry under their OCA. Three tracked vehicles struck mines which inflicted minor damage to the vehicles, but no personnel casualties 23 June. During the morning 24 June, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry observed three to five NVA soldiers and called in mortar fire with unknown results. At 1030 hours, the Reconnaissance Platoon patrolling to the west received small arms and automatic weapons fire. Air strikes and armed helicopters were called in. The forward air controller reported 15 NVA soldiers killed. The remaining enemy withdrew to the west. The Reconnaissance Platoon pursued the enemy and was pinned down by intense small arms and automatic weapons fire. There were snipers in trees. The NVA had retreated to well-prepared, fortified positions. At 1225 hours one platoon of Company A was sent to help extricate the Reconnaissance Platoon and another infantry platoon from Company A conducted a combat assault into the area at 1425 hours. Elements of C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry and Company C were dispatched north to aid Company A minus and the Reconnaissance Platoon. They came under fire from the west at 1430

hours and at 1625 hours were under heavy attack. The NVA used small arms, automatic weapons, 82mm mortar and anti-tank rockets. A vehicle from C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry was hit by a B-40 rocket (this was the first instance of this weapon being employed against armor during Operation PAUL REVERE I). Elements of the Reconnaissance Platoon and Company A (-) were extracted and the enemy broke contact at 1850 hours. It was estimated that the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry had been engaged with an NVA battalion. Enemy losses were 73 killed, one hundred possible killed, and one hundred and fifty wounded.

(4) Continous contact with elements of the NVA occurred daily during this period. Sightings were made, usually at long range, and artillery and mortar fires were employed. Elements of C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry captured one enemy soldier 26 June.

(5) During this period the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor provided a mobile reserve/reaction force at the brigade forward base of operations and was used extensively for convoy escort and road opening operations. Company C remained with the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry as the IFFV reserve/reaction force at the brigade base camp.

f. (C) Period 3 July - 11 July.

(1) General: Surveillance was continued on the Cambodian border by the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry and search and destroy operations were conducted by the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Capital ROK Infantry Division joined the 3d Brigade Task Force 9 July.

(2) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was extracted from AO 72 by helicopters to the brigade forward base of operations and transported by motor convoy to the brigade base camp 3 July. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was transported to the brigade forward base at WAIKIKI by motor convoy and conducted a combat assault into AO 28 and 36. There was reason to believe that some elements of the NVA had infiltrated through the surveillance positions established by the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry which created some danger to the battalion's rear area.

(3) A platoon of Company B, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was ordered to conduct a patrol in an area 3000-5000 meters from the Cambodian border on the morning of 3 July. The platoon leader split his platoon into two patrols, one patrol in the south under his command and the other patrol in the north commanded by the platoon sergeant. Initial contact was made at 1225 hours by the patrol in the south and the enemy was pursued to the west. The enemy was successful in encircling the patrol with a force possessing superior firepower. The platoon leader

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)(U)

radioed for assistance from the patrol in the north. Before the platoon sergeant with his patrol could link-up with encircled element in the south, he became encircled by the enemy. With one infantry platoon and a platoon of C Troop, 3/4 Cavalry, the Commander, Company B, went to the assistance of the trapped patrols. The relief force moved 8000 meters rapidly in APC. Link-up was established with the platoon sergeant's patrol which had been able to break out of the encirclement. The relief force moved south, observed NVA troops to the east and came under small arms fire from that direction. The relief force turned and engaged the enemy and came under immediate heavy contact from the south and west. The company commander turned his forces to the south and was able to disrupt the enemy attack. However, the contact was so close that artillery and mortar fire inflicted casualties on the relief force. Casualties included the company commander. Machinegun fire from the APC stopped the attack from the west. The relief force linked-up with the remanents of the platoon leader's patrol and subsequently withdrew to the north so air strikes and artillery fires could be fired during this action and during the night. The enemy used small arms, automatic weapons, 82mm mortars, anti-aircraft weapons, and anti-tank weapons (two APC were struck by 75mm recoilless rifles, but not put out of action). Enemy losses were thirty nine killed and an estimated one hundred and fifty wounded. The enemy force was estimated to be at least a battalion.

(4) Light contact continued daily throughout the remainder of this period. On 7 July the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry while operating in AO 27 and 35, engaged an estimated 40-60 NVA vicinity YA823097 which resulted in five NVA KIA. Later the same day they flushed a NVA force of approximately 100 equipped with small arms, machineguns, recoilless rifles and mortars vicinity YA800095. The NVA was hit by all available air and artillery, but they managed to extract their dead and wounded.

(5) On 5 July the brigade forward base of operation moved from WAIKIKI to CATECKA (ZA206344). On 7 July a joint US-ARVN operation was conducted to search and clear the immediate area around CATECKA Tea Plantation. Company A and B 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry participated. 174 Viet Cong Suspects were detained. The 3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment, moved to AO 27 where it assumed a surveillance, ambush and blocking mission along the Cambodian border, 9 July.

g.(C) Period 12 July - 23 July.

(1) General: This period was characterized by a lack of significant contact with the enemy. Surveillance was continued along the Cambodian border by the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry in AO 35 and AO 27 and by the 3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment, CRID, in AO 27. Search and destroy operations were conducted by the 1st and 2d Battalions, 35th Infantry in AO 10, 20, 21, 29, 52 and 61.

(2) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry discovered seven 60mm and eight 81mm mortar rounds 14 July. These were found to be "booby trapped". Numerous punji pits were discovered in the area.

(3) C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry was placed under OCA of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry 12 July and continued operations in AO 27 and 35 until 18 July when it moved to the brigade base camp.

h. (C) Period 24 July - 31 July.

(1) General: This period saw increased enemy activity throughout the PAUL REVERE I area of operation. Contacts became more frequent and intelligence indicated a substantial build-up of North Vietnamese Army strength.

(2) The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment CRID continued the surveillance mission along the Cambodian border. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry engaged ten NVA 27 July, killing three. On 28 July 10-15 NVA were engaged and seven of them were killed.

(3) The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in AO 61 until 28 July when the battalion moved into AO 36 and 37 where frequent contacts were made. Ten NVA were engaged 29 July. One was killed and two were captured. One of the captives provided considerable information about the NVA build-up in the area of operations. Company A made contact with 20 NVA vicinity YA963075 311120 July. At 1445 hours Company A engaged an estimated NVA company reinforced vicinity YA970077.

