



# *Vietnam's*



## CHIỀU-HỘI<sup>LAU</sup>

# POLICY



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**VIETNAM'S CHIEU-HOI  
POLICY**

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
<i>I.— Introduction</i>	5
<i>II.— The Chiêu-Hồi offer and What It Means</i>	7
<i>III.— Organization of The Chiêu-Hồi Program</i>	11
<i>IV.— Quy-Chanh Processing</i>	15
<i>V.— Conclusion</i>	22
<i>VI.— Appendix</i>	
<i>1— Number of Returnees</i>	25
<i>2— Training courses For Chiêu-Hồi Program</i>	29

## I.— INTRODUCTION

The Chieu-Hoi Program is the program of the Republic of Vietnam, enunciated by President Ngo-Dinh-Diem which offers to those who have been misled, into resistance against the national democratic government, an opportunity to return to their proper allegiance. The best name for it is the Vietnamese term «Chieu-Hoi», which is sometimes translated figuratively into English as the «Open Arms» Program.

The Chieu-Hoi Program is not a national amnesty for those in rebellion against the government ; neither is it a campaign to secure defections from the enemy forces. The Government of Vietnam does not offer a blanket forgiveness for past offenses to any and all who may have placed themselves outside the law. Such an offer would not be consonant with the moral principles of the government and of the Vietnamese people. A man who has committed a cold — dlooded murder, a rape, or a robbery is a criminal who should and must be punished appropriately.

As it is not an amnesty program, neither is it a program to induce individuals to betray a cause in which they believe. It is not, in other words, a *campaign to procure defections from the Viet Cong*. Rather it is an offer addressed to those who realize that they have been duped, have been misled, and who now wish to return to their proper allegiance. There is another term which has frequently been applied in countries under French influence to per-

sons or groups who changed their allegiance. They are often called « ralliés ». This term is not used, because to Vietnamese it has a connotation almost as unpleasant as defector. Too often those who have « rallied » have done so out of motives of personal gain, have been casualties of a war of « silver bullets » as the Chinese call it. The Government of Vietnam does not want people to return to it or to join it from hope of reward, forgiveness for past crimes. The government does invite the return of those who realize that they have been misled and now wish to return to a patriotic course of their country.

Those who return under the Chieu-Hoi program are called « Quy-Chanh », a term best translated into English as « returnee ». This word is used because it connotes as well as denotes acceptance of the spirit of the offer which the Government has made, and indicates also the reception which will be given to the individual who returns to his allegiance.

## II— THE CHIEU-HOI OFFER AND WHAT IT MEANS.

The Chieu-Hoi Program was in effect announced by President Ngo Dinh Diem in his message to the nation at the last Lunar New Year (which in Vietnam is traditional festival called « Têt ») on 26 January 1963. In this message he said, « It is in this spirit (referring to the spirit of optimism and confidence in the future expressed earlier in the message) and in the sight of a truly independent, free and strong Vietnam, in conformity with our lasting sense of justice, that I make today a fraternal appeal to all those who, straying on the wrong path, have let themselves be abused by the Communists' deceitful propaganda. I invite them to join the National Cause while there is still time; to grasp quickly this chance now given to them to return to the side of honour, to regain their dignity as men, and to fulfill the longings of their cherished families ».

This is indeed the spirit of the Chieu-Hoi Program.

On 17 April of this Year President Ngo Dinh Diem issued a special proclamation announcing the Chieu-Hoi Program. The essential terms of this announcement are of such importance that they should be repeated here.

(Excerpts from Special Proclamation of President Ngo Dinh Diem on 17 April 1963:)

« Inspired by the ideal of respect for the human being which is based on the spirit of Justice and Charity, the

« Chieu-Hoi Campaign provides for appropriate measures  
« in favor of all those men and women who, deceived, ex-  
« loited or enrolled by force by the Communists—have a  
« new awareness and decide from today to return to the  
« national government.

« Those having families and means of subsistence will  
« be authorized to rejoin their families, or to reside in the  
« hamlet or strategic quarter of their choice subject only  
« to the approval of the administrative committee.

« Those having no means of subsistence nor family  
« support, can be assured of the assistance of the Govern-  
« ment.

