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## UNITED STATES OPERATIONS MISSION

Saigon, Vietnam

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

## Public Safety Division

December 7, 1962

## Counter-Insurgency - Resources Control and Rural Internal Security

w/ commentary  
by CTRB  
attached

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TO: Distribution List DATE: 11 December 1962  
FROM: Frank E. Walton, Chief, Public Safety Division, USOM  
SUBJECT: Counter-Insurgency - Resources Control and Rural Internal Security

Forwarded herewith for information and consideration is a paper prepared by Mr. Elmer H. Adkins, of USOM Public Safety Division on the subject of the Resources Control phase of Counter-Insurgency Operations.

We believe that Mr. Adkins has presented a logical approach to the solution of the problem of Resources Control and that his paper merits the most careful attention.

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Distribution "I" + 35-COPROR  
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## THE PROBLEM

The Control of Resources, both human and material, by legal methods, and efficient and adequate Rural Internal Security, are essential measures which must be taken in the war against subversion and guerrilla activities. We have only to look at the recent experience of the nearby Federation of Malaya where use of such Controls and Security Methods were key elements in starving out, tracing, locating and bringing to justice the insurgents and disrupting their communications. The problem, then, is to control the enemy's sources of supply of all things which will be of significant aid to him, to disrupt the current freedom of movement and communication, to obtain the necessary trained temporary manpower to handle the problem for the duration of the emergency, and to finance such operations.

## FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

These Control and Internal Security functions are generally conceded to be properly placed under civil authority. After an area has become sufficiently secure to allow them to operate with a reasonable degree of safety. This safety is, of course, relative since the constant danger of enemy attack and ambush will remain for some time after the effective military operations cease for an immediate area.

The largest suitable civil force in being in the National Police organization, with an authorized manning table of 21,000 individuals, practically all of whom are assigned to other specific duties. The group within the National Police which has been assigned the control function as far as the highways and immediate areas are concerned including the establishment of static and mobile check points is the Combat Police unit has an authorized strength of 3,100,000 (actual strength) who are currently being recruited and trained for the purpose of small scale raids and ambushes as a para-military force the original purpose of the Combat Police. The Director General of the National Police and the Minister of Interior state that there are not any, nor is it likely that there will be funds to pay the large numbers of personnel required for movement and control tasks.

In addition the control of all of the transportation arteries, both land and marine, the Strategic Hamlets are a prime source of resources and a major factor in Viet Cong communications. The Internal Security hamlets now rests with unpaid police volunteers, with no training in police work, and who are headed by an unpaid, untrained, elected Hamlet Council member. It is a fact that operations on a twenty-four hour support function in spot have gates, but without proper internal security, these physical items of protection are of minimal a sound system of control supply investigations patrols and curfews are contemplated

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5 The Director General of the National Police and his staff, officials at the Provincial, and others at the "Working" level understand generally the needs and requirements of the program. The officials at the Ministerial and Presidency level apparently do not. Some of these officials believe that the resettlement and rehabilitation programs are the total answer. There has been a serious lack of coordination and understanding in the various control programs between the officials at the Ministerial level and the American Country Team and Technical Advisors, as well as the technically qualified personnel in GVN. For example, a series of impractical instructions in the Family Census program were issued by the Presidency, all of which had to be rescinded. Several similar situations exist.

6 There is in being a so-called system of static check-points and cargo manifests but investigation has shown that they are improperly placed, inefficiently operated and serve little, if any, use. There is no properly administered curfew.

7 A National Identity Card program is in process, which when completed by February 1963, will furnish positive identification for some 7.5 million persons over 18 years old throughout the nation. A Family Census program, which will identify each family by residence, enumerate his vital resources (food, etc.), record a family group photograph, is scheduled to begin about January 1, 1963. After completion in about nine months, this will serve as another aid for the civil authorities in control enforcement.

8 The Communist guerrillas and agents now move about the country with almost complete freedom, and each village, hamlet, farm and town serves as an easy source of supply for them. Raids for food supplies are common and effective, and vast amounts of food seep out as a result of communist blackmail, terror and assassination. The military efforts to date have not been able to control this situation nor were they designed to do so.

COURSES OF ACTION POSSIBLE

9 1. The present policy of having the populations of the Strategic Hamlets police themselves could be continued, with the hope that such would ultimately be successful, with such help as the currently authorized strength of the National Police could furnish.

10 2. This problem could be turned over to the military for solution by designating some group such as the Civil Guard, the Self Defense Corps, etc., as the agency to operate the control system.

