

Same Wilson  
Late for plane - "hold the plane"

25 Jan 1963 - Same trip to VN - had  
breakfast w/ me  
Stayed w/ Beliaunov

I got a call to go to Palace -

See Diem -

- Sense of desperation on part of Diem -  
Eel -

Wrote a verbal report to McNamara -

- Helen Paul Under attack -

Late 61 early 62 - Eel command w/  
Mongeece -

Left morning met at office to See  
focused in

dealt directly w/ McNamara - Gilpatrick >

Same Left office in mid '63 for \_\_\_\_.

RURAL AFFAIRS

SCHEDULE FOR CONFERENCE

Monday, May 27, 1963

|             |   |           |
|-------------|---|-----------|
| 1430 - 1450 | Opening Remarks   | Mr. Brent |
| 1500 - 1550 | Current Status of Program, Future Plans,<br>Strategic Hamlet Phases |           |
| 1600 - 1625 | Hamlet Establishment - Strategic Hamlet<br>Construction Teams       |           |
| 1625 - 1700 | Relocation  |           |
| 1710 - 1730 | Hamlet Executive Committee Training                                 |           |
| 1730 - 1800 | Hamlet Militia  |           |
| 1810 - 1900 | Generating Hamlet Spirit  |           |

All meetings will be held in the USOM Conference Room unless otherwise indicated.

RURAL AFFAIRS

SCHEDULE FOR CONFERENCE

Tuesday

May 28, 1963

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| 0815 - 0850 | Hamlet Development (General)  |
| 0900 - 0925 | Hamlet School Program   |
| 0925 - 0950 | Hamlet Health Program   |
| 1000 - 1025 | Forestry Program  |
| 1025 - 1050 | Seed Program  |
| 1100 - 1200 | Self-Help and Public Law 480  |
| 1400 - 1730 | Provincial Reports (Emphasis on successful results and practical problems - 8 minutes each) |
| 1830 - 2030 | Cook-Out and Exhibit<br>at Mr. Phillips' house at<br>197 Ngo Dinh Khoi                      |

RURAL AFFAIRS

SCHEDULE FOR CONFERENCE

Wednesday

May 29, 1963

0815 - 0900

Chieu Hoi

0910 - 1000

Supply - Transportation

1010 - 1100

Reporting - Accounting - Administration

1110 - 1230

Summary and Conclusions

1545

Departure for Gia Long Palace Meeting  
at 1600 hours

## MEETING NOTES

*Fi 1 7*  
*Rural Affairs Conference May 27-29, 1963*  
~~BA Staff Meeting~~, May 27, 1963

Mr. Phillips opened the meeting and turned the floor over to Mr. Brent, saying that Mr. Brent will give an explanation of our situation in general regarding our AID program. "Many of you have not had an opportunity to speak to him personally and that is why he would now like to talk to you."

Brent: (in substance) I would like to share some thoughts with all of you.

I am happy to meet with you and welcome you to Saigon. You are the most effective part of our program and I want you to know that we are all behind you just as you are out there pulling for us, too. You all know that there has been a significant new development; that there is a different system under which we will have to operate in the near future. This will affect not only Rural Affairs but the entire Mission. There are a number of causes: the counterinsurgency money is coming to the end of the 10,000,000 piaster purchase which is 100% obligated and is all earmarked for final disposition. There will be no additional purchases of piasters. I am sure that the President would not OK another purchase because of the gold outflow and because we have not put in a big bid for it. Another reason for the new method: Military costs continue to rise every year so that every piaster we can generate has to go to the military to support the ARVN budget. During the 64 - 65 calendar year, we should go for broke in an effort to complete <sup>the</sup> counterinsurgency program. In 1965, operations *should* become more normal and funds become available for economic purposes. Until then they will all go into the military program and there will be nothing left for the others. We want to the top Government level and tried to make an agreement for a joint fund, saying we would put in part of the money if they would put up the rest. We would continue to operate the program on the former basis. They objected and said that to have our people signing off on their

funds would make it seem that Vietnam was a US protectorate. They offered, instead, to put up to whole estimated 2,33 billion piasters for the Rural Affairs program and technical divisions. We received the distinct impression that they would not continue the present funding system even if we put up all the money. It was a hard decision to make and some people got quite emotional about it, but it seemed the only solution. The Christian Science Monitor yesterday said in an article we had lost the major battle in Vietnam. This is foolishness. We got from the GVN not only a <sup>m</sup>commitment to put up the money, but also an agreement that our personnel, Sector Advisors and our own representatives, will be consulted from time to time as projects are planned and implemented. The only difference is that US signature will no longer be required on the vouchers. If this doesn't work, perhaps we can replenish the piastre<sup>fund</sup>, and if so, the old rules will apply.

What we are up against is the biggest challenge this mission has ever had -- what we came out to try to do is to win the people for the government. We started to do all of the things, made a terrific impression in the provinces, but raised questions in the minds of locals whether they were doing it or we were doing it. Our Vietnamese friends have now undertaken to approach a project in principle and funding in principle. They now have their own necks on the block. If they are not able to make a go of this, it will be the end of the Diem regime. We must try to make this system work, extending the greatest possible amount of leadership in the provinces and Saigon; you must seek to really lead the people you are working with. I know you will be able to do it, we are back of you, we will handle your problems at the highest possible level.

