

Bohannon
Lecture

TRANSCRIPTION OF LECTURE
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FETC/AID - UH

(Reel 3)

Bohannon:

Gentlemen: I had hoped, or intended, at this time to go on with the approach to counter-insurgency following the material which we presented this morning. However, with so many people missing, I don't think that it would be fair to do that; neither do I want to waste your time nor do nothing, which would not compensate me for giving up my siesta. This is a good old Philippine tradition and I like to take it. Maybe we can start off by asking if there are any questions left over from this morning's session. I got wound up in my own logorrhea this morning and didn't stop in time for the questions. Let's see if there is any discussion left over from this morning.

Question: "Going over the theories about counterinsurgency which we discussed this morning, it seems to me that it boils down to the attitude of the people. Now let me ask you: If you had the choice of working in one of two villages, as an old specialist in counter-insurgency would you choose one where the people know the importance of combatting these insurgents, and have a tremendous desire to restore their own status quo, and one where you had 45 specialists in counter-guerrilla, but the people didn't give a damn, which one would you work in?"

Answer: "Well, just saying that you have 45 specialists in counter-insurgency in village 'Y', is enough to put me off that one completely, because I don't want any parts of any damn specialists in anything, especially those who consider themselves experts in counter-insurgency. Aside from that, if you get people with a tremendous desire to do something, and the know-how to do it, you can always direct them towards the objective, or deflect them towards a better one. Motivation? Yes, that is the

best thing that you can have, especially when you have the know-how to go with it. What I am trying to do here is not just to give you basic theory, for the sake of theory, or to make you specialists in counter-insurgency. What I have been trying to do is to distill experience into a pocket form so that it can give you reference points to think with, to analyze the situations which you may encounter, and particularly, the proposed solutions that may be handed to you. I think of this material as tools, not as an end in itself but as tools to work with, and to help you analyze properly the situation in which you may find yourself. Does that in any way answer your question?

Question: [badly garbled, in substance] "What order of priority could you give to the many things which need to be done in counter-insurgency?"

Answer: "Well, there are so many different orders of business in the way that it is difficult to get a handle on them. I think that the only way to approach an answer to that question is by saying that I would, realizing that the only way that we can bring this war to a satisfactory conclusion is for the people to support their government, and for their government to earn their support, therefore I would look for those things that are not being done but could be, that would lead in this direction. I would look at things that are being done that are counter-productive, and try to get them stopped. There are any God's number of specifics, based on common problems:

One. What about the Chieu Hoi Center? The Chieu Hoi program in the province is one of the most visible examples of government's attitude towards the people. If it is a miserable damp hole where people are lying around doing nothing all day long, barely fed, no indoctrination, no effort to prepare them to go back to useful life, - there is a real easy, potent, target to work on. I have some hope that by the time you gentlemen get to the field these will be in general pretty good, effective, places and they won't be a good place for you to grab hold of.

Give you another. What about the para-military forces? Popular Forces especially. Are they getting fed and paid? Again there is something that, unless there has been a radical change in attitude in the field is not really an AID matter, but if it is not being done, we better get into it.

What kind of a New Life Hamlet program do they have? What are the Rural Construction or Revolutionary Development cadre actually doing? Get out in the area where they are supposed to be at work and find out: A; Are they there? B; Are they doing anything besides sleep, chase women, thieves? C; What ought they to be doing, what is the work that needs to be done, what constructive suggestions can you make for their actions?"

Question: "One thing that nobody has talked about, except today, is that it seems that almost everybody who has been there is glad that he is out of there. It seems as though the biggest problem is working with the ARVN and with the GVN officials, that they are the greatest stumbling blocks. Have you any words of wisdom on how to go about countering these artificial problems, and establishing good working relations with the province chief? "

Answer: "Well, I don't know whether I have any words of wisdom or not, but this is a good question. Experience has been, in Vietnam and elsewhere, that if you go in at a level where you can do so, that is, if you are the provincial representative you go to the province chief and the first thing that you want to do, or try to do is to get acquainted with the province chief and find out what he thinks he is doing, or what he says he is doing, find out what announced motivations or purposes are, and, in general, they will be pretty damn laudable by your standards. This is reasonable, since after all by now he is almost certain to have a real good patter to give the Americans, so you just buy that lock, stock, and barrel.

