claimed that until 1970 his hamlet had been largely ignored by the government and permitted to manage most its affairs under a "Council on Religion" and to maintain a school for religious instruction. So long as religionists met their quotas and acquiesced in the political order the party left them alone. This was in a rural area heavily populated by Catholics).

More familiar to Americans than the problem of ethnic and religious minorities in the North is that of land reform. Most public discussion of this episode has concentrated on the number of people killed. Rather than subject this question to still another analysis, I should like only to enter into the record the findings of the most recent, dispassionate study, which concluded that "the total number of people executed * * * was probably in the vicinity of 5,000, and almost certainly between 3,000 and 15,000, and * * * the slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent victims, often described in anti-Communist propaganda, never took place." (Edwin E. Moise, "Land Reform and Land Reform Errors in North Vietnam," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, Spring 1976, p. 78). Moreover, of those executed an unknown but evidently substantial proportion were individuals who indeed had committed crimes. Not all stories of landlords who murdered, bribed and tattled to the French in order to preserve their petty tyrannies were products of revolutionary fiction. Whether they deserved the extreme sanction they received depends on the point of view. From the point of view of the party central committee, as presented at its 10th plenum in October 1956, at least some of these executions were not justified, and likewise many instances of corporal punishment and political disenfranchisement were admitted to have been unjustified. These "errors" often were committed by vengeful mobs egged on by over-zealous, poorly trained, cadre. Effort subsequently was made to rectify these errors. There is no hard evidence that party leaders cynically desired this trauma for psychological effect and quite a lot to suggest that they believed the goal of redistributing wealth and power could have been achieved at less cost in human suffering. So far they have not made similar errors in the South.

Finally there were the intellectuals. Taking their cue from China's "Hundred Flowers" campaign, a large group of leading intellectuals in 1956–57 published several journals of independent opinion which were highly critical, in a bitingly satirical fashion, of the party, the army, the bureaucracy, and any number of aspects of life in the DRV. Most of these intellectuals were party members or at least had participated actively on the Viet Minh side in the war against France. As in the case of dissident intellectuals in other Communist countries, they purported to seek perfection of the socialist order not to bring it down. After about six months, the government finally organized popular protests against the dissidents, cut off their supply of newsprint, and hounded them into silence. In contrast to the hundred flowers campaign in China, two extenuating factors in Vietnam were the intellectuals' considerable power relative to the party's still underdeveloped machinery for controlling arts and letters and the coincidence of errors in land reform which left the party uniquely vulnerable to criticism. Party leaders might genuinely have felt the intellectuals posed a threat to stability. Whatever the case, the dissidents passed out of public view and since then the movement has been held up as a symbol of antipatriotic thought.

Turning now to present conditions in Vietnam, we should acknowledge that our sources of information are not always reliable. The testimony of foreign observers is contradictory, reflecting personal biases, selective perception, and limited experience. Correspondence with friends and relatives is similarly tainted. Rumors passed around the refugee community only amplify the bias of the original source. The government press is about as good a source as any, and of course it also is partial. In this situation all dogmatic assertions about what is really happening, especially assertions which extrapolate from a specific incident to a general conclusion, should be greeted with skepticism. And, most important, we should always consider the background of reported incidents and government policies. With these qualifications it is reasonable only to summarize the broad features of a few selected issues in which questions of human rights may be raised.

Much publicity has been given to the "re-education" and subsequent treatment of former soldiers and civil servants of the Saigon government. No one contests the legitimacy of the Communists' effort to disarm and reintegrate their former enemies, but questions have been raised as to their ultimate fate. As of this date all but a couple percent of persons who entered reeducation camps have been released. Most have been restored to full political rights and cast ballots in the

election for the National Assembly last year. If it is true that less than half of the more than one million persons slated for reeducation actually passed through the camps, the number remaining is probably in the vicinity of 10,000–30,000. Since these persons have had more than enough time to digest their "reeducation," there is much plausibility to reports that their lives now consist simply of penal servitude and "constructive labor." Distinction however should be made between individuals who no longer constitute a threat to Communist rule and remain in camps only because they were on the losing side, and those who remain because by any objective standard they are culpable for criminal acts. The former should be considered political prisoners; the latter, such as police and security officials who tortured Communist cadres or abused the powers of office, criminals. Unfortunately there is no way to determine how many persons fit in each category, and even if we had precise information on every case the culpability of many would remain arguable. Certainly an indeterminate number of indisputably political prisoners do exist, but they are a very small percentage of the total number of persons who served the former regime.

As for reports of individuals sent to the camps apparently for no other reason than association with the United States through education or work for an American organization, there are more reports of others who have not been similarly stigmatized and in fact have continued to enjoy relatively privileged positions. The negative reports have declined over time, suggesting that as the situation has stabilized the government has gained confidence. Of course many of these people and their families have suffered sharp decline in their standard of living, but this has been part of the general levelling process in which formerly privileged groups have been made to share the economic hardships of the poor. The government is also under constant pressure from its war-time supporters and their families to make room in housing and employment for those who made sacrifices for the revolution, if necessary at the expense of those who opposed it.

The position of ethnic and religious minorities is more ambiguous. The Catholics constituted perhaps the best organized and most stridently anti-communist group in Vietnam. Many Catholics genuinely feared for their lives as the Communists approached, and they have been among those most willing to express hostility to the new regime, as demonstrated in the incident in Vinh Son church in February 1976. The government's policy, an extension of the policy developed earlier in the North, is to mollify Catholics by guaranteeing freedom of worship but at the same time to curb their political power by confiscating some of the church's material assets and surveilling its activities. Given the mutually reinforcing negative perceptions of Communists and Catholics in Vietnam it is not surprising that their relationship should be tense. Nor is it surprising that it should produce reports that are impossible to substantiate. Thus we hear that Nguyen Van Thuan, the bishop of Nha Trang, accused of being a CIA agent, died after torture; and that Nguyen Huu Thanh, the anti-Communist Redemptorist priest who led protests assailing the corruption of the Thieu regime is in prison. In assessing such reports, not only must we question their veracity, but also we must entertain the possibility that the government's action has been a legitimate exercise of its responsibility to maintain order. Based on precedents in the North, we can expect the government to permit religious observance and not to discriminate against Catholics as a group but at the same time to curtail the autonomy and some of the educational and other social services the church has provided them.

Similar observations should be made about the Hoa Hao, a Buddhist sect centered in the Mekong Delta, and the Cao Dai, a syncretic religious movement headquartered in Tay Ninh province. Both of these groups, particularly the Hoa Hao (some branches of which hold the Communists responsible for the assassination of their founder in 1947), over the years have sought to increase their independence from the central government and at times have maintained private military forces for this purpose. I have seen no information worth mentioning on how these groups have fared, but when reports are received consideration should be given to the very real problems of order and security which these groups always have posed as well as to the means the government employs to deal with them.

