Substantial foreign aid becomes critical to the regime's success.

To acquire some duc but not surrender to the ethic of phuc duc Hanoi must continue to seek political advantage from nationalism by winning from the United States a gesture of admission that the American effort in Vietnam was an unjust extension of French Colonialism and that the Americans as a great world power now recognize Hanoi as a legitimate nationalist Vietnamese regime. The duc gained here is confirmation of self-sacrifice of the past necessary to free the nation from foreign bondage. The Le dynasty benefitted for generations from the duc of Le Loi who defeated the Ming.

Third, the regime can always demonstrate its so, its mandate from Heaven, by making every decision, seizing all power. This would confirm part of its uy tin at the same time as it would embody the policy of force and coercion necessary to win obediance from those who do not credit it with uy tin.

Even though they do not accept uy tin, Hanoi's leaders already find their revolution constrained by the political reality created by a people who do believe in the concept.

June, July, August 1975;	initial policy: re-eduction and destruction of the decadent morality and culture of Saigon rather than reconciliation.
September 1975;	conversion of currency destroys the economic base for a society based on individualism and private economic incentive.
October 1975;	machinery and goods from the South begin to flow north. The military management committee apologizes for price increases triggered by currency conversion.

(It is these early policy initiatives which lose uy tin for the communists)

November 1975;	reunification of north and south under northern leadership is established as a goal and termination of the NLF is announced; private schools are abolished in the south; the North Vietnamese army is not demobilized and 18 divisions are left in South Vietnam.
December 1975;	reported military resistance inside South Vietnam: only 300,000 to 400,000 former soldiers of the nationalist government registered with the new authorities.
January, February 1976:	gunfight and arrests at the Vinh Son Church in Saigon; arrests in Tam Hiep near Bien Hoa; a visitor to Ho Nai reports that GVN flag is still flown; 10,000 chambermaids are brought down from Hanoi to clean up hotels in the south.
March, April 1976;	control structure of solidarity cell of 10 families, then a unit of 10 solidarity cells, then ward, then district completed; Gen. Van Tien Dung publishes

	the inside story of the victory giving all credit for the great national liberation to Hanoi and its leaders; election held on reunification and for a National Assembly. Nayan Chanda reports that Saigon is much the same as before liberation; the problem lies in "deep seated anti-socialist attitudes among the population".
May, June 1976;	foreign consulates and press moved to Hanoi; decree announced that re-education will last 3 years; Le Duan tells the National Assembly that "feudal attitudes" must be eliminated and that all Vietnamese must live in conditions determined by the degree of their productive labor. A five year economic plan is adopted; aid request presented to the West through Dr. Victor Umbricht of the U.N. Patrice de Beer comments on July 11 that "enthusiasm is at low ebb in all of Vietnam." He quotes a Ho Chi Minh city official saying "Vietnamese are confucian. The party and President Ho therefore symbolize traditional values. We will lead the people to socialism through patriotic feelings."
July, August, September 1976;	major diplomatic effort undertaken; relations improved with southeast asian neighbors; conciliatory speech made about the US at non-aligned conference at Sri Lanka; last Americans in Vietnam allowed to leave; names of 12 MIA's known dead released to Ted Kennedy and George Mc Govern; Hanoi seeks American help to build up its economy; such aid is sought under the Paris agreement as war reparations; revitalization of the communist party is announced in Hanoi.
November 1976;	Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh writes that there has been a decrease in the fighting will of the cadres" and that the party faces serious shortcomings; he complains that party promotions are based on personal patronage and not on merit and that cadres have been lured by the materialism of the south and have "failed to preserve their revolutionary qualities".

December 1976;	First party congress since 1960 focuses on economic development; Le Duan says the plan will provide the essentials of life for everyone, that a "socialist new-type man" will be created; Pham van Dong notes that workers may be moved from north to south; Pham Hung says that the Mekong delta will produce rice, the central highlands forest products and the central coast fish and seafood; whatever industry in the south will be light. Nguyen Khac Vien writes that 1,000,000 people will be moved from cities in the south to new economic zones.
February, March, April 1977;	northern officials are said to run nearly everything in the south; Hanoi's ambassador in Paris admits 50,000 in re-education; a foreign investment code is drafted permitting up to 49% foreign equity ownership; Nguyen Khac Vien writes that 2 years of Communist control have "failed to persuade the people that working on the farm is the best life"; Hanoi's press agency announced that 6,000,000 more would leave cities in the south for new economic zones; all leading Buddhist monks of the militant An Quang congregation in Saigon are taken into custody.