Well, that is just the greatest idea I have heard since the invention of sex -- now, how can I help you?"

"Well, I really don't need any help" he says, in a very polite way.

"Well, anyhow, I am here to do the best I can to help you, and so on."

And then you go out and find his cadre teams in their sacks when they ought to be working, and you go back to him and:

"Sir, this is awful, somebody has been putting one over on you, or you have been too busy to check up on this -- this is what has been going on and I want to help you straighten it out in line with your objectives."

It is not that they are not doing what you want; it is that they are not doing what he has said he wants them to do; they are not contributing to the mission that he has avowed to you.

I'll tell you a story. Many years ago I went into the office of the Chief of Intelligence of the Philippine Constabulary, whom I knew moderately well, quite a friend of mine. He went into his usual song and dance about the trouble that he had with his agents and some of his officers shaking down the Chinese, bringing false charges against them, in order to extort money, or get something from them. Well, while this was going on his aide knocked at the door and said, in effect, that here is that man you wanted to see right away. The captain dragged in a scared Chinaman and the colonel looked at him and in Tagalog said: "You! You, if you don't get those two kegs of nails over to my house tonight, you are going into a cell as a member of the Chinese Communist Party." Yes sir, yes sir, and he went out again.

The colonel went on for some time longer about the problems he had, and when I left, I dropped word to the aide that I hadn't realized the colonel was having difficulty getting materials for his house, and there should be any embarrassing problems to let me know and I would see if I couldn't at least scrounge a keg or two of nails off some American construction

outfit. That was all I said, but do you know, we had the most wonderful cooperation from that colonel from then on? All I had to do was ask him to get his men on a job, and they would be there. There was no suggestion that he was engaged in anything improper, no, and he didn't want me to make that suggestion, either. You guys are going to be in a wonderful position to do that with your knowledge of Vietnamese. Yes sir?

Question: "Earlier you said that there was a place for the use of terror by insurgents and by counter-insurgents. Do you plan to, or would you care now to comment further on that point. Certainly there is the indiscriminate kind of bombing terror, which the government does have control over and doesn't seem to make any kind of sense in counter-insurgency; but there are different sorts of terror, different uses of them which are not the same as bombing, and that is what I hope you would expand on."

Answer: "I certainly will try to. Certainly there are differences in the degree of terror and its use by the insurgent and counter-insurgent. I think the most important difference though is that the insurgents can publicize their use of terror; they can do it generally speaking, openly and in their own name. Of course once in a while there will be an unfortunate accident which they will want to disavow, but generally speaking they regard it as a demonstration of their strength, and too bad if somebody gets in the way."

But when we get in the position of trying to get people to support their government, which is solicitous for their rights and welfare, you can't very well say, well, yes, we also commit acts of assassination, terrorism, and so on. This is the weakness of the bombing, and so on. Here is the government which claims to be their friend and protector, bombing them. On the other hand, what can be done with particularly good effect, is deep penetrations and assassination. Even deep penetrations without assassination, getting way the hell back in the area which the guerrilla thinks they own, lock, stock, and barrel, and put-

ting up signs. One that we used in the Philippines with good effect had an eye on it - just a piece of cardboard with an eye printed on it. That is all it was, but, do you know, a band of guerrillas following its regular route, going into the little village or campsite that they are accustomed to spending the night in and finding these signs tacked up in four or five or six of these places, it worries them. What the hell is this thing all about? It obviously must be more than just a piece of paper, or is it? Well, if a couple of weeks later they find somebody in their own territory, one of their own people, dead, with one of these things pinned on his chest, it is pretty sure that this is bad medicine.

Whether you actually want to identify the specific act or not depends on the level of sophistication; of how naive the guerrillas are; whether they can believe that the eye actually reports what it sees. Some may think that it is a form of television; other may see it as the symbol of some secret avenger. That sort of activity is worth while in counter-insurgency. In those situations where the government does not claim the support of the governed you can go into other means of coercion or punitive measures, short of murder, but very serious, such as enforcing curfew from four o'clock in the afternoon until eight o'clock the next morning -- nobody goes out of their houses. This in a sense approaches terrorism."

