

TRANSCRIPT OF LECTURE  
FETC/AID - UH  
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Sessions 6, 7, Reel 4

(There was) another thing we experimented with in the Philippines along these lines, (we only made one of them, because by that time the need for such things was pretty well over) we took an old 45-70 rifle, the immediate post-Civil War type, one of the old trap-door 45-70 Springfields, and proceeded to fit it with a silencer and a chamber adapter so that we could use .45 pistol cartridges in it. Standard .45 ACP. And you know you could reach out 500 yards and knock off a man with that, and he wouldn't hear a damn sound, and neither would the people with him.

Question and answer (from audience): "What was the purpose of using the .45 pistol cartridge? Availability.  
Continued: Precisely. Plenty of those to be had. The original 45-70 cartridge would have been very nice, but, actually, not a hell of a lot better at 500 yards. What they did use a good deal in the Philippine campaign was silenced "grease-guns". Modelled on the US silenced sub-machine gun M-3, but actually an improvement on them. This will interest the gun-nuts in the group, if any. You remember in the US silenced sub-machine gun the gas escape holes are drilled in the barrel in about six strings in straight lines, with absolutely no regard for where they go into the rifling? The old boy who was in charge of this for the Philippine Army, he swore up and down that, gawdammit, you should at least take care enough to make sure that the holes pierced the grooves and not the lands. I didn't think it would make a damn bit of difference, really, but he was right -- it made a consistent difference of 7/8ths of an inch penetration in ordinary pine boards, at a range of about 25 yards. I was amazed, but apparently the roughness, the drag set up by these holes going through the rifling slowed down the bullet just that much more. Don't sound logical.

He also came up with a real Buck Rogers weapon, a double automatic carbine, two automatic carbines, US Army issue, barrels and breech assemblies mounted on sliders on a single, standard, stock. And that damn thing had a cyclic rate of fire of 1600 rounds per minute. I mean, you could load both of them with 30 round clips, and go Br-r-r-ang and that was it. My what a lot of bullets it would spit out.

Question: "Would it stay down at all?"

Answer: "It stayed down just about the same as the standard. I think it was a worthwhile weapon (Unintelligible question) Its psychological effect - here you are - it was used by long-range deep penetration patrols in the area which the Huks thought they owned. Imagine their shock to run onto somebody who turns something loose which shoots twice as fast as a machine gun at them. Wow !!"

Question: "Can you explain something which I haven't quite understood? One of the inventions developed, and I gather for use in the war in Vietnam, is these .22 calibre terribly high velocity guns. As I understood it, those kind of guns if they hit anything tangible on their path, were very likely, the cartridge was very likely to be partly deflected if not to explode. Or is that applicable only to the hollow-point type? And I wondered why in jungle warfare these things should be developed, or are they not used in jungle areas? Why not use very low velocity bullets?"

Answer: "Well, the answer to your question is this: We have always believed, and we have had some experience, that light-weight bullets were easily deflected by brush, twigs, or anything of that kind. It has proven that with these very high velocity light bullets, which are rather shorter than the old high-velocity small caliber bullets, this deflection does not seem to be a problem. Those who have used them extensively in the jungle say that it is not; I tried one afternoon for several hours at fairly close range, about a hundred yards, to get some deflection out of one, and I could not. It seemed just to snip it through and keep going.

The big advantage of this weapon, and the high-velocity bullet, is the cavitation effect that it sets up when it hits meat. If you will recall, we used to use things like fairly high-speed .35 and .40 calibre bullets for demonstrations; fire into a gallon can of tomatoes and explode it. Well these little bastards will do the same thing, and they do it to meat. The man who is hit by one of these bullets is in about the same shape as if he had been hit by a .50 calibre machine gun bullet, not quite as bad, but just about. Gentlemen, I am going to have to present my profuse apologies for just a minute, but I have got to step back to the next building for a moment, where I left my cigarettes. "

Question: "Have you seen any of these little projectile firing pistols; these which use the little solid propellant rocket projectiles?"

Answer: "I have not seen any of the delivery mechanisms, but I am quite familiar with the little rocket itself, but I did know they had come up with any decent delivery mechanism for it."

Question: "Yes, as a matter of fact they caught a couple of Russians from the embassy down in San Jose trying to buy one in a hock shop."

Answer: "Was it that one, or was it the experimental triangular cartridge job?"

Question: "It was the projectile firing one."

Answer: "Hmmp. You know this is one of the amusing things about how meat-headed people can be. It was in early 1962, the manufacturers of these things, the rockets, were wandering around the Pentagon, trying to peddle them. The Chief of R&D, DOD, was very much interested. At the least excuse he would pull one out of his pocket, touch a match to it, pf-f-ft it would go and stick in a man's door, and he would say: "See what a wonderful weapon it is!!" But you couldn't get them to come up with a delivery mechanism, a pistol or a rifle. I begged them to go down to the dimestore, buy a 25 cent toy plastic submachine gun, put a little magazine in that and a hot wire, you know where you could demonstrate it.

The answer: "\*\*\*! +!, we don't want any of these goddamn bread board contraptions; somebody will have to engineer something up for it." Well, I don't know, maybe they are right, but those things could have been available for issue in Vietnam by the end of '62. And, if they are as good as they seem to be, if they had made up a couple of dozen Rube Goldberg contraptions like that, the demand would soon have created a market."

Question: "Well they finally did. I think it was finally bought up by one of these aircraft outfits out there, Aerojet I think it was. Got hold of the patent."

Answer: "Of course they have several disadvantages, of which the most conspicuous is the tracer characteristic at night. You fire a burst of those things and everybody knows just exactly where they hell they came from. The new weapon which I think is the most formidable, but still without a good launching platform, is the M-79 rocket launcher. That little job, it fires a junior-sized billiard ball sort of thing with a very high explosive in it, impact detonating, accurate up to about 300 yards, and it makes quite a little scatteration where it hits. I believe, so far, they have only come up with it with a special shotgun type launching device, which is much too heavy to be carried for the sole purpose of firing these things. I think they would do much better to have a propelling cartridge adapter so they could be fired from the grenade launcher on the rifle or carbine."

Question: "Adapter for the current grenade launcher?"

Answer: "Yes, or for something comparable to it. It needn't be the current grenade launcher, but at least it should be something that wouldn't require you to carry a big special weapon to fire it. The projectile itself, this little grenade, it's the nicest nasty little thing to come out in a long, long, time."

We had one on an experimental basis during WW II, a standard hand grenade body fitted with a special tail assembly and a detonating, point detonating fuse. The T-17 rifle grenade. The disadvantage of that was that it was heavy, and as a consequence you got quite a recoil when you fired it. But if you fired that from the shoulder as a flat trajectory weapon it was very accurate, and it was very nice for discouraging boys down around the roots of a tree, or in a bunker, or something like that."