Conclusions

Hanoi's domestic policy since its conquest of the south has essentially been to dictate the terms of life for all Vietnamese and to impose on them its vision of the good life. Compromises are made here and there but the pattern is clear: consolidation of political control first and then economic and social reorganization to impose new norms. The sequence is from power (so), to mastery of the situation (tai)

and then to the inculcation of new values (replacement of duc), using confucian attitudes and nationalism to the extent possible in the interim to sustain some duc. Priority is now placed on general economic development of all sectors rather than political purity, cultural revolution or heavy industry. To assist in this display of tai and to increase the regime's stature as national liberators, a major effort is made to win recognition and aid from the Americans.

This history suggests a regime bent on having its own way, conscious of the fact that it cannot hope for willing cooperation from its people and seeking to replaced traditional values with its norms while in the meantime acting through coercion and material incentives, with supplemental sops to uy tin through efforts to preserve a mantel of national liberation and to foster successful economic development.

There is no self-evident reason why the United States should rush into political and economic relations with Hanoi to convey legitimacy on a police state which has forfeited moral authority in the eyes of its own people. Hanoi's problems are of its own making; it should look to its revolution and not to us for answers, if any are to be found.

Americans most zealous in seeking normalization of relations with Hanoi justify their advocacy as necessary to "heal the wounds of war". While full normalization and aid might ease the consciences of some who knew nothing of Vietnamese culture or ideals to begin with, such actions would only assist a repressive regime and work further injury to the people of Vietnam.

APPENDIX 4

[From the New York Times, June 21, 1977]

ISRAEL WILL OFFER ASYLUM TO 66 VIETNAMESE REFUGEES [1]

JERUSALEM, TUESDAY, JUNE 21.—Minutes after becoming Israel's Prime Minister, Menahem Begin said that his first official act today would be to offer asylum to 66 Vietnamese refugees.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman said the Ministry had received calls from individuals who cited their own periods of homelessness before the establishment of the State of Israel and who demanded that the country act on behalf of the Vietnamese.

The Vietnamese, including 20 children and 16 women, were picked up in stormy seas last week by the Israeli vessel Yuvali off the coast of Vietnam. Their fishing boat was said to have been foundering.

The Vietnamese had been without food or water for five days, it was reported here. The Israeli Government had been seeking without success to have the refugees accepted in the Yuvali's ports of call at Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan.

The other day, Maariv, an independent newspaper, said in an editorial that Israel should welcome the refugees and that "it might be symbolic if the new Government starts its tenure with this gesture."

Another editorial in support of the refugees appeared yesterday in the Jerusalem Post, an English-language newspaper. It said: "For Israelis, the refusal of South Asian countries to permit the entry of these refugees, saved from death at sea by the action of a humane Israeli captain, conjured up the trauma of the 1940's when refugees seeking to escape death at the hands of Hitler were refused entry into British Palestine and other Mediterranean ports."

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APPENDIX 5

[From the New York Times, June 21, 1977]

ATTITUDE OF ASIANS HARDENS TOWARD INDOCHINA REFUGEES [1]

(By Henry Kamm)

KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia, June 19.—Boatloads of Vietnamese refugees are landing along the east coast of Malaysia almost every day, and how many are pushed back out to sea by police, navy and immigration authorities will never be known.

Six hundred were given shelter in May in the largest monthly total since the flow began last year.

Thirty-three refugees were reported to have drowned a few days ago off the coast of Sabah, a Malaysian island state in northern Borneo, when their boat struck a rock as it headed for the Philippines after having been refused entry on Sabah and earlier in Sarawak, a neighboring Malaysian state. Four persons survived.

Accounts are multiplying of refugees who move from country to country in Southeast Asia, who are rejected at eight or nine ports along Malaysia's long coastline until they scuttle their boats and are allowed to land. The surprising flow runs counter to expectations—that when North Vietnam won control of all of Vietnam, all of the country would become as airtight as the North always was.

LITTLE OBLIGATION IS FELT

As the flow increases, the attitudes of the countries where the boats run ashore are hardening.

Asian countries, no matter how much they may have profited during the war in Indochina, feel little obligation to extend help to the war's final flotsam. To Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand or the Philippines, it is up to the large Western powers—first in line, the United States—to provide new homes. At most, and increasingly unwillingly, they will provide temporary haven.

International officials and diplomats dealing with the problem are concerned that unless the principal countries that receive refugees in the West increase and accelerate their intake, there will be many more deaths among those who are hounded from port to port, and more misery in the camps and on the boats for those fortunate enough to have been granted temporary shelter.

