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## *Vietnam and the New Isolationism*

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Speech of  
**Hon. Thomas J. Dodd**  
of Connecticut  
in the  
**Senate of the United States**  
**Tuesday, February 23, 1965**

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## Vietnam and the New Isolationism

### SPEECH OF

**HON. THOMAS J. DODD**

OF CONNECTICUT

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#### THE NEW ISOLATIONISM

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, there has been developing in this country in recent years a brand of thinking about foreign affairs which, I believe, can aptly be described as "the new isolationism." This internal phenomenon is, in my opinion, potentially more disastrous in terms of its consequence than the major external problems that confront us.

Its background is a growing national weariness with cold war burdens we have been so long carrying, a rising frustration with situations that are going against us in many places, a long-simmering indignation over the fact that our generosity and sacrifice have too often been met abroad, not just with indifference and ingratitude, but even with hostility and contempt.

Its political base seems to be to the left of center, although it forms as yet a distinct minority there.

Its scareword is "escalation"; its cure-all is "neutralization."

Its prophets include some of my colleagues in the Congress, influential spokesmen in the press, and leading figures in the academic world. Some are new volunteers in this cause of retrenchment; they regard themselves as pragmatists. Others are old hands at Pollyanna-ism, those unshakable romantics who were disillusioned by Moscow at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact, disillusioned by Mao when they discovered that he was not really an agrarian reformer, disillusioned by Castro when they learned

that he was not a cross between Thomas Jefferson and Robin Hood—and who, having again dusted themselves off, now look for new vistas of adventure.

If I may digress, let me say that I have always admired their durability. The manner in which they have survived, unchastened, a whole series of intellectual Dunkirks is, if nothing else, a tribute to man's invincible confidence in himself; and their adeptness in avoiding discreditation, in the face of repeated catastrophes and evacuations, must be acknowledged as one of the marvels of modern history—a triumph of self-rectitude over reason.

The basic premise of the new isolationism is that the United States is overextended in its attempt to resist Communist aggression around the world, overcommitted to the defense of distant outposts, and overinvolved in the murky and unintelligible affairs of remote areas.

The corollaries of the new isolationism are many. It is contended that we should deemphasize the cold war and reverse our national priorities in favor of domestic improvements; that we should withdraw from South Vietnam; that we should cease involvement in the Congo; that we should relax the so-called rigidity of our Berlin policy; that foreign aid has outlived its usefulness and should be severely cut back; that our Military Establishment and our CIA, organizations that seem particularly suspect because they are symbols of worldwide involvement, should be humbled and "cut down to size" and stripped of their influence in foreign policy questions.

In my judgment all of these propositions have one thing in common. Each of them would strike at the heart of our national effort to preserve our freedom and our security; and collectively they add up to a policy which I can describe

by no other name than "appeasement," subtle appeasement, unintentional appeasement, to be sure, but appeasement nonetheless.

My purpose, this afternoon then, is to oppose these propositions and to enlist Senators' opposition against them—for the new isolationism is as bankrupt as the old.

First of all—to tackle the main premise—I reject the assumption that the United States is overextended, or over-committed, or overinvolved.

We are enjoying a spectacular growth in every index of national strength. Our population, our wealth, our industrial capacity, our scientific potential, our agricultural output, all are enjoying great upward surges. We were informed that our gross national product was again up in January, and the trend seems ever upward.

Far from overextending ourselves in the cold war, we are actually in a period of declining defense budgets, of steadily lowered draft calls, of sharply reduced foreign aid, of one tax cut after another.

Let me emphasize this: In every basic resource, we have greater capacity today than during the past 5 years; by every military or economic standard, we are stronger; and by every physical measurement, the percentage of our resources going into the cold war is lower. Why then should we talk of weariness or over-commitment?

We are not even straining ourselves. We are actually pursuing today a policy not only of both guns and butter, but of less guns and more butter.