(4) The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in AO 29. One company was under OCA 1st Battalion, 69th Armor at CATECKA with a reserve/reaction mission and assisted in the security of the brigade base of operations. The 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry minus moved to OASIS (ZA108277) 26 July and conducted search and and destroy operations in AO 21 and 22 throughout the remainder of the period.

(5) The 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division came under OCA 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division 301630 July 1966. On 31 July Company A and B conducted combat assault into landing zone Delta in AO 21 (ZA047262). Company C and D secured the base camp area for 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division vicinity AR805365.

(6) As the reporting period closed it became increasingly evident that major NVA forces were operating in the PAUL REVERE I area of operation. They were taking advantage of the monsoon weather to infiltrate

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

far inside the Vietnamese/Cambodian border. These forces were discovered and fixed because of the aggressive ground patrolling conducted by the men of the brigade. Every effort was made to locate the NVA units and to deny them the ability to mass and meet the brigade task force at a time and place of their choosing or to be successful in subsequent actions.

(C) 5.(C) LOGISTICS

a.(U) General: Support for combat operations has been more than adequate, and no major problems have developed.

b.(U) Supply:

(1) Supply of the brigade task force elements is accomplished through a combination of unit and supply point distribution. Bulk Class I, IV and V supplies were normally moved to Pleiku Support Unit (Prov) by area surface transportation and further distributed to the brigade by transportation organic to the 3d Support Battalion (Prov). Bulk Class III arrives at the Pleiku Support Unit (Prov) by area surface transport, and subsequently is transported to the brigade. In most instances, distribution of Class II items, to include repair parts and expendable supplies has been by supply point from either Pleiku or Qui Nhon.

(2) Support of combat operations has been accomplished utilizing two methods. The first method involved movement of supplies from forward supply points of the 1st Logistical Command to the brigade forward base of operations where a forward supply element was maintained by the 1st Logistical Command. The second method was initiated when the brigade forward base of operation was relocated closer to the forward supply points of the 1st Logistical Command. Under this concept all bulk shipment was transported from the 1st Logistical Command's forward supply points to the 3d Support Battalion (Prov) located at the brigade forward base of operations. Further distribution to using units was accomplished by the 3d Support Battalion (Prov) located at the brigade forward base of operations. Class II supplies, to include repair parts, in most instances have been provided from the brigade base camp.

c.(U) Transportation:

(1) The medium truck squad cargo section has been utilized primarily for line haul operations between Pleiku and Qui Nhon.

(2) With the exception of ration hauls from 1st Logistical Command, Pleiku Support Area, the light truck squad has been utilized as task force troop haul vehicles. These vehicles have also been utilized during combat operations to support movement of the infantry battalions.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

d.(C)Maintenance:

(1) Continued use of the new family of radios over extended periods of time has created serious problems. The shortages of signal repair parts and components precludes the attainment of an acceptable operational status. Lack of trained personnel in signal repair has necessitated evacuating inoperative radios from 3d Support Battalion (Prov) to the Qui Nhon Support Command in an attempt to reduce maintenance backlog and to expedite repair. Liaison visits to IFFV, Qui Nhon Support Command and Saigon were made to alleviate the problem.

(2) Due to the shortage of repair parts engineer items, particularly generators, continued to create additional maintenance problems. Many units utilized TOE generators to supply all electrical power. The installation of a 100 KW generator in the brigade base camp has alleviated this problem to an extent; a second 100 KW generator has arrived and is being installed. This will significantly reduce the need for using TOE generators as a primary power source.

(3) The repair of fire control instruments continued to be a serious problem. As in the case of signal items, the primary difficulty was non-availability of repair parts. Excessive time in support maintenance has been experienced by all units. Liaison visits to IFFV, Qui Nhon Support Command, and Saigon have been initiated to alleviate this problem.

e.(C)Equipment:

(1) During the last quarter of FY 66, sufficient M-16 rifles were received to replace the remaining M-14. As of this date approximately 90% of the combat troops are armed with the M-16; it is anticipated that the remaining 10% will be replaced by the end of the first quarter of FY 67.

(2) During the period Starlight Scopes were received by the brigade and issued to using units.

f.(U)Construction:

(1) Base camp development continued with semi-permanent mess halls, troop billets, and offices being erected.

(2) Planning for a central water supply system was completed. Construction is slated to commence during FY 67.

(3) Construction of the MSR leading into base camp from the north has been completed. Work on the MSR within base camp and from the south is now in progress. Drainage facilities have been installed throughout the brigade area.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

g.(U) Statistics for the period 10 May through 31 July.

(1) Fuel:

(a) Mogas: 179,952 gallons

(b) Diesel: 176,590 gallons

(c) Eng oil: 2,256 gallons

(d) JP-4: 215,000* gallons

(2) Ammunition:

(a) 40mm: 6,763 rds

(b) 81mm: 16,036 rds

(c) 90mm: 756 rds

(d) 4.2": 8,283 rds

(e) 105mm: 33,373 rds

(f) 106mm: 30 rds

(g) 155mm: 5,728 rds

(3) Rations:

(a)	A rations:	340,130 meals
(b)	B rations:	337,440 meals
(c)	C rations:	186,492 meals
	Total	864,062

(C) 6.(C) AVIATION

a.(C) General: The brigade aviation section arrived in country 5 January 1966 organized at full strength under TOE 7-42E. The section consisted of six (6) aviators (one comissioned officer and five warrant officers) and eight enlisted men. The section was equipped with six OH-23G helicopters. The brigade was augmented with one U6-A Beaver and one OH-23G for the artillery battalion. The beaver and OH-23G both came

* JP-4 total is for period 6 through 31 July 66 only.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

with pilot and crew chief. The aviation section was reduced in strength by two OH-23G and two pilots 1 April 1966. This was in accordance with the DA directed ARCSA reorganization.

b.(C)Tactical Employment: All aircraft arrived in RVN equipped with the M-2 machine gun system. After three and one half months of testing, modification and further testing, the M-2 system proved unsatisfactory. Primary cause factors were:

(1) Helium charges were not available for recycling the system. Immediate action during jamming had to be effected manually.

