

traitors, etc. Here and there appeared mass struggles or harangues by shock propaganda units supported by armed self-defence groups.

As for the building of armed forces, the Party strove to develop self-defence groups for national salvation, while making efforts to maintain the «Viet Nam Army for National Salvation» sections, founded armed propaganda groups and took care of the question of securing arms and preparing material conditions for the insurrection.

At that time, the Soviet Army had victoriously launched the counter-offensive against the German fascists on numerous battlefields. The annihilation of the fascists was only a question of time. On May 7, 1944, the Central Bureau of the Viet Minh Front, relying on the line laid down by the Party Central Committee, issued the directive «Let us prepare for the general insurrection», to give a further impetus to the movement.

On August 10, 1944, The Party Central Committee launched an appeal to «Secure arms and drive out the common enemy». The mass organization in the Front warmly answered it and pooled their resources to buy arms. At the same time, the Central Bureau of the Viet Minh issued «bonds» to raise the funds necessary for the preparations for the insurrection. A feverish atmosphere of revolution was prevailing and gaining in all the provinces.

Particularly keen were the preparations in Bac Son — Vu Nhai and Cao Bang bases. People from all walks of life took an enthusiastic part in them. On the night of November 13, 1944, the local Party branch led the people of Dinh Ca (Vu Nhai, Thai Nguyen province) to launch the insurrection. This insurrection broke out without the knowledge of the Central Committee. While the French and Japanese were increasingly divided, and the Japanese fascists successively defeated in many battles in the Pacific

Ocean, we should have reserved our forces, waited for a good opportunity and the general order to launch the insurrection in the whole country. But the local Party branch had launched the insurrection locally, on its own initiative, thus revealing its forces and condemning itself to isolation. At the news of this insurrection, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee timely criticized it and decided to switch the insurrection to local guerilla warfare using the forms of ambush and attacks by surprise to check the enemy's foraging and mopping up plans. However, the Dinh Ca insurrection and the subsequent guerilla warfare had an echo in the country, encouraging the « Secure arms drive out the common enemy » movement in the provinces and increasing the confusion in the enemy ranks.

In Winter 1944, like the Vu Nhai people, the people in Cao Bang, Bac Can and Lang Son provinces, whose hatred against the imperialists had reached its climax, were ready to launch the armed insurrection. The order to launch it was about to be sent out when Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc, coming back home from China, issued a directive to delay it, for the following reasons :

« 1 — The decision to launch the insurrection was only based on the situation in Cao Bang, Bac Can, Lang Son provinces, and not on the situation in the whole country, therefore denoting a partial, not comprehensive evaluation of the situation.

« 2 — In the conditions prevailing then, the launching of the guerilla warfare on a scale decided by the Inter-provincial Committee was doomed to failure because the imperialists will concentrate all their forces to repress it. More flexible armed forms should be carried out, political activity should be given more

attention than military action, in order to promote the movement and consolidate the political basis first.» *

Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc proposed the founding of the «Viet Nam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation» on December 22, 1944, on the basis of the armed forces in Cao Bang, with a view to launching the armed struggle from the Cao Bang base down to the delta. The «Viet Nam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation» commanded by Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap, right from the beginning of its activities, successfully seized the two posts of Phay Khat and Na Ngan (December 24 and 25, 1944), opening a new stage of development of the Vietnamese people's armed struggle.

The clear-sighted plan advocated by Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc avoided great damages to Cao Bang and greatly helped to raise and consolidate the movement in the zone of Cao Bang, Bac Can and Lang Son.

The decision to launch the insurrection was based on the situation in Cao Bang, the situation in the zone of Cao Bang, and the situation in the zone of Cao Bang. The decision to launch the insurrection was based on the situation in Cao Bang, the situation in the zone of Cao Bang, and the situation in the zone of Cao Bang.

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Excerpt from the First Issue, 1944, by Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap, ed.

