

Based on these requirements, the Party's **Programme of action** put forth itemized claims for workers, peasants and soldiers. It was approved by the Communist International in 1932.

In 1931-1932, our Party also waged the struggle against erroneous political tendencies. First of all, the struggle against the revolutionary line of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party in the Hoa Lo prison in Hanoi (1931). The leaders of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party jailed there bitterly criticized our Party's revolutionary line and opposed the « Programme on the national democratic revolution » of our Party. Our comrades detained in the prisons of Hanoi and Poulo-Condor, used illegal newspapers to contend with the leaders of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party and defend the Party's revolutionary line and its methods of mobilizing and leading the struggle of the masses to win the practical daily rights leading to the insurrection to seize power. At the same time they brought out the errors of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party in the doctrine of Three People's Principles, in the theory of « National existence », in the bourgeois democratic viewpoint, etc. These discussions brought victory for the Party's line and policies, and won the agreement of many prisoners who were not yet communists and of a number of left-wing members of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party. After these discussions the differentiation within the Viet Nam Nationalist Party became more clearly evident.

A number of radical members of the Viet Nam Nationalist Party passed over to our side; others became inactive, resigned to their lot, while a number of reactionaries worked in the service of the imperialists.

In 1932-1933, a number of Party members availed themselves of the legal newspapers to debate on « materialism or idealism », and struggle against Phan Khoi's ideology, a kind of defeatist and shame-

less ideology which denied the revolutionary potentiality of the Vietnamese people. Though limited because it was confined in the framework of the legal newspapers, this struggle won victory and exerted to some extent an effective influence for Marxism among the population.

In 1935, a number of the Party members opened a debate in the legal newspapers on the problem « art for art's sake or art for life's sake » in order to struggle against the bourgeois viewpoint of pure art divorced from the masses. This polemic also exerted a good influence among the intellectuals and youth in the towns.

These polemics defeated the ideas of compromise and reformism, pessimistic and hopeless thinking, and the political and artistic viewpoints of the bourgeoisie. They consolidated the confidence of the Party members and revolutionary masses in Marxism-Leninism and in the only correct revolutionary line.

During the period of low ebb, the great part of the Party members were jailed, but they never ceased struggling. In the prisons they organized Party cells to disseminate the Party's line and policies, continually led the struggles for the improvement of their living conditions, combined or connected their struggle with the revolutionary movement of the masses on the outside, and protested against the French imperialists' ruthless policy. Moreover, the Vietnamese Communists transformed the prisons into revolutionary schools. It was thanks to the courses of theoretical study, the discussions on questions of the day, on policies, and the educational classes in the prisons, that the communists in jail could raise their own theoretical, political and cultural level and improve themselves in order to become the Party's activists later on.

From the end of 1931 to the first half of 1932, the mass movement subsided. But from the middle of

1932 onwards, it began to recover gradually. Workers' struggles broke out again, first of all in South Viet Nam where workers in many enterprises went on strike (those at the Testalin printing-house, the women workers of the towel-mill, the rickshaw men in Saigon, the workers of the Dau Tieng plantation, etc.). Noteworthy was the demonstration against famine of thousands of peasants flocking from Ha Tien to Saigon in 1932. The struggle gradually extended, including people of all walks of life: workers, peasants, small traders, owners of small industrial concerns and even national minorities in the Western highlands (Central Viet Nam), in Cao Bang and Lang Son provinces. The movement extended to Cambodia and Laos. The restoration of the movement of the masses was due mainly to the close link between the Party members and the masses, their care of the people's livelihood, and Party leadership in the people's struggle for daily rights and interests.

From the end of 1932, after their return, the Party members from abroad created the Party's primary organizations on the border areas of Indochina and in the mass national minorities. Those in activity outside the prisons together with those released from prisons made full use of the legal and semi-legal means, used the general forms of mass organization, such as the Associations for mutual aid in case of death or marriage, for rice-transplanting, harvesting, roofing houses, football associations, reading-rooms, etc., to re-create the Party's primary organizations. However, a number of localities, instead of bringing into effect the above-mentioned tactic in the period of low ebb, still used such forms as distribution of leaflets, sticking up bills, hoisting red flags, thus showing their force, and creating for the enemy the opportunity to repress and terrorize, so that the Party's primary organizations newly restored there, were destroyed once again.

During this period, a number of comrades knew how to utilize the legal means to publish newspapers and books, disseminate the Party's policies, participate in the election of the Saigon Municipal Council, and winning victories, skilfully availing themselves of the debate during the election to disseminate the Party's minimum programme and educate the masses. But it is to be regretted that some errors were committed. Some comrades, lacking principle, co-operated with the Trotskyites who utilized this co-operation to influence the masses and win over a number of our sympathizers in South Viet Nam. Moreover, this co-operation sowed confusion among the masses, so that they could not see the sabotaging and anti-revolutionary nature of the Trotskyites, could not differentiate between the latter and the communists, could not distinguish the true from the false.

The struggle to restore the movement in the years 1932-1935 was mainly due to our Party's and people's subjective effort, but it was also partly due to the help of the Communist International, especially that of the French and Chinese Communist Parties.

The French Communists strenuously struggled against the French imperialists' blood-thirsty policy. In the Parliament, in the newspapers, everywhere, the French Communists protested against the repression of the revolution in Yen Bai, Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces by the French colonialists. The French Communist Party also led the French workers and working people to combine their struggle with the Vietnamese people. These acts, imbued with proletarian international spirit, encouraged the Vietnamese people very much.

During the years of low ebb, the Chinese Communist Party always followed the Vietnamese revolution and strove by every means to help the Vietnamese revolutionary movement to recover. The letter sent by the Chinese Communist Party to the Indochinese Communist Party in 1934 said: «For

many years the Chinese and Indochinese Communist Parties have had close connection because of the brotherly love in the struggle against the common enemy »...

In that period, the Soviet Communist Party trained many leading cadres for our Party. Comrades Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap and many others were trained in the Soviet Union, and they returned to China and France, seeking means to contact the comrades at home to restore the movement.

According to the policy of the Communist International, in early 1934, the Overseas Leading Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party was officially founded in Macao (China), headed by Comrade Le Hong Phong. Its task was to unify the Party's organization in the country, train leading cadres and prepare for the first Congress of the Party. It published the **Bolshevik** to criticize the errors and guide the mass movement at home and practically did the task of a Provisional Central Executive Committee of the Party.

The first Congress was held from March 27 to March 31, 1935, in Macao. Ten comrades, representing the Party's organizations in Viet Nam and Laos, attended it.