Question: Wasn't there some religious group in Vietnam that used this same sign?"

Answer: "Yes, various forms of this symbol have been used in many places and by many groups. The Cao Dai use a more elaborate version of this same symbol. This is one of the reasons this symbol was used back in 1955 against the Hoa Hao -- to encourage good feeling and cooperation between them and the Cao Dai."

Question: [garbled, in substance] What about local government and local elections in counter-insurgency? Wasn't elimination of local self-government by President Diem, as said by Dr. Fall, a very bad thing?"

Answer: "Well, local elections, local self-government is extremely important in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, the official suspension of local self-government at village level by President Diem was factual. But, from there on, Dr. Fall and I went to very different schools together, as far as concerns the facts in the matter. First of all, (this of course is rehashing material which you have had in other presentations), the Vietnamese village traditionally was self-governing, yes, but they were not self-governing through a formal electoral process. They were to all intents and purposes self-governing through a Council of Elders, Conseil de Notables, who were a more or less self-perpetuating, self-appointed body. Generally speaking, they did not have statutory or command functions, rather the way that it worked: The Village was notified of a requirement by the emperor's representative, perhaps the cantor or the province chief, or whatever the lowest official echelon might be; then the gentlemen of the Conseil de Notables sat down together and talked it over, could they do it, how much could they bargain the emperor's representative down on his demands, could they buy him off, and whatever they had to do, how could they do it.

Well, if the requisition was, say, for 20 draftees, this was how they would do it. They would go around, and say: "Now John that son of yours who really isn't very bright, and actually he is more trouble than he is worth, well, we have got to furnish twenty soldiers from the village, and we think maybe it would be a good thing for all concerned if he went off and maybe learned how to do something."

Then they would say to Bill: "That young stud of a son of yours who is going around getting the girls in trouble, we better get him out of here before he gets in any serious trouble, so fortunately the emperor needs twenty soldiers, and he can be one of them." It worked out, really, as pretty much of a consensus system, and more or less, actually, I believe, in most villages

there was a ~~representative~~ representative of the emperor who might or might not have the title of village chief. His authority was limited, he was in most cases appointed, hopefully from the village or at least from the general area. It was in this sense that the village was self-governing. So far as I know there were not formal elections at any time for any official except in the major cities, prior to the time of Diem's government.

Question: [unintelligible]

Answer: "Not initially, First of all, the system which I described is the system which existed in Central and North Vietnam without too much change until after WW II. After WW II, the French began to lean down on the villagers in Central and North Vietnam, rather more than they had in the past. In South Vietnam, Cochinchina, which was a French colony, the French were in control all the time. They appointed the officials, even putting into Frenchmen, in some cases, right down to the village level for years. So the fact that Diem started appointing village chiefs did not come (so far as I have been informed - I could be wrong about this, but I don't think I am), did not cause any great to-do.

What did cause problems was the widespread corruption of village officials and district officials. Incidentally, the district, at least until recently, had no legal status whatsoever, the district chief was a military officer who commanded the garrison and troops in the area, but he had no other legal status or legal position. These people and the higher officials who backed them up, these were the ones who through widespread corruption, abuse, and inefficiency, disregard of the rights of people -- these were the things that the Viet Cong harped on then, and harp on now, more than anything else, in seeking to develop motivation for their support."

Question: "What are the rights of the people under the Vietnamese government? Just what is the court structure, what do the people mean when they ask for justice?"

Answer: "Essentially it is a respect for their individual dignity, a desire for elementary country justice -- that is about all it amounts too. True, there were legal restraints written into their legal code -- you couldn't serve warrants after dark, except under extraordinary conditions; until about three years ago there were only a very limited number of people who could legally make arrests for offenses not committed in their presence. The average policeman could not arrest anyone for an offense he was reported to have committed, even with a warrant. Only an elite corps, originally made up of retired NCO's from the French forces called the gendarmerie, were the only people who could serve warrants. I think you could sum up the aspirations of the average Vietnamese peasant by saying that he wants fair play, and reasonable country justice, and respect for himself as an individual.