(2) Repeated jamming in the ammunition chute was experienced. These deficiencies precluded use of the OH-23G with M-2 system as a scout aircraft.

c.(C)Command and control: The most common use of the OH-23G is as command and control ships for battalion commanders. As of 31 July 66, 1340 hours of the total time of 2466 hours flown were in this role. The major problem encountered has been the incompatibility of the ARC-44 FM radio with the new family of FM radios. Modification of the aircraft radios proved only moderately satisfactory. Commanders normally carry one or two PRC/25 with them during missions and communicate in this manner.

d.(U) Cargo: A considerable amount of cargo has been transported by the OH-23G. The loads consisted primarily of small amounts of ammunition, rations and water which would not justify the use of a utility aircraft. The major problem has been in securing the load. A partial solution to this problem was the local fabrication of "saddle bags" which were attached to the transmission mounts. These bags can carry 75 pounds of cargo each and were found invaluable in stowing passengers' web equipment and other small items which normally clutter the cockpit. They are large enought to carry a full five gallon water can or case of "C" rations.

e.(C)Liaison: Next to command and control, the movement of individuals for the purpose of liaison with other units was the most common aircraft utilization. Delivery of orders, overlays, staff visits and transport of liaison officers were daily missions. The OH-23G is ideally suited for these missions.

f.(U)Aircraft performance: The OH-23G first saw service in the RVN with the brigade. A few comments on its performance seem appropriate. An OH-13S was used by the aviation section during operations LONGFELLOW and PAUL REVERE I. An accurate comparison of the two was made. The OH-23G's 305 horsepower was found to be sufficient in all areas of operation

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

regarding the climate and loads. With two passengers and pilot, full fuel, midday temperature and a 4,250 foot pad at Dak To field site, translational lift was never required to effect a safe take off. From this same site the OH-13S could not lift one passenger. Normal cruise speed was found to be 75 knots with two passengers for the OH-23G. The OH-13S cruised at 65 knots with one passenger. The 57 gallon fuel capacity of the OH-13S gave it a slightly longer in-flight time than the 46 gallon capacity of the OH-23G. From the standpoint of power, passenger capacity and top speed, it is felt that the OH-23G is the best aircraft of its type now available for the LOH mission in Vietnam.

g.(C) Maintenance: A large number of OH-23G parts were brought with the aviation section upon deployment to the RVN. These parts filled in while a parts demand was being established in country (initially, there was a complete lack of supply parts in RVN). Aside from the lack of parts, no significant maintenance problems were encountered. With the exception of periodic inspections, all maintenance was performed in the field. Periodic inspections were performed at Holloway AAF.

(U) 7.(U) CIVIC ACTION:

a.(U) General: Although concentrating mainly on short range/high impact projects, the civic action program has made significant contributions to the economic and social development of the local population, thereby improving the GVN/FWMAF image.

b.(U) Major emphasis has been placed on improving the health and sanitation conditions of the various villages in the brigade AO. During the reporting period, brigade civic action personnel have improved conditions in over 50 villages with soap and medical treatment. The medical teams have treated more than 3,800 people with many of the more serious patients being evacuated to the province hospital.

c.(U) Numerous other projects have been conducted. For instance, spillway construction, blast furnance improvement, sewing machines for classes, tools for charcoal production, distribution of food and clothing to refugees, and relocating families. Ground teams have presented movies and musicals to many villages with obvious success, especially in remote highland areas.

d.(U) It is felt that more Vietnamese participation in civic action projects would improve the GVN image in the eyes of the local population.

(C) 8.(C) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (U).

a.(U) General: PSYWAR activities have been directed at NVA/VC units, VC/VMC Cadre, and Montagnard/Vietnamese noncombatants. Both air and ground PSYWAR activities have been employed.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

b.(C) The U-10 PSYWAR aircraft has been effective over targets determined from current intelligence. The most successful employment has been immediately after ground contact is broken; its use over known enemy areas has also been quite successful. Lack of aircraft availability at the required time has been a major obstacle.

c.(C) Tape recordings have been made by NVA/VC returnees and POW. These were broadcast in the most lucrative areas. Pictures of NVA/VC returnees and POW receiving good treatment were printed on leaflets. An appropriate message was usually included and the leaflets dropped on selected areas.

d.(U) Statistics:

(1) Missions: 68 (U-10)
4 (C-47)

(2) Leaflets: 3,600,000

(3) Chieu Hoi: 7 NVA/1 VC

(4) Weapons: 5

(U) 9.(U) ENGINEER SUPPORT:

a.(U) General: Engineer support was provided by Company D, 65th Engineer Battalion.

b.(U) A combat engineer squad is normally provided each committed infantry battalion. This support includes clearing landing zones using a combination of explosive, mechanical and hand means, destruction of captured enemy explosives, and duds.

c.(U) Construction has been provided for major projects such as the rehabilitation of the membrane landing strip at OASIS to accept C-130 aircraft and maintenance of the road net. The latter has been a priority operation. The soil in the area is predominately clay and thus highly susceptible to rutting during the monsoon season. This is particularly true when subjected to heavy traffic. The engineer is experimenting with a mixture of clay, laterite, rocks and other materials to solve this problem.

d.(U) Combat service support includes: Construction of buildings (two completed and a third begun) and transporting personnel and supplies.

(1) The base camp's permanent construction was started in June 1966. There have been a series of delays due to design and layout changes and the monsoon weather has been responsible for considerable loss

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

of construction time. The weather has not only delayed construction of buildings but has also delayed the construction of hard surface roads within the brigade base camp.

(2) The five ton bridge trucks of the bridge platoon have been used to haul supplies from Qui Nhon, troops from brigade base camp to forward operational areas and back, and for hauling ammunition to employed artillery batteries. This utilization is not an innovation in itself since the secondary mission of the bridge platoon is to ground its bridging and provide transportation support.

(C) 10.(C) TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT (U).

(C) General: Tactical air support was utilized by the brigade as indicated below:

a. Statistics:

			TYPE MSN			
PERIOD	MSN REQ	MSN FLOWN	AIR COVER	LZ PREP	SKY SPOT	FAC
10-31 May	46	46	3	30	7	6
1-30 Jun	181	166	0	22	95	49
1-31 Jul	192	160	0	4	95	62

b. Results: 61 KBA (BC), 80 KBA (POSS), and innumerable bunkers and huts destroyed.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Section 2

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Personnel: None.

2. (C) Operations:

<u>Tactical Control Measures</u>

<u>Item</u>: (C) System of establishing areas of operation.

<u>Discussion</u>: During PAUL REVERE I, the 3d Brigade Task Force operated in an AO roughly 57 kilometers wide (E-W) by 90 kilometers long (N-S), bounded on the west by the Cambodian border and on the east by Route 14. Sustanined operations within an AO of this size required an easily identifiable system for command and control and identification of helicopter landing zones.

<u>Observation</u>: The brigade AO was "checkerboarded" into 10,000 meter squares, with each square given a number and with landing zones within the square designated with a letter suffix (i.e., LZ 61G). Careful records were kept on coordinates and helicopter capacity of landing zones in order to facilitate future artillery preparations and combat assaults into previously used landing zones. Maneuver battalions were assigned missions within specifically numbered AOs, with boundary lines considered as fire coordination lines.