This is the biggest example of self-help and will have great political advantages. Best of luck and don't forget to call on us, - we are here to back you up. Mr. Phillips then quoted some passages from the last meeting minutes. "We are now speeding up the government's take-over of what they should have been doing all along."

Brent: "The Government of Vietnam says they will try their best to make it work." Everything will still be reviewed by the MAAG Sector advisor, the province chief and the formula will ~~flow~~<sup>follow</sup> the same pattern. The program will be backed up by VN government funds.

Phillips: We will phase in their assistance now into the provincial agreements and gradually our funds will fade out. Therefore, we must rely on you to tell us of breakdowns so we can see immediately where the problem is. From all concrete indications, the government will follow through with what they say.

Brent: The new system will be harder for the rest of the mission than for you because you already have a method.

(A rather detailed discussion about the new funding procedures followed:)

PH: Perhaps liaison between ourselves and the Interministerial Committee could be improved all the way down the line for better coordination.

Glaser: Many of those Vietnamese who were sent to the US to obtain skills are now in the Army, and they are not doing anything to justify the money we spent training them.

PH: It is very difficult to get officers transferred to other jobs and areas.

HH: As far as staff liaison is concerned: as this transition takes place, we will be encountering more and more adjustment points which will influence the target dates. We need a fast way of breaking bottlenecks, which I feel will

form; ~~and~~ it is a rather ponderous <sup>supply system</sup> situation. We need a liaison type of flexibility to break bottlenecks. If we are going to meet some of our target dates, this has to be done rather quickly.

PH: This is a good idea, but I think we already have this kind of liaison with all levels of the government. If it is not solved at our level - it can be passed up to the ministerial level. Liaison with the VN government is already existing. It is difficult for the VN government to find a central place <sup>to solve these problems</sup> there is no standard approach to each problem.

Brent: We are going to have many problems as time goes on.

PH: Now that the government must do these things themselves, they will learn to keep the ball rolling.

Brent: Standards have been <sup>set</sup> which have to be maintained and they will extend to all aspects of the program.

Brent exit.

PH: (Reviews current status of the program. Discussed funding procedures and how they will work.) Operations in the provinces will continue with basically the same procedures and perhaps we can improve them and make them more flexible. During the transition phase, we need flexibility to meet needs if the program breaks down someplace. What I want you to do is to keep yourself very much informed of how things are working. The province chief is supposed to keep you informed of what he is doing on a day by day basis. There will be an advisory committee. It is up to the province chiefs to make the committees work. To be observers, advisors, and participants will be your role: also to be a friend, trying to understand and help them with their programs and to be there to witness what their difficulties are. The PC must feel he can trust you.



This thing will work. We will have our problems but because we are there and we are working with them together, we will be able to influence change. The government in Saigon told us they are most interested<sup>IN</sup> what we see. The Ambassador saw Mr. Nhu and the President personally this morning. I was told that they greatly appreciate the work our people were doing in the field and if there were any misunderstandings, we should try to be diagnosticians rather than physicians, reporting on the state of health, particularly if the patient does not respond to the treatment. You are obliged on your part to see what is going on in the provinces and to report to us here in Saigon. This new system will separate those who can really do a job here in Asia and those who can not. I have noticed a tendency on the part of some people to use the influence of money -- to shake the bag of money in front of the Province Chief's nose. Instead, use your own ability to influence him and use your own ability as a platform for getting your thoughts across. The negative can be used but the positive is better and now we will see who can use the positive.

I have personally been assured that the people in the government have a high regard for what we are doing and are not upset by the problems we have, and, if we do have problems, let us keep them in the family, bring them back to Saigon and get them resolved. The criticism was not directed toward our operation very much. They want and they know they need the kind of assistance that we can give them

Feel sure that we are wanted here and that the people in the government believe that we have a useful and necessary role to fulfill. There is a feeling that people don't want us here. It is true they are very sensitive, oversensitive, which is part of their colonial heritage. We should be aware of it, recognize

it and must try to overcome it. We have to rely on the higher people in Saigon

to resolve this type of problem. I am confident that this is the genuine feeling of the government and that they want us here. I went over these points with the President in considerable detail this morning; he assured me personally that he wants our assistance, appreciates our assistance, that any problems ~~may~~ could be resolved, and that he has confidence in us. I think this is worth looking at. Some of you had reservations about the inhospitable climate here in Vietnam. This is not only between Vietnamese and Americans, but also among Americans themselves.

(A discussion follows)

DD: The slow down of funds into provinces will discourage the province chiefs.

PH: They need to know the new procedures in very great detail.

DD: If the support is forthcoming, it will be good.

BF: We should be dealing in optimism.

PH: Let us know immediately if it doesn't work. I know that Washington is also happy with our program. Mr. Janow went into great detail about this and told the chiefs of our government about our operation here, example Quang Ngai. This result can be made typical of the rest of the program.

(Discussion about the Delta area)-:they will get most of the remaining money.

There are 87,000,000 piastres remaining of US money. This has been allocated.

As soon as it is spent that will be all. Insofar as possible, we want to put it into the Miscellaneous funds, and use them to back up any places where GVN funding may break down. The GVN has agreed to pick up the tab for the self-help projects.

(Discussion on funding procedures, self-help projects, etc. continues).

PH: (In answer to a query about transfer of funds from one item to another):

We have done this many times. We have modified funding procedures by letter.

(Gives example of how this can be worked out.) We will still be working a joint program. It will still have to be approved by the Trueheart Committee on this side and the IMCSH on the GVN side. PL commodities will be ordered as before.