The Congress adopted the following lines of action:

1 — To consolidate and develop the Party, strengthen its forces by developing the Party membership in the enterprises, plantations, along the communication lines and in the enemy's army, by increasing the number of élite Party members in the Party's leading organs and of reserve cadres for these organs.

2 — To win over broad masses, especially to pay attention to the national minorities, women, soldiers in the enemy ranks, foreign residents, and to build and consolidate the Communist Youth Association, Red Trade Union, Red Peasants' Association, Red

Assistance and Self-Defence Unit ; to found the Anti-Imperialist Unified Front. To utilize all the legal and semi-legal forms in our activity.

3—To struggle against imperialist wars, to support the Soviet Union and Soviet China. To make our people consider these problems as those related to their own rights and interests.

The Congress elected the Party Central Executive Committee comprising nine comrades, among them Comrades Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap, and Phung Chi Kien.

The Party Congress in Macao as well as the activities of the Overseas Leading Committee succeeded in unifying the Party's organizational system and the Viet Nam revolutionary movement under the leadership of the new Central Executive Committee. The Congress resolutions brought confidence to the Party members and revolutionary masses in the country, and prepared the conditions for the Indochinese revolutionary movement to rise to a new, higher and stronger stage.

The shortcoming of the Congress was its failure to clearly analyse the fascist danger all over the world, the urgent task to safeguard world peace, struggle against fascism, war and colonial reactionaries, and urge for democratic freedoms, and improvement of livelihood, etc.

**THE PARTY FOUNDED THE INDOCHINESE
DEMOCRATIC FRONT AGAINST FASCISM AND
WAR, AGAINST COLONIAL REACTIONARIES,
FOR FREEDOM, FOOD, CLOTHES, AND PEACE
(1936-1939)**

The economic crisis in 1929-1933 and the distressed situation following it in the capitalist countries made the existing contradictions in the capitalist system more acute. A number of imperialist countries which could no longer maintain their domination by the parliamentary democratic regime established open dictatorship of the most reactionary, chauvinist and imperialist elements of capitalist financiers. They aimed at high handedly repressing the revolutionary movement in the country, unloading the heavy weight of the crisis on the working people's shoulders, provoking the war to redivide the world market, and attack the Soviet Union, the citadel of the world revolution. Two hotbeds of war began to be kindled in Europe (Germany) and Asia (Japan).

Faced with this situation, in July 1935, the Communist International held the seventh Congress in Moscow. In its resolution as well as in Dimitroff's report to the Congress, the Communist International assessed that the most dangerous immediate enemy of the world's people was not imperialism in general but the fascist imperialists; the task of the international working class was to unify their own ranks

and found a broad front with the other classes and strata of people in order to struggle against fascism and war.

The Communist International's resolution had a deep, wide and strong echo throughout the world. Fascism developed, but the movement against fascism and war was also rising. The Spanish Popular Front, the Anti-Japanese Unified National Front in China and particularly the French Popular Front had a great influence on Indochina. On May 3, 1936, the French Popular Front won a resounding victory in the general elections in France, and afterwards a government of the Popular Front came to power in France. This event greatly encouraged the peoples in the French colonies.

In Indochina, it was due to the consequences of the economic crisis and of the French imperialists' policy of repression and deceit that the various strata of people, including the national bourgeoisie and the democratic prominent personalities, could hardly breathe, and hoped for necessary democratic changes.

In this situation, the Central Committee held a Session in July 1936, convened by Comrade Le Hong Phong. Basing itself on the resolution of the seventh Congress of the Communist International and starting from the concrete conditions of Viet Nam at that time, the Session temporarily decided not to put forth the slogans « To defeat French imperialists » and « To requisition the landlords' land and distribute it to the peasants ». It advocated the founding of the broad « Anti-Imperialist People's Front » * « embracing all classes, political parties and religious organizations, and nationalities in Indochina, in order to struggle together for elementary democratic rights: freedom of association, of organization, of speech, of publication, of movement, and of travel

* Afterwards it was changed into « The Indochinese Democratic United Front ».

abroad, general amnesty for political prisoners, eight-hour work-day, labour law for workers, enlargement of economic and financial services, colonial councils, Chambers of People's representatives:» *

The Session stressed: to enable the Front to have a broad mass basis, the forms of mass organization must be changed to legal and semi-legal ways; we have to make full use of the legal and semi-legal means to educate the masses, creating a strong movement of struggle to gain democratic rights.

While struggling legally, the Party had to consolidate its own illegal organization, and carry on its illegal work; in the mass organizations the Party had to pay attention to the admission of new Party members, etc.

The Session criticized the «leftist» and conservative ideas which paid attention to the illegal work only, and protested against the legal work, which only took into account the worker and peasant masses, and were unwilling to co-operate broadly with the allied forces, the revolutionary national and reformist national parties. But on the other hand, it also took precautions against rightist tendencies: not to educate the Party members and masses on the revolutionary aim that is to liberate Indochina from imperialist yoke and wipe out every feudal vestige in Indochina; to give up class stand; to hinder the workers in their struggle against the bourgeoisie and the peasants in their struggle against the landlords, etc.

The Central Session held on July 1936 had an important significance; it opened a new period of development for the Vietnamese revolution. Its correct resolutions amended those of the first Party Congress. From this Central Session, our Party brought into play a flexible strategy, broadly winning over the

* Excerpt from the document «Around the Indochinese Communist Party's New Policy» published on October 30, 1936.

allies, however small and wavering, to struggle together temporarily against the colonial reactionaries, and utilize all legal and semi-legal means to make propaganda, educate the masses, and launch them in struggle. If in the 1930-1931 upsurge attention was devoted to the agitation of only workers and peasants by our Party, now, beside the workers and peasants who are the basic revolutionary forces, the Party also won over broad allied forces to set up a front. If in the 1930-1931 upsurge only illegal forms of struggle were used, now, our Party skilfully used the legal and semi-legal forms of struggle and combined the illegal with the legal work. This showed that our Party had developed a step further.