<u>Saturation Patrolling</u>

<u>Item</u>: (U) Saturation patrolling as a technique for finding and fixing the enemy.

<u>Discussion</u>: Saturation patrolling is the most expeditious and effective means of finding and fixing the enemy and accomplishing a search and destroy mission in a specified AO. To implement this technique, an infantry battalion base of operation, with supporting artillery and an appropriate security/reaction force, is centrally located in an AO. Rifle companies may occupy different bases of operation, from which platoon and squad patrols are dispatched. The positioning of the 4.2 inch mortar platoon in a company base of operation increases the patrol range as troops remain within range of indirect fire support. Platoons and squads may be airlifted into landing zones several thousand meters from the company or battalion base of operations to search assigned areas generally leading back to a base area or a pre-determined ambush site. A variation of this technique is to land separate elements of a company in several landing zones and have them converge on a common, selected location while searching the area of operation enroute. When rifle companies are issued two or

three days rations, disclosure of friendly unit locations is eliminated through the absence of resupply helicopters. There are many variations of this technique, all involving rapid movement and helicopter support. Centrally locating the battalion base of operations enables an infantry battalion to search and clear an area of approximately 144 square miles without moving its base or displacing the supporting artillery battery.

Observation: Saturation patrolling has certain disadvantages which should be noted. First, heliborne assaults require extensive artillery and air preparations on selected landing zones. This, in conjunction with the presence of large numbers of helicopters, definitely alerts the enemy to the intended area of operations. Secondly, the enemy can be expected to leave the area, hide, or move into prepared and advantageous positions to fight on his own terms.

Cross Country Movement

Item: (U) Cross country movement as a technique for finding and fixing the enemy.

Discussion: Cross country movement from one area of operations to another has certain advantages over the saturation patrolling technique, however, it is more time consuming. This technique requires the movement of rifle companies cross country from one area of operations to another. A forward battalion base of operation is secured by the units moving cross country; essential personnel and equipment are lifted into the new base of operation without the normal landing zone preparation and assault. Rifle companies are resupplied as necessary, or at predesignated times and locations. One variation of this technique requires the prepositioning of artillery to cover the intended area of operation. Subsequently, all rifle companies and the battalion forward command group move into the area of operation over multiple routes. Under conditions of good weather, air support can be substituted for artillery fire, thus increasing the operational radius of the battalion.

Observation: Cross country movement is extremely slow and difficult in most areas of South Vietnam. The helicopter permits positioning of troops and equipment to take advantage of the terrain as well as the enemy. Also, and most important, the helicopter permits rapid reaction against the enemy once he is located.

The enemy has observed and studied our tactics and techniques. After one has observed artillery preparations, air strikes, and large numbers of helicopters moving into an area, it is not difficult to determine what is taking place. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the enemy is becoming more difficult to find. In difficult terrain, he can avoid us with relative ease if we fail to vary our techniques.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Artillery and Mortar Firing

Item: (U) Technique employed for clearance and notification.

Discussion: Presently all firing units notify the brigade artillery liaison officer of all firing conducted within their area of operation. The brigade liaison officer then notifies the Air Force liaison officer and the Army Aviation representative who, in turn, notifies aircraft. If the firing is to take place outside of the unit's area of operation, the brigade liaison officer will then determine if the coordinates are clear to fire. The information given by units to the brigade liaison officer consists of the coordinates of target, time firing will start and stop, nature of target, and maximum ordinate.

Observation: This method has proven reliable during our present operations.

Interdiction Program

Item: (U) Nature of fires in interdiction program.

Discussion: This method employs a scheduled saturation of a particular area for a period of time rather than firing random concentrations throughout the entire area. These fires are coordinated at brigade by the Fire Support Element and utilize all available artillery and air.

Observation: The method provides flexibility, control and its results can be more accurately measured than those of the random method.

"Blocking Fires"

Item: (U) Pre-planned "Blocking Fires".

Discussion: When reports indicate heavily used trails leading into an area of operations, concentrations are planned to block the trails as an avenue of escape or reinforcement. Each time enemy contact is made, the general support and reinforcing artillery deliver "blocking fires" on the preplanned concentrations. Direct support artillery can also fire in support of these missions.

Observation: This method affords maximum utilization of available artillery in minimum time.

Counter-Mortar Fire

Item: (U) Need for rapid initiation of counter-mortar fire.

Discussion: Experience has shown that the initiation of counter-mortar fire will silence the enemy mortar attack, even if the coordinates of the enemy's mortar location are not precise.

Observation: When a friendly unit receives enemy mortar rounds, it is imperative that the direction from which the mortar rounds are being fired be sent to the firing battery immediately so that counter-mortar fire can begin immediately.

Marking Round

Item: (U) Marking round procedures.

Discussion: By firing an illumination round first in any mission requested by a ground or air observer, first round identification is facilitated and the safety of friendly personnel who may be in the area is enhanced.

Observation: For marking purposes, an illumination round with a low height of burst (100 or 200 meters) is usually more accurate and more easily recognized than a smoke round.

Engaging a Target

Item: (U) Procedures for engaging a target which is masked by a dense forest canopy.

Discussion: Forward observers must consider the height of the canopy when requesting a fire mission and request fuse delay when appropriate. An air observer firing a mission in a dense area can more easily identify the adjusting rounds if fuse VT is used. Fuse delay can then be fired for effect.

Observation: These procedures will help ensure accurate, rapid and effective engagement of the target.

Fire Missions

Item: (U) Fire missions within 200 meters of friendly troops.

Discussion: When a fire mission is to be adjusted within 200 meters of friendly troops, all pieces that will fire for effect are fired in adjustment. In this manner, the observer will know the pattern of all the rounds and can adjust them accordingly. To request this, the observer includes the information in his initial fire request; i.e., "close 200 meters, south".

Observation: This alerts the firing battery to the proximity of fires to friendly troops and will ensure their safety.

Artillery Accuracy

Item: (U) Improving the accuracy of artillery located in a landing zone.

Discussion: Although survey control is usually not available in landing zones, the accuracy of firing can be improved by survey being initiated from a prominent terrain feature. After a battery occupies a new position, a survey team is airlifted into the area, and the survey is conducted using available infantry personnel for security.

Observation: Prompt implementation of this technique will ensure the maximum accuracy possible in minimum time.

Firing Chart

Item: (U) Use of standard firing chart.

