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PARAPOLITICS AND PACIFICATION VIETNAM:
A Study in Applied Cadre Techniques

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PREFACE

In early 1960 a group of six men dressed in rumpled khakis entered a village in northern Laos, asked for the Nai-ban* and began passing out propaganda as they talked to the villagers. Two years later, in the central highlands of Vietnam, a fifteen-man team of tribesmen ambushed two Viet Cong propagandists and carried their bodies into the nearest hamlet. While twelve men fanned out around the village perimeter, the other three gathered the villagers together and began speaking to them, in their own dialect, about 'the government. In a town abutting the Viet Minh stronghold of Maquis D, four former Viet Cong had tea in four different houses as they quietly conducted a 'census.' By 1964 "Peoples' Action Teams" of forty men were openly operating in the Viet Cong infested coastal province of Quang Ngai - thatching roofs, helping with the harvest ... providing security.

Each of the above represents a type of activity which, in the aggregate, has here been labeled 'parapolitics,' specific courses of political actions following several directions which converge into an overall effort known as 'pacification.' Implementing these courses of action is the political combatant. In the Communist world he has

* village chief

been praised, even sanctified, in his role as the "vanguard of revolution." Among the free nations he is treated as an unwanted stepchild, either slighted or denied recognition. To the communists he is a 'regular' of unquestioned status, yet in the non-communist world he must seek a number of guises to perform his functions.

Only recently has attention become focused on the dynamics of political combat - 'the other war.' This sudden attention has been a mixed blessing, creating an aura about pacification which has conjured up images of green berets, civic action, mass inoculations and guerrilla gimmickry - all combined to send the insurgent into ignoble retreat. The real issue, that of building or shoring up the underpinnings of a viable socio-political structure, has been, and is still being, neglected or sidestepped.

This apparent unwillingness to come to grips with pacification stems in part from the fact that its problems defy solution by familiar methodologies. Militarily these problems have now been categorized under 'limited war' and 'insurgency'; politically the terminology is 'development' or 'pacification.' Military staffers have formalized doctrines of 'counter-insurgency,' although some loose ends remain in terms of allocation of resources. On the political action side, while some concepts are beginning to take shape, the doctrines are still confusing and contradictory. One school of thought sees pacification in fashionable Mao' ' phasings,' the first phase a military one with the armed forces on stage and the civilian components waiting in the wings. In the second stage the civilians

take over to usher in an era of democracy and nation-building. An opposing school sees the entire pacification effort as a political exercise whose outcome will be determined by the omniscient leadership of civil government. Leaving aside such polarized theorems, the problem of who controls what and when, particularly in a nation such as South Vietnam, continues to present itself. However, there is general agreement that political and military processes must move in tandem if national stability of any sort is to be realized.

Granting then recognition of the critical function of political action during the development process it is appropriate at this time to look at those component parts of the political structure of a country which bear on this process and in Vietnam on the insurgency as well. After factoring out these components and examining their strengths and weaknesses, it should be possible to devise an index on the proportionate requirements for political action. In the case of South Vietnam these components are the government leadership, government bureaucracy and administration (civil and military), the traditional social structure, and the population as a whole. An additional component is the enemy who is both part of and apart from the regular socio/political structure. All of these components, with the variable constant identified as "parapolitics," made up the political action equation.

The structure of this study will deal first with a definition of the field of parapolitics and then examine its dynamics as it

relates them to the process of national development. Since this study pertains primarily to development during periods of political turmoil and military crises, particular attention will be given to parapolitics during an insurgency and its effects on the viability of newly established institutions and local political structures. Parapolitical activities are of special interest as they relate to the pacification process, a term used to describe development during these periods of stress activated by an insurgent movement.

A case where a parapolitical cross section can be examined in terms of a developing national body politic is South Vietnam from 1962 to 1967. The parapolitical organism found there is the cadre team, an integral part of the overall pacification program and this study will focus on the role of these political action cadre.

Before dealing with this aspect directly however, it is worth looking at related experiences which will emphasize the uniqueness of the Vietnamese case yet give it a meaningful frame of reference. For background we will look at pacification as it has been attempted in areas where parapolitical expedients have assumed other shapes and can be seen in different dimensions. These areas include Malaya, the Philippines, and Algeria. The study will then shift to Communist China and North Vietnam for a look at their use of cadres as a means of injecting the government presence into the rural countryside.

With this as background, the cadre program in South Vietnam will then be examined, its evolution traced from its origins in 1962 to its current status as the Revolutionary Development Program. Essential features of this program such as recruitment, training, and operational aspects will be discussed along with missions, tasks, and some of

the more unique and specialized functions such as census-grievance. The study will conclude with an examination of the particular problems which are derivatives of this type of activity.

This paper, then, takes one aspect of accelerated national development, herein termed parapolitics, and using the cadre program as its applied case study, attempts to determine its relationship to and efficacy upon the development phase.

I. PARAPOLITICS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

A. Definition:

While the term parapolitics could be used to cover almost any activity not part of the structured political system, the definition has been narrowed for the purposes of this paper. It refers here to organized political action undertaken to implement programs in the national interest through the use of assets which are not integral parts of regular government institutions. It does not include political party activity unless the party is a recognized arm of the national government, such as the Communist Party in North Vietnam, or the Neo-Destour Party in Tunisia. It does include activities of paramilitary assets where those assets have been specifically created to carry out a political role, such as pacification, and where they are not in the structured command line of the formal military organization. It would include special cadres of all types, particularly those not part of the techanical services of a national government. In a broad sense, parapolitics refer to those activities in the political action field which are ad hoc, quasi-governmental, supra-partisan or 'irregular.' Parapolitics is an inherent appendage to every political system and not a new concept. It has, however, assumed more crucial dimensions in the developing nations and, where insurgency or civil war are in progress, it often seems to dominate the regular political processes.

B. The Dynamics of Parapolitics:

A hallmark of guerrilla warfare is its non-conformity and as a consequence, it has produced a variety of irregular components. Although the concepts of insurgency have hardened into distinguishable and even somewhat regular patterns, the insurgent is still treated as an irregular and to corbat him the counter-insurgent has had to develop irregulars of his own. Many paramilitary units are examples of these irregulars, adjuncts to but not integral parts of the military structure as the Greek origin of "paro" (along side of) implies. At the same time, insurgencies tend to produce political irregulars who, while operating within the political structure, are not recognized as an integral part of it, although their activities are frequently subsumed in the regular administrative structure. Some irregulars combine paramilitary and parapolitical functions but usually are designed for the latter consonant with Mao's "Political power grows out of the barrel of the gun ...(but)... the Party commands the gun and the gun shall never be allowed to command the Party."

The dynamics of parapolitics are most practically reflected in extragovernmental operations, political operations conducted without benefit of an institutional framework. One of the barometers used in measuring the progress of national development is the extent of "institutionalization." By this measuring scale, the farther along in the institutionalization process a nation is, the more "developed" it has become. This would mean that nations which resort to

extragovernmental operations are ipso facto inhibiting institutionalization and hindering their own national development.

This theory may have validity where the internal and external pressures are not such that extra forces have to be brought into play merely as a matter of survival. For example, in Malaya and the Philippines, existing institutions were firmly enough rooted so that insurgency could be controlled by strengthening already viable administrative structures and security forces, the main components of which were already effectively operating. In Vietnam and Algeria on the other hand, while the French colonial legacy provided an acceptable functional bureaucratic structure it was one which was 'all sail and no rudder,' the actual responsibility of administration having always been left to the colonial parent. Even as technical services and other facets of modernization forced the creation of new ministries and departments and the training of local personnel, the decision making process remained in the hands of the colonialists. The rank and file personnel maintained the temperment of the "petit functionnaire" and their immediate indigenous superiors played the role of bureaucratic bridesmaids.

Therefore, when a crisis occurred and measures were needed which required initiative and imagination, the established bureaucracy was not equipped to provide them, and we see the advent of extragovernmental operations. An immediate need might exist, as an example, for a tangible

government presence to show itself in the villages of a particular area. This presence could be made manifest through repairing a dispensary, building a school, digging a well, improving the marketplace, constructing an access road, etc. Each of these relatively elemental projects could technically be provided under the ægis of one of the central ministries such as Education, Agriculture, Public Works or Public Health. These ministries, however, were geared at the central government level primarily to long range projects and their local offices were powerless to implement interim projects without lengthy bureaucratic delays, if approval was forthcoming at all. Means were therefore sought to provide locally both the financial and material support as well as the personnel to effect these projects and it is here the parapolitical process comes into play. Sir Robert Thompson cites this as a danger point and warns that:

> "When an insurgency breaks out, the question immediately arises of how far the government should alter its normal administrative structure in order to meet the needs of the situation...it is desirable to limit any re-organization and to avoid creating any new machinery except in so far as it is necessary to ensure co-ordination of effort, quicker decisions than are normally possible in a bureaucracy and closer supervision of their execution."(1)

Unfortunately, in South Vietnam the presupposed "normal administrative structures" were operationally ineffective and could not be relied upon. Therefore, while attempts were made to shore up the normal administrative structures to meet these pressures, this could not be accomplished in a short period of time.

The need for stop-gap measures to handle an insurgency is not the only reason for resorting to parapolitical measures. Leadership, factionalism, regionalism, minority problems -- all of these provide a source of parapolitical agitation. In Malaya, local leadership and responsibility were encouraged and at the same time critical decisions could be made quickly since actual control still rested in the hands of the British and problems of local autonomy or central power struggles were virtually non-existent. If the national plan in this case called for the development of a particular area at a given time, forces could be allocated without reference to the political fetters which might restrain other governments.

Conversely, South Vietnam has always been plagued with chronic regionalism and political rivalry, which has led to the growth of regional centers of autonomy as well as continued power struggles at the central government level. If the latter institutions had been viable enough this autonomy and rivalry could have been contained but the regional power centers often equally balanced the central government, a factor which had to be taken into account if a national leader was to survive. In a situation of this kind there was considerable agitation for creation of local parapolitical assets which, although nominally part of the national effort, became the private domain of local leaders. The "Force Populaire" in Central Vietnam had missions similar to those of the current revolutionary development teams, but its assets were completely controlled by President Diem's brother,

Ngo Dinh Can, whose brother, Nhu, attempted to counterbalance this with his own Republican Youth efforts. Both of these sizeable parapolitical/paramilitary organizations, organized during an early period of budding insurgency, were parapolitical forces of "authoritarian personalism."

Parapolitics not only finds fertile ground in regionalism but prospers well under charismatic leadership. Charismatic leaders, in most cases, are reluctant to delegate authority except to their most trusted advisors. They often have a scornful disregard for the bureaucratic processes, the bypassing of which is one feature of their charisma. Even President Magsaysay, whose institutions had reached a minimum level of national development, albeit plagued by corruption and inefficiency, gained much of his stature as a popular leader through his Presidential Complaints & Action Office which, while utilizing the institution of the presidency, was - by design - a sanctioned bypass of regular administrative procedures. The charismatic leader has an almost compulsive desire to command personal loyalty, and one practical method of achieving this is to create his own parapolitical organizations, which are responsible either directly to him or to his chosen subordinates. President Diem's office was noted for being 'open' to select province chiefs or prominent Roman Catholic leaders who were able to use their favoured disciple status to obtain special allocations of paramilitary and parapolitical forces.

A word should finally be said about the relationship between paramilitary and parapolitical forces and the military. In a country such as South Vietnam, military commanders, particularly those having

geographic areas of responsibility, often encouraged creation of special paramilitary units both to supplement their own forces and simultaneously to augment their personal power. This use of parapolitical forces in military roles has often proved disastrous, and the remedy for this is not an easy one so long as the military commanders maintain geographic political responsibilities. The best arrangement is generally to levy on the military commander political requirements which have a priority equal to that given military tasks and insure that he has sufficient assets to carry out these tasks. If not, the units tend to be used to carry out minor security functions and lose any real political value they might have had.

Although the need for paramilitary and parapolitical forces has token legality in an insurgent situation, there is a certain uneasiness among regular officers about units which have military functions but exist outside the regular military structure. This feeling is even stronger when directed at parapolitical units with paramilitary capabilities. While nominal recognition is accorded these forces, pressure is continuous for their integration into the regular establishment.

In the parapolitical field, as in the paramilitary, it is during the initial stages of development that the regular government ministries and departments become uneasy over these 'irregulars.' Yet it is during these stages that the need for these assets is greatest.

Born of crises, these extra-governmental assets are nurtured and developed while the established elements are not strong enough to cope with the extraordinary pressures of the situation. The argument, therefore, as to whether it is better to encourage parapolitical activities or to strengthen government institutions is meaningless since the decision to do the former does not necessarily mean detracting from the latter.

These then are some of the dynamics of parapolitics -- the crisis of an insurgency -- the weakness of established institutions -- the politics of regionalism and local autonomy -- and the charismatic leader. Each can be maximized for either the national good or detriment.

From the foregoing, the proposition which first clearly emerges is that parapolitical activities are the manifestation of a need to organize power in what are basically weak societies. There are sources of strength even in these weak societies which are found in the disciplined military, the skilled technician, and in political parties. There is, however, no mechanism for marshalling these resources into an organized political power plant and the parapolitical organization reflects an attempt to meld these sources into such a power arrangement.

A second proposition is that these developing societies also have within them the seeds of revolutionary change. Without these changes chances are minimal for the survival of these societies as viable free communities. The parapolitical organization serves as the link through which national governments can effect and adjust these revolutionary

changes without destroying the institutional framework that has been or is in the process of being established. Thus, as a mechanism for organizing power and acting as the connecting link of revolutionary change, the parapolitical organ finds its raison d'etre.

II. LESSONS & LEGACIES

It is dangerous to extract political combat lessons from particular insurgencies for application elsewhere since each insurgency is a product of its own parochialism. Also, the overall subject of counterinsurgency is too broad to consider in a paper of this scope. Narrowing down the broad sprectrum of counterinsurgency, however, some of its aspects should be treated here where they concern counterinsurgency forces employed as a functional part of pacification or nation building. The examples drawn in this chapter from Malaya, Algeria, and the Philippines relate only indirectly to cadre functions. They do nevertheless help demonstrate both the value and limitations of such parapolitical products as cadre programs in countries where the factors of the pacification equation are differently weighted than those of Vietnam.

The objectives in all three countries were basically the same - the extension of government control, the winning over of the population, and the elimination of the insurgent. In Malaya, the strategic emphasis and tactical application rested on strengthening existing technical cadre and security forces while eschewing parapolitical measures. The selected Algerian model relied upon foreign stimulation of village 'do-it-yourself' organizational programs. The Philippines found the answer in making cadremen out of soldiers. Each has exploitable lessons in terms of pacification in South Vietnam as subsequent chapters will show.

A. MALAYA

The Malayan experience, according to a leading expert on counterinsurgency, clearly demonstrates how unnecessary, and even undesirable, are parapolitical activities in general and cadre programs in particular.[2] The emphasis on the need for strengthening regular government institutions during a period of national development is touched upon elsewhere in this paper, but this does not ordinarily mean, as Sir Thompson would suggest, that there should be no extra-governmental activities even during periods of crisis. In Malaya, the existence of sound institutions and the complete control by the British of all assets which could be brought to bear on pacification were two factors which make that aspect of the Malayan recipe irrelevant to South Vietnam.