« Those having skills and ability—after a period where  
« they become conscious of the requirements of the Natio-  
« nal Cause, during which they will have proven by con-  
« crete acts their total detachment from Communism—will  
« see their services accepted.

« Those who have trespassed against the law and who  
« have already been sentenced, or who are subject to court  
« trial, will have the opportunity to amend and to redeem  
« themselves by meritorious patriotic acts which will jus-  
« tify the extension of clemency to them.»

Then follows the offer itself:

« All of our compatriots in the country or abroad who  
« have been victims of Communist propaganda and exploi-  
« tation, I urge to return and uphold the just cause of the  
« Fatherland and to contribute their efforts, along with  
« those of all our people, in order to build, in a militant  
« spirit, the new society and civilization where every citi-  
« zen will be able to develop totally and full freedom.»

To recapitulate, the President in his proclamation of the CHIEU-HOI Program urged all misled Vietnamese, at

home or abroad, to return to their allegiance. He promised those innocent of criminal actions who wished to return to their families and former useful ways of life that they could do so if they could satisfy their local administrative officials of their sincerity. He promised those without means of livelihood or family, assistance in gaining a livelihood. He promised those had skills and ability to fight against Communism, an opportunity to do so. And finally, he warned those who had committed common crimes that they would be given a chance to earn forgiveness for their offenses.

For one who wishes to understand not only the nature of the Chieu-Hoi Program but also something of the Vietnamese national character and purpose, this proclamation is almost a required study. It makes no extravagant promises. It makes no threats. It does offer to the repentant rebel an opportunity to return his allegiance and to help his country to a better way of life for all its people. In other words, it offers proof of the moral superiority, the justice tempered with mercy, of the Government, thereby imposing a moral obligation upon those who deserve to serve their country or claim its protection.

This theme is dominant in all official propaganda addressed to the Viet Cong and Viet Cong sympathizers. They are invited to return to the righteous National Cause. The folly, the futility, indeed the treasonable nature of further resistance against the government of the people of free Vietnam is pointed out to them. The only inducements so far offered (as of the first of July) are the opportunity to serve their country and their people and the privilege of returning to their families and resuming a life as normal as the exigencies of the counterinsurgency effort and their duty to their country will permit. Scarcely mentioned in the propaganda is the promise of assistance to those without means of livelihood, nor has the promise of

clemency to criminals who merit it by their deeds after their return been stressed.

The appeals have of course stressed the fair treatment accorded to returnees, the freedom from harsh interrogation or physical abuse, which is a paramount principle of the program. These appeals also stress that Quy Chanh returnees may expect to stay in a Reception Center for a period of one or more weeks while their personal history is ascertained, their sicknesses or injuries treated, and they receive some re-orientation toward the ways of freedom and democracy. Sometimes mentioned, but not stressed that is the fact returnees are free to leave the Reception Center at any time and return to the V.C.

There are additional appeals which could be used, and will be used at later stages in the campaign. So far they have not been necessary because the Program is proceeding well and the government is now receiving in fact, very nearly as many Quy Chanh as available facilities can care for properly. As organization and facilities are expanded and improved, the pace of the program will be intensified. So far, in the first half of this year, and only two months and a half after the campaign was officially proclaimed by the President, the government has received a total of nearly 8 thousand returnees. Of these, some four thousand individuals may properly be regarded as having been militant, effective, members of the Viet-Cong. They range in rank from hamlet militiamen, in other words the classic « farmer by day, fighters by night » who go into action only when they are called upon by higher authority, to hard core field grade officers trained in North Vietnam and sent back to the South to seek to destroy the Government of Free Vietnam.

### III.— ORGANIZATION OF THE CHIEU-HOI PROGRAM.

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As is perhaps not sufficiently well-known, the counter-insurgency campaign in Vietnam has for the last 18 months been conducted along two main axes of advance. One, of course, is the military axis, the enemy destroying combat operations of the regular armed forces and the paramilitary forces. These latter range from the Civil Guard (which was formerly the national constabulary) through various types of local and national militia units, to highly specialized, highly trained quasiguerrilla forces. All in all perhaps a million of the nearly fifteen million people in Free Vietnam are now serving in one or another element of the armed forces.