Discussion: The standard firing chart (scale 1:25,000) is not large enough to plot maximum range for the firing battery throughout 6400 mils. One method used is to orient the long axis of the chart in the direction where most of the firing is expected to occur. Then, in anticipation of firing at maximum range on the short axis, the grid lines on the firing chart are numbered for both 1:25,000 scale and 1:50,000 scale. This requires that the battery center be plotted for both scales. The use of color coding for each scale prevents confusion. In this manner when it becomes necessary to engage a target at a range that can not be plotted on the firing chart using a scale of 1:25,000, it can be plotted on the 1:50,000 scale.

Observation: This method has been found to be the most accurate and is current practice.

Graphic Firing Table Utilization

Item: (U) Firing chart and GFT utilization.

Discussion: When a fire mission is being adjusted on the gun-target line, firing data can be computed much faster by using the GFT for the computation rather than the firing chart and the GFT. Initial data is computed using the firing chart. Thereafter range corrections are applied directly to the GFT to determine quadrant elevation and deflection.

Observation: This method will increase efficiency when engaging targets.

Deflection Indices

Item: (U) Initial versus permanent deflection indices.

Discussion: Initial deflection indices become the permanent deflection indices on a firing chart that is used for 6400 mils. Total drift corrections can therefore be placed on the GFT and applied as appropriate.

Observation: Recent experience has shown that this situation and the described procedure are quite common.

Laying Howitzers

Item: (U) Laying howitzers by magnetic azimuth.

Discussion: In an area where no survey is available, a battery must lay by magnetic azimuth. To avoid variations in azimuth caused by the needle floating in the aiming circle, an orienting line is established when the battery is initially laid. Any subsequent checks can be made accurately by measuring azimuth from the established orienting line.

Observation: The necessity of an accurate orienting line cannot be over emphasized.

Minimum Elevation

Item: (U) Minimum elevation information.

Discussion: The battery executive officer and fire direction officer must have readily available to them the minimum elevation for each howitzer throughout 6400 mils. This then becomes a necessary reference for any firing, particularly at night.

Observation: Individual howitzers can be called out of action if necessary due to minimum elevation.

Firing Platforms

Item: (U) Need for field expedient construction of firing platforms.

Discussion: Some type of firing platform is necessary for the 105mm howitzer during the monsoon season. Without it, the wheels sink into the mud. As it becomes necessary to rotate the howitzer for firing throughout 6400 mils, it becomes unstable and mired. Satisfactory platforms have been made from pierced steel planking, lumber from ammunition

boxes or sheets of plywood. They have been constructed as one solid platform for both wheels, or a small platform for both wheels, or a small platform for the left wheel to pivot on and a circular track for the right wheel to move on. Each method has proven satisfactory.

Observation: Construction of a field expedient platform for the 105mm howitzer will increase its combat efficiency during periods of prolonged rain.

Locating Troops

Item: (U) Aerial location of friendly troops through a thick forest canopy.

Discussion: It is often impossible to visually identify friendly unit locations in heavily forested areas. Smoke grenades are also difficult to see. The most effective method found has been the use of hand flares and/or firing Vary pistol flares using the M79. By firing a hand flare or Vary pistol flare from each flank of the element, the area occupied can be readily identified from the air.

Observation: This procedure assists the air observer and FAC in adjustment of close-in artillery fires and close air strikes.

Marking Smoke

Item: Field expedient smoke for marking friendly locations.

Discussion: It has been found that the smoke generated by the trip flare M49A1 is sufficient to make it an adequate substitute for standard smoke grenades. It can be used for marking friendly unit locations.

Observation: Flare, Surface, Trip M49A1 can be used as a substitute for the standard smoke grenades.

Land Navigation for Armor Units

Item: (U) In dense woods or jungle, armored vehicle commanders have difficulty maintaining direction and orientation.

Discussion: Commanders of armored vehicles must make frequent turns when selecting a route of movement. They have experienced difficulty in maintaining direction and orientation. The use of the lensatic compass is not practical due to the mass of metal inherent to armored vehicles. This organization has been successful in directing armor commanders from an aircraft. To facilitate air identification, designation

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

symbols have been painted on the vehicle tops or rear decks. The use of cloth panels is impractical because the brush rips them from the vehicle, and they fade rapidly in the sun.

Observation: An observer in an aircraft can provide direction for armor units and thus reduce travel times from SP to destination.

Enemy Anti-tank Weapons

Item: (C) NVA AT weapons, RPG-2, 57mm RR and 75mm RR will penetrate the turret and hull of the M48A3 tank.

Discussion: The use of sand bags as a field expedient will decrease the effectiveness of the enemy HEAT weapons as well as absorb metal fragments from these weapons.

Observation: A tank which had sand bags on the front slope was hit by an RPG-2 round which caused no damage to the vehicle or crew.

Scout Vehicles

Item: (C) The majority of casualties from the scout vehicle crews are observers.

Discussion: The scout vehicle commander is protected by a prefabricated gun shield while the observer has no protection.

Observation: The gun shield for the track commander is effective in protecting him from enemy fire. The use of sand bags or an armor plate shield will reduce the casualty rate among the observer personnel.

3. (U) Training and Organization.

Grenade Training

Item: (U) Grenade training from prone position.

Discussion: Personnel engaged in jungle combat must be instructed in the proper techniques of throwing the hand grenade M-26 from the prone position while the individual's observation is restricted by the vegetation. Too often individuals have exposed themselves by rising to the kneeling position to throw a grenade.

Observation: Newly assigned personnel should receive instruction on how to throw grenades in dense vegetation from the prone position.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Zeroing of Weapons

Item: (U) Establishing weapons battlesight zero using field expedient method.

Discussion: The personnel attrition rate dictates frequent weapons firing to insure that each individual has the correct battlesight zero on his weapon.

Observation: This brigade has published a method that can be easily adopted by field commanders to conduct firing to establish battlesight zeros (Incl #3).

M-79

Item: (U) M-79 as indirect fire weapon.

Discussion: The M-79 Grenade Launcher has the capability of being employed as both a direct or an indirect fire weapon. The best method of utilization in a given situation is dictated by the terrain and vegetation. At present the Army training program for this weapon does not include the indirect role; hence the full capability of the weapon is not utilized. This additional role of the M-79 would in no way diminish the need for the 60mm and 81mm mortars.

Observation: Manuals and training directives are required that incorporate training guidance and techniques for use of the M-79 as an indirect fire weapon.

Light Observation Helicopters

Item: (U) Need for increase in LOH for the brigade.

Discussion: The Aviation Requirements for Combat Support of the Army concept is based on the support provided a brigade to come from the General Support Company of the division aviation battalion. Our experience has been that a brigade operating separately under the current TOE 7-42E, of necessity, should have six LOH.