The refugees wait in virtual isolation from the world on the boats and in the camps for officials from the American, French, Australian or Canadian embassies or from the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to tell them that an end is in sight.

The United States has been caught, more than two years after the war, as unprepared for the continued escape of people from Indochina as countries that were less vitally linked with Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in the past. Washington has no effective program to cope with the thousands that have fled this year and those that are still arriving.

THEN THE BOATS CAME

After the original program of taking in 130,000 refugees after the collapse in Indochina had been exhausted, Congress grudgingly granted authority for another 11,000. It did so on assurance from the Administration of President Gerald R. Ford that this would be the final request.

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"Then the boats started arriving," an American official said. Unwilling to go back to Congress because of earlier assurances of an end to special immigration privileges for people from Indochina, the Ford Administration put into effect last March a program under which 100 "boat people"—Vietnamese who escape in what is still the only way possible—would be granted entry every month. This would fall under the "conditional entry program" for refugees, such as Soviet Jews, from all Communist countries.

Those chosen must either have close relatives in the United States, have been trained in the United States during the war or have worked closely with American forces or agencies. Their families are allowed to accompany them, but under a nonprivileged immigration status that causes long delays.

At the moment, family members whose applications were made no later than last Nov. 15 are eligible to accompany their relatives, and the cutoff date will not be changed before Sept. 30, if then. But the heavy flow of refugees started this year.

As a result, the Government of Malaysia is aware that it is now sheltering, in a number of scattered camps, well over 2,000 refugees, most of whom arrived this year, that so far this year only 75 have left for the United States—with 48 more due to leave this week—and that the record of the other refugee-receiving countries is similarly low.

The situation is comparable and the host governments' sentiments are similar in Thailand, with about 2,300 "boat people" and more arriving; in the Philippines, with 1,000; Singapore, with about 100; Indonesia, with more than 400, and Hong Kong, with 200.

Each for their own reasons—eagerness to avoid complications in budding relationships with Hanoi, sensitiveness of existing communal problems between ethnic groups within the country, fear of becoming identified as a haven for refugees, anxiety that the refugees might contain a Communist fifth column—the unwilling hosts fear that the Vietnamese might stay because no one wants them.

"The other day I nearly broke down in tears," an American diplomat said, recalling a field trip to refugee camps in which he had little but negative news to give to people who saw him as their principal hope.

But another American official spoke without seeming disturbed of how many refugee boats left Singapore for the Philippines in 1975 because the United States would receive refugees only there and on Guam. "Most of them probably made it," he said, seemingly dismissing probable losses at sea, which he estimated at 10 percent.

Officials in general are agreed that present procedures tend to be too pedantic and cumbersome, especially in the case of the United States, and that all recipient countries should make the political decision to admit greater numbers quickly. If they do not do so, it is feared that attitudes that now seem hardhearted will settle into systematic cruelty.

HOW 8 SET OUT, 4 ARRIVED

Already. in maritime circles, there is an unhappy discussion over increasing neglect of the fundamental rule of the sea that passing ships must stop to rescue people from vessels in trouble. But from Japan to Singapore, governments have taken punitive attitudes against companies whose ships try to put ashore refugees they have picked up.

According to maritime sources and refugee accounts, SOS signals are ignored to avoid difficulties in the next port. In a not untypical account of an arrival in Malaysia, four young men in an overcrowded refugee camp in a police station in Kuantan told how they had left Vung Tau, near Saigon, last Dec. 15, with four other men in a boat. They arrived in Malaysia on Dec. 20 and were driven off; they reached Singapore on Dec. 23, and were driven off.

Next they were chased away from Indonesia, where they had spent five days fishing—their trade—and selling their catch to islanders. They went back to Singapore, to be driven off again. They caught and sold fish for a few days to islanders off Malaysia and set out for Thailand.

Their boat broke up off Kuantan, and they swam from 4 in the afternoon until 5 in the morning, catching their breath occasionally by holding onto fishnets attached to buoys. Four never reached the shore. The survivors were detained in jail for four weeks before being "freed" to the Kuantan police station.

A total of 117 Vietnamese, including many children, are confined in the barracks and lockup, which is under constant guard and which no one is allowed to leave. Outsiders are not allowed to enter. Some detainees have been there for a year.

SECURITY AND MAIL CENSORSHIP

In Malaysia the National Security Council, a powerful and cautious body, handles the refugee situation, and no Government official was prepared to discuss the situation with this correspondent. The refugees' mail is censored and greatly delayed, which complicates their efforts to locate relatives abroad and to arrange for emigration.