So far as our resources go, we are capable of indefinite continuation and even intensification of our present efforts, if need be. It is only our mental, and perhaps our moral, resources which seem to be feeling the strain.

We would, of course, prefer to live in a world in which it were possible for us to have no commitments, a world in which

we could devote all of our energies to the task of perfecting our society at home and enriching the lives of our people.

But we must face the world as it is. And the basic fact of our world is that Western civilization, itself terribly rent and divided, both politically and philosophically, has been forced into a twilight war of survival by a relentless and remorseless enemy.

It is incontestable, in terms of peoples enslaved and nations gobbled up over the past 20 years, that we have not been holding our own. And each year, the world Communist movement is committing more and more of its resources to the task of subjugating our allies, all around the perimeter of freedom.

Against this background it is preposterous to maintain that we should reduce our effort and lessen our commitment to the great struggle of our century.

Yet, according to Time magazine, it is the widespread sentiment of the academic world that we have overreached ourselves and ought to pull back. Walter Lippmann, the well-known columnist, for whom I have great respect, says that "the American tide will have to recede."

It has been argued that we would be in a "precarious situation" if we were attacked on several fronts. Of course we would, but does anyone believe that we can solve the problem by abandoning our commitments and defensive alliances? Would the loss of these countries be any the less disastrous because they were given up undefended?

On the contrary, if we are not strong enough to honor our commitments today, then we should solve the problem, not be reducing our commitments, but by becoming stronger, and by aiding our allies to become stronger.

The defense of the free world rests on a very delicate balance. The key elements in that balance are American power and American determination. If

we lack the power to maintain that balance then certainly all is lost. If we reveal that we lack the determination, if we, for instance, allow ourselves to be pushed out of Vietnam, such a humiliation may indeed be the second shot heard around the world; and a dozen nations might soon throw in the sponge and make whatever accommodation they could with an enemy that would then seem assured of victory.

Fortunately, at the present time we do not lack the power to carry on the defense of freedom. Our power is at its peak and we have the capacity to increase it vastly if necessary. It is our spirit, apparently, that needs shoring up.

Four years ago, after a visit to southeast Asia, I said on the floor of the Senate:

If the United States, with its unrivaled might, with its unparalleled wealth, with its dominion over sea and air, with its heritage as the champion of freedom—if this United States and its free world allies have so diminished in spirit that they can be laid in the dust by a few thousand primitive guerrillas, then we are far down the road from which there is no return.

In right and in might, we are able to work our will on this question. Southeast Asia cannot be lost unless we will it to be lost; it cannot be saved unless we will it to be saved.

This problem, seemingly so remote and distant, will in fact be resolved here in the United States, in the Congress, in the administration, and in the minds and hearts of the American people.

The passage of 4 years has not diminished my belief in this course.

If the main premise of the new isolationism is erroneous, then surely the lesser premises are fraught with terrible danger.

It is argued that we should de-emphasize the cold war and turn more of our resources to domestic welfare.

The annual congressional revolt against the foreign aid bill grows more

violent and successful each year, and the administration, forced to yield, now sends foreign aid requests 40 percent below what it solemnly declared 2 years ago to be the minimum figure tolerable for free world survival.

And a small but growing band of Senators have begun offering each year amendments making across-the-board percentage cuts in our defense budget, cuts not directed to any specific economy, but rather to a principle—the principle that we should be spending less on defense and more on welfare.

Here, in my judgment, are sure-fire formulas for defeat.

Where are the victories in the cold war that would justify such a reversal of priorities? In what global trouble spots are there lessened tensions or improved postures that would make this plausible? I can see a lot of cold war areas where things are looking worse—but very few where things are getting better.

More effort, more sacrifice—not less—is the need of our time. And I speak as one who does not disparage the need or the importance of domestic improvements. As a credential of this I recommend to Senators my scorecard, compiled last year by the ultraconservative Americans for Constitutional Action, which asserts that I voted right only 13 percent of the time—one of the worst records, alas, in the Congress.

