

The Short Run and the Long Walk
(Parts I & II)

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PREFACE

The following two-part paper started out as two papers. The original versions of these two papers were prepared, on very short notice, for the Wingspread Symposium on South-East Asia, held in September 1965 at Wingspread (Racine, Wisconsin). The Symposium was jointly sponsored by the Asia Society, the Johnson Foundation, and the University of Chicago.

There is, in the present versions, some overlap between the two papers; this was necessitated by the requirements of autonomy, and the earlier publication of the first part (The Short Run).

A Military Perspective:

PART I

THE SHORT RUN AND THE LONG WALK

Many approaches to peace in Southeast Asia must be explored, says this RAND Corporation staff member, but none of them will be fruitful without "visible and significant and continuing military success."



By Amrom H. Katz

Southeast Asia is a display case of conflict. Vietnam and Laos are real, hot, noisy and visible. Thailand and Malaysia are latent, combustible, threatening.

Some kind of peace can be obtained in Southeast Asia via either of two essentially unilateral routes—Western (U.S. and U.K.) withdrawal, abrogation of commitments, and change of policy, or change of policy and actions by North Vietnam, Indonesia, and the People's Republic of China. Neither prospect seems likely. Fortunately for the longer term prospects of peace, these two routes do not exhaust all possibilities.

Examination of the present conflicts in Southeast Asia with a narrow angle lens is dangerous. The urgent tends to occupy all one's attention, excluding the important.

Clearly the Vietnam conflict is an urgent matter; it cannot be set aside, postponed, disregarded. Furthermore, the outcome in Vietnam, and the way it is reached, cannot help but influence the longer-range and important, but not equally urgent, matters.

What is important in Southeast Asia is the future of China, the pace, extent and outcome of its arguments with the Soviet Union, and the future course of other "wars of national liberation," in that area and around the world.

Modern communication and transportation—of people, ideas, hardware, and weapons, have killed the 19th cen-

*Amrom H. Katz, senior staff member of The RAND Corporation, adapted this article from a paper he presented at the Wingspread Symposium on Southeast Asia, held in September by the Asia Society, the University of Chicago and the Johnson Foundation. The views expressed here are his own, not necessarily RAND's. The conference papers will be published as a book, *The Prospect for Southeast Asia*, edited by Kenneth T. Young, Jr., and Gilbert F. White, by Praeger next April.*

tury notion of contiguous, non-overlapping "spheres of influence." However, this obsolete notion still haunts the columns and speeches of well-known pundits. It is as misleading as the Mercator projection, that distorted map which was probably a major factor contributing to American isolationism. The sphere of influence of the U.S. is a ball 8,000 miles in diameter—the Earth.

Apart from their localized and near-term effects, the issues that will be settled in Southeast Asia will have an impact far distant from that troubled, unhappy area. One does not have to believe in the automatic, immediate, serial falling of dominoes to visualize the difficulties facing Thailand, Malaysia, Laos and other countries if Vietnam falls. It is clear that communist success in Vietnam will encourage and stimulate other attempts far from Asia. This does not mean or even suggest that the world is simply connected—that if the communists triumph in South Vietnam, they will therefore and therefore only, start and win similar wars elsewhere. Nor does it suggest that U.S. credibility—its willingness and ability to live up to commitments elsewhere—automatically disappears if South Vietnam is lost to Hanoi. But these events would have noticeable effects.

No New Gimmick

No combination of Western moves or proposals to secure peace will appeal to or satisfy that alienated minority in the U.S. if the threat or use of physical force is involved; it is equally clear that the communist bloc will respond to no combination of moves or proposals unless they are backed by the threat of force.

Given our demonstrated and repeated willingness to enter into discussions on Vietnam, and our failure to get such discussions started, it is hard to invent readily a new and untried gimmick or catalyst that might succeed.

The choices available to governments

are narrower than those available to—or at least proffered by—non-responsible individuals.

The class "non-responsible" contains a sub-class "irresponsible." Unfortunately, both Peking and Hanoi tend to mistake the proposals, advice, petitions, advertisements and picketing of the irresponsibles for evidence of lack of U.S. will and staying power, and this misinterpretation feeds back, with negative effect, on the possibilities of getting Vietnam discussions started.

