In early 1965, U.S. propaganda services lavished praise on Thunderchiefs F.105's as of unimaginable efficiency. Discredited now as unsuitable for the Viet Nam theatre, owing to their structure, these planes are largely replaced by Phantoms F.4B and F.4C. According to the *U.S. News and World Report* of October 24, 1966, the production of F.4C's could not offset timely the loss of F.105's in North Viet Nam. But the Phantoms have served their time. Eleven specialists were sent to Viet Nam by the Pentagon to enquire into the cause of their vulnerability and the inefficiency of American missiles.*

Many types of unmanned reconnaissance planes were tested. The first to be experimented — the Q.2C flying at very high altitude was shot down in great numbers. The 147-J which could fly at 400 metres high were also downed by North Viet Nam A.A. batteries and even by rifles.

Some people think that the losses suffered by the U.S. air force in the D.R.V.N. are insignificant for such an industrial power as the U.S.A. This is not the case however. A lot of time has been required for the Pentagon to supply the Seventh Fleet with a number of planes equal to one-third of that downed over North Viet Nam. In terms of dollars, this represents

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* According to *U.P.I.*, December 15, 1966, the Shrike used to attack radar installations, had given rather disappointing results. Hanson W. Baldwin confirmed also that air-to-ground missiles were not up to expectation (*The New York Times*, February 7, 1967).

nearly 6 billion*, enough to keep up 5 million unemployed persons in the U.S.A. for over one year.

No trifling sum even for the American budget, if one remembers that the question of 700 million dollars necessary to purify the air of New York city from pollutions was put off till doomsday after heated debates in Congress and the government**. In 1966-1967, the U.S. ground force received only 400 million dollars to improve the Nike X anti-missile defence system (*U.P.I.*, November 6, 1966).

The above-mentioned estimates do not involve the charges of maintenance and repair of aircraft nor the cost of bombs and ammunition which, according to *A.P.* of January 8, 1967, amounted to 2,000 dollars per minute. Each flying hour requires 700 dollars worth of fuel and 500 dollars of bonus for the pilot. *Reuter* of April 16, 1966, reckoned that the B.52 attack on Mu Gia, west of Quang Binh province, on April 12, 1966, cost no less than 21 million dollars. The training of

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* According to *U.P.I.*, December 29, 1966, Gen. William W. Momyer had estimated that each plane downed in North Viet Nam cost from 2 to 3 million dollars. In fact a Thunderchief F.105 cost over 2.5 million, a RB. 66 reconnaissance plane 6 million and an EB.66C 6.5 million dollars.

** Senator W. Fulbright declared at the Connecticut University in spring 1966 that he thought it senseless to suppose with levity that one could find billions of dollars for the reconstruction of American schools and towns, for the improvement of public transport and the struggle against air pollution while financing by tens of billions an endless war in Asia (*Political and Economic Year*, October 1966).

an American pilot requires 773,000 dollars on the average (*A.P.*, April 4, 1967).

But it is the losses in human lives which are the greatest concern of the Pentagon. Ninety-five per cent of American pilots captured in North Viet Nam ranked from lieutenant to colonel, many of them being squadron leaders. Among them there were aces made "heroes of the U.S. Air Force" such as Ropson, Kasler, who had flown over one thousand hours during the Korean War.

The New York Times of October 10, 1966, pointed out that the shortage of pilots in various arms was similar to that of aircraft. A naval officer said that the Navy lacked 1,660 pilots and the Marines about 650.

The Navy as well as the U.S. Air Force had to proceed to a screening in order to find airmen necessary for the Viet Nam war. But this is only a temporary measure.

Major James H. Kasler, captured on August 7, 1966, declared: "Since the beginning of 1966, 50 F.105-D's, that is 90 per cent of the number of planes of my Wing No 355, have been downed by your A.A. defence. In June, July and August alone, 24 of our F. 105-D's were downed, that is 40 per cent of the planes of our Wing. We lost more than 30 airmen. Twenty pilots have just come from West Germany and a certain number from Okinawa."

Early in 1966, it was necessary for the U.S.A. to send to Viet Nam 2,000 airmen fulfilling other missions, to prolong the duration of the pilots' service, and increase the number of air sorties. The pilots in mission over North Viet Nam must fly 40 sorties a month, that

is sometimes two sorties in a day and often for ten days running (*A.P.*, October 29, 1966).