Cadres functioning in the various departments in the Malayan services prior to and after the declaration of the emergency were trained, productive and provided a good nucleus on which to build. These cadres were carrying out their responsibilities in the districts and due to this the government presence was felt down to the village level. This contrasts to Vietnam where functionaries were embedded in the Saigon bureaucracy and were given little taste and no training for work among the villagers. To attempt to break down the resistance of the entrenched bureaucracy in Vietnam and wait for a thorough housecleaning would have been fatal and in most cases such a retrenchment was not even feasible. There was no direct power which could be applied to compel the government of South Vietnam to reform its bureaucracy. This led to

parapolitical activities necessitated both to get pacification moving and as a device for applying indirect pressures on the Saigon ministries to broaden their programs.

The interrelated factors of law and police enforcement in Malaya are relevant to Vietnam. One of the cardinal tenets applied in Malaya was that the government must function in accordance with law and that the law must be supported by an effective police mechanism. A sizeable portion of the tasks, which in any insurgency situation require priority resolution, was in Malaya assumed by the Police Field Forces who could carry out paramilitary activities and simultaneously enforce the law. These forces had been trained by the British who could also effectively employ them when and where needed, unlike Vietnam where the police and military roles are often in political conflict, and where the employment of both toward achieving national pacification goals suffer. Deficiencies of the French-created judicial system in South Vietnam inhibit or prevent prosecution of the insurgent, making doubly difficult the cadres' task of eliminating the enemy infrastructure. In Malaya, each village had a police post with a police officer in charge who had the necessary authority to make arrests. The cadre in South Vietnam rarely finds a police post in the villages where he operates. This forces the cadres into taking police action themselves and in so doing they may jeopardize their own position, since the provincial officials, for fear of political reprisals, may not support their action.

B. THE PHILIPPINES

The Huk insurrection in the Philippines has left its mark on Vietnam in parapolitical programs bearing the 'civic action' label. Unlike Vietnam, however, the army in the Philippines was chosen as the primary instrument to bring the political as well as the military presence of the government into the countryside. To insure that the army was properly supported in this role and that the civil side of the program received proper emphasis, the Civil Affairs Office was set up under the Secretary of National Defense.[3] From this office emanated most of the plans for civic action programs which were to be the main thrust of the army's activity in the 'barrios' or villages. The cadres to carry out these activities were to be the soldiers themselves who were given special training in civic action, proper conduct, etc., which were to be applied when they went out to work with the civilian population. The program, which had a measure of success, did help create a favorable image of the government represented by the individual soldier. The advantages of using the military as civic actors is obvious. First, in employing soldiers the cadres come with built in security, eliminating the need for extensive armament and paramilitary training. Second, in many countries, particularly those undergoing physical conflict, the army is the only government presence seen by most of the rural population. To have this presence trained along political lines is an obvious advantage. In Vietnam for example, many of the grievances cited by the peasants to the census-grievance teams concerned the misdeeds of the

Vietnamese soldiers. This levied the requirement on the pacification teams not only to root out the enemy infrastructure, and carry out civic action activities etc., but also to undo the unfavorable image of the government which had been created by these actions.

This does not mean that the military should shoulder the pacification responsibility, for with rare exceptions, such as a situation having Magsaysay as Secretary of Defense, the civic action role is considered secondary for the soldier and the quality of personnel assigned reflects this. The Philippines experience does point out, however, how effective direct military support and integration into the pacification effort can be.

In South Vietnam a separate Civic Action Ministry was created during the Diem regime largely as a result of Philippine influences. Under this Ministry the first South Vietnamese government civic action cadres were trained. Their success was limited,however, because having no connection with the Defense Ministry, they were forced to operate in a vacuum without any security or real political backing.

Another Philippine influence was that of the 'complaints-and-action' office used by Magsaysay and imported into Vietnam, where it eventually took on the mantle of the census-grievance program. The success of the complaints-and-action program in the Philippines was actually due more than anything else to the charisma of Magsaysay and the use of his Presidential 'personalism' in support of the program. The image evoked of Magsaysay breaking off cabinet meetings, flying to an obscure barrio and settling a poor farmer's grievance against a robber-baron landowner

is hard to duplicate. In Vietnam, when a poorer version of this technique was tried, the general in charge of the complaints-and-action program was summarily transferred due to fear on the part of the other government leaders that he was gaining too much 'power' through this mechanism. The success of the grievance program in South Vietnam was finally achieved through a shift in emphasis to quiet and methodical data gathering by the census cadre which in the end was more instrumental in rooting out the resident Viet Cong than in resolving grievances, which in Vietnam's case was of equal priority.

As in the example of Malaya, only some of the cross fertilization from the Philippines to Vietnam 'took'. Civic action has now been given its due recognition, with it goes less emphasis to certain aspects of the Philippines program such as the give-away activities which often have been counterproductive in Vietnam. As for getting the army into the pacification act, our troops are now being assigned with that specific mission and a "motivational training" program is underway with the popular forces which will eventually encompass all military units.

C. ALGERIA

Some of the most pertinent parapolitical lessons are found in a segment of the French pacification program in Algeria, where concepts developed out of other insurgencies were applied and where they worked. In Algeria, regular military units supplied the necessary security for pacification efforts and, using their own resources, gained the commitment of the population. Beginning with one 'sous-quartier' as a trial area, a pacification program was begun by conducting a census of the population, during which an attempt was made to identify the 'pro-government minority.'[4] The second step carried out by the French pacification team was to requisition village labor, voluntary or involuntary but paid, for civic action projects. Being paid for his labor, the peasant had already committed himself, albeit involuntarily and unknowingly, to the government effort.

The pacification team next organized the education of the children and the women, thereby extending government influence over these two important segments of the population. At the same time, through a continuing process of interrogations, the enemy infrastructure was identified and gradually eliminated. This process subsequently opened the way for the progressive arming and training of the population who gained more confidence and daring as the enemy in their midst was rendered harmless.

Men chosen for this particular task of village self-defense were first issued arms during daytime hours only; gradually they were

allowed to keep the arms at night, and finally permitted to keep them in their homes when not on duty. This was the ultimate gesture of confidence by the government to the villager and his commitment to defense the final step - the proof - of his loyalty to the government.

The organization of these 'harka' or self-defense units in every commune led to the final pacification of the sous-quartier.[5] The same techniques are being applied by the cadre teams in South Vietnam, the lack of permanently available security forces forcing the creation of self-contained armed pacification teams outside the regular military structure.

The French experience also provided the lesson that, while the sous-quartier operation might be successfully implemented on a local basis, overall national pacification efforts, lacking a concerted plan, did not progress accordingly. The Vietnamese have taken steps to eliminate this problem through formulation of a national pacification plan co-ordinated under one responsible ministry although the problem has, as yet, by no means been solved.

SUMMARY: In conclusion, the parapolitical program now underway in South Vietnam reflects the lessons of the three examples cited above. Unlike Malaya, the institutional structures in South Vietnam have not yet been strengthened to the extent where extra-governmental operations are unnnecessary. The army in Vietnam is not at the point where it can be entrusted with overall pacification responsibilities, as in the Philippines leaving parapolitical and paramilitary assets to continue performing this function. Local editions of that part

of the Algerian program which proved successful are being attempted in the Revolutionary Development program in South Vietnam, yet in this there is difficulty in the program's taking hold nationally as it meets the same points of political resistance and national limitations experienced in Algeria.

III. RURAL COMMUNIST CADRES - CHINA AND VIETNAM

Cadres in the communist system, in Asia as well as Europe, are such a large part of that system and have so variegated functions that they cannot be adequately covered here. For our purposes, the communist use of cadres in China and Vietnam will be examined in a somewhat limited technical sense. The sector of primary interest lies in communist techniques as they use cadres to push the government into the rural areas to carry out national programs there. Of direct relevance to this study is the actual missions and tasks assumed by the cadres in interpreting to the population and ensuring their implementation on the ground the various land or agrarian reform programs. A look at the peculiar role of cadres in both Communist China and North Vietnam not only as advisors and technicians but as appointed leaders of the villages sheds some light on the approaches taken by the Viet Cong progeny in South Vietnam. A system which uses cadre to implement a national plan by actually becoming part of the structure which is to be manipulated, makes interesting comparisons to the South Vietnamese government's cadre program which has this same structure as its target yet tries to use indirect pressures in gaining its ends.

Of equal interest are the lessons found in the Chinese rush to gain their objectives, an urgency also found in current pacification efforts in South Vietnam. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists

found, as did the French in Algeria and the South Vietnamese in Vinh Binh, the criticality of creating self-defense units to the success of the cadre effort.

A discussion of actual Viet Cong cadre techniques, the use of agitprop teams and other assets to carry out the rural revolution in the south will conclude this section.

IV. SOME COMMUNIST USES OF CADRES: CHINA & VIETNAM

A. The Chinese Heritage:

The North Vietnamese could hardly have selected a poorer "model" for an agrarian reform program than that carried out by the Chinese. Though all their energies were devoted to the task, the Chinese were still in the process of 're-reforming' their agrarian revolution as late as 1963. Moreover, the single factor held most responsible for the program's continued failures was the action of the cadres.

Not only was the rural Chinese cadre program a poor choice to follow but once committed to it, the North Vietnamese made no attempt to correct its weaknesses before adopting it themselves. The Chinese cadre system was a workable one and had a corps of highly dedicated leaders. However, overzealousness of the 'vanguard' , as the cadre were called, led to excesses of terror which in the end were counterproductive - a lesson that was lost on the North Vietnamese.* It is ironic that the man responsible for carrying out the ill-fated land reform in North Vietnam, the failure of which was laid directly to him personally, and to the cadres in general, is now the head of the national cadres.

* Similarly experience has shown in South Vietnam that in terms of lasting results, pacification does not lend itself to too much forced acceleration regardless of initial indications of success as will be demonstrated in section V.

Chinese Rural Cadres:

Cadres in Communist China are theoretically "all things to all men." Describing their inclusive role, Professor Shurmann states:

> "Strictly speaking, a cadre (kanpu) is someone who holds a formal leadership position in an organization. A Party secretary is a Party cadre; a military officer is a military cadre; an official is a government cadre; and so on. However, the cadre concept is so fundamental to Chinese Communist organizational thinking that it has acquired connotations far beyond its basic meaning. Colloquially, the word cadre generally refers to Party members who exercise leadership roles. It is also used to designate a leadership style. A cadre is a leader who is supposed to lead in a certain way. ...Every cadre in Communist China has a specific rank." (6)

It was only natural then to turn to the cadre when the vast economic revitalization, known as "The Great Leap Forward," was decided upon. The cadres were to mobilize the peasantry and put the spirit of the peasantry into the cadre. This they set out to do and in a relatively short period:

> "...exhorted, enticed, and drove the rural members of some 740,000 agricultural producers' co-operatives into approximately 24,000 people's communes ... a movement that originally was to take five or six years was completed in about six weeks. Amid a blaze of catechismic propaganda slogans ... 'close cropping-deep plowing,' 'politics in command,' the peasantry marched into battle against nature, determined to overcome her." (7)

Enthusiasm of the cadre leadership at this moment was indeed unlimited; there were no bounds to what they could accomplish. Here also can be seen the bypassing of existing structures to implement a crisis program:

> "The Great Leap Forward was the great period of Party Leadership. Everywhere Party Cadres were in command. Party cadres were young, they were workers and peasants they were members of a superbly disciplined organization who channels of command and communication cut across bureaucratic jurisdictions. It seems as if the Chinese Communist Party had found the organizational key to social engineering on a scale never before known in the world. Through the cadre-led production team, any problem could be solved..." (8)

This was one crash program that didn't work and by 1961 it was apparent that drastic reforms were necessary. In view of the demonstrably poor cadre performance, these reforms centered around the 'reopening' of the peasant cadre dialogue, to refurbish the cadre image which had fallen into some disfavor.

> "They (the cadre) were the men who carried the Party's propaganda about the'entrance' into communism so far as to confiscate the bedding and the cooking utensils of the peasantry. They were the men who stubbornly pursued the policies of close planting and deep plowing without consulting old peasants who had farmed the same land for decades...it appeared as if the cadres were indeed tending to become a bureaucratic stratum of a new class...The Party hoped to rehabilitate the cadres' reputation by getting them out of commune and brigade offices and putting them to work in the fields." (9)

A Red Flag newspaper article, alluding to the aloofness of the cadre, stated that

> "...some of the commune cadres, particularly the leading cadres, are always busy convening and attending meetings, listening to reports, preparing charts, and reading documents at their offices the whole year round."

The cadres must perform manual labor, the article continues, because

"participation by the cadres, particularly at the basic levels...shows the people that Party cadres are ordinary laboring people, not magistrates sitting above them." (10)

China continued to experience difficulty in utilizing cadre as a bridge between the elite and the peasant masses. The cadre in whom the government had greatest confidence were the elite who for the most part came from urban origins and were intellectually oriented. For these it was particularly difficult to communicate in terms which would have meaning to the peasant.

"From a sociological point of view, the red and expert contradiction is the most important in China today. It reflects not only the bifurcation of elites, but the gulf between a modern coastal sector and a backward inland sector... Worker-peasant cadres are constantly worried about their level of education, whereas intellectual cadres are worried aobut the ideological stance." (11)

The reforms designed to correct these errors were now all combined into an overall 'rectification campaign' to expurgate the entire cadre process:

"In the winter of 1960 and early 1961 there were reports of a fresh rectification campaign with the attention on the political education of cadres and the purging of some of the 'deadwood' among the cadres as well as of special recruitment from among the 'poor peasants'...From Anhwei came the report that in the Ta-kuan commune after the rectification campaign and reorganization of the commune, 20 per cent new cadres had been added. ... The peasants were advised to be particularly careful and watchful in 'electing'cadres of their teams and brigades which was likened to selecting a 'son-in-law.' 'We must be earnest in our selection just as a girl chooses her husband.'

For the cadres, the Party press was full of exhortation to go deep among the masses...to forge closer links with the peasants. There were admonitions for 'some cadres' who did not go deep and who sat in their offices issuing impractical

> and empty decisions. ...On the other hand, the cadres were further admonished that it was not just enough to go around visiting without a thorough understanding of the problems. The cadres were advised to profit from the experience of veteran peasants and learn their method and make them their advisors...old techniques were not to be discarded until the new ones were fully established. ... The problem with the cadres in the countryside was that while their general educational level was not very high, they were expected to deal with complex and difficult issues in a most prescient manner." (12)

These problems of the cadres had their parallel in South Vietnam. In 1967 Government of Vietnam (GVN) province chiefs complained that the land reform methods taught at the National Cadre Training Center were not applicable to the provincial situation and that a complete retraining process was required once the cadre returned to their provinces of origin. These were old complaints from village elders of young know-it-all cadres and of cadre snobbery in dealing with the peasantry.

The Chinese cadres were also faced with a common cadre dilemma, that of trying to carry out an essentially unpopular program. The pressures are similar to those of the GVN's cadre who are between the peasant and the province and who are pressured to report 'progress.'