In this period, Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc was in China. Relying on the Communist International's resolutions and basing himself on the documents printed in the legal newspapers published in the country, he sent letters to the Party. His leading ideas were composed of the following points:

1. At present the Party (i.e. the Indochinese Communist Party) should not put forth too high claims (independence, Chamber of Deputies, etc.). To do so is to fall into the Japanese fascists' trap. The Party must lay claim to the democratic rights, freedom of organization and meeting, freedom of press and speech, general amnesty of political prisoners, and struggle for the legality of the Party.
 2. To achieve these aims, the Party must strive to organize a broad national democratic front. Not only should this front be composed of Vietnamese but also of progressive French, not only must it include various strata of working people but also the national bourgeoisie.
- Owing to the Party's correct line of action, the mass movement grew very strongly. Opening the

Excerpt from Nguyen Ai Quoc's letter to the Communist International 1939.

democratic movement was the agitation for the organization of the Indochinese Congress in Autumn 1936. On the one hand, the Party constantly made appeals to the parties, political organizations, and classes to combine their action; and on the other, the Party mobilized the masses, organized meetings, handled petitions, and claimed democratic freedoms. The movement extended from towns to countryside; from South Viet Nam it spread to the whole country. 600 Committees of action were set up in South Viet Nam alone. In North and Central Viet Nam, the movement also soared to new heights. At that time, the imperialists' lackeys plotted to turn the movement in another direction, but they met with an energetic opposition from the masses.

Faced with the strong development of the mass movement in Indochina and the resounding victory of the French Popular Front in the general elections of May 1936, the French rulers were obliged to yield. The government of the French Popular Front was in power for some months when, under the pressure of the strong movement of struggle of the French and Indochinese peoples, it had to decree the shortening of working days for workers, to grant the workers paid annual holidays, amnesty of the political prisoners in Indochina, etc. But on the other side, it connived at the colonial reactionaries who dissolved the Committees of action.

The Indochinese Congress was forbidden, but the mass movement, far from dying, developed further. In Autumn-Winter 1936, owing to the amnesty from the Government of the French Popular Front, thousands of political prisoners in Indochina were released including on this occasion many Party leading cadres. Our Party had thus more cadres to work among the masses, and lead the mass movement.

At the end of 1936 and in 1937, there was in Indochina a mass upsurge demanding the improvement of living standards, democratic freedoms, freedom to

set up trade unions, decrease of poll-tax and other taxes, etc. From August 15, 1936 to January 15, 1937, there were in Indochina 339 mass struggles with 62,620 participants, which included 242 strikes of 54,625 workers in industrial or handicraft enterprises. The most important struggles were the general strikes of Hongay and Campha miners and that of Ba Son workers (Saigon). In 1937 there were nearly 400 strikes, the most important being the general strike of railwaymen. At the same time, there were hundreds of demonstrations by the peasants and the various strata of people. In the same year, the Party utilized the reception to the Investigation Commission of the French Popular Front government headed by Justin Godard, and the reception to the new Governor General Brévié in Indochina, to gather thousands of people from all over the country to demand the carrying out of democratic reforms, etc. These receptions were in fact mass mobilizations on a large scale, and were a terror to the French rulers in Indochina. They tried by every means to stop the movement but in vain.

While the movement was soaring, the Central Executive Committee held a Session in March 1937. The Session stressed that every legal means should be made wide use of, the forms of organization to be mobile and suited to the circumstances; not too rigorous. It was decided to dissolve the trade union and the peasant's Association, and found the Assistance Society, and Friendly Society; to dissolve the Communist Youth Association, and found the Indochinese Democratic Youth Association*; to dissolve the Red Assistance and replace it by the Popular

* In the movement, the forms of mass organizations in general, the Youth Organizations in particular, were very flexible. In some places the « Vanguard Youth Associations », and in others the « Democratic Youth Associations » were organized. But the name « Indochinese Democratic Youth Association » was more generalized.

Assistance Society. The Session decided that «every situation must be utilized to organize all the mass associations under legal or semi-legal forms. Where the Popular Front could not yet be founded..., Democratic Fronts, Committees of Joint actions or Committees of Support for French Popular Front could be founded according to the local situation...» *

After the Session of the Central Committee in March 1937, the mass movement took a further step forward. The primary Party organizations and mass bases were strongly consolidated and developed. Party leadership at all levels was reinforced, membership increased. By March 1938 the Party membership had increased by 60 per cent. Concerning the mass organizations, in the towns friendly organizations of workers, small traders and owners of small industrial concerns were founded everywhere; sports and physical training Associations, and reading Societies were also organized on a large scale. In the countryside, the various forms of mass organization were widely and rapidly developed: harvesting teams, rice-transplanting teams, teams for roofing houses, burial societies, hunting clubs, feasting societies during the New Lunar Year Festival, mutual assistance associations, tontines, etc. These multi-form organizations gathered broad masses under the Party's leadership. On the Party's initiative, «the Association for the Popularization of National script» was founded and rapidly developed; the movement against illiteracy became an organized mass movement.

Parallel with the development of people's organizations, struggles successively broke out putting forth more practical and concrete slogans. The workers struggled for the increase of wages, implementation

* Excerpt from the communiqué of the Central Committee on March 20, 1937.

of labour laws, and freedom to set up trade unions *; the peasants struggled for the decrease of poll-tax and other taxes, against new taxes, appropriation of land, corvee, etc. Many struggles resulted in great victories. Besides the struggles for economic interests, there were the important political struggles, (such as the general strike of the railway workers in 1937) which had an influence all over the country.

The Party thoroughly utilized the legal books and newspapers as weapons for its struggle. **Dan Chung** (People's Mass), Party's central organ, **Tin Tuc** (News) and many other newspapers of the Party and Democratic Youth Association, either written in Vietnamese or in French language, laid bare the rotten colonial and semi-feudal regime. They reflected the working people's poor life, pointed out the aspirations of the various strata of people, and demanded improvements in living standards and democratic reforms.

Besides the newspapers, many progressive books were published by the Party, aimed at bringing Marxism-Leninism and the Party's policies to the widest sections of the people. The book **The Peasant Question** written by Comrades Truong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap, courageously accused the imperialists and feudalists of cruelties towards Vietnamese peasants. It faithfully reflected the Vietnamese peasants' life, and pointed out their important role in the Vietnamese revolution. Influenced by the Party, many writers wrote good works, and contributed to the struggle against various kinds of reactionary and prostitute literature. To Huu's poems began to conquer the hearts of the masses.

Moreover the activity of the Party in the matter of books and newspapers was the link in the relation between the legal and the illegal work of the Party.

* On the one hand the illegal organization of trade union was cancelled, but on the other, the freedom to set up trade unions must be claimed.

and played the role of liaison between the Party members and the masses. It had an important part in the work of propaganda and organization of the Party at that time.