"Pilots are flying up to 120 per cent of their maximum allowed flying time, according to official reports" (*U.P.I.*, January 10, 1967). Meanwhile *A.P.* (October 29, 1966) pointed it out that "Adding to the problem is the heavier pilot loss-rate, the natural result of more missions and more exposure to the enemy." *U.S. News and World Report* wrote that the cost in human lives and material had increased in the air war and that those at the front said that the price paid for this war might be still higher when the "communist" A.A. defence system was improved.

American airmen captured in North Viet Nam disclosed that the need for the Viet Nam theatre was so pressing that it was necessary for the United States to curtail advanced training, to train members of the flying personnel into pilots, and to accustom F.105 pilots to man F.4 jets. The rotation of duty per company applied at the beginning of escalation, they also said, had to be given up owing to heavy losses, and replaced by individual-service rotation.

"More than 2,000 officers have been ordered out of desk jobs and into cockpits in the past year" (*A.P.*, October 29, 1966).

According to *U.P.I.* (February 4, 1967) "the shortage of pilots was so serious that the U.S. even thought of dispatching a pilot with an amputable limb to Viet Nam".

The longer the war, the more serious the aircraft and pilot crisis. Makeshift solutions and the hasty training of pilots will only increase American losses. The Pentagon will never get out of this vicious circle.

III. DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH

On April 7, 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson the hyprocrite invoked Deuteronomy in favour of his peace blackmail: "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing, therefore choose life, both thou and thy seed may live." (*U.P.I.*, April 8, 1965).

On September 8, 1966, on Washington's orders U.S. aircraft dropped in North Viet Nam leaflets (3,200,000 according to *U.P.I.*) containing unveiled threat: "What will the future be like? There will be fiercer and fiercer bombings. Either death or a solution negotiated in honour."

The promise of a "road of life" and a "solution negotiated in honour" was attended by an intensification of air strikes on North Viet Nam communication-lines, means of transport, factories, dykes, economic installations, public utility works, populous areas, schools, hospitals, etc. General Maxwell Taylor, father of the "flexible response strategy" and U.S. ambassador to South Viet Nam in 1964 and 1965, made no bones about the intentions of his government. He said: "The reason for the decision to use air power was to provide a

sobering reminder to the leaders in Hanoi that progressively they must pay a mounting price for the continuation of their support of the Viet Cong insurgency. In a very real sense, the objective of our air campaign is to change the will of the enemy leadership."* Washington then expected that within a few months, the North Vietnamese people would give up the fight, because of the collapse of their economy, the upsetting of their political, social and cultural organizations and the increase of their human and material losses. Left alone, the South Vietnamese people and armed forces would be defeated, the people in both parts of the country would finally accept the "solution negotiated in honour", that is, Washington's terms.

The Hawks' hope can be summed up in a cartoon carried by the *Chicago Sun Times* of 1965 representing a Vietnamese peasant in rags and tatters, armed with a prehistoric stone lance and running away under the bombs delivered by up-to-date American jets.

After two years of efforts, the result was rather disappointing for the White House.

" U.S. military officials will admit off the record that North Viet Nam has shown a remarkable degree of resilience under the stress of the U.S. air campaign " (*Newsweek*, May 2, 1966).

" Senator Eugene J. Mc Carthy said that, in view of the testimony Secretary of State Dean Rusk gave before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ' I do not

* Report to the Congress, *The Viet Nam Hearings*, Vintage Books, New York, p. 174.

think that the administration has demonstrated that the past bombing has particularly helped the cause'." (*U.S. News and World Report*, March 1967).

But the London *Times* was more emphatic on this score in an issue of August 9, 1966: "The U.S. is defeated in its air war in Viet Nam." That was also the opinion of *A.P.* correspondent Bob Horton: "In their larger objectives the raids have failed." (January 8, 1967).

THE COMMUNICATIONS BATTLE

Bridges, communication-lines and means of transport are one of the main targets of U.S. aviation.