**THE PARTY LAUNCHED THE HIGH TIDE
OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT FOR
NATIONAL SALVATION, PREPARED THE
GENERAL INSURRECTION AND BROUGHT
IT TO SUCCESS**

Exactly as our Party had forecast, the death-conflict between the Japanese fascist and French colonialists broke out*. On March 9, 1945, by a coup d'état the Japanese ousted the French colonialists, and became the exclusive masters of Indochina. Within less than forty-eight hours, the French Army throughout Indochina either surrendered to the Japanese or fled to China or Thailand. The more arrogant and cruel the French colonialists had been formerly towards the Vietnamese people, the more cowardly and mean they were now in face of the Japanese bandits.

On the contrary, the Vietnamese people, under our Party's leadership, waged a heroic struggle against the Japanese. Right in the heart of the French-Japanese conflict, Vietnamese Communists and the Vietnamese people had carried out bold activities worthy of admiration. Our guerillas seized the posts of Cho Chu, Chò Dón, Sơn Duong, Dai Tu and others, very quickly. A number of « Youth for National Salva-

* See « The Bomb Shall Burst Open » — The Banner of Liberation —
No. 7.

tion» and «Peasants for National Salvation» captured the Ban Yen Nhan (Hung Yen province) post without having to fire a single bullet. The political prisoners in Nghia Lo Camp revolted, broke open the doors of their jails and dispersed in various localities to resume their revolutionary activities. Political prisoners in Son La and many other jails, availing themselves of the French-Japanese antagonism, succeeded in liberating themselves peacefully. The political prisoners of Ba To (Quang Ngai province) in joint action with enemy's soldiers rose up, capturing the whole of the enemy's arms and organized themselves into the Ba To guerilla unit, the embryo of the People's Army in the Fifth Interzone.

A few days before the Japanese coup d'etat, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee which was then seated in Hanoi suburbs, was informed by our Intelligence Service that the Japanese Army had received orders to get ready for an imminent battle, and that Decoux, Governor General of Indochina had just been summoned by the Japanese to Saigon and forced to surrender.

On the night of March 9, 1945, an enlarged session of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee* was held in Dinh Bang village (Tu Son, Bac Ninh province) to evaluate the situation and put forth the urgent and immediate tasks.

The Session clearly analyzed the causes of the coup d'etat, foresaw the defeat of the French Army, the temporary victory of the Japanese Army and clearly stated the impossibility of the Japanese fascists consolidating their power and that of the pro-Japanese puppets in Indochina. On the contrary, the

* The Central Committee could not hold a full session because a number of its members, on duty in Cao Bang province or in China, could not come back home.

coup d'etat had created an acute political crisis, which speeded up the ripening of the conditions for an armed insurrection.

The developing favourable conditions for insurrection were :

a) the political crisis being acute, the enemy's hands were tied, preventing them from dealing with the revolution ;

b) the terrible famine then prevailing, hatred of the masses for the aggressors was at its climax ;

c) the war was entering its decisive stage, which decided the fate of the Japanese fascists.

The Session estimated that it was a pre-insurrectionary period and that the direct task of our Party at that time was to lead the whole people to move to the general insurrection.

The Session evaluated further : the ranks of the enemy and the allies of the Revolution had undergone changes : the Japanese fascist imperialists were « the main, and sole immediate enemy » of the Indo-chinese people ; the French imperialists who had been overthrown by the Japanese, and had lost their ruling power in Indochina, were no longer the immediate enemy of the Indo-chinese people, although, the latter still « had to be on their guard against the manoeuvres of the De Gaullist group who are trying to restore French rule in Indochina »*. The French who were conducting a Resistance to the Japanese were for the moment objectively allies of the Indo-chinese people.

Therefore the Session decided to replace the slogan « Drive out the Japanese and French fascists » with « Drive out the Japanese fascists » and upheld the

* Quotations in this paragraph are excerpts from the Directive of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee : Our Tactics in Relation to the Franco - Japanese Conflict, March 12, 1945.

slogan « Establish the revolutionary power of the Indochinese people » in the struggle against the Japanese power and the puppet government of the pro-Japanese traitors.