I would like to go back to what we were talking about this afternoon, the Strategic Hamlet as an instrument both of counter-insurgency and of nation-building. I said that before we undertook the program, undertook to support the program, I personally opposed it as being unnecessary for the counter-insurgency side, which was all it was billed for, and secondly because I feared that it might very well turn into a sort of concentration camp program, something like the Malayan New Villages on which it was allegedly, but not actually, patterned. I believe you were all issued on Saturday a widget called "Notes on Strategic Hamlet" and I would strongly

recommend to you that you read this with some thought. These notes were prepared, as a matter of fact, to give guidance to primarily Vietnamese officials who didn't understand the program, or didn't understand it the way we thought that it should be conducted. Secondly, for guidance to US AID and military personnel; and third, as a gentle nudge to the elbow of Brother Ngo dinh Nhu and perhaps even to President Diem. Accordingly, it was written in such a way as not to be offensive, not to seem to give orders or directly to criticize what had been done, but trying to give a pretty good idea of how they ought to act. The strategy stated in here is exactly in line with the strategy, with the approach to counter-insurgency, which I have, I fear, been preaching to you gentlemen as well as to others. I think page 13 you will find particularly useful. I would also like to point out these conclusions, saying that the Strategic Hamlet program was just on the road, it had gone too far

to draw back, that any abandonment of the program, or any drastic modification of its objectives, was likely to be extremely costly in the counter-insurgency effort there. This was originally written, part of it was originally written, in April of 1963. The whole thing was finally wound up and issued in English, (it was previously issued in Vietnamese) was issued in English in August of 1963. I think that subsequent events have more than amply demonstrated the truth of the forecast.

The fact that the Strategic Hamlet program, to all intents and purposes, was abandoned from perhaps September of 1963 until March or April of 1964, (when it was renamed, revived on a modified basis, with commendably heavy emphasis on voluntary participation in the program) virtually undid all the good which had been accomplished by the program. More than that, the de-emphasis of it, the lack of support to it from then on, has made the Strategic Hamlet program a real liability today. I think it is not too late to salvage some benefit from it. Of course, it is now known as the New Life Hamlet program, it is still an official program of the Government of Vietnam. Properly gone about, a re-emphasis on it, with special attention given to making good on the promises made to those hamlets which were once called "completed" Strategic Hamlet, I think we could gain a net benefit from it still.

One thing that is most persistent from that program is the extent to which it made the average peasant aware that central government was a concern of his, that central government had an effect on his life, prosperity, and what have you. Before that time the average peasant tended to regard the central government as something very very far away indeed, possibly interesting, but certainly not significant to him. But here, its representatives came to him, they gave him a lot of promises, they engaged him in a lot of work, perhaps considerable inconvenience, perhaps danger, perhaps loss of property. In some cases, in, as I said earlier, perhaps 3,000 of them, there were some concrete benefits at least; in the others there were not. In some they were in sight; in more they were not even in sight.

One of the big problems, big gaps in the Strategic Hamlet program, and this is one that is applicable to any program where the government, any government, tries to reach the people in the villages, in the hamlets is the great tendency that once a hamlet has been declared completed, "Strategic" unless it was on a main communication route, unless it got into trouble, no one ever paid a goddam bit of attention to it again. I have talked to people early last year who were in some of the first Strategic Hamlet completed, in 1962, in Long An Province. These were Catholic groups, strongly anti-Communist, delighted to have some help in defending themselves. I visited one of these hamlets in late '62 or early '63, and it was a dam good one. This time they said that after the hamlet was declared completed, they never again saw a single civilian, a single representative of civilian government, again in their hamlets. Not a single one, not a Vietnamese Information Service cadre, not a village official or a district official of any kind. Nobody. They were completely forgotten, unless a Regional Force or an ARVN operational patrol happened by, and the chances were that cost them at least some chickens. You can get people cranked up to participate in community activities, including self-defense, but dammit you have got to stay with them, you just can't go off and leave them to think that they are forgotten.

In the Philippines, in Huklandia, in the area of major Huk operations, we had something comparable to hamlet militia, village militia, voluntary armed groups, perhaps fed and paid out of the provincial budget, perhaps fed and perhaps paid out of contributions from well-to-do local citizens. They were generally called Civilian Guards or Volunteer Guards. During the first five years of the campaign, they did more good - did more harm than good. In practice they lived off the peasants, they were usually undisciplined, untrained, left-over guerrillas of the war period, who never amounted to anything and never would, and almost completely uncontrolled, except by the guy who nominally supported them. They were one of

the things which helped the Huk to grow. After Magsaysay took office as Secretary of Defense his first inclination was to abolish these Civilian Guards; there was a constant agitation for their abolition. I think, as a matter of fact, he did order their dissolution.

This order was a mistake for two reasons. One, it wouldn't be enforced, it couldn't be enforced. Too many people who considered these as their only protection, government officials, provincial officials, well-to-do landowners and business men; they weren't about to let their defenses, their defenders, be eliminated. Secondly, it was bad because organizations of this type are so important, not only for defense, not only for the actual threat or restraint they impose on insurgent foraging or raiding parties, but also for the element of commitment which they impose on the civilian population. As I told you this afternoon, with 10 or 12 men even in a hamlet, who are bearing arms against the insurgents and have used those arms against the insurgents, that means that you have probably at least 50 to 60 people who have some kind of stake in the success of the government as against a success of the insurgents. You may have many more than that. It depends on what age group and type these people are drawn from.

What we did in the Philippines, instead of dissolving these units, was to put with each one an NCO from the Armed Forces, pretty carefully chosen, usually given some special training for the job, to be, not their commander but their adviser, quote-unquote. And he was responsible for their training, discipline, conduct and employment. More than that they were actually brought into the military establishment in the sense that checking on the activities of these Volunteer Guards was a part of the regular duty of the officer responsible for that area.



For example, we would have a battalion combat team in a province. That combat team was, generally speaking, responsible for combat operations against the Hukbalahap in that province. The CO of that battalion combat team was responsible for the volunteer guard units in his province. Whatever defense or alert plans he set up in the province included those people. Generally speaking, this meant a radio or telephone contact with every unit at least once a night, it meant visits by an officer from the BCT at least once a week.

It meant, too, that when one of these outfits failed to report, or came under attack, they had the same SOP in either case -- go to their assistance just as though you knew they were under attack. Of course, if you found that some guy had gone to sleep on the radio, you spoke severely to him or more so. There were a lot of false alarms at first, but these began to die down pretty fast, especially in some areas where they had rather servigorous BCT commanders.

I think myself that local defense forces of this nature are almost essential in successful counter-insurgency. They can't do it by themselves, they can't stand up against a major attack nor should they try to. In Vietnam, in the Strategic Hamlet we had as many horrible examples of hamlet militia standing up and fighting when they should have took off and run; as of their taking off and running when they should ought to have stood and fought.