The situation is if anything more complex in the mountainous areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. Ever since 1946 the Communists, taking a page from their earlier experience with minorities along the Chinese and northern Laotian borders, promised southern minorities some measure of autonomy in return for their support. Thereafter minority support for the Communists fluctuated in

proportion to the degree they felt repressed by successive Saigon governments. The Communist policy had mixed success until the last stages of the war. At that time even groups that had fought alongside American forces against the Communists in the late 1960's switched to the Communist side. Subsequently the Communists placed minority leaders in reeducation camps, began moving ethnic Vietnamese into the highlands to build "new economic areas" (just as Ngo Dinh Diem had done years before), and in general failed to live up to their promise. Many of these people then went into resistance, and the government has confirmed in its own press that armed conflict continues. From this record it might be concluded that the government is embarked on a policy of forced assimilation. At very least it has been clumsy in its dealings with the minorities since spring 1975. However it is difficult to ascertain whether this reflects a systematic policy or merely inept handling of turmoil stemming from the war's chaotic end. On the basis of past experience in the North, the government might have been expected to extend full political, economic and cultural equality, with integration and partial assimilation to occur by a natural and gradual process, much as modern nation-states have been consolidated in other parts of the world. In more recent years there has been evidence of desire to accelerate this process in the North, and it appears that current policy reflects anxiety, exacerbated by long years of war, about the security of remote border areas as much as it does traditional Vietnamese arrogance toward these groups. In any event, when appraising the evidence we are faced with the philosophical problem of deciding upon two legitimate but conflicting interests: the government's desire to integrate the minorities into the national community and concern with the security of its borders, on the one hand, and the desire of the minorities for separate development, on the other.

In all of these cases we must ask to what extent SRV action is justified in view of prevailing conditions. In this connection article 4 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights recognizes the right of governments to "take measures derogating from their obligations under the * * * covenant * * * in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation * * * provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin." The life of the nation is not threatened at present in Vietnam, but the period since the spring victory certainly has been a time of public emergency. It hardly could have been otherwise in the wake of thirty years of revolutionary war which pitted irreconcilable ideologies, faiths, class interests and personal ambitions against one another. We can expect civil disturbances to splutter on for a decade, periodically provoking repressive action which our sensibilities, formed in a much more harmonious environment, may find distasteful. This incidentally would have been the case even if the Thieu regime, not the Communists, had won, and I doubt very much the Thieu regime would have been as skillful as the Communists in combining positive incentives and persuasion with indirect coercion to bring about the stability and social reform this society so desperately needed. Actually, in view of the dimensions of the problems it has faced the SRV's handling of the transition from fratricidal war to peace and the redistribution of wealth and power has been measured and judicious, if not as mild as some of its defenders have claimed it to be.

I do not wish this to be read as an apology for everything that has happened or may happen. The SRV is not a paragon of pluralist, democratic enlightenment. Unlike the Western European communist parties the Vietnamese have not discarded even in their rhetoric their insistence upon "genuine socialist freedom" at the expense of "bourgeois liberties." They also are capable of being unnecessarily heavy-handed, as seems to be the case with respect to the ethnic minorities. But in relation to the problems it has faced and by comparison with a number of governments we count among our friends the SRV's record on human rights thus far does not deserve to be an important consideration in our relations with it. We should follow events there closely but postpone judgment.

Finally, any appraisal of human rights in Vietnam must take into account how rights are understood in Vietnam. Party leaders of course take the ideological position that freedom has meaning and rights can be exercised only through fulfilling the purposes of organized social communities. This conception is in reasonable conformity with traditional Vietnamese political culture, and the party has developed terminology to express it which resonates with deeply rooted popular yearnings for a sense of community within the family, the village, and the nation as a whole. Besides these yearnings American emphasis on rights of

individual self-expression seem out of place—except among intellectuals and others exposed to western, urban values. More important, party leaders have skillfully wedded their corporate conception of rights to the cause of national independence. They depict the freedom and unity of the Vietnamese nation as the highest right, which they maintain rather convincingly the United States sought to violate. A similar position taken by an Eastern European government would not be nearly so credible. In this environment we cannot expect our deliberations about human rights to be taken very seriously in Vietnam. It is unfortunate but true that should we uncover irrefutable evidence of systematic violations of human rights in Vietnam our protestations will sound hollow in the very quarter where we should want them to have most effect.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Dr. Turley.

Let me start out with a general proposition, and see what the witnesses say. It had been my assumption throughout the period of the Vietnamese war that if the north prevailed or the Liberation Front prevailed, that the likelihood would be that there would be established a Communist regime which would probably be similar to but probably a variant on the regimes that we see in Cuba or Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union or China.

In other words, one's expectation was that it would be—this is my expectation, maybe nobody else's—that it would be like those regimes, highly ideological, highly coercive, professing to deal with problems of distributive justice and equity, forbidding free press, making it a crime to criticize or challenge, in effect, in some fashion the existing government, probably limiting immigration, and having a rather thoroughly controlled one-party state. They, it seems to me, are the common generic characteristics of these regimes.

What would the witnesses say about that? Would that have been your expectation, and whether it was or not, is that what you think in general is what has happened?

Father GELINAS. I do, certainly. This is what I think most of the Vietnamese who fought communism expected, and to me, there is no doubt whatsoever that it is what did happen. Now, as Dr. Turley says, one can study the inner workings of the party dictatorship and distinguish it from the inner working in Cuba and China. They have variations, certainly, but it is, to me, totally obvious that it is a dictatorship of the party, that it is coercive, that it is ideological. I don't think anyone can deny that.

Mr. TURLEY. I certainly wasn't surprised by the outcome, and I never held any delusions about the central direction of the revolution. It was clear from a very early stage in the war that the Vietnamese Communist Party, at that time known as the Vietnamese Workers Party, had a central committee in Hanoi, and various revolutionary organizations in the south were essentially extensions of it, and they themselves have made no bones about this since the spring of 1975.

Of course, institutionally, its structure very definitely is similar to that which we find in the other party rule states, and we should expect it to evolve as an authoritarian state, bearing most of the marks that we find in the Eastern European and Soviet world.

Yes, I guess I would agree. I guess the question that comes to my mind then is, well, OK, so what? Does that really advance our understanding much? I just would make a couple of observations around that that don't really satisfy me, but I think they are important to consider.