The Session also decided to change to forms of agitation, propaganda, organization and struggle which were best suited to the pre-insurrectionary period, especially leading the people to take arms and storm the imperialists' paddy stocks in order to relieve famine. It called for the masses to get on to the streets, to hold demonstrations tending towards general insurrection; where conditions were favourable, to develop guerilla warfare and take power locally. The Session decided to « launch a powerful high tide of anti-Japanese movement for National Salvation, as a prerequisite of the general insurrection, » and, « to be ready to switch over to general insurrection when the right conditions existed (e. g. after the Japanese capitulation or when the Allied troops had established a firm position and were advancing firmly on our territory) ».

These clear-sighted and important decisions were clearly pointed out in instructions of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee, entitled, « Our tactics in relation to the French-Japanese conflict ». These instructions were a compass guiding all activities of our Party and of the Viet Minh Front in the period from March to August 1945. It could be said that the Enlarged Session of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee, held from March 9 to 12, 1945, and the instructions of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee issued on March 12, 1945, had a decisive influence on the victory of the August Revolution.

Basing itself on the March instructions of the Party Central Committee, on April 16, 1945, the General Committee of the Viet Minh also issued instructions on the organization of Liberation Com-

mittees « pre-governmental » forms at all levels: enterprises, communes, districts, provinces, towns, zones, Xus. On a national level the All-Viet Nam Liberation Committee, that is the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Viet Nam was to be set up. According to the directive of the General Committee of the Viet Minh, the Liberation Committees would function only in the pre-insurrectionary period. When the insurrection broke out, the Liberation Committees would be dissolved, and Revolutionary Workers' Committees set up in enterprises, and Revolutionary People's Committees in all localities. The instructions dated April 16, 1945, of the General Committee of the Viet Minh had effectively built the revolutionary power and prepared the people to seize power after the victory of the insurrection. These instructions reached the various localities. Liberation Committees sprang up, with the enthusiastic support of the masses. At that moment, in regions where Liberation Committees could be set up, two forms of administration prevailed side by side, the Liberation Committee and the local puppet administration.

From April 15 to 20, 1945, the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee convened the North Viet Nam Revolutionary Military Conference, decided to define the limits of the resistance zones,* and to unify the armed forces — the Viet Nam Army for National Salvation, the Viet Nam Propaganda Unit for National Liberation and other armed organizations — into the Viet Nam Liberation Army.

They were:

- 1. The Loí Resistance zone (North Viet Nam)
- 2. The Hqang Hoa Tham Resistance zone (North Viet Nam)
- 3. The Quang Trung Resistance zone (North Viet Nam)
- 4. The Tran Hung Dao Resistance zone (North Viet Nam)
- 5. The Phan Dinh Phung Resistance zone (Central Viet Nam)
- 6. The Trung Trác Resistance zone (Central Viet Nam)
- 7. The Nguyen Tri Phuong Resistance zone (South Viet Nam)

It decided to develop the armed self-defence and fighting self-defence units, to intensify guerilla warfare, and open a Political and Military College for Anti-Japanese struggle to train cadres for the general insurrection. The Session elected the North Viet Nam Revolutionary Military Committee which comprised Comrades Vo Nguyen Giap, Chu Van Tan, Van Tien Dung and others. The resolution of this Session entitled «Ahead towards the General Insurrection» was approved by the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee.

From the North Viet Nam Revolutionary Military Conference onwards, military action grew increasingly. Propaganda by armed units and suppression of puppet officials and traitors, paved the way for the setting up of revolutionary power from the commune to provincial level in some regions. On June 4, 1945, the Free Zone, comprising six provinces: Cao Bang, Bac Can, Lang Son, Thai Nguyen, Tuyen Quang and Ha Giang was founded officially, with People's Committees at all levels, where the Viet Minh policies began to be implemented. The Free Zone became the main revolutionary base for the whole country. At the same time it was an image of the newborn Viet Nam.