But I say to you that if our foreign affairs are going badly, no aspect of internal welfare is secure or stable. And if we cope successfully with the great problem, the cold war, no internal problem can long defy solution.

Our first national priority is and must ever be the survival of our country and our freedom—and if the 20th century has taught men anything, it is that survival and freedom cannot be purchased on the cheap, in a discount store or a bargain basement.

But our situation is such that we can meet our needs both at home and abroad—not as handsomely as we would prefer, but well enough. This I take to be the objective of the Johnson administration. The war on poverty and the struggle against tyranny can go hand in hand, if our vision be broad.

Twenty-five years ago, our country, comparatively new and untried among the great nations of the earth, through passage of the Lend-Lease Act, described by Winston Churchill as "the most unsordid act of recorded history," embarked irrevocably upon the path that has brought us to our present posture in history. Through that act, we affirmed the preservation and expansion of liberty as our highest goal; we acknowledged that freedom was insecure everywhere so long as tyranny existed anywhere; and we assumed the burden, and the glory, of being the champion and defender of man's highest aspirations.

Since that embattled hour, when the light of freedom was but a flicker in the dark, our journey across the pages of history has been fantastic and unprecedented: tragic, to be sure, in its mistakes and naivities, but heroic in its innovations and commitments, prodigious in its energy and power, gigantic in its generosity and good will, noble in its restraint and patience, and sublime in its purpose and in its historic role.

We have not realized the high goals we set for ourselves in World War II.

But we have preserved freedom and national independence in more than half the earth; we have prevented the nuclear holocaust; we have restored Western Europe; we have helped friend and foe to achieve prosperity, freedom and stability; we have launched a world peace organization and have kept it alive; we have offered the hand of friendship and help to the impoverished and backward peoples of the world if they will but take it.

It may be said of our country today, as of no other in history, that wherever people are willing to stand up in defense of their liberty, Americans stand with them.

We cannot know at this hour whether our journey has just begun or is nearing its climax; whether the task ahead is the work of a generation, or of a century. President Kennedy said, in his Inaugural Address, that the conflict would not be resolved in our lifetime.

The Chief of Staff of the Army recently told the Congress that it might well take 10 years to decide the issue in Vietnam alone. And Vietnam is only one symptom of the disease, the epidemic, we are resisting.

Against this somber background, how foolish it is to talk of deemphasizing the cold war, of pulling out of Vietnam, of abandoning the Congo to Communist intrigue, of slashing the defense budget by 10 percent, or of any of the other irresponsibilities of the new isolationism.

#### VIETNAM

It is against this background that I take up today the question of Vietnam, which has been the favorite target of those who urge withdrawal and retrenchment.

Over the past several months, a number of my most respected colleagues have taken the floor to urge that we get out of Vietnam or that we enter into negotiations over Vietnam.

The propriety of our presence in Vietnam and the validity of our position has been challenged. It has even been suggested that we are the real aggressors in Vietnam. The war has been called "McNamara's War." It has been suggested that we more or less ignore Asia and Africa and concentrate on Europe and the Americas.

I have listened with growing dismay to these presentations—and with all the more dismay because of the respect and

affection I have for the Senators who made them.

If I have not risen to reply to my colleagues before now, it was not because Vietnam was a new subject to me, but because I felt that their arguments required the most carefully considered and most painstakingly prepared reply.

I had visited most of the countries of southeast Asia in early 1961, and I have spoken a number of times on the floor of the Senate on the subject of Vietnam and Laos and Indonesia since my return. I have endeavored to keep up with the situation in that part of the world as best one can do by reading the press and official publications. But I realized that there were important gaps in my information because the press coverage of Vietnam was, with a few outstanding exceptions, weak and in some cases completely misleading. I have, therefore, sought to fill these gaps by correspondence with friends in Vietnam, both Vietnamese and American, and by conversations with Americans who have served in Vietnam in various capacities—some of them for long periods of time.