First of all is that regardless of what political movement came to power in Vietnam, I think you would find it exhibiting many of the same traits. It would not be ideological in the same fashion. The Vietnamese Communists take ideology seriously, but they have also shown a great deal of flexibility and pragmatism. One could show you examples of this throughout their history, and they are willing to use coercion if that is necessary. Show me a government which is not when it comes to maintaining itself in power, or when it comes to achieving distributive justice that is considered to be necessary for the livelihood of all people, and so forth, these things are true, but this is a society that was much more divided against itself than we can comprehend, living here in a country that has been at peace for so long, basically at health with itself.

We think of the 1960's as a time of trouble. That is nothing by comparison with what Vietnam has been through, and it is very hard to imagine any government, even one ideologically committed to democratic pluralist ideals, which no political movement in Vietnam really was, at least none of them that had a chance of winning, instituting those ideals in the Vietnamese context. I think it would be extraordinarily difficult.

Now, if you are asking what would be a feasible scenario in that kind of complex, conflictual situation, I think that it would be possible to do a better job than the Vietnamese Communists are doing right now, yes, but there will be times, there would be times, regardless of who was in power, when there would have to be a few heads knocked together.

Mr. FRASER. Ms. Forsythe.

Ms. FORSYTHE. Yes; I guess I don't feel capable to compare systems, because I am not a systems analyst, and I have never been anywhere else but Vietnam, so with that kind of an introduction, the one point I might like to pick up on, and again, I can't compare with other systems, is the element of flexibility. There is absolutely no question that the Lao Dong Party is the central party in Vietnam, and is the ideological force that projects long-range plans, and so on and so forth, but for me, living on a street in Saigon, there was also some ability as a grassroots person, and granted, a foreigner, but I felt it among my neighbors as well, to have some input into what happened in our lives on that street.

That is the little picture, and I think that is important, and had a great deal to do with my sense about what is happening in Vietnam today.

Mr. FRASER. Well, in my question, I wasn't trying to make a moral judgment. I was trying to be descriptive at this point.

Once we decided we weren't going to continue in that war, or to support the Saigon Government, I suppose that it was probably inevitable, at least given the circumstances, that the Communist Party, the Lao Dong Party, or—I guess that is the North Vietnamese Party, but anyhow, its counterpart in South Vietnam, would come to power.

It seems to me there are two other basic questions. One would be, I suppose, looking backward, did this have to happen, which to some extent is water over the dam, but it undoubtedly continues to be of interest to many people. Then, the other question is, What policy im-

plications are there for the United States? We have fashioned our foreign policy in a very general way in the last two decades in fearing and being concerned with the so-called Communist world, and we have given very vigorous support to the so-called free world, terms which seem to have been overgenerous when you examine the countries which fall into the free world, but maybe just one last question, and then my colleagues will have some.

Father Gelinas, you itemized in sort of detail some of the things that happened, the abolition of the free press, the shutdowns of the electronic media, the reeducation camps, and so on. I gather that on those particular details—Is there any argument? The one argument I sense may be the question of how many people have been or are in the reeducation camps. What about this question of people disappearing, however, which is a somewhat more ominous one?

Father GELINAS. Well, the question of the numbers of people in the reeducation camps that you just mentioned, Dr. Turley said that he is not aware of any official statements of the Government. Tran Van Tra, who was the head of the Government in the south, General Tra, who was the provisional head for the first 6 months or even more, 9 months, said on the day he was replaced, on the 21st of January, 1976, in his speech, sortant de charge, his—the speech on the day he was leaving the office, that there were at that time hundreds of thousands of men being reeducated, in reeducation. Now, he was making a list of the problems——

Mr. FRASER. You said hundreds of thousands?

Father GELINAS. Hundreds of thousands. He did not say how many hundreds of thousands. Now, the only other statement which I know of an authority, a Communist authority, was the one made by Mr. Tra, the former spokesman of the south in Paris, who said at the Stockholm TV—he was interviewed in Stockholm, in Sweden, and he talked about 1 million men reeducated, but the context was not clear. He probably meant all processes of reeducation, including camps and also those who were being reeducated at home.

So, in other words, the statement of Tra does not mean much, but to me, it is significant that the only two statements which have dared to publish big figures, which the Government obviously does not publish, the only two statements come from southerners, authorities who were leaving office, being replaced by northerners, who were bitter.

As you know, there is a very strong rivalry between the winning northern group, who is taking over all the important jobs—Madame Binh is about the only person of name which has been left in the new government, and she has been given a small ministrate. So, there is resentment among the southerners, the southern Communists. They felt that they fought the war, that they carried the heaviest part of the burden, and now they are completely neglected.

So, it might be significant that these two statements come from southerners. Maybe it was—they said it intentionally to compromise the Government.

Now, statements from the northern government are few and vague. Francois Mitterand, the head of the French leftist party, the French Socialist Party, published an editorial in L'Unite, which is the newspaper of the leftist party in France, where he called upon the Vietnamese to answer these charges.

He says textually, "I must know, you have to answer." There was never any answer.

As you know, here in the United States there was a letter published by Daniel Berrigan, Joan Baez, Bishop Gumbleton, the other Berrigan, and about 20 or 30 important pacifist persons, who, after the Communist takeover, wrote to the man, the observer of the Communist government at the United Nations, asking him to answer these charges, saying: "well, we feel most uncomfortable"—this letter was published in the New York Times. Everyone can see it. "We feel uncomfortable. We fought for you, and now, well, we would like to know what it is all about. We did not fight for that type of punishment and destruction of civil liberties." And there was no answer.

It is because there was no answer, as is stated in the New York Times, that the letter was made public. So, on the one hand, you have silence from the Government, except the few of them who are from the south, who have dared to give figures, embarrassing the Government. Lately, very lately, the Government has finally understood that they had to make some statements, and that is when we began to hear about 30,000 or 40,000. That is the figure which is usually given now.

Where do I get my figure of 300,000? Obviously, I have not counted them, but I have lived with the people for 19 years. I have thousands and thousands of friends through the children, the university students and the families, and in my experience, I can say in Saigon between, oh, let's say, the lowest would be 60 percent and the highest would be 80 percent, or even 85 percent, of the educated people were all taken.

So, if you have roughly 80 percent of the people, educated people, gone, that could hardly be much less than 300,000, 400,000 people.

Now, from the reports that I have from the other priests, the pastors in the different parishes, from the bishops, from the demilitarized zone all the way to the south, I have heard of the location of these reeducation camps. This is secret, but after a while you know, you hear, there is a camp in this place, because the road is blocked, and there is a camp there, you can't go there, and someone has a report because they have managed to contact the people, and I have got word of roughly between 60 and 90, or around that, camps.