In this period, the Party worked to found the Indochinese Democratic Front. In this Front, besides the groups of Communists working openly, there were the Franco-Vietnamese group belonging to the French Socialist Party, the «Tu Luc Van Doan» group, the friendly organizations of workers, small traders, owners of small industrial concerns, etc. Thanks to its work, the Party won victory in the elections of the Council of People's Representatives in Central and North Viet Nam.

In Central Viet Nam, the Party was able to enlarge the Front, winning over even «the 1884 group»*. Therefore in the election of the Council of People's Representatives in 1937, the Democratic Front won victory and held the seats of chairman, vice-chairman and first secretary.

In North Viet Nam, thanks to the Party's correct Front policy, the Democratic Front held 15 seats in the election of the Council of People's Representatives in 1938.

Although the election was very limited and sabotaged by the French rulers, in 1938 the Democratic Front won victory even in the Indochinese Economic and Financial Council, the highest organ «elected by the people» in Indochina in this period.

But the Democratic Front did not win victory in the election of the Nam Bo (South Viet Nam) Municipal Council in 1939. The Trotskyites sabotaged and distorted the Party's policy, utilized Daladier's surrender to fascism at Munich and the delay in the carrying out of suitable democratic reforms in Indo-

* Political group claiming the return of the 1884 Treaty signed by the Nguyen dynasty and the French colonialists in 1884.

china by the Government of the French Popular Front, to sow doubt in the masses about the Party's policy. On the other hand, we were subjective, did not lay bare the Trotskyites' schemes, and tended to belittle the work of agitating the grass-root masses. In the book **Tu Chi Trich** (Self-criticism) (published on July 20, 1939), Comrade Nguyen Van Cu, correctly analysed the causes of defeat and drew lessons from this election. At the same time he criticized the «leftist» tendency which wanted to «overthrow the constitutional party», and the rightist tendency which wanted to «rally all parties and classes of the population, except the reactionary elements», making no distinction between progressive and reactionary elements and parties. In this book, Comrade Nguyen Van Cu also explained all aspects of the Party's strategy in the period of the Democratic Front. Therefore not only had it the effect of correcting the immediate shortcomings within the Party, it was also a document summing up the Party's experiences in carrying out agitation inside the Front in this period.

In 1936-1937, the Party won successive victories, and its influence rose steadily. To develop these victories further, the Central Committee in its March 1938 Session decided to give the All-Indochina Front a unified name, the «Indochinese Democratic Unified Front» (briefly «Indochinese Democratic Front»).

The Session emphasized the Party's principle of democratic centralism :

« Either open or underground, all organizations must obey the Party's leading organ. Organizations operating openly are not on an equal footing with the Central Committee or at other respective Party levels. It is only a part of the Party's organization. » *

* Excerpt from the resolution of the Central Committee on March 29 — 30, 1938.

The Session also set the whole Party the task of carrying on the struggle, so that it could act legally, and strengthen the relation between the Party and the masses.

Implementing this resolution, our Party continued to develop every ability to act legally, and further to enlarge the Democratic Front. Thanks to that, the movement developed stronger and stronger. Not only workers and peasants, but also small traders, owners of small industrial concerns, students, civil-servants, etc. participated in the struggle in increasing numbers. Worker-strikes, school-strikes and market-strikes followed one after the other. Most noteworthy was the meeting on May Day 1938 during which 50,000 people, including people of all strata in Hanoi, put forth slogans claiming democratic freedoms, the freedom to set up trade unions and the improvement of the people's livelihood, and in support of the French Popular Front. It was a demonstration of the huge force of the masses under the Party's leadership which sowed terror among the colonial reactionaries. The meetings and demonstrations of scores of thousands of people combined with the struggle in the Trung Ky (Central Viet Nam) People's Representatives Council on September 16, 1938, succeeded in cancelling the draft on head-tax put forth by the French. The close combination of the struggles of the masses with those waged in the press and the council was the condition for victory of all the struggles from 1936 to 1939.

While the democratic movement in our country was developing, the danger of a world war was increasing. The Japanese militarist imperialists launched a large-scale aggression against China and directly threatened Indochina. The Party launched the movement to support the Chinese people in their resistance against Japan. This movement was enthusiastically welcomed by the masses. In many places subscription and fetes were organized to get money, clothes and medicines to help the Chinese army resist Japan.

At the same time the Party put forth the slogan «To defend Indochina», and demanded that the French government decree every democratic freedom, improve the people's livelihood, grant an amnesty to all political prisoners, and give allowances to the soldiers' families, etc. At that time, there were two wrong tendencies within the Party: «To defend Indochina with conditions» and «to defend Indochina without conditions».

The first was: if France is unwilling to implement the Indochinese people's democratic claims, they will not defend Indochina together with France.

The second was: If the fascists attack Indochina, the Indochinese people will certainly have to fight against them, without demanding France make concessions to them.

Both tendencies were negative, did not start from the Indochinese people's interests and from the necessity to defend the Indochinese people's life and property against the blood thirsty fascists. The Party's correct policy of the moment was: as France was not yet turning to fascism, the Party must lead the Indochinese people to struggle to force France to defend Indochina together with the Indochinese people; to compel France to implement democratic freedoms and to improve the people's livelihood so that the people would actively defend Indochina. The Indochinese people must arm themselves to resist the aggressive fascists; they must defend Indochina on their own initiative, and not passively support the defence of Indochina with or without conditions. The Party struggled to unify the ranks of the Party on this question.

To maintain the Party's line and policy in this period, it was necessary to struggle against the «leftist» narrow-minded tendency which opposed co-operation with the national reformist parties, and the conservative thinking which was against the use of legal and semi-legal methods to propagandize,

educate, organize the masses, and lead them in struggle. At the same time, the Party had to struggle against the rightist tendency, the unprincipled co-operation with the Trotskyites, and the tendency to lay bare all our forces, and not pay attention to illegal work.

In the same period, besides the internal struggle, the Party had to struggle permanently against the policy of repression and demagoguery of the colonial government. It had to struggle against the Trotskyites who were trying by all means to sabotage our Party's line and policy. When the Party called for the founding of the «Democratic Front», they advanced the slogan for the setting up of the «Worker-Peasant Front». When our Party founded the «Democratic Youth Association» they advocated the setting up of the «Communist Youth Association». When our Party put forth the slogan «To defend Indochina», they issued the slogan «To turn the imperialist war into a revolutionary civil war», etc. Concerning these problems, the Party had to expose the Trotskyites' schemes in order to make the masses clearly realize that they were saboteurs and imperialists' lackeys.