Can I go on with this for just one minute? You have all heard about the Personalism doctrines which the Ngo family sponsored. Generally they are spoken of as being either a complete fraud, wholly un-understandable, totally nonsensical, or else you get into a metaphysical discussion of their alleged ancestry in France, and so on; but the fact of the matter is that basically it was a hell of a good political philosophy for Vietnam or Vietnamese. The real trouble with it was that, first, it was almost always explained in the most high-faluting language, completely unintelligible, or almost completely unintelligible, to those who heard it, even though they too might be educated. Usually, too it was explained to them in a mumble mumble fashion. Secondly, the officials of government generally didn't give the most remote indication of trying to live up to it, because personalism teaches the duty of the State to the individual, of the

individual' to the state, but emphasizing the rights to the full development of the personality of the individual.

This makes good sense, but unfortunately, as I see it, the average Vietnamese official really cannot accept that the average Vietnamese peasant is a person, so although they were persons in the abstract, in the concrete this is only a damn peasant, and what he feels or thinks or wants or what happens to him doesn't matter a damn. You had this tremendous gulf, in practice, between the political philosophy of the government and the average government official, and the average peasant with whom he came into contact. Right there you had all the Communists needed to start some sort of trouble.

Once I sat in the office of a province chief, and he told me at great length about all the things he was doing to win the support of the people, I looked out his window and there was a whole queue of people lined up, that I had seen when I came in. They had moved a little bit but not much, standing out there in the hot sun, many of them with a half dozen chickens, or perhaps two bags of produce. I asked him who these people were, and he said: "Oh, they are just a bunch of damned peasants waiting to get permits to go to town to the market."

"Sir, they get around quite a bit, wonder if they wouldn't be useful to get the word around about what you are trying to do for the people?" "Ah, nobody pays any attention to these little bastards."

It would have been so damn easy for him to have gotten two or three or four reasonably energetic people putting out the permits, instead of one guy sitting back there, every once in a while deigning to notice one of those who were waiting for permits. It was not just a matter of courtesy, but it would have been such an easy and effective way of demonstrating the changed attitude of the government. They would still have had to get permits, but instead of spending the whole day sweating it out in the hot sun, the government would at least be trying to make it as fast and easy as possible.

Question: "We read about VC attacks, especially against province chiefs, school teachers and public officials of the GVN, but relatively few reports of attacks against AID officials. What do you attribute this to? Is it their lack of tactical value to the VC, or do they make themselves pretty scarce at the right times?"

Answer: "Well, probably both of those might enter into this at times. Another is that it is a little bit hard to justify the murder of AID men as being a service to the people. Again they are not as much exposed as most village chiefs or village school-teachers. Anyone who has a job out in the province, and really is trying to do it, is likely to be a good deal more exposed than an AID man who usually has a good deal of protection when he goes out into the province, if there is really any serious danger of assassination.

I will not pretend to be able to read the mind of the Viet Cong, to know exactly why they do or do not choose them as victims; neither do I believe that there is so much organization, so much discipline, that a wholly consistent policy is followed. Considering all the people they could have grabbed who would give them an unfavorable reaction from the general population. Doug Ramsey who was snatched in a near by province about a year ago. There was a man who was really doing a fine job, really got along with people, he probably was grabbed, I suppose, because they thought that not to grab him was leaving too dangerous a man loose. There have been others who were snatched, whose utility to anyone has been seriously questioned. I do not know certainly their actions are not wholly consistent, which is not to say that they do not react in accordance with reason in any given case.

Question: [Unintelligible]

Answer: "Well, this depends. Many insurgents, many resistance movements, have taken prisoners very successfully. The Chicoms, when they were really marching in 47, 48, 49, so they were pretty much prevented from (unitelligible); they took prisoners like mad. They had a very interesting program which comes as a surprise to many people. They would throw them into a reorientation camp under reasonably pleasant conditions as far as were appropriate - obviously they weren't putting out featherbeds or linen sheets to a bunch of Chinese coolies - that they happened to catch -- everything considered, they were reasonably pleasant within their facilities, held them there without any undue pressure for three to six months, then released them. They said: "OK son, go along home now. We hope you have learned by now why: You should join our party; if you don't want to do that you shouldn't go back to serving the running dogs of Chiang Kai Shek. Of course, you may be forced to go back into the army, you may get captured again. Don't worry about it, in fact if you do go back into the army and get into combat, and the situation is such that it seems feasible for you to do so, come on over to us, we won't hold it against you."