> "On the one hand the cadres were required to 'faithfully carry out Party directives whether they were in time or out of time, feasible or not, popular or otherwise and, on the other hand, would have to take the blame if Party policies failed. They had also to function as a pipeline between the peasant and the Party high command; the higher echelons of the Party were almost completely dependent on reports that percolated from the lowest level cadres to the middle level ones. If these reports departed too greatly ... the axe could easily be applied against them ... on the charge of 'sectorianism' - but if they did

> not reflect properly the mood of the masses and report the actual conditions, the formulation of Party policy itself became vitiated." (13)

We will see later how this problem was somewhat resolved in provincial, rather than national, control, although the question of carrying out policies of the parent ministry remained.

The Cadres and the Village:

The adage that 'The Emperor's writ stops at the village gate' was as apropos in China as in Vietnam. In both countries the problem of control over, and support from the countryside was equally vital and the key to this support lay in the village. In China, the desired penetration and manipulation of the village structure was finally achieved, although time alone will be the arbiter in determining how effective in the long run this social change will be.

In carrying out this process of village penetration, the cadres assumed the mantles of leadership from those whom they had been instrumental in eliminating. The cadres were thus no longer advisors but began playing active leader roles, beginning with the establishment of co-operatives.

> "Only if the Party cadres could penetrate deeply into the villages and become the accepted leaders of the movement could it succeed. Administrative methods alone were not enough." (14)

It soon became apparent that while the village was a good structure around which to center their land reform program, it had to be reorganized from top to bottom. Administratively organizing a

village was one thing, while setting up a motivated village organization was something else. Using the work groups as an example:

> "Once Party cadres infiltrated these groups, the latter lost their particularism and much of the strength which gave them cohesion. Every intrusion of a Party member into the group represented another interference from the top down. Yet the process could not be pushed too far and too fast. A delicate balance had to be maintained between imposed and self-generated organization."* (15)

The Cadres and Popular Defense:

On a national scale, one of the best methods for organizing and motivating the population to the government cause is to galvanize collective efforts into a common defense. Locally applied this gives the cadre an opportunity through a popular militia program to organize the population to assume leadership roles. In China, the same teams that were organized as work teams became battle teams whose experiences in combat forged a close bond. The younger cadres who organized these teams inevitably rose to leadership positions and became part of the village structure. How essential this was to achieving the goal of cadre 'penetration' of the village is noted below:

> "The old form of organization had to be transformed from within to serve the new purposes of the Communist movement. This could only be done by recruiting the leaders of these village organizations into the movement. Thus young peasants, native to the village and leaders in work co-operation teams, were made into positivists, and findally taken into the Party... In this way, the new cadres were simultaneously village team leaders and committed members of the party. The last step was the link between organization, work, and war.

* Underlining the author's.

> This 'penetration of the natural village' was, in essent, the great achievement of the Yenan period. The work and battle teams had arisen on a traditional foundation of work co-operation, but through their Party cadre leaders, had been transformed into a new type of organization that served the political-military and socio-economic aims... the team was indissolubly a part of the village yet at the same time transcended it.
>
> Traditional forms of village military organization had never been integrated into village social organization... the military parochia and the civilian village traditionally remained dichotomous... traditional China's political weapons were restricted to army and bureaucracy... but though the army could rule the village by force and the bureaucracy could exploit it by various administrative means this applies equally to South Vietnam; neither could penetrate it until the Communists forged the link, as seen above, in the Party." (16)

The application of similar techniques, yet using the cadre in a different role, will be seen later in South Vietnam.

Although, as a lesson in organization and the use of cadre, the Chinese communist agrarian reform program is almost a classic, it was a costly one.

> "The land reform had a momentum of its own. The repeated references by the leaders to 'excesses' indicate that they did not have full control over the actions of the village cadres. Land reform is remembered in China by many as...a period of terror...what had begun as a program of land redistribution ended as revolutionary terror in which China's traditional elite was destroyed." (17)

B. Truong Chinh and Land Reform in the DRV

Like the Chinese, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) decided to embark on a crash cadre-led land reform program - with no apparent regard for the consequences and with much the same results. How many of the errors made were intentional parts of

Ho's strategy is unclear. It is evident, however, that Ho, like Mao, used the cadre's failure as an excuse to inaugurate his own rectification campaign. And this campaign, like its precursor to the north, served as a convenient device for eliminating the opposition.

Ho's chosen agent to carry out this program was the Party Secretary General, Truong Chinh, who immediately ran into trouble by emulating the same overzealousness that beset the cadre program in Communist China. Professor Honey has commented that

> "The agrarian reform campaign was carried out under the supervision of Chinese cadres familiar with the similar campaign in China and Truong Chinh identified himself publicly with it. He thrust the campaign down people's throats, using every available propagandist device, and it was carried out with a brutality and disregard for justice that shocked the Vietnamese peasants more than the war itself had done. Chinese patterns had to be followed even when they proved to be unworkable in the different conditions of Vietnam." (18)

A closer look at the campaign in North Vietnam similar to one of the earlier campaigns in China helps expose the comparative techniques of the two countries. Huang Van Chi has selected some examples for examination,appropriate excerpts of which are given below:

(NOTE: The campaigns he describes were carried out in five successive "waves," each in strategically located provincial areas, following the so-called 'oil-stain technique,' similar to the 'priority pacification area program' now underway in South Vietnam.)

"The work of launching the campaign in these experimental spots was carried out by a special team of cadres, carefully trained in China and having first-hand experience of the Chinese land reform. A great number of cadres from all parts of the province were sent to the chosen village to observe and learn for themselves. After the first wave was over, these newly trained cadres, under the guidance of trained Vietnamese and Chinese advisors who remained nearby, launched the second wave in the surrounding area." (19)

The following description of the tasks carried out by the cadre bears a striking similarity to case studies of the Advance Political Action program undertaken by the GVN in the delta area in 1963.

"Almost immediately after the 'Political Struggle' had died down, a group of cadres, trained secretly in China, came to the village disguised as peasants. Through the local party-cell, they made the acquaintance of a few landless peasants and asked for permission to live in their houses. Then they put into practice what is known as the 'Three Together System' (In Chinese, San Tong), which means that they worked with their hosts (taking no payment), ate meals with them (whilst paying own share), and slept with them in the same bed. When the host was married, as was usually the case, a girl cadre came and slept with the peasant's wife.

The cadres usually stayed from two to three months, and the peasants were very pleased to have them since they worked without accepting payment. They performed all manner of tasks, ploughing, harrowing or harvesting, according to the season; they cleaned the house or took care of the children, and the whole time they talked interminably. They demanded to know every detail in the lives of their hosts, showing particular interest and sympathy when they heard of any past misfortunes which peasants had suffered. Before very long their hosts took them completely into their confidence and opened their hearts to them.

The next step was to make these peasants understand that there was only one way of improving their lives, namely, to side with the party and attack the despicable exploiters who were responsible for all the misery in the village. This intensive indoctrination went on for almost eighteen hours a day, until at last the formerly docile peasants were ripe for rebellion against their landlords. The converted peasant was called a 'root' and the operation just described was termed 'striking roots'." (20)

This 'root' operation developed into a version of the GVN census grievance operation. The 'root' was responsible for recruiting another 'root' in a process called "bed stringing," a method of establishing a permanent communications link between the villages.

Once this structure was implanted an sufficient intelligence on the local infrastructure was available, hard corps elements were brought in unannounced, the village surrounded, and the 'enemy' captured or eliminated. These measures were often brutually thorough but were rationalized by Ho in an explanation to his elite cadres designed to cover a number of excesses of the land reform program,

> "To straighten a curved piece of bamboo, one must bend it in the opposite direction, holding it in that position for awhile. Then, when the hand is removed it will slowly straighten itself." (21)

SUMMARY:

This gives some idea of the techniques of rural revolution as applied in China and the DRV. A number of Viet Cong, both prisoners and defectors, cited the excesses of the land reform program as a primary reservation about their life in North Vietnam. In describing the program, one of the aspects most frequently mentioned was the unwonted and vindictive actions by the cadres.

C. THE VIET CONG

The Viet Cong and their program of national liberation are in large part responsible for the growth of parapolitical activities in South Vietnam. This has come about for two reasons; first, the Viet Cong, through a campaign of calculated terrorism, have been able to cause the rapid erosion of the South Vietnamese government's posture in the rural areas; second, through a small but viable cadre effort the Viet Cong have been able to replace this diminishing government presence with a structure of their own. The initial GVN programs were then as much in reaction to these two stimuli as to the normal nation building processes.

Although forged from the same mold as the North Vietnamese cadre, the Viet Cong cadres' tactical concepts have been reshaped to meet changed conditions. Furthermore, in South Vietnam, the cadre do not work under the protective mantle of a legitimized government and have no local government backing to support their actions.

The Viet Cong were aware, however, that as in North Vietnam, human communications would be the vital factor in achieving their goals and that the key human link was the cadre. Among the types of cadre, the agitprop team is most important for the purposes of this study. Douglas Pike has gone into this facit of the Viet Cong movements in some detail, pointing out again the relatively high status granted the cadre, a derivatory from their DRV heritage.

> "Although communication efforts were conducted simultaneously on various levels and with differing and often contradictory themes, the key communicator at all levels was the agitprop cadre. He was no mere technician but one who sat at the highest policy determining levels and who at the lower echelons tended to dominate all activities, not just agitprop work. He was regarded as an instructor who explained NLF policies and programs in terms the ordinary rural Vietnamese could understand." (22)

While the agitprop cadre team is an integral part of the Viet Cong organizational structure, there is a parapolitical quality in its 'temporariness.' It has usually been thought of as an asset of value primarily during the softening-up phases of the insurgency, and their role at least as armed mobile propagandists, is a transitory one. Even so, General Giap himself has given its functioning high priority and a sense of urgency:

> "The most appropriate guiding principle for our early activities was armed propaganda...political activities were more important than military activities..fighting was less important than agitprop work." (23)

The Party, i.e. The National Liberation Front (NLF), puts it in more concise policy terms:

> "It is the present policy of the Party that after completing the indoctrination work we begin to reach the masses by propaganda in depth, by meetings in hamlets and villages, word of mouth communication. In this, the first action is agitprop work...a means of persuading the masses to participate in the political struggle movement." (24)

The agitprop cadre was thus a combination of propagandist, organizer, and activist - an all-round political combatant.

During the days of the struggle against the French, guerrilla action was the keynote to the campaign for independence. In the

current struggle to 'liberate' South Vietnam, organization and propaganda activities have been, at least until recently, the foremost consideration. Since the Communist cause was not a selling point in a country where ideological propaganda has been as overworked as to become meaningless, the Viet Cong chose to have their cadre concentrate on local issues. These were generally grievances against the local GVN military and civilian authorities, land reform measures, and village improvements. Using these issues as a springboard, the cadres were able to work into the political struggle.

TECHNIQUES

The agitprop team concentrates its propaganda activities on the "meetings," of which there are a number of types, each of which clearly shows Chinese and North Vietnamese influence. The 'struggle meeting' is a device for seizing political control of the village. The cadres lead the meeting at which they generally produce an 'enemy spy' and whip up the fury of the villagers, who - if the cadres succeed in their task - denounce the administration and eschew government control. In the 'denunciation meeting,' the cadres stimulate and guide individual villagers to recite an account of their poor lot under the current regime. Most important is the 'face-to-face meeting,' which is still found to be the most effective as a propaganda tool.

> "Frequently cadres were criticized for ... underestimating the face-to-face group, defined as a meeting that assembles a small number of people, usually from three to five

families but not more than 30 people...at which there are long and deep political discussions aimed at promoting the struggle movement..." (25)

The modus operandi of the agitprop team is the standard combination of soft-sell and hard organization. The team makes initial contact with the village through a sympathizer, after which it begins its selling process. The latter is iniated by making friends with the local leaders, listening to local grievances, and introducing some type of simple entertainment. At periodic intervals speeches are made, with propaganda themes closely tied to such local issues as defoliation, indiscriminate shelling, conduct of government troops, etc. Gradually the organization activities begin, starting with the recruitment of resident organizers. This process requires a number of repeat visits, a byproduct of which is the organization of combat hamlets, an inter-village defense system, and a recruitment program for both regular and guerrilla Viet Cong forces.

Through these mobile agitprop teams, backed up by area guerrilla units, the Viet Cong have been able to exert their influence and control over large areas. Their task was always made easier by the lack of any equivalent type of GVN presence either in the form of cadres or an administrative structure.

The directives to the cadre emphasize the 'units of three' concept as an organizational must, made up a formula copied directly by the People's Action Teams formed in 1964 by the GVN, and already mentioned in conjunction with the Communist Chinese cadre system.

Self-criticism sessions were based on the three man cell; the struggle movement was organized around three groups (lead, guide and front); and the agitprop centered around three committees.

The Viet Cong agitprop cadres began to have their problems as war attrition began to take its toll. More and more North Vietnamese cadres were sent in to 'cadre-the-cadres,' assuming control as well as filling in as replacements. This led to resentment by the indigenous southern cadres and began to impair the effectiveness of agitprop teams, since the outsiders were not as readily acceptable by the local population. This problem had also beset the Chinese intellectual cadres trying to deal with the rural peasantry and later plagued the GVN cadre program which, in its rapid expansion, had to reduce the caliber of its cadres and call in outsiders. One southern cadre recalled with nostalgia the 'old days' of more informality and less bureaucracy, referring to the era prior to the advent of northern cadre infiltration.

SUMMARY:

The Viet Cong cadre essentially followed the tactics of the Chinese and North Vietnamese cadre necessarily deviating in a number of ways since they were, at least in the initial stages, 'persuaders' rather than 'enforcers.' Instead of trying to carry out 'sweeping reforms,' the Viet Cong localized their activities and geared their efforts to more immediate issues. Unlike the DRV programs, where the

cadre became resident and assumed command in the village, the Viet Cong made extensive use of the mobile agitprop or armed propaganda team - a 'periodic presence' which, in the course of its visits did begin to build a more permanent structure. This agitprop unit was probably the closest counterpart to the first parapolitical units formed under the ægis of the government of South Vietnam.

V. PACIFICATION AND CADRES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Leaving aside for the moment the insurgency in South Vietnam, what are the other determining factors that have led to the need for a special program targetted at rural South Vietnam? The answer lies in the society of South Vietnam itself, which is still weak and disorganized as it tries to right itself as a new nation. While the traditional social structure has remained intact through the eruptions that have occurred over the past quarter of a century the institutions needed to help the transition to nationhood and modernity and enable Vietnam to stand on its own feet have not yet taken root. Institutions which are in being have unfortunately been used by the government to reach down to the peasant rather than to communicate with him on his own level. This has had the effect of setting up counter-reactions to these government pressures instead of gaining a positive response from the peasant. The need is, therefore, to provide the bridge for the government to cross over so that it can establish itself among the broad base of the population. With this foothold it can begin to build its institutions whilst using the cadres as a power catalyst to support it. Well trained cadre can provide the bridge and revolutionary development program with all its assets can provide the necessary power then, as the government organization at the grass roots is solidified, so the nucleus for a broader based political organization is being built which could provide the political institutions of the future.

In this section the evolution of the parapolitical processes in their role of institution building will be traced from the beginnings in Laos through the Advance Political Action units, Peoples Action Teams, up to the current Revolutionary Development program. This latter program will be covered in terms of its present objectives, organization, tasks, training and recruitment. Some of the special problems and features of the program will also be discussed, including the relationship of parapolitical programs to the government administration and of the military establishment and questions on how to handle the ethnic minorities and what role to play in connection with political parties.