In a word, during the period of agitation for democracy (1936-1939), our Party scored many achievements and drew many rich experiences from the use of every legal and semi-legal means to disseminate Marxism-Leninism, agitate the masses to struggle for immediate demands, develop and consolidate the Party and mass organizations, and closely combine legal and illegal work to fulfil the revolutionary task.

However, during this period the Party also had some shortcomings. Firstly, while supporting the government of the French Popular Front and the defence of Indochina, the Party did not consider the national problem thoroughly. Secondly, the Party did not put forth the problem of rent and interest reduction as slogans of struggle for the improvement of the peasants' livelihood.

**IN WORLD WAR II, THE PARTY FOUNDED
THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AGAINST
AGGRESSIVE FASCISM, DIRECTED THE
SPEARHEAD OF THE REVOLUTION AT THE
FASCIST IMPERIALISTS AND VIETNAMESE
TRAITORS**

In September, 1939, World War II broke out in Europe; as imperialist France was one of the countries involved in it, Indochina was also thrown into this conflagration. The French rulers ordered general mobilization in Indochina. The number of taxes, loans, subscriptions and lotteries increased day by day; vehicles and boats were requisitioned. In the enterprises, working hours were increased and wages decreased and many youths were conscripted into the army. But the problem which drew the French imperialists' particular attention was that of consolidating their rear, of annihilating the revolutionary force in the country so that they could carry on the unjust war with an easy mind. The elementary democratic rights gained by the workers and peasants in the period of agitation for democracy (1936-1939) were abolished. All democratic organizations, friendly societies were dissolved; freedom of propaganda and of meeting were abolished. The premises of the Party's legal newspapers were searched, their personnel arrested, and their property seized. Persecutions

and massacres were carried out everywhere. In September 1939 alone, there were 1,051 police raids and arrests in North Viet Nam.

After the outbreak of war the French Communist Party was outlawed. Our Party ordered the organs and cadres working legally or semi-legally to rapidly withdraw to underground work. That is why, generally speaking, its force was kept intact. However, due to the enemy's policy of terror, our Party suffered heavy losses.

Faced with the enemy's offensive and after the signing of the Soviet-German treaty of non-aggression, a number of Party members and non-Party members became confused and wavering. To overcome this state of mind, on September 29, 1939, the Party issued a communique on «The present political line» and the Party Committee of Bac Ky (North Viet Nam) published the book, **The Soviet Union is Always Faithful to Peace** to explain the Soviet Union's policy of peace, to unify the ways of thinking and looking at the situation and immediate tasks of the Party. At the same time, it was decided to transfer the central point of activity from the town to the countryside. This policy was very important, because the countryside was the place where the enemy's machinery of rule was relatively weak. The Party had more opportunity to come into close contact with the peasant masses to make propaganda, organize them, and transform the countryside into a revolutionary base. It was thanks to this change in the direction of work that, despite the enemy's frenzied repression, the revolutionary force was not destroyed as in 1930-1931, but on the contrary, it struck roots among millions of toiling peasants, making the revolutionary movement firmer and stronger.

With the outbreak of World War II political lines and policies suitable to the new conditions were needed. In November, 1939, the Session of the Central Committee sponsored by Nguyen Van Cu, third Sec-

etary General of the Party, Phan Dang Luu and Le Duan, decided to found the Indochinese Anti-Imperialist National United Front in order to unify various strata of people, social classes, and Indochinese nationalities, and directed the spearhead of the revolution against fascist imperialism.

The Session assessed that the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks were two basic tasks of the Vietnamese bourgeois democratic revolution. But at the moment the national danger was the more serious. «From the standpoint of national liberation, considering the national interest as supreme, all the problems of the revolution, even that of land, must be solved according to this aim. That is why, while advocating the Indochinese Anti-Imperialist National United Front, the bourgeois democratic revolution only confiscated the lands of the landlords who betrayed the national interest.»*

The Session also assessed that the imperialist war and the fascist rule would anger the people, and the revolution would break out. Of great importance was the political line of the Session to advance to the founding of the Indochinese Democratic Republic and suppress the slogan «To found the Soviet power by the workers, peasants and soldiers.»

It also decided to consolidate the Party in every aspect, making the Party unified in mind as well as in action.

The November, 1939, Session of the Central Committee marked a turning-point in the Vietnamese revolutionary movement.

The Vietnamese people were struggling to implement the Party's new political line, with matters moving swiftly at home and abroad. In June, 1940, France was occupied by the German fascists. In September, 1940, Indochina was invaded by the

* Excerpt from the Resolution of the Central Session on November 1939

Japanese fascists. The French colonialists surrendered to them, conniving at their occupying Indochina. But thanks to their longstanding undaunted struggle and to their education by the Party, the Vietnamese people rose to fight the French and Japanese. On September 22, 1940, Japanese troops attacked Lang Son. Defeated, the French army withdrew and passed by Bac Son district on their way to the delta. On September, 27, 1940, the Bac Son people, under the leadership of the local Party branch rose up, putting forth the slogan «Against the French-Japanese imperialists», and disarmed the defeated French troops to arm themselves. During the insurrection the Japanese and French were leagued together in order to give the French colonialists freedom to repress the Vietnamese revolution. Comrade Tran Dang Ninh was sent to Bac Son by the Party Committee of North Viet Nam to lead the insurrection. The Bac Son people held a meeting at Vu Lang to set up the revolutionary power, but because of their lack of experience and vigilance, they were surprised by a French attack. The insurrectionists withdrew to the forest and founded the first Vietnamese guerilla units led by the Party.

In support of the Bac Son movement, upon receipt of the Party Central Committee's directive, a number of localities combined their struggle, especially at Ngoc Trao (Thach Thanh district, Thanh Hoa province). The struggle led to the organization of armed forces, that afterwards had to disperse among the population.

In spite of its defeat, the Bac Son insurrection laid bare the Japanese and French fascists' schemes, and gave birth to our first people's armed force under the leadership of our Party. This armed force gradually developed and became the « Viet Nam National Salvation Army». The Bac Son insurrection opened a new historical page of armed struggle for the Vietnamese people. It broke out while the people through-

out the country were not yet prepared, hence the insurrectionary forces had to fight alone. But the lesson drawn from the Bac Son insurrection was very useful and served as a basis for preparation for the August general insurrection later.

