

SECRET

December 3, 1965

MEMORANDUM

TO: VNCC Members

FROM: Robert H. Miller, Chairman, Viet-Nam Working Group Committee

SUBJ: Existing Cadre Programs in Viet-Nam

Enclosed as Attachment I is a list of the various cadre programs now operating in rural Viet-Nam as known by Washington agencies. A brief description of each is provided, and estimates, where possible, of the magnitude of Vietnamese manpower resources devoted to the respective programs. In some cases the estimates are based on fragmentary, conflicting, or out-dated information. In addition, it is likely that some small programs employing what may loosely be defined as rural cadre have been omitted or overlooked. The purpose of this list is to define in rough terms the present allocation of manpower resources to the listed cadre programs, the functions these programs serve, and an evaluation of the past and present performance of the cadre/programs.

Attachment II is a statistical breakdown of cadre. Items 1 - 9 in this breakdown are the cadre programs described in Attachment I. Items 10-18 are not covered in Attachment I because information on them is not readily available.

Attachment III is a chart categorizing GVN employees (not just "cadre") and their geographical distribution.

Attachments:

As above.

SECRET

CADRE PROGRAMS IN VIET-NAM

1. Vietnamese Information Service (VIS). Of estimated 12,000 VIS personnel, probably some 10% (1,200) are true cadre operating in rural areas. VIS is a Directorate under the Ministry of PsyWar. VIS headquarters in Saigon has about 2,000 persons. Some of the 12,000 personnel are administrative and service employees in corps and provincial VIS offices, while 250-300 cadres should exist in each province. The district VIS offices are staffed with from three to ten men, and theoretically one information cadre per village exists at the lowest level. The incorporation of 7,000 civic action cadre into VIS in the fall of 1964 has not resulted in the hoped for increased VIS functioning in rural areas. A decentralized organization with VIS corps-level organs responsible for field operations has been established, and provincial VIS chiefs report to Saigon through corps representatives.

2. JUSPAO - Employees. Some 115 of JUSPAO's 390 Vietnamese employees function as cadres in rural areas. Most are assigned to provincial offices and are responsible for stimulating, advising, and assisting VIS personnel. Other JUSPAO employees are members of mobile teams serving on information or training missions in the field.

3. People's Action Teams (PAT's). Initiated in Quang Ngai province in April 1964, the PAT program has expanded to include 8,678 PAT personnel operating or training in 19 provinces as of 10 November 1965. The projected strength for 30 June 1966 is 20,393 personnel. The PAT's are responsible to the district and province chiefs, the former administering them in day-to-day operations. The province chief is responsible for coordinating their activities with ARVN and the pacification program. The PAT's provide the province chief with a psywar social/civic action instrument to assist him in winning the confidence and respect of the villagers. PAT's serve, in a sense, as advance pacification cadres, attempting to establish good relations with the local population and develop an intelligence capability in the villages. Team members are recruited from and serve in their native areas. The performance of the PAT's is considered as very good.

4. Advanced Political Action Program (APA). Initiated in several Delta provinces in April 1964, the APA Teams are selected and trained in a similar fashion as the PAT's. As

of 10 November

of 10 November 1965, 3,948 APA personnel were operational or in training in 32 provinces. The projected 31 June 1966 figure is 4,392. Six-to ten-man teams are to prepare the groundwork for regular military and pacification personnel, primarily by conducting social and civic action programs with the villagers. Intelligence collection is another aspect of their functions. The APA Teams also aid the province chief in evaluating the readiness of villages to come under GVN control. Like the PAT's, the APA Teams are under the control of the district and province chiefs. The APA program is considered to have achieved considerable success to date.

5. Census Grievance Program (CG). The CG program was initiated in Kien Hoa province in February 1964 with the objective of determining accurately the number, location, and political sympathies of the local population, and establishing a political dialogue with the peasantry by determining popular grievances and aspirations and taking corrective action. One- or two-man stations conduct a person-by-person census and regularly reinterview each individual and family. Current intelligence is also acquired. As of 10 November 1965 1,028 CG cadre were operating or in training in 11 provinces, and 2,100 are scheduled by 30 June 1966. CG Teams are responsible directly to the province chiefs. While measuring progress statistically is difficult, CG Teams in the first nine months of 1965 interviewed 350,230 families and 87,962 individuals, and identified 2,630 VC for province tactical units.

6. Current Intelligence Program. The Counter Intelligence Program is designed to identify and monitor activities of non-military insurgents, primarily in contested areas where a definite pacification effort is underway. The object is to provide current intelligence and political OB to identify, locate, and eliminate non-military insurgent entities during the pacification process. Most of the 7,000 Special Police Branch as well as several hundred Central Intelligence Organization personnel are deployed through the 43 provinces. The CIA/CIO/SPB combination directs the day-to-day activities. CIA is expanding the program to develop its potential for greater quantity and quality of intelligence.

7. Counter-Subversion Program. Primarily targeted at major metropolitan areas, the Counter-Subversion Program seeks primarily to penetrate and subsequently destroy insurgent networks and cells responsible for street-level political action. The Combined Security Committee (CSC) of U.S. and

GVN

GVN security and intelligence agencies conducts the program in Saigon, and smaller organs operate in other cities. Increased effectiveness of security operations has resulted from the program.