None of the reports I have heard from people coming out of camps list a population of prisoners of less than 3,500 per camp. Some say 5,000, some say 3,500. There is a camp where they claim that they have 20,000. I never saw it. It is out north of Hue.

So, if we have camps of roughly 3,000 or 4,000 prisoners, and if we have close to 100 of them, it would come up to the figures which are usually quoted. So, these figures are vague, I admit it, but they come from different computations, and they all come more or less to the same number.

Now, it is interesting to know who is in these camps. A word was said a moment ago that police, former policemen would be there. Every person who has been on the list of officers in the army, and as you know, Vietnam was at war for 20 years, and for 20 years the law has been that everyone who finishes his university studies is officially a student to officer school, to military school.

Now, many of these people have never been to war. They are on the list. They are reserve. These people were all called, people who have never been soldiers. So, since Vietnam is a country where there is a

large proportion of secondary education, it is not surprising that there would be 300,000, 400,000, 500,000 who would be on these lists.

Now, you mentioned those who are being arrested. I have no way of knowing how many have been arrested, except that for 15 months my job all day long was to receive the people who came crying that, my father is gone, my son is gone, my daughter has disappeared, and I have talked to very, very many people that way, and a few who have been arrested have come out, and they have described the conditions in the jails or in the houses of detention, and that is where I learned how crowded they are.

Usually, a room—one instance I have in mind—a room 6 meters by 5 held 32 people, which is an average of 1 square meter per person. So, it is very crowded.

Now, most BOQ's and BEQ's are used for that purpose, and it would be easy to get from the Pentagon the number of BOQ's and BEQ's, the houses for the U.S. military personnel that you have in Saigon. These buildings are crowded. So, there is certainly a large number of prisoners.

Now, one should—if we were making a more complete testimony, one would have to distinguish between reeducation camps for one, true prison, two, and detention. They are three different things. From true prison, one rarely comes out. From detention, you do come out. Detention is when you are taken—you are called to the police station and you are taken, and you may come out a few months later. They just wanted to ask questions or they suspected you, but from prison you rarely come out.

Mr. FRASER. Ms. Forsythe.

Ms. FORSYTHE. I knew two people who were detained in Saigon when I was there. One was an American named Bill Cooper, who had worked with the AFSC for a number of years in Quang Ngai, who was held for a number of months, and his own story has been published in the newspaper. The things he described in jail, and I don't know whether I am allowed to talk for someone else, but——

Mr. FRASER. You can repeat what he said, if you think it is deserving of repeating.

Ms. FORSYTHE. The only comment was that jails were holding criminals, and that would include North Vietnamese or soldiers who had in one way or another accepted a bribe, you know, just whatever the range of crime was. Now, I am not sure exactly what Father Gelinas is saying, so I am not quite clear.

The other person was a former worker in our center who came down and put on black pajamas. He came to visit us in Saigon, and borrowed our bicycle and went around the streets pretending to be a bo-doi, and asking people to give him free meals, and he was held for 2 weeks for that kind of an impersonation. They felt that he was wrecking the name of the revolution, and he was not mistreated. He was held, and had hoc-tap every morning, as just about everyone in Vietnam does, including Dr. Tom Hoskins, who worked in a hospital in Da Nang and had education sessions once a week as part of their staff routine.

Hoc-tap is a way of life in Vietnam for everyone who is there. It is a matter of the Government and the vast numbers of cadres communicating to the people what is going on there, and it is also a

method they use with themselves to constantly be remembering what it is all about and why they are there and why they are doing that.

I don't know what else to say. I have, in my 6 months, been living on Yen Do, which was about two blocks away from Alexander-de-Rhodes Study Center, I never heard of any disappearances, and so I don't know what to say.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Turley.

Mr. TURLEY. Let me start by saying that I heard of a lot of disappearances, but they all happened from my classroom in 1973. But I would like to go back to the statement of Father Gelinas, the recounting of the evidence as to the number of people who might be in the camps, and again, I say, I don't know, and I don't think that anyone has a very good idea, but to give you an idea of the kind of problems that are involved in judging the information we have, the statement by General Tra in January 1976, in which he said there were hundreds of thousands of camps, came at about the time they were beginning to release them, and by the spring of that year the figures, the sort of general, vague statements that the people were making, suggested a lower figure, and this was in advance of the national elections in April of 1976.

They said at that time that of all of the people who had gone to the camps, 95 percent had been released and restored to full political rights, which meant, of course, that 5 percent were still in the camps, and at about the same time there were other estimates, both by those—I can't remember the exact source, but it was a Vietnamese source overseas speaking for the SRV, and an American intelligence source, that estimated that perhaps at most half of the over 1 million people who qualified for reeducation had actually gone through the camps.

So, if you extrapolate from those figures, then you would say that the number in camps in June of 1976 was certainly not in the hundreds of thousands. It was something substantially lower. Now, subsequently, who knows? There just doesn't seem to be a rational proposition that they would retain such a large number of people in camps at this time. It is not a very economical proposition.

One other observation. Father Gelinas cited the fact that these observations had been made by outgoing southerners, and that this tells us something about the nature of the regime and that the statements had some sort of special credibility.

We should remember that these people, whether northerners or southerners, have fought the same war for in many cases 45 years, and that the individuals who were the front men, if you will, for the party in the south were loyal party followers, and that was a party that was national in organizational scope and national in designs, national in goals, and it behaved that way in its appointments and in the orientations of its top leadership.

For the lower level leadership, it was a different matter, I would agree, but at the top, the people had basically a national orientation, and certainly these people that he mentions have not been shunted aside or demoted, if you consider that the positions they had during the war as president of the national front or president of the PRG, and so forth, they have done really quite well, if you consider that those organizations were fronts for the party itself. Those positions were essentially without power.

Now, in relation to that fact, Madame Binh's being appointed Minister of Education is a promotion. She probably even has a limousine now that she didn't have before. Huynh Tan Phat and Nguyen Huu Tho are now both—one is a vice president, and one is a vice premier. That is not bad, when you consider that formerly they were the heads of essentially phantom organizations and not leading figures in the party.

General Tra, who was the head of the Saigon Giadinh Military Management Committee in 1975–76, is now a commander of the 7th military region. Being a military officer, he of course had to go back to a standard military command. I think moving back into full command of a region, he was not exactly being demoted or shunted aside.

These people I don't think had any particular motivation to protest some presumptive northern victory. This simply is not the case.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Well, Mr. Chairman, I find the testimony very interesting, just the diversity, the fact that Ms. Forsythe, for instance, was only there 6 months at the end of the war——

Ms. FORSYTHE. I was there for 3 years.