The activities of the Viet Nam Liberation Army and fighting self-defence units were growing increasingly. The ambushes laid at Cho Chu, Deo Khe and the attack of Tam Dao post had a resounding echo throughout the whole country. On June 8, 1945, under the leadership of the local Party branch, the people of Dong Trieu rose up and disarmed the enemy troops at Dong Trieu, Chi Linh, Mao Khe, Trang Bach. They suppressed the puppet administration, founded the Revolutionary People's Committee, set up the Dong Trieu Resistance zone and the Anti-Japanese guerilla unit.

In Central Viet Nam, the Ba To guerilla unit was carrying on and developing its activities.

In South Viet Nam the movement was developing at My Tho and in the region of the Bassac (Western arm of the Mekong).

At this time, the Party paid particular attention to the press and other forms of propaganda to combat the Japanese influence, defeat all thinking aimed at cooperating with or making use of the Japanese and to dispel the fear of them among the people.

The Party energetically laid bare the deceitful schemes of the Japanese and the pro-Japanese clique: the Phuc Viet (Recovered Nation), Dai Viet (Great Viet), Nationalist and Trotskyist parties. These gangs of toad-eaters upheld the slogan of a false independence and deceived the people with the Japanese «Great Asia» programme: «Joint diplomacy, military alliance, economic co-operation, cultural exchange, political independence». The Party pointed out clearly to the people: ...«to believe the Japanese is to commit suicide. To follow the pro-Japanese traitors is to snap at the Japanese venom. As regards the Japanese bandits there is only one way: the whole people united as one, arms in hands, to fight them».*

The Party criticized the erroneous thinking of a number of intellectual cadres who advocated a reshuffling of the Tran Trong Kim government, hoping «to win independence» by means of peaceful negotiations with the Japanese, or through the pro-Japanese puppet government, to promulgate the «Constitution of the Constitutional monarchy». The Party held this tendency a dangerous one, because it embellished the Japanese fascists with a false veneer, misled our people, created illusions about the Japanese and gave our people vague conceptions of the Japanese and the clique of pro-Japanese puppets,

* Excerpt from the article «The Japanese Policy Towards our People» in *Communist Review* No 3.

Further the Party Central Committee criticized the «rightist» tendencies of the comrades of the paper **Tien Phong** (Vanguard) — region of the western arm of the Mekong, Nam Bo — who had by themselves withdrawn the slogan «Against the French fascists» prior to the March 9, 1945, **coup d'etat** (and after that day, planned to rely on and make use of the Japanese to «seize power»). At the same time, the Central Committee criticized the «leftist» thinking of the comrades of the paper **Giai Phong** (Liberation) — region of the eastern arm of the Mekong, Nam Bo — who still put forward the slogan «Drive out the Japanese and French fascists» after the success of the Japanese **coup d'etat** when, in fact, the French no longer had power in Indochina. Both papers had wrong viewpoints but they attacked each other in very hot terms. The Central Committee pointed out the errors of both parties and called on the comrades in Nam Bo to follow the watchword of the Central Committee and put an end to factionalism and partitionist tendencies and unite in order to correctly implement the Party line and policies.

All these above-mentioned propaganda and ideological struggles were aimed at uniting the whole Party and people, concentrating all forces on one immediate goal: **general insurrection to seize power.**

While preparations for the general insurrection were being made, North Viet Nam and the North of Central Viet Nam suffered a terrible famine threatening millions of lives. This was a consequence of the exploiting and war-provoking policies of the Japanese and French fascists. The Party put forth the slogan of struggle «storm the rice-stocks, relieve the famine.» The Party considered it the central slogan to mobilize the masses, bring millions of people on the streets to hold demonstrations and train them for the coming general insurrection. It called for bold development of the organizations for National Salva-

tion of the Viet Minh Front, to develop « the political guard of the masses » and prepare the decisive assault — the general insurrection to seize power. This slogan entirely conformed to the vital and immediate interests of the masses who supported and heartily took part in it. Attacks on rice stocks broke out continually and spread to numerous communes in North and Central Viet Nam. In daily struggles, the Party did not neglect to link economic slogans with political ones, including slogans for the overthrowing of the Japanese fascists and the wresting back of power for the people.