It cannot be necessary to keep coming up with new proposals simply because old ones haven't been accepted. We have spun out almost every permutation and combination.

It is in the nature of this war that unequivocal, convincing analyses of how the Vietnam struggle is going are not to be had. This is certainly true for the U.S. and the Government of Vietnam; it is probably as true for Hanoi and Peking.

Hanoi's urge to negotiate seems minimal. It is not zero and can be strengthened. New words, or repackaging of previous offers, are not sufficient unless accompanied by visible and significant and continuing military success. It is not the author's purpose to comment further on this point, except to note that hope exists precisely because there is so much room for improvement in the military part of the Vietnam struggle.

Outside initiatives—whether from the U.N., the so-called neutrals, the nonaligned or the not-yet-fully-aligned states—should be welcome.

No single approach to attaining (and retaining) peace is unequivocally better than all others; none carries overwhelming *a priori* probability of success. Hence multiple, simultaneous approaches need be tried—as long as they are not mutually exclusive.

We should continue the attempt to enlist the support, the good offices, the

wisdom of as many nations as possible in the search for peace.

The U.N. should be used—but no one can depend on it alone: for opposite reasons, but with the same disastrous consequences, both its sentimental friends and its enemies would overburden it with tasks beyond its means and its muscle. Certainly the U.N. can perform some meaningful, constructive tasks—but those tasks must be carefully chosen. Such tasks must lie well between assumption of full responsibility on the one hand and participation via only generalized pieties on the other. Such tasks could include conducting fact-finding commissions, acting as intermediaries or catalysts in negotiations, in the short run, and playing a full and congenial role in the Mekong Valley Project. Of course, the latter project requires the attainment of peace as a precondition to its success.

Smaller aggregations of concerned states—a Southeast Asia regional grouping or the 1954 Geneva powers—could work toward the starting of negotiations, which if successful could be a step toward a stable, meaningful peace.

But these are mechanisms; not solutions.

Talks Are Not Peace

Our dismal and protracted experiences in other negotiations suggest that simply getting talks started is not identical with securing peace.

Even a narrow-context "solution" for Vietnam must take into account the war in Laos, the threat to Thailand, the attack on what is left of Malaysia. To "solve" Vietnam while watching the others go condemns the "solution."

A clear, non-hesitant, unambiguous policy toward Southeast Asia in which these pieces are fitted is still missing.

The cost of involvement in Southeast Asia is high, but bearable. It will have been wasted if we haven't learned our lessons. There is still time and space to do better in Vietnam, and to negotiate—when it comes to that—from position instead of pose. The major lesson from Vietnam, and from China, is that the free world faces more "wars of national liberation" in the future. The less we recognize them and learn how to cope with them, the more probable will they be.

Long-term prospects for peace in Southeast Asia and elsewhere will not be found in a legalistic formula or conference which momentarily seems to save U.S. face while handing over Southeast Asia piecemeal to communism, thus verifying the doctrine of the success and safety of "wars of national liberation."

If there is to be no negotiated peace soon—and it takes more parties to agree to this than it takes to quit and give up—what then?

The U.S.—and the free world—must settle down for the long-term prospect of "wars of national liberation"—which will be called that even though they are mainly directed against the already liberated.

We cannot attain and prosecute peace successfully if at home we are so divided, misinformed, or poorly informed, that our fundamental unity, direction and purpose are blurred and misinterpreted abroad.

We understand and have successfully deterred both all-out nuclear war and high-level conventional war between East and West. Well organized and equipped for these wars, we are poorly organized and equipped for coping with "wars of national liberation."

Our resources should be rearranged and focused on these problems; where absent, resources should be developed.

The jargon term "escalation" has conjured up many irrational attitudes toward and beliefs in the dangers in military parts of the conflict in Southeast Asia. This word carries with it images of an inexorable automatic device which goes only up and ends in disaster. All parts of this image are unfortunate and inaccurate. Continued military pressure is necessary, and hopefully will be more effective than it has been to date in forcing negotiations. The lesson of Korea must not be forgotten. There, the pre-negotiating respite was one-sided and when the Chinese and the North Koreans were out of steam, they got the time to build an extensive defensive position. It should not be forgotten that the U.S. suffered more casualties after negotiations started than up to that point.