SUMMARY:

What this section will attempt to do is place the parapolitical programs in South Vietnam in context of their role in the institution and nation building process. This role is to provide the temporary mold for the concrete foundations of pacification which will be removed once the foundations have hardened.

A. Background and Evolution of the Cadre Program

The Revolutionary Development program now underway in South Vietnam is the product of efforts, in many ways unique, that have been evolving over the past eight years. While similarities can be found to other pacification campaigns in Asia and elsewhere, the current program is peculiarly Vietnamese - with a heavy flavoring of American input. The recent 'discovery' of the "other war" by the press and other elements of the American community does not mention that 'war' has just begun. Rather it manifests a sudden awakening to the political erosion in the countryside and the desperate need to find a remedy. The magic imagery of "Peoples Action Teams" and "Revolutionary Cadres" (which appeared in the limelight comcomitant with Vietnamese power plays for their control and frequent and frenetic American reorganizations) has obscured the developmental processes which preceded the present program but are equally crucial if the lessons of the past are to have any value.

The Beginnings:

LAOS: A convenient point of departure is 1960 and the embryonic efforts in Laos. The Lao government at the time was city-oriented, inexperienced and faced an opponent whose political action efforts had already effected considerable territorial gains. One of the first measures jointly undertaken by the Lao and American governments was the organization of special six-man teams, drawn primarily from the Lao army. Their political/psychological mission was to be carried out by 'specialists' in health, sanitation,

agriculture, propaganda and civic action. Village radio sets were provided as well as other gift items and special equipment.

Owing to a number of false starts, the program never really got off the ground, but it did provide some useful lessons in political action. The first lesson was to force rethinking on the question of what was meant by enemy 'control,' a term which led to misconceptions about the feasibility of operations in 'enemy-controlled areas.' In most of Laos, and the same applies to much of Vietnam, 'control' actually meant (1) a lack of any tangible government presence, and (2) the peripatetic presence of an enemy, usually in small numbers, such as agitprop teams. This so-called 'control' was so often more psychological than real and caused the 'paper cession' of areas that were more void of government presence than interdicted by enemy activity.

The second lesson was that misdeeds of the government had a more lasting effect in the minds of the population than alleged malfeasances on the part of the enemy. Third, hasty recruitment and poor training of cadre, accruing to the government mismanagement, resulted in more harm than good.

Other lessons that were not new, but came into focus during the six-man team operation, were the need for a paramilitary capability in civic action or agitprop activities, the ineffectiveness of gift items per se, and the need for relating civic action to specific political goals. The civic action work of the cadre teams in Laos was ineffective mainly because no casual connection was made with the

government.

Finally, the foreign advisory effort which helped get the program going was not centered around the individual Lao whose actions would be the determinant of the program's success. It was expected that given training, equipment, etc., the Lao would be able to go out and produce the desired results. A better appraisal of the Lao limitations would have set more realistic goals and concentrated the main effort on intensive groundwork in working out the basic tasks. Expecting and striving for too much too soon interms of the individual cadre was the lesson of Laos still unlearned in Vietnam.

The Beginnings:

VIETNAM: By 1962 the situation in South Vietnam had reached the point where strong counterinsurgency measures were necessary if the insurgency was to be contained. Yet while the open subversion, particularly the terrorist attacks against government officials, schoolteachers, etc., was directed primarily against the Vietnamese, initial American moves were made in areas primarily populated by ethnic minority tribal groups. Strategically there was some justification for this since the Viet Cong were reportedly determined to set up a 'liberated area' in the central highlands. There were, however, other reaons for this initial move. First, there was a minimum of GVN bureaucratic interference because of the remoteness of the area and the paucity of Vietnamese living in it. Second, the

responsiveness of the tribal groups (Montagnards) to outside direction was attractive to the American side.

The most publicized of these initial efforts was the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) - the oil-spot concept applied to the Montagnard areas. This program was largely paramilitary and one over which the regular GVN administrative processes had little control.

Another project initiated at approximately the same time. was an agitprop program, using mobile Montagnard units to politically 'soften-up' contested areas. While the basic unitwas a fifteen-man commando team, the program was essentially a <u>parapolitical</u> one and incorporated a special three-man political/psychological cell into each unit. The past had shown that indiscriminate patrols ranging through the countryside, as they struck the enemy, were ineffective unless their actions were politically exploited. Where ideological considerations play only a minor part, as in the Montagnard areas, a hard-hitting paramilitary force with a political exploitation capability proved to be the most effective method for injecting a sense of government prescence. More important, for the first time, these teams came directly under the control of the GVN administrative head of the area, the province chief. Because they could be used at local discretion and were quite flexible, these units soon became the favourite item on the counterinsurgency shelf.

As the program expanded, however, its size and power brought it to the attention of military planners and its control was eventually subsumed as part of the military structure. Its political capability

was eliminated, as the teams were reorganized into larger military units, and as a parapolitical weapon, its usefulness negated.

An all-Vietnamese political action program was the Force Populaire mentioned earlier (not to be confused with the Popular Forces - established village defense units which are part of the regular military force structure). The basic unit of the Force Populaire was a 'company', of approximately one hundred men, all indigenous to their area of operations whose mentions were primarily in the civic action and intelligence fields. The Force Populaire stayed in a village area for a period of up to three months, leaving their weapons stashed in the village for defensive purposes only. Their 'modus operandi' and even their geographic areas of operations were almost identical to those of the first People's Action Teams. The relatively short life of the Force Populaire was due to its abrupt end with the overthrow of the Ngo Dinh family, since the organization of the Force Populaire was inextricably tied to the fortunes of Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Can.

Advance Political Action in the Delta:

With the assimulation of the Montagnard program by the military, American political action sights shifted to the delta. Parapolitical activities in the delta were virtually nonexistent and had to be started from scratch. Although one organization, the Republican Youth was in existence, it was a paramilitary showpiece only, recruited primarily from 'volunteer' government functionaries. It was decided by American and Vietnamese officials to attempt a new program which would combine previously tested concepts. To forestall precipitate

power moves by the military, teams were to be formed whose label would stress their political role. A pilot area was to be selected where the province chief had good political instincts and the insurgency was still of manageable proportions.

The area selected was Kien Hoa province. The Province Chief, a man of excellent political action instincts and a fervent admirer of Magsaysay, had slowly been working to refurbish the image of the government which had been badly tarnished by the repressive reign of the Vietnamese metis, Col. Leroy, province chief in the 1950's. The province was also well known for its large number of Viet Cong sympathizers, many of whom were Vietminh 'wives,' 'bethrothed' in mass marriage ceremonies conducted in Kien Hoa just before the troop repatriation to the north in 1954.

The province chief had already on his own begun political action by organizing the nucleus for the first 'census-grievance' (CG) program. With this effort already targetted at the Viet Cong infrastructure, another mechanism was set up to negate the influence of the Viet Cong agitprop apparatus. This was the Advance Political Action team (APA) which initially numbered from seven to ten men. Their mission was to act as an advance presence of the government and as such to carry out basic propaganda, civic action and intelligence missions. They were lightly armed, dressed in the 'black pajamas' of the peasant, and completely mobile. Their areas of operation were those already slated as part of the regular pacification plan. The selection of these areas helped insure that the initial probings by the APA teams would be followed up by a more permanent government presence.

The APA operation was kept deliberately small in the beginning until its results could be evaluated. After four months of APA activity

which meant repeated swings by the teams through the same villages, voluntary intelligence began filtering to the teams from the villagers, one of the best indications that pacification is beginning to "take." In addition, the teams were able to spot and begin to recruit resident census/grievance cadre, a difficult task since for a villager to come out in the open as a cadre or even to remain under cover involved an element of risk, and there had been little in recent history to reassure the peasant that commitment to the government was a wise choice.

Following the Kien Hoa experiment, variations of the APA concepts were attempted elsewhere. In Kien Phong the experience of Colonel Phat, the "Fox of the Plain of Reeds," was put to use in forming 'canal teams;' working in conjunction with regional force units, these teams began operating along waterways whose only government 'presence' had been the triangular-shaped outposts which were now abandoned. In Phuoc Long, working with one of the Vietnamese Army's brightest and most imaginative zone commanders, defectors were trained and used in propaganda operations near Zone D. The defector operations, however, had only limited success and in one case the team redefected with new weapons and equipment. Thenceforth, the defectors were used as part of an APA propaganda team, although they continued to act as individual cadre in the census-grievance activities.

In Long Khang, with plantation workers as the specific target, teams were formed to work on the families of the workers during the day and the workers at night. In the same province an unsuccessful attempt was made to form teams of Nung tribesmen who turned out to be more adept at banditry than political action. In Phuoc Tuy province, a fifty-man political action unit was trained to operate in

conjunction with the "shrimp soldiers," a quasi-official paramilitary force which operated between Saigon and Vung Tao. The training course conducted at Cat Lo in Vung Tao was the first of what later became the National Cadre Training Center.

The above operations indicate the shakedown trial-and-error processes which were taking place in 1962 and 1963. They were undertaken in this non-systematic order in order to determine from a number of different cases the most effective method of extending government control into the countryside where the assigned government assets were either understrength or unequal to the task.

Post Diem and the PATs:

The period following the revolution of 1963 serves perhaps as one of the strongest arguments for the institutionalization of government operations. As noted earlier, the Force Populaire was summarily disbanded in late 1963 having spent its last days riot-breaking in Central Vietnam. With few exceptions, province chiefs during this same period were removed and their successors, untutored in political action concepts tended to misuse the teams to replace them with personal followers, or to disband them entirely. At the same time, the central government was indecisive and unsure of itself with the result that the program came to a halt except for minimal holding actions in some provinces.

While there was a certain amount of tenure within the lower echelons of provincial officials, the program had generally been run by the province chief himself and with his removal went the guiding force behind the program. This lack of continuity has plagued all programs in Vietnam since the beginning of the present insurgency.

By the spring of 1964 the GVN had decided to continue programs that had been carried out in the past, a conclusion reached only after the convulsions of changing governments had left a hiatus of more than six months during which the Viet Cong moved back into the areas where the APAs had been operating.

While the pieces were being reglued in the delta, local initiative put together a new type of expanded APA effort in the northern coastal region of Quang Ngai, spawning ground of the People's Action Teams. The PAT program had some unique characteristics, particularly in its motivational training techniques which were similar to those used by the Chinese. The teams were broken down into three-man cells, used self-criticism methods, and held student-participation sessions at night. The gravity of the security problem in the area necessitated that the teams be made larger than those of the APA. The new teams were grouped into units of forty men which were broken down into three twelve-man teams, plus leadership and communication elements. This enabledthe team to disperse during the day and work in different hamlets, regrouping at night for better security. The hybrid that evolved from this program was a combination of paramilitarily capable, personally motivated, agitprop trained local recruit. Employing techniques similar to those of the APA and Force Populaire, the PATs led to the rejuvenation of parapolitical programs in South Vietnam. The PATs seemed to provide "the answer" to pacification at a time when both Americans and Vietnamese were trying to determine how best to put some rural flesh on the fragile body politik in Saigon.

As a parapolitical program, the PATs were particularly useful in that their operations drew attention to the entire parapolitical process and gave it high-level recognition at a time when it was

sorely needed.

As the PAT program began to make headway and the central government started showing signs of stability, efforts were made to expand and at the same time centralize the overall effort. This led, after lengthy discussions between the U.S. and the GVN, to a decision to organize all provincial cadre programs under the relatively new Ministry of Rural Construction which was in turn provided with new power and authority. The nucleus of the new national cadre program directed at the rural areas, was to be the PATs, which, augmented by specialist groups, would now become the Revolutionary Development Cadre team (RDC). Other GVN cadre programs were abandoned, their former cadre screened and, those who qualified, retrained and integrated into the RDC. Approximately 7,000 of these cadre belonging to various GVN ministries were eventually absorbed. These, plus over 12,000 PAT and APA, officially became RDC in January 1966.

The training center at Vung Tao, which had been expanded following the decision to increase the number of PATs, became a national training center, while the center at Pleiku, which had been established as a Montagnard APA/PAT training area, became the national ethnic minority center.

And so, by the end of 1966 more than 20,000 cadres were operating in the provinces as Revolutionary Development teams. Para-political activities of the past seven years had become a national program and the institutionalization process began to gain ground.

B. The Revolutionary Development (RD) Program:

The basic concept of the Revolutionary Development program was to provide the link between the GVN and the population and, through this link, carry out positive actions to strengthen the position of the government. Simultaneously it was to try to deny the enemy support of this same population in its attempts to get the people to actively commit themselves to the GVN. Applying this concept and physically carrying out the 'linking' process were to be the function of the Revolutionary Development Cadre.

The Cadre:

> "After settling the question of the political line to be followed and the tasks to be fulfilled, the question of cadres proves to be the most important one to solve. Who applies the political line and carries out the tasks? Of course it is the whole people, but first of all it is the cadres, who are the vanguard elements devoting themsleves actively to the work of propaganda and organization, who devote themselves to leading the masses to carry out the policies of the government, and the Party,and to serving as good examples for the people." (26)

As this paper was being written the term "cadre" was dropped from official usage in referring to the Revolutionary Development (RD) program. "Teams" and "workers" are to be substituted in its stead. Indeed, there is a semantical justification for the change which will become apparent in the discussion of the plural concepts of cadre, although it is doubtful that the change will significantly affect the continued use of the term. And, while 'cadre' is no longer used in official correspondence, it will appear in this paper because of its association with programs in the past and its convenience as a reference comparative to its communist counterpart.

'Cadre', like any term applying to a group or technique which is part of a changing process, has a variety of meanings in the U.S.

and Vietnam. The first and most common is that of a 'nucleus' providing the framework around which an organization is built. Another meaning, codified by law in Vietnam, is that of a 'technician' or 'specialist:'

> "Ordinance No. 59-244 4 Feb 1959... every individual who, having been appointed to permanent employment in a public civil administration in Vietnam, is titularized thereafter in a cadre whose organization has been established by a decree of the chief of state...." (27)

There is also the more perjorative meaning of a secret political cadre infiltrated into an organization for purposes of 'security.'

In its most recent evolution in South Vietnam, however, cadres refer to members of revolutionary worker 'teams' which are broken down into units of paramilitary warriors, technicians, agitproppers and intelligence agents. Their role is paramilitary and parapolitical; they are counter-guerrillas,civic action workers, and quasi-policemen. They perform an essential mission in the nation-building process yet are not part of its institutionalized structure.

As used in this paper, 'cadres' are individuals trained to represent and carry out actions on behalf of the national government wherever the regular processes of government are not properly functioning. These men and women act as the vanguard of the government in isolated, restricted or contested areas.

Here is a point where one finds contrasts to communist cadres. While the objectives or at least the immediate goals of both cadres are similar, it is only in the communist system that the cadres have been made a permanent and legitimatized part of the political structure. In the non-communist world the cadres remain in a 'quasi' 'para' or 'supra'-governmental role.