BF: We will maintain control of logistics. We have 25,000,000 commodities to draw on a year, so as not to take away our capacity as advisors.

PH: We will use these commodities which will help to break some bottlenecks. Let us know what bottlenecks there are. PC's have very little knowledge of what this change is going to be. Many are very fearful.

Break.

(Discussion on Strategic Hamlets. Highest completion rate - Ninh Thuan Province - look down in the Delta and you will find hamlets 5 - 10 - 15% complete and not having fulfilled the concept of what a SH is: a viable SH. The rest of VN is about 65% maximum complete).

PH: (Pointing to various areas on the wall map) We are a long ways of being out of the hamlet construction phase and we have to go both ways at the same time. If the hamlets that are established are not well established, if there is no security, there is no economic development, and no social development. We have to see that there is a connection with both. Enthusiasm of the population has to be justified with well established hamlets - if not, you have nothing to work further with. We must see our work as going ahead together. If the first phase is not done well, the second has no meaning. This is the strategy. A concerted effort is being made in trying to pacify areas, province by province, to limit the Viet Cong

to the mountains and to conduct operations there; at the same time trying to support the Montagnards, so that the Viet Cong loses all popular support in the area. Total assistance in the area of the Viet Cong is very difficult to render. By and large, they are doing it, in some areas with conspicuous success, and making viable hamlets. Zone D, etc., are traditional VC areas. The most effective efforts are directed at Zone D's hamlets while conducting deep penetration into Zone D to make infiltration inoperative. Tay Ninh will take more time. Gia Dinh - Long An are trying to carry out the so-called Delta Plan to pacify those provinces. Would like to declare these provinces white areas, but they are closely linked with other areas and are spotty. Will take time to clear these two provinces to a point which you could declare them semi-white areas. GVN has never had a systematic approach to the Delta. Army moves independently in some areas, provinces left on their own to carry out their program best as ~~they~~ they can, with forces not enough to counter VC activities. ~~Delta~~ Delta is a very confused situation - needs to be restudied, reprogrammed, specific missions assigned. Progress has been spotty. We can anticipate problems in the Delta for a long time since vast areas of it have been under VC control for a long time. There is an opportunity to do something <sup>as there are</sup> ~~so you have~~ vacuums which have to be filled. The resources are limited and it is going to take time. We can expect this will be slow. There is faster progress to the North of Saigon and much faster on the coast which is due to our organized effort. I expect much progress there. This is the general situation, countrywide. We are making tremendous progress in the center. When we get that kind of resistance, we know we are really winning. The hamlet establishment phase will still take another year or not longer. We need to focus our attention on this phase. If we do the establishment phase well and real security is established, we have something solid. Trying

afterwards to develop <sup>6</sup> something with an unstable basic program will not succeed... this is our main opportunity to win the support of the population in a positive way and not a negative way. People inside the hamlet have to support the hamlet. Look at the hamlet program in this fashion and make it work. This afternoon, we will have a discussion of the entire phase.... to see what we have been doing, what we can do to improve this phase. We must do the first phase well or we won't have another phase. (Discussion on the development phase, etc., follows).

PH: We have to face many problems, a lack of experience and a feeling that we have to make certain commitments. Most province chiefs do not understand the hamlet "state of mind." They concentrate on numbers and not on quality of hamlets. I would like to hear from you what ideas you feel have been working in your province to improve action and might be applied to other provinces and what the problems have been also.

#### SH Construction Teams

*Repeat for discussion*  
Training, equipping, and the effectiveness of their operations . (Rather inconclusive *comment* replies followed.) Maynard: Believes we have gone as far as we should on the teams.

*(Comment on)*  
PH: ... ~~tells~~ what should be done in organizing hamlet militia -- if this is not being done, we should stick our noses into this to see just what they are doing. (Further discussion on construction teams.

RD commented that he saw a team who were measuring and determining where houses were to be relocated and then they moved on, <sup>he</sup> ~~and~~ wondered why they don't stay until they finished the job. He thought that this was a political patronage job which the heads of province would like to pass out, <sup>to the province</sup> Ruoff and Glaser thought that the

Minister of Civic Action did not do enough on ~~that~~. The Provinces were told to recruit from their ranks. Every time a new hamlet is constructed, they stand around and do nothing. Proper use of cadres is a valuable asset in the SH construction- rather than only to impress people from the press on impromptu deals.

PH: You are not going to get a highly effective person with the salary they are getting. Part of the problem is that they haven't split these teams up into small groups - they are simply defeating themselves. They should stay in a hamlet to complete the job before they go to another hamlet.

(There were several recommendations for improving this situation)

Cleveland: Vinh Binh PC has developed, among other things, a special group which is a limited strike force. CA turns over captured VC to the security office. Other functions of the CA office are intelligence work, propaganda, psywar, operations and placement of agents into the VC military and civil organization. They also control a special group of 12 men, paid 2,200 monthly, 190 groups of propaganda teams consisting of three people who are unpaid and do mostly propaganda work. Another thing the CA cadres do is penetration. Vinh Binh has over 800 CA employees of which only about 75 are on a regular payroll.

PH: CA cadres are leading the SH construction teams. Perhaps people should stay long enough in one hamlet to finish their job.

DD: In Kontum, Pleiku, they finished training the SH construction teams and they have been building hamlets for quite some time and were ~~not~~ using CA cadres.