Observation: An infantry brigade operating separately on a mission, is not adequately supported with just four LOH.

60mm Mortar

Item: (U) 60mm mortar versus 81mm mortar.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Discussion: There is a definite need for 60mm mortars in the rifle company. Although the 81mm mortar provides greater fire power, the weight of the weapon and its ammunition makes it impractical for offensive operations in the difficult terrain found in most of RVN. The 60mm mortar and its ammunition can be carried on cross-country operations without materially slowing down movement.

Observation: Consideration should be given to authorizing three 60mm mortars for each rifle company. The elements of this brigade have submitted requisitions for the 60mm mortars.

Command and Control Requirement

Item: (U) Need for a utility transport capability organic to the brigade.

Discussion: An organic utility transport capability is essential to meet the command and control requirements of the brigade. This requirement includes a communications system, readily available to the commander, and flight crews oriented to this function.

Observation: The optimum requirement for this function is seven HU-1D's. This provides one for the brigade commander, one for each maneuver battalion and two for maintenance down time.

OH-23G Radio

Item: (U) Need for OH-23G to be equipped with the new family of FM radios.

Discussion: The ARC-44, FM radio even after modification does not satisfactorily net with the new family of FM radios. This creates unnecessary problems especially when the OH-23G is used in a command and control role.

Observation: The OH-23G should be equipped with the new family of FM radios.

4. (C) Intelligence.

Enemy Tactics

Item: (C) Establishing decoys against friendly pursuit elements.

Discussion: During late May 1966, elements of the 3d Brigade Task Force made contact with regimental size NVA forces (66th and 33d). After sustaining heavy losses, the NVA units elected to break contact

and exfiltrate to safe areas. Friendly forces, in an attempt to regain contact, began aggressive pursuit actions with company and platoon size elements along suspected routes of enemy withdrawal. Over a period of three to five days, contact was made with small NVA elements (usually five or six men). These elements would open fire, causing friendly forces to deploy and would then withdraw in a direction not compatible with originally intended routes of the friendly forces. The immediate reaction of friendly forces was to pursue these small enemy elements.

Observation: In retrospect, it is believed that these small enemy elements were, in fact, decoy forces positioned along major withdrawal routes. The mission of these forces was to await the arrival of main enemy elements in the area.

Item: (C) Border bait and lure.

Discussion: During most of Operation PAUL REVERE I, at least one battalion of the 3d Brigade Task Force was deployed along the Cambodian border in a surveillance posture, vicinity the Chu Pong Mountain and Ia Drang River. The mission dictated the establishment of small observation posts, listening posts and small unit patrolling (squad and platoon size). Periods of total inactivity were experienced, followed by a gradual increase in sightings and finally an engagement with large enemy forces. This was characterized by pursuit of a reinforced squad to platoon size NVA force by friendly elements into areas near the Cambodian border, where company to battalion size enemy forces were located in fortified positions. This resulted in friendly elements fighting on the enemy's terms with no maneuver room, due to either terrain or proximity to the Cambodian border, or a combination of both.

Observation: This tactic was moderately successful, but proved costly to the enemy. It definitely precluded friendly forces from defeating the enemy in detail.

Utilization of IPW Teams

Item: (U) Prior to Operation PAUL REVERE I, the attachment of IPW Teams to battalion level was SOP. While this procedure enabled the battalion to have a trained capability, it left the brigade with limited resources during periods when more than one prisoner was in the brigade POW facility.

Discussion: In analyzing an infantry battalion's inherent capability to interrogate, it was apparent that with interpreters available (each battalion had an equal share of the brigade's available resource) interrogation for information of immediate tactical exploitation could be accomplished at battalion level without the IPW Team

being present. This is accomplished by the company commander, battalion S2 and battalion commander. Therefore, it was decided to pool the IPW resources at brigade level for more flexibility.

Observations: The advantages have been:

Faster evacuation of POWs to brigade after the battalion obtains tactical information.

The IPW capability at the brigade POW facility is increased and more prisoners can be interrogated on a sustained basis.

IPW Teams can still be dispatched to battalion areas, if necessary, on a specific mission basis.

Documents Translation

Item: (U) During periods when the brigade is engaged with enemy elements of company or larger size, the organic resources for document translation are not sufficient to handle the work load.

Discussion: During portions of Operations LINCOLN, GARFIELD and initial stages of PAUL REVERE I, document translation teams were made available by I FFORCEV to support the brigade. The value of these teams was readily apparent. The organic MI Detachment was recently provided personnel to form a document team consisting of two Vietnamese linguists (US).

Observation: An increase in strength to further augment the brigade's document translation capability during those periods when enemy contact is light, cannot be justified. As long as this capability can be provided on an "as needed" basis for brigades on separate missions, there will be no significant deficiency in the overall intelligence processing cycle.

Terrain Information and Trafficability Maps

Item: (U) Terrain information and trafficability maps must be compiled by each control headquarters.

Discussion: The non-availability of trafficability maps and the need to constantly up-date terrain information on tactical maps has dictated a centralized recording system within the brigade. This keeps the area of operations overlay current with pertinent information such as new trails, conditions of old trails, fords, enemy positions, and trafficability conditions.

Observation: Current information regarding terrain and possible or known enemy locations assist operations.

5. (U) Logistics.

Mess Operations

Item: (U) Battalion mess operations in the trains area.

Discussion: The kitchens in the trains area of the brigade forward base of operation must supply A, modified B or B rations to personnel in the trains area three times a day and to the forward areas of the battalion once a day. By consolidating the unit mess teams, better support of all elements was achieved. One team prepared food for all of the trains personnel. One team prepared and packaged the hot meal for all forward elements. One team baked in the evening for both the forward units and the trains personnel. The fourth team remained in the brigade base camp and prepared rations for all stay-back personnel. The unit loading officer controls the dispatch of the prepared food.

Observation: Consolidating mess operations in the trains area provides for efficient preparation and distribution of food and the most effective utilization of personnel.

Supply Back Up

Item: (U) Special precautions during the monsoon season.

Discussion: As a precaution against the weather preventing air resupply, infantry companies maintain a three day supply of extra ammunition, C-rations and water in their base of operation.

Observation: This is a necessary procedure during the monsoon season.

Field Maintenance

Item: (U) Field expedient maintenance of panoramic telescopes.

Discussion: During the monsoon season a maintenance problem developed on the panoramic telescopes which was caused by moisture condensing on the lenses. Sealer compound was not available at ordnance to make an air tight seal, so a field expedient was devised. This consisted of a metal fuse box in which wires were strung and arranged in such a manner that a panoramic telescope could be suspended in the middle. The fuse box was then placed across a small trench in which a fire was started. After about thirty to forty minutes, this "hot box" effectively dried the lenses.