Simultaneous with the inrush of the Japanese army in North Viet Nam, the Siamese army attacked Cambodia. The French colonialists forced the Vietnamese people, first of all the people of the South, and the Cambodian people to go to the front as cannon-fodder. Boiling with hatred for the French colonialists and refusing to be slaves of the Japanese and French imperialist, and at the same time strongly encouraged by the spirit of the Bac Son insurrection, our people in South Viet Nam were ready to strike back.

At that moment, a number of the Central Committee members such as Comrades Nguyen Van Cu, Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap, and Le Duan, were arrested. The Central Committee members remaining in South Viet Nam and in the Nam Ky Committee intended to lead the people in Nam Ky to rise up in order to turn the Franco-Siamese war into a revolutionary civil war, and sent Comrade Phan Dang Luu to North Viet Nam to attend the seventh Central Session of the Party and ask for directives about this question. On October, 1940, the Session was held in Bac Ninh. Comrades Phan Dang Luu, Hoang Quoc Viet, Hoang Van Thu, Truong Chinh, and Tran Dang Ninh attended it. (Some members of the Central Committee did not attend because they were occupied in South Viet Nam.)

The seventh Central Session analysed the situation at home and abroad, clearly pointed out the danger for the Indochinese people to face two enemies; affirmed that the Anti-Imperialist National United Front was the Anti-Japanese-French Fascist National United Front, and decided to temporarily withdraw

the slogan of the sixth Central Committee Session «To confiscate landlords' land and distribute it to the tillers».

The Session assessed that a revolutionary upsurge of the Indochinese people would certainly break out, therefore the Party must lead them to prepare the armed insurrection to recover freedom and national independence.

It also heard Comrade Tran Dang Ninh's report on the Bac Son insurrection and decided on the maintenance of the Bac Son armed force, the founding of guerilla groups operating separately, and the setting up of guerilla bases the centre of which was the Bac Son — Vu Nhay region.

Concerning the proposal of the Nam Ky Party branch, the Session assessed that because of the failure of the Bac Son insurrection and the fact that conditions were not ripe for an insurrection in Nam Bo and throughout the country, the insurrection should not be launched at this time. The immediate task of the Nam Ky Party branch was to use the forms of political and economic struggle against the French colonialists and Japanese fascists, and protest against the Franco-Siamese war. At the same time it was necessary to intensify propaganda, educate and organize the masses of people, first of all the workers, peasants and armymen. It was necessary to prepare the conditions, and wait for a favourable opportunity when conditions were ripe throughout the country, to launch an armed insurrection to defeat the French and Japanese. If the insurrection was launched immediately it would be isolated and annihilated by the joint French-Japanese army.

On his arrival in South Viet Nam, Comrade Phan Dang Luu learnt that the order for the insurrection was already issued and everywhere all was ready. It could not be withdrawn. On the night of November 23, 1940, the Nam Ky insurrection broke out. The

Revolution did not yet prevail in the whole country. As the main revolutionary force was composed of only a number of soldiers in the enemy army, and upon the plan of the insurrection being discovered by the enemy, the Nam Ky uprising failed. The French imperialists repressed it savagely. But the Vietnamese people did not flinch. The fire of the Nam Ky insurrection had not yet been extinguished, when the soldiers at Do Luong (Nghe An province) rose up.

The Bac Son, Nam Ky and Do Luong insurrections did not bring victories as yet, but they upheld the Vietnamese people's undaunted heroic spirit. So many heads fallen and so much blood spilt gave our Party and people an invaluable lesson in armed insurrection.

This lesson could be summed up as follows:

First, to gain success, an insurrection to seize power must break out at the right time; that is, when the conditions for revolution are ready, viz:

a) when confusion and discord in the enemy ranks have reached a climax; when they are facing difficulties, and are quite at a loss and cannot overcome them; b) when the middle-of-the-road strata are sick of the enemy, side with the revolution or sympathize with it, and are ready to follow the vanguard Party; c) when the vanguard Party is determined to make sacrifices and lead the whole people to fight to the end in order to annihilate the enemy, liberate itself and the nation.

Second, in an agricultural colony such as ours, the line of armed struggle to seize power is: the insurrectionary forces must seize and occupy the enemy's most exposed places in the countryside, set up bases there, gradually spread their activities, and when the conditions are mature, take action in the towns to destroy the enemy's leading organs, and reconquer the whole country.

Third, to be successful, the insurrection cannot rely only on the force of the enemy's soldiers won over to our cause. We must chiefly rely on the force of the

great masses of people, first of all on the worker and peasant masses. At the same time, we must strive to propagandize among the enemy's soldiers to awaken them, so that they don't shoot at the revolutionary troops; we must persuade them to go over to our side, and use the enemy's guns to shoot at the enemy. Army rebellions can only have a practical effect on the revolution if the broad masses in the rear actively support it and respond to it.

Matters were moving more and more swiftly both at home and abroad, necessitating a closer leadership by our Party. On February 1941, Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc returned from abroad and convened the eighth Session of the Central Committee. The Session was held from May 10 to May 19, 1941, at Pac Po (Cao Bang province), close to the Chinese border. Comrades Nguyen Ai Quoc, Hoang Van Thu, Truong Chinh, Hoang Quoc Viet, Pham Van Dong, Hoang Van Hoan, etc. were present at the Session.

The Session assessed that from the day Indochina was under the double oppression of the French and Japanese fascists, the contradiction between the Indochinese people and the aggressive imperialists had become the main contradiction, because «the oppression was too heavy, the Indochinese people could not endure it; the French and Japanese imperialists oppressed not only the worker and peasant classes, but also the whole people... The classes' interests were robbed, the fate of the nation was threatened more than ever.» That is why the Session emphasized: «For the moment the partial and class interests must be subordinated to the national problem. If the independence and freedom of the whole nation could not be recovered, not only the whole nation would be further condemned to slavery, but the partial and class' interests would be lost for ever.» *

* Excerpt from the Resolution of the Central Session on May 1941.

To rally the different strata of people and the national revolutionary forces in the struggle against the main enemy of the nation, that is the French and Japanese fascist imperialists, the Session advocated the founding of the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Front of the allies for the independence of Viet Nam) that is the Viet Minh Front, a name full of significance which facilitated the mobilization of the masses' national spirit.

The Session highlighted the slogan of national liberation; therefore the chief aim of the mass associations was to save the country, and they were uniformly called National Salvation Leagues.

As for the land question, the Session assessed that: to further differentiate the ranks of the landlord class, it would still be necessary to temporarily put aside the slogan « To confiscate landlords' land and distribute it to the tillers », and to put forth the following slogans: « To confiscate imperialists' and traitors' land and distribute it to poor tillers »; « to reduce land rent and interest »; « to divide the communal fields », and to proceed to the realization of the slogan « land to the tillers ».