The other main axis of advance has been that of the nation-building, nation-wide effort to improve the security and the social, economic and political well-being of the rural residents, the farmers, who make up the vast majority of the population. This is Strategic Hamlet Program which many competent observers consider a major new contribution to the art of counter-insurgency. The National direction of this program has been entrusted to a special interdepartmental committee, or sub-cabinet, which is called the « Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets ».

Since the Chieu-Hoi Program is regarded as one of nation-building rather than enemy-destroying, it has been entrusted to a special Sub-Committee for Chieu.Hoi of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets.

This Chieu-Hoi Sub-Committee has as its chairman The Secretary of State for Civic Action. Its members include representatives of the Departments (Ministries) of National Defense, Interior, Rural Affairs, and Justice. In addition on there are represented on it the Commissioner General for Land-Development, the Assistant Director General of the National Police, and finally the Executive Secretary of the Strategic Hamlet Inter-Ministerial Committee. Below this Committee and its working officers, there is in each province a Provincial Chieu-Hoi Committee; in each district of each province a district Chieu-Hoi Committee; and finally, in each hamlet (roughly equivalent to an American small country village) a hamlet Chieu-Hoi Committee. This structure has been created, and its members given training (ranging from three days to two weeks) in the principles of the program, in order that all officials and responsible persons in the country shall understand its purposes and its implementation. Members of these committees are both government personnel and civilians, all serving without pay for their Chieu-Hoi duties.

The Chieu-Hoi Committees at levels below the province have four primary functions. They are :

- 1) To spread the word about the Chieu-Hoi Program ;
- 2) To receive and welcome those who may wish to return under it ;
- 3) To care for the Quy Chanh until they can be forwarded, as they must be as quickly as possible, to the provincial Reception Center; and finally.
- 4) To assist the Quy Chanh who has been through the Provincial Reception Center and been returned to be reinstated in his home, his hamlet, and his village. (Each hamlet is part of a village, which in Vietnam plays somewhat the same role as a U.S. county.)

The Provincial Chieu-Hoi Committee, chaired by the province governor (Chef de Province) is responsible for the conduct of the campaign in that province. In addition to supervising and assisting the committees at lower echelons, it is responsible for the establishment and operation of the Provincial Reception Center, where the rehabilitation process is really begun. For most Quy Chanh, it is the place from which they leave, in from one week to a month, to begin again a normal life with their families. Incidentally, below this level no Quy Chanh may be detained for more than 48 hours, and even here he may be so detained only with his consent.

In addition to the Provincial Reception Centers there is a National Reception Center located near Saigon. In this center, which will be in operation very soon, Quy Chanh who have held important posts in the Viet Cong movement will be held for detailed de-briefing and extensive re-orientation prior to their return to normal life.

Actually, it is hoped that most of these individuals may be employed actively in the struggle against the Viet Cong, primarily as propagandists. It is anticipated that in a separate section of this National Center there will be a vocational training program to help those Quy Chanh who are without means to support themselves and who do not wish a rural life may be trained to become self-supporting.

Ultimately, there will be a number of resettlement sites (at present ten such resettlements, each for two hundred Quy Chanh, are programmed) where those who wish to own and farm their own land may live. Although this plan is not classified, there has been no public announcement of it as yet. The reason for this is the tremendous propaganda value which it has, a potential which can best be realized by waiting until the announcement can best serve to increase the success of the Chieu-Hoi Program.

All of this organization and administration has been accomplished at very little cost. Virtually all of those administering the program are doing so in addition to their other duties. If they receive pay, it is earned on the basis of their normal government employment. The nearly 150,000 people who have attended training courses on the Chieu-Hoi Program have done so either on their own time or in addition to their normal duties.

Through the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Government has made available some 34 million piasters for this program, a little less than a half million dollars. Of that amount not even a tenth has been spent so far. Many of the propaganda leaflets which have been used were printed by the U.S. Information Service or by the U.S. AID Mission. More have been printed by Vietnamese Government Agencies, especially the Directorate of Psychological Warfare of the Department of Defense. By and large, however, following the advice of Presidential Counsellor Ngo-Dinh-Nhu, every effort has been made to make this a « boot-strap operation », in other words, to improvise, to make maximum use of available and existing resources without incurring large new expenditures.