Observation: This is strictly a field expedient method, but it will keep the telescope from becoming unserviceable.

Aiming Post Lights

Item: (U) Night lighting devices on the aiming posts.

Discussion: The night lighting devices on the aiming posts are designed to be turned on individually. To preclude individuals from running to the aiming posts at night to turn on the lights for each fire mission or leaving the lights on continuously, a system of remoting the light switch to the howitzer can be easily arranged. Ordinary communication wire is attached to the lights at the aiming post. This is connected to a switch and the power source (BA 200) at the howitzer. A refinement of this procedure is to include a rheostat for adjusting the intensity of the light.

Observation: This method ensures light discipline at night and a more rapid engagement of a target.

Substitute M-14 Light Bulb

Item: (U) An adequate substitute for the M-14 light bulb.

Discussion: M-14 light bulbs are used as lights on aiming posts. The light bulb from the claymore mine tester has been found to be a satisfactory substitute.

Observation: Knowledge of this fact increases supply flexibility in the field.

Antenna AT892/PRC

Item: (U) Experience with antenna AT892/PRC for the PRC/25.

Discussion: The antenna AT892/PRC becomes easily unscrewed as the RTO moves through the dense vegetation. Another problem has been the antenna base breaking.

Observation: A field solution to this problem has been to tie the antenna to the radio set using nylon cord.

S5 Equipment

Item: (U) Need for equipment in S5 Section.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Discussion: To accomplish his mission, the S5 has been using personnel and borrowed equipment such as clerical equipment, tape recorder, tapes, cameras, film and motion picture gear.

Observation: These items should be included as standard equipment for a brigade S5 section.

SB-86

Item: (U) Limitations of standard tactical switchboard, SB-86.

Discussion: It has been found that the Standard Tactical Switchboard SB-86 will not suffice for use at brigade level. The volume of traffic flowing through it daily is so great that a high degree of breakdown occurs in line packs (TA-208) and stacks (TA-207). It is also more desirable to have a switchboard that uses light indicators rather than mechanical drops for a brigade base camp telephone system.

Observation: These experiences should be taken into consideration in any future study of tactical switchboards.

PRC/25

Item: (U) Experience with handset H-138 for the PRC/25.

Discussion: The handset H-138 has been a constant breakdown item. Either the handset itself cracked and broke off just below the receiver element or the wires are pulled out from the recepticle.

Observation: A sturdier handset should be developed or an extra allowance should be authorized maneuver battalions.

Illumination

Item: (U) Command detonated illumination.

Discussion: There is a need for a simple command detonated (electrically and/or manually) illumination capability that can be set up and dismantled rapidly in the dark under all weather conditions. Accidental detonation of current trip flares presents a definite tactical hazard.

Observation: A requirement exists for a simple electrical or manually detonated, easily erected and disassembled command illumination system.

Trip Flare M49A1

Item: (U) Insufficient trip wire for Flare, Surface, Trip M49A1.

Discussion: Experience has proven that the amount of trip wire provided in the cases of Flare, Surface Trip M49A1 is insufficient for the quantity of flares contained. This shortage is further complicated when flares must be removed, wire retrieved and set up in new locations. Some wire is inevitably lost in the process.

Observation: An increase in the amount of wire per case of flares should be made available for this purpose.

Blasting Cap M18A1

Item: (U) Blasting Cap Assembly M18A1 Antipersonnel Mine (Claymore).

Discussion: The wire and connections of the blasting cap assembly of the M18A1 antipersonnel mine have proven particularly susceptible to damage caused by repeated emplacements and removals and the effects of weather. When this occurs, the mine is lost to the using troops. Repair by inexperienced personnel is a safety risk.

Observation: Provision for extra replacement blasting cap assemblies would cut down on the number of mines turned in to Class V supply channels for maintenance and re-issue.

Ammunition Containers

Item: (U) M-60 machine gun ammunition containers are unsatisfactory.

Discussion: Present carboard and cloth containers for the linked 7.62mm machine gun ammunition are unsatisfactory, especially during the rainy season. These containers disintegrate rapidly forcing the men to carry the ammunition in belts slung around their shoulders. The belts get rusty and dirty causing the M-60 to malfunction.

Observation: The linked 7.62mm ammunition should be packed in a plastic waterproof container.

Chain Saws

Item: (U) Need for gasoline powered chain saws.

Discussion: During the monsoon season in the central highlands, the water table rises virtually to the surface of the ground. This causes difficulties in constructing defensive positions, as well as health and sanitation problems. Any holes dug as sumps, latrines, or fox holes immediately fill with water, creating breeding areas for mosquitos. Defensive positions must be constructed above ground using sand bags and logs.

Observation: Gasoline powered chain saws should be included as a standard item in the rifle company's pioneer set.

River Crossings

Item: (U) Problems in crossing swollen rivers.

Discussion: Streams become definite obstacles to foot troops after four to five days of constant rainfall. The major rivers in the area, such as the Ia Drang and Ia Meur, become virtually impassable at times, or at best passable with considerable risk.

Observation: 120 foot climbing ropes, 12 foot survival ropes and snap links should be distributed down to rifle squad level.

Generators

Item: (U) The 4.2 KW generator authorized as a component of the Track Command Post M-577 is used extensively during combat operations in Vietnam.

Discussion: The repair parts for the 4.2 KW generator were based on demand data generated outside RVN. For the past 5 months the generators for the operations and intelligence vehicles have operated an average of 8 hours a day. Repair parts, particularly replacement engines are not available in the supply system at this time.

Observation: Support agencies must stock repair parts for this piece of equipment based on demand data generated by like units incountry.

Mermite Food Containers

Item (U) Additional mermite food containers.

Discussion: This brigade has a policy to feed a hot meal daily to units in forward areas. Mermite food containers are used for this purpose. Resupply in the field is effected by helicopters which are dependent upon favorable weather conditions. When helicopters are unable to pick up empty mermites the following morning, there is insufficient time to permit cleaning and refilling for the subsequent meal. Hence, the hot meal cannot be sent to the field. C ration meals are then consumed and the hot meal is wasted.

Observation: Each maneuver battalion should be given a double issue of mermite food containers. The flexibility thus gained will ensure that the daily feeding of a hot meal is not dependent upon the return of the mermites from the previous evening meal.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Armor Repair Parts

Item: (U) Enemy mines have caused suspension damage to many tracked vehicles. These vehicles, particularly tanks have not always been immediately repairable due to shortage of suspension parts.