The Session decided to accelerate every field of work to prepare the armed insurrection, strengthen the leadership of armed organizations and build guerilla bases.

These tasks advocated by the May, 1941, Session of the Central Committee had a particular importance. These decisions marked a strong shifting of the Party towards directing the spearhead of forces against the fascist invaders. They stimulated the whole Party and people in their struggle to expel the French-Japanese fascists and brought the Vietnamese revolutionary movement to the victory of the August, 1945, Revolution.

The Session consolidated the Central Committee and elected Comrade Truong Chinh as its General secretary.

After the Session of the Central Committee, the Viet Minh Front was officially founded (May 19, 1941).

The central task of our Party and of the Viet Minh Front was then national salvation, national liberation. Therefore the mass organizations rallied in the Front were re-organized into associations for national salvation: «Workers for National Salvation», «Peasants for National Salvation», «Women for National Salvation», «Youth for National Salvation», «Self-defence units for National Salvation», «Pioneers for National Salvation», «Old people for National Salvation». Besides, «The Viet Nam Association for National Salvation» was founded to attract those elements from the bourgeois or landlord classes who approved of our anti-French and anti-Japanese struggle.

In order to strengthen the leadership of the armed forces, the Central Committee appointed Comrades Phung Chi Kien, Le Van Chi né Huy, and Comrade Chu Van Tan, as the commanding committee of the guerilla units in Bac Son — Vu Nhai, gathered under the name of the «Viet Nam Army for National Salvation». In Autumn, 1941, «The National Salvation Army» was divided into two sections: one, commanded by Comrade Phung Chi Kien stationed in Bac Son (Lang Son province); the other, commanded by Comrade Chu Van Tan, stationed in Dinh Ca, Trang Xa (Vu Nhai, Thai Nguyen province). Late in 1941, the section of «National Salvation Army» stationed in Bac Son, passing by Na Ri (Bac Can) on its way to Cao Bang, fell into an ambush and suffered heavy losses. The section stationed in Dinh Ca — Trang Xa waged guerilla warfare during eight months on end (from July, 1941, to February, 1942), fighting in extremely hard conditions. It succeeded in maintaining our forces and wearing down the enemy. At last, owing to difficulties of supply, it scattered into armed groups which carried out propa-

ganda and agitation work, creating revolutionary bases among the masses all over Thai Nguyen, Tuyen Quang provinces and part of Bac Can and Ha Giang provinces.

From these eight months of guerilla warfare in Bac Son, Vu Nhai, we can draw the following lesson on armed struggles: under the double French-Japanese fascist yoke, with the Party's leadership, our people could establish revolutionary bases and wage protracted guerilla warfare to wear down and defeat the by far stronger imperialists, but that broad mass bases are needed for the activities and development of our guerilla units. The principles of guerilla warfare are: reliance on the masses; continual growth, extreme mobility and constant adaptation. If the guerilla units stand on the defensive and coil themselves up, divorcing themselves from the masses they will be crushed. When the situation requires it, they must disperse, be able to stick to the masses and identify themselves with them, overcome difficulties, build bases, and when the situation is favourable, gather again and wage the struggle.

Guerilla warfare was a new form of struggle of the Vietnamese Revolution against the French-Japanese fascists, under our Party's leadership.

The patriotic war waged by the Soviet Union against the German fascists had had a very strong influence on the revolutionary movement in Viet Nam and in the world. The Vietnamese people considered each victory gained by the Soviet Army as their own. Towards the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943, the Soviet Army smashed 330,000 German fascists at Stalingrad and switched firmly over to the offensive on all fronts. This historical victory was a very great encouragement for the Vietnamese people. It was at the same time a strong blow to the French-Japanese fascist imperialists. Though living in poverty under

the double fascist yoke, thanks to the Party's leadership the Vietnamese people, always confident, were all the more confident of their liberation.

At that time, the Japanese were encroaching further and further on the French interests. The French-Japanese contradictions became sharper and a conflict between the two cliques of rulers was inevitable. The contradictions between the Japanese and the French, between the French De Gaullists and the French fascists, between the pro-Japanese and the pro-French, etc., were becoming more and more acute.

In view of the new situation, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee in its session held from February 25 to 27, 1943, decided to consolidate and enlarge the National United Front (Viet Minh Front). It decided to agitate for the foundation of the Indo-chinese Democratic Front, rallying anti-fascist foreign residents in Indochina, mainly resistant French and anti-Japanese Chinese residents. At the same time, all efforts were to be exerted to prepare the insurrection. As the Session emphasized, «the preparation for the insurrection is the present central task» *.

After the Session, the whole Party struggled to carry out these decisions.

On August 29, 1942, Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc, while on duty in China, was captured by the Chiang Kai-shek government and only released on September 16, 1943. Out of jail, he immediately got in touch with the «Liberation Association», a branch of the Viet Minh Front in Yunnan. At the same time, he established relations of co-operation with «the Association of Vietnamese Revolutionaries», an Anti-Japanese and Anti-French organization of Vietnamese residents in China, functioning legally in Kouang-si, under the clique of Nguyen Hai Than, Nguyen Tuong

* Excerpt from the Decisions of the February 1943 Session of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee.

Tam and Vu Hong Khanh. Thus began the alliance between the Viet Minh Front and the « Association of Vietnamese Revolutionaries ». Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc took the name of Ho Chi Minh to carry on his activities.

At home, implementing the decisions of the February, 1943, Session of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee, our Party increased its activities to broaden the Front, in rallying as many students, intellectuals and national bourgeois as possible. At that time, there was a division in the ranks of these strata. Some were pro-Japanese, others, pro-French while others were pro-Viet Minh. The pro-French were growing fewer and fewer; those who had wrongly believed in a possible use of the Japanese, realized more and more clearly their imperialist, fascist nature and became disappointed. The Viet Minh gained increasingly greater influence. Our Party deemed it opportune and necessary to help the Vietnamese national bourgeoisie and bourgeois intellectuals found a revolutionary party in order to draw the Vietnamese national bourgeoisie and the Vietnamese intelligentsia into the Viet Minh Front; on the one hand to check the « Great Asia » deceitful policy of the Japanese imperialists in Viet Nam, on the other to further broaden the National United Front against the French-Japanese fascists. Therefore, our Party helped Duong Duc Hien's group of students and the Thanh Nghi* group found the Viet Nam Democratic Party which joined the Viet Minh Front.