The conflicts in Southeast Asia are more difficult and more complex than any problem the U.S. has faced since World War II. The development and deployment of strategic weapons, the Korean conflict, the exploration of space, the Berlin Blockade and many other problems were and continue momentous, consequential, and difficult. But they were either solved or reduced to manageable proportions via U.S. techniques—and above all—style.

We have yet to develop a "style" in coping with "wars of national liberation." But we can. The resources are available but scattered. What is needed is a long-term, free-world agency for support of freedom and independence, for early detection and treatment of latent and combustible problems, for measured response, not over-reaction.

Military success is a necessary, but insufficient condition for a favorable outcome in Southeast Asia. However expensive and inefficient, military success can only provide the background requirement for progress toward justice, economic improvement and government stability. But without military success, there is no hope for progress.

Bold ideas like the Mekong Valley Project are needed—but they are distant and long term. An equally bold list of near-term, realizable, and significant economic and social projects for several countries of Southeast Asia needs to be formulated and started.

We understand—and can recognize—war which starts on a given day, with noise and fire, and crossing of a border, as the Korean War started. The kinds of conflict going on in Southeast Asia started gradually, almost unnoticed, by osmosis. Peace may well come the same way, without formal treaty, without formal conferences.



PART II

THE SHORT RUN AND THE LONG WALK: THE NEED FOR A NEW AGENCY

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INTRODUCTION

Examination of World War II, and the Korean and Vietnam wars exhibits a steady decline in the "military exclusivity" of these wars. The complexities of Vietnam exceed those of previous wars, and U.S. style seems less adapted to Vietnam than it did to World War II. The tools of analysis and discussion developed by the strategic establishment seem inapplicable to Vietnam. If indeed we recognize that "wars of national liberation" present novel problems, and that these are really "interdisciplinary wars," we need to settle down for the long pull, restructure U.S. efforts, to better anticipate combustible situations, instead of simply reacting when they get to be forest fires. Because our real interests are not embraced by the notion of and the phrase "counterinsurgency," and because the efforts covered by that inadequate term are minor activities in the several government departments, it is suggested that a new agency, the National Independence Support Agency, be constituted in the Executive Office of the President.

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WARS ARE GETTING LESS MILITARY: FROM WORLD WAR II THROUGH KOREA
TO VIETNAM

The last three wars in which the U.S. has participated are World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. They illustrate a progressive decline in the dominance of the military aspect of the war; a decline in what may be called the military exclusivity of the war.

World War II was certainly the latest, and probably the last, all-out war. Both sides in World War II were unrestrained in their ferocity and velocity, their use of geography, their choice of weapons--at least when they really got going. Production miracles astounded even production experts. And not only weapons and trucks and airplanes and tanks were produced--technicians and military men were produced. Who now remembers how terribly short it was between the time when American soldiers, short of equipment and few in numbers, were using wooden rifles on maneuvers in Louisiana, and the time when they invaded the continent of Europe? And how it was but two and a half years between the first demonstration of a nuclear chain reaction (December 1942) and an atomic bomb being dropped in war on Hiroshima?

Limits on where we went, what we did, how hard we fought, and how fast we brought new weapons to the battlefield were imposed only by available energy, production ability, time, and resources. We worked and fought to the limits, and were not limited by self-imposed constraints. What seemed to be a gradual quickening of pace, an acceleration of violence, was more likely the result of accumulating experience and increasing availability of both men and the tools of war.

The non-use of gas is, possibly, the only exception to this general point. However, recollection serves up the point that on the several occasions during World War II when the use of gas was seriously considered, it was discarded only because of military arguments. Other weapons were "better," as judged by a kind of "cost-effectiveness" analysis, performed before that term was invented.

With the super-acuity conferred by hindsight, many have suggested that political and other long-term factors should have played a larger and continuous part during World War II. But they didn't--at least for the Allies. It was, especially for the U.S., a nearly 100 percent military war.