The senior Senator from Wyoming [Mr. McGEE] and the senior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY] on the one side, and the distinguished minority leader, the junior Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN] and the senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] have already spoken eloquently on the need for standing fast in Vietnam.

A debate has been joined which is worthy of the best traditions of the Senate.

I hope that the remarks I make today will contribute at least in some measure, to the further unfolding of this debate. Out of this debate, let us hope, will ultimately emerge the kind of assistance and guidance that every President must have in dealing with vital issues of our foreign policy.

What we say here may help to guide the President. But in the final analysis the terrible responsibility of decision is his and his alone. He must listen to the exchanges which take place in this Chamber. He must endure a hundred conflicting pressures from public sources, seeking to push him in this direction or that. He must also endure the impatience of those who demand answers to complex questions today, and who accuse him of not having made the American position clear when he has in fact made our position abundantly clear on repeated occasions.

And finally, when all the voices have been heard, when he has examined all the facts, when he has discussed all aspects of the situation with his most trusted advisers, the President must alone decide—for all Americans and for the entire free world—what to do about Vietnam.

No President has ever inherited a more difficult situation on coming to office. No President has ever been called upon to make a decision of greater moment. At stake may be the survival of freedom. At stake may be the peace of the world.

I believe the United States can count itself fortunate that it has found a President of the stature of Lyndon B. Johnson to meet this crisis in its history. I also believe that, whatever differences we in this Chamber may have on the question of Vietnam, our feelings to a man are with the President in the ordeal of decision through which he is now passing.

I have said that I have been dismayed by the rising clamor for a negotiated settlement. In the type of war which the Communists are now waging against us, I fear that, although those who urge negotiation would be among the first to oppose an outright capitulation, their attitude may not be construed in this way by the Communists.

The Vietnamese war, in the Communist lexicon, is described as a "war of

national liberation." Its strategy is based on the concept of what the Communists call "the long war." This strategy is premised upon the belief that the free world lacks the patience, the stamina, the fanatical determination to persist, which inspires the adherents of communism. It is based on the conviction that if the Communists keep on attacking and attacking and attacking in any given situation, they will ultimately be able to destroy the morale and the will to resist of those who oppose them in the name of freedom.

China affords the classic example of the long war. It took 20 years for Mao Tse-tung to prevail. There were several times during this period when his entire movement seemed on the verge of collapse. But, even in his blackest days, Mao Tse-tung remained confident that, if he persevered, ultimately his enemies would crack and he would emerge as China's undisputed ruler.

There is no more cruel test of courage and staying power than "the long war" as it is waged by the Communists. Five years, 10 years, 20 years, means nothing to them. And if they detect any sign that those opposed to them are flagging, that their patience is growing thin or that their will to resist has weakened, the Communists can be relied upon to redouble their efforts, in the belief that victory is within their grasp.

I disagree strongly with my colleagues who have spoken up to urge negotiations.

But if there is any way in which my voice could reach to Peiping and to Moscow, I would warn the Communist leaders that they should not construe the debate that is now taking place in this Chamber as a sign of weakness; it is, on the contrary, a testimony to our strength.

Nor should they believe that those who speak up in favor of negotiations are the forerunners of a larger host of Americans who are prepared to accept sur-

render. Because there is no one here who believes in surrender or believes in capitulation. I believe the senior Senator from Idaho made this abundantly clear in his own presentation, in which he underscored his complete support for the retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam.

#### WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM?

I have been amazed by a number of letters I have received asking the question, "Why are we in Vietnam?" or "What is our policy in Vietnam?" I have been even more amazed to have the same questions put to me by sophisticated members of the press.

To me the reasons for our presence in Vietnam are so crystal clear that I find it difficult to comprehend the confusion which now appears to exist on this subject.

We are in Vietnam because our own security and the security of the entire free world demands that a firm line be drawn against the further advance of Communist imperialism—in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, and in Europe.

We are in Vietnam because it is our national interest to assist every nation, large and small, which is seeking to defend itself against Communist subversion, infiltration, and aggression. There is nothing new about this policy; it is a policy, in fact, to which every administration has adhered since the proclamation of the Truman doctrine.