PH: Perhaps paying some teams more than others and changing the pay scale (Kien Hoa) can get more qualified members to lead the teams and get more output of work.

O'D: They start to do the job, then they have to wait for other equipment and things, so they move on.

PH: What are some of the relationships between district and province chiefs -- would CA people accept orders unless <sup>they came</sup> ~~it would come~~ from their Province Chief?

There seems to be a double chain of command. They should detach these teams out there under the district chief. Most provinces have such an operation running.

~~The PC will send~~ -- someone out checking to see if he is doing a good job.

BF: Why should the construction teams stay in the hamlets?

PH: It takes 3 -4 weeks to fulfill all tasks which they are supposed to carry out.

BF tells about the Chinese Communists who took kids during school vacation, put them thru cadres training course, took all college students, gave them 3 months training, put them in uniform and set up the <sup>whole</sup> Communist government; they did an incredible job.

Ruoff: I brought this up to my PC and asked him what about the students. He said something to the effect that his hands are tied and that Saigon will not permit him to use students that way. I asked him if we can't use students during vacation. He said that Saigon frowns on it. I don't know if this is true.

Warne: <sup>asked</sup> ~~asked~~ for teachers to use and they went to the government to get assistance on this.

F: This does not happen in all provinces; the teams stay and do what they should do

Glaser: ~~said they did~~ use the teachers. They were used during the summer and got some pay, and the teachers were glad to do it.

PH: Expose the problem here - any of you have explicit ideas here, write me and we will make some proposals here for additional advice to improve the operation of the team. Circulate these ideas.

### Relocation

PH: Some of our province representatives have been able to get across a systematic approach to these problems. I would like to get some of these experiences.

There have been some good and some horrible examples.

J'O: At Long An, for instance. The population pattern is very scattered - great many people are dispersed. PC is working under pressure from Saigon. He decided <sup>to</sup> ~~to make~~ a massive relocation. He had his district chief make a survey as to which areas are necessary to relocate. He made maps, placed them on an overlay, etc. Listed the advantages of the SH. I talked to some people who have been relocated and got various answers. Some said OK simply because the DC told ~~me~~ <sup>them</sup> to. Others, like schoolteachers, told me exactly what they had to do. They were assigned to help people move. Soldiers went out to help the people move. They were told one or two days in advance that they would be moved. Trucks drove them to the new home site. They asked for voluntary contributions in ~~the~~ trucks. We purchased the gasoline. We spend some 100,000VN\$ on gas. During March - April 1963 7,000 families were moved. They were given options as to where they wanted to be moved. One major problem was that in some cases, the ~~sector~~ <sup>sector</sup> ~~advisors~~ <sup>advisors</sup> and I thought these people were moved unnecessarily. He would have left them ~~there~~ <sup>where they were</sup>. A lot of people were upset. District and village lines were arbitrarily changed which caused a bit of a problem because the people in one village quite close to a SH wanted to stay in their own village. They had to move 200 ~~km~~ <sup>km</sup>. Another problem was lack of fresh water. Many people had to buy their water. Another problem ~~was~~ in one district -- people approached me and said they wanted to go back to work. I talked to many families and for most of them it was all right, they realized there was a war on. but others complained. USOM representatives not having enough time in the province is a drawback of the program. We should have enough time.



They were not given any assistance in money, we gave them Bulgur wheat, 2 kg per family. The original budget provided for only 1,000 families - PC wrote a letter to the IMCSH to get more money.

RD: ~~Was~~ <sup>P</sup> doing the same thing in Kien Phuong on commodities. This got way out of hand. We set up ~~criteria as point~~<sup>a</sup> for the distribution of money instead of food. There were tremendous transportation problems. It was easier sending in money and it worked out well. Money criteria: distance to be moved, type of families, illness, etc. to be determined by the village chief. He gets a receipt for every piastre spent. Each hamlet which was to be relocated had a map and every house is placed on that map with either number or name as on the list. He just checked it off as it went along. This was his individual effort.

Question: How did you determine how much money would be needed? JO'D: This we left up to the district chief. He makes the decision.

Nighswonder: We gave a flat amount to every family.

PH: This throws some light on the problem of the various personalities. If you have a very experienced administrator, he is able to carry out a decentralized method of operation. He can also juggle his province budget. He is skillful enough so he can do this. This points the finger in the right direction. Authority should be further decentralized at the province level as it should from here in Saigon. (More discussion on relocation follows.) GM asks which is better, to give relocated people commodities or money? He believed that with the exception of the Montagnards, giving money is better than giving commodities.

Hudson: How far can you move a family and still leave them able to work their rice fields, etc.?

PH: 2 or 3 km maximum.

Glaser: We will achieve greater effectiveness in relocation and in winning people for it if we have the assistance ready before people arrive. This means giving

them needed commodities, rice, etc., as they arrive. The shortcoming in the past was that the material wasn't there when they needed it.

Ruoff: Location of relocation sites is also very important. Some of the new locations still don't have water.

PH: A study should be made of what is available and thoroughly thought out in advance. I would like you to prepare and draft some planning guidance for the province chiefs to fill in some more details. I think a use(ful) idea would be that before any relocation takes place, the PC should have an airplane for at least a day to fly the entire area to make sure the relocation makes sense. We can get airplanes to make available to the PC. As I see it, the major problem would be in the Delta.