It seemed to work out very well. The Viet Cong for a long time were doing something very similar with the Vietnamese armed forces personnel whom they captured. True, when they would run into pinpoint targets, let us say a guardpost, watch tower, and that watchtower had a bad reputation in the neighborhood, had been giving them too much trouble, or the people of that community or the people in the village, who were supporting the Viet Cong were finding it a nuisance, they might very well make a Roman holiday out of the post commander, perhaps all the troops. In some cases they cut up the women folks as well. But these were exceptions to the rule, which was to receive the erring brother, try to persuade him of the errors of his ways, and then give him a chance to demonstrate what he had learned."

Question: "How unsophisticated or sophisticated is the idea of ransoming in counter-insurgency (unintelligible)?"

Answer: "Well, there have been repeated proposals that we go into ransoming activities, or that we go into headhunting and activities where you buy or reward surrenders. This is an ancient Chinese custom, of course, "silver bullets" and all that jazz. One of the hardest fights I have had with American advisors has been over the advisability of adopting one or more of these practices in Vietnam. I don't think they are worth while, they are the wrong move, they are counter-productive because they violate the moral basis which the insurgents and the counter-insurgents alike seek to establish. I doubt if the Viet Cong actually would be too receptive to such proposals."

Question: "[unintelligible] don't like the local officials, the local [unintelligible]?"

Answer: "It might the VC, not the government, because of his promise of good behavior, when he knows you can grab him any time. You may even make a deal on a local basis, for salt (?) fish (?) you release him in return for this or that in turning his loyal support for your cause."

Question: (in substance): "Was the practice of offering rewards in the Philippines very successful?"

Answer: "Well, first of all we did not have that. We had something that (unintelligible) worked like the same thing, but it was a different matter. Actually a very different basis. What we did in the Philippines was offer rewards for the capture or death of specified criminals. Now these guys were not called criminals because they were Huk leaders. Thereward for Luis Taruc was his acts of murder, robbery in band, arson, etc., etc., right down to moperly and breaking into jail. It was not a reward for Luis Taruc as field commander of the Huka. On the posters all the big print was about the crimes for which he was wanted. Then down in the small print it said incidentally he is may also be readily identified as being the field commander of the Hukbalahap movement.

That was one half, the biggest half of the strength of the moral position of the government, and a nice little indirect propaganda debit to the whole Huk movement. The other half was that we had damn good identification information, on these people so that when a man was brought in alive, or a head was brought in, or a body was brought in, we could usually identify him with a high degree of certainty, whether this was actually the guy for whom the reward was offered. This is extremely important. When you start offering rewards for heads, I don't care what society you are in, and you don't take damn good measures to insure that you get only those heads that you want - identifiable as the ones you want, you are likely to get all kinds of heads. I ran into this problem once myself, years ago. I had to insist on a set of Japanese dogtags coming in with each head because I started getting some Filipino heads in return for a box of K-rations, which was the reward we were offering then.

Now, in Vietnam this is being tried, this business of offering rewards for specific individuals. They were all cranked up, about eighteen months ago to go into this campaign full blast, so to speak, and then they made the devastating and discouraging discovery that they didn't have any good ID information on most of the big fish. This was preposterous, and depressing, because somewhere around there are photographs, and fingerprints, and probably what the criminologists call a portrait parle, of damn near every Vietnamese over, say, about 30 years old, but they are lost, strayed, or stolen. And, until recently there has been no organized effort to collect these things. Sometimes at provincial level you can pick up photographs of the wanted men. Some provinces have very nice little black books where they list man after man, with his photograph with crossreferences to his fingerprint card, and so on. This is the exception."

I think we should take a break now.

Reel 3, Side 2

I think that at this time we really ought to go into the question of, or go into some theory and descriptive analysis, of counter-insurgency. We had a definition of it the other day - two definitions -- one of them as it being everything you could think of, the other being a much more limited one based on the idea of a government which claims to owe allegiance to the people, and claims a right to their allegiance.