We are in Vietnam because our assistance was invited by the legitimate government of that country.

We are in Vietnam because, as the distinguished majority leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], pointed out in his 1963 report, Chinese Communist hostility to the United States threatens "the whole structure of our own security in the Pacific."

We are in Vietnam not merely to help the 14 million South Vietnamese defend themselves against communism, but be-

cause what is at stake is the independence and freedom of 240 million people in southeast Asia and the future of freedom throughout the western Pacific.

These are the reasons why we are in Vietnam. There is nothing new about them and nothing very complex. They have never been obscure. They have never been concealed. I cannot, for the life of me, see why people fail to understand them.

IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT?

The senior Senator from Idaho, and several other Senators who spoke last Wednesday, repeated the proposal that we should seek negotiations for the purpose of terminating the bloodshed in Vietnam and of avoiding an enlargement of the war. We are told by some people that negotiations are the way of diplomacy and that if we reject negotiations now, we are in effect rejecting diplomacy.

The proposal that we negotiate now overlooks the fact that there does exist a negotiated agreement on Vietnam, approved by the participants of the Geneva Conference of 1964. The final declaration of this agreement read, and I think it is worth while reading it for the RECORD and for our own recollection:

Each member \* \* \* undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

Since there is no point to negotiating if it simply means reiterating the Geneva agreement, I cannot help wondering whether those who urge negotiations envisage rewriting the agreement so that it does not "guarantee the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned states."

The history of negotiated agreements with the Communists underscores the fact that their promises are worthless and that only those agreements have

validity which are self-enforcing or which we have the power to enforce. A report issued by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security—on which I have the honor to serve—establishes that the Soviet Union has since its inception violated more than 1,000 treaties and agreements. The Communists have repeatedly violated the terms of the Korean armistice, of the Geneva agreement on Vietnam, and of the Laotian armistice.

Incidentally, I had hoped the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] would be present. He had hoped to be here. He is tied up on another matter, but hopes to get here later.

The Senator from Idaho has held up the Laotian armistice as an example of a rational agreement with the Communists that has served our interests. He could not possibly have picked a worse illustration for his argument.

I can think of no more dramatic proof than the Laotian armistice that agreements with the Communists are worthless, and that every time we try to escape from today's unpleasantness by entering into a new covenant with an implacable aggressor, we are always confronted on the morrow by unpleasantness compounded 10 times over.

I traveled through southeast Asia just before the conclusion of the Laotian armistice.

I talked to many people at that time. It is true that the armistice was favored by our Ambassador in Laos, and it obviously must have had the support of important members of the State Department hierarchy. But the personnel of our Embassies in Saigon and in Bangkok did not conceal from me their grave apprehensions over the consequences of such an armistice for Vietnam and southeast Asia.

All of this I reported on confidentially upon my return.

At that time, the Saigon government still controlled the situation throughout most of the countryside, although the 15,000 Vietcong guerrillas were giving it increasing difficulty. Our Embassy personnel in Saigon expressed the fear that the conclusion of the Laotian armistice would enable the Communists to infiltrate men and material on a much larger scale and would result at an early date in a marked intensification of the Vietcong insurgency. Needless to say, the apprehensions which they expressed to me have been completely borne out by subsequent developments.

The Laotian armistice has served Laos itself as poorly as it has served the cause of freedom in Vietnam. The Communists have continued to nibble away at what is left of free Laos, in one aggressive act after another, so that by now they firmly control more than half the country, while their infiltrants and guerrillas are gnawing relentlessly at government authority in the rest of the country.

In mid-1964, I asked the Library of Congress to prepare for me a study of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice agreement. The study which they submitted to me listed 14 specific violations up until that time.

That was last year. There have been many more since then.