Mr. GOODLING [continuing]. A time, until today, listening to the Doctor speak, I had heard nothing other than the fact that it was a time when the victors were trying to get their own camp in order and had very little time to worry about anything else, and the Viet Cong were trying to establish their influence, which again until today I had never heard amounted to any more in 1977, in fact, 100 percent less, than the Republican influence in the Congress of the United States, so I am certainly surprised all of a sudden to find out that that is not true.

Second, we find Father Gelinas, who was there much longer, long beyond the time when they were only establishing their own camp, and then were looking at the rest of the situation, and how they would control the situation, now that primarily the north got the control and the power that they were seeking, and then, of course, Dr. Turley, from his testimony, I would understand, has no onsite observations to report since the war whatsoever.

I found the 10,000 to 20,000 figure quite surprising. Reading from Henry Bradshaw in the Washington Star in June of 1976, he said over 50,000. George MacArthur, in the Los Angeles Times, in 1976, said over 200,000. Terzani in Der Speigel said 150,000 to 200,000. New York Times Magazine said 70,000, and the Far Eastern Economic Review—these are all recent—said over 200,000.

Am I to believe—where did the 10,000 to 20,000 come from? Was it the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or how do we come up with that figure when all of these other figures seem to be so different?

So, I realley don't have any questions. It is just an observation, you know. Those of us who listen to the testimony have to judge the people who are testifying, and unless we have a golden opportunity ourselves to go and look into the situation, which I am sure we would not be allowed to do, I guess we just have to make our own decisions from what we have heard, so I really have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FRASER. Dr. Turley wants to respond. We have a vote. You wanted to comment?

Mr. TURLEY. Very briefly.

Mr. FRASER. Why don't you comment, and then perhaps we can go vote.

Mr. TURLEY. I have only got one or two points.

Mr. FRASER. Well, let's go ahead, then.

Mr. TURLEY. I sympathize very much with your puzzlement over the contradictory nature of the information, and if I have any point to make, it is that all the information is going to stay contradictory, and therefore it is difficult to make reasoned and final judgments as to what the real situation is, and all this is a good argument for establishing relations with the SRV relatively soon so we can have somebody on-site looking around.

Mr. GOODLING. Or to some extent on our terms.

Mr. TURLEY. Oh, yes, absolutely.

Mr. GOODLING. Or to some extent on our terms.

Mr. TURLEY. We don't want them locked up in the Hotel Hanoi.

Ms. FORSYTHE. I would like to say that there are others, Mennonites, who were in Vietnam longer than Father Gelinas, and Dick Hughes, who worked for the Shoeshine Boys, and I find that their opinions are very much like my own. I have submitted some of their material in addition to my own testimony. I agree that is a weakness, and would hope that you would consider that, and would invite them to speak if that is appropriate.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Like Mr. Goodling, I have to make the point that we are dependent to a degree on your prepared testimony, but we have to take into account the sources, if any, that you acknowledge, and also take into account the history of your personal experience in Vietnam as well as the group that you may represent.

Ms. FORSYTHE. That's right.

Mr. DERWINSKI. It would come as a surprise to me that the American Friends Service Committee would not look with a quizzical eye at developments in Vietnam, given their attitude all through the war period.

Ms. FORSYTHE. We are very concerned about Vietnam.

Mr. DERWINSKI. So, there is nothing inconsistent in your statement, Miss, that wouldn't be typical of their material for the last 20-some years. But Professor Hurley, I just want to be sure that I don't misunderstand your prepared testimony, because there are a few things that threw me off.

One is that I would like to be sure I understood, you were a student in Vietnam in 1967 and 1968?

Mr. TURLEY. That's correct.

Mr. DERWINSKI. And you have not been back since then?

Mr. TURLEY. In 1972–73.

Mr. DERWINSKI. And both times that would be, of course, South Vietnam?

Mr. TURLEY. Right.

Mr. DERWINSKI. This point I would like to question. On pages 7 and 8 of your printed testimony, you make the point that the sources of information are not always reliable, and they could be contradictory, and then you go on and point out the reasons why various sources

might be—might have information which one would have to take with a grain of salt, let's say, but then you go on and specifically, starting on page 8, make a number of very flat statements, such as the number of people remaining in camps, the fact that people——

Mr. TURLEY. I said, if you will read the sentence, that if it is true that less than half of the more than 1 million persons slated for re-education, et cetera, have passed through the camps, and then the other follows. If you accept certain things as true, then that follows. I am not saying that those things are true. I am frankly not too confident of it.

Mr. DERWINSKI. All right. Are you saying, that if the figure of the people slated for reeducation would double, then the number held would be doubled?

Mr. TURLEY. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In other words, would there be a mathematical relationship?

Mr. TURLEY. If the SRV's statements that over 95 percent of the people slated for reeduction have gone through the camps and have graduated out, yes, that is correct.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now, how about the point you made, and I am now looking at page 10 of your testimony, where you say—I am reading the specific sentence: "Based on precedents in the north"—I assume this means when they came into power after the French left——

Mr. TURLEY. Yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI [continuing].

We can expect the government to permit religious observance and not to discriminate against Catholics as a group, but at the same time to curtail the autonomy of some of the educational and other social services.

What you are really saying is that they would leave them with nothing but the sort of tolerated situation where church services could be conducted, but none of the traditional social services which, in the case of the Catholic Church, their heavy emphasis is on education, that none of these services would be tolerated any longer. Is that the point?

Mr. TURLEY. Father Gelinas, I am sure, will want to add something to what I have to say on that. I wouldn't put it quite that far. The Government's concern was above all to undercut the means the church had to remain partly politically autonomous. There were some areas where its political power was quite substantial.

Now, in our pluralist system, that would be fine by us, perhaps, but in Vietnam they don't operate that way, and regardless of what we think of it, that is the way they operate, and yes, they did undertake steps to limit the ability of the church to maintain constituent support, to evoke the kind of disciplined response that they would find useful for political purposes. This is true.

Now, I have run across, rather by accident, some other information which I cite there in a parenthesis about a young fellow I interviewed. As you will see, there is a blank spot as to where he was from, because he is still in Vietnam. He is one of the few people from that particular Catholic village, in a particular district of a particular province, who said that the Government frankly left them alone, and they ran affairs pretty much as they saw fit, but I understand in less remote areas the Government's restrictions are more noticeable.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I find Dr. Turley's statement quite interesting, and if you don't mind, I do have a few more questions.

Mr. FRASER. We will take a short recess. It will be about 10 minutes, and we will be back.