In a camp at Endau, the police guard forbade a visitor to leave something for the many children, and insisted that the visitor obtain permission from the police station. It was refused. To get into such camps, Vietnamese take the risk of scuttling their boats or setting fire to them offshore, endangering the lives of all, just to avoid being pushed back into the sea.

Recently a boat arrived in Sarawak intact, with a woman in labor aboard, and it was not scuttled. As a result, the woman and her infant were returned to the boat two days later and the boat pushed off. Only then did the boat catch fire, and the passengers were taken ashore.

In a series of interviews in camps on the Malaysian east coast, the view most often expressed was that if the stays in the camps were transitory and emigration would soon follow, it would have been worth the ordeal, even if the transit stop closely resembled a prison camp.

Refugee officials and diplomats accent the positive, stressing that no matter how cold the reception, at least Malaysia lets a good number come ashore.

But Americans are finding it difficult to explain to Vietnamese who have taken enormous risks to escape to what they still often call, in the language of the war, "the free world," why the power that coined the expression and encouraged them to aspire to freedom does so little now to allow them to go further in the world in which they have arrived but the hostile atmosphere of restrictive camps.

APPENDIX 6

ARTICLE FROM THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY [1] (NOVEMBER 1977) ENTITLED "A CASE FOR INTERVENTION" BY STEHEN YOUNG [2]

Nuclear proliferation and the law of averages governing the percentage of lunatics likely to become rulers mean that we are going at some point to be confronted with an Adolf Hitler, Idi Amin, or Papa Doc Duvalier, who either has a big bomb or will soon have the power to make one. What do we do then? Sit back and wait for the blast? We have to intervene, and, instead of intervening in the wrong way, as we did in Vietnam, we have to do it right.

I believe we had good reason to try to help the people of South Vietnam. I realize that this view is not likely to be instantly persuasive to the readers of this magazine. I acknowledge that many of the ways we intervened were stupid and callous, and that there are lessons to be learned from what we did wrong in Vietnam that we must never forget. What I am saying—as one who worked with the Vietnamese, studied their culture, and learned their language—is that there were large numbers of people in South Vietnam who wanted and deserved our help.

Curiously enough, there is some interesting evidence for my view in the way the South fell.

Remember how the American Left predicted the fall would occur? The American-supported government would collapse immediately—within 72 hours, according to George McGovern—upon the withdrawal of American combat troops. The handful of corrupt lackeys at the top would flee, and the masses, almost all of whom were either members or supporters of the Viet Cong, would seize power.

It is a fact, however, that South Vietnam did not collapse when American combat troops went home in 1972. It did not collapse when American airpower was withdrawn in 1973. It did not collapse when Congress severely cut military aid in 1974. It did collapse in 1975 when the hope of future American aid was lost.

The Viet Cong, instead of leading the victorious forces in April 1976, played no role at all. This information does not come from Thieu or Ky but from Hanoi's General Van Tien Dung, who has described the last offensive in great detail. His account was published this year in several American newspapers including *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. According to him, the offensive was planned and executed entirely by the North Vietnamese Communist leadership, using the regular army of North Vietnam. Neither the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam nor the related Provisional Revolutionary Government played any role. The indigenous guerrilla forces of the Viet Cong were not in evidence as Soviet tanks rolled into Thieu's presidential palace at the moment of victory.

The South Vietnamese who fled before the victorious North were not just a handful of corrupt leaders but hundreds of thousands of people who did not want to live under the Communists. If our belated and ill-organized rescue effort was able to save 130,000, imagine how many more who wanted to leave were left behind.

Many of those who stayed behind are still resisting the Communists. Two large units commanded by Colonel Luan control the highlands between Ban Me Thuat and Pleiku, from the Lao border to the seacoast. A Montagnard force is to the

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[2] Stephen Young practices law in New York.

north of them. Around Saigon, roads north are cut at dusk. A large group of followers of the Cao Dai religion have taken over the old Communist base area of Zone D. In the Delta, small groups operate everywhere. My old district town of Tam Binh in Vinh Long was attacked. Cho Gao in My Tho was also attacked in a two-day battle. A large force secures the heartland of the Hoa Hao people. Major bridges south of Saigon have been blown; North Vietnamese ammunition dumps in Go Vap and Bien Hoa have been destroyed. Plastique is set off in Saigon. All of this has been acknowledged indirectly by Saigon radio.

A MANDATE OF HEAVEN

The Left's expectation that a Communist victory in Vietnam would enjoy widespread popular support in the South grew out of the work of writers like Frances FitzGerald. FitzGerald wrote that the National Liberation Front was a natural extension of an internal dynamic peculiar to the people of South Vietnam. Relying on the work of the French scholar Paul Mus, FitzGerald postulated that modern times had triggered a revolutionary disequilibrium among Vientam's people, who consequently demanded a new mandate of heaven to restore the wholeness of the social order. Of all the political forces loose in South Vietnam, she believed that only the Viet Cong had such a mandate.

