

1. Nonsense. Experience has shown- as in the Phils- that guerrilla are defeated by winning away popular support - and that measures resented by the people help the guerrilla. Proven 1901, 1942 -45, 1946- to date. The only guerrilla supply source which is critical is the will of the people (or, possibly, outside logistic support, although I know of no case where such support has been decisive) Castro's victory in Cuba is an outstanding example -- see Chapelle's report, reprinted in F M Osanka.
2. Not generally conceded that control & internal security are properly placed under police. (Incidentally this would be profitable field for historical research) A good national constabulary (such as old Phil Constab) might well be, but this takes years to build, and is far more a military type organization than a police one, as the word is generally understood to day. Garde Civile originally intended to serve function here, could still perhaps be developed to do so ? with supervisory authority over hamlet militia and SDC, but this would be large new project. Better to leave responsibility for training and supervision to Army, a large part of which should ~~be~~ continue to be devoted to area security and counter-guerrilla activities.
3. In what way is the National Police suitable - if they cannot even bring their "Combat Police" force over one-third authorized strength?
4. These are not hamlet"police volunteers" The fact that the writer seems to confuse police and militia shows his complete

lack of basic understanding of the situation, the problem, or the bases on which an edifice of peace and order are built. Police for purposes other than harassing petty offenders are useful/only when the structure of the state is sound, when rebellion is not thought of - in other words, when loyalty to the state, and respect for its authority have been built through a process of committing the people to fight for their state. Police methods applied to a rebellious people may quell the rebellion, if the force of the state is overwhelming -- otherwise they simply intensify the rebellious attitude and strengthen the rebel forces. Prime example again is Castro's rebellion.

5. If the Director General of the National Police understands the problem he doesn't want his police mixed into it. Who believes that resettlement and ~~rehabilitation~~ is the "total answer"??
6. These ineffective checkpoints are being administered by the National Police, according to para 3. How has utility been assessed and by whom?
7. Only intelligent statement so far.
8. Alarming - in fact - horrible -- if true. Strategic hamlet program total failure. If military efforts not designed to control this system they better be redesigned.
9. Better than getting the police into the act.
10. Should so be done - integrating control of hamlet militia into the military effort - also recommend integrating Nat Police.
11. How about maintaining force level, but transferring more

personnel into CG, making it into a real national constabulary?

12. Such a program would cost on the order of 8-9 million US per annum, rather than the unrealistic figure cited later in the paper.

13. Certainly people cannot be expected to perform full-time jobs on a continuing long term basis and do them effectively without pay or training. On the other hand, given a reasonable amount of training, and called on to serve intermittently and in such a way as not to impair their gaining a livelihood, volunteers are notoriously more effective than paid professionals. The basic idea of hamlet militia, serving perhaps one day a week, with a ~~professional~~ a few fulltime leaders, and a trained advisor or two, is the idea that pays off. Using them only for spot emergency support is almost certain to vitiate their usefulness--by destroying their volunteer spirit which is the key to success.

14. If so, why did they have 250,000 of them? The same faults are consistently found in police, and even soldiers, assigned to similar duties in an environment in which they feel at home.

15. These are, and should be accepted as, actual battle conditions - they are total war -- and the sooner the military realize it the better. By all means, civilian control of civilian functions, but defeating guerrilla infiltration is not civilian -- it is war, and victory in it is achieved only by mobilizing, in spirit at least, the population to fight the enemy.

16. This is the most asinine statement in the whole thing. The only true similarities between the problem in Vietnam and that in Malaya are:

- a. Both are more or less tropical areas, relatively under developed, with much difficult terrain.
- b. In both ~~our~~ Communist guerrillas are, or were, trying to overthrow the de facto government.

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Some of the differences are relatively minor, such as the difference in population (less than 6,00,000 in Malaya proper at the height of the emergency); some are ~~very~~ serious such as the difference, in terms of percentage of population, of the size of the guerrilla - perhaps .5% here, .01% or less there; some are extremely serious, such as the difference in traditions and status of the armed forces and police here and there, and some are absolutely fundamental -- over-riding all others -- in Malaya the political base of the government was outside the country, here it is inside, resting on the very people whom the proposed program will alienate.

17. To the extent that a strategic hamlet resembles a new village it is a failure -- if many do the war is lost

18 To call concentration camps "resettlement and rehabilitation" is ironic- but also deceiving. Better to say that the British decided to make a concentration camp out of the whole area . Even this probably would not have succeeded had they not sought to build a political base among the majority of the population who already disliked intensely the people from whom the guerrilla came - the Chinese.