I think that at this time we should point out that there are two radically differing types of government that are likely to be faced with what we call insurgency. One of them is a government imposed from outside, usually a so-called colonial government, whether that term is acceptable or not, these governments generally fit into the category of colonial governments. They are, in effect, occupation governments, comparable to a wartime occupation government, in that they have been emplaced for some time, and usually their emplacement has been through more or less apparently legal means, usually with the consent or apparent consent of the former government. No matter how they have come into power, normally we expect to find the colonial government, which is faced with an insurgency, which is engaged in counter-insurgency, being emplaced for some time, having established effective machinery of government which expectedly, usually, actually, is largely loyal to it.

The other type of government is an indigenous government, usually one which more or less functions with or purports to function with, the consent of the governed, and on their behalf. This pertains to such governments as we had in the Philippines, a government which was elected according to almost exactly the same principles as our own administrations in the United States; where basic constitutional rights of the citizen were even broader, even more specifically defined, than they are under our own system.

It ranges from a government such as that, to such a government as President Diem's which was nominally elected; which was in fact elected, but by people who, I believe, had very little idea of what the electoral process through a rigged election, certainly a government which achieved its over-whelming parliamentary majority by elections which were highly questionable. It ranges from such things as that, to such things as constitutional monarchies, such as one has in Thailand, or the Greek monarchy. Not necessarily government of the people, not necessarily government chosen by the people but at least the national government, purporting to govern for the welfare of the governed.

This distinction I think is very important, between those governments which have been imposed - alien governments imposed on the people - and indigenous governments which claim to govern on behalf of the people, in the people's interest, call for the people's loyalty, because it makes a lot of difference in the techniques of counter-insurgency, approaches to counter-insurgency, which may be employed.

These approaches, essentially, seem to boil down to four. The first of them is area clearance. These are described in the handouts, so no need to take detailed notes unless you want to. Area clearance operations are designed to exterminate, or to capture and transplant, both the active guerrillas and the civilian populace from among whom they draw their support. This is the oldest and when it works, the most effective approach -- and the most profitable approach -- to counter insurgency.

The old Romans did it -- move into an area, any body opposes you catch him, make a slave of him, sell him off to the slave traders or send him back to Rome for a spectacle, realize a nice profit, and eliminate the opposition. If you want to make a horrible example you just move in and kill 'em all -- or where you can't catch them or get to close enough range to make slaves

out of them, shoot them with arrows, or what have you.

It is also an approach which has been used, is being used I think right down in (unintelligible) today by governments which ordinarily do not claim the support of their people, or when they do so, say they are working for the good of future generations. I refer of course to the Communist governments, which have repeatedly employed this approach from the days of the anti-White movement in '20-'21, then again in the Ukraine in the early '30's, and the Chinese have been employing it in recent years in Tibet. It works, either kill 'em or move 'em out where they will be useful to you.

Gentlemen this is not a technique which can be employed by a government which purports to represent the governed, which seriously purports to represent the governed, and to govern in their behalf. British operations in Malay were to a large extent of this nature. The clearance of the 500,000 Chinese squatters which Dr. Fall described last night, was largely a case of relocating everybody, clearing the area, so that the guerrilla had no one from whom to draw their support.

Next approach is fighting the guerrilla - placing the emphasis on combat, running down the guerrillas, fighting them, while either ignoring the civilian population, or trying to seal them off from contact with the guerrillas. Generally when a guerrilla movement starts, this is the first approach taken to the problem. First police, then the Rangers, then the army, are sent out to find these damn guerrillas, and either shoot them all, or capture them for trial and punishment. Never mind the people.

Sometimes this works. It works when the guerrillas have no base among the population, when they are trying to start a movement without the groundwork laid for it. If, however, there is real support for the guerrilla; for the insurgent, whether they are a political insurgency or they are simply a resistance movement against an occupying power, this business of chasing down the

guerrillas and ignoring the civilian population usually doesn't work at all.