The passage of time since the end of World War II has inevitably blurred and defocussed those years of desperate struggle. The dominant, permanent, and remembered fact of allied victory remains. Yet it was hard enough, the allies found, to win that war--no matter how certain that victory seems under confident and retrospective analysis. After all, with the "answer" in hand, and the difficulties and uncertainties of the war itself resolved, one can afford to wonder why so little attention seems to have been given during the course of the war to latent and looming long-range post-war problems.

There are many explanations, reasons or excuses. The great difficulties, the numerous problems, the inordinate complexity of the war itself absorbed priorities, emotions, and energy--and forced both vision and attention to concentrate on matters at hand. Further, the United States, though a major partner in the alliance, and a major participant in the war, had little experience, and even less taste,

for the kind of politics whose absence during World War II seems more conspicuous and important now than it appeared then. Additionally, the United States had only recently discarded its isolationist blinders. Unaccustomed to and inexperienced in its new role, it was willingly foisting off part of its hopes and responsibilities on to the just-born United Nations organization, whose structures and powers, for substantive problems, proved inadequate and resistant to forced feeding.

Such long-term intra-war considerations (planning for an indefinite and lengthy period of worldwide involvement and accompanying the plans with matching actions) would make sense only if the United States consciously intended to become and to remain an active participant on the world scene. Such uncongenial plans would be unnecessary if the United States intended only to fight, win, and, repeating an earlier withdrawal, disengage from continued and indefinite responsibility and response. In addition, and probably decisive, was the notion that we would get to the other problems in due course. The logic of first things first was hard to refute--and few were trying.

Many military men serving in Korea (which started less than five years after VJ day--the end of World War II) looked back to their participation in World War II and were puzzled by the operative restraints in Korea. Many constraints were tacit on both sides; others were one-sided. We didn't go everywhere we could, and we didn't use every weapon we had. This is how it looked to our military, and this is how it was. The reasons were defensible, but to many it was, and remained, an uncongenial "puzzlement."

Vietnam--current phase--started about ten years after Korea. One of the many anomalies in Vietnam is that no one can accurately state when "it started." In the first place, there is only sparse consensus about what "it" is. Do we mean the early Vietnamese struggle against the French before the beginning of World War II, or the fight against the French after World War II? Or the post-1954 phase? Which?

A recent personal experience highlights the point. In talking to a senior U.S. military officer in Vietnam, the writer suggested that "part of the political disquiet and unease in the United States (about Vietnam) derives from a feeling that we've been there too long. Some will argue that we've been there since 1954, others, disputing this date, claim we've really been there only since 1961." The general interrupted, saying; "We [my division] didn't get here till the late summer of 1965, and we're doing very well. 1954, or 1961, as starting dates mean nothing. Measured against a starting time of late 1965 we've done magnificently." He could not be faulted; he was certainly right, but so were those who were concerned with 1954 and 1961.

Of course, each of those who opted for the different "starting" dates meant something different. And truly the nature, extent and commitment of the summer of 1965 was massive enough to qualify as a qualitatively different and significant milestone.

This comment illuminates a related point. Whether one is a student or a statesman, it is convenient to be able to answer the question, "When did the war start?" For the former, if he were asked

about Korea, he can answer, "On June 25, 1960, at 0400, the North Koreans crossed the line with shot and shell and flag and bugle." For the statesman, the sharpness of the date and time of Korea and the galvanic reactions produced, made the aggression very noticeable and this in turn made for prompt response.

The techniques of gradual aggression have only compounded the as yet unsolved problem of defining aggression, a problem with which the UN has been concerned. The UN grappled with this problem for a long time, but completely failed to solve it, and this topic has now lain abandoned for years.

Although the waging of war has not been eliminated from international relations, declaring war does seem to have gone out of style. It appears that the declaration of war by the Soviet Union against Japan, a couple of days after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, was the latest example. Since the formation of the United Nations, there has been no declaration of war in the world. India-Goa, India-China, Indonesia-Malaysia, UAR-Israel, Sinai, Korea, Greece, are but a small sample of the many post-1945 conditions and states of war. All were fleshed out by the full apparatus, personnel, and consequences of war--without an accompanying preliminary declaration of war which would tidy up the records. Declaration of war as a classic prologue to war itself seems to have passed from the scene without much notice--or effect, either.