Discussion: The normal enemy mine will cause damage that will require replacement of six road wheels, three road wheel hubs with bearings, two road wheel housings, one road wheel arm, and eight track blocks to effect repairs. The repaired vehicle will experience future problems with the suspension system. The track life will be cut to approximately one half that normally expected.

Observation: Armor units deploying to RVN should have suspension parts stockage based on the demand experience of this battalion.

Historical Activities

Item: (U) Collection of historical items.

Discussion: Fluid combat operations dictate a requirement for a system that provides a complete and detailed accounting or recording of operations for historical purposes. This system should include data on unit locations, activities, and aspects of major contacts. The strength authorization for the brigade S3 section dictates that an officer perform in this capacity as an additional duty.

Observation: The daily staff log, supplemented by excerpts from the SITREP provides the basis for the historical data. In addition, a daily log is maintained of locations within the AO and dates occupied by units of the brigade. Lastly a staff officer is dispatched post haste to any element that has undergone a heavy contact to gather first hand all pertinent material, eye witness statements, ground locations, disposition of forces, etc, from which a detailed report is prepared.

VHF System

Item: (U) VHF system using delta band.

Discussion: A line-of-sight condition is necessary for a good VHF system using delta band. Experience has shown that it is best to use this band only for short, line-of-sight systems.

Observation: There is less chance of interference with FM or other VHF frequencies when delta band is used for this purpose.

AVDC-C-OP 15 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Section 2

Part II, Recommendations

Recommend the observations noted in Part I, Section 2 above, be considered appropriate.

GLENN D. WALKER
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

3 Incl:

1 - Schematic of the Area of Operation PAUL REVERE I
2 - Statistical Summary of Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses
3 - Battlesight Zero - M16E1 Rifle

Distribution:

ACSFOR, DA	3
CINCUSARPAC	1
DCG, USARV	3
CG, IFFV	1
CG, 1st ACD	1
CG, 25th Inf Div	1
1/14	1
1/35	1
2/35	1
1/69	1
2/9	1
3d Spt Bn (Prov)	1
3d Bn, 1st Cav Regt (CRID)	1
D/65	1
CG	1
S1	1
S2	1
S4	1
S5	1

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



3 Incl:
~~Tab A: Density of Operation Within AO - May~~
Tab B: Density of Operation Within AO - June
Tab C: Density of Operation Within AO - July

Inclosure #1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Schematic of the Area of Operation PAUL RE

Density of Operations in Area of Operation May 9

1	31 May 2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
	28-31 May	25-31 May						
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
					10-24 May 30 May			
17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	
		21-31 May	15-20 May	11-14 May	10-15 May 25-31 May			
25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	
		22-31 May	22-24 May	17-25 May	11-16 May			
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	
			18-19 May 22-26 May	15-19 May 26-29 May	11-17 May			
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	
			20-21 May 23-25 May	22-25 May				
49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	
Tab A								
57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Schematic [illegible] the Area of Operation PAUL REVERE I
Density of Operations in Area of Operation Jun 1966

1	1-3 Jun 2	[illegible]-9 Jun 8 Jun 3	4	5	6		
9	1-7 Jun 10	1-6 Jun 11	4 Jun 8-9 Jun 12	8 Jun 13	14	15	16
17	2-4 Jun 6 Jun 18	4-7 Jun 19-26 Jun 19	20	21	9-21 Jun 27 Jun 22	23	24
25	26	1-30 Jun 27	11-15 Jun 28	11-15 Jun 29	1-2 Jun 21 Jun 24 Jun 27-30 Jun 30	31	32
33	34	1-30 Jun 35	36	11-15 Jun 37	38	39	40
41	42	21-22 Jun 43	21-22 Jun 44	45	46	47	48
49	50	20-21 Jun 51	16-30 Jun 52	23-27 Jun 53	26-28 Jun 54	55	56
57	58	59	60	61	29-30 Jun 62	63	64

Tab B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

JULY

Schematic of the Area of Operation PAUL REVERE I

Density of Operations in Area of Operation Jul 1966

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	11 Jul 13 Jul 10	9-13 Jul 18 Jul 11	12	13	14	6-12 Jul 27-31 Jul 15	16
17	18	1-9 Jul 19	18-21 Jul 20	13-17 Jul 31 Jul 21	12 Jul 27 Jul 22	23	24
25	26	6-31 Jul 27	3-7 Jul 28	17 Jul 26 Jul 29	1-5 Jul 30	31	32
33	34	1-31 Jul 35	3-5 Jul 28-31 Jul 36	28-31 Jul 37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48
49	50	51	18-21 Jul 52	53	54	55	56
Tab A 57	58	59	60	21-27 Jul 61	1-3 Jul 62	63	64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Statistical Summary f Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses (U)

a. (C) Personnel:

(1)	KIA (BC)	546
(2)	KIA (POSS)	891
(3)	WIA (BC)	135
(4)	WIA (POSS)	470
(5)	CIA	99
(6)	RETURNEES	9
	TOTAL	2,150

b. (U) Weapons:

(1)	Small arms	135
(2)	Automatic	89
(3)	Crew served	17
	TOTAL	241

c. (U) Other equipment:

(1) Ammunition:

(a)	Small arms	13,158 rds
(b)	12.7mm	1,942 rds
(c)	HMG	600 rds
(d)	TNT	325 lbs
(e)	Grenades	289
(f)	75mm RR	80 rds
(g)	57mm RR	9 rds
(h)	B40 rkts	20 rds
(i)	81/82mm mortars	152 rds
(j)	60mm mortars	70 rds

Inclosure #2

(2) Chicom radios: 3 ea

(3) Chicom telephone: 4 ea

(4) Rice: 15,063 kilos

Battlesight Zero - M16E1 Rifle

The battlesight zero for the M16E1 Rifle is 250 meters. To establish the battlesight zero on your rifle, pace off a 25 meter range (approximately 33 paces) select a suitable target surface (a "C" ration box or ammunition box) draw a bull's eye the size of the one below on the target surface, take up a good supported firing position, align your sights, aim with the front sight centered in the notched out portion of the bull's eye and the bull's eye sitting on the rear sight, and carefully squeeze off three shots. If the center of the three round shot group is not at the X, as indicated in the diagram below, adjust your sights to bring it on the X and fire a confirming three rounds. Your squad leader will assist you if you need help adjusting your sights. GUARANTEED TO BRING DOWN "CHARLIE", THE NEXT TIME YOU GET HIM IN YOUR SIGHTS.



Incl 3