Harwood: I wonder if we go too far on the matter of compulsion -- I would say let the PC's work out their problems. Sooner or later they have to straighten out the titles and look at the economic possibility of an area.

PH: Thorough planning is important before moves are made to make sure proper facilities are there. The population should move voluntarily rather than being forced to move.

Break.

#### Hamlet Militia

PH: Here I want to discuss with you how we might generate the proper spirit and learn what experiences you have had with the hamlet militia. My feeling is that it needs more development than it has received in the past. Effective hamlet militia is better security than any physical devices. The program has been too slow in getting started. Many hamlets are not as secure as they should be.

(Comment (by X): Special Forces have been responsible for training hamlet militia. They trained the militia of about 56 hamlets, and armed them. Each hamlet had originally no less than 25 militia. This has been working fine. Very recently a letter came from Saigon which ordered that Special Forces people should train and arm no more than a maximum of 15 people in each hamlet. PC is now unhappy because we want the training of the maximum number to continue.

PH: (commenting further on Special Forces training): MAAG is going to take back weapons and issue MAP supplies. This whole thing is being discussed right now. I believe this may cause serious difficulties.

Harvey: One Special Forces team seems to be confused between MAAG and Special Forces. Special Forces had orders that they would train hamlet militia assigned to them by the Province Chief. Then, this order was changed again and SDC training centers are now doing the training.

PH: There are two approaches to this -- in some areas the SF are doing it as part of their overall training job and are responsible first for the CIDG.

(A discussion follows)

It was agreed, in theory, that Special Forces would train hamlet militia and when they run into problems, the representatives are to let us know so we can try to resolve them. Other problems exist in most areas where there are no SF teams available. There are problems of site, cadre, training course, etc.

PH: Those people dealing with that problem should tell us how the training was done.

RDavidson explains from his province, Kien Phoung. The PC insists 30 days training is minimal, whereas in other provinces, 15 days is apparently enough. Another

problem concerning the type of training - one is done at province level the other at district level. In one province a full course is needed, in another only minimum training apparently suffices. A more immediate problem is the availability of MAP supplies and per diem. Do we pay for the training of individuals or is payment made when arms are issued? One Chief of Province wants to have one weapon for every 8 men to break up the time that one individual has to put in guarding the hamlet. I am certain we can't afford to finance such an operation and another problem is, how do we pay?

JO'D: There are two training situations. During the first week they have classroom training, the 2d week is practical work in the hamlet. My province has a defense system where the hamlet militia share in hamlet teams. The ones who have been selected for training and have been trained, work with others to show them how to do it. The outstanding ones are sent to Saigon to show them that they ~~might~~ have might on their side and that there is a future in this. More and more VC attempted attacks have been repulsed by the hamlet militia.

PH: John's province is the most effective province in Vietnam. His province chief set up a number of model pig pens, put up windmills, etc., so that the ~~people~~ people will see that and take the idea back to their hamlets. How about the training center in Quang Ngai?

Fistick: There is a training center in Quang Ngai.

Maynard: The esprit of the people made it successful.

(A general discussion on hamlet militia training continues)

Study Problem

PH: You have the official doctrine of the government: these people must operate like the VC guerrillas. This is true - you can not defend hamlets unless you do like the guerrillas do. Mr. Nhu talks about how the country must become self-sufficient in every way and the only solution is total resistance by the civil population. However, to get the population to be determined anti-communist takes a lot of effort and social and economic revolution. The President and Mr. Nhu are dissatisfied with the rate of speed of this change, they want it faster. Pay first the SDC and then pay hamlet militia.

(Again general discussion on hamlet militia)

PH: One thing I am working on - the sector advisors will be directed to get into this act to help out with some of these practical problems. It is up to the Sector advisor's discretion to see that the weapons are properly distributed. A lot more pressure will be put on these people to work on this aspect, more than they have in the past and we hope this will result in some improvement. I expect to see quite a change in the MAC/V staff - we are getting good officers there - quite a change in how the entire military structure will look at the program. Warne suggested that they could make their own weapons. Glaser talked about guard posts, etc. There has not been that much push from top side of the government. They understand more now than they have before. There is also push from MAAG side - the advice goes down to the field much faster. (Again a discussion follows).

PH: I am pushing here in Saigon to get a clear definition on this problem and I am interested in <sup>as</sup> keeping <sup>a</sup> our finger on this. Also, this is a reservoir for improving personal attitudes - some of our ideas, ~~in~~ calculations, etc., stimulates them.

Meeting - May 28

This meeting consisted mainly of technical conversation about well drilling, self-help, etc. Dick Evans thought that the most effective program is that of Self-Help - to have them develop something on their own is most useful.

BF: Is it true that a lot of progress is being made? (Self-Help) There were various opinions. Earl Rhine was asked if he could get tractors, he said, no, they were too expensive, but what about plows? Now they are training buffaloes to pull plows. The Montagnards never used livestock except to eat or sacrifice. Now we are teaching them to harness and train their animals. Warne commented upon his school program and what he is doing to improve it. John O'D talks about his program. Many PC's suit their own concept of what they need - pigs, fish, etc. Doughty discussed various methods of accountability when, e.g., 20,000 pigs are assigned to a hamlet.

BF: To prevent diversion of funds, give the hamlet committee the money and then tell everybody they have the money. How many projects are actually being developed? Various answers from the representatives. Various patterns are evolving in the Self-Help projects. Some favorable, other unfavorable.

PL 480 discussion follows.

May 29

Meeting called to order by Fraleigh.

