

Return

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RURAL AFFAIRS MEMORANDUM

TO: All USOM Regional and Provincial Representatives
FROM: *Williams* Ogden Williams, Assistant Director for Rural Affairs
SUBJECT: "When the Communists Come"

The attached is a useful study of VC tactics. As the introduction notes, it is quite objective and the operations described appear to have been very effective. It should not, however, be permitted to add to the myth that the VC are seven feet tall. Their success is largely proportional to avoidable failures and defaults on our side. As you know, just one outstanding GVN official in a key job in a province can often change the complexion of that province, and in a relatively short time. When and as GVN officials, backed and encouraged by us, develop the conviction and habit of victory, our side will look pretty good, too. Also, the situation in a province at a given time---whether good or bad---is less important than which way the province is moving. I think we can do a good deal, not only with programs but also with personal leadership, to help things move in a forward direction.

Enclosure
Pamphlet

OWilliams:ptm:

Reading III -- When the Communists Come

a study

when the communists come

united states information agency

saigon, vietnam

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Reading III -- When the Communists Come.

This reading is a translation from Vietnamese of a report dated October 14, 1961 made by a delegate to a National Liberation Front inter-district meeting, place unknown, titled Experiences in Turning XB Village in Kien Phong Province into a Combattant Village.

It is an objective account of the efforts of the Viet Cong to convert XB Village into the Communist equivalent of a strategic hamlet. To the careful reader it also offers: a clear picture of the operational methods of the Viet Cong in an area where they maintain a relatively high and stable degree of political control, a graphic account of the tribulations experienced by the rank and file Viet Cong, a delineation of the Viet Cong scale of values, a fairly detailed description of the communication factors including the all-important political propaganda program which in the final analysis the Viet Cong hold to be their route to power, and an insight into the mystique of the Viet Cong which those who would counter the Communist effort must have.

We know nothing about the document's author, except that he is a southerner, probably a native of Kien Phong province and most likely a Cao Daiist. Although he has picked up much of the jargon he is not a doctrinaire communist; much of what he says would be considered highly heretical in orthodox communist circles. He appears to be a man of the people -- simple, direct, dedicated, and probably very effective.

Part One

SITUATION FACING US WHEN WE BEGAN.

The village of XB is entirely surrounded by water. It has a population of 6,000 and is a new village, founded during the war (i.e. late 1940's - ed). There were 200 Cao Dai and 100 Hoa Hao.

Land originally was owned by landlords. There was one big landowner and 50 smaller ones. During the resistance the landowners were absent and control of the land was in the hands of the farmers. At the restoration of peace the landowners returned with the troops to retake their land and collect back rent. Since the farmers were dependent on the land for their livelihood, for their survival, they were thus greatly motivated to struggle against the landlords.

XB village had a Diem government administrative office, a security section and a post of militiamen. Mobile troops (ARVN - ed) and Civil Guards were active in the area, especially in the two neighboring villages which are on dry land.

During the first few years of peace the Party made several attempts to step up its activities. Three times its organization was destroyed by the enemy. Three Party members were killed, two secretaries arrested, more than 100 cadres and members were taken into custody. Finally only one Party

member remained and he was driven onto the beach at Luc Binh. He got no help from the local people.

In 1959, cadres from the higher level arrived to gather the scattered Party members and instruct them in the reestablishment of the destroyed party base. Things were so difficult, at that time, that our comrades were forced to hide in the fields and marshes during the day and only at night could they slip into the village to do propaganda work among the farmers. Several farmers were deeply interested in the struggle to get them land and they let themselves be indoctrinated easily. A base was soon established at a farm. Our cadres went on helping the farmers fight for ownership of certain lands and for the reduction of rent on other pieces of land. Gradually our victories convinced some of the farmers and we were able to bring into being the XB Party, consisting of seven members.

Then the enemy began launching sweep operations. Battalions of troops came by land and water to clear the area. But the Party base and the Party organization were not injured. One Self-Defense Group, a three-man cell was reduced to a one-man cell one bitter day when the two members were killed in action. Now, this self-defense group has become a real force, a platoon of armed men.