The communists make another distinction which has had a significant impact on the image created of cadre in the non-communist world: to the communists, the cadre is an elite, a selected and trained individual whose role is that of a disciple or 'chosen one.' In this role as an elite he occupies a structured slot and is a 'careerist.' His non-communist counterpart does not enjoy equivalent prestige, and he is continually in doubt as to his status.

Missions and Tasks:

The best summary of what the Government of Vietnam hopes to accomplish through the RDC program was staged in late 1966 by the Minister responsible for its implementation - General Nguyen Duc Thang:

> "It is important both to build democracy at the grass roots level by creating for the people, especially in the rural areas, conditons which would endow them with the capacity for self-determination and self-government and to provide the nation with superstructural democratic institutions. Our endeavour to replace the 'gloomy old-life' hamlets with 'bright new-life' hamlets in our pain-stricken rural areas is called 'Rural Development.'" (28)

Thang outlined the essential targets as the eradication of communist terror through elimination of its local infrastructure, the restoration of security, the establishment of administrative machinery to allow rural self-government, the building of a popular self-defense force, and promotion of a new national spirit of solidarity and responsibility towards achieving national goals.

While injecting a sense of urgency into the program, General Thang also adds a note of caution:

> "The Strategic Hamlet program was subjected to a kind of 'forced feeding,' at an extremely rapid pace, in the vain hope to submerge the Communists in a spectular wave; our strategy is to proceed slowly and in depth - as a

> cluster of 'oil spots' which are to expand with safety and certainty. Also, the Strategic Hamlet program conceived rural development as a task relevant essentially from the central government and the people; the key to success is not government action but popular consent. Our cadres are only helpers; They assist, they advise ...thus the basic philosophy in all our efforts is popular adhesion, popular support... the men and women in charge are neither members of the bureaucracy nor of any partisan troop... they are cadres locally recruited...dedicated to the social revolution and the interest of the people..." (29)

The program is seen as an operation to be conducted in three main steps. The first is 'clearing,' which consists of expelling or destroying any sizeable enemy units in the area. This is basically a military responsibility with parapolitical and paramilitary forces in a support role. It is during this first phase that the cadres attempt to eliminate the enemy infrastructure and begin to implement civic action projects. The second step is one of rural 'development,' employing the cadres who have already been sent into the area. Organized into 59-man teams, the promote self-help reorganization, defense and rehabilitation projects while simultaneously gathering intelligence and ferreting out the enemy. The final step is the establishment of local self-government in conformance with democratic principles to try to insure that a firm administrative structure will be left which can withstand outside pressures.

In a 1966 directive from the Revolutionary Development Ministry (30), the RD cadre are given eleven objectives which are to be realized by the cadre in the 'real new life hamlets; "* these objectives

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* The Real New Life Hamlet (Ap Doi Moi) differs from the New Life Hamlet (Ap Tan Sinh) in that an RD team must have actually effectively operated in a hamlet for it to achieve Ap Doi Moi status. Reciprocally, once a hamlet has achieved Ap Doi Moi status per the eleven criteria, it is eligible for an additional 750,000 $VN for self-help projects.

are fairly all-encompassing and require optimum conditions and performance. To work towards these eleven objectives, the ministry has listed ninety-eight 'operations' or tasks which are broken down for each objective, e.g., eleven tasks for #1, 21 tasks for #3, etc. The eleven objectives are:

1. elminiate the VC infrastructure 2. get rid of village 'bullies' 3. instill a new 'spirit' 4. organize groups and a basic administration 5. organize a defense-system 6. eradicate illiteracy 7. help wipe out disease 8. implement land reform 9. develop agriculture and handicrafts 10. set up a communications network 11. aid combatants.

Some of these objectives are unclear although answers are partially provided in an RD Ministry Guidebook entitled "50 Questions and Answers Concerning R.D. Activities." This publication helps clarify what is meant by 'village bullies' (undesirable individuals who have set themselves up in positions which enable them to mete unjust punishments, extract illegal taxes, etc.); 'administrative structures' (village councils, administrative committees, Hamlet Managing Committees); 'communications' (roads, rivers, bridges.) These are explained further in the "Schedule of the 98 Operations." The Ministry enjoins the cadre not to adhere too rigorously to the 98 tasks which, it is stated, are minor guidelines only and "will have to adapted to their own experiences and local needs in order to have a practical activity program." (31)

The 98 tasks represent an improvement over past programs where the guidelines were so broad as to be meaningless or the bureaucratic regulations so picayune as to be stifling. The tasks are relatively simple ones such as those applying to the objective of 'eliminating

the VC infrastructure.' Cadres are told to make a list of VC in various categories, determine the families of the VC, establish census card systems and perform other tasks which are actually the essentials of census-grievance programs. In 'organizing the basic administration,' cadres are given the task of organizing collective or group activities once a month, drawing up the hamlet constitution, organizing the election of the hamlet RD committee, and holding various other elections. To accomplish their security tasks, the cadres organize and train family combat cells, put up fences, conduct training exercises, set up liaison systems, and help select leaders for the local defense units.

The above represents only a sampling of the tasks that the teams are expected to carry out, but they show the degree to which the program has moved from its earlier APA and PAT concepts when the mere physical presence of the team, performing limited civic action and carrying out basic organizational activity and propaganda work, was considered sufficient. Whether the government is expecting too much, given the limitations of cadres now being recruited in such large numbers, is something that remains to be seen. Some of the objectives and tasks will have to be eliminated or at least given a different priority. There have already been instances of teams returning to their provinces not fully aware of the tasks they are expected to perform and even refusing on occuasion to stay in the assigned villages. Apparently, however, this difficulty is peculiar to the former Rural Political, Mobile Administrative and New Life Hamlet cadres who had not been required to undergo the field experiences of the PATs or APAs.

There is no set order for carrying out the tasks assigned the RD cadre nor is there a fixed time period. One of the tasks not spelled out in the directives but which requires more time is that effecting a smooth transition from the initial pacification moves to the final development processes. This involves phasing in the permanent government 'presence,' and it is here that the RD cadre can act as a bridge between the villagers and the regular government functionaries and technicians.

For time planning purposes, the figure of 2.8 hamlets per year per RD team has been established, although this figure is not binding. In Binh Dinh, a national priority area where an abundance of allied troops was available, six weeks perhamlet has been the average.

Finally, there are always 'contingency tasks' that may affect the overall timing. In the spring of 1967 the cadre were assigned the task of helping get out the vote in the village and hamlet elections. (32) The ability of the RD cadre to adjust to new tasks unrelated to their mission may be one measure of their effectiveness.

Organization:

The 59-Man team:

Evolution from five and seven man agitprop teams to the 59-man RDC group does not necessarily indicate progress in the development of cadre techniques. The 59-man figure represents the increasing need for a more sizeable security element and for the integration into the group of specialist components which had formerly operated separately. Nor should the large size of the group imply that they

operate as one body. When properly employed, the 59-man unit is a single entity only for administrative purposes. Once the team is operational, it is broken down into smaller individual, squad-size or cellular units and regroups only for security or administrative requirements.

A Revolutionary Development Group or Team is commanded by a group leader, assisted by two deputy group leaders for the two inter-teams. There is a group staff of five men composed of one psywar specialist, one intelligence specialist, three medics and one communicator (usually the intel specialist - see chart.) The first inter-team is similar in makeup to the PAT and is referred to as the Armed Propaganda Inter-team. This inter-team is broken down into the three armed propaganda units of eleven men each. This inter-team bears the burden of security for the 59-man group, although the other team members have all had paramilitary training and can be called on when needed.

The second inter-team, headed by the other deputy group leader, is the Construction Inter-team and is broken down into three units of 'specialists.' One of the most important of these three units is the census-grievance unit composed of six men. The second unit also has six men, who specialize in civic action. The third unit is the institutionalizer, the New Life Development Team which is responsible for organizing the hamlets, arranging for elections, and setting up viable administrative structures.

While it was intended that the RD Ministry act in a staff co-ordinating capacity at the national level, leaving operational control to the provinces, it soon became apparent that a closer working relationship between the central council of the RDC and the province

was needed. In November 1966, RD Control Groups were authorized to meet this need, one control group to be assigned to each of the four corps of zones. Each control group would include one group leader and four teams whose size would be dependent on zone requirements. The mission of the control group is "...to investigate and control the organization and employment of the RD cadres ... and has the mission of the implementation of the Ap Doi Moi program." (33) This group control concept could be unfortunate, however, as Division or Corps echelons have generally tended to compound the bureaucratic blockage which already exists at the national level.

Recruitment:

> "These (new) countries... have, however, been faced with the pressing task of increasing greatly through very rapid recruitment their corps of civil servants. As a result of... policies of modernization, they have had to recruit at a dizzying rate, without always being able to maintain a high standard, partly because they do not have available to them a reservoir of very high persons and partly because communal and parochial considerations have been allowed to intrude into the process of selection. In consequence the efficiency and probity of the civil service have gone down. This in turn has aggravated the feeling of alienation of the people from the government and the politicians whom they hold responsible..." (34)

The Achilles' heel of any cadre program is its recruitment process, and the RD program is no exception. The prestige, pay and equipment make the RD program an attractive one for patronage purposes and thus vulnerable to nepotism and corrupt province officials. The program is an accelerated one and subject to the reservoir drain of qualified personnel cited by Mr. Shils.

The RD Ministry has taken steps to give national uniformity to the recruiting standards (covered in the RD Directives in the Appendix)

with certain adjustments made in the literacy requirements for Montagnards. To guard against abuses in recruitment, which tend to increase with the succession of changing province chiefs, a circular was issued by the Ministry in December 1966, which stated:

> "No recuritments for replacement purposes are permitted which are not endorsed by the Ministry."

One of the frequently mentioned positive features of the PAT and RD cadre programs is the fact that cadres are indigenous to the areas in which they operate. This factor has obvious advantages -- knowledgeability of the area and its customs, receptiveness on the part of the villagers to 'one of their own,' and the motivation that goes with having a personal 'stake' in the operation. Nevertheless there are advantages in having at least a sprinking of outsider on the teams. They can act as a kind of national antidote to the 'localitis' that often overcomes the teams. Local units often tend to blend so well with the community that they cease to exert any pressure on it. Although there is always resentment of the outsider, his cross-fertilization into the team can broaden the unit's perspective. With the exception of the census-grievance, intelligence or propaganda activities, which are best left to the local cadre, it has been found that the outsiders are most readily accepted in the staff 'specialist' roles.

The key to recruitment remains with the Province Chief and the provincial RD chief. There is little that can be done to prevent the recruitment of cadres who are members of a political party or some other 'interest' group, particularly if the province chief is a supporter of that party or group. The RD chief can, however, act as a balance, keeping the ministry informed, who in turn can exert

pressure on the province chief when it desires. One of the mechanisms for siphoning off undesirable elements is the filtering process that takes place at the national training center where the interests are geared to national rather than local goals and where it is easier to take remedial action.

Training:

During the genesis of the PATs, press reports attached a certain mystique to the motivational training techniques of these groups. The training did make a difference in making the PATs an effective mechanism, but the training techniques were actually only part of that difference. The teams went through a rigorous selection process, and training was carefully tailored to meet local requirements. Classes were small which made seminars and self-criticism sessions workable and effective. For training purposes, the teams were broken down into three-man cells, giving them a vicarious sense of their Viet Cong counterparts' own training. Smallness and selectivity then were part of the magic of the PATs.

Most significant in the success of the PAT training program was that it pointed out the need to revise the shopworn GVN political orientations that cadre had been given in the past. These orientations had consisted mainly of an encomium on the current government leadership, a tortured history of Vietnam, and lengthy treatises on various ideologies. The PAT program on the other hand had used instructors familiar with communist techniques which they adapted where appropriate and applied to their 'classwork' in the field. From these village proving grounds training concepts evolved which had

meaning and current applicability and which were used to help modify the old GVN political orientation program.

The National Trianing Center at Vung Tao has incorporated many of the training techniques of the PAT program although some of the techniques, which were dependent upon small group study, had to be modified. The PAT influence can still be seen in the two weeks' re-orientation training which takes place after the teams return from Vung Tao to their home areas where the smaller individual training techniques can be applied. The two weeks also help re-establish the ties between the province and district officials and the teams, reminding the former of their responsibilities to the teams and the latter of the government which they will be representing.

While the overall training at Vung Tao gives the cadre program a national uniformity, not all the students follow the same course of instruction.

All students do undergo the basic five weeks of paramilitary training which includes weapons training, small unit and guerrilla tactics, basic intelligence, and the organization of hamlet defense groups and basic communication and liaison systems. This is followed by five weeks of political and motivational training which includes a history of Vietnam, a description of the nature of the present struggle, and courses on the objectives and techniques of political and civic action and rural development, propaganda and psywar techniques, and a study of the tactics of the enemy. This five weeks is followed in turn by a two-week field exercise, during which the teams are sent into secure or semi-secure villages near the training center to apply their lesson plans. The 'specialists' among the 59-man teams receive their training during the second five-week period.

To ease the leadership problem, which is of some concern, the training center also provides a special twelve-week course for cadre whose operational performance has indicated leadership potential. And finally, a new program calls on all government functionaries and military officers connected with the cadre effort to undergo a special course fariliarizing them with cadre training and concepts. It is hoped that this will prevent some of the misuse of the teams which has occurred in the past.

Communications:

A problem that has plagued South Vietnamese governments since 1954 is their inability to establish a two-way communciations system. The weakness of the GVN system is that it has limited its communications to those coming 'down' from the government to the population in the form of propaganda. One of the RD team functions is to attempt to rectify this unilateral communications system.

Vietnam has been satiated with every kind of propaganda, disseminated through many mediums - leaflets and loudhailers, banderoles and radios, agitprop teams and music-drama troupes. Hardened to the incessant harangues against the 'enemy' of the moment and weary of the promises made by both sides, the peasant has little interest in propaganda content.

The RD cadre is thus enjoined to limit his verbal salesmanship to informal face-to-face meetings and concentrate on propaganda-through-deeds. He is nevertheless given training in basic propaganda devices and techniques but told that his primary mission is to act as the channel of communication between the villager and government and vice-versa. One means of activating this channel is through the census-grievance cadres described below. The other cadres, however,

must follow up on whatever grievances or aspirations are channelled through the census-grievance mechanism which can have a dramatic effect on the standing of the cadre in the eyes of the villager.

Census-Grievance and Intelligence:

Initial reports from the first census-grievance cadres operating in Kien Hoa indicated that more than seventy per cent of the villagers' complaints were traceable to government misconduct either on the part of civilian officials or military forces. This is the type of information that, in the past, was purposely not transmitted to higher channels. It does point up the critical nature of the census-grievance mechanism, however, a device still viewed with skepticism by the people and with concern by some provincial administrations.

The CG project serves two main purposes. The first is to aid the operations of the RD teams by making them aware of the villagers' aspirations and complaints in order to do something about them. The second is to gather intelligence to provide both security for the team and information about the enemy.

Numerous systems similar to the Magsaysay "Complaints and Action Office" had been tried previously but were ineffective largely because they required the villager to expose himself to both the GVN and the Viet Cong, and, though the former might be addressed, the latter might well respond. The current CG program enables the villager to air his grievance covertly while the 'census' is being taken. Indeed, with the RD team in support, some of the grievances and aspirations can be handled by the team themselves, thus eliminating the less bureaucratic channels.