FitzGerald's vision of Vietnam gives a central role to the Confucian mandarin tradition. In effect, FitzGerald argues that the Communists are modern Confucians. The same force that traditionally pulled Vietnamese towards the Confucian pattern of social organization are pulling them inevitably towards the Communists now.

FitzGerald is right about the Confucian mandarins but not about the village culture of the masses. Most Communist leaders in fact have come from mandarin families. But because she did not speak Vietnamese or use original Vietnamese materials in her research, FitzGerald failed to take into account Vietnamese popular culture.

The differences between this popular culture and the elite attitudes used by FitzGerald are substantial. FitzGerald uses as a centerpiece of her theory the figure of strong paternal authority in the family leading to rebellion in the son and the replacement of the father's mandate with the son's. Yet in the average Vietnamese family it is the mother who rules. The father may reign but his authority is hollow. The mother is the *noi tuong* or the "boss of the within."

The Vietnamese ethnic tradition centers on a concept called *phuc duc*, which intertwines personal destiny with social morality. This tradition pushes most Vietnamese away from the Communists into a form of nationalism that one can trace through centuries of Vietnamese history, including four victories over the Chinese and one over the Mongols. Contrary to what has been written, there has long been a profound core of nationalist strength in Vietnam.

The antagonism between Communism and Vietnamese culture arises from contrasting views of the individual. Communism is an imported western ideology that subjects individuals to the total dominion of the party's leadership. Under *phuc duc*, a society should be organized to allow each individual room to maximize his or her potential according to the rules of Buddhist Karma, as modified by the Vietnamese.

Vietnamese believe in a universe created by the ceaseless flows of positive and negative cosmic energy. Each person has a unique destiny produced by the interaction of three variables: astrology, or the cosmic energy of time; geomancy, or the cosmic energy in the land on which we are born and live; and *tuong so*, or the cosmic energy of our bodies. This energy triad gives destiny a deterministic face, making it the end product of spinning primordial forces.

Belief in one of these forces, geomancy, helped the Vietnamese develop a kind of national loyalty long before it was fashionable in the West. After a Chinese general had put down a Vietnamese revolt in 39 A.D., he set up a bronze column inscribed with the words: "When this column falls, the state of Giao Chi (the old Chinese name for Vietnam) will perish." Later, as they passed by, Vietnamese would carry stones over to the column to secure its base and prevent its collapse. Geomancy, by giving a collective similarity to the fates of all in a certain territory, creates a distinct homeland for a people. In the eleventh century, a Vietnamese prince called on his soldiers not to despair and to fight on against the Chinese because fate had given the Vietnamese a separate territory of their own and would not let the Chinese defeat them. Like the Jews, Vietnamese believe they

have a special relationship with a specific homeland sanctified by the highest power in the universe.

In addition to its deterministic aspects, the concept of *phuc duc* posits another dimension of fate, a capacity within ourselves to influence the final outcome. This controllable part of the destiny equation was borrowed from the Indian doctrine of reincarnation and Karma. Our good and bad deeds are believed to be small movements of cosmic energy. Accumulated deeds have the power to set in motion larger movements for the future. Good deeds will tilt fortune towards happiness and bad deeds will have the reverse effect.

To the simple Buddhist notion of Karma, which applies only to individuals, the Vietnamese have injected a Confucian element, so that families and lineages as well as individuals are receptacles of good and bad Karma. The merit of one generation can improve the fortune of succeeding ones. Thus veneration of ancestors in Vietnam arises not so much from authoritarian Chinese notions of blind filial piety, but from a sense of obligation to those whose deeds have brought about one's present circumstances. Many Vietnamese are less than enthusiastic in commemorating forebears of marginal or negative Karma.

Beyond the debt to one's ancestors lies a debt to the nation. This is explicitly recognized, for example, in the Vietnamese Buddhist sect of the Hoa Hao, which places the debt of gratitude to the ancestors and the nation before the debt to the Buddha. The rural Hoa Hao have always been among the most unconditional anti-Communists. Vietnamese feel that they must pay back those who created and preserved a unique Karma for the Vietnamese people by defending what is distinctive about their heritage from foreign intrusions. Along with geomancy this facet of *phuc duc* provided a basis for Vietnam's traditional peasant nationalism.