3. GVN might impose a special defense tax for the duration of the emergency, to finance the additional temporary personnel under the National Police.

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11 4. If existing GVN forces could be reduced to a sufficient degree to free an amount of money sufficient to pay the salaries required, this could be a good course of action, particularly from the American standpoint. 11

12 5. The AID, or some other U.S. program, could finance the cost of the personnel, carefully control the numbers and salary ranges, and provide adequate FSD advisory personnel to handle the program as an expansion of the current National Police force. 12

DISCUSSION

13 1. Volunteer Police 13

It is thoroughly unrealistic to expect people to perform full-time jobs without remuneration or training. This is an invitation to graft, and certainly an alert, efficient day-to-day operation cannot be carried out under these circumstances. Such training as these volunteers have had, has little application to the Internal Security job at hand, and such matters as screening consists largely of political indoctrination. Volunteers have an important place in the picture, but should be limited to spot emergency support such as an attack, a riot, or a fire.

14 The Federation of Malaya attempted to use volunteers for the regular Internal Security functions of the Hamlets, but discarded the idea as unsound even though some remuneration was given to the men. They found graft, sleeping on the job, desertion from the post to allow the terrorists to steal weapons and supplies, beyond their control even with substantial numbers of British officer personnel in direct charge. Fines as punishment for these and other disciplinary offenses were legally levied, but these were often uncollectable, did not correct the situation and even led to defection to the side of the Communist terrorists. 14

15 2. Military Control 15

This type of control, except under actual battle conditions, violates military as well as law enforcement fundamentals. It is basic that the bulk of the police, particularly at the Hamlet and Village level, should come from the area of operation. Military control over civilians of long duration usually creates more problems than it resolves, as well as diluting the military forces needed for other things. Our military associates generally agree that after a successful "Clear and Hold" operation, that it is the duty of the civil authorities to take over the policing function.

3. Special Defense Tax

Since financing the operation has been the principal objection of GVN, this alternative was considered. Economic and politic considerations

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aside, from the U.S. standpoint, this solution has considerable merit. Payment of large numbers of Vietnamese para-military and temporary police salaries certainly will create problems in a situation where we have no direct supervisory and administrative control. Since GVN already has a tremendous financial burden which is likely to increase, and because of the obvious political and economic problems, this course of action is not recommended.

4. Reduction of Other Forces

As long as there remains both a severe internal and external threat to GVN, there is little likelihood of any substantial reduction of existing forces. Furthermore, these control forces are needed now, and the delay involved in bringing about such a reduction appears to make such a course of action impractical.

5. Aid Emergency Financing

16 Turning again to Malaya<sup>1</sup>, where the differences between that and the problem in Vietnam are superficial; i. e., size of operation, easy identification of the enemy (Chinese), smaller population (7.4 million vs. 14.5 million) less severe enemy action, etc.; the fundamental problems are identical. 16

17 The initial approach was similar to that used in Vietnam with the resettling of population groups into 510 new villages (Strategic Hamlets) operated by civic action groups under general supervision of the Resettlement Administration. General rehabilitation and improvement of the villagers' lot was a part of the program. Initially volunteer police were tried, too, but the idea was discarded as indicated under item No. 1. 17

18 It was soon realized that resettlement rehabilitation and military operations were not enough, and that it would be necessary to control the guerrilla's capabilities as to supply and communications. Accordingly, what was first called a "Food Denial" program was implemented under the direction of the Resettlement Administration with the Police Force having the responsibility for its enforcement. 18

Facing up to the problem squarely, the British imported some 300 plus of what were called "The Palestine Sergeants", although there were many officers and men from other places included, but all were British with experience in guerrilla warfare. There were some 150 British officers in the regular police force key positions. The initial police strength of 20,000 men, was raised to

<sup>1</sup>Note: Based on an investigation conducted by the writer in Malaya during the period Nov. 17 to 25, 1962, concerning which a detailed report is being prepared.

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30,000 augmented by 41,000<sup>2</sup> Special Constables, or temporary paid police, recruited and trained for the duration of the emergency and supervised largely by the "Palestine Sergeants" aided by the regular British police officers. These 41,000 Special Constables were responsible for, under Police Force directives, Resources Control and Rural Internal Security. This was not an insignificant financing problem, even though Malaya's income was substantial because the Korean War inflated prices for rubber and tin, so it was necessary for the United Kingdom to aid in the underwriting of this and other emergency programs.

