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Reorganization of A.I.D.'s Vietnam Mission and Program for more
Effective Support of Counter-Insurgency

A.I.D.'s Vietnam program and Mission organization have officially been drastically reorganized within the past two months.

(a) The traditional economic development and technical assistance program featuring project assistance to the national government has been changed to one primarily concerned with counter-insurgency and employing a new technique of a "non-project" flow of commodities "for government account", for direct use for counter-insurgency activities at the village level.

(b) The Mission organization has been changed to establish a clear command line from the Mission Director through a new Assistant Director for Counter-Insurgency to new A.I.D. provincial representatives who are to work directly with provincial chiefs on village level operations.

Program Change

Although much of what the A.I.D. program has done in the past has been truly of a counter-insurgency nature insofar as subject matter content was concerned, it often bogged down at the national government level and was not applied in an effective manner to support specific counter-insurgency operations at the grass roots. A.I.D. goods were delivered under the terms of detailed project agreements worked out painstakingly with various national ministries and often submitted to Washington for review. Lead time from the start of project planning to the delivery of commodities was counted in years. And then, we were dependent upon the effectiveness of these national ministries, to which our commodities were delivered, in applying our A.I.D. aid to the villages and hamlets. Although many attempts were made to approach the grass roots problem more effectively, we, of course, have not been free to deal directly with local government officials without the consent of the sovereign national government of Vietnam. The GVN rejected certain proposals for A.I.D. working directly with provincial authorities. However, in the course of working on specific "clear and hold operations" we were able to, in fact, initiate such arrangements on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, by altering our program mechanics and developing better rapport with the Vietnamese Government, we have been able to initiate the following system which can, in effect, accomplish almost the same end:

Step 1 - Task Force/Saigon estimates bulk commodity and fund requirements for the strategic hamlet program and other special counter-insurgency operations.

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Step 2 - Without formal negotiations with the GVN, USOM places direct orders with suppliers for needed imports.

Step 3 - USOM warehouses these commodities in Saigon so that they may be delivered on a "quick reaction" basis direct to the hamlet level.

Step 4 - In areas of active U.S.-supported counter-insurgency operations, USOM representatives are to be stationed at the provincial level to monitor the effective application of A.I.D. commodities and services for counter-insurgency purposes.

General Note: Commodities will be released only to support those counter-insurgency operations which are approved by the GVN (through a single point of expeditious clearance in the Ministry of Interior) and by the U.S. Committee on Province Rehabilitation.

The large Commercial Import Program will be continued as in the past for the primary purpose of financing essential import requirements, but with the secondary benefit of generating piastres for financing the GVN defense budget and other counter-insurgency needs.

A relatively small portion of the A.I.D. program will continue to finance certain on-going development activities which are essential to strengthen Vietnamese social and economic infrastructure and to maintain a psychology of victory and hope for the future.

Mission Reorganization

The new Mission organization features the Assistant Director for Counter-Insurgency mentioned above who has across-the-board line authority to plan and direct counter-insurgency operations and to employ most of A.I.D.'s resources flexibly as needed. He will have a small headquarters staff in Saigon and a number of provincial field personnel resident in the provinces. In addition, a number of rural police advisors are being provided to work in the provinces; provincial medical teams are being recruited to staff certain key provincial hospitals built with A.I.D. assistance; and a number of personnel are being provided for the village-hamlet radio program which is jointly staffed and financed by A.I.D. and Defense.

New positions directly concerned with counter-insurgency activities, most of whom will work primarily outside of Saigon, total over 100. In addition, a large number of the regular technical staff of USOM assist in various ways to support counter-insurgency activities, often by lengthy field trips. The attached table summarizes the staffing of these new counter-insurgency positions.

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STATUS OF A.I.D. COUNTER-INSURGENCY STAFFING *

As of October 8, 1962

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Now In Vietnam</u>	<u>Now in Training **</u>	<u>Due in VN by 10/31</u>	<u>Due in VN by 11/30</u>
Counter Insurgency Line Organization	38	12	9	7	4
Rural Police Advisors	22	19			
Medical Teams	24	9			15
Village-Hamlet Radio Personnel	<u>32</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>14</u>
TOTAL	116	58	9	7	33

* Excludes regular police advisors, public health personnel (except for provincial hospital teams), 69 International Voluntary Services personnel (most of whom work in provinces), malaria control personnel, plant protection and agricultural credit personnel, etc.

** Already employed and in a special 4-month training course; due in VN in January 1963.

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