The ethic of *phuc duc* has led the Vietnamese to oppose Communism for three reasons relating to individual freedom, private property, and selfless leadership.

First, Communism leaves no room for free expression of the self. It is too totalitarian for Vietnamese tastes. Generally, Vietnamese resent authority and have a very sensitive sense of self. Even though *phuc duc* places the individual in a family and national context, it rests on a notion of individual destiny. The Vietnamese call this powerful sense of self *tu*. It shows up in their word for freedom—*tu do*. Thus to say that rural Vietnamese have no concern for the differences between democracy and totalitarianism is to distort their values.

In the 1930s a series of very important novels was written by a group of young Vietnamese intellectuals in Hanoi who had broken with the Confucian elite, which was generally supportive of French rule, to rediscover the more personal ethnic tradition of fate and the self that had survived in the villages. Those novels revolved around the problem of freedom for the individual. They looked upon the individual Vietnamese, released from excessive Confucian formality, as the means by which Vietnam could be at once Vietnamese and dynamic and modern. None of these works has been translated into English or French, so they were unknown to Frances FitzGerald and the other writers who have told us about the Vietnamese culture.

Second, Communism does not allow an individual to own personal property. But under *phuc duc*, material prosperity indicates to a Vietnamese that either he or his forebears were moral people of good Karma. His current good fortune is therefore rightfully his. To deny him his wealth would be to deny virtue itself, but this is what the Communists do. After their conquest, economic conditions for South Vietnamese plummeted. Their cash assets were confiscated through an exchange of currency. Their reaction has been to oppose a government that robbed them of the evidence of their virtue.

However, property must, in the *phuc duc* scheme, be deserved to be rightfully owned. If a morally unfit person, too greedy in seeking immediate wealth or making money through corruption and foreign influence, should come into property, then it is just to strip him of his goods. They are not his by the workings of *phuc duc* but by his selfishness and by his manipulation of power to short-circuit *phuc duc*. He has no "right" to the property he has acquired. Wealth must come on its own accord to be really deserved. Vietnamese like material well-being, but they do not like avarice and self-seeking. Old money is more correct than new.

When David Halberstam noted that the succession of leaders in Saigon seemed collectively unable to rally popular sympathy, he was observing the consequences of leadership without *phuc duc*. The trouble with Saigon's rulers was that they were generally too greedy in their use of power and in their accumulation of

personal wealth, when both in turn also depended on manipulation of first the French and then the Americans.

THROW AWAY THE RIND

Finally, Communism dictates that everyone follow the orders of the party's leaders, while *phuc duc* demands that true moral authority allows each person to achieve his own private ends. Selfish people accumulate only bad Karma. Bad Karma in national leadership brings future hardships for the people. Leadership that is respected and appreciated brings prosperity and good fortune to the many. Vietnamese tend to resist politicians whom they perceive to be interested in self-aggrandizement. The Buddhist monks who led the movement to overthrow Diem did not seek to convert their street power into political office. Had they done so, the people who had volunteered to follow them in the streets would have deserted, fearing that the monks were really more interested in personal achievement than the national weal. If the Communists were genuinely interested in serving the people, they would, in the eyes of the Vietnamese, be willing to consult others and share power. In the villages it is said that the Communists *vat chanh bo vo*—"squeeze the lemon and throw away the rind."

The most telling flaw of the Communists is their willingness to shed blood to gain their way. They assumed leadership of the war against the French by murdering the other nationalist leaders. When they took the palm of state power, they split Vietnam into fratricide. The ease with which Communist commanders could send wave after wave of men into battle and near-certain death contrasts with the reluctant attitude toward fierce combat taken by most nonCommunist officers. The good nationalist officer tried to achieve his objectives without losing a man if he could, preferably by waiting until the enemy had moved on. French-trained South Vietnamese generals who were careless with their men's lives usually had bad morale in their units.

These contradictions between Communism and Vietnam's ethnic tradition explain why South Vietnam held on until there was no hope, why the Viet Cong could be defeated, why Vietnamese fled Communist rule, and why there is continuing resistance to Communist authorities.

TO SEND OUR LORD BYRONS

Well then. Where does all this leave us?

First, it says we were justified in seeking to help the South Vietnamese. The way we went about it may have been wrong—terribly so in the case of the indiscriminate slaughter of Westmoreland's search-and-destroy missions and in Johnson's cruel sacrifice of lower-case draftees to keep influential Americans from experiencing the human cost of his massive escalation—but we didn't have to help in those ways.

We could have sent volunteers who were trained in the language and the culture, who could have helped in the ways most of the Vietnamese wanted to be helped. We could have sent arms and economic aid to balance the external contributions from the Communist world. We did not have to take over the war from the Vietnamese.