Declaring war permits--and encourages--the nation's leaders to mobilize and channel resources and opinion, to rearrange priorities, and to quiet opposition--among other things. But a war that is

formally declared (at least in the examples furnished by the past: the future holds no referable examples) usually requires formal conclusion. A declared war can't just fade away. Declaring war in the present case would add complications and inconvenience to all concerned, severely restricting possible modes of settlement.

It came with considerable shock to the writer to discover many U.S. military men in Vietnam who were not yet born when World War II started. To them, World War II is for and from the history books. Some of this group remember Korea, albeit dimly. Of course, there are American fighting men in Vietnam who fought in World War II and Korea--and U.S. armed forces remain in Korea today. But as the fighting men in Korea, puzzled by restraints and constraints on operations, looked back to World War II--without enjoyment and glorification--as the "good old days," so too does the fighting man in Vietnam look back at Korea. (See Fig. 1.)

Why? Perhaps the most conspicuous difference is that Korea had what is completely missing in Vietnam--a front line. It is almost impossible to draw a map of Vietnam which shows who's who and what's whose. The map pulsates from day to night, the lines aren't firm, and the map is speckled. Further, meanings of the map shadings aren't unequivocal. When there is a genuine moving front line as in World War II and Korea, it is relatively simple to tell how one's doing.

The front line is not the only thing missing from the military landscape. In Korea (and of course in World War II), the landscape featured many enemy military objets d'art such as tanks, trucks, and artillery, and they cooperated with our reconnaissance efforts both

by standing still long enough to be photographed, and by not moving very far away by the time response was mounted. Not so in South Vietnam. There the Viet Cong make very difficult reconnaissance targets.

And Vietnam sees the full flowering of complicated and numerous "rules of engagement"--the description of the conditions under which firepower can be employed. The restrictions, and the coordinating and verification processes employed to tell friend from foe are necessary, but make difficulties. Not all military men--on either side--wear uniforms. That this makes difficulties and is not "fair," accounts for most of the reason that it is so. Further, and in addition to the formal military forces in Vietnam, there are several types of friendly paramilitary forces under control of the province chiefs. The Viet Cong do not go out of their way to make themselves conspicuous. Their presence is felt, but their visibility is low. Identification problems add to other complexities. In sum, the military part of the war in Vietnam is novel to our recent and available experience and is extremely difficult.

THE STATISTICAL SUBSTITUTE FOR A FRONT LINE

In the absence of a front line, we are left with an avalanche of statistics--"incidents," target destruction, defections, weapons lost and captured, kill ratios. And the statistical "front line" constructed from and balanced on these statistics is a poor and unconvincing substitute for a real front line. But it's the only substitute we have, and in the absence of either conspicuous and

VIETNAM: A MISMATCH TO U.S. STYLE

The number and magnitude of problems that the U.S. has faced since the end of World War II is truly formidable: for example, the development, deployment and understanding of strategic weapons, the Korean War, the Berlin Blockade, the Cuba confrontation; many others of major importance could be listed.

Yet Vietnam, perhaps because it has proved more difficult for the U.S. than any of the above examples, serves better than any other single or continuing event since World War II to focus on and to illuminate questions and problems posed by:

- (1) the U.S. role, responsibilities, and responses in the world arena
- (2) the likely character of future aggressions
- (3) the multi-faceted character of communist revolutionary warfare
- (4) the Sino-Soviet split
- (5) arguments about morality, intervention, isolationism

The American responses to Korea, to the Berlin Blockade, to the Cuba confrontation, and the others, although different from each other, were straightforward. The problems were either soluble or reduced to manageable proportions by congenial and understood U.S. techniques and style.

INTERDISCIPLINARY WAR

In former wars the American style was to do things serially. First we fought--and the War Department (now the DoD) was predominant. When the fighting ended, the next job was making peace, and the State

Department was predominant. And when peace was established, we'd next go in and rebuild the place--the job of an agency like ECA.