Those struggles were interrelated with repression of traitors, puppet notables, and ruffians, warnings to mandarins and puppet officials of villages and cantons, opposition to requisition of rice and refusal to pay taxes to the Japanese, public speeches by shock teams, and armed propaganda units in markets, landing-places, enterprises, schools, theatres. Leaflets, placards, gold-starred red flags appeared everywhere, right in some Japanese barracks and offices of the puppet administration. The Viet Minh reputation echoed throughout the cities and countryside, the delta and the mountainous areas. The movement included not only workers, peasants, small traders, students and public servants, but even national bourgeois and a number of small landowners. Organizations for national salvation, particularly the self-defence units, developed at an unprecedented speed. In many localities, the enemy administrative machinery was paralyzed. The primary Liberation Committees came forward to organize the maintenance of security and order, the building of revolutionary order and safeguarding of the people's lives and property. In many places, the people, slighting the puppet power and ignoring them, went to the Liberation Committees and asked them to settle their disputes and disagreements in their every day life.

The fever of the insurrection was boiling throughout the whole country.

The great World War was entering the last stage. The German and Italian fascists had surrendered. The Japanese fascists were also nearing their end. In July, 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, the Soviet Union decided to participate in the war on the Eastern Front.

In Summer 1945, Comrade Ho Chi Minh* arrived at Tan Trao (Son Duong, Tuyen Quang province) the headquarters of the Revolution in the Free zone. The Central Committee, headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh, decided to convene the National Congress of the Party and the People's Congress.

The National Congress of the Party opened on August 13, 1945, at Tan Trao, comprising representatives from all Party branches and a number of representatives in activity abroad, decided to launch the general insurrection and put forth three principles: centralization, unification and timeliness, to guide the insurrection.

The Congress stressed that « forces must be concentrated upon the essential tasks », « unity of action must be realized in the military and political fields » and that we must « demoralize the enemy and induce them to surrender before fighting them. »

Besides the main question which was that of the general insurrection, the National Congress of the Party took many important decisions on domestic and foreign policies to apply when power was in our hands.

As regard domestic policy, the Congress emphasized that great attention should be paid to propaganda and education and to the organization of the masses into the organizations in the Viet Minh

* From now on Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc is called Comrade Ho Chi Minh.

Front. Attention should be given to agricultural production, first of all to food production. The Congress defined the national flag and national anthem of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam; endorsed the great ten-point Viet Minh policy as the fundamental and immediate policy of the whole Party, and entire people.

As regards **foreign policy**, the Congress pointed out the policy of making full use of the contradictions between Britain, France, the U. S. A., and Chiang Kai-shek, to by all means avoid being alone in face of many enemies at the same time; to strive to win the approval and support of the Soviet Union and the world people, especially the French and Chinese peoples; to shatter the French imperialists' schemes of coming back to our country and Chiang Kai-shek's plots of turning our country into a vassal.

The resolutions of the Congress guided the whole Party in the leadership of the Vietnamese people to rise and win back power. At the same time they pointed out to the whole Party and people the guiding principles and policies to be implemented after the victory of the insurrection.

Immediately after the winding up of the National Congress, on August 16, 1945, the People's Congress met at Tan Trao. Present at the Congress were 60 representatives from political parties, people's organizations, various nationalities and religions, including representatives from the North, Centre and South and a number of Vietnamese residents coming from abroad. For the first time, the representatives of the Viet Minh Front in the whole country and representatives from various nationalities in Viet Nam saw Comrade Ho Chi Minh, their respected and beloved leader.