It was a constant struggle to keep the hamlet militia in existence and armed. I have no exact statistics on this, or on anything else; but I believe it is safe to say that less than half of the hamlet militia who completed training and were supposed to be armed ever were actually armed, ever were actually armed, ever actually received their weapons. More than that, but perhaps less significant, very few hamlets had the number of arms, the number of militia that they could have and should have had, and used.

Why was this? Why, both Vietnamese and Americans were very reluctant to put arms out in the countryside where they might be lost to the guerrillas. Vietnamese officials from Brother Nhu down, but not President Diem, were also very much concerned over the degree of independence which these weapons gave to the hamlets; felt that perhaps after the Viet Cong, these hamlets would still want to stay rather independent, wouldn't be quite so easy to push around. Of course, some of us thought this was nothing but a wonderful idea and a very useful part of the program.

Question: "I wish you would speak to that point for a second, I mean about arming people out in the countryside, and, you know, first in areas where you have people who want to be armed and fight, the second is that the arms can get into the hands of the guerrilla, and what is the real value of this?"

Answer: "Well, I can only give you my opinion on this, and my opinion is, based on what I have seen in the various countries where I have kicked around with this stuff in the field, for God's sake don't worry about giving guns to the guerrillas!! If they are any good they will get them anyhow. I mean if the guerrillas, the insurgents, are on the ball, they will get the guns, whether you issue them to the people or not. But, if you issue them to the people, some of them will use them against the insurgents. The rule, the rule of thumb rule which I suggested be practiced in Vietnam, and I still think that it would be a good one would be this: That any man, or any group who comes in and wants a weapon -- there is a man who comes in and says: "There are quite a few VC kicking around in my area, and I am scared of the bastards, but if I had a rifle or a carbine I could get some of them once in a while" -- I would say to him: "Son, bless your heart, here is a carbine and fifty rounds, that should last you until you can get more from the VC. And here is a license saying that unless you are proven to be a VC, or caught firing at government troops, this is your carbine to keep," and then I would say: "Now there is just one small charge, I want to tattoo a little blue dot on

the middle knuckle of your left hand, so that if you go around to some place else and tell them the same story, they can take a look at your hand and tell that you have already gotten one carbine. The fact that you have gotten one carbine, or one rifle, (or whatever it is that they have got there at the moment) and lose it, this is not necessarily going to be held against you. If you have a reasonably plausible story of what happened to it, OK, you will get another one, and you get another blue dot. You lose that one and go back for a third one, you may get it, or you may not, but you better be prepared to sweat a little before you get it. And if you do get that third one, and lose it; Brother, you better have an awfully good story."

One of the supporting arguments for giving weapons, assuming that you have them in abundance, and God knows we have had, one of the supporting reasons for doing this in Vietnam is that weapons are, and have long been, so damn plentiful there; the penalties for unauthorized possession by an ordinary citizen are so severe -- they are comparable to the infamous Sullivan law in New York -- that there is virtually no black market in weapons -- they just aren't worth having or trying to sell. At one stage of the game I had a lad out checking, and he came back and told me he could get me all the M-1 rifles I wanted at the equivalent of five dollars a piece. Cartridges, well, it would take a little time to get any quantity of cartridges because they weren't worth anything, and nobody was bringing them into the market.

Had another guy, a Filipino with considerable experience in gun-running -- actually he had run guns over to Vietnam from the Philippines to supply the Viet Minh with, with a fairly good knowledge of Vietnam. I asked him to go out and make a little survey for me, of what we could do with buying weapons for possible resale. He went out and kicked around for a couple of weeks and came back and said: "Well, if we go to buying weapons, assuming that we have to pay off the police and so on, and I have a pretty good idea

how much that will cost; assuming that we lose every other cargo, we can still buy 'em and ship 'em to Indonesia, and pay the grease there, we can still make rather better than a hundred percent profit on every load of arms, including those that are lost."

Well goddammit, with weapons so plentiful, why deny them to a man who even looks like he might use it against the Viet Cong?"

Question: "To what extent are we in control of this business of the distribution of arm to the Popular Forces? Is that really?"

Answer: "Well, during the Diem administration, we were not successful in issuing as many arms to the Popular Forces or types of arms, as we generally - I am talking of official US policy, of MACV or MAAG, as they generally wanted. Again this reluctance on the part of Brother Nhu, particularly, for having arms in the hands of the people."

Question: "I was talking specifically about AID personnel (unintelligible) we direct such people as come to us to those MACV personnel or . . . ?"

Question: "You have nothing to do with arms or straight military supplies. AID has furnished rations and clothes to Popular Forces and hamlet militia, (unintelligible)."

Question: "What about housing as a way of enticing a few more to serve in the local militia? Housing as a sort of a reward or prize, or whatever you want to call it?"

Answer: "We have unofficially assisted in the housing. That in the past, I can't say for today but in the past that was supposed to be a domain of MAAG-MACV, but we have assisted in housing for them, both barracks type and family quarters type housing. This is a very useful type of program, project, activity. I would suggest that, if in the province you go to you find any troops, whether it is ARVN, Regional Forces, Popular Forces, or hamlet militia which still exist under one name or another in quite a few cases, find them living under very bad conditions, and can't interest anybody else in doing something about it, you see if you can't build a few concrete

floored sheet-iron roofed pig stys that happen to be, where these people and their families move into them. There have been many things done with AID funds and material in Vietnam which were quite outside the AID charter, but which were definitely commendable -- as well of course as things being done which damned well didn't ought to have been."

Question: "Did you personally carry a weapon when travelling in Vietnam?"

Answer: "It depended on the situation. If I was travelling with others I usually did not -- if I were travelling alone, or perhaps with one of my Filipino friends or something like that, yes, I often did. This was a matter primarily of encouraging the troops, if the old man didn't bother about weapons. It was "pasikat", show-off to a certain extent, but it was also in accordance with a military belief of mine, which is that officers and NCO's in combat units should not carry anything but sidearms. The temptation, when you carry a long weapon, to get into action with it yourself when you ought to be directing the troops is almost overwhelming. I can't tell you how many people I have literally kicked in the -- for being down there shooting, themselves, when they ought to have been attending to their boys. It is also a little touch of bravado, shall we say, that sets well with the troops."

Question: "What I meant was in Vietnam?"

Answer: "That was what I was talking about, in Vietnam."

Question: "And in the Philippines?"

Answer: "In the Philippines it was the same story."

Comment: "You might add too, Colonel, that when you are travelling with a group that is well armed, and should something drastic happen, there probably will be an arm available if you should decide that you need it."

Answer: "That is very very true."