Furthermore, our Party carried on agitation among anti-fascist democratic foreign residents, including French De Gaullist elements in Indochina, to take part in the foundation of the Anti-Fascist Democratic Front. At the same time, it strove to rally the Vietnamese soldiers in the French Army, the legionaries and French soldiers to our cause.

* Name of a progressive magazine with a national bourgeois tendency.

Due to these correct policies of the Party, the Viet Minh's prestige grew, its influence increased more and more, and the Vietnamese revolutionary movement developed with every passing day. The French-Japanese fascists realized that they could not quench the fire of the Vietnamese revolution by repression and terrorism. So they revived depraved old customs, spread reformist and reactionary ideology, tried to draw the youth into the so-called « Strong to Serve » movement, to keep them from the revolutionary path and at the same time to create favourable conditions for their recruitment as soldiers. The Japanese imperialists used the « Dai Viet » clique as their spokesmen to propagate the « Asian Union » theory and win the masses.

In the legal press there appeared an overflowing romantic, debauched pessimistic and dispirited literature. The Trotskyite Han Thuyen publishing house issued books with a « research » character to slander Marxism, making use of « materialism » and the « theory of class struggle » in an attempt to « defeat theoretically » the national democratic ideology and patriotism advocated by the Viet Minh Front, and at the same time, blemishing the whole history of the war of liberation waged by the Vietnamese people.

In order to oppose this kind of literature, in 1943 the Party put forth the « Viet Nam Cultural Programme », clearly setting out that the new culture of Viet Nam should bear a triple character : national, scientific, mass character, and should be led by the Party. The programme set forth the immediate task : « To struggle against the fascist, feudal, retrograde and enslaving culture, an obscurantist and deceptive culture. To develop the culture of new democracy in Indochina ». Not only did the programme set forth the immediate task, it furthermore mapped out the long-standing line of struggle of the whole Party, aimed at building a new culture for Viet Nam according to the methods of socialist realism.

In the period of World War II there was a host of illegal books and papers from the Party and the Viet Minh Front: **Co Giai Phong** (The Banner of Liberation), central organ of the Party; **Cuu Quoc** (National Salvation), central organ of the Viet Minh Front; **Viet Nam Doc Lap** (Independent Viet Nam), organ of propaganda of the Viet Minh Front in Cao-Bac-Lang zone; **Be Xieng Sat** (Breaking our chains), organ of propaganda of the Party Committee of Trung Ky (Central Viet Nam); **Giai Phong** (Liberation), organ of propaganda of the Viet Minh in Nam Ky (South Viet Nam) etc. Besides, the Party and the Viet Minh Front published books of general propaganda and training books on news and information, policies, guerilla warfare or experience in work. These books and papers played an important part in the political and ideological struggle against the enemy, in the ideological struggle within the Party and the Viet Minh Front, thus bringing the line and policies of the Party and the Front to a successful realization.

In particular, concerning **Party work**, the question then was to consolidate the Party ideologically and organizationally, liquidate separatist and factionalist tendencies, maintain the homogeneity and strength of the Party organization, increase its membership with care and prevent the A. B. clique* from worming themselves into the Party and sabotaging it from inside.

The May, 1941, Session of the Central Committee emphasized: « The training of cadres has now become an urgent task, not to be delayed one hour, even one minute; leading committees of the Party at all levels should pay particular attention to it ». Relatively regular short term training courses were opened to form and train cadres. Experiences were drawn from

* A. B.: anti-bolsheviks, name of an anti-communist organization founded by the French Imperialists.

underground work, organization of offices, liaison and communications, to be disseminated among all cadres and Party members.

In 1943, after Comrade Hoang Van Thu had been arrested and executed by the French fascists, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee decided to promote to the Party a number of new members, called «the Hoang Van Thu promotion» drawing a great number of elite elements to the Party, and increasing the leading power of the Vietnamese Revolution.

As a counter-action against the A. B. clique in Bac Bo (North Viet Nam), the Party unmasked the sabotaging activities of one named Cong, who attempted to win a few dissatisfied members of the Party North Committee against the Central Committee, and creating factions within the Party.

The greatest harm was caused by Dinh Van Di's A. B. clique in Central Viet Nam. The Central Committee called the Party members in Central Viet Nam to heighten their vigilance, to fight the A. B. clique, and pointed out: «Under the cloak of the Revolution and communism, the A. B. clique in Central Viet Nam deceives our compatriots, spies on patriots, sabotages revolutionary organizations. Besides, they strive by every means to sow doubt and discord in the ranks of the Revolution.» * To eliminate the A. B. clique was to cut open the ulcers of the Party and disinfect the Party's organism.

Beside the counter-action against the A. B. clique, in this period, our Party had still to wage an inner-Party struggle against partitionism and factionalism. In Bac Bo (North Viet Nam) after the Eight Session of the Central Committee, the Party had to liquidate individualist tendencies and factionalist ideology, which were cropping up among the

* See The Banner of Liberation No. 8, August 25, 1943.

Party Committee of Bac Ky (North Viet Nam 1941). In Nam Bo (South Viet Nam) the Party struggled to unify the two groups « Tien Phong » (Vanguard) and « Giai Phong » (Liberation) (1945). Our comrades in Trung Bo (Central Viet Nam) had also to struggle to overcome factionalist ideology originating from opposite points of view in Banmethuot jail.

It is beyond doubt that through these inner-Party struggles, our Party was further steeled and strengthened.

Concerning the work of the Front, on the one hand the Party saw to it to broaden the Viet Minh Front, to unite all classes and strata of the people, even to win a number of landlords and neutralize others. On the other hand, the Party attached much importance to the development of the workers' and peasants' organized forces, so as to turn the worker and peasant alliance into the firm basis of the Viet Minh Front. Intensified propaganda work was carried on among the enemy soldiers. Through the realization of **unity of action** against the common enemy of the nation, the Party broadened the Viet Minh Front. Many struggles launched by the workers for raising of wages, reduction of working-hours, against wage cuts, drew even overseers and clerks into action. The peasants' struggle won even rich peasants and a number of small landlords who either took part in or supported it in such struggles as fighting against the requisition of large quantities of paddy; against crop destructions for the cultivation of jute and castor-oil seeds; against the pillage of markets by the Japanese who either robbed goods or bought them at an extra low price, against forced enlistments and conscription of labour. In localities where the mass movement was powerful, there appeared irregular armed forms of struggle such as: fighting predatory Japanese soldiers, suppressing Vietnamese