As the campaign continues (there is no time limit on the program nor is it believed that there should be one at this stage of the counter-insurgency effort) more and more elements of the Government and of the people of Vietnam will be incorporated into the program. This is in accordance with national policy, which seeks, literally, to mobilize the nation to end the insurgency. Every individual citizen is expected to contribute to the best of his ability to all aspects of the counter-insurgency effort, not least of which is the Chieu-Hoi program.

#### IV.— QUY CHANH PROCESSING

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When the topic of a program to reclaim communist guerillas is broached usually the first question is asked :

« How do you know that they are no longer communists ? » The answer, of course, is that one cannot know. It is most unusual for one man to be able to tell the true inner beliefs of another. On the other hand, it has been found by experience, garnered in many countries, that if a group of individuals are systematically interrogated individually, are systematically lectured to and invited to discuss the lectures, are carefully observed for a period of time, the truth or falsity of as many as possible of their statements about matters of fact verified, the inconsistencies or too great consistencies of their statements examined, a very fair idea of the innermost beliefs of most of them can be obtained. The effective and painless implementation of this process is the underlying purpose of the treatment given the Quy-Chanh while they are in the Reception Centers, and before they are restored to full membership in the community of loyal citizens. Even after they are so restored, appropriate measures are taken to seek to ensure that the loyalty apparently demonstrated is indeed genuine, and that they are not subjected to undue pressures by adherents to their former beliefs: In all of this, the Chieu-Hoi workers seek to maintain the most scrupulous respect for the dignity and value of the individual, for his personalism, as it is called in the national philosophy.

The formal screening and re-orientation of the individual Quy-Chanh begins as soon as his urgent personal needs have been met after his arrival at the Reception Center. First he is asked to fill out a simple questionnaire or if he cannot write, to guide someone in filling out this questionnaire for him. His answers to the questions are discussed with him by a trained interrogator, and he is then given one or more additional questionnaires to fill out. Each of these is designed not only to glean from him information of tactical or strategic value but also to lead him by imperceptible steps to a better appreciation of the error of his former ways.

Preliminary screening accomplished, the returnee is tentatively placed in one of four categories. Since this classification is so important, it seems appropriate to quote at length from an official document which defines the categories and the principles governing classification.

« Returnees can be classified into the following categories :

« 1. Category A : *Returnees who can be useful for friendly propaganda and intelligence activities.*

« Before rejoining our side, they were leaders or specialized cadres of various Viet Cong organizations, such as :

« Members of Communal, District, Provincial Commissariats etc...

« Specialized cadres of various branches subordinate to the Communist Party such as Party Committee, Public Propaganda Branch, Front Troop Propaganda and Indoctrination Branch, Security Section etc.

« Platoon leaders and larger unit commanders of VC regular, regional and full-time guerilla forces.

« Steering cadres of political organization at communal

and higher levels, such as South Vietnam Liberation Front, VC Youth Association, Woman's Association, Farmer's Association, Worker's Association etc...

« The above persons were familiar with studies, command and leadership, therefore they were somewhat well-trained in politics and are now qualified for intelligence or public propaganda activities etc.

« Our purpose is to employ them in some of our branches of activities.

« 2. Category B. *Unimportant or untrained persons who were induced and misled by the Communists but did not commit any crime.*

« This category includes the following elements :

Cadres at hamlet or lower levels

Unimportant Communists Party members.

Members of armed elements

« Common personnel of specialized branches such as Transportation, Communications, Supply, Economic and Financial Branches etc.

« Members of VC political groups.

The point to be emphasized is : The above elements include the opportunists and those who were induced or forced to join the VC, but did not commit any crimes. They were only executors but not leaders. They made a mistake by joining the VC but are now aware of the wicked nature of the Communists and have returned to the Nationalist Cause.

« 3. Category C : *Persons having neither job nor family and hoodlums accused of no offenses or of minor offenses only, who are not accepted by Strategic Hamlet Executive Committees.*

« This Category includes low-ranking Party Members, personnel, enlisted men and some unimportant cadres.

These elements were those :

Who had no job and joined the VC because they could not earn a living.

Who had no family (For example : Their relatives are in North Vietnam).

Who were undesirable persons because of gambling, drunkenness, adultery, stealing or indebtedness and were received by the VC. This category can also include some armed personnel of rebellions Religious Sects or some persons who are not authorized to stay in Strategic Hamlets by their Executive Committees.