Question: "What about the temptation, you talked about the temptation to the Officer or the NCO to use his arm, what would you say the temptation would be to one of us would normally not be armed, and would be tempted to use one, what would you say would be the practical advantage to one of us of having an arm?"

Answer: "Well, I would say this, that as this gentleman here just said, that if there is any real need for you to shoot, you can probably get a weapon that somebody doesn't need any more. However, I am not even suggesting a rule of conduct to you. Whether you should, or should not, carry a weapon depends first on your own inclination; and second on the situation, and terrain, where you are. I would seek to avoid the temptation to indiscriminately get into any fire fights that may be available, but I certainly would not hesitate to use a weapon in any situation where it looks as though one more weapon could really make a difference."

Question: "You speak of having officers and NCO's carry only sidearms. Doesn't that make it easy to identify them at close ranges?"

Answer: "That has been repeatedly said, and said. Undoubtedly there is some truth in it. However the use of snipers has been so seldom -- For example, in the Japanese war, we heard a great deal of talk about Japanese snipers. Japanese Snipers' x \*?!, you would have thought that every second Japanese was a sniper. This was absolutely a misconception. These were ordinary riflemen, often very lousy shots. In the whole dam war, (I saw a reasonably sizable chunk of it) I saw only two Japanese actual honest-to-god snipers; birds who could reach out and hit a target at long range, and whose job it was to do this. I am sure that at times you will suffer a few more casualties because your officers and NCO's are distinguishable at a distance, but my feeling has always been that I would risk those additional casualties for the morale effect and the added combat efficiency. From their added combat efficiency when they are doing their job, and looking after what their boys are doing, rather than getting into the fight themselves. I believe this gentleman over here?"

Question: "What we have been talking about for the last few minutes brings us to a matter which I would like to ask but which I would like preface with another kind of question. If you don't see the relationship you are welcome to be discriminate and I feel a little nervous about this question . . . .

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Question: "Colonel, this has to do with our relationships as non-military types, and the first type of question I want to address to you, which is probably the most naive, but one to which I have not had a satisfactory answer ever since coming into this program, - As civilian AID types in the field, might we make contact as individuals, with members of the VC, should we seek these relationships, should we deliberately refrain from such relationships where we might be able to make individual contact with known members of the VC? And then this will lead into - there is a second area of questions - having to do back with what you have just finished discussing, and that is various suggestions about our behavior, the outlook we have already made in terms of possible contact with aggressive VC, that is with ones that are shooting at you or that might be tempted to shoot at you? Is there any possibility that you might talk them out of it? (background comments) "

Answer: "These are good questions. Of course, I cannot answer them or any other questions in terms of what AID policy is today, because I do not know, and I don't really too much give a dam. I know what policy was in the past on many of these things. I would say this -- this is my opinion. - I would not try to make contact with active VC; I would recommend that you avoid, generally speaking -- if an effort is made to contact you, and this may happen, or at least you may be told that it is happening, - dodge it. I would go as quickly as possible, with due regard to whether or not I wanted to conceal this, to the sector intelligence advisor and discuss the matter with him. Either the military -- and/or the CAS type, depending on your assessment of the two as intelligence officers and as reasonable human beings -- which is by no means always the same thing.

But there have been passes made of this nature at our people in the field. Usually, more often than not, so far as I am aware, they turned out to be fraudulent, that is to say, somebody was hoping to make a few nickels by setting up what appeared to be a juicy chance to get the word from the other side of the fence. Some were

deliberate attempts at entrapment, to get the man into a compromising position, attempts to get him into a position where he could be kidnapped. As far as I know, none of our people who have been captured were captured for that reason, as a result of such a <sup>u</sup> manoeuvre but I can think of a couple of them, Gus Hertz, for one, the Public Administration chap, and very possibly Doug Ramsey although possibly, but probably not, Doug Ramsey might have fallen into a trap of that nature. I would say that I think it should be an iron clad rule that nobody contacts no VC, no how, no-time. Some have done it with some advantage, but those who have done so were, so far as I know, all people with a great deal of experience in this field, a good deal of experience in dealing with Vietnamese, and a hell of a lot of local knowledge. I, myself, would be most reluctant to accept an invitation for me to meet a live, active, VC because I would feel that it most probably would be a trap, and that it might very well be so carefully laid that I might not be able to smell it. So much for that one.

Your other question was, I believe, what kind of relations you could expect to establish with the military in your province?

Question: "No, it was not. If I were driving down the road and three VCs jumped out in the middle of the road to stop my vehicle and take me out -- you understand that I am setting up a situation which may be hypothetical."

Answer: "No, it has happened, it has happened. Let your conscience be your guide, let your conscience be your guide. In the past this has happened and the provincial representative has been identified as being a prov rep, an AID man, and has been signalled to go away from there. In the first one we lost, Granger, he encountered a bunch of VC as a range of about 200 yards; he had plenty of time to get away; he started backing his vehicle away from the spot where he stopped -- incidentally he was in a place where he had no business to be, and he had been told that there were VC up ahead but



he was going ahead anyhow -- Well the first thing he did was to try to get away, and he backed his vehicle into the ditch. The VC came toward him. While they were still about a hundred yards away he pulled out his carbine, ordered his two companions to do likewise, apparently got down into position to fire and then decided not to, and dropped their weapons and took off on foot. They were caught.

Well, this is just about as bad a way to handle such a situation as you could possibly dream up. What he should have done? Well, he shouldn't have been there; he should have been able to drive, if he decided to fight he should damn well have fought. As nearly as I can reconstruct the situation, three men in the position in which he and his two companions were, very possibly, if they were fighting men, knew their weapons, and how to use them, and were inclined to do so, they very possibly could have fought a successful withdrawal action. From what I know of Granger and his two companions, what they should have done, having run the vehicle into the ditch, was to get out and sit on the hood or something with big grins on their faces, waiting for their friends to come up and help them out of the ditch.

However, what you do in a given circumstance, in a given situation, depends so much on that situation and on your own abilities and experience that I can't give you any advice other than to play it by ear. But don't get into a fight unless you are convinced that that is the best thing to do. If a bunch of people are shooting at you, you might as well shoot back. If they are not shooting at you, and you are all by yourself, so that, practically speaking, you would be starting the shooting, probably the best thing to do is not even to look like you ever thought of shooting. A gun, what is that? Me no savvy dat peller palaver. Next question?"

Question: "Well if you are captured, are there any indications as to what sort of treatment you could expect?"