[Whereupon, from 3:21 p.m. to 3:36 p.m., a brief recess was taken.]

Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will resume its sitting.

Mr. Derwinski will be here shortly, but I thought until he comes perhaps I could ask a question or two.

Father Gelinas, in the New York Review of Books article which you wrote, which appeared last May, you indicated that a systematic elimination of PRG, the old revoluntaries, that there was sort of a coup d'etat against them in July of 1975.

Does that appear to be a fairly—Is that something that is clearly evident, or one that you have inferred from a number of circumstances, or what?

Father GELINAS. That there was something very significant on the 19th and 20th of July 1975, is a fact. The meaning of this thing is, of course, deduced from a certain number of evidence. If you want me to give you the facts so that the deduction can be made by everyone, on this weekend, the entire city was frozen. That is, all of a sudden people woke up on Saturday morning to find that there were soldiers all over, that solders were wearing the bulletproof vests, the "casques," the helmets, guns and bayonets, that there were machinegun nests at street corners with sandbags, that there were antiaircraft guns, and there were tanks at many places.

No one knew what was coming. I was there, and many people were saying, this is the beginning of the Third World War. Others were saying, the Americans are going to land, to send parachutes. Something big. The whole city found itself all of a sudden in a state of war, and it lasted Saturday and Sunday. Not one bullet was fired, and by Monday morning things went back to normal, and it took some time before we could understand what had happened.

Little by little, the informations came in. A student came in and said he noticed there was a tank in such a place, right in front of that house, where a prominent PRG man lives. Someone else from another area of the city would say, that house also was surrounded by troops. That is another place where PRG people lived.

The Vo Tang Street, the former seat of the national police, which had become the headquarters of the PRG, was completely surrounded by tanks. There was no firing. There was no violence, but getting all the information, it seemed impossible not to conclude that the coup was against the PRG.

Now, if you add to this the fact that there had been more and more grumbling, especially among the lower cadre, because the higher cadre, we don't talk with them, we don't know what they think or say, but among the PRG people there has been a lot of grumbling about the fact that they had fought the war, what they thought was a war of liberation for South Vietnam, and now South Vietnam was becoming a colony of North Vietnam. So, all of a sudden this was finished. Madame Binh finally did come back from all of her errands. She was always outside of the country representing the country somewhere or another. It seemed that they were sending away the persons of name or of influence of the PRG because they were afraid of them.

After that, after this show of force, things were quiet, and the PRG never said anything. The grumbling was ended.

So, it is a consequence of trying to interpret something big that did happen.

Now, what else could have happened, obviously no Third World War started. I don't think that they could have captured secret documents revealing that someone wanted to start a Third War on the 19th of July. Later on, the Government did bring out the clumsy explanation that they were afraid of a revolution from the Catholics, which was completely impossible to believe. I mean, who could rebel? No one has a gun, and there were 200,000 troops occupying Saigon, 20 divisions. So, obviously there was no question of rebellion.

So, it is the consequence of deduction, but I have some testimony from one person in particular who was an important man in the PRG, an undercover agent. He was—I think he can be identified. He was the right hand man of Caritas. Caritas is the agency of the Catholic Church which distributes all the money they receive from international sources, which was extremely substantial during the war, so all the money going to orphanages, leper camps, and everywhere passed through his hand. This man was a man 60 years old, a convert, and completely trusted. He had all the files.

Well, after the Communist takeover, he told the Mother Superior of the convent where his daughter was that he had been a Communist all along, and he told his wife and daughter, who did not know it, it was all secret: "I have been a Communist for 45 years, since I was 15 years old."

"All the documents have been given to the Communists. They know all the money that came in and where it went, and all that." And at that period, around July, he went back to see the same sister, and he said: "I have given 45 years of my life to the party, and I have been cheated. They used us, and now they are the masters. We don't count. If I was 10 years younger, I would join the guerrillas," and he said: "many of my friends feel the same way."

Now, there is one man, of course, but it is significant, I think, of the state of mind that did exist.

Ms. FORSYTHE. Mr. Fraser, may I say something, please?

Mr. FRASER. Yes.

Ms. FORSYTHE. It is very hard for me in listening to Father Gelinas to square what he says with my own experiences, and so I am kind of at a loss to even know where to begin. The first thing I would like to say, however, is that it is important for us to remember that Dinh Ba Thi, who is the observer now, today, at the United Nations, is from Da Nang. He is a southerner and he has been a southerner all along. He was part of the PRG, and so on and so forth.

In my experience in Saigon, the people I met who were cadre, and that was local people, a young student who worked on a student newspaper, who turned out to be a cadre, his mother-in-law, who was a cadre, were all people who had jobs in Saigon. They continued to have those jobs. They did not change places, that in July there were rumors of some kind of a coup or something or other—it was kind of a rue contenant, street gossip about what was going to happen included rumors about some kind of a coup. That never took place. National Day, which is in July, is the day that there was the thought that there

might be some unrest. There was no unrest, and I think this may be the occasion that Father Gelinas is talking about, but in my experience, there was never a purging of the PRG from any level in Saigon, and I just need to make that statement for the record.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Derwinski. I was in the process of questioning.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Fine. Well, let me say, Professor Turley, that especially with respect to your academic background and the fact that you hopefully can look at the situation with total objectivity and scholarship, I detect, again looking at your prepared statement, a feeling of almost—or a position of almost passive support for whatever steps the Government of Vietnam is now taking toward Catholic Church organizations; your theme seems to be, since there is obviously some political potential there, that whatever steps they take to put down this opposition political force seems to be, if not approved, at least a practical thing.

Now, am I misinterpreting your position?

Mr. TURLEY. That is not what I meant to say, and it is unfortunate if that is the impression that I have left. My point is that when we receive reports about what the Government is doing toward certain groups, we should entertain certain possibilities that may not seem obvious at the outset. With respect to the Catholics, we should consider for a moment that there is considerable potential for conflict between the Catholics and the Government in which the Catholics may and will from time to time initiate acts that any state would consider insupportable, and take actions that are repressive, as all states do. We don't accept street crime in our own country.

In other words, you have to entertain that as a possible cause of the incident that is reported. It may not be the cause, but before leaping to the conclusion that so-and-so has been put in jail, or that such-and-such a demonstration was brutally suppressed, that the incident may have been initiated against the laws of the state by the Catholics themselves, or the Hoa Hao, or Cao Dai, the ethnic minorities, or something of that nature. That's all. It is a hedge. That is all I mean by it.