« 4. Category D . *Criminals, whether under court sentence or not yet tried :*

This category includes any VC cadres, Party members, soldiers and personnel who are accused of murder, assassination, banditry, blackmail and any former government employees, military personnel or government servants who embezzled public funds and defected as well as any private persons who violated criminal law or who dodged the draft evaded their taxes, or refused to pay their debts to Agricultural Credit Agencies.

« Attention must be paid to the fifth-columnists and suspects, because the VC will try to plant their personnel in friendly organizations by using « false returnees ». Before these VC are sent back to their families they will try to sabotage our activities, or to infiltrate into our organizations to carry out their long-rang missions.

« During the classification, we must pay attention to the sincerity and good will of each returnee in each category.

«In general, when a person returns to our side, he is somewhat aware of his faults and of the Nationalist Cause. However, because their motives are dissimilar and very complicated, their sincerity and good will may not be alike.

«The determination of the good will of each returnee in each category is very important because it will permit us to deal with each one in a proper manner when we take care of his reinstatement.»

Once tentative classification has been accomplished reorientation in preparation for restoration to full membership in the ranks of loyal citizens and as an aid to final classification is in order. For category B Quy-Chanh (those individuals whose participation in the Viet Cong movement has not been that of competent and dedicated communists, but who may be returned to full status in their communities as useful self-supporting citizens) and for those in category D, (draft dodgers, deserters, etc.) a fairly short course of reorientation and rehabilitation usually appears adequate.

Such a course may last some 14 days, rather long days of 12 or 14 hours each. Approximately one half of this time is normally devoted to useful work, either in improving the Reception Center, in growing food stuffs for its inhabitants to eat, or in making items which may be donated to residents of hamlets who have suffered from Viet Cong redactions. The philosophy behind this work requirement is that it is not only physically beneficial, but is also a means by which the Quy-Chanh may learn new skills or refurbish old ones, and, finally and perhaps most important, is another means by which they can demonstrate the sincerity of their reformation.

Other hours of the training course are devoted to lectures about the organization and purposes of government and its services to the people, emphasizing those facili-

ties which may be of assistance to the individual after he returns to normal life. These are made more meaningful by lectures and films developing which may be of use to the Quy-Chanh : how to build a fish pond or smoke house, how to support themselves. Finally at least one, preferably two hours, a day are devoted to a practice highly developed and found most useful by such widely divergent groups as the communists and the Oxford group or Buchmanites. These are the group discussion and self-criticism sessions practice, in which each individual discusses his past life, his mistakes as well as his accomplishments, and his hopes and plans for the future. This has been found a most useful teaching aid as well as an excellent way of verifying the appropriate classification of the individual.

Once this training course is completed, the Category B Quy-Chanh who wishes to return to his home hamlet, may do so as a fully restored citizen, provided that the elected Administrative Committee of his hamlet believes that he will be a useful citizen, and his family are also willing to take moral responsibility for his return. There have been few cases where this approval and assumption of responsibility have been refused.

During his stay in the Reception center the Quy-Chanh is fed on the same scale as a member of the armed forces. He is also given a small cash allowance for the purchase of cigarettes etc... and if he needs it is given one or even 2 sets of clothes. As previously mentioned he receives medical care if required. Most important of all, from the standpoint of the individual who is thinking of returning, the Quy-Chanh is treated as a man with human dignity, and is even free to leave and return to the Viet Cong should he desire to do so.

Other categories of Quy.Chanh have not yet presented

a problem. The Category «A» Quy-Chanh, that is to say, those who have been dedicated communists and have held positions of importance in the Viet Cong movement, have been handled in accordance with their individual cases. Without exception they have proven truly anxious to assist the government in order to redeem their past misdeeds, and most of them have been actively engaged in such assistance. Some have been brought to the national level and on information received from them several major combat operations have been launched. Others have been active at the provincial level in giving information, accompanying operations, or preparing additional appeals to their former comrades to return to their true allegiance.

Category «D» returnees have so far been mostly draft dodgers with whom the policy has been adopted of returning them to duty in the armed forces, to give them in that way opportunity to demonstrate the sincerity of their new-fond intentions to be useful citizens. The same measures have applied to the category «C» individuals, the youths without trades or without good standing in their community. Most have been glad to accept an opportunity to prove themselves through military service.