Answer: "Well, this depends a great deal on the current policy line from higher authority, and on the discipline of the people who captured you. What should be done under, what you should expect under more or less standard VC policy in the past, is to be treated moderately well by their standards; to be, to have your hands tied behind you; you might be blindfolded; you might be walked for what seemed to you ungodly distances; exhibited as a trophy or as a war criminal in various villages and hamlets. You should be able to expect to be fed an average of perhaps one and two fifths times per day, - rice, some vegetables, maybe a little fish or meat. You can expect the attitude of your captors to be that you are really a beast, but it is the policy of the Front to treat their irresponsible enemies, war criminals, well - until such time as they have been duly tried. This would be. I think, the probable treatment. However, again, there is nothing sure in love or war as the saying goes."

Question: (Unintelligible)

Answer: "Well, in the past, generally, in the provinces the relations between AID personnel and the military has been good. Where it has not been, I think at least fiftypercent, and perhaps more of the time, this has been the fault of the AID man, either having a chip on his shoulder, or thinking that he saw the chip on the military man's shoulder, and feeling impelled to knock it off. I should think that, - I am thinking now, I am not au courant of all aspects of all situations in Vietnam -- but I think that 3 chances out of four if you make any effort at all, the relationship should be good with the military. Any man's relationship should be good. How good? Well, that depends on how much you work at it, and, you know, the things that make the difference between friendship and business association. Yes sir?"

Question: "To go back to one or two points that you raised with respect to the Strategic-cum New Life Hamlets, one of the things you said today was that there was a displacement of two to three miles, if not more, and I believe we should be, conscious of such things as the way Vietnamese farmers everytime they plough their fields, why they got to carry their plough back and forth to their fields."

Doesn't two or three miles each way, right there constitute too great a distance to expect a man to go lugging his junk back and forth to his fields? I don't know how important that kind of thing is, but I wondered if you would also expand on the Strategic Hamlet thing, if you would talk about the ir defense, the defense of such hamlets in Iran (?), the defense of such hamlets in Algeria, where I know they created them, because I have seen them, and I wondered what the hell they did. Of course, it seemed quite obvious that Dr. Fall never really mentioned Algeria very much . . . (Interjection: Yes, that was interesting, wasn't it?). . . I wondered how the program had gone there, besides the things that you could learn, such as in the simple defense of them, and again, something of such things as he mentioned as non-lessons from others?"

Answer: "OK. To start off with, on the question of defense of Strategic Hamlet -- or not, let me stick with the one about displacement. I think what I said was that displacement usually was not more than two or three miles, in some cases perhaps 25, in many cases it was no more than a few hundred metres. Generally speaking, displacement on the order of two or three miles, and I might expand that, on second thought, to say that 3 or 4 miles might be somewhere more near the median. That is a little too far for the people to go back to their original fields. One of the many mistakes made in the areas where Strategic Hamlet were constituted de novum, that is where all or many of the people were moved into the Strategic Hamlet, most common mistakes was to pay absolutely no attention to land rights or practices either of the people in the hamlets, or those who owned the land the hamlet Representatives of the province chief would say: "Build the goddam hamlet here!" OK. Sometimes they went to the extent of saying: "All right, here's the fields around here, this one belongs to you, this one belongs to you, this one belongs to you, and get busy and get a crop in!" They had absolutely no regard for to whom the

land belonged. Well, this caused a'l kinds of trouble, and, had these hamlets not collapsed under the combination of government neglect and the VC pressure, there would be real, really substantive problems of straightening out land ownership. I think in reply to your specific question, a dislocation on the order of two to three, or three to four miles more than often than not would mean that a man could not efficiently farm his old friends, most especially when you take into consideration the possibility that the Viet Cong would be out in that area. Does that answer that portion of your question?"

Questioner: "Well, I was interested in the impact on this -- could you pursue this one just a little bit? As prov rep, would you say that the creation of more of such hamlets or perhaps relocating the ones that were done badly - Should this kind of thing be, in your opinion, a significant part of any budget that we, or any thinking on the matter that we do? And if so, can you give us some idea of what you think it is with respect to - I don't know, - on some other program, so we can get a little perspective on it? Self help, rural electrification, something like that, so we can get an idea how important you think it is?"

Answer: "I should say this. In so far as the general situation and climate appear favorable to the construction of New Life Hamlets, which will be supported; which will get reasonably voluntary participation of those in the hamlets, which are capable of getting support if attacked; I should say that should be quite a high priority item in your thinking and planning. (aircraft noise) Have we got any fox holes around here. (aircraft noise) There are many places, many communities, where I think it would be feasible and profitable to reconstruct the Strategic or New Life Hamlets, if you can get the voluntary participation of the people, and if they are so located that there is a reasonable prospect of reinforcing them if they come under attack. This, one of the great shortcomings, in practice, of the original Strategic Hamlet program was that it took so, usually it took so, little consideration

of either one of these factors, - of whether the people could be persuaded to come somewhere close to wanting to be in a Strategic Hamlet; or of whether that Strategic Hamlet could reasonably be supported, - in other words whether you could justifiably ask these people to risk their necks by opposing the Viet Cong under circumstances where you couldn't come to their assistance if they were attacked.

One of the provinces where John O'Donnell worked had very good luck in voluntary Strategic Hamlet. The province chief was sold on this idea, and they largely did it that way. In another one of the provinces, the other province where he worked, in some parts the hamlets were completely voluntary; in other parts they were completely forced. We contributed. We Americans contributed a lot of deficiencies in the program. While I think that most of our AID field people pretty well understood, the requirements of the program and its limitations, too many of the military never had it adequately explained to them, never understood it, but were continually under pressure from higher authority to meet quotas for the construction of Strategic Hamlet.

Of course, there were examples of incredible stupidity, such as the senior officer who told me with a straight face and absolutely believing it: "Look, we gotta go ahead building these Strategic Hamlet ." (I might say parenthetically that along about March 1963 some of us tried, began a continuing effort, to slow down the pace building Strategic Hamlet. They were just going too goddamn fast, meeting quotas.) Well, this senior military officer told me: "Look, we gotta go ahead, all we got to do is build 11,000 Strategic Hamlet, then we will have all the people of Vietnam inside them, and there won't be any more insurgency!"

And this is almost as incredible as the senior CAS officer, who objected violently to any proposal that the mad pace of building Strategic Hamlet be slowed down: "Because the momentum of the program will be lost. This is going forward now at a great rate, and we can't afford to lose momentum." JC, I think he was, oh yes, he also brought in something about shock effect. I think he was, had been reading something about, someplace, about Armor Combat Commands

and how you uncoil from your harborage and then let them all "go hey diddle diddle right down the middle, and let it ALL hang out." Maximum shock effect! Gr-r-r-r! Draw sabres and charge. No, the idiocy of which the human mind is capable is beyond my limited comprehension. We contributed a lot to the failure of these programs. Let me go back . . .