Ham Rong bridge, Thanh Hoa province, some 300 metres long, was up to the end of 1966 the target of 1,560 air sorties and received 1,600 tons of bombs and 250 rockets. In 18 months a road section 11 kms long near the 17th parallel, was struck 380 times, sometimes for 45 days and nights running. One thousand bombs were showered on a length less than 3 kms in Tinh Gia district, Thanh Hoa province. Even bamboo pontoon-bridges a few metres long built on beaten by-roads were not spared. The Yankees do not hesitate to pay their raids at a high price. To attack Ham Rong bridge which is always standing, they lost in 1965 70 jets and dozens of pilots. A 20-metre bridge in Quang Binh cost them 19 planes, and another 10 metres long in Ha Tinh, 6. Each ferry hit caused them the loss of 4 or 5 planes.

Sampans and rafts, railway stations, trains and vehicles are prime targets. There are cases in which a cyclist alone is the object of a hot pursuit by many jets. International passenger-trains between Hanoi and Lang Son are often struck.

Capitalizing on the experiences of twenty-five years of war, the North Vietnamese people resolutely fight the communications battle. They heap up bags of earth and stone near the frequently attacked sections. As all the roads cannot be subjected to a round-the-clock bombing, there is always enough time to fill the pot-holes and bomb craters in one locality or another, and make the road negotiable again. In this patient work, the American air force is always the loser. A few half-days of navvying were needed, Western new agencies said, to put in good repair the road across the Mu Gia pass on which 700 tons of bombs had been dropped Some sections bordering on a mountain, raised to 12 metres high by thousands of bombs, are cleared in a few hours with the help of thousands of carrying poles, spades and shovels.

The "Young Volunteers' brigades To Resist U.S. Aggression for National Salvation" mount a vigilant guard along strategic roads. They live in nearby trenches, and, in normal time, go in for animal husbandry and cultivation, study, sing and dance; they take up their guns when enemy aircraft come, and their picks and baskets for navvy-work when the marauders are away.

New roads with junctions lined with quick-growing plants as camouflage, with trenches and embankments

to shelter men and vehicles, have been built at a rapid tempo. 107,000km of roads were built in 1966-1967.

Each bridge is accompanied with a system of reserve ferries and bridges (spare bridges, bridges at water level, sham bridges and trap-bridges to deceive the enemy, collapsible bridges dismounted in the day and mounted at night to sidetrack aerial survey). Many plans for construction and repair have been mapped out for these works. The material—steel, iron or bamboo—is preferably supplied locally and must be simple, practical and resisting. Some floating bridges, made of bamboo put on plaited bamboo boats tied together, can withstand several train carriages at a time. The repairing of certain bridges, which normally requires one or two years, is completed in a few months.

The most modern technique is combined with rudimentary methods. Engineers trained in higher schools co-operate closely with technicians formed by practice; political and technical cadres complete each other.

A group of engineers and technicians studied the repair of a bridge in the event of its destruction by the enemy. It submitted two projects, one requiring 15 months in peace conditions, and the other two months in war conditions. The secretary of the Party provincial committee found the second project still long drawn-out. The plan was revised with the participation of heads of agricultural co-operatives and militarymen responsible for the area near the bridge. The term

was brought down to 20 days but in fact, the repair work was completed in 14 days, thanks to the contribution of the local population in manpower and material.

Bold and efficient innovations have been introduced, for instance, cable bridge. Made originally of two parallel cables hanging across the river, the bridge enables vehicles to run on pulleys adapted to the axles of the wheels. It is then transformed into a system of many parallel cables on which can be drawn from either bank of the river a kind of ferry-boat capable of carrying passengers and vehicles. It is difficult for aircraft to hit the cables which, if broken, can be connected in a matter of minutes.

Delayed-action bombs dropped wantonly on communication-lines, are another source of disappointment for the men in the Pentagon. Each village in hard-hit zones has at least a few persons capable of unpriming the most complex delayed-action bombs.

The North Vietnamese people have done their best to keep traffic going. Their watchword was, "The enemy destroys the road, we repair it to pass. Should he destroy it anew, we repair it and pass". It now becomes. "We pass despite destruction by the enemy". The communication and transport personnel adopt the slogan: "Each kilogram of goods arrived at destination is a bullet shot in the head of the American pirates and a brick to build socialism."

All means of transport are used: trains, trucks, motor-boats, pinnaces, launches, motor barges, sampans,

wheel-barrows, buffalo-carts, improved carts, bicycles with 300kg-loading capacity, carrying poles.