The program encompassed such things as National Identity Cards; Tenant Registration (VN - Family Census), static and mobile check points; food and critical supply control, supply control patrols, and investigations; central food storage, and in one critical area Central Cooking was established; New Village Internal Security, including a national night-time curfew in 75% of the country.

There were serious Public Relations problems as the people objected to Resettlement, and after being resettled, objected to the controls exercised. A continuous program, which was leveled at the populace by the usual communications media, was based on advising the people as to the reasons, blaming the terrorists for the need for the controls, the need for the people to help the government, and the promise that the controls would be lifted in each area as the local situation permitted. The latter was done progressively as the emergency was whipped, and can be counted on to be a critical and controversial item here in Vietnam. The success of this feature was indicated by the fact that, even though the people did not like the controls -- a perfectly natural thing -- they became used to them, and at the end of the Emergency many did not want to leave the New Villages and the general protection and convenience they offered.

A contemporary situation involving lack of adequate controls exists in the border country of Thailand abutting on Malaya in the north. The Communists have fled to the Thai area, and are now, some 500 of them, beginning their political and logistical buildup in the same familiar fashion. The Thais are largely ignoring the problem, and since 1960 the increasingly successful operations of the Communists in this area are mounting. Responsible officials, civilian, police and military, uniformly predict that the Thai Communists in the southern border area, will continue to have success unless, among other things, adequate Resource Controls and Rural Internal Security measures are put into effect, which was done in Malaya and should be done in Vietnam.

<sup>2</sup> Note: Source of Statistics: Paper entitled "Lecture on Organization and Function of Royal Federation of Malaya Police Force." They have returned to a normal strength of 20,000.

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The Federation of Malaya won its war and Resources Control and Village Internal Security were necessary and expensive adjuncts of the victory.

RECOMMENDATIONS -- FOR THE DURATION OF THE EMERGENCY

1. It is recommended that the Country Team take a firm position in advising the GVN to establish an adequate program of Resources Control and Rural Internal Security under the jurisdiction of the National Police following in general terms the Malayan pattern sketched above, tailored to meet local conditions as outlined in part by the PSD publication, "The Control of the Movement of Population and Material."<sup>3</sup>
2. It is recommended that immediate appropriate steps be taken to improve the coordination and advisory situation at the Ministerial and the Presidency level. This could include a series of short briefing sessions to explain what we have in mind as far as the operations are concerned. Likewise specific counterparts could be designated at the Ministerial level to develop joint plans, and to obtain the maximum benefit from the technical skills in both the American and GVN groups.
3. Since it appears that from a practical viewpoint, GVN cannot finance such a program, it is recommended that AID emergency funds, to be administered by the Director of USOM, be requested from appropriate Washington sources. The temporary force is an extraordinary measure brought on by World Communism and as such is not one normally faced by a friendly government. It is reasonable that as the principal ally, we should finance this program. Based on 5,600 Strategic Hamlets, in being or under construction, with an average of ten temporary police per hamlet plus an average of 100 temporary police per province for arterial control, with an average monthly salary of 1,000 piasters per month, \$10,000,000 per annum would be required.<sup>4</sup> This would not include hardware equipment or construction. This would provide a total of 60,000 men for Vietnam as compared with 12,000 used in Malaya - for twice the population. It is not proposed that any such large program be instituted simultaneously throughout the country but rather that a system of priority provinces or areas be drawn up and controls be established and withdrawn as required.

<sup>3</sup>Note: A more complete text on the subject for training purposes is being written by PSD and will be published in the near future

<sup>4</sup>Note: These figures were obtained from Mr. Brandum (OPROR/DOC/75/ ADD 5, as of November 1962) and from using the surveys and experience gained in the Phu Yen Province Operation Sea Swallow II.

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4. It is recommended that AID emergency funds be provided for, and administered as above, to cover the required hardware, equipment and construction. We have in mind such things as firearms, uniforms, vehicles, communications equipment, highway and marine checkpoint posts with highway turnouts, patrol boats, etc.

5. An adequate PSD staff of American advisors with suitable backgrounds is recommended for this program alone. A minimum of one man per province is required. These men could be recruited, among other sources, from the ranks of the Military Police officers and NCO's who have recently retired under the 20 year rule and would be resident in the provinces, or as an alternate, TDY personnel in civil clothes assigned to PSD. Such a request seems modest enough when compared to the strength of the forces involved. An adequate support staff at Saigon is also required and recommended.

6. Detailed plans can be developed if the principle is approved.

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