Questioner: "I have a comment I would like to make, I read a beautiful defense a while back from the Sociology Department of the University of Pittsburgh on the Strategic Hamlet thing, and one of the points which stuck with me was that if Diem had been able to go ahead and implement the Strategic Hamlet program as he originally conceived it, without outside tinkering he would, in fact, have accomplished de facto land reform at that time and one of the problems would have been resolved, except that for the next thirty years they would be untangling the legal things in court. (Another questioner): Did any of the hamlets survive? Are any of them in operation still, or are they all closed up? "

Answer: "Oh yes, most of them survive as hamlets, because most of them were hamlets before. Some of them survive as what we would have called Strategic Hamlet, defended, organized, even in some places hamlet elections still, although there was a decree outlawing these about two years ago."

Questioner: "From the Thompson I heard that these hamlets are moved and then they served no purpose at all. Do you think that it is a proper critique of what happened? (unintelligible) . . . I think the idea of having Strategic Hamlet is to have the Strategic Hamlet perform a task?"

Answer: "Yes, this happened, as a result of the assignment of quotas to the province chief, and quite often, to the sector advisor. It seemed like almost a matter of life and death to try and meet the quota, construct the number of Strategic Hamlet they were supposed to construct each month. However, in a sense, looked at from a different point of view, the Strategic Hamlet could be almost an end in itself, because hopefully it was the establishing of an organized viable self-governing community, receiving conti-

nuing evidence in government interest in improving the welfare of its inhabitants. If we had indeed 11,000 Strategic Hamlets in Vietnam, which actually meet the criteria written and unwritten, there would be damn little insurgency there, I can guarantee you that, but not because you have all the Viet Cong fenced in and they couldn't get out. Of course, Sir Bob never quite got the idea that these were anything more than a control mechanism, he always harked back to his Malayan New Villages which were in effect self-supporting concentration camps. Eventually many of them were guarded by the people inside, but a lot of them were always guarded, as all of them were in the beginning, by people outside."

Question: "How is it that the some two thousand of those have been so safe? Is it because of their location or some other reason that the Viet Cong have not marked them down as particularly target areas? "

Answer: "I don't think that there is any place in Vietnam that the Viet Cong have not marked as a target area -- unless it is one's that they already control. True, some of the, perhaps most, at least many, of these successful hamlets were in areas where it was difficult for the Viet Cong to attack, where it was hazardous for the Viet Cong to attack. This contributed to their success, but I think more, the success was owing more, to the organization which went into them, the support which they received, and to the attitudes of the people even before.

For example, there were many hamlets, many people in Vietnam who were actively anti-VC, obviously when you get a group like this and organize them into Strategic Hamlet, you have got two-thirds of the battle won already.

On the other hand you take a group that is actively pro-VC and try to organize them into a Strategic Hamlet and all you are doing is tying down troops to try to keep them in their Strategic Hamlet. There was one area up in the North, I disremember what province at the moment, where there was a little group of eleven

Strategic Hamlets filled with devoted VC families, and for about a year and a half one regiment was tied down ostensibly defending these hamlets, with damn little success I might add, but a full regiment was tied down, doing nothing else but trying to keep the VC in and the VC out.

Perhaps now would be a good time to go back to your question on the defense of the Strategic Hamlet. If it will meet with the approval of the group I would like to go into this at a little length. OK? I hope we have got a piece of chalk here. Yep. OK.

The ideal Strategic Hamlet would look something like this, (drawing diagram on the board) street, a fence around it, watchtower, watchtower, houses inside, about two hundred families in there, a more or less circular perimeter, radius of circle less than half a kilometer, in other words a nice, compact, theoretically defensible, position. We figure that the perimeter of the area, I think it was supposed to be from one to two kilometers maximum. Well, that looks pretty defensible. Practically speaking it isn't. Practically speaking, to defend this perimeter adequately you need<sup>d</sup> at least two companies of troops on the perimeter, and another in reserve in the center to meet any penetration. They had, if you recall, ten men with arms, or maybe 20, or maybe 30 at the most. More than that, aside from a couple of model Strategic Hamlet up in the Montagnard country, and one down in the Delta, I don't never saw, a Strategic Hamlet that looked like that.

Generally speaking, you would get a monstrosity shaped something like this, (drawing diagram) with a perimeter of maybe 8 kilometers, 10 kilometers, all kinds of zigzags, entrant and re-entrant angles, JC, the damn thing was completely indefensible against any half-way intelligent attack. The best thing you could hope for was that this fence, if there was one, and - if it was maintained, would slow the people down a little, as they might be spotted in getting through the fence. And, secondly a reasonably good hamlet was always divided up inside by fences between groups of houses. These were fences of bamboo or brush, so that rapid



movement through one of these unless you knew it intimately, was rather difficult, particularly in the dark.

However, they were not really defensible in terms of position warfare. I have never seen a Strategic Hamlet, other than these two or three models, that I spoke of, which I would engage to defend with a battalion of well-trained troops, from inside, or from the perimeter against penetration by a platoon of well-trained guerrillas. That is just how weak they were in terms of defense against a determined attack, or a skillful attack. The only real way to try to defend a thing like this, and this was one of the causes of major warfare at Saigon level between MAAG, (now part of MACV), and Rural Affairs, most specifically their consultant on counterinsurgency, about how do you defend one of these things by the hamlet militia?

Now mark you, by everything that I know, the only possible way to defend something like this, or at least to give yourself a half-way decent a break against some half-way competent insurgents, is to take your squad, or part of your squad, or one of your squads, and get the blankety blank blank hell out of here as soon as it got dark, and go wandering around, perhaps a radius of one kilometer outside the hamlet. Keep a few men back here in the hamlet, yes, to man your watchtower, your gate, but a substantial part of your strength outside, moving on a random course, so that their position could not be predicted, so that within that radius any Viet Cong who might intend to try to bust into that hamlet, very likely, perhaps totally probably, would not know where this hamlet militia squad was. Now in something like this, an element of uncertainty of this nature is very very hard on guerrilla morale, it is very prone to disrupt guerrilla operations, especially when it is a guerrilla which has the scientific solution to every thing, like the Communists always have. You may get hit alright, perhaps they may be able to cut a hole in the fence and walk right in, no sweat, but where are these half-dozen or dozen armed men, are they going to be waiting for you here, or are doth figure you are apt

to or are they just going to come charging in behind you? Where the hell are they? OK, so I have a platoon of guerrillas, and there are only six or eight of them, but if they catch me with my pants down I am going to lose four or five men, killed or wounded, and that is going to raise hell with the morale and effectiveness of my guerrilla platoon. Now this is one of the wars which has never ended. I suspect it is still going on, to the extent that there are efforts to defend NLH.