Bohannon: Several topics to take up with you. First concerns the use of check points and the control of the movement of personnel and materiel.

This is a topic on which there has been quite a bit of controversy and on which I would like to make it quite clear the attitude of Rural Affairs as I understand it.

Our position is that this war can only be won by securing for the <sup>Government</sup> ~~the~~ the support of the people. This cannot be done if the people are angered by undue harassment in an effort to keep materiel from going to the VC. In other words the only effective way of stopping this is by the people policing themselves. A few excellently run mobile check points on main arteries can be useful. They should be so spaced and timed that in a trip from here to Dalat one might hit one such checkpoint every three to five days. I cannot overemphasize the importance of good discipline, careful location (so the traveler can be sure well in advance that he is approaching a legitimate checkpoint <sup>but</sup> ~~and~~ can not duck off the road to evade it.), <sup>sc</sup> ~~sur~~teous treatment and <sup>finally</sup> ~~finally~~ relative infrequency.

■

Mr. Glaser last night mentioned a mimeograph machine captured from a VC unit in the field 3 days after it was sold in Saigon. This and similar incidents are used to justify the imposition of <sup>rigid</sup> ~~rigid~~ checkpoint systems. The placeto stop things like this is enroute from legal to illegal hands i. e., during the <sup>Government</sup> ~~break~~ from the end of commercial transportation out to the VC unit in the field. If <sup>Government</sup> ~~at~~ forces are conducting <sup>proper</sup> ~~adequate~~ control operations this material will be intercepted at that <sup>stage</sup> ~~point~~.

Personally I would much rather see the VC receive all they can get from Saigon than to have traffic tied up, travelers harassed, and costs of all commodities in provinces raised by a proliferation of checkpoints at each of which the driver has to pay an informal toll.

Interjection by Melvin(?): Between here and Dalat it is 20 piasters per truck at each checkpoint.

For your <sup>info</sup> ~~information~~, there does seem to me the need, which I had expected to become acute before now for an effective manifesting system supported by a very efficient communications network to prevent the hi-jacking or diversion of entire truckloads of food or supplies. As the SH Program becomes more effective, ~~the~~ less the VC decide to call off the war, the need for some such system will probably become apparent.

There was some mention yesterday about the ECATS. These are experimental Army teams of which we now have 7 in the country, two control teams and 5 field teams. Each field team which consists of one officer and 6 NCO's on 6 months TDY, is capable of a fairly wide range of construction or maintenance jobs designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of military/civic action. Although these teams are now fairly well committed, at least one of them may be sprung loose in two or three weeks, for some pet project which some of you may have.

Many of you are probably aware of the work being done by these ~~STAT~~ (Seabee Technical Assistance Team) which has been doing such excellent work down in the <sup>TRU</sup> ~~Tien~~ <sup>TON</sup> district. These teams, consisting normally of one officer and 12 ~~SA~~ and very well ~~equipped~~ supplied with earth moving and repair equipment, are capable of doing a wide-range number of jobs. They claim they work 12 or 13 hours a day 7 days a week, and can keep as many as <sup>300</sup> ~~three people~~ semi-skilled Vietnamese busy. At least two such teams are ready to come now, if the money for their per diem,



fuel, etc., can be made available.

Fraleigh: These teams could be extremely useful on a wide range of jobs from airport construction to the overhaul of machinery already in country but unserviceable. If you have a project that is big enough to be worth your while write it up, we'll see what we can do about the funding.

One thing which I feel <sup>that</sup> would be very useful on is on the repair of Public Works equipment. I have seen a lot of this around which should be working but isn't.

(Considerable discussion on how much equipment is out of service and why. Evans cites the mobile team of the <sup>Dept</sup> ~~dept~~ of Agr which go around repairing equipment on request. Burns springs to the defense of the PW Dept saying that they do a heroic job considering the lack of spare parts. <sup>Sense</sup> ~~Consensus~~ of discussion is that spare ~~of~~ parts are certainly often not where they are needed, but maybe in-country or could be produced if organization were adequate. Conclusion is that both the ~~STAT~~ STAT and the ECATS can do a lot and that those who feel they have suitable projects for them should write them up informally and get them into Saigon. )

~~ECATS are here and at work. Seabees not here yet but ready to come.~~

PH: generally the ECAT teams will work with the province people and get some of the ARVN to go with them. Have not seen problems. BF talks about the need for budgeting and paying the ECAT 22,500,000 - also hopes for spare parts and equipment. Don't have such equipment. But are good at scrounging equipment. Much of the equipment is very old. A discussion on needs of equipment follows by various reps. Public Works could do much more to get the equipment in shape. We will suggest it to PW. Has the potential to do it.

DE: Agriculture Dept. If there is a need for specific ~~xxx~~ spot they have mobile shops. BF: Once this equipment is repaired <sup>if</sup> is not being maintained and kept in condition. [Various opinions follow - good and bad. Spare parts missing and old equipment and looks bad.

Conclusion: <sup>N</sup> lot these teams can do - both with equipment and the actual construction.