But in Vietnam the luxury of the serial solution is unavailable. The job there is to beat the Viet Cong militarily, create the conditions which would permit and enhance GVN stability and viability, pacify and secure the countryside, win the political and psychological war for the hearts, minds and votes of the peasants while teaching them how to raise pigs and how to use fertilizer, to cope with and satisfy legitimate aspirations and needs of civilian, religious, political factors, student groups, and refugees. In short, the job is to do in parallel and simultaneously, all the tasks and more which formerly we did serially (see Fig. 2). We have not been conspicuously successful.

It is widely appreciated, although needing constant restatement, that the word "win" as used in discussions about Vietnam, does not and cannot have its classic meaning. "Win" in Vietnam, for us, means "favorable outcome." However, as an example of the numerous asymmetries besetting the Vietnam problem, "lose" more nearly retains its classic meaning. Another asymmetry is found in the generally understood notion that military success, though necessary, and hence indispensable to a "win" (however non-classic), is not sufficient in and of itself to "win," whereas military failure by the Government of Vietnam and the Free World Forces assisting it is sufficient to guarantee loss.

We are involved in an interdisciplinary war. Military success is necessary; without it, success on the political, psychological, economic, social fronts will be impossible. But military success

alone is insufficient. This dilemma, and a persistent failure by many to think this through--that what is necessary (military success) is insufficient--accounts for much current domestic argument, vexation, unease, non-understanding, and misunderstanding about Vietnam.

WHERE ARE THE STRATEGISTS?

The years since World War II have seen the emergence in the U.S. of a sizeable, vocal, and by now well-known group of civilian strategists located in non-profit corporations, university institutes, and government. They constitute a recognizable and influential strategic establishment. They have addressed the problems of thermonuclear war, deterrence, and defense; they have invented tools of analysis and have debated, argued, written. They have constructed and promoted strategic theories. Almost without exception, they have had nothing to say, and by and large, have said nothing about Vietnam, counterinsurgency, and wars of national liberation. Why?

There are many reasons. Detailed and more complete exploration of the failure of our "official" strategists, fascinating as it may be, lies off the axis of this paper. But at least two points need making. First, expertise on thermonuclear war is continuously earned by those who claim credit for preventing thermonuclear war. The expert, in this case, is one who so behaves himself as to preclude his obtaining experience. This notion lies behind the following (only partly tongue-in-cheek) definition of deterrence:

Deterrence is threatening to do something to someone else if he does something to you, so that when he doesn't do it to you, you say "he's deterred," whereas he may never have had it in mind in the first place.

Thus, the condition of deterrence is fuzzy while it's going on, but the failure of deterrence would be clear and conspicuous.

Furthermore, when two decades ago the problem of nuclear war began to be addressed, everyone got off the starting-blocks at the same time. Who had experience? No one. The problems addressed were those amenable to analysis and discussion, and the race went to those whose logic, tongue, and pen were fastest.

One should hesitate long and hard before proposing solutions to a real problem, where others did get off the starting blocks early, where others have had relevant experiences, and where the problem requires more and different tools, data, and insights than can be supplied only by logic, wit and the standard tool-kit of the strategist.

Real war does many things--and Vietnam is a complex furnace that can reduce to ashes fine theories invented elsewhere and not grounded in relevant experience.

Despite these cautions, it is easy and safe to predict that the massive ongoing fact of Vietnam, institutional priorities, concern with future problems, and the continuous embarrassment of silence, will pull the strategic establishment into this problem.

Systems analysis, operations analysis, model-building, optimization, cost effectiveness, and other tools of strategic analysis--so far, are by and large inapplicable to the Vietnam type of problem. This comment of course does not argue against the relevance and application of operations analysis techniques to what, in the context of the war as a whole, are relatively minor problems.

To "optimize"--in systems analysis usage--means to choose the best among several choices--and the choices have to be solutions. But first we need a solution. After several inefficient, expensive solutions are found, these tools--and practitioners--are useful and can be valuable. But the tools are tools of choice and discussion, not discovery or invention. We are not yet at that second stage in Vietnam.