At the present time our organizational strength is as

follows: the Party totals 26 members, the Lao Dong Youth 30, the Farmers Association 274, the Liberation Youth Group 150, the Liberation Women Group 119; 2,000 people, or two-thirds of the villagers, take part in Party led activities.

Part Two

MEANS AND METHODS OF OUR SUCCESS.

Elimination of Village Elders and Security Agents.

As the first step in establishing a base and fanning the fires of revolution, the Party began agitation of farmers to seek their own interests -- the right of owning land or reduction of land rent. This struggle, however, remained sporadic and weak and did not constitute a mass movement. Better to meet the enemy, which remained strong in the village, the Party began the elimination of influence of the village notables and local security agents. However, it failed to follow this with the development of a mass base. The cadres thought that efforts to end the authority of the village leaders alone would be enough. The enemy succeeded in maintaining the village administration. In the face of such a situation the Party called for a meeting. We explained to the

villagers the evil caused by village notables and security agents. We awoke the people to the fact that if the American-Diem clique succeeded in permanently maintaining the organization of village notables and security soon Mister H, the cruel landlord, and others would return to the village to seize land and collect back rent. For that reason, we said, the farmers must eliminate the influence of the village notables and sweep away the security agents. At the same time we sought to win the sympathy of the families of the village notables (while we were urging the masses to rise up and eliminate the influence of the notables). It was a good method. After a while certain notables refused to work for the enemy and some took the side of the people.

Thus, when our enemies tried to begin projects in the village no one would work for them. The US-Diem clique tried to win back the people by distributing drugs in the village. The offer was flatly rejected. Some of the people even debated openly and strongly with the enemy agents. Finally the Diem clique had to abandon the village, no village council could be maintained there.

The Party hailed this great success and urged other villages in the area to follow the example. Since then, in surrounding village, we have been successful in preventing the influence of the enemy. In the area now there remains only

some Diem soldiers who live in a military post.

The Struggle For Land.

As I have noted, the main interest of the farmer of XB village is in land. Before, during and after the elimination of our enemy's influence, the Party in XB village always used the subject of land as a means of propagandizing the people and indoctrinating the masses.

In its political and armed struggle, in its administration of the rural area, and in other revolutionary tasks, the Party knew well how to make use of the farmers' interest in land. On it we built a mass movement. And for that reason the revolutionary movement made great progress and resulted in a great success.

At first this struggle was sporadic and weak. The farmers merely wanted land rent to be reduced and their right to farm the land maintained. Now the farmers cling to their land. The landowners remain in the cities, leaving the task of retaking the land and collecting rent to the soldiers posted in the area. But these troops can do little.

The Party Unit developed and used this slogan: "Kill the Land Robbers." This slogan was welcomed and used by the local

people. The farmers now know they have the force to prevent the land owners from retaking their lands and can prevent the US-Diem clique from oppressing the people. Farmers are now free to farm, without paying either land rent or agricultural tax.

With respect to land, the people have scored these successes:

1. All private and public land has been distributed and ownership is now maintained except for land located near enemy army posts.
2. Land rent has been reduced by 16,000 gia of paddy (one gia equals forty liters; this is rice payment on rice producing land but to whom it is paid is not clear - ed.)

Victory came to the farmers and the people then enthusiastically joined the movement and put their confidence in the Party as the leader of the revolution.

However there were some clashes of interest, some discord. There was a dispute between two farmers over a small parcel of land and each threatened to kill the other. The Party stepped in and called a meeting of villagers to hear and solve the problem. A cadre pointed out that:

"Land comes as part of the revolution's achievements and as a result of the people's struggle. Farmers must remain united and share the good and bad. Because the American-Diem clique and the landlords plot to come back, farmers must make concessions to each other to ensure final victory. Only if these conditions are met will the farmers be able to take permanent possession of the land."

Upon hearing this the two farmers became enlightened, embraced each other and wept.