The People's Congress wholeheartedly approved of the policy of general insurrection advocated by the Indochinese Communist Party and the General Committee of the Viet Minh. Representing the Party at

the Congress, Comrade Truong Chinh made it clear that: We must wrest power from the hands of the Japanese and their stooges before the arrival of the Allies in Indochina, and, as masters of the country, we shall receive the Allies who come to disarm the Japanese.

The Congress adopted the ten-point Viet Minh policy and elected the Viet Nam National Liberation Committee, which was tantamount to the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam headed by Comrade Ho Chi Minh.

The news of the Japanese capitulation spread throughout the whole country. The order of general insurrection was given everywhere, exalting the masses and the people.

The whole people rose up like one man. The indomitable spirit of the nation surged up stronger than ever before.

The Liberation Army, starting from Tan Trao marched on Thai Nguyen town which was then still in the Japanese hands. In the whole country, the armed organizations, self-defence units, national salvation organizations, the entire people rose up to carry out the general insurrection and seize power.

Because of difficult means of liaison, many localities had not received the Central Committee order of general insurrection, but, basing themselves on the Central Committee's instructions « Our tactics in relation to the Franco-Japanese conflict », they led the people to rise up and seize power. The people in Ha Tinh province rose on August 12, 1945, the people in Quang Ngai, on August 13, 1945. On the 14th and 15th, many Japanese posts standing in the proximity of the Free zone were seized by our forces.

But it was in the three big cities: Hanoi, Hue and Saigon, that the August general insurrection won victories of a main and decisive meaning.

In Hanoi, while our Party was actively preparing for the insurrection, the reactionaries set up the « National Salvation Committee » with a view to beguiling the masses and opposing the Revolution. On August 17, 1945, the General Association of Functionaries held a meeting in favour of the Tran Trong Kim puppet Government. Answering the Front's call, the people of Hanoi protested energetically and turned this meeting in favour of the Viet Minh Front. The revolutionary effervescence was prevailing. Many enterprises, offices and shops closed down, the general political strike broke out.

On August 19, 1945, more than one hundred thousand inhabitants of Hanoi, under the leadership of the Party, displayed their forces in a huge demonstration which quickly turned into an insurrection for the peaceful conquest of power in the capital city.

The victory of the insurrection in Hanoi gave a strong impetus to the movement in other towns and the countryside. This victory greatly influenced the victory of the August Revolution as a whole.

Following the insurrection in Hanoi was the successful insurrection in Hue (August 23, 1945). On August 25, 1945, the Delegation of the Central Government headed by Comrade Tran Huy Lieu went to Hue to receive Bao Dai's abdication.

In Nam Bo, on August 25, 1945, more than one million people, under our Party's leadership, held a huge demonstration and won power in Saigon.

Within ten days, the August General Insurrection was successful in the whole country. From the Central down to the village levels, the people's revolutionary power was established. On August 27, 1945, the Viet Nam Provisional Government was re-shuffled, and included non-Viet Minh and non-Party personalities.

On September 2, 1945, 500,000 people of Hanoi and from other provinces gathered in Ba Dinh Square,

Hanoi, to hold a meeting to acclaim the first Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

On behalf of the Provisional Government President Ho Chi Minh read the **Declaration of Independence**, declared that the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam was born, inaugurating a new glorious page of the history of the Vietnamese nation.

The **Declaration of Independence** affirmed the role of the masses as the creators of history, and the authors of the Revolution. The August Revolution was the work of the people under the leadership of the Party.

September 2, 1945, will for ever remain one of the most glorious days of the Vietnamese people.

Combining their action with the Vietnamese revolutionaries, the Laotian people, under the leadership of Laotian democrats and patriots, headed by Prince Souphanouvong, rose to seize power. Simultaneously, the Cambodian people rose up too, to wage the revolutionary struggle.

The Vietnamese Revolution influenced the revolution in our two neighbouring countries and had a resounding echo on Southeast-Asian people and French colonies in Africa.