We have been confronted with the possibility of an inefficient, expensive loss. Certainly the first order of business is not to construct an efficient, inexpensive loss. The adjectives are regrettable, but tolerable. The noun is not.

First we must find out how to convert Vietnam into an inefficient, expensive win. Later we may be permitted to use the second-order tools of the analyst to save money and improve efficiency. First we need the invention. And we do not mean an item of military hardware.

Yet there are people--quiet, unorganized, known mainly to insiders--who are "good" at this kind of war as demonstrated not by eloquence, but by performance charts. They are, by and large, not part of the regular establishment, and so far the structure of the U.S. government and the style of its operations seems ill-suited to using such people. This point was made with elegance and perception by an unnamed author writing in The Reporter (January 13, 1966):

...Within a week, I know many Americans who are involved. Fanatics, mavericks, losers, non-team-players, fluent speakers of Vietnamese, old Vietnam hands who have hung on or gotten back (despite the warnings of the "career management" specialists in their bureaucracies) or have found a place on their own that keeps them in Vietnam. They are mostly distrusted or handled with great reserve by their organizations, because they care too much, because

they fight the problem, because they are arrogant and contemptuous of the majority of uninvolves, not very highly motivated Americans who necessarily fill the ranks. More and more I come to suspect that these men are essential; that we simply cannot succeed without them. Which means that the system must somehow come to adapt to them, to learn to find them and place them and keep them and bear up to them. The system, as yet, is not geared to do that.

REORGANIZATION AND REFOCUS OF U.S. RESOURCES

Let's see what the U.S. can do to reshape itself to better cope with such wars. U.S. performance in Vietnam must improve, even were Vietnam a one-time aberration and discontinuity, instead of a prototype and herald of the future. Political geologists studying and charting the massive and ongoing Sino-Soviet rift have found many abrasive edges, strange formations, chasms and fault-lines. However virulent and noisy may be the overt parts of the dialogue between the principals, and between their surrogates, stand-ins and proxies in the communist world, we had better not forget that they continue to agree on many more important matters than they disagree on. We need to recognize and remember that there is no Sino-Soviet dispute on the importance, the justification and the necessity of "wars of national liberation;" the differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China, with respect to this important problem, lie mainly in the evaluation of risks attendant on tempting the full weight of western power.

Nikita Khrushchev has been retired. The doctrinal and operational differences there are between him and his successors with respect to domestic policies do not extend to the Soviet view of (to repeat their preemptive euphemism) wars of national liberation. That portion of

Khrushchev's oft-quoted speech of January 6, 1961, dealing with wars of national liberation (and he used Vietnam as an example) still stands as working doctrine.

Briefly, the Soviets argued that nuclear war is too dangerous for all concerned (and we agree)--further, they believe that high-level conventional war (such as a large-scale non-nuclear war in Europe) is also too dangerous because it might erode into nuclear war. But wars of national liberation--that's another matter. To them, these are "just" wars, and are safe.

We had better settle down for the long pull, and recognize that new problems loom, requiring new approaches, new solutions.

Our perception about communist-style wars of national liberation contains a paradox: On the one hand, such wars are low-level. They are slow-paced, seemingly less consequential than the larger wars we know about and have prepared for. However, the admixture of almost equal military, political, psychological, and economic components, makes the non-orthodox war extraordinarily complex and more complicated than larger-scale conventional war.

There is no suggestion or implication here that the U.S. either could or should respond to every situation over the entire world. Neither is it valid to argue that because we can't or won't respond to all situations, we should therefore refrain from responding to any.

We cannot cope with the new problems by traditional and orthodox techniques. To many old hands and to many beginning students of these new problems, the organization of U.S. effort to anticipate, detect, identify and respond to combustible situations seems ineffective and

overwhelming defeat or victory, the equivocality of the statistical indices accounts for much of the travail and argument about the war.

When, in late August 1950, two months after the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel, the UN forces were confined to the Pusan perimeter, no statistical presentation could have outweighed or outshouted the fact that we were losing and were being shoved back and off the Korean peninsula. The North Koreans knew how they were doing, they knew exactly how we were doing, where we were, and which way we were moving. And we knew and shared the same data about them.