## V.— CONCLUSION

The Chieu-Hoi Program, carried out primarily through civilian channels, with the support of the Armed Forces at all levels, is a sincere effort to call back to their rightful place those who have been misled into joining the Communist insurgents who are seeking to destroy Free Vietnam. It offers to those who return to their allegiance no greater reward than a sense of duty well-performed and the opportunity to share the duties, as well as the rewards, of good citizens in a country fighting for its life. It is not in itself, nor does it stress this aspect, a campaign to persuade communists that they should no longer be communists. It is not even a campaign to persuade guerrilla, the insurgents, that they must surrender or die. It is, instead, a statement, and a demonstration, of the sincerity and understanding, of the *clement but just attitude, of the President, the Government and the country of South Vietnam.*

The primary purpose of the Chieu-Hoi campaign is to extend misled citizens an opportunity to return to good and useful citizenship. Other valid purposes more directly connected with the insurgency are well served by this campaign. There are three principal purposes :

- 1) To weaken the enemy by reducing his numbers ;
- 2) To weaken the enemy by inspiring dissension and distrust, doubt and suspicion, between and among the insurgents ; and, of course,

3) To secure intelligence about the enemy from those who return to their allegiance.

There is a strategic purpose which is served also; a strategic purpose which many believe is far more important than the tactical advantages which may be gained. This purpose is :

To destroy the belief that there is a moral obligation to support friends or relatives among the insurgents. This belief arises from the strong sense of family loyalty, but is largely dispelled when it is shown that there is nothing but his own refusal which prevents the insurgent from sharing the rewards (and the obligations) of good citizenship.

Once this becomes clear, any feeling of moral obligation to deprive oneself or ones family, perhaps to risk ones life, by assisting the insurgents, is placed in sharp contrast to the actual and existing moral obligation to support one's government which has shown itself understanding and helpful as well as just and strong.

The Chieu-Hoi Program is already a success. Measured in terms of dollars, hours, effort, proportionately it has caused greater loss to the Viet Cong than have the military operations in the last six months. It has cost the Viet Cong at least 4,000 fighting men, and more than twice that number of potential recruits. How much more, in terms of support withheld, of internal distrust and dissension, cannot be estimated.

The success already achieved is almost certainly a small comparison to that which the Chieu-Hoi program will achieve. It is not too much to expect that by the end of 1963 there should be four times as many returnees each month, that is to say the equivalent of two Viet Cong regiments monthly coming to the support of the Government. Past experience in other countries indicates that when a program of this nature reaches such proportions there are

actually many more insurgents who simply quietly resign from the war, than who formally return to their proper allegiance. If the people who now support individuals in the insurgent ranks because of family ties, or a sense of moral obligation, are convinced that this obligation longer exists the Viet-Cong will soon become, in terms of individual members, as it now is in ideology, a foreign expeditionary corps, alien to the country and doomed to defeat at the hands of the people ; the people whom they have abused and whose country they have invaded.

The Chieu-Hoi program *has far more meaning than any appeal for surrender*. It is in fact an appeal to all Vietnamese everywhere to throw off their shackles, whether imposed by their own wrong doings, by glib propagandists, or the seemingly inexorable march of events, North or South, in outlawry or in government service, they are invited to return to the ways of righteousness, to the duties of good citizenship in a free country.

# 1.— NUMBER OF RETURNEES

NAME OF PROVINCE	Number of Returnees		Remarks on the situation during the week		
	During the week	Total from Feb 18 to June 25	Civi- lans Fleeing Commu- nism	Total Refu- gees	Remarks
<b>CENTRAL LOWLANDS</b>					
Quảng-Trị	0	4	7 Monta- gnards	11	
Thừa-Thiên	0	1		1	
Đà-Nẵng	0	0		0	
Quảng-Nam		4		4	
Quảng-Tín	1	66		66	— Carrying with them 1 Mas 36, 1 grenade and 5 rounds of ammunitions
Quảng-Ngãi		485		485	
Bình-Định	0	25		25	
Phú-Yên	7	66		66	
Khánh-Hòa	0	0	141 Monta- gnards	141	— After the provincial opera- tion striking the enemy stronghold at Diên Khanh District
Ninh-Thuận	0	16		16	
Bình-Thịn	1	112		112	
<i>Total</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>779</i>	<i>148</i>	<i>927</i>	
<b>HIGHLANDS</b>					
Kontum	3	6	6	12	— Carrying with them 1 Mas 36 and 10 rounds of am- munitions
Pleiku		7		7	
Darlac		25		25	— Report submitted but lack of determining factors for conclusion