But granted that we could have helped and helped effectively in Vietnam, why bother to make the point now?

The reason is that one of the lessons the Left has learned from Vietnam is that because our intervention did not turn out well there, we should not intervene anywhere. The trouble with this view is that it denies us the opportunity to help others as the French helped us in 1781, to send our Lord Byrons to tomorrow's equivalent of the Greece of 1824. More critically, it denies us the right to intervene where intervention may be vital to our survival, which it was not in Vietnam. Nuclear proliferation and the law of averages governing the percentage of lunatics likely to become rulers mean that we are going at some point to be confronted with an Adolf Hitler, Idi Amin, or Papa Doc Duvalier, who either has a big bomb or will soon have the power to make one. What do we do then? Sit back and wait for the blast? We have to intervene, and, instead of intervening in the wrong way, as we did in Vietnam, we have to do it right.

But because the Left has decided we should never intervene, it has lost interest in how to intervene effectively. We need a CIA and a military that are capable of

pulling off an Entebbe if they have to. Instead, they are committed to their own bureaucratic survival and receive almost no constructive criticism from the Left. Constructive criticism is needed, not only of the morality of foreign involvement, but of its techniques as well. Those parts of the Pike Report that focused on the CIA's failure to do the things it should be doing were largely ignored by a liberal press. So was the military's penchant for landing at the wrong place in the case of the *Mayaguez* and Son Tay.

So, if we're faced with something far more dangerous than Vietnam in the future, the probability is that, regardless of what is really needed to deal with it, the Navy will dust the mothballs off some old carriers, the Army will ready its divisions, and the Left will virtuously oppose any intervention. The result in all probability will be either too much or too little response. And that could mean that we would be incinerated. Let's accept the fact that intervention can be necessary and concentrate our efforts on turning the military and the CIA into organizations that can deal with threatened danger sensibly and effectively.

APPENDIX 7

Paper Entitled "Vietnam and the Press" by Robert K. Musil[1]

One story about life in Vietnam after liberation on which everyone agrees is the problem of mines. They were literally sprinkled around the countryside by the Americans. Removing them now is a laborious and dangerous process. On hands and knees, one carefully probes with a bamboo stick, inch by inch, across a field that is to be returned to farming. When metal is struck, the mine is gingerly dug up and removed. Occasionally, one goes off. As a United Nations Mission Report on Vietnam put it last year, "The Mission itself often heard explosions and was the unwilling witness of an accident... when a mine went off, killing six workers and injuring many others."

To probe recent accounts of life in Socialist Vietnam is to enter a kind of minefield in itself. The ground is sown with potentially explosive items; some are duds, and some tragically go off. But it is clear that as in the past the American press has plunged ahead blindly, guided by their prejudices, not their probes. And, they have set off mines at every turn.

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The results of such reckless coverage of Vietnam include stirred up anti-communist passions, splits within the remainder of the peace movement, votes in Congress to ban any post-war aid to Vietnam, and disturbing hints in the press that perhaps our intervention there was not so misconceived after all. As the Wall Street Journal pontificated on April 21, "even some of the most vocal antiwar protestors of a decade ago have shown signs of now knowing that Mr. Johnson's prediction was not so paranoid after all." This kind of reverse revisionist history has been abetted by President Carter who, when asked in a press conference whether we owed any moral obligations to Vietnam, replied, "We went there to defend the freedom of the South Vietnamese, and I don't feel that we ought to apologize or to castigate ourselves or to assume the status of culpability."

Toward its end, there was much talk of the "lessons" of the Vietnam War. President Carter, seemingly, has yet to read even the Pentagon Papers; the press, with its greater experience, has, however, not yet learned to properly defuse the complexities of the new Vietnam. After initial reports that there was not a bloodbath after liberation, press interest in Vietnam practically disappeared. Such reporting as there was tended to focus on refugees to the United States. Then that story, too, died. As the mindless coverage of the Bicentennial and a Presidential election year soaked up more and more space in 1976, Vietnam news virtually ended. And in

the spring, the last permanent U.S. correspondents were ordered to leave by the new government. Western correspondents and visitors continued, however, to tour Vietnam and to send reports. French journalists Patrice LeBeer and Jean Lacouture wrote balanced, though critical accounts for Le Monde and La Nouvelle Observateur, but these received little attention in the U.S., until later. Tiziano Terzani, an Italian journalist who had stayed in Vietnam until July 1975, wrote a balanced account of a return visit and life one year after liberation in the July 15, 1976 New York Review of Books. Though Terzani was somewhat critical and warned of increasing bureaucracy and authoritarianism if aid to Vietnam were not forthcoming, no establishment media noted his remarks that "Vietnam one year after the end of the war, can already claim important successes in public health and agriculture and education. That they should have been accomplished at all by, and in, a country that has suffered so much from bombing, defoliation, and destruction is itself remarkable."