Though the RD program employs mobile CG cadre in the 59-man

team, it also uses two-man static CG teams. Initial moves against the Viet Cong in a village will net the better-known members of the infrastructure but cannot insure permanent eradication of the enemy. The mobile team must, therefore, implant a static census-grievance network which will remain operative following its departure. Without the presence of the larger 59-man team, the CG static team needs police back-up, a factor recognized in a recent RD directive to use combat police whenever possible in conjunction with RD operations.

Under the original static CG program, carefully selected personnel were recruited and trained to operate in pairs in chosen hamlets to be the 'eyes and ears' of the provincial government. Their first job was to take a population census, which would divide the hamlet into sectors, interfamily groups, and familes or households. Through this census it was hoped to identify VC members or sympathizers. Following completion of the census, it was expected that one member of each family group would be interviewed every fifteen or twenty days - a system which would serve to update the census but, equally important, to identify the grievances and aspirations of the population. In addition to his job of conducting private interviews, the cadres were expected to spend part of each day travelling throughout the hamlet to pick up local gossip and, if possible, talk to transients from neighboring hamlets.

Initially the program was highly successful in obtaining intelligence on the local Viet Cong infrastructure - so much so that more emphasis was placed on the intelligence effort than on the census-grievance functions and the cadre subsequently lost something in the eyes of the local population. This resulted in a reformation

of the program, leading to better training and more selective recruitment, particular emphasis being placed on getting older and respected residents of the hamlet as CG cadre. People with this type of stature can, in their 'confessional status,' become successful in eliciting intelligence and grievances, and their findings will also be taken more seriously by provincial officials.

The use of 'Chieu Hoi' defectors or former prisoners to operate among Viet Cong familes must necessarily be limited; though the defector was formerly 'one of their own,' he is often considered a traitor or an opportunist by the local populace. In selective instances, however, defectors have been found to be effective cadres, especially in identifying the infrastructure, providing intelligence and conducting their own Chieu Hoi program.

Intelligence should be the primary by-product of an effective RD effort. Given the nature of the RD missions and tasks, all of which require continuing personal contact with the population, intelligence is a natural resource for exploitation. In the first of the eleven criteria the cadre are directly enjoined to gather intelligence by identifying the enemy's infrastructure. On the other hand, it has just been shown that pushing too hard to obtain intelligence can be harmful to the main effort which is to gain the confidence of the population and their allegiance for the government. The RD cadre must therefore place his emphasis on elicitation rather than interrogation and obtain results based more on performance in his political action role than on employment of intelligence techniques. He must be aware of intelligence when he obtains it and know what to do with it and how to report it once it is in his hands yet not seem to be after it as an end in itself.

Security:

When General Thang issued instructions to the RD teams to organize popular self-defense units in the hamlets, there were adverse reactions in American quarters, the feeling being that the creation of another armed element would further complicate an already confused paramilitary picture. The Minister overruled these objections on the ground that pacification can never succeed without the self-imposed commitment of the villager to the government and the irrevocable commitment, in an insurgency, is the voluntary taking up of arms. The peasant will listen to propaganda and ostensibly even acquiesce to its demands; civic action benefits are welcomed; and the motions will even be made to carry out elections. However, the final 'separator' of the villager from the enemy is for him to actively participate in an armed unit. This is why organization of these self-defense units is given high priority on the list of RD cadre tasks.

The actual carrying out of this task by the cadre is undertaken only after the initial objectives of the pacification process have been carried out such as elimination of the infrastructure, development of self help projects, etc. The techniques used are the same as those in the Algerian sous-quartier example already mentioned. A Case Study of its effectiveness in South Vietnam in Vinh Binh province is included in Appendix A.

C. Special Problems

Cadre and the GVN Administration:

> "If the government performance is going to be effective and keep pace with the aspirations of the people, while at the same time creating an atmosphere of order and stability, the main essential is to establish a sound administrative structure. The best of plans, programmes, and policies will remain nothing but good intentions unless the machinery exists to execute them so that they make their impact throughout the country." (35)

The essentials outlined above are enviable goals of political action programs, although during an insurgency they are not always easy to attain - much less accelerate. In South Vietnam it was necessary to do some political action jerry-rigging while the more permanent foundations were being developed and the institutional framework hammered into place.

Since the early 1960's, a number of 'crash' programs have been initiated in South Vietnam which, in one form or another, have attempted to bring the GVN presence into the countryside. The tendency in implementing these programs has been to bypass the legitimate parent ministries and strive for better and faster results through a process of local option.

During the Diem regime, for example, a number of 'irregular' activities, specifically designed to counter the growing insurgency, were initiated jointly by the U.S. and the GVN. Simultaneously, longer range programs, which were already in effect on paper, tended to overlap in terms of stated objectives.

The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), for instance, in addition to its security missions, carried out tasks in the fields of civic action, health, agriculture and education. The chosen instrument for the implementation and control of this program was

the Vietnamese Special Forces, whose operations were virtually autonomous from both the regular military and civilian components of the government. Provincial authorities and division commanders were seldom consulted, although the program involved paramilitary operations in their own provinces. Neither were the concerned ministries or directorates brought into the picture, though the Civic Action Directorate was brought into the picture later so that Civic Action cadres could be provided for the CIDG camps.

This lack of co-ordination in some cases cannot be excused, though it should be remembered that the regular military establishment was already overcommitted and unable to even keep its own civil guard and popular forces units adequately trained, supplied or up to strength. Moreover, the ministries had, on previous occasions, been proven virtually incapable of implementing their programs outside the major cities.

To avoid recreation of an autonomous national mechanism such as the Special Forces had been, it was decided that subsequent parapolitical programs would be run directly by the individual provinces though approved and co-ordinated at the national level. While this decision may have slighted the national structure, the use of the province as the point of operational control did not mean isolation of its activities from the national administration since the province was actually the operating element of that administration. Nghiem Dang, in his book on national administration in South Vietnam, supports this last point:

> "The province seems to have available the necessary conditions for forming a distinct administrative unit; at this echelon the necessary means can be found to aid the villages in intercommunity works, the undertaking is sufficiently important to attract an educated elite, personnel sufficiently numerous to permit a judicious

> division of labor...the province chief, who is the local executive power, also represents the central executive power. This is a typical example of the integrated administrative system." (36)

In the province, the APA and PAT cadre programs were directly under the province chief, a factor that was not true in the case of other programs. In each province there were a number of different ministries, each having its own provincial offices, each reporting to its own ministry. Compounding this were separate offices for directorates under the ministries, and any attempts to consolidate them had inevitably ended in failure. The cadre program fortunately had only one provincial committee chief, who was directly under the province chief's control.

In most cases the province chief made one of his two deputies, either the deputy for security or the deputy for administration, responsible for the cadre program. Ordinarily it was preferable for the deputy for security to have this function so that he could use whatever provincial forces were available to work in support of the teams.

The immediate commander of teams in the field was the district chief, who served as the focal point for the cadre program and all administrative services. The chain of command, then, from the cadre teams, was to the district chief, province chief and, on a national level, to the head of whatever administrative 'umbrella' in the central government had been selected for this purpose. Generally the Minister of Interior was the minister to whom the province chiefs would, in any case, be responsible for this kind of program. After the fall of Diem, one of the two deputy prime ministers was responsible but again his function was still primarily

one of co-ordination although the position did entail monthly approval of all funds and equipment passed to the province chiefs, approval for any major changes in the program, and responsibility for keeping the chief of state informed of the status of the program.

While the regular technical services were only tangentially involved in programs such as the APA and PAT, it was pressure from these field projects which helped revitalize the technical ministries in Saigon. When the Ministry of Health became critical of non-ministry civic action medical cadres operating in the provinces, the Ministry was urged to take over the training of these cadres, issue them supplies from the ministry and help oversee their activities. The funding and operationsl control were left to the provinces, since, bureaucratically, the ministry was not capable of handling an added responsibility of this size. At any rate, the ministry did get into the program and, as a result, began to augment its other activities in the field.

When the Agriculture Ministry became alarmed at the farm self-improvement projects being initiated by political action teams in the provinces, this ministry was urged to incorporate some of its own instructors into the training program and send some of its technicians to the field to work with these teams.- a course of action which they later adopted.

This indirect pressure on the ministries was taking place at the same time the ministries themselves were beginning, with their own resources, to make some headway in the countryside. It can be seen then that what was needed, in the final analysis, was one authority who could pull together and draw upon the resources of all

these programs. In 1966 elevation of General Thang to Commissioner General, with supervisory responsibility over the ministries of Public Works, Agriculture and Administration, was certainly designed to fill this need.

The Role of the Military:

Considerable attention has been focused on the question of whether the pacification program in Vietnam should, on the American side, be controlled by the civilians or the military. This is an unfortunate diversion, since the program's ultimate success or failure does not depend on either element. Lessons of the past few years have shown that, even though the U.S. marshals all its efforts in various model programs, the fate of these experiments is usually foredoomed because the action agent to carry them out, i.e. the Vietnamese, was unable to absorb the pressures placed upon him to carry out what was basically an American idea. Neither the military control center with its vast numbers of personnel and charts ready to record and act instantly on material requests, nor the organized co-ordination of the civilian advisory elements, had any real impact on the net results.

Furthermore, the question of control should not address itself, as it does here, primarily to administation. The important question is not that of administrative jurisdiction, which has already been settled in favor of the military, but what that jurisdiction means to the pacification program. If military control means concentration on the establishment of command lines, integration of local assets into the military structure, and the dovetailing of cadre efforts

to coincide with military operations, then such control will be detrimental to the pacification effort. If, on the other hand, it means fuller support for and a deeper involvement in the actual pacification effort, without subordinating that effort to military objectives, it can have a salutary effect.

Two other factors must be borne in mind concerning the question of military control. First, the time dimension of the pacification program is generally not consonant with that of the overall military effort. And pressures for tangible results within a given time, which are applied to military operations, should not be similarly applied in the pacification program. Second is the fact that the Vietnamese pacification effort is still a civilian one. The fact that the Minister of Rural Development is a military officer has no more bearing on the on the program's nature than does the U.S. President being General Eisenhower or the U.S. Ambassador, General Taylor. Some of the most capable leaders in Vietnam today are in the military and it is natural that their talents be used where they are most needed and can best be applied. The pacification program is one place where these talents are needed. It should be noted that the Minister of Defense is not charged with pacification.

The extract below expresses the views of a military officer whose pacification operations in a sous-quartier in Algeria have already been mentioned:

> "That the political power is the undisputed boss is a matter of both principle and practicality. What is at stake is the country's political regime, and to defend it is a political affair. Even if this requires military action, the action is constantly directed toward a political goal. Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, <u>its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.</u>" (37)

Apart from the question of jurisdictional control, there is also a need for the Vietnamese Armed Froces to take a more active part in the pacification program. Theirs is often the only government presence the peasant sees, and the soldiers' actions can often determine the eventual commitment of the wavering peasant. The foremost task of the military in pacification then should be to see to it that the training and discipline of the conventional armed forces are equal to their pacification role either as direct participants or in support.

The Ethnic Minorities:

The problems of the ethnic minorities, still struggling for autonomy while the government of Vietnam attempts their assimiliation, are many and varied. The political implications of the minority problem do, however, have a bearing on the parapolitical programs in South Vietnam and, therefore, deserve some attention. Previously it was noted that the ramifications of the CIDG program were largely responsible for initial Vietnamese misgivings about recommencing any parapolitical activities after November 1963, which were directly tied to United States support. The Americans have gone to great lengths to insure Vietnames direction and participation in the Montagnard cadre program which is now underway -- somewhat to the discomfit of the Montagnards who have an understandably jaundiced view of Vietnamese control.

When the Rural Construction Ministry first assumed control of the current cadre programs, it was agreed that the Montagnards would continue to administer their own cadre activities through the newly created Commissariat of Montagnard Affairs. Through a 'misunderstanding,' however, province chiefs in the highlands were

led to believe that the new RDC program applied to the Montagnards with the result that in some provinces Montagnard cadre were ordered to 'integrate' into teams where Vietnamesewere in command. Montagnard cadres began to desert in large numbers, and only the personal intevention of General Thang saved the Truong Son* cadre program.

The Montagnard cadre programs, with the exception of a special program in one province, had been developed under the aegis of a national office, currently known as the Commissariat for Montagnard Affairs. Recognizing the special problems of the Montagnards, a separate GVN training facility was established at Pleiku where a program similar to, but in many respects distinct from, the Vietnamese cadre training produced cadres for the pacification effort in the highlands. These teams differ in size from the RD teams, having a larger security element, which is an impressive factor with the Montagnards, and a civic action capability especially tailored to meet the needs of a highland village. Their techniques employed by the Montagnard cadre are in many respects different from those of RD cadre in that the former can use a more simple and direct approach to village problems, whereas the RD cadre must indulge in rather complex and sophisticated tasks to win over their targets. Rarely does the Montagnard cadre mission include the elimination of the Viet Cong infrastructure, which is largely non-existent or weak at best. Their biggest task is to promote the idea of a promising and equitable future for the Montagnard within the framework of the South Vietnamese nation.

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* Truong Son: A composite term applied to the various political action programs in the highlands.

For the immediate future the Montagnards will maintain their own cadre system under their commissariat, working increasingly closer with the RD Ministry. 'Mixed' teams are being used on an experimental basis, but, for the present, cadre autonomy will be favored over forced assimiliation. Once the Montagnards show that they can and want to 'identify' with the Vietnamese national spirit, further integration will be attempted.

Political Role of the Cadre:

One fact clearly understood by most South Vietnamese is political power. The potential political power of the peasant as the key to control of the Vietnamese countryside is self-evident and has become more graphically so as the Viet Cong lay their claim to South Vietnam on this control.

And it was in fact, although not publicly admitted, that recognition of the political potential of the cadre program, as much as any other factor, prompted its 'nationalization' by the government.

Rumors of the Vietnamese Kuomintang Party's (UNQDD) domination of the teams in central Vietnam reached the press by early 1966. The Dai Viet Party was accused of using the cadre training center for political proselytizing purposes. Regardless of the validity or lack thereof of such charges, the GVN became concerned about the political machinations within the cadre program and ostensibly took steps to remedy the situation.

That interest groups of various kinds will continue to try to use the cadre for political purposes is a foregone conclusion, the main restraining device being the Rural Construction Ministry itself. The national training center can attempt to neutralize overt

political activists, but little else can be done once the teams return to their area of origin if a close watch is not maintained by apolitical observers.

The question is not as much how to control this political potential but how best to exploit it. Creation of a single mass party system using the revolutionary cadres to form a peasant base is an inviting though probably premature suggestion. Vietnamese political organizations have demonstrated their propensity for fractionalism even during periods of national crisis, and recent struggles have indicated little or no political cohesion in the urban areas. In the rural areas, however, the RD cadre were employed with some effect in hamlet and village elections. It is unfortunate that the historical precedent for a national mass party in South Vietnam is found in the National Revolutionary Movement of the Diem regime. This movement was directly tied into the local administration, whose leaders maintained a close relationship with the movement and often served as its advisors. Its depth, however, rarely reached beyond this functionary level.