The victory of the August Revolution put an end to more than eighty years of imperialist and thousands of years of feudal oppression, and brought the Vietnamese people from the condition of slaves to that of masters of the country. « It is the first time in the revolutionary history of colonial and semi-colonial people, that a party of only fifteen years of age has led the revolution to success and won power in the whole country ».

This great victory was due first to the united forces in the struggle of our entire people, to the heroic

* Excerpt from President Ho Chi Minh's political report at the Second Congress of the Party, in February 1951.

sacrificing spirit of all cadres, Party members and members of National Salvation associations, and particularly because our Party had successfully applied Marxism-Leninism to the Vietnamese conditions.

On the other hand, the success of the August Revolution was due partly to the victory gained by the heroic Soviet Army over the aggressive fascists, including the Japanese fascists, which created extremely favourable conditions for our people to rise up and seize power.

From the August Revolution we have drawn the following experiences :

I. CAREFUL PREPARATION :

« The success of the Revolution does not come by itself, it must be prepared and won*. The August Revolution took place within the span of only fifteen days but it had been prepared through fifteen years from the first days of our Party. The struggles launched by the people from the birth of our Party until 1945 were so many drills on a great or small scale to prepare the August Revolution. From the May, 1941, Session of the Central Committee to the August, 1945, National Congress of the Party, many instructions and resolutions of the Party had directed the work of the Party and the Viet Minh front towards the preparations for general insurrection and seizure of power.

On the ideological field, the Party combatted and smashed all pessimistic and defeatist ideas, the tendency to surrender to the French-Japanese fascists, to collaborate with and make use of them, and other erroneous thinkings ; united the whole Party and

* Stalin : The Principles of Leninism, (reprinted) Vol. 2, Part 1, Chap. 1.

entire people to reach the aim of the struggle, the general insurrection for the seizure of power.

On the organizational field, the Party strove to train cadres, build up the bases of the Resistance, organize the armed and semi-armed forces, seize local power, and found the Free zone. At the same time, the Party united all people's strata into the Viet Minh Front and organized « the political army of the masses », ready to struggle under the leadership of the Party.

Thanks to the long and careful preparations of the Party, our people throughout the country availed themselves of the opportunity which was given to them by the capitulation of the Japanese fascists to the Soviet Union and the Allies, to rise up as one man, seize power, and found the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

2. SEIZE THE RIGHT OPPORTUNITY

In an insurrection « if we seize the right opportunity, our victory will be ensured ». *

Our Party decided to launch the general insurrection at a time when the objective and subjective conditions were most favourable. In the world, the democratic forces led by the Soviet Union had crushed the German, Italian and Japanese fascists. In Viet Nam, the enemies of the Revolution, the French imperialists, had been ousted and sent sprawling by the Japanese fascists who were also defeated and reduced to a state of extreme confusion. The Japanese troops in Indochina were completely demoralized, the imperialists' stooges had lost their support, and the broad masses of people were feverishly struggling for their right to live. The middle strata were tending towards the Revolution and the vanguard our Party

* Lenin : Left Wing Communism : An Infantile Disorder

was resolved to sacrifice to the last in leading the masses to smash all chains of slavery and secure independence and freedom. Though the opportunity was most favourable it only lasted a short time. If we had launched the general insurrection immediately after the March 9, 1945, **coup de force** or before the Japanese surrender to the Soviet Union and the Allies, we would have suffered great losses and would not have been able to seize power in the whole country. On the contrary, if we had not launched the insurrection after the Japanese capitulation to the Soviet Union and the Allies, before the British and U. S. A. Armies (or the army of Chiang Kai-shek) had entered our country and the Tran Trong Kim puppet government had got in touch with them, or before the French colonialists came back and restored the old power, the favourable opportunity would no longer have existed. To seize the right opportunity to launch the struggle was an important successful experience of the August Revolution.