In administering the rural area, the Party seeks to settle contradictions between people, teach the people Party policy, urge the people to have spite for the Americans and Diem and seek to unite all groups and social classes in the village. If a party member or cadre makes a mistake he will be freely subjected to the criticism of the people. When the people can boldly criticize party members they will then be ready to forgive them.

Since the people are united, and since they have learned how to guard against leakage of secrets and the penetrations of the enemy, security agents and spies cannot survive.

Besides the matter of land, the Party also attends to the other needs of the people, such as public health, sanitation, education, maternity facilities, etc. Moreover, the Party

helps farmers market their produce at high prices. Through organization, merchant speculators are avoided.

The Party operates a first aid station run by a public health cadre who also makes visits around to look after the health of people in the area. There is also a midwife who manages confinements. The people pay for these services and they also have a voice in the management of them.

In the matter of schools, the Party called the problem to the attention of the people at a public meeting. The Party guided the people in applying to district officials for aid in building schools and supplying teachers. This failed and the Party led the people into the task of providing a school themselves. At the last moment, the authorities approved the establishment of a school (meaning unclear - ed). A Pupil Parent Association was founded and two school were built. Maintenance of the school is through money collected from the people. The school is managed by the people under the guidance of the Party. The people take turns observing the operation of the school and prepare to answer the enemies if they come to criticize the school operation.

In one case, as one of the schools neared completion, soldiers came to ask why. The people answered: "Admission to (nearby) public school requires birth certificates. Our

children have none and therefore cannot be admitted. Therefore we establish a special school for them." The soldiers agreed with this view. Consequently the schools established are legal. And children are educated under our guidance.

Display of the Flag.

Seeing that the Party assumes responsibility for education, seeing that Party members in XB village are devoted to the people's cause, especially with regard to land, seeing how the Party looks after the people's living standards, the people of the village became attached to the cadres and Party members and ready to support Party policy.

During a ceremony to welcome the establishment of the National Liberation Front (December 1960 - ed) the inhabitants of XB village enthusiastically prepared. The walls of the houses were whitewashed, flags were made and raised on flagpoles in front of each house. In all, 600 flags were flown throughout the village -- expressing the people's spirit of struggle and their support of the revolution. The Party cadres had indoctrinated the people and prepared them to debate with the enemies. When the soldiers came to take away the flags, the people said to them calmly: "This is a flag of peace. It is not a Viet Cong flag. This flag means that the people, some of

whom are your relatives or even your families, have land to till."

Most of the soldiers agreed with this view and took away only a few flags.

One old man was concerned because his flag was wet. He feared this would lessen the solemnity of the ceremony. This incident proves that if the people understand the Party's goals, and become enlightened, our efforts can never fail.

In summary, the Party in XB village has established a mass movement, has enlightened the people, has made the Party's policies a great force among the villagers.

Forging Weapons and Establishing Defenses.

When we tried to get the people to forge rudimentary weapons we encountered great difficulty, for the people were not accustomed to this sort of thing. At first our own self defense troops and cadres carried the burden, unsupported by the people.

The laying of naily boards (metal or bamboo spikes set in weeds or in marsh land to pierce the shoe and foot - ed), the forging of rudimentary weapons, the establishment of combat villages requires the cooperation of all. Unless all understand

Party policy and contribute to these works, the movement in the village will be weak.

The people thought that the laying of naily boards was illegal and would result in terror and reprisals by the soldiers. In light of this the Party members laid the naily boards themselves, while endeavoring at the same time to educate the people. The Party laid more naily boards than ever. Once, during a terror sweep one of the soldiers was injured by a naily board. This caused the soldiers to withdraw. Party members correctly regarded this as a success and held a mass meeting at which it was explained that laying of naily boards had prevented the entrance of the enemy. The cadres declared that if the people did not lay naily boards the enemies would come to collect land rents, levy taxes, impose corvee labor and draft young men into the army. The Party then introduced the slogan: "One naily board for each square of land."

The people each day were urged to oppose the Americans and Diem in order to keep their land and protect themselves.

The idea of naily boards was eventually supported by the people. Many were laid. Later three enemy soldiers were injured by naily boards. Taking advantage of this event, the Party held a meeting and reported the success to the whole village.