In Tunisia, on the other hand, roughly 10,000 cadres, more than half of whom were drawn from rural areas, provided the backbone of the successful Neo-Destour Party. The use of these cadres was ideal in that, while coming from the countryside and thus able to maintain their local identity, they were also attuned to modern ideals and social change. (38)

The proper time for beginning such a party in Vietnam will be when (a) the incumbent government has reached a point of confidence in its own viability and (b) the cadre program has demonstrated through its activities that it deserves to provide the nucleus for the broad-based party.

CONCLUSION:

It has been implied that parapolitical programs, competing with normal government processes and manpower reserves, tend to work against the structured well being of government. This study has attempted to point out how, even in their competitive and combative aspects, extra-governmental activities can be a strengthening fiber in a flimsy bureaucratic fabric. The qualifying factor is that parapolitical activities, useful as they may be, must be employed with a view towards their ultimate institutionalization.

In Vietnam, the heart of parapolitical activity has been the cadre program in its various forms, and the backbone of the counter-insurgency the individual cadre. In North Vietnam the cadre was an avowed member of the government elite whose mission was to insure the implementaiton of government policy. In South Vietnam the cadre identifies himself with the villager and tries to gain his commitment to the government and its programs.

A cadre program is only as good as its leadership and its advisors. Profiles of parapoliticians in Vietnam would have to include Major Mai, one of the original planners, 'advisor to the advisors' and an ardent nationalist who lost confidence in the cadre program once it came under the control of Saigon; Major Be, ex-Vietminh, who was continually trying to 'one-up' the Viet Cong in co-operative fishing villages or land reform programs; and Lt. Col. Chau, abrasive and moody when frustrated by division commanders or high government officials yet the father of the census-grievance program and the first to initiate the APA concept. In many ways each of these individuals embodies the parapolitician who contributes

much to the strengthening of his nation's institutions but who finds it hard to accept the bureaucratic rigidity of an effort as large as the Revolutionary Development program.

Concerning the Revolutionary Development program itself, there are several points the author feels are crucial to its success. None of these are original but neither is the RD program or its concepts.

The first point is that of the program's implementation-continuum: the question has never really been whether pacification programs will or will not work in South Vietnam. No program has ever been given the chance. If the Vietnamese aren't reshuffling their government in Saigon, the Americans are reorganizing theirs. The Strategic Hamlet program, the Force Populaire, the New Life Hamlets...each of these had all the necessary ingredients. Before measures could be taken however to remedy the faults of implementation and get the program back on course, the program was completely scrapped and the exercise began all over, this time working against the added burden of recent failure. Changes and alterations are bound to occur, and in most cases will probably be needed in the present program, but these alterations should occur within the present structure.

Second, the Vietnames-American dialogue must be kept open. The role of the advisor has not been covered as such in this paper. It should be noted, however, that the programs such as the APA and PAT were developed as a result of a close and continuing dialogue between local Vietnames and Americans who were able to hammer out programs based on a free exchange of ideas within the realities of the local situation. This applies at high and low levels where the tendency of increasing bureaucratic procedures is for more formalized approaches as opposed to informal discussions. Vietnamese appreciate protocol but enjoy and need their own 'kitchen cabinets' behind the screen of bureaucratic order. The cadre program still is experimental and needs to maintain the flexibility which personal

Third, pacification programs should be designed around what the Vietnamese can accomplish(with maximum effort), and not what American standards consider optimum. The Vietnamese are intelligent and energetic yet are handicapped in their available assets. There may be only a handful of people a province chief can work with who are capable of understanding and willing to work on the program. If three out of four district chiefs are corrupt, it is better to scale down the program to one worthwhile effort until the necessary removals have been affected than to insist on meeting the normal criteria for progress. The analogy of the hose which emits only so much water regardless of the amount of pressure behind it is applicable here.

Fourth, the cadre must be continually impregnated with the idea that his main task is his dialogue with the peasant. As the teams grow larger and more specialized, the tendency is often for the cadre to behave in a more detached and even superior manner. The most successful teams in the past have been those able to establish a running dialogue (the evening talks in the village, the conversations while owrking with the peasants, etc.) which comes about only after a continued development.

Fifth, time pressures on the provinces must be relegated to its proper priority. One of the reasons for abuses in the Strategic Hamlet Program was the time requirements levied from the national government; so many hamlets had to be constructed in a certain period, so many fences built, etc., this led to the temptation to falsify

figures or do a haphazard job rather than admit failure. While the present government may be a more liberal and progressive one than that of the Strategic Hamlet era, this tradition has been deeply ingrained and given pressures from both the U.S. and the GVN to 'show results,' some of the same symptons are beginning to appear. Col. Chau, under Diem, was in the lower fourth of the country in terms of accomplished goals reported, yet his figures were legitimate and represented progress.

Sixth, local option as to program implementations must be encouraged. The current trend towards putting more emphasis on division and corps level is reinforcing a Vietnamese anachronism which did little other than stifle programs in the past. The operating level is the province; corps and division levels are bureaucratic roadblocks which serve no useful function other than that of a co-ordinating mechanism. Every effort should be made to keep the channel open between the ministry and the province even though the size of the program may demand intervening levels for administrative and support matters.

Finally, an end goal of parapolitical programs should be that of 'withering away' into the nation 's permanent institutional structure, a good parapolitician continually trying to do himself out of a job.

The success, in fact, of a pacification/cadre program of the type described in this paper will be measured not in meters of fence built or roads repaired, but in voluntary intelligence, self-generated security and the growth of viable institutions.

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APPENDIX A

CASE STUDY: REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
VINH BINH PROVINCE

1. Vinh Binh Province has a population of approximately 568,000 people with about 175,000 living within the GVN controlled area. The terrain is flat, with the highest elevation being about four feet above sea level. There are large open fields interspersed by numerous canals and rivers with heavy foliage bordering these areas. A large mango grove is located on the southern tip of the province which faces the South China Sea. Tra Vinh is the capitol of Vinh Binh and has a population of about 40,000 people. The main dollar earner is rice.

2. The Viet Cong are reported to have one main force battalion of about 400 men - a provincial mobile regiment totalling about 800 men - eight district companies, and approximately 2,000 village guerrillas. The GVN has twenty regional force companies and 6,100 popular force troops. One ARVN regiment, the 14th of the 9th Division is located in Vinh Binh.

3. The security situation is tenuous. Mining and roadblocks are frequent, making travel and transportation risky. However, Vietnamese civilians can generally travel freely in daylight - night travel is prohibited.

4. In October 1965 intelligence estimates and assessments of GVN leadership showed an operationally exploitable situation to exit in Tieu Can District of Vinh Binh Province. Success was judged to hinge on planning, supporting and executing a fully integrated pacification campaign with high initial impact and great momentum. Central to the pacification campaign was to be the concept of hamlet self defense systems - around this theme would be woven all supporting activities by the GVN, vis Vietnamese information service, JUSPAO, USAID, National Police, Census-Grievance, Chieu Hoi, and RD cadre. In late December plans were developed, the cadre had completed initial field work and special training and logistics requirements for the first six months of the campaign were worked out and material was arriving on schedule .

5. January 1966 saw the pacification of the first hamlet, since that time 17 hamlets, with a total of 12, 318 people, have been brought under firm and continuing government control. Momentum has been maintained - cadre strength has grown from one team in January 1966 to five teams today. Plans call for completing pacification of all hamlets in Tieu Can District in 1967. When this campaign began the GVN controlled only nine hamlets out of fifty in the district.

6. Description of the Area:

a. GVN military situation - only three platoons of popular force (PF) troops can be made available to provide additional security during pacification operations. The remaining 15 platoons and squads are tied down with defense of routes of communication and previously pacified hamlets. ARVN forces have never operated in support of pacification in Vinh Binh Province. Realizing that adequate security is absolutely essential to RD operations, the only manner in which this security could be provided was to concentrate RD cadre strength when operating in highly insecure hamlets and then use the cadre to train a defense force generated from the hamlet population itself. Fourteen newly pacified hamlets are now defended entirely by hamlet self defense forces.

b. Enemy Situation - VC activities in Tieu Can are controlled by the Teiu Can - Cau Ke Inter-District Committee. Military units under this command include a district company, plus one full platoon of Guerrilla forces attached to each village party unit. In addition, there are three under strength provincial mobile companies of main force troops which normally operate in the Tieu Can - Cau Ke area. The enemy thus has the capability of fielding a battalion plus one main force.

c. Population - the population of this area is approximately 45,000 - this number is almost equally divided between two ethnic groups - Vietnamese and Cambodian. Administratively the district is divided into six villages and fifty hamlets. Today there are 23,275 people living under government control.

d. Terrain - this area is typical terrain - flat, broken by numberless canals, streams and rivers. The population is clustered in narrow tree lines along these streams or rivers. Rice fields stretch between the lines of cover provided by trees and brush along the streams, thus giving unbroken fields of observation or fire from 500 to 3000 meters in depth. In daylight hours a position of this type of terrain can be defended with a relatively small force - the problems come with darkness when the strength ratio of defender to aggressor must be reversed.

e. Economy - Tieu Can is one of the most productive areas in the province, with exports of rice, hogs, fish, sugar cane, and coconut oil. Viet Cong tax rates in this district are the highest of any other area, running fifty percent of a family's rice crop plus a special tax of VN $2000 per family. Tax in other areas runs twenty-five percent of crop.

7. Factors of Success:

a. A competent District Chief and staff
b. Availability of intelligence.
c. Realistic planning done at the district level
d. Efficient logistics to support RD cadre and hamlet defense
e. Hamlet defense theme and program

a. District Chief and Staff:

i. The District Chief has had over four years experience as Chief of Tieu Can District. He was discouraged with past pacification programs but was receptive to new ideas and had remained convinced that the hamlet people would respond to a campaign with real "teeth" in it. The District Chief's staff had potential and with help from the GVN province staff and members of the RDC advisors personal staff organized reporting procedures, finance and logistics to support the campaign.

ii. Although the District Chief requested ARVN and regional force units to support the pacification campaign, none were forthcoming. A major decision had to be made - the risk was that without screening forces the VC might overrun the RD cadre and initial hamlet defense groups, thus destroying that first psychological impact on which the planned build-up and momentum hinged. The decision to go ahead was made, with approval by the Province Chief. The thing that needs underlining here is the fact that this decision was made on the basis of political intelligence and sensitivity to the mood and aspirations of the people of Tieu Can. Using relative military strength as a guide the operation would have been called off.

b. Availability of Intelligence:

i. A great number of different sources provided the information that led to the estimate that this area could be exploited if a pacification campaign was tailored to the situation. After the initial estimate the primary sources of information that has gone into planning and operations has come from the National Police, the Chieu Hoi program Chief, the District Intelligence sources, and Census-Grievance. The National Police provide the initial information on a hamlet's infrastructure - when a census-grievance cadre is placed in the hamlet, resident VC are also his target, along with other normal reporting. The Chieu Hoi Program Chief has the responsibility for counter-intelligence reporting on cadre personnel and on VC plans and policy within the District. The District

Intelligence Net concerns itself with tactical information on VC units and movements. This information has allowed the leadership involved to better determine the strength necessary in a given hamlet, to weed out VC penetrations among the cadre themselves, and to reinforce hamlets when information indicates probable VC attack.

c. Planning:

The pacification campaign plan itself contained no radical approaches or new technology - however, two features of the plan are of special interest - firstly, given the number of GVN military forces available to support pacification operations in this area, any success would depend on political action amd mass movement technique; therefore, great attention was paid to this factor in planning and training. Secondly, the use of unpaid hamlet personnel providing the security force in the hamlet when the RD cadre moved out.

d. Efficient Logistics:

i. A highly responsive logistics mechanism was critical to maintaining the momentum of the campaign. At no time have operations or plans been held up for lack of logistical support of the RD cadre.

e. Hamlet Defense Theme and Program:

i. The work of the RD cadre is not finished until the entire hamlet population is organized both politically and militarily to defend itself. The major point that was stressed in this operation was that the defending force must come from, and remain organic to, the hamlet. Once the political groundwork is laid and population is actively participating in building a better life for themselves, and they have means to defend what they have built, then a more formal and much less politically oriented program such as popular force may be introduced into the hamlet. Initially, however, these types of military programs react far too slowly and do not possess that psychological impact so necessary in leading the people to identify themselves as a community tied into a government and a cause.

ii. The following propositions are the ones that have been followed in establishing a total of seventeen hamlet defense systems:

1. The defending force must be at par in training, weapons, political education and number with the VC force most likely to attack them;

2. The defending must come from, and remain organic to, the hamlet they are defending;

3. The defending force must be part of a defense system which includes the entire population of the hamlet;

4. Politically the defending force and people must be led toward identifying themselves as a community, then to identify with larger entities of province and nations;

5. There must be an organization at district level which frequently inspects, retrains, re-educates and re-supplies the defense system in both its political and military aspects.

iii. With early warning and intelligence collection efforts built into the defense systems; it has been proved on three occasions that a hamlet with thirty armed men can defend itself against a company of VC main force Experience has also shown that a PF squad not organic to a hamlet defense system can be taken out at will by a VC platoon, and offers very little real security to the people of a hamlet. (The GVN, Saigon, has established a T. O. and E. of one popular force squad per new life hamlet - in Tieu Can the axiom followed is - on the basis of hamlet population, terrain and estimate of VC capabilities place as many trained, armed men in the Hamlet Defense System as is necessary to utterly deny the VC access to the hamlet population).

8. Results:

A. PACIFICATION/CIVIC ACTION:

a.	Number of hamlets secured	17
b.	people brought under control	12,318
c.	USAID self-help project completed	11
d.	Meters of road built/repaired	20,670
e.	Meters of fence built	150,925
f.	Man hours to needy families	22,693
g.	Building built	108
h.	Bridges built	21
i.	Wells dug	22
j.	Hamlet Committees elected	14

B. HAMLET DEFENSE:

a.	Hamlet defense systems established	17
b.	Men trained	361
c.	Outposts constructed	20

C. CENSUS GRIEVANCE:

a. Established in 15 of the 17 hamlets to date.

D. HAMLET MEDICAL PROGRAM:

a. Established in all hamlets.

E. INFORMATION PROGRAM:

a. Included periodic showing of films in hamlets, at night - information cadre and offices in all hamlets, delivery of newspapers, magazines, etc., on a regular basis to all hamlets.

F. ROUTES OF COMMUNICATIONS:

a. All roads within zone of expanding hamlet defense systems are secure.

G. VC ACTIVITIES:

a. There has not been a VC initiated incident within the expanding zone of hamlet defense systems in 6 months - the VC have launched three company sized attacks on perimeter hamlets but were driven off in all 3 cases.

9. PROBLEMS:

There is only one problem, a continuing one and only partially solved. There is, of course, the lack of supporting troops, a problem which may never be solved because any given number of troops do not add up to a successful RD Program.

Unofficial Translation

SUMMARY OF THE CAUSERIE OF MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG, COMMISSIONER GENERAL FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AT THE CONVENTION OF PROVINCE CHIEFS HELD IN BIEN HOA, PHONG DINH, DA NANG AND DALAT ON FEBRUARY 22, 24 and 28, 1967.

Gentlemen:

We have two major tasks to be accomplished in 1967. The first task is to build up democracy. The second one is to step up the effort of revolutionary development. We cannot be too attentive to the building of democracy to fail to carry out the revolutionary development in rural areas. Conversely, we cannot concentrate merely on the revolutionary development effort to be undertaken in rural areas and neglect the job of building democracy.