Bohannon ~~made~~ <sup>concerning</sup> talks on Chieu Hoi: Report as of 21 May 5,109 <sup>returned</sup> of whom 1500 are Cambodian refugees. Various provinces did not even send in reports. The evaluation - <sup>the program</sup> ~~it~~ is paying <sup>off</sup> - but it is important to be kept informed. This can be a very important asset <sup>in</sup> winning the war ~~and~~ if we can once get it across to the people who are supporting the VC and contributing to the VC -- we can see ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> Their influence fade away. 2/3 support VC gets on the basis of blood or family relationship, simply to support the poor devils out there fearing to <sup>come back.</sup> ~~be alive.~~

Get it across to the people that Cousin Willy does not have to be out there but can get back to work -- he is only causing his family trouble, <sup>and</sup> ~~the~~ The whole picture of the war ~~is~~ will change. Limited informaton I am getting is that a good start is being made to get people to come in. If you all will take an interest in this and will try to sell the program in your province, try to keep

<sup>we will try to make it go here</sup>  
 us informed, <sup>all us</sup> ~~give~~ what you need out in the province, <sup>in</sup> ~~it will go~~ selling, <sup>but</sup>  
<sup>I will give you the</sup>  
~~it will be a very large and important factor here.-----~~ <sup>which show</sup> ~~2~~ <sup>There are</sup> ~~explain how the~~  
 hand outs here this morning, <sup>how the CH program should be working.</sup> 1 30  
 different organizations in the province. I don't think it is <sup>too</sup> necessary to have  
 a uniform organization, <sup>what is</sup> ~~etc.~~ Important is to have an organization in your  
 province that works. Get the words out to the people to <sup>get</sup> their various  
 relatives in to surrender. See that they get fed, ~~treated~~ <sup>get</sup> fairly well, screened,  
 as much detail as the situation warrants, <sup>give them</sup> some sort of indoctrination, preferably  
 a week's short course. <sup>Separate</sup> <sup>who</sup> those that can be returned to their hamlets or  
 villages, <sup>and</sup> <sup>who</sup> those that should not <sup>be</sup> sent to Saigon reception center. <sup>This is not yet in operation, but</sup> If word were  
<sup>was</sup> sent to the C. H. committee that there is a reasonable number <sup>of volunteers</sup> ~~there~~  
<sup>to be sent to there</sup> ~~to be returned,~~ they would be prepared to receive them in about two weeks.  
<sup>In the province committee, no further should not be</sup>  
 Not kept over a month unless there is justification from Saigon. I want to know.  
 You have a job to do. <sup>We have been</sup> -- Pushing this program almost 9 years, <sup>we</sup> finally got it  
<sup>and the</sup> started, <sup>are</sup> top echelons in favor of it. ~~if~~ You have a selling job to do on this -  
<sup>and</sup> let me know what is going on.

A discussion follows

<sup>in the</sup> Elaborate training program: <sup>it is</sup> difficult to find any two who have the same  
<sup>Question:</sup> opinion. <sup>not to</sup> Has the word gone out - <sup>the</sup> ~~don't~~ send in to Saigon center, <sup>anyone</sup> except big  
<sup>what is advanced as to</sup> fish? Various ideas <sup>on how</sup> what they are going to do with the <sup>reception</sup> center. <sup>It</sup> will be <sup>the</sup>  
 central collection points of those that can not be returned to their hamlets.

<sup>There is</sup> ~~Nothing~~ Nothing too rigid on this program. A discussion follows.

Bohannon explains the paying methods (get this straight from him.) Send it,  
 in, send me an information copy. If you have already sent in vouchers to USOM  
 on this money... Discussion about paying methods follows.

PH If this is going to be problem, we might just <sup>write</sup> ~~write~~ it off as <sup>asked</sup> Pvc rehabilitation.

Tom Luche comments that this might cause difficulties. <sup>↑</sup> further discussion follows.

Inclined to let that <sup>money</sup> go, unless they feel it is going to put them in dutch.

Continued reimbursement. Bo would like to make a try on 1 or 2 cases and see how

it works. BO: Qui Chay, <sup>change</sup> Qui Vi - see memo 22 April. Reads notes from

memo. Gives a talk on various interpretations, and how to <sup>work</sup> this out with

various province chiefs. Question: We have no money in our Pvc <sup>to do</sup> on this: If

there is no money there - get it paid from misc. funds, and ~~jell in Saigon~~. Don't

send your vouchers in on this. Some ~~one~~ have no contact with ARVN on this.

BO, discussed the letter that should have gone out to the Pvc C. <sup>BF</sup> APO system

will be used to get the mail out. Everything will be mailed out from now on.

You have to check your files here, too. Glaser asks question on Chieu Hoi Program.

How many weapons are <sup>being</sup> given. BO: You should seek to encourage them to bring their

arms in. If y u could deal out some money, reward ~~de~~ system. Can't put much

emphasis on bringing in names at this stage of the game. Evidence of good

faith - exchange of ideas on the initial surrender - interrogation or not -

you know techniques the Chinese communists used. Self criticism - any

man can be persuaded to write. If you need help in interrogation techniques, we

might be able to help. Kitty Hay: What about women Qui Vi? No conclusive answer

given. More discussion on C H program, Ron Davidson made <sup>comments</sup> of

plain paper wraps so that this wont know anything about the program. <sup>?</sup> PH winds it

up. He is not satisfied with our progress of this program up to now. When you

see something working in your <sup>province</sup> ~~prv~~ let us know and we will disseminate somthing

<sup>and</sup> ~~worth~~while, it would be beneficial to all of you.

A demonstration follows on planting sweet potatoes.

Break

Supply presentation

As far as transportation is concerned, Maynard has received 2 - 3% more, second is Perry, 3<sup>rd</sup> Harwood, Melvin least of all.