In one hamlet the Party cadre showed the people how to lay a barricade of thorny bamboo across a road and underneath put grenades attached to the branches. When the enemy came, however, the soldiers hooked ropes to the branches and pulled them away, exploding the grenades but not injuring the soldiers. However, the soldiers became fearful and did not do any more mopping up that day.

Encouraged by this success, our comrades urged the people to set up eleven combat gates (barricades - Ed) to prevent the entrance of our enemies.

However, the education work was not careful enough. For instance, one old farmer opposed our plan and asked permission to leave the area. But then the soldiers came and the farmer was afraid. The soldiers forced him to remove the combat gates. He removed a few.

The Party began anew its education work to explain away the damage done by the mopping up operation. The cadre explained that fencing the area, laying combat gates, laying naily boards, proselyting the Army and engaging in political struggle all contributed to the defense of the village, protected the lives of the villagers and kept the land intact.

The Party sent its best cadre to reeducate the old farmer and in time he became enlightened, approved the setting up of

combat gates and confessed his faults before the people.

The Farmers Association was put in charge of combat gates (each was given a number) and of laying naily boards. Each sub-cell of the Farmers Association is in charge of one combat gate -- and closes the gate when the enemy comes and gives the alarm by means of tocsin. When a tocsin sounds each person knows which gate the enemy is entering and thus how best to cope with the situation.

The mass movement to lay naily boards, set up gates and establish a combat village and had good results and illustrates how our comrades know correct propaganda techniques. They know how to make efficient propaganda that reflects the real interests of the people; they also know how to stimulate the rancor of the people.

The Party constantly studies not only the interests of each social class, but also the attitudes of each family.

In rural areas, they found it necessary to propagandize in the following way: "To keep your land and prevent landowners from collecting rent, you must lay naily boards."

With families who have youths of military age it is necessary to propagandize as follows: "The laying of naily boards prevents the Americans and Diem from recruiting soldiers by force. Soldiers taken into the Army will die, as did A and

B, from this village. Those who become soldiers will be forced to participate in mopping up operations and will die of naily boards injuries as we have seen here."

In a family whose members are from North Vietnam it is necessary to say: "Please lay naily boards to fight against the Americans and Diem for the restoration of peace, and for the unification of our country. When the revolution is successful you and your relatives will be reunited."

Before the start of a recent series of mopping up operations the Party worked to educate the people. They prepared by designating people to lay naily boards, engage in legal struggles against our enemies, carry on Army proselyting efforts, etc. During the operation our enemies encountered naily boards everywhere. They tried to force the villagers to guide them but no one would accept this task. People told them that the day before, the Liberation Army forbade the inhabitants to go out so they did not know the location of naily boards and grenades. The people also urged the troops not to advance. Some persons, designated to guide our enemies, led them into swampland. Tired, after many hours, our enemies had to withdraw.

After each mopping up operation the people review the failure or the success of the resistance effort in each hamlet.

A meeting is held and each hamlet makes a report, in the presence of a cadre, who then points out the experience gained. At this meeting the hamlet which showed initiative or which achieved some outstanding victory in fighting with rudimentary weapons occupies a place of honor in the front ranks. Although one group is not encouraged to outdo the other, the various groups sometimes compete with one another in laying naily boards.

One farmer even competed with his wife in laying naily boards. The husband said: "Your duty is in attending to the children. You do not have time to lay naily boards. Let me fight our enemies." "You fight against our enemies," answered the wife, "it is your duty. But as a woman I also have the task of annihilating them." So they both participated.

During one operation some of the villagers did not fight and were captured. Later they were released and when they came home, the villagers met them and berated them and told them only by fighting could the people protect their lives and property.

After each mopping up operation, various groups review the actions of each hamlet and indulge in mutual criticism. This serves to increase devotion, bring out the strong points and the shortcomings of the effort. This enables the people to

convert experience into an improved organization.