8. Counter-Espionage Program. Targeted at the DRV Central Research Bureau (Cuc Tinh Bao) intelligence agents within the GVN is a small operational Counter-Espionage Program, limited primarily to metropolitan areas in South Vietnam. The National Police and CIO are aided by CIA, MACV, and RVNAF components in what has been a moderately successful program. Increased allocation of manpower is being made to the program.

9. Communist Party Penetration Program. This program has the goal of infiltrating long-term agents into the Lao Dong and Peoples Revolutionary Parties to, in the short range, provide advance intelligence on insurgent intentions and capabilities, and in the longer range identify VC leadership cadre to facilitate their arrest when the insurgency has begun to regress. Only limited success has been achieved by this program, and results are far from satisfactory.

10. Exploitation of Prisoners and Ralliers. The exploitation of prisoners and ralliers for certain intelligence purposes is conducted through the various National Police tactical interrogation centers. Construction of new and modern provincial interrogation facilities is being urgently carried out to keep pace with the training of interrogators and analysts which has progressed rapidly. The CIA/CIO/SPB combination operates the program, including the Saigon National Interrogation Center, and it is considered that progress on the program has been generally satisfactory.

11. Mobile Action Cadre (MAC). MAC Teams of five to ten members spend 30-45 days to organize New Life Hamlets by re-establishing the GVN presence, restoring civil administration in hamlets following clear and hold operations, and carrying out special pacification tasks directed toward bridging the gap between the government and the people. Approximately 4,200 cadre were functioning as of 31 August 1965. Responsible to Ministry of Rural Construction, these cadre evolved from the Strategic Hamlet Construction Cadre, and are sometimes now referred to as New Life Construction Cadre or Pacification Cadre. Under the new plans for rural construction cadre these cadre will be integrated into the unified

cadre

cadre program. Their performance in the past, as the performance of the cadre listed in 12 and 13 below, has been unsatisfactory. Their mission has been ill-defined, organization poor, recruitment standards low, training too theoretical and not adequately practical, equipment and transportation poor, leadership unqualified, operations un-coordinated, and morale deficient and lacking of esprit de corps.

12. Mobile Administrative Cadre (GAMO). The GAMO cadre were developed by the Ministry of Interior to reinforce or reestablish village governments. Their mission is very similar to that of the MAC but they have been recruited at a higher level and given special training. A total of 1,150 were operational as of 31 August 1965 with an eventual goal of 1,200 set. Their performance and problems were described in 11 above.

13. Rural Political Cadre. The political cadre are responsible for building a political machine and infrastructure at the village level. Original force levels called for up to 15,000 men, but their strength as of 31 August 1965 was only 700. Although recruitment was to include all political and religious groups, Dai Viet party influence has so far been preponderant.

CADRE STATISTICS

1. Vietnamese Information Service (Including all VIS personnel)	12,000
2. JUSPAO Employees	115
3. PAT's	8,678 (20,393 projected 6/30/66)
4. APA Teams	3,948 (4,392 projected 3/30/66)
5. Census Grievances	1,028 (2,100 projected 6/30/66)
6. SPB/CIO Current Intelligence Program	7,300
7. Mobile Action Cadre	4,200
8. Mobile Administrative Cadre (GAMO)	1,150
9. Rural Political Cadre	700
10. <u>Ministry of Social Welfare</u>	(1966 Projec- tion appears to be 16,000)
(a) Social Welfare Cadre	466
11. <u>Ministry of Education</u>	
(a) New Life Hamlet Teachers	5,620
12. <u>Ministry of Health</u>	
(a) Malaria Eradication	1,494
(b) Rural Health and Sanitation	5,853
13. <u>Ministry of Agriculture</u>	
(a) Crop Protection Cadre	101
(b) Agricultural Extension Cadre	160
(c) Family Life Cadre	51
(d) Animal Husbandry Cadre	19
(e) Sanitation Cadre	15
(f) Land Reform	47
(g) Agriculture Cadre	314
(h) Cooperatives Cadre	19
14. <u>Ministry of Finance - Tax Inspection</u>	
Cadre	2
15. <u>Ministry of Youth - Youth Cadre</u>	520
16. <u>Ministry of Defense - Popular Forces</u>	
Cadre	392
17. <u>Ministry of Labor</u>	
(a) Investigation Cadre	25
(b) Civic Action Cadre	22
18. <u>Ministry of Interior</u>	
(a) Re-Education Cadre	165
(b) Administrative Cadre	72
(c) Montagnard Cadre	113
	<hr/>
TOTAL	54,589

CATEGORIES OF GVN EMPLOYEES
(as of December 31, 1964)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>SAIGON</u>	<u>PROVINCES</u>
Career	39,532	14,756	24,776
Contract	1,744	1,131	613
Daily Wage Status	37,292	17,172	20,120
Temporary or Piece Work	<u>64,345</u>	<u>16,565</u>	<u>47,780</u>
TOTAL	142,913	49,624	93,289

Of the 48,000 police force, 73.58% are assigned to rural (non-Saigon) areas.