Let me add that I don't think there is any such thing as total objectivity. I am aware of traps there, and for that reason, I am simply recommending that we be very cautious about the way we interpret the information we do have.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Well, of course, I am trying to credit you with total objectivity with respect to——

Mr. TURLEY. Well, I am admitting I don't have it.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You are a professor from a distinguished university in my home State. Keeping in mind, then, the fact that one of the few comparisons we do have to make of what the Reds may now be doing in the entire country is the steps that were taken in the north by the Communist regime when they acquired their power there after the French left, and there have been reports that during the fifties in the procedure which involved reemphasizing agriculture and readjusting the economy of their country, that as many as 500,000 people may have been killed in one way or another.

Now, isn't that an experience on which one would draw to look at what might be happening in the south?

Mr. TURLEY. If anything like that had happened, that certainly would be true. This is an area about which there has been considerable

debate over recent years, and it is the reason I cite in my written testimony the study which I feel is perhaps the most dispassionate on this very point.

A figure of a half million, I assure you, is completely out of line. There have been some opposite figures, incidentally, too, of a few hundred, also out of line. No one probably will ever have a perfectly accurate count, but I think the figures that I have cited here for you are the best ones we have at this time.

The individual who wrote that article is a recent Ph. D. from the University of Michigan, and his dissertation was on land reform in Vietnam. He has done probably the most systematic study of any person I know. I think that we can take his judgment as the best reasoned estimate we have.

Mr. DERWINSKI. In trying to analyze this situation, and looking at it from a historical standpoint, starting in 1918, in Russia, when it became the Soviet Union, and looking at what happened in Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, analyzing the reports from Cambodia and Laos, looking at the situation in North Korea, there is similarity, regardless of any emphasis that might be placed on regional or local differences of structure or, personality cults.

One of the things that always shows up is that a Communist government, when it takes control, immediately works to crush the strongest historic nationalistic and intellectual force. For example, in the Soviet Union they started off with wiping out the independence of the Orthodox Church. In some of the Eastern European countries, it started with the Catholic Church or the Reformed Church or the Lutheran Church or the Orthodox Church, depending on circumstances, and the same is true, evidently, in Asia, where, for example, to the Chinese Communist Confucius is now a traitor, and the philosophy of Confucius is wiped out.

My question then is, is it not logical that the new rulers of all Vietnam would not follow a policy similar to that we see historically in attempting to eradicate the intellectual and—let's call it the inspirational sources that they might interpret as being contrary to their philosophy of long-term goals.

Mr. TURLEY. Well, I dislike words like "total" and "absolute," because there is no such thing. No government has total control. There is no such thing as absolute rule. There are degrees. Of course, Communist governments do strive more than most to exert the maximum degree of control over people's lives. This is true, and Vietnam is such a government, and therefore can be expected to limit, box in, put lines around alternative sources of power and perhaps over time squeeze them out. But I think your question has a second element.

In doing so, do they repress something unique and special about their own national heritages? This, I think, was the drift of your question with respect to China and the anti-Confucius campaign, the general will to forget the past in China, and you see somewhat the same kind of thing in Russia. Certain aspects of history, writers, historical incidents, and so forth, are simply forgotten and repressed or whatever.

This is not the case in Vietnam, and it is one of the respects in which they should be most clearly distinguished from other Communist revolutions. That is not just that they are willing to permit the traditional

aspects of the Vietnamese culture to survive, but they in fact in some respects cherish them, nourish them, and seek to promote them.

One of the striking things—there is a well-known article by a Vietnamese intellectual, Nguyen Khac Vien, in which he shows the parallels between Confucianism and Marxism, and shows how Marxism can be adapted to a Vietnamese context because it is continuous with certain traditions in Vietnamese culture. Now, whether his analysis is true is a matter of dispute, but he has made the effort.

The idea that a Chinese would do this is unthinkable, you see. The Vietnamese are different on that particular score, and you will find them doing things of that nature in many respects.

I think that there is generally more tolerance for schools of thought, traditions, and so forth emanating from the past, so long as they do not conflict with the regime's goal of restructuring social relationships, redistributing wealth and power.

Mr. DERWINSKI. One thing that strikes me in looking through the statements is that everyone recognizes that given the closed society that now exists and inability to get on-the-spot information from objective observers, that one is at the mercy of rumors, having to draw conclusions, some of which might not be accurate, based on scanty information.

It reminds me of the old story which I first heard as applied to Armenia, but I am certain it could be applied to Vietnam today. It was the period just after World War II when the Soviets started a campaign among free-world Armenians to convince them to return to Soviet Armenia and help build the fatherland, this one American-Armenian was intrigued, and decided he would return, but he was a little skeptical as to what he might find, so he prepared a communication system with his family in the United States.

It consisted of this. That after he traveled back to Soviet Armenia and established himself, that he would write a letter in which he would report on conditions, and operating on the assumption that there might be some form of censorship or surveillance, he said, don't pay attention to what I say, but I will enclose a photograph, and if in the photograph I am standing, you know that things are well for me. If in the photograph I am seated, you will know that things are not well.

Three or four months later, his family in Boston received a letter in which he wrote in glowing terms of the situation in Soviet Armenia, and he enclosed a photograph in which he was lying down.

Now, we will have to devise that kind of system, I believe, to find out what is really happening in Vietnam. I have one other point. Let me switch for a moment to Father Gelinas. You mentioned in your testimony that prior to the takeover of Saigon, there were 27 daily newspapers published, of which 1 was French, 1 English, 3 Chinese, and 22 Vietnamese.

Now, I could understand closing the English publication. I could even understand limiting 22, you know, consolidating 22 others, because that seems to be counterproductive, but this leads me to the question, has there been any different treatment of the Chinese population in Saigon by the conquerors? Are any of you three willing to address that question?

Father GELINAS. Not so far as freedom of information, certainly. There was no different treatment. All Chinese publications were suppressed, purely and simply.

Mr. DERWINSKI. What about their economic activities?

Father GELINAS. Well, the economic activity is different. They fought the most to keep their hospitals, because it is well known that the Chinese have the best hospital system. They lost. All their hospitals were taken away from them. Their property, since most Chinese were businessmen, since a good many Chinese were not much educated—Chinese were not schoolgoers; they believed in running the store—they were less hit by the reeducation campaign. Less Chinese leaders went to reeducation camps than certainly the Vietnamese counterparts, so more Chinese remained capable of going on and working.

Now, some stores were confiscated by the Government. A few Chinese were shot publicly, because they were accused of being hoarders, but not to a very, very large extent. As a result, since the Chinese had stocks of goods, and since bank accounts were all frozen, the stocks of goods remained the best wealth, and the price of things went up tremendously. Everything became tremendously expensive, so the Chinese live better than the rest of the population.