In mopping up operations in mid-July our enemies sent in 600 soldiers, in motor boats, to attack XB village. The leadership of the Party was stable, however, and had prepared well the political and military struggle, so the efforts of the enemy came to nothing. Seven enemy soldiers were wounded by naily boards. The enemy soldiers withdrew before the united resistance of the people.

During this same operation it was discovered that some of the naily boards had become warped and unusable. Afterwards the people held a meeting attended by the cadre in charge of laying naily boards. It was decided that round naily boards were better than the ordinary one, also that the barbed naily boards were more dangerous for our enemies.

One farmer had invented a kind of bottle grenade using a cartridge. It was tested on a dog and the explosion disembowled him. Now people are busy making the new bottle grenade.

It should be noted that whereas the laying of naily boards was at first done by the cadres, now everyone, especially the Farmers Association, participate in the effort, under the guidance of cadres.

The people now even say to the cadres: "Take care of the

documents and avoid encountering the enemy." This proves that the people place full confidence in the cadres, are devoted to them and want to protect them.

XB Village is still not yet well known. But local soldiers are fearful of it. The soldiers camped at LH and TH villages (nearby) say: "If you wish to meet your loved ones again, don't attack XB."

Part Three

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM XB.

The Party at XB has scored some outstanding successes. These are due to the following:

1. Party members were determined correctly to carry out Party's policies. When the village bases were dispersed and the situation worsened, these comrades took increased resolve to surmount their difficulties. They strived at all times to get closer to the poor farmers, to keep a firm hold on, and at the same time keep a deep faith in the masses. By so taking this approach they were able to re-kindle the people's spirit and reorganize the mass movement.

2. Their attitudes and working methods were based on the Party's policy of being in close touch with the masses, of relating to the indispensable interests of the masses, especially with relationship to land. On this they built a mass movement. They not only learned how to use the interests of each class, group and circle, but also learned to study carefully the interests of each individual so they could better influence him. The experiences at XB show clearly that if one fails to base propaganda on the practical interests of the people, one cannot expect the people to stand up and face the struggle.

Using democratic methods plus detailed planning, the Party and the people considered, debated and met all problems concerning the rights and interests of the people. This increased the people's role and interest in the struggle to protect the countryside. The Party thus was able to harness the whole of the masses. Finally, from the struggle it drew out various lessons, it overcame weaknesses and it modified working methods where necessary.

3. The Party spirit of serving the masses is correct. Party members in XB are determined to work and die for the masses. If a member or cadre commits a mistake,

he openly admits it before the masses. As a result, the masses believe in the cadres more and more, and spare no effort to protect them.

4. The educational methods used by the Party in XB village are both practical and effective. The Party leaders learned how to put theory into practice; it educated the internal ranks as well as explained the situation and basic plan to the masses. It did not try to teach the masses difficult arguments by rote. After attending a course for four days, for example, Party members came back to the village and studied documents for 5-7 days more. During this time they taught themselves ways in which they could make the contents of the documents known easily to the masses through public speaking.

Propaganda was very simple and made to fit the feelings of the people. For example, in the matter of the relative strength of ourselves and the enemies, Party members told the people: "In the past, the US-Diem clique and village notables and security agents pursued us. Right now they do not dare come against us. Therefore, who is stronger? They are. They still can return. They still have military posts and conduct mopping up operations." This is the truth and thus

the masses are made aware of the true situation.

5. The Party put prime stress on leading the masses in the struggle for land. It also paid close attention to the people's daily needs by leading in the struggle for the establishment of schools, first aid stations, a maternity clinic, etc., whose expenses were borne by the people. The Party consolidated and improved relations between workers and farmers. In any revolutionary operation, the Party must always heighten the role of the masses and see they are served. Thus the people are made to know that their interests are tied to the general struggle and that the glorious revolution is theirs. Consequently, the masses will take sides with the revolution and will adopt the political ideas of the revolution.

The Party in XB Village, however, still was guilty of a number of shortcomings:

1. It has failed to make a full three-prong attack. Best progress was made in the field of the armed struggle. But the political struggle and the army proselyting operations remain weak. The weakest effort is the Army proselyting operation. But even the armed struggle is inadequate and the Party must stay on the

defensive. It cannot take the offensive to destroy the enemy forces and make our forces supreme.