Each river crossing is sometimes an epopee. Let us mention the case of a ferry-boat in Thanh Hoa province. One day in early May, at 8.15 a.m., though the alert had been given by a tom-tom, the motor-boat started all the same, hauling a barge with many cars on board. There, it was impossible to have a quarter of an hour without an air attack. Five F.105-D's rushed in in two waves. The crew and the A.A. batteries on the river banks shot at them. A jet crashed. Six other planes came up, bombing and strafing the ferry-boat which zigzagged along and continually changed speed. As it was about to reach the bank, the chief ferryman shouted, "Back!" The pilot moved the ferry back, just in time to avoid many bombs. The enemy formation closely struck by our A.A. guns, turned tail. The loss was light.

There were days when the same ferry received up to 3,000 steel-pellet bombs, dozens of incendiary bombs and hundreds of fragmentation bombs. But it goes on working.

*

After two years of efforts, the U.S. air force did not succeed in disrupting, even seriously hampering, the North Viet Nam traffic. American authorities themselves confessed that out of the 5,000 bridges destroyed by U.S. aircraft, the majority had been repaired within

two or three weeks or rapidly put back into order (*A.P.*, March 8, 1967.)

Bob Horton, *A.P.* correspondent, wrote on January 8, 1967: "For 22 months, U.S. planes have bombed and strafed North Viet Nam roads, highways, bridges, railroads, secondary power plants, truck convoys, boats, barges and fuel storage facilities. Almost as quickly as the targets are hit, they are patched up, replaced, by-passed, plugged up, restocked, overhauled or discarded."

Salisbury who was in Viet Nam reported: "The moment there is a break in the railroad line they bring a thousand people in to fix it. The railroads have been knocked out but are now fixed (*U.P.I.* January 12, 1967).

U.P.I., May 16, 1967, admitted: "The effect of the bombing of the North is limited by the structure of the country's economy. The principal supplies are of local origin: rice which is grown locally and fish caught locally and charcoal and items of that kind that are produced locally, McNamara explained. It is not a highly industrialized society depending upon imports and exports. I think that the economy of North Viet Nam could continue essentially without imports. It is unlikely that, even if the daily movement requirements were to increase, air attacks could affect it substantially."

All those opinions testify to the vain efforts of the U.S. air force to destroy transport and communications in North Viet Nam.

ON THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FRONT

"In face of the war of destruction waged by American imperialism, our people have got used to a life devoted to production and combat. They have grown very quickly aware that one must fight in order to preserve production, and produce so as to ensure victory in fighting. In many places, production work is closely linked to the heroic fighting that has been going on day and night. We are happy to see that in the fire of combat, progress in production and building has sometimes proved better than in peace time and that the most notable progress has been achieved in regions that have undergone the worst trials".*

This Declaration by Premier Pham Van Dong has been confirmed by figures and facts. In 1965, agricultural production went up by 4.2 per cent compared with 1964 and by 21.2 per cent compared with 1960 (the first year of the first five-year plan). The area under industrial crops increased by 9.2 per cent compared with 1964. It should be noted that weather conditions in 1965 were far from favourable to agriculture.

In regions south of the 20th parallel, subjected to intense air bombing, food production in 1965 went up 12.3 per cent compared with 1964.

All over North Viet Nam, intense and successful efforts have been made in spite of American bombings

* Report before the D.R.V.N. National Assembly (3rd Session, 3rd Legislature, April 1966).

with a view to achieving an output of 5 tons of rice per hectare per year. Before the start of U.S. escalation, the drive was launched only in important rice-growing areas. Even in time of peace, it is a bold undertaking for an agricultural country in which farm work has been very little mechanized, and which is subjected to the whims of a tropical climate. Over the centuries, no district in Viet Nam has ever dreamt of such an output for its rice-fields as a whole.

In 1964, a year of relative peace, only two districts in the D.R.V.N. achieved the 5-ton target.

In 1965, 680 co-operatives, 162 villages and 7 districts reached or surpassed that target. The Thang Loi co-op, Thanh Hoa province, which stood in the lead, achieved 6,754 tons (an increase of 0.5 ton per hectare, compared with 1964).