One more thing, there were an awful lot of hamlets which weren't even as defensible as this. Down in the lower Delta area I have seen Strategic Hamlet along canals, maybe 25 feet wide, 10 feet deep, houses averaging a hundred meters apart, a single row of them, for perhaps 10 miles, and a nice straight sharp barbed wire fence, a hundred meters in from the bank of the canal, all around them. Now gentlemen, if there could be anything much more asinine than that, I don't know what it is, except some of the AID bureaucrats, Army brass, and CAS senior officials that I have met. Gentlemen, the most ridiculous things are done.

Now, let me get away from this point of defense, and go back and pick up something that I started to develop this afternoon, when I was talking about the cost of this Strategic Hamlet program, this astronomical figure, of which the largest part was for barbed wire and stakes. It was pitifully inadequate, especially for hamlets, for areas where the population pattern was like this, or where the population pattern was like this. (indicating diagram) There was not enough money adequately to compensate people who were required to move; there was not enough money to provide building materials; to provide defense works. There was not, certainly not, enough money to even to begin to tackle the problem in areas where you had population patterns like this (referring to the canal hamlet diagram). These people could have been moved into really

viable effective Strategic Hamlet which would have been a positive long-term benefit to them, insurrection or no insurrection. What could have been done in areas like this, of course, is to take a short section of canal, and dig some laterals, dig some laterals, in other words to these people living close to the water, within at most a hundred meters of the water, is an absolute necessity of life. If you should bring them over here into something like this they (diagram of theoretical hamlet) would have hated your guts forever more, and at first opportunity would have slipped away. But if you spent a little money and a little effort, perhaps the cost of the barbed wire, in digging some canals, and helping them get together, moved in like this, there would have been an immediate counter-insurgency benefit, yes; how much of a benefit to the counter-insurgency would depend primarily on the attitude created among those people.

But more than that, and much more important in the long run it would have brought them together into a community where there would be, where they could have a school; where they could have a community market and they wouldn't have to spend half their time, perhaps, taking their produce to market, or being at the mercy of itinerant peddlers or buyers. You could have built a community where a better chance of contributing to your nation building efforts; where as building this blank barbed wire fence leaving the people living in their original pattern did no good to nobody. Does that answer your question about defense?"

Question: "Yeah. I did ask the other about the experience of Malaya or Algeria, and their lessons or non-lessons. Both of these, then, were more the attempt to keep people in rather than to keep others out?"

Answer: "I know very little about that aspect in Algeria, in Malaya, very definitely the purpose was to keep people in . . ."

. . . (End of tape) . . .

(Continuation of Session 8 (?) recorded on reel 4, Reel 5, side 1)

There is a wonderful RAND study, classified CONFIDENTIAL, never been able to persuade to declassify it, by David Galula. This is one of the most valuable books on counter-insurgency, based on personal experience, which I have seen yet. It is Galula's account of his own experiences during a year when, with a company of picked French troops, he sought to pacify an area, a hamlet. His area of responsibility was six square kilometers. There were, if memory serves me correctly, 15 guerrillas who used sometimes to pass through the area. He worked for nearly a year on that, employing some very interesting techniques. He did a lot of good for the people; he brought a reasonable degree of peace to the area while he was there -- but he didn't do one goddam thing that was effective in terms of counter-insurgency. Immediately after he relinquished command of that company, the next two company commanders were knocked off within three months, although he had suffered, if I recall rightly, no casualties at all. It is the clearest possible demonstration, to my way of thinking, that saturating an area with troops; doing nice things for the people in a sort of a Lord of the Manor fashion; is not going to answer the problem where you have a well-developed insurgency; that only political means will do it. You need these other things, yes, to a greater or less extent; but without finding out what the people want politically; socially, if you please, I don't know a good word for it; what their aspirations for future government are; and then in one way or another, at least partially meeting those, or changing them, your not going to cut the mustard."

Question: "Colonel that (unintelligible through most of question) to a large degree ... you mentioned that ... the word didn't get to the people ... have to be willing to cooperate... doing things for people that they didn't need in the first place... to carry on guerrilla operations or an insurgency really

can't exist for a sustained period of time without the support of the local population?"

Answer: "Well, that sounds like a good dilemma that you are posing me. The answer is that the guerrilla does not need, does not expect, does not usually have, the support of the majority of the population. He actually needs the active support of only a very small percentage of the population, so long as the majority of the population is passive; so long as those that are opposed to him are not effective in their opposition. You take a hamlet, take even this monstrosity (diagram) let us suppose, as might well be the case, that 10 percent of the people are actively pro-VC; 10 percent are pro-GVN, 80 percent passive -- they haven't become involved in this. Now this means that these group of houses, lying out here a fair piece, the people are largely left to their own devices. OK. This 10 percent can be pro-VC; or this 10 percent can be pro-GVN, and this 10 percent pro-VC. If this 10 percent (the pro-VC) are organized, in constant touch with an organization, they are levying on the 80 percent with the help and the threat of the armed VC outside; and these people are practically hopeless to do anything about it. However, just putting up a fence that makes it a little difficult to get in and out without being, without running a risk of being detected; putting in, arming, 10 men of this hamlet, assuming that these are only a part of those who are pro-government; preferably you would try to choose them from the 80 percent who are passive, making a direct pitch, in other words, to get them involved. Ten men, fifty people, population of 1,000, what is the percentage that you have changed? Five percent. Right there, in that alone, you have changed this 10 percent to 15 percent. You have gotten these 10 men involved on the side of the GVN. More important you have given these people, a way, a means of working on the eighty percent, and also a means to work on controlling these ten percent. That is one of the reasons why something like the Strategic Hamlet is really a state of mind. And I think that that is true. As long as you get those, get a reasonable percentage of the people, actively supporting the

government, and organized to be effective in: a) supporting the government; b) in repressing the guerrilla and their supporters; you being to make life much less happy, less profitable, for the insurgents. . . . You never expect, really, except under very special circumstances developed over a long period of time, you don't really expect the active support of any large majority of the people for either side. They will go along, with whoever tells 'em to go, but generally speaking you have got to pray with them before you can to get anything out of them. This gives the government faction a chance to pray with 'em."

Question: "To go back to the matter of the Strategic Hamlet. Now keeping in mind, you know, cost accounting features, what's available and so on, to go into these defence perimeters, what kinds would you suggest should be made beside barbed wire, bamboo stakes, etc?"

Answer: "Actually the material of which the defense perimeter is constructed isn't too important. Probably the best, in many sections, would be the moat and wall inside the moat. However, one of the horrible mistakes, or it was, both mistake and oversight, was the question of clearing fields of fire around these. At one time there was a very important policy, decreed by Brother Nhu, that you would plant bamboo hedges outside the fence. \* & + \*! All that does is give a perfect covered route of approach to somebody to come up to the fence and shoot (unintelligible) or shoot over it, or what have you. That puts the people on the inside, it makes them fish alright, like fish in a bathtub or a barrel. Even in places where this asininity wasn't perpetrated, there was stillness seldom any thought given to clearing fields of fire, or siting them so there were not covered routes of approach, - hell, I've seen the things with damn big gulleys running right up to the fence. You could bring half of the army right up that gulley, and: OK boys, here we go, right over the top; who the hell wants to live forever?" and charge right in to the dam thing. Now that

sort of thing seemed to be overlooked more often than not."