Delta have to police barges owner - must make profit or they do not accept cargo. Bid competition. Starts out with escort problem. Various other problems develop. (1) Does not want it (2) takes time to unload.

Barge sits and no one to unload there. Goes into details on this.

Find out what the handling job is.

BF: People are aware that this is a problem? Answer: yes - some discussion on that. Difficult getting barge men paid. Once barge arrives, can it be paid for further shipment? Crews not owners - difficult to make local decision.

Truks: The from Saigon as far North as perhaps Natrangh, Dalat to Zone D is most difficult due primarily to the bureaucracy of the GVN. Again bid basis, lowest receives the award-- did not know capabilities of that Company. Ended up with a man that <sup>was</sup> not only 10 trucks. Price is too low, Also had authorization to subcontract to other truckers. Tried to get practical approach. This presented by various letters but did not go any further. Ask that they throw old contracts out and make new contracts that would serve these areas. Net result has been that Melvin and Harwood have received very poor transportation service. Even attempts for escorts have been very poor. Net result on trucks pretty dismal. Mr. Doggett totake up as a subject of disucssi n with Mr. Trinh again. Why Mr. Maynard gets more tonnage. From Bangkok & LST moving some cargo N 200 - 1,000 tons and all of which means that we have been able to move to Danang more materials. Out of Danang also <sup>now</sup> real cars and trucks. Lucrative to work within existing contracts and they are moving quite a bit of stuff. Rail cards in conflict with ARVN needs which has priority. Danang moving by coastal vessels is the best way. But this has been clipped b Mr. Tinh. Now wants new contract. DoD has written a new contract 3 pi now 2 pi. Net result is we can not move out of Danang. Airlift - both good and bad.

Does anyone have any use for 200 pack saddles?

Fistick: How much PL 480 commodities can we expect? HH: transportation can only move just so much a month. Too localized business. To drop tonnage to Danang we run up against what kind and what ~~timex~~ type has the highest priority. High demand for cement, food, but the pipeline is only so bid and only so much can go through each month. Mr. Maynard has to make decision just how much he must have. BF: feels we have made a good breakthrough in Danang. We have moved fertilizer and cement. ARVN in competition with us as to the movement of various commodities. Drivers, etc. is the responsibility of the PV Chiefs. Gas comes out of your misc funds. IVS still have to pay tax. Whitfield to see us on the truck situation. HH: we are out of vegetable oil - 10 lbs cans, they are now 5 lbs cans, later 3 lbs can of shortening.

Cement: I can not say there is enough cement to go around. Present stock of cement satisfy pig, fire, school, etc - leaves about 70 tons per pvc for self-help projects. RP you can write off several provinces who are not able to use cement. BF: cement can be purchased.

HH: fertilizer \$1,800,000 - 3d purchase to be delivered first half of October, second half, first of January - Oct push us to get it out, January will be able to be moved OK. 3 chemicals contained in a blended sack. Not too optimistic about the October situation.

BF Would like to get together to take up fertilizer Friday. HH: Past experience 50% Danang, 50% Saigon - now 45 % Danang, 55% Saigon to give a 10% holding in Saigon for use other places. Approximately 16,000 tons. BF: further discussion on this.

HH: Roofing - 50,000 sheets of aluminum roofing came in last week. 26" x 96" 19,000 corrugated. BF: send down your request we will review it and then you can tell the province chief. HH 2d purchase on galvanized sheeting from Korea and 25,000 sheets should be coming in. Cleveland asks if vessels can go to the Delta area? Kantho - limited warehousing in the area, no possibility of easy transportation facilities out to the areas/ May be you can come up with some ideas? Quonset hut - transshipment point.

Nighwonger: Oftentimes bulgar arrives at ports and no one knows where it is to be picked up. McNerney asks for specific on that.

B Warne talks about tool kits. HH tells him tool kits are here and have been for 30 days. Has been limited in warehouse and personnel facilities.

McNerney in addition of US tools we have french tools. These are tools people are used to work with and will be very popular.

Accounting: Report form discussed. Our report form is not good and want to change the format on reporting of funds. McE: Need the amount of cash on hand is not always a true indication of the status of funds. We should know what obligations you have against the funds you have on hand. What has been spent to liquidate. When you make request for release we can look at the status and obligation against ~~cash~~ cash on hand and need money. What we need to know short form incorporating fund have been released, have been obligated, vouchers already supported. Vouchers submitted deducted from the fund release. Paid vouchers you have on hand. Paid vouchers, deducted from the total obligation gives you the balance. We need to know the cash on hand as compared as to the actual obligation. Does not want to hold up funding. Unpaid obligation and cash on hand. Form will be remodeled regular size form rather than legal.

Maynard addresses everyone on salvaged equipment. H. has not been receiving receipts for salvage equipment. We need to have a record of all salvage equipment so have him sign the delivery form.

RP: List of people to see Nhu this afternoon. Stated when I saw him lately and would like to have the opportunity to see you and what some of the problems are in carrying out your projects and how he could help. I told him we will hold this meeting and we can leave at 4:00. Hope it will be a worthwhile ~~experience~~ exchange. Also marks a step forward in US/VN relationships.

A discussion on the revision of the reporting forms ended the meeting.

RP: If it come from his (VN) fine, but don't ask him to fill out the forms. It is better to take about these personal relationship and talk about it.

"State of Mind - Hamlet Spirit"