The laying of naily boards and various counter attacks were designed only to check the enemy's operations. They were not aimed at annihilating the enemy and seizing his weapons. From a practical standpoint the whole effort was not aimed at destruction of the enemy, only injuring him. The naily boards were numerous but they only injured the enemy and we did not seize any weapons from him. The combat village still lacks many conditions for us to go on the offensive.

The political struggle is weak and is not closely enough bound to the armed struggle. The people are not properly trained in political arguments and in standing up to the enemy. Instead of attacking our enemies politically, through denunciations and army proselyting operations, the Party only led the people to the point where they passively opposed our enemies and were content if the latter did not terrorize the village.

Hundreds of people left the village -- but they left only to avoid enemy soldiers, not to go out and

make political attacks on them. The people do not understand that this is not a form of struggle. During mopping up operations the people are responsible for trying to win over the enemy soldiers' sympathy, enlightening them, and persuading them to desert to the revolution and bring their weapons with them. This is a form of army proselyting which the Party must teach the people and tell them to practice it every day under all circumstances.

With regard to person to person propaganda, the method and the slogans used are still poor. They achieve little except in one case, when a village council was overthrown through agitation. The struggle of the masses is also inadequate. The political struggle is on a low level, consisting only of simple demands and denunciations. The Party lacks slogans that reflect the practical interests and the aspirations of the people. Demands relating to economic and political rights have not yet reached the proper level.

2. Concerning army proselyting operations, the Party has paid little attention to getting agents to infiltrate into the army, to persuade the families of soldiers who have rallied to the people, and these came without

guns except a few who brought cartridges and grenades; others deserted but only went home. All of this had little effect on the enemy's strength. The Party still has not tried to persuade the families of soldiers of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects to take sides with the revolution. The local cadres, being short-sighted, have failed to enlighten soldiers whom they contact and turn them into infiltration agents, or to establish political bases in local military units.

3. The political education of the people is not yet so well organized that the people can be taught politics regularly and thus improve and increase their political knowledge and revolutionary thoughts.

Though the Party correctly based its action on the people's interests -- especially with respect to land -- and persuaded them to join the mass movement, it did not know how to profit from the opportunity to teach the people that their rights and interests must be subordinated to the national interests of Independence, Peace and Reunification, or that they must focus all their resentment on, and fight against the US-Diem clique. Consequently once the people are satisfied about land, the movement degenerates. This

does not fit in with the Party's objective of mobilizing the strength of the entire people for the day of the general uprising.

4. The Party did not pay enough attention, nor is it determined to get in touch with, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious people who are also farmers in the area -- to make propaganda and persuade them to join the revolution. The enemy, on the other hand, has been resorting to every kind of trick in order to win over the religious people. The Party is strong in the great part of the village, but few cells exist in the localities where live the religious compatriots.

Part Four

SITUATION AT OTHER VILLAGES AS COMPARED WITH XB.

The above is what happened at XB Village. This is the situation at other villages:

Village N is also a combattant village. It is fenced in, has naily boards and gates, etc. It has succeeded in keeping out the enemy, especially the commandos. But the mass movement there remains weak. The struggle against the enemy was assumed

by Party cadres and self-defense troops and they also laid the naily boards. The farmers did not participate in the operations.

The Party in N village does not understand that the key motive power in a combattant village comes from urging the people to stand up and fight. It failed to study the situation and work out concrete plans, and it failed to make propaganda among the people. Thus, the people, being unaware of the necessity for a combattant village, did not participate positively in its establishment. The said Party does not know how correctly to start a mass movement as was done in XE village, nor how to draw out lessons from experiences, nor to attach itself to the people's struggle. Therefore the movement in N is not as strong as previously planned.

In the villages of MM, MN, MT, and LN the farmers made naily boards to be laid by the self-defense forces but the people did not take part in laying the naily boards.