So most often from the civilian population. This is a favored approach, it can merge into the fourth one, which I call "stealing the thunder" of the guerrillas, of the insurgents, but it is probably the most popular approach to counter-insurgency, at least as a step. In US Army doctrine today this is the second step in a counter-insurgency program -- to drive first a physical and then a psychological wedge between the guerrillas and the people on whom they call for support. This is absolutely essential, the breach between guerrillas and civilians is a prerequisite to success, to successful counter-insurgency. However, the feasibility of creating a physical separation, as contrasted to a psychological or emotional separation, is another matter.

That is why I feel that there is a fourth approach which should be considered, which is indeed, in my opinion the only one that is feasible for a government -- which claims to be of, by, and for the people, in a well-developed insurgency situation. That is the approach which I call "stealing their thunder", in other words, as I have written it out here: "Taking the political, psychological, economic and social actions affecting both civilians and guerrillas, which will draw support away from the guerrillas and attract it to the government, accompanied by continuing closely coordinated combat operations against active guerrillas".

You may say that that sounds an awful lot like a second version of the preceding. It is an awful lot like it, but, the significant difference is that in one the focus is on the guerrilla, in the other the focus is on the people -- who may willingly or unwillingly support the guerrilla movement. It is with that, it was with that theory in mind that the Office of Rural Affairs in Saigon came into being. It was on that principle that they operated, it is still to a considerable extent, I think, the

guiding philosophy of that office which is now of course the Office of Field Operations. Certainly it focusses on the civilians rather than on the guerrillas, and it is precisely because it did focus on the civilians rather than on the guerrillas that it was so tremendously effective, in 1962, 1963, 1964.

All of these approaches have been tried in various variations, combinations, and permutations, time after time, with varying degrees of success, varying degrees of persistence. There is one more approach to counterinsurgency or counter-guerrilla operations -- or perhaps it might be more accurate to call it a retreat from them and that is to surrender to the guerrillas. And don't kid yourselves, this has been done repeatedly; this is what some of our fellow-Americans are agitating that we do now in Vietnam; it is something that we might possibly wind up doing, even without realizing it. The French surrendered to them in Vietnam, they surrendered to them in Algeria; they have been consistently advising us that since they couldn't win, we can't either, so the quicker we surrender the better. The British did it in Cyprus.

It may seem unthinkable, at first glance, to think of a major Western power surrendering to guerrillas, but the longer the war drags on, the more the issues and principles involved become obscured by emotionalism, by wishful thinking, by softheartedness or meat-headedness, the more attractive it becomes, particularly to the man who wants to be sure of winning an election back in the home country.

However, of all of these approaches to counter-insurgency, the only one which so far as I know has really succeeded in achieving the objective, that is of eliminating the insurgency, establishing and maintaining a government which has the support of the people while respecting the rights of the people, has been the approach of "stealing their thunder". In fact, the only successful

counterinsurgency, by a government of elected by the people, against a well-organized and viable guerrilla movement, was the one done in precisely this way in the Philippines. I don't know of another really successful counterinsurgency that meets those criteria.

Question: "What system would you say was used in the insurrection of the Finns against the Russians in 1944-45; the insurrection by the Tibetans against the Chinese in 1955-56; and the insurrection of the North Vietnamese peasants in Ho Chi Minh's home district against the North Vietnamese communist government in the late 50's?"

Counter--question: "What techniques were used? Answer: Against these insurrections which were successfully quelled?"

Answer: "In all three of those, the North Vietnamese, the Tibetans against the Chinese, the Finns against Russia: Shoot the bastards. Kill 'em, or capture them, and put them to work for you, and in no case was that done by a government elected by the people and claiming, to govern, sincerely claiming, or with an appearance of sincerity claiming to govern on their behalf. This is the old iron hand system.

Sure, there have been other successful counter-insurgencies, in terms of preserving the government, but, they weren't conducted by governments which claimed the support and allegiance of the people, and they weren't governments which had to depend on the support of those people from whom they drew their troops, and the bulk of their supplies.

This is an extremely important point: Where do the soldiers come from who engage in your counter-insurgency activities? Where do the government officials come from? Were they drawn from the same people who are engaged in the insurgency, or are they aliens? This has been one of the squawks in South Vietnam, that the government is an alien government, run by a bunch of damn Northerners, or damn Centrists, or damn Catholics. These are