No statistical potpourri of data, no matter how well presented, would have convinced anyone, on either side, of a conclusion opposite to the one that was accurately and vividly portrayed on the map.

And when, after the stunning success of the Inch'on invasion, the direction of movement of the front line reversed, both sides again knew and agreed on what was happening.

The de facto agreement by both sides on the position of the front line and the direction of its movement finds no ready parallel in Vietnam. Of course, the front line doesn't exist in Vietnam, but more important, and directly relevant, is that there is no a priori, tacit, or de facto agreement between the antagonists on what are the relevant statistics, data, indicators or measures of progress. Simply put, Hanoi likely doesn't use the same data that Washington or Saigon do. Hanoi has its own data, and evaluates them via its own politico-military calculus. This point requires further, extensive, and detailed development.

insufficient. Clearly there are enough resources, but they need focussing and correlation.

The phrase "counterinsurgency" (and its common abbreviation: COIN) conveys too much of a reactive, defensive, status-quo approach. It should be excised from our vocabulary before it finds its way into the dictionary. What is needed is a concept, attitude, and program which does not exclude, in its title, possible support of insurgents in some future situation. We need to support freedom and independence, not just "counter" someone else's initiatives.

Further, the several activities now lumped under the umbrella of "counterinsurgency" are minor specialties within the various concerned military and civilian agencies.

Smooth, interdisciplinary effort is not the result of a simple sum of the separate efforts. Coordination is not integration. As noted earlier, many of the people who have had useful, insightful experiences in the prominent post-World War II insurgencies do not find understanding, continuity, major activities and career opportunities in the standard government agencies. This is not to say that, by now, Vietnam is not exceedingly high on everyone's problem and action list. The bureaucratic version of the universal law of gravitation explains why all agencies are strongly attracted to programs high on national priorities, especially if the President exhibits continuing high personal interest. Thus, in 1957, when space "hit," there was a frantic, unseemly scrambling by departments, agencies and bureaus to get into orbit. Prestige, control, jurisdiction, and money--all were up for grabs. More recently, the establishment and

rise to prominence of the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg (since renamed the John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare) was a direct reflection of and response to the interest of President Kennedy. Under similar impetus, the Air Forces created a matching organization, the Special Air Warfare Center in Florida.

The organization of the AEC in 1946, NASA in 1958, and ACDA in 1961 were responses to new problems. These organizations are not the respective and exclusive proprietors of atomic energy, space, and arms control and disarmament, but when one visits these agencies, he knows what the main business of each is.

By now it is clear that coping with "wars of national liberation" is at least as difficult, serious, and important as these other subjects.

This suggests that a new agency devoted to these new problems on a full-time basis needs to be established. The title of the organization should reflect the earlier comment about counterinsurgency; that word should be dropped. A suggested name for such an organization could be the National Independence Support Agency (NISA). It should probably be in the Executive Office of the President. The agency need not be large, but should be big enough to make effective use of the talented, dedicated men who now find no useful continuous career; it would be a place where the interdisciplinary nature of the problem is recognized by using all the various skills and techniques.

Above all, properly established, it would let everyone know that we are taking the problem seriously, and are indeed settling down for the long pull. And this has a value of itself. Hopefully we can do

fire prevention as well as fire-fighting. The suggestion that another agency is needed does not come lightly or quickly from this old bureaucrat; nor is it expected that NISA could be useful for Vietnam. Vietnam is a forest fire, barely under control. The new agency need not start out with operational responsibilities, though this door need not be tightly or permanently closed.

NISA would be the focus of U.S. efforts to collect data on current experiences, to retrieve--before it is too late--data from past experiences. It could and should conduct and sponsor research in this field. The U.S. continues to pay heavily in blood, treasure, prestige, and credibility, for its participation in Vietnam. It would be cruel and wasteful not to learn how to do better or different. Costly experiences and events do not automatically leave their lessons; passage of time leaves only bitterness, war stories and anecdotes. We certainly have more to learn than that.






Fig. 1—The decline in the military exclusivity of the last three wars



The serial approach: former U.S. style



The requirements of interdisciplinary war: doing everything simultaneously

Fig.2—Contrasts in styles