Even today I keep receiving letters from Vietnam, and whenever they describe the situation in Saigon, the only place where you have a semblance of normal life is Cho Lon, the Chinese quarter. In Cho Lon, people eat. In Cho Lon, you still have restaurants. Actually, they eat, I would say, a lot, because the Chinese are selling their goods little by little. They are selling at very, very high prices. They are making tremendous profits, and they are not allowed to reinvest these profits. They can't put the money in the bank. It is going to be seized by the Government. They cannot import. They cannot produce. Factories have all been seized, so the only thing they can do with their money is eat it, and they are eating.

So, there is a very different picture for the visitor between Cho Lon, the Chinese area, and the rest of the country.

Now, of course, quite a few Chinese, because they are still making money, have managed to buy the officials and many have escaped. If you have gold leaves, you can escape. There is a price for escape. You buy a fisherman's boat and you buy the police alongside the beaches, and you buy the coast guards, and you escape.

Lately I had a conversation 2 weeks ago with Le Kim Ngan, who is not a Chinese, but who did escape with Chinese. He was the director of the Buddhist University in Saigon, and he described minutely how his escape went on.

So, there is a difference of treatment with the Chinese population, but it is due to the fact that they have money. I don't think it is due to the fact that they are afraid of mainland China. My impression is that mainland China does not exert any pressure to protect these Chinese.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Did you have a comment, Ms. Forsythe?

Ms. FORSYTHE. Yes: I did. I guess—this is real interesting. The one thing I do know about the Chinese in Cho Lon is that the Chinese schools, of which there were a great number, where Chinese was taught

as the first language and not Vietnamese, were ordered to change languages, which was not received well within the Chinese community, and in looking at Dr. Turley's information, it is again that same very curious relationship with minorities.

The Chinese population is very large in Saigon. It is about a million people, I think. I don't know that it has decreased a lot by now. The Vietnamese are always in a very interesting relation with those people. That is all I know.

Mr. TURLEY. I will add just one thing. I also found your testimony very interesting in that regard. They are details I had not heard of, but they conform perfectly with everything that I heard and understand and know about the Chinese in Saigon. They have constituted a problem from the perspective of Vietnamese Governments since there was one, virtually, largely because of the proportion of control they have over the market in Saigon. The Government clearly, when it came to power in the spring of 1975, wanted to get better control over the entire national market structure, and this required getting better control over the market in Cho Lon, and it was in—let me give you the precise date. Beginning in the fall of 1975, they had a campaign against the Compadore bourgeoisie as they were called, very wealthy businessmen who were held to have gained their vast riches by elicit traffic with the American imperialists, and the striking thing is that almost every single Compadore bourgeoisie that was tried and punished, usually by sentence to prison of 10 or 20 years, was a Chinese, almost every single one, not only in Saigon but in the smaller market towns as well. Knowing the traditional antipathy of the Vietnamese toward the Chinese, and the desire of a series of Saigon government to gain greater control over the economy through Cho Lon, it is not impossible that the policy toward the Chinese may over time evolve in a way that would suggest discrimination against an ethnic minority.

Ms. FORSYTHE. There is one other comment I would like to make, and that is about the press. When I left in October of 1975, there were 11 papers being produced, and Ngo Cong Duc, who is someone you have met when he was here in the United States in the early seventies, he was not allowed to live in Vietnam under Chou, who had been an opposition candidate but was run out of the country, is the editor of the one paper that is not a Government organ, and that is the Tin Sang Magazine, or the Morning News.

Mr. DERWINSKI. Ms. Forsythe, there is one thing I am curious about. In looking through your statement, you basically paint a rosy picture of developments in Vietnam. Any problems that exist you blame on either American military action or the days of American presence, but you did indicate that you had requested to return, and I was just curious, there you were seeing utopia evolve, and why did you select to leave at that point?

Ms. FORSYTHE. I think, on the contrary, I paint a very grim picture of Vietnam. I think I paint a picture in this testimony of a Vietnam that is suffering at this point from a lack of food, a lot of that because of what has happened physically to the land in Vietnam, so the people aren't able to produce rice in the way that they would like to, to earn a living, to live.

I produce a picture or paint a picture of a country that is littered with munitions, where people have their arms and legs blown off as they try and get back to the land. I paint a picture of a country where there is a lot of unemployment, where prostitution and drug addiction are enormous problems. I think it is not a very rosy picture at all.

As to why I asked to come back to the United States, I was on assignment in Vietnam for 2 years. I stayed 1 year longer than I had intended initially, and it was time for me to get back to my other work and my own life here. I was not there on a life mission, but for 2 years' service for AFSC.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You were there just long enough to see the Government change.

Ms. FORSYTHE. Well, that happened to happen while I was there, yes. If I had been there 2 years earlier, I suppose it wouldn't have, would it?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Now, one last point, Mr. Chairman, back to my Illinois friend. Professor Turley. In your analysis of the problems which the conquering forces automatically face, you also touched on the Catholic groups, the ethnic and religious minorities. Now, if I recall, those minority groups were fundamentally Buddhist, or at least uniquely Vietnamese, weren't they?

Mr. TURLEY. You mean, the sects in the South?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Right.

Mr. TURLEY. The Hoa Hao are essentially Buddhist. Cao Dai I would describe as a syncretic religious movement. Other descriptions have been applied to them, but they are peculiarly Vietnamese, yes.

Mr. DERWINSKI. You state here that you have no information worth mentioning on how these groups have fared.

Mr. TURLEY. Do I have something worth not mentioning?

Mr. DERWINSKI. No; you say that you do not have any information worth mentioning on how these groups have fared. I find that curious. Both of these groups were quite notorious and received extensive coverage from American and other journalists during the period from 1954 on, especially when they were agitating against the Government in Saigon. I find it curious that you acknowledge the fact that there isn't any information now available about them. Isn't this sort of a sinister development, this wall of silence?

Mr. TURLEY. Possibly. The information I have heard is so circumstantial and strained, as I say, I just really don't even want to mention what it is. I don't know if it means anything. There is very, very little of it. Is it possibly sinister? I don't know. Difficult to say. The Hoa Hao were concentrated in an area that throughout the world was reputed to be most free of Communist influence, and this was held to be because of the unity of the people against them.

If a Communist cadre came into a village, he would be kicked out the other side. Now, as a matter of fact, the situation wasn't quite so simple, because the Hoa Hao often made local deals with the revolutionary side. Their area was most densely inhabited and sat astride the infiltration route from Cambodia into the lower Mekong Delta, and in order to use that area, the Communists had to make certain deals with the Hoa Hao to get free passage, as it were. From friends we have there