NAME OF PROVINCE	Number of Returnees		Remarks on the situation during the week		
	During the week	Total from Feb 18 to June 25	Civi- lans Fleeing Commu- nism	Total Refu- gees	Remarks
Quảng-Đức		4		4	
Phú-Bồn	7	32		32	— 2 liaisons V.C. agents
Dalat	0	0		0	
Tuyên-Đức	0	3		3	
Lâm-Đồng	0	51	60	111	
<i>Total</i>	10	128	66	196	
<b>CAPITAL</b>					
CITY	0	13		13	
<i>Total</i>	0	13		13	
<b>EASTERN</b>					
<b>AREA</b>					
Phước-Long	0	2		2	
Bình-Long	0	38		38	
Bình-Tuy		33		33	
Phước-Tuy	6	110	2	112	
Long-Khánh	0	3	1	4	
Biên-Hòa	50	335		335	— 50 is the number of returnees available during the two-week period
Phước-Thành	3	16		16	— 1 scout rallies carrying with him 1 grenade
Bình-Dương	36	226	7	273	
Tây Ninh	25	320		320	
Gia-Định	15	129		129	
<i>Total</i>	139	1,252	10	1,262	

NAME OF PROVINCE	Number of Returnees		Remarks on the situation during the week		
	During the week	Total from Feb 18 to June 25	Civi- lans Fleeing Commu- nism	Total Refu- gees	Remarks
<b>WESTERN AREA</b>					
Long-An		127		127	
Định-Tường		381		381	
Kiến-Hòa		366		366	
Kiến-Phong	10	164	4	168	— Reports submitted but lack of determining factor for final conclusion — 1 party member who is Youth and Labor cell leader, 1 mobile sabotage team leader
Kiến Tường	0	44	9	53	
Vĩnh-Long	46	583		583	— 1 V.C. cultural commissioner
Vĩnh-Bình	14	130	1	131	— 1 V.C. liaison agent
Phong-Dịnh		211		211	— Report submitted but no conclusion is available
An-Giang		1.476		1 476	— 60 is the number available during the two-week period
Ba-Xuyên	60	463	3	466	
Kiêm-Giang	2	50		50	6 squad leaders, 9 liaison agents
An-Xuyên	7	458	11	469	— 1 NLF cell leader and 1 V.C. midwife
Chương- Thiện	60	204		204	— 4 V.C. liaison agents
<b>Total</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>4.657</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>4.685</b>	— 60 is the number of returnees available during the two-week period, 1 guerilla platoon leader and 3 V.C. liaison agents.
<b>TACTICAL AREA III</b>					
Tactical zo- ne 31	1			1	
Tactical zo- ne 32	24	134		134	

NAME OF PROVINCE	Number of Returnees		Remark on the situation during the week		
	During the week	Total from Feb 18 to June 25	Civi- lans Fleeing Commu- nism	Total Refu- gees	Remarks
Special Re- gion					
Phuoc-Binh- Thanh	0				
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>134</b>		<b>135</b>	
<b>GRAND</b>	.	.			
<b>TOTAL</b>					
Central low- lands	9	779	173	952	
Highlands	10	128	66	194	
Capital city	0	13		13	
Eastern Area	139	1.252	10	1.262	
Western Area	199	4.657	28	4.685	
Tactical Area III	25	134		134	
<b>Total</b>	<b>382</b>	<b>6 963</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>7.240</b>	

- Return on own will 210
- Answer call upon direct appeal 48
- Answer call upon indirect appeal 124

**Total** 382

#### BREAK DOWN INTO SUB-CLASSES

- Military 189
- Political 69
- Liaison 19
- Rebellion 0
- Desertees, Draft dodgers 91
- Detained by V.C. 14