3. LAUNCHING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY

HIGH TIDE OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE:

«To win success, the armed insurrection must rely on the people's revolutionary high tide.»* This is a Marxist-Leninist principle.

The August Revolution had drawn the great majority of the people to rise up. Our whole people from North to South, from the countryside to the town, belonging to all classes, nationalities and religions were closing their ranks under the banner of the Party. In this high tidal wave, the workers and peasants were the greatest force with a decisive influence on the victory of the insurrection. Scores of thousands of workers, poor people and students

* Lenin: **Marxism and the Question of Armed Insurrection**

in towns, millions of peasants in the countryside, under the Party leadership, held demonstrations followed by displays of force in the streets, and by direct action took power into their hands. The high tide of the anti-Japanese struggle for National Salvation was indeed an unprecedented revolutionary high tide of the whole people in our national history.

It was precisely thanks to this revolutionary surging tide that the August Revolution had rapidly gained victory, though Party cadres and members were few and the armed forces of the people were small...

4. SKILFUL COMBINATION OF FORMS OF ARMED STRUGGLE WITH FORMS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE

The August Revolution was a creative combination of forms of armed struggle with forms of political struggle.

Since the Bac Son insurrection (September 1940), the Party's policy was to maintain armed forces, build bases and by means of armed struggles, to promote the political struggle in the whole country.

After the March 9, 1945, Japanese **coup de force**, the general form of struggle was armed demonstrations, and the particular form of struggle then was guerilla warfare where the conditions were favourable with the use of «units of honour» to repress traitors in towns and countryside.

After the Japanese surrender to the Soviet Union and the Allies, the National Congress of the Party held at Tan Trao decided to «combine military and political actions» in order to launch the general insurrection.

During the feverish days of the August Revolution, the widespread and main forms of struggle were general political demonstrations by the masses closely combined with local armed struggles, and armed demonstrations with displays of force turning into local armed insurrections. All these forms of struggle paved the way for the general insurrection for the seizure of power in the whole country.

5. MAKING FULL USE OF THE CONTRADICTIONS IN THE ENEMY'S RANKS AND SPEARHEADING OUR FORCES AT THE MAIN ENEMY

From the November, 1939, Session of the Central Committee to the May, 1941, Session, our Party conceived of the foundation of a broad National United Front in order to aim the spearhead of our forces at the enemy of the nation, the Japanese-French fascist imperialists.

After the February, 1943, Session of the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee, the Party recognized the necessity to broaden the Front further, to unite with national bourgeoisie and intellectuals; to carry on propaganda among the enemy soldiers and functionaries, win over anti-fascist foreign residents, and differentiate between the ranks of the French in Indochina and thoroughly isolate the Japanese-French fascists.

After the Japanese **coup de force** (March 9, 1945), the Party replaced the slogan «Drive out the Japanese and French» by the slogan «Drive out the Japanese fascists», concentrating the fire of revolutionary struggle on the Japanese fascists and pro-Japanese traitors.

The August Revolution broke out. While the Japanese fascists who had surrendered to the Soviet

Union and the Allies were demoralized and practically did not fight us any more, our Party advocated the neutralization of the Japanese in order to concentrate our forces to disintegrate the pro-Japanese puppet administrative machinery. Even the puppets were in a confused vacillating situation, therefore our Party worked to win over as many forces as possible, neutralize others, thus isolating the most stubborn reactionary elements to overthrow them. Thus, our Party availed itself of the least contradictions among the enemy ranks, to paralyse the opposition of counter-revolutionary forces and dissolve the ranks of the pro-Japanese clique.

To make full use of the contradictions among the enemy ranks and take good aim at the main enemy was a feature and also a good point of the August Revolution.

The lessons and experiences of the August Revolution have a practical influence on our people's struggle to achieve the task of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country. At the same time, they make a contribution to the enrichment of the treasure of revolutionary theory in a colonial and semi-feudal country, in an epoch when imperialism is in decay and socialism is victorious.