

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

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SUBJECT: Emergency Planning

1. The Problem: To make best timely use of U.S. resources, especially personnel with close intimacy with key Vietnamese, in the event of a coup attempt.
2. Assumptions:
 - (a) Ambassador will be responsible for policy.
 - (b) Adequate plans for staffing, securing, principal U.S. agencies already exist, and should be implemented to extent possible.
 - (c) Ready access to following installations probably will be denied:
 - (1) Embassy
 - (2) MAC/V
 - (3) JGS
 - (4) USMC
 - (5) Cliff-house
 - (d) Following installations may or may not be accessible:
 - (1) USCM
 - (2) MAAG
 - (e) Telephone service questionable, travel probably possible, but only selected individuals able enter downtown (Palace) area. Cong Ly probably blocked. *Radio jamming?*
 - (f) Radio-jamming. V.C. will seek to exploit confusion by sabotage, incitement of mob violence, probable attacks on Americans.

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(g) Residences of known (old-time), possibly other, key Americans, likely to be (either or both) 1) Swamped by refugees, sympathy-seekers, spies; 2) Interdicted by GVN or coup forces

3. Facts bearing on the Problem:

(a) Adequate specific guidance from Washington as to recognition, acceptance, and extent of support to coup regime will probably not be available. General guidance can be assumed to be to the effect that any apparently strong, reasonably respectable (excluding Nhu's) regime will be provisionally accepted and assisted -- after the fact.

(b) Coordinated action ~~now~~ will be essential if the Americans are not to lose more face, both here and abroad. We must secure a position of influence with the group taking power, without compromising ourselves either for or against it.

(c) No coordinating machinery adequate to meet the needs of such a situation is now in existence.

4. Discussion:

(a) This will be a fast-moving situation, confused by an incredible number of rumors, and likely to be seriously affected by personal prejudices.

(b) Unquestionably a sudden, unexpected, action designed to change the government will be attempted. It may well be tipped off by troop movements, but specific advance information to U.S. sources is unlikely.

(c) Once the issue is joined, requests for U.S. support assistance will come from all sides. Guidance in answering these requests must be provided.

5. Conclusions:

(a) An ad hoc Operations Coordinating Group should be established immediately.

(b) A command post (other than those listed in 2(c) above) should be immediately selected, and commo facilities provided.

6. Recommendations:

(a) OCG be established immediately, to include:

Chairman	General Richard Stilwell
MAC/V	Colonel Black
MAAG	Colonel Jacobson
Embassy	M. L. Manfull (?)
OSA	D. Smith
USOM	R. C. Phillips
USIS	J. Meeklin (?)

(b) OCG should be directed, in event of a serious coup, to commence operations, directing and coordinating all U.S. actions, under general guidance from Amb. and chiefs of other U.S. agencies.

(c) All U.S. elements should be given firm directions to coordinate all in-country actions with OCG upon receipt of pre-arranged code word.

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(d) OCG planning to commence immediately.

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