**Total** 382

## TRAINING COURSES FOR CHIEU HỘI PROGRAM

PROVINCE	During the week		Total up to		BREAKDERING OF THOSE TRAINED DURING THE WEEK
	No of classes	No of at- tendants	No of classes	No of at- tendants	
<b>Central lowlands</b>					
— Quảng-Trị	46	428	269	31.270	— 10% village cadres, Hamlet Executive Board, 5% Combat Youth 85% civic groups.
— Thừa-Thiên			14	2.007	
— Đà-Nẵng	2	142	13	756	— 40% teachers, 60% civil-servants and cadres of various branches.
— Quảng-Nam	6	1.939	80	39.958	— 15% combat Youth, 10% Hamlet Executive Board, 10% cadres from various civic groups. 25% VietCong Cadres families which rallied, 40% laymen.
— Quảng-Tin			13	2.298	
— Quảng-Ngãi	27	9.176	127	84.005	— 30% VietCong cadres families which rallied, 70% laymen.
— Bình-Định			205	70.728	
— Phú-Yên	(a) 1	4.314	26	23.654	— 100% laymen from the villages and hamlets.

(a) Each course lasts 1 week and consists of 14 sessions. Each sessions has over 300 attendants.

PROVINCE	During the week		Total up to		BREAKDOWN OF THOSE TRAINED DURING THE WEEK
	No of classes	No of attendants	No of classes	No of attendants	
— Khanh-Hoa			19	23.217	
— Ninh-Thuận	15	1.100	21	1.570	— 3% government cadres from district, 30% civic groups 10% Hamlet Executive Board, 40% civil guard and Self Defense corps, 17% relatives of Viet Cong.
— Bình-Thuận			42	13.158	
Central highlands	97	17.099	829	292.621	
	6	1.171	21	5.195	— 65% civic groups, 35% members of the Hamlet Executive Board
			4	779	
			7	834	
	1	78	5	332	— 100% commissioners of the Hamlet Executive Board
			3		
	25	2.155	77	15.428	— Hamlet Executive Board, Village Council, Civic Groups
— Phù-Bồn			54	3.577	
— Đà-Lạt			9	368	
— Tuyên-Đức					
— Lâm-Đồng					

PROVINCE	During the week		Total up to		BREAKDERING OF THOSE TRAINED DURING THE WEEK
	No of classes	No of at- tendants	No of classes	No of at- tendants	
<b>South VietNam Eastern Area</b>					
— Phước-Long			103	196	
— Bình-Long			33	5.954	
— Bình-Tuy			21	2.229	
— Phước-Tuy			5	808	— 38 % employees of government services in The province, 45 % members of Hamlet Executive Board, 17 % members of village Councils.
— Long-Khánh			2	250	
— Biên-Hòa			89	18.175	
— Phước-Thạnh					
— Bình-Dương			7	418	
— Tây-Ninh	2	521	17	1.819	— 62% Combat Youth, 38% Self-Defense Corps.
— Gia-Định					
— Saigon	5	930	10	1.108	
			23	4.424	— 60% Inter-Family Heads, 40% Quarter Chiefs.
<b>South VietNam Western Area</b>					
— Long-An			4	370	

PROVINCE	During the week		Total up to		BREAKDERING OF THOSE TRAINED DURING THE WEEK
	No of classes	No of at- tendants	No of classes	No of at- tendants	
— Định-Tường	5	561	41	3.894	— 90% government teachers, 10% village council, 16% Youth, 38% Hamlet Executive Board, 27% Civic Groups.
— Kiến-Hòa	5	620	18	3.830	— 10% Hamlet Executive Board, 20% civic leaders, 70% civic groups
— Kiến-Phong	20	5.084	157	32.105	— 100% laymen from Hamlets and fortified hamlets.
— Kiến-Tường			19	1.111	
— Vĩnh-Long			12	3.472	
— Vĩnh-Bình			1		
— Phong-Dinh	25	4.481	46	7.927	— 10% Government cadres, 10% vil- lage Council, Hamlet Executive Bo- ard, 30% returnees and relatives of VietCong, 50% laymen.
— An-Giang	1	40	8	745	— 100% returnees.
— Ba-Xuyên			3	421	
— Kiến-Giang			26	2.189	
— An-Xuyên			16	1.352	
— Chương Thiện			5	33	
<b>Total :</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>32.932</b>	<b>1.575</b>	<b>412.340</b>	

Nha Chiêu-Tranh Tâm-Lý  
Ấn hành 1.000 tập