Such being the case, this year we will have to achieve satisfactory results in both fields: building of democracy and revolutionary development in rural areas. For this year, to build up democracy means to carry through these three jobs: to hold free, clean and lawful elections to elect hamlet and village officials, and to train them and pave the way for the general elections scheduled to be held in the last six months of 1967. We must hold free, clean and lawful elections for perfunctory elections will result in nominal democratic institutions only. Moreover, we will have to provide training to elected hamlet and village officials because otherwise, our institutions in the sub-structure will be nothing but powerless and inefficient organizations. The question of holding elections has been thoroughly discussed this morning at this meetinghall.

Now I would like to deal with the acceleration of the revolutionary development effort in rural areas. This is the first year in which we have all the requisites to be in a position to achieve good results in the revolutionary development in rural areas. Indeed, a rather fitting and seasonable conception of revolutionary development in rural areas has been set forth; a mighty army of revolutionary development cadres has been constituted; a management system for revolutionary development activities in rural areas has been set up from central to local level; a modest but realistic activity program has been mapped out; and especially five hundred thousand servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam have been committed to the essential task of backing the revolutionary development effort in rural areas to contribute to its success. With the favorable conditions I have just mentioned, we must serve hard in our jobs this year so as to get some satisfactory results as a groundwork for its expansion in the years to come. To this end, I propose to you the accomplishment of eight really pressing jobs as follows:

First: Aggressiveness in our job

Since we are determined to carry out our job so that 1967 may be actually the first year of success, we have to accept all sacrifices. If you are shy of hard work and just work eight hours a day and five days and a half a week, I fear that we will not be in a position to achieve the objectives we have proposed. I call on your loyal dedication and endeavour in the pursuance of your task. Be aggressive and zealous in your job, no matter when you are on or off duty. We will not work under constraint but we will work out of our desire to see a prompt accomplishment of the tasks we have set forth. The sooner these tasks are accomplished, the sooner peace, prosperity will be restored for rural folks, the more the lives of our fighting men will be spared and probably the sooner will come the end of the war. It is my belief that only by working with such fervor and conviction, can we realize that we cannot afford to waste our time and 365 days in 1967 are really too few. Your own eagerness is not enough. You still have to manage to get all servicemen, cadres and administrative personnel under your authority to follow your example.

Second: Concentration of our efforts in a given area or two

Last year, some programs which fell within the revolutionary development plan for rural areas were not well coordinated in more than a locality. For instance, while cadres are operating in Hamlet A, a school is constructed in Hamlet B and a well is dug in Hamlet C. It turned out that the inhabitants of Hamlet A regarded revolutionary development cadres as being merely propagandists, incapable of providing positive assistance to farmers. As a result, the cadres' job became difficult and yielded few results.

As for the inhabitants of the two Hamlets B and C, they took it for granted that such works as school construction and well digging had the nature of a work of social welfare, a favor of the government for the people. Therefore, those works failed to produce a favorable psychological impact on the masses as expected.

Moreover, cadres were confronted with multiple difficulties since some programs pertaining to the revolutionary development effort in rural areas or not, were not connected and coordinated with one another. For instance, no revolutionary development cadres were assigned to many areas under the protection of Armed Forces or conversely, no support was provided by the Armed Forces in some areas where revolutionary development cadres were at work.

This year, the situation is by far better. In each province cadre groups have been concentrated to operate in one or two priority areas. The programs of military support, education, health, agriculture, public works, administration, etc., have also been focused on these areas for efficient assistance to cadre operations. Despite this, the provinces are requested:

1. To make the most of the companies of combat police detailed by the General Directorate of Police to the provinces to provide support to revolutionary development cadres operating in rural areas.

2. To employ the groups of cadres graduated from the first five training courses held in 1967 in priority areas in the provinces for the purpose of whitening them completely. Existing cadre groups will be employed in other areas only when they are deemed apt to complete the job as scheduled.

Third: Unified Command

In 1966, our cadres at the lowest level operated almost separately. As a result, there was no question of coordination of work. But this year, with the joint activities of military, administrative personnel and cadres, a combination of works is very necessary and the question should be considered and settled properly. Otherwise, the functioning of the component parts of the revolutionary development apparatus in rural areas will not be well connected, the responsibilities will not be clearly defined,and thus, carelessness and mutual incrimination will likely arise and develop. I have noted that in several areas, when people complain about something, military and administrative personnel blamed each other or when the revolutionary development effort fails in some areas, cadres accuse military personnel of not being active in providing support and being unpopular, on the other hand, the latter accuse the former of being sluggish, bureaucratic, and formalistic while administrative officers blame cadres for being shy of hard work, and discomfort, and unwilling to mix with local people by living, eating, fighting and building together with them. In consequence, the problem of unifying the commanding system in the infrastructure must be resolved without delay and in the following way:

1. Each province will have some priority areas intended for revolutionary development. Any area with more than three cadre groups operating will have to stage a campaign.

2. Each campaign will be under the unique command of a commander. The latter will be responsible to the province chief and the commanding officer of the military sector for both revolutionary development activities and purely military ones.

3. The command of a campaign may be the command of a regiment, a battalion or the reduced command of the sub-sector. These joint military and administrative commands will have to be installed in the very activity areas of cadre groups and be strengthened with special brances on planning, follow-up, acceleration and assistance for revolutionary development activities in rural areas.

4. The District Chief or Sub-Sector Chief, with the assistance of the Cadre Inter-Group Commander, commands directly the Revolutionary Development Cadre Groups: If he is not Sub-Sector Commander, the District Chief will serve as Assistant Commander in charge of questions relative to the RD program.

5. In the case where a cadre group is supported by a military or police unit, the coordination of purely military operations is entrusted to the Armed Force or police unit Commander. Purely military activities of the cadre group will only aim at the protection of their own security.

6. If a rotation of the military units in the RD task is necessary, only the units should be rotated while the commanding staff of the campaign should be maintained, and in any case, the rotation of the latter may be effectuated at the utmost only once every three months.

Fourth: Setting up of RD plan for each New Life Hamlet

Based on the 11 criteria and the 98 tasks set by the Central Government, and based on the local situation, especially on the righteous and sincere aspirations of the local people, the Provincial Permanent Bureau must set up for each New Life Hamlet a realistic, logical, and suitable plan. This plan will be prepared through the efforts of the Head of the Permanent Bureau, Provincial Cadre Corps Commander, Cadre Group Leader, and Chiefs of Services concerned. In other words, the Head of the Permanent Bureau, the Provincial Cadre Corps Commander, and the Cadre Group leader must conduct investigation and research work on the special operations to be accomplished in the New Life Hamlets planned for construction to meet tne criteria 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The said work includes such items as the type and length of the hamlet fence, the number of armed young men and young women teams which may be organized, and the number of people's bodies, the question of Chieu Hoi operations aimed directly at the known VC figures, the problem of local bullies, and the cases of corruption, etc. The Education Service Chief will take charge of the plan for elimination of illiteracy. For instance, he will foresee the number of classrooms to be built, and the number of teachers to be recruited. The Public Health Service Chief must set up a plan of attack against diseases. For example, he will plan the digging or cleaning out of wells, the number of dispensaries to be built, and the number of nurses and health workers to be recruited. The Service Chiefs in the Agricultural Branch are responsible for the activities aimed at satisfying the criteria 8 and 9: land reform, and development of agriculture and small industries. Examples: The Agricultural Affairs Service Chief plans the number of families to be granted agricultural loans for the participation in the campaign of planting secondary crops; the Irrigation Service Chief plans the digging or dredging of canals; the Fishery Service Chief plans the number of fish ponds to be dug or dredged; the Animal Husbandry Service Chief plans the number of families to be granted pigs or chickens for raising. The Public Works Service Chief is responsible for the plans of development of the communication system. He will plan the main arteries to be covered with stone, the transverse roads and paths to be repaired by the cadres and local people under the community development program.

The Provincial Permanent Bureau will associate and adjust the separate plans so as to obtain a realistic one which must meet the requirements of the policy, suit the capabilities of cadres, as well as satisfy the people's aspirations. If we just entrust everything to the existing cadre groups, they will become ineffective, and unable to set up the said plans, and throughout the year they will live next to the people, use demagogic measures towards the people, but cannot build anything for them.

All the plans, upon completion and agreement of the people, Armed Force units, cadres, and administrative authorities, and upon approval of the District Chief and Province Chief, must be implemented jointly by the RD cadres and technical cadres with resolution according to their respective scope of activities.

Fifth: Constant visits and supervision

The Provincial Permanent Bureau and the Provincial Cadre Corps commanders must frequently visit the cadre groups in order to provide them positive guidance and support. The Province Chief must recall the Service Chiefs to take care permanently of the activities implemented at the hamlets and villages so that the technical cadres will support positively and efficiently the RD cadres. Most of the inspection trips of the Province Chief must not be previously notified. Only with this measure, he can grasp the true situation in the hamlets and evaluate the infrastructure cadres. To render these inspections and visits efficient, the Province Chief must order the cadre groups to establish a daily work schedule. This schedule must be based on the 12 steps set by the Central.

Only the rigorous inspections and supervision can give hope to the progress and development of the RD program.

The cadres usually commit two mistakes that can be retrieved only with regular inspections which will make them:

1. Always remember that the important point lies in the building up of the morale while the material construction works are only of secondary importance. Thus, upon their arrival at the hamlet, they must behave in such a way that the local people will accept them and treat them as brothers. They must make friends with them in order to win their sympathy, their confidence, and their admiration. Then the cadres organize the People's Hamlet Construction Committee and help it reconstruct the hamlet. The moment comes then for vigorous material construction works.

2. Understand that the RD cadres must every day implement construction work, either moral or material, or both. They must not be lazy and spend too much time for rest. They must not operate in disorder and without plan. Each step of operation must be implemented in several weeks.

The weekly activity program then must be divided into parts for daily implementation. Each evening, the cadres must hold a meeting to review the activities performed in the day, and set up the working schedule for the following day.

Besides, to allow the Central to follow up the efforts of different provinces, I propose that the Division Commanders convene once a month a meeting of the Campaign Commanders and Sector Commanders. I will personally attend or designate a competent representative to attend these meetings.

Sixth: Model hamlet

Each province will have to select at least one hamlet for construction into a model New Life hamlet. This hamlet will serve as the ideal type for the cadre groups operating in other hamlets. The province may also use this hamlet for the training of new or weak cadre groups. It is not necessary to state that it meets all the 11 criteria set by the Central.

Seventh: Training of cadre groups on briefings

I have had occasions to visit many cadre groups unexpectedly. Most group leaders were embarrassed when making briefings. They must be trained by provincial officials on how to make concise and accurate briefings. Briefings must be given at the cadre group's headquarters. Used by the group leader as base for command, it may be a mobile place where adequate charts and materials are available. It may be moved every day, every week, or every month. Briefings must include the following four items:

1. Information on population, economy, geography of hamlet under construction.

2. Information concerning cadre groups in operation.

3. Moral and material achievements of the group since its coming to the hamlet.

4. Works the group plans to carry out in the coming month.

After briefing, the group leader should guide everybody in an observation trip to the hamlet to prove the statements he has just made on the achievements. Example:

Objective 1: Wipe out underground Viet Cong:

a. Exhibit the booties.

b. Introduce the Viet Cong the group has spotted and persuaded to rally to our cause.

c. Show the list of VC defectors.

Objective 2: Wipe out village bullies:

Show the complaints received give indications on how they have been settled and the outcome.

Objective 3: Build up a new spirit:

a. Show to the visitors those at odds with one another and now reconciled by the cadres.

b. Show to the visitors a cooperative activity of villagers.

c. Show to the visitors the cadres organized to become each a friend of three families.

d. Show to the visitors the sports ground built through community development.

e. Show to the visitors the refugee families which have come back to their villages.

Objective 4: Organize people groups and administrative institutions:

a. Introduce members of hamlet building committee.

b. Ask the visitors to see the children at school. Ask these children to greet them and to sing as they have been educated.

c. Arrange a meeting of the visitors with the leaders of male or female youth.

d. Show hamlet charter.

Objective 5: Organize people's struggle against the VC:

a. Show to the visitors combat houses: fences around the houses, shelters, alarm toesins, movable spike sets.

b. Practice alarm exercise.

c. Show to the visitors such works as village fencing and bush clearing.

d. Introduce armed youth leaders.

e. Invite the visitors to a military training session.

Objective 6: Eradicate illiteracy:

a. Show to the visitors some people who have just got out of illiteracy.

b. Show to the visitors some newly built classrooms.

c. Show to the visitors a national language class.

Objective 7: Wage war against diseases:

a. Show to the visitors some cadre living quarters as well as the garbage pits, and latrines the cadres have built for the families which accommodate them.

b. Display and explain the campaigning for frequent baths and clothes changing.

c. Show to the visitors a barber shop.

d. Show to the visitors communal wells.

e. Show to the visitors newly built infirmaries.

Objective 8: Carry out land reform policy:

a. Give information concerning public land in the village.

b. Give information on the debate on equitable land distribution.

c. Give information on lands of those families which have defected to the Viet Cong.

d. Give information on land rents in the village.

Objective 9: Develop agriculture and handicraft:

a. Show to the visitors the fields and gardens cultivated according to new methods by Agricultural Credit loan recipients and participants of production boosting campaign.

b. Show to the visitors demonstration plots set up in the hamlets.

c. Show to the visitors some farmers' families which got better off thanks to assistance of agriculture cadres.

Objective 10: Develop communication roads:

a. Show to the visitors the main roads built, being built or to be built by Public Works Service.

b. Show to the visitors by-paths and tracks the villagers have built, are building or will build through community development.

c. Show to the visitors the road signs the group has erected.

Objective 11: Proper treatment for the fighters:

a. Arrange a meeting with some persons with meritorious action in the hamlet.

b. Request the award of decorations to a number of deserving persons.

Eighth: Carry out the decisions of the Central promptly and accurately

I hope that you have understood thoroughly the seven tasks I have just mentioned. Please carry them out immediately. I shall pay an unexpected visit to you in a near future.

I repeat that what I have said today is in line with the seven points I raised during my visit to different parts of the country in early 1967.

These are:

1. Build selected hamlets, entrust work to dependable groups, organize leadership on rational basis.

2. Provide active, permanent and continuous military support to the Revolutionary Development effort.

3. The Revolutionary Development cadres should stay in the hamlets to eat, live, work, fight and build together with their inhabitants.

4. Training, inspection, supervision, guidance, correction, support and stimulation are important matters.

5. Servicemen, cadres, officials should regard one another as brothers in a family.

6. Servicemen, cadre, officials should be strictly thrifty and honest.

7. Servicemen, cadres, officials should not fear difficulties, discomfort and should be determined to achieve any objective they have set forth.

I do ask you to keep always in mind the spirit of our 8th seminar recently held in Dalat so as to work actively to make the revolutionary development job successful in 1967.

59-MAN RURAL CONSTRUCTION CADRE GROUPS
GAINING RURAL SUPPORT FOR THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BY ENGAGING THE PEASANTS IN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROGRAMS



59-man groups are directed by a 15 member control organization in each province

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