Only with the post-election lull in the fall and the appearance of highly critical charges about Vietnam aired by some peace activists did the American press corps snap to attention over Vietnam. On December 16, Henry Bradsher of the Washington Star reported on a letter addressed to the Vietnamese Observer at the U.N., Dinh Ba Thi. The letter, which had been leaked to the Star, was signed by about 90 persons, including the well-known names of Joan Baez and

Daniel Ellsberg. Entitled "An Appeal to the Government of Vietnam Regarding Human Rights," the letter called on the Vietnamese for "a complete accounting of all those detained or imprisoned..." and went on to demand that they "release immediately all those held for purely political or religious reasons." The letter further asked the government in Vietnam to make public "any unreleased information it may still possess regarding Americans who died or were imprisoned in Vietnam."

The Appeal was organized primarily by Jim Forest of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a draft resister and then editor of Fellowship magazine. Once the story of the appeal broke in the Star, its organizers went ahead with a press conference in New York. Now Vietnam was fully back in the news. The headlines and editorials gushed with relief. "Doves of Yesteryear Squawk at Hanoi" is the way the Washington Post ran it. The Chicago Tribune saw the lessons of all this clearly. "As the Soviet Union builds up its strength now confrontations between the free world and the Communist world are likely to become increasingly frequent...There will be new debates on how to respond...But there is one argument that no sensible American will ever fall for again, and that is that morality or human rights can ever play a part in an unelected Communist regime." The wave of jubilant reports went on. The main themes were that the peace movement was "sadder, but wiser," that Hanoi was now revealed for even the most naive as a

"brutal regime." Drowned out in this chorus of press adulation for prodigal peaceniks returned to sanity was any rebuttal to the charges brought in the Appeal and the press conference. Early reports perfunctorily quoted Gareth Porter of the Indochina Resource Center or John McAuliff of the American Friends Service Committee--usually out of context and with a thinly veiled charge of Stalinism. Even more effectively buried was any mention of an "Appeal for Reconciliation," the peace movements main effort before Carter's inauguration. It was coordinated by McAuliff and sponsored by numerous peace and church groups. Calling for reconstruction aid and recognition for Vietnam, it circulated at the same time as the Jim Forest appeal, but was signed by nearly 100,000 peace activists, not 90. It never made the news.

The Forest appeal, if carefully examined by the press, would not have lived up to its headline billings. And, if they had looked, the press and some signers would have found sufficient contrary evidence, as Porter and McAuliff originally claimed, to refute or soften much of the grim picture of Vietnam so eagerly transmitted to the public. The Appeal charges were based essentially on the previous Jean Lacouture reports from May; charges made by Theodore Jacqueney, a former State Department and USAID official who had done a New York Times Op-Ed piece in September, and reports from refugees and clandestine correspondence channeled through Thich Nhat Hanh, the Buddhist poet-priest exiled in Paris. Nhat Hanh had

long been close to FOR and to Jim Forest who wrote up his reports in Fellowship magazine.

To the neophyte, the combination of the respected Lacouture, the New York Times piece by Jacqueney who had protested against Thieu's repression, Thich Nhat Hanh who had lectured widely on the peace circuit in the 1960s, and the seeming sponsorship of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, was more than enough. Given such impressive sponsorship, and for the press, the certified star quality of Baez and Ellsberg, few probed more deeply into the situation.

The combined charges in the Forest appeal and documentation added up this way: There were 200,000 - 300,000 "political prisoners" which included not only Thieu's generals and members of his repressive apparatus, but also Vietnamese "Third Force" leaders and religious figures, especially Tran Van Tuyen, Bui Tung Huan, Luong Truong Tuong, Tran Ngoc Chau and Father Tran Huu Thanh; the government had closed the LaBoi press which published Thich Nhat Hanh, had closed the School of Youth for Social Service run by the Unified Buddhist Church (Thich Nhat Hanh's group), and one of its leaders. Thich Tri Quang had been detained for three weeks, charged with being CIA-connected. In addition, the Appeal cited reports of the immolation of 12 Buddhist monks and nuns on November 2, 1975 because of restrict on their monastic practices in Can Tho Province.

Few people carefully examined Tee Jacqueney's piece in The New York Times or suspected that his "Paris sources"