In 1966, the enemy intensified his raids and destroyed some dykes. A protracted spell of drought was followed by flood in some regions, and in others, rice plants were affected by chlorosis or insects. And yet, over 1,000 co-operatives, 280 villages, 15 districts and one province brought in 5 tons or more per hectare. Sixty-nine co-ops recorded more than 6 tons, and four more than 7 tons. Among those regions was Thai Binh, the most important rice-growing province in North Viet Nam, with a population of over a million, a province little favoured by nature and fairly frequently raided by U.S. aircraft. One co-op in that province, Tan Phong, achieved 7,205 tons per hectare, 481 kilograms more than in 1965. The Hanoi-Hue-Saigon co-op in the outskirts of Hanoi recorded 7,057 tons per hectare.

Southern regions, the special targets of U.S. raids, continue nonetheless to achieve bigger outputs in cereals and other food crops. The Hong Long co-op in Quynh Luu district, Nghe An province, raided two or three times a day on an average, lost six of its members right at the beginning of the dry crop cultivation season. Yet, it recorded 5.7 tons per hectare—3.8 tons for autumn rice—i.e. 0.7 ton more compared with 1965. The Lien Minh co-op, in Ha Tinh province, received about 1,000 bombs in the course of 57 raids, in the 1966 autumn rice season; yet, it brought in 0.1 ton more than in 1965. P. village in Ky Anh district, Ha Tinh province, was subjected to 1,260 air raids from March 26, 1965 to the end of November 1966. But its rice output was 0.5 ton more per hectare, compared with 1965. Instead of receiving from the State a subsidy of 30-35 tons of rice per year as formerly, it sold to the State 12 tons of rice in 1966. Fishing brought in 121 tons of fish in 1964 (a record figure at that date) but the catch went up to 134 tons in 1965 and 103 tons for the first nine months of 1966.

The region of Nam Ngan, Ham Rong, waged 300 battles against U.S. planes in the space of 600 days and had to set aside part of its lands for trenches and other defence works. Yet, in 1966, it obtained 12 tons of rice more than in 1965. Nhan Trach village, in Quang Binh province, which on certain days fought back as many as ten U.S. air and naval raids, overfulfilled its 1966 agricultural plan by 121 per cent. Ly Ninh village, also in Quang Binh, was subjected to 103 raids between February 1965 and September 1966, an average of one raid every six days, and two bombs per household;

yet, its people raised 80 more pigs in 1966, compared with 1965, five more draught buffaloes and oxen, 23 more buffaloes and oxen for food, 11 more cows, 22 more calves and young buffaloes. The co-op's investment fund and its members' savings, 2,857 and 24,754 dongs respectively in 1964, went up to 6,684 and 42,076 dongs in 1965. The latter figure reached 103,200 dongs in September 1966.

Vinh Linh, located along the 17th parallel, keeps on bringing in good harvests. Two of its villages have surpassed the 5-ton norm.

Livestock breeding has gone up 2.7 per cent per year. The number of pigs has reached a record figure, 6.2 per cent more, compared with 1965. In 1966, the co-ops' capital accumulation increased by 22 per cent compared with 1965 and the value of real estate, by 45 per cent.

North Viet Nam's agriculture has ceaselessly consolidated its material and technical bases. The technical revolution has been adopted by broad peasant masses. In 1964, each inhabitant of Ly Ninh village moved an average of 17 cubic metres of earth for agricultural hydraulic works, he moved 37 cubic metres in 1965 while U.S. war escalation was in full swing, and 31 cubic metres for the first nine months of 1966. The people of the same village have built a water reservoir with a capacity of over one million cubic metres, the irrigated area increased by 20 per cent in the 1964 autumn rice season and by 71 per cent during that of 1966.

*

Industry in the D.R.V.N. has been reorganized to fit war time conditions. Big undertakings have been dispersed and production kept up. Smaller ones have been built. Power stations, the special targets of U.S. aircraft, have not ceased functioning. The engineering industry has been reinforced and produced 50 per cent more machines and equipment than in 1964. Coal mining and the chemical industry are more active than ever, so are geological surveys and forest exploitations.

Light industry turns out ever more new items.

As for regional industry, money was invested 3.3 times more in capital construction in 1966, 300 new factories and workshops have been built, as well as 100 engineering shops. The value of products turned out for the benefit of agriculture increased by 44.74 per cent in 1966, that of items set apart for communications and transport, by 79.69 per cent. The number of skilled workers trained in 1965 increased 2.5 times, and three times in 1966, compared with 1964. Of the 26,789 agricultural co-ops, 3,800 have been mechanized, thanks to regional industry.