Question: "Another question. It was my understanding from what we have been told so far, the hamlet militia or I guess nothing more than the Popular Forces, I mean, are really part-time soldiers I mean full-time (unintelligible), or full-time farmers - that is they are not full-time soldiers. "

Answer: "That is correct."

Question: "Now the idea being that, if somebody gave me a rifle and told me to go patrolling until seven thirty, just in time for my Vietnamese language class, I doubt if I would be either good in language class or in patrolling. How does this work out?"

Answer: "Well, to a considerable extent it works out just as you imply, but still, not entirely. First of all, Popular Forces and Hamlet Militia are not the same thing. Theoretically, the Popular Forces have now replaced the hamlet militia but they correspond to the old Self-Defense Corps, which was paid sometimes, got some support. The concept on the hamlet militia was that if the people of the hamlet really wanted to defend themselves against the Viet Cong, even though they were authorized only one squad, given arms for only one squad, they should train, organize and train, at least three squads, so that a man would be on duty perhaps one night out of three. This is not an unreasonable demand in an area where there is a definite enemy threat. As soon as it looks quiet, yes, people start getting sleepy and pretty ineffective, but if there is a visible threat, if people are interested in defending themselves, they can keep up with this. More than that, they can and will, if you actively encourage them to, they can contribute to the support of the militiaman, so he doesn't have to depend entirely on his farming to feed his family and himself.

Mr. Nhu was very profoundly concerned almost at all times, (and this was very unusual for Mr. Nhu because he would go around in circles with his thinking at an incredibly high rate of speed), but he was profoundly concerned about the danger of pauperizing the people, the peasants, of getting them to expecting too much from the government. He had a certain nugget of good solid sense

there, but he often carried it to ridiculous extremes. He didn't want us to help to feed the hamlet militia at times; he ordered that troops would not go to the relief of a hamlet under attack: "Because they must learn to defend themselves, and not lean on the government for support." A quite good training film was made for general distribution, general showing, both in the hamlets, to the Self Defense Corps, The Civil Guard (now the Regional Force), and ARVN, showing how, and techniques, for coming to the support of a Strategic Hamlet under attack. He vetoed this thing and wouldn't allow it to be released, it never was released, simply because he thought it was wrong to lead the people to expect that they would get help if they were hit. And get, in training and policy documents which he himself prepared at other times, he emphasized this as one of the strongest points of the Strategic Hamlet, that it would provide a point to which reinforcements could be rushed. The man was rather a headache to deal with.

Question: "Were the Revolutionary Development Cadre in operation while you were there?"

Answer: "They were just about to get on the road when I left there. I participated to some extent in the planning, know many of the people involved with it. It seems to have developed more or less along the lines which were either planned or expected; in any other word the training, the composition, and the mission are much as were planned, the accomplishments seem to have been about as expected."

Question: "Do you think it has much hope, like the Strategic Hamlet: Does it have the basis of profitable program or . . . ?"

Answer: "I don't know how to answer that question." It can be quite effective, and there are a lot of problems involved which seem not to have been sufficiently thought through, ranging from what we might call more or less mechanical problems of support, supervision, direction, to the physical but non-mechanical problems of where do you get enough men and how do you train them well enough



in what length of time. With all due apologies, I must say that to this group, or any comparable group, I would have to say that I simply cannot reasonably predict what will be, what is to be anticipated from this program. Certainly it can be useful, it can be very valuable. Where you have Rural Construction Cadre teams in your province, I would give a lot of effort to trying to support and guide them in their activities because they can be very useful."

Question: "How about refugees and relocation, what roles do they play in counter-insurgency in Vietnam?"

Answer: "Refugees and relocation. What roles they are actually playing today, other than to provide, in some areas, badly needed labor which would not otherwise be available, again, I do not know. I know what was planned, I know what some of us expected, I have an idea of what could have been done. I think I'll just have to, I think I will just have to leave, that, again, for you to find out for yourselves where you go.

I will say this, refugees offer a tremendous opportunity, an opportunity to reach people whom you otherwise could not, reach them with indoctrination, with positive evidence of government concern for their welfare, reach them with education which can be of value to them, and finally, to organize them so that they can be effective both as citizen's groups in future nation building projects, and, as anti-VC, This opportunity exists. To what extent it is being realized, to what extent the facilities for its realization exist in Vietnam, I do not know. Certainly they vary from province to province and they depend on many factors, some within AID control, some not."

Question: "On your comment about Nhu and his notion of teaching the villages and hamlets that they cannot always depend entirely on the government raises an interesting point that I guess I had not thought about before; but not necessarily Nhu,

but in the same state of the art in Saigon, what the devil do they think, is the role of the Vietnamese government vis-a-vis the people? I hear a lot about what ought to come up, but not about what ought to come down. In their view, what do they owe the people?"

Answer: "In the view of Vietnamese officialdom? Oh, I would say, generally speaking, they owe them reasonably effective administration. (Laughter.)

Now mind you, this varies tremendously from individual to individual. There are a lot of people with lots of good ideas about how they would like to help the people. There are even a few with specific concrete ideas in mind. For example, one of the rather nice little things that was dreamt up, if I recall rightly, by KY himself, but possibly by his closest political advisor; was establishing a scholarship system, so that each year at least one student from each hamlet, could go to high school at government expense. This is something new and different, something rather dramatic, and potentially damned effective in showing that the government wants to do something for the people. It is also something that is practical. Much to my complete amazement, about three months ago, a usually reliable and well-informed Vietnamese source in a position to have first-hand information, assured me that this was being implemented. I was very much surprised, but I think perhaps it is. Incidentally, this is something that all of you might take a look at in your province. Is it being implemented there; anybody ever heard of it? If it isn't being adequately implemented, it would be a damn good thing to get behind and push.

Gentlemen, I can talk all night on almost any given subject. Maybe you have lessons to do, maybe you have more questions. I told someone earlier that I would try to talk about the parallels or the non-parallels between Vietnam and the Philippines. I think it perhaps a little late to go into that, and yet I am perfectly

willing to, if anybody wants me to. I will leave it up to you gentlemen whether we break it off now, go ahead with the questions and answers, or I talk on any specific topic that the group would like me to talk on. (Background voices: "Its been a hell of a long day. We are the last dogs, and we are hung.)

OK gentlemen, officially, let's knock it off. If anyone wants to stick around and ask questions or what-not, I am going to sit here and drink another cup of coffee."