In MQ village though an enemy soldier was injured once by a naily board, the Party failed to take the opportunity to point out this success and further mobilize the people. The movement there was supported by a small number of people, and some time later it degenerated.

The cadres in a great number of villages assume the

responsibility for doing work, instead of leading the masses. Thus they really do not follow the Party's policy of engaging the masses. Their educational and propaganda efforts are not based on the fundamental needs and desires of the people. The said cadres also adopt out of date working methods, become bureaucrats, stand in awe of the enemy, lack vigilance and wish for peace. They serve in form only and do not attack the enemy.

In summary, our movement is weak in those villages because:

Cadres do not properly grasp Party policy and consequently lack revolutionary spirit. They are not in tune with the thoughts of the people; nor are they dedicated to serving the masses and struggling in the interests of the people.

Their attitudes and working methods are too bureaucratic. They do not follow the methods which the Party has worked out, do not study their local situation closely enough. They inaugurate policies which are not rooted in the rights, interests, hopes and feelings of the people. They also attempt to indoctrinate the masses dogmatically, using materials which are not relevant to the situation.

The lessons to be learned from XB Village may be summarized as follows:

The people are all powerful. It remains only for us to harness ourselves to serving the people. With the people following us, if we have initiative and use tested Party techniques, all operations will succeed.

In the simplest terms, the Party's political line must be based on the needs and interests and rights of the people, the most vital ones. These are concrete and plain to see. On these needs and interests we must build, educating the people, mobilizing them to rise and join the revolution.

In any operation we must carefully make specific plans, well in advance. This is particularly true in the launching the organization of a mass movement. People are not eager to join such movements unless they have carefully been made aware of its objectives and thus are enlightened. In leadership, tasks assigned should be graded from the easy to the difficult, and should be assigned with consideration of the person to execute them, that is from capable to less capable persons. In XB, the Party made careful advance preparations; the people were well educated and mobilized prior to the launching of the mass movement and the start of the building of the combat village. Once started everything progressed quickly and smoothly. The day after it was started the people were in a position to repulse an enemy attack. This is the way it should be done elsewhere.

Properly containing security agents and informers depends on uniting the rural people against these enemies. This is done by showing how these agents would deny the people's rights, showing how they do damage, telling about the crimes they commit using specific examples from the local area. This is also done by promoting the spirit of secrecy among the rural people as well as getting them to commit themselves in fighting with the self-defense forces against the enemy. We must also maintain firm leadership of the various civic organizations, and set up special revolutionary groups if necessary -- only then can we prevent security agents, local informers and spies from penetrating our area.

We must maintain a spirit of the offense. In order to motivate the people to attack our enemies we must make them understand the validity of the Revolution's policies, and must also set up rules and working methods for them. They will not be active unless we carefully show them what they must do. Most of these efforts are political and the poor people must learn how to advance the revolution through political means thus avoiding the risks of regrettable losses which hurt the revolution and discourage the people. Above all, we must keep the masses from becoming passive.

We must better our movement, that is the caliber of Party members, the cadres and all organizations working with us.

Highly motivated people will show initiative in carrying out various tasks, making propaganda, etc. In truth, there is a tendency for the Party members to study documents in a mechanical fashion and for form's sake only. As a result the Party members and cadre are not well aware of rules and working methods. In this situation they fail to carry out plans eagerly and as a consequence the movement goes astray. Further, in some places, local policy runs counter, unintentionally to Party policy. Further there are cadres with erroneous thoughts, bureaucrats whose working methods are wrong and these affect the organization very much. Our internal ranks, therefore, take top priority in training work.

We must increase our spirit of dedication, and be determined properly to carry out Party policy, always serving the people's needs. We need to develop better methods, as was done by the Party at XB. We must rid ourselves of any strong desire for peace, eliminate our fear of the enemy. We must resist adopting irresponsible attitudes. We must develop discipline. We must avoid becoming too optimistic. We must remain always vigilant. We must eliminate bureaucratic attitudes. These things still exist in the Party.

Finally, we must develop a great spirit of offense, determined to attack our enemies ever more fiercely. In this way victory over our enemies finally will be accomplished.