Let us take Hung Yen province for instance. In two years, regional industry turned out 170 agricultural machines: husking machines, food-grinding machines for animal husbandry, threshing machines, pumps; 148 engineering shops and 120 electric generators have been built. The engineering network has extended down to district and co-operative level.

In the first quarter of 1967, the value of regional industrial production in 28 provinces and cities of North Viet Nam increased by 11.2 per cent, compared with

the same period in 1966, the rate of increase being 41 per cent for engineering, 47.7 per cent for chemical fertilizers, 12.8 per cent for wood and paper, 15.4 per cent for ceramics, 13.2 per cent for textiles, 0.3 per cent for foodstuffs, 4.1 per cent for handicraft, 8.6 per cent for consumption goods, 12 per cent for urban industry, 18.6 per cent for provinces of the Midlands and 8 per cent for plain regions.

The first five-year plan of the D.R.V.N. ended successfully in 1965, as pointed out by Premier Pham Van Dong before the National Assembly in 1966.

" Socialist transformation has recorded decisive successes since 1960. From that date, we have ceaselessly consolidated and improved socialist relations of production, essentially through two big revolutionary campaigns: one aimed at improving management and technique in the agricultural co-operatives, and the other at promoting the ' three fors and three againsts ' * in various branches of the State economy.

Parallel with the development of all branches of the State economy, the ' three fors and three againsts ' campaign has raised our economic management capability one step higher, thus making it possible for the State economy to develop its leadership in the whole of the national economy.

In industry, the first bases of engineering, electrical engineering, metallurgy and chemical engineering have

* Three fors: to heighten the sense of responsibility, to strengthen economic and financial management, to improve technique. Three againsts: to fight embezzlement, waste and bureaucracy.

been built and have begun operating. In light industry, new branches have been created and new products turned out. Hundreds of regional industry undertakings, built in the provinces, have gradually proved their worth by meeting the local needs in capital and consumption goods. In the North, a big mining, manufacturing and processing industry is taking shape, including many branches of heavy and light industry, big, medium and small undertakings, and combining modern and rudimentary methods. This industry is more and more in a position to turn out most of our consumption goods and over half of our capital goods.

In agriculture, our vast hydraulic network comprises hundreds of State-built big and medium works which, combined with the use of electric pumping stations, diesel-powered pumps, reservoirs, dams and canals, have ensured the irrigation and draining of 73 per cent of areas under crops, one-third of which according to scientific methods. These last few years, the drive for the re-arrangement of rice-fields has been greatly extended: its aim is to re-adjust and rebuild the paddy dykes so as to make irrigation and draining easier, develop communications, plant more trees, and transform the face of the countryside. Agricultural co-ops have adopted with more and more enthusiasm improved agricultural implements, small machines and new techniques. Many have built collective breeding stations, centres for the selection and multiplication of seeds, shops for the processing of agricultural products, drying yards, silos, etc. By late 1965, over 1,000 co-ops had been equipped with small machines, which heralded a revolutionary transformation in the years to come.

Stress must be laid here on the conscious efforts made by the co-ops in strengthening the collective-economy sector; manpower has been mostly devoted to the building of the co-ops' material and technical basis and to intensive cultivation so as to increase output.

On the basis of intensified cultivation of food crops, that of industrial crops and fruit trees, as well as livestock breeding, has been developed, and a greatly diversified agriculture has taken shape, full of promises.

The 1966 plan was fulfilled satisfactorily, having achieved results which conformed to the three criteria put forward by the National Assembly at the beginning of the year: to mobilize all forces and all possibilities with a view to meeting war-time needs, to satisfy the essential needs of the people, develop their strength and make it possible for them to carry on production work and fighting for a long time; to ensure the development of our economy.

The plan for the first quarter of 1967 was overfulfilled and the summer rice crop, a bumper one.

Thanks to these economic successes, the people's living standards have not undergone serious disturbances and have been maintained at the 1964 level or even improved, including in the hardest hit regions. Necessities such as rice, salt, meat, fabrics, etc. have been kept at the 1963-1964 price level. Compared with 1964, State retail trade increased by 11.4 per cent in 1965 and 10 per cent in 1966. The sale of consumption goods in 1966 increased by 27 per cent, compared with 1964. Buying and selling co-operatives ran 22,712 stores in 1966 as against 12,948 in 1964. State trade services