Mr. President, I plan to insert into the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks a copy of the survey of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice prepared for me by the Library of Congress. I earnestly hope the Senator from Idaho will take the time to study this before he once again holds up the Laotian armistice as a model for Vietnam.

I should also like to quote from a statement made on March 30, 1963, by Gen. Kong Le, the neutralist military commander who, as is common knowledge, had favored the conclusion of the Laotian armistice. Kong Le's statement

is significant because it illustrates how Communists will deal tomorrow with non-Communist elements that they are prepared to accept into coalition governments today.

Referring to certain Communist stooges, Gen. Kong Le said:

Despite their continual defeats, however, these people learned their lessons from their Communist bosses. \* \* \* When the Prime Minister went abroad, they moved rapidly to destroy the neutralist forces. They used tricks to provoke the soldiers and people to overthrow Colonel Ketsana. When these did not succeed, on February 12 they used an assassin to murder Ketsana. They also savagely killed or arrested all neutralist party members, and their bloody hands caused the death of many people.

This was the statement of Gen. Kong Le, one of those who had pressed the hardest for the Laotian armistice, after he saw what the armistice had done to his country.

Finally, I do not believe that the Laotian armistice has served the interests of the other peoples of southeast Asia. I have in my possession a map of northern Laos showing areas where the Chinese Communists have been building roads that would give China direct access to the borders of Burma and Thailand. The construction of these roads bodes ill for the future peace of southeast Asia. That they are intended for future military use is taken for granted by everyone in the area.

So much for the example of the Laotian armistice.

All this does not mean to say that we must not under any circumstances enter into negotiations with the Communists. I do not suggest that at all. It simply means that when we do so, we must do so with our eyes open and with a clear understanding of the ingredients required to enforce compliance with the agreement about to be entered into. That is all I have ever urged.

Moreover, there is a time to negotiate and a time not to negotiate.

The demand that we negotiate now over Vietnam is akin to asking Churchill to negotiate with the Germans at the time of Dunkirk, or asking Truman to negotiate with the Communists when we stood with our backs to the sea in the Pusan perimeter in Korea. In either case, the free world could have negotiated nothing but total capitulation.

The situation in Vietnam is probably not as desperate and certainly no more desperate, than Britain's plight at the time of Dunkirk or our own plight at the time of Pusan. If we are of good heart, if we refuse to listen to the counsels of despair, if we again resolve that "we will never give in"—as Churchill put it—there is every reason to be confident that a time will arrive when we can negotiate with honor and for a more acceptable objective than a diplomatic surrender.

There are those who say that the whole of southeast Asia will, whether we like it or not, go Communist. These people are at least consistent in urging negotiations now. But anyone who believes that we can negotiate now and not lose Vietnam to communism is deluding himself in the worst possible way.

#### THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT IN VIETNAM

It is human to oppose the cost of staying on in Vietnam when American boys are dying in a faraway land about which we understand very little. I am conscious of this. I am sensitive to it. I share the troubled minds of all Senators. But I am convinced that the great majority of those who advocate that we abandon Vietnam to communism, either by pulling out or by "negotiating" a settlement, have not taken the time to weigh the consequences of defeat.

In my opinion, the consequences of an American defeat in Vietnam would be so catastrophic that we simply cannot

permit ourselves to think of it. This is truly an "unthinkable thought," to use an expression coined by the Senator from Arkansas. He was not applying it to this problem, I point out, but I find the words particularly apt in reference to Vietnam.

#### GENOCIDE

For the Vietnamese people, the first consequence would be a bloodletting on a genocidal scale.

In the Soviet Union and in Red China, tens of millions of "class enemies" were eliminated by the victorious Communists. While it is true that there are some slightly more moderate Communist regimes in certain countries, Vietnamese communism is characterized by utter disregard for human life of Stalinism and Maoism. What will happen to the more than 1 million refugees from North Vietnam? What will happen to the millions of peasants who resisted or bore arms against the Vietcong. I shudder to think of it. The massacre of innocents in Vietnam will be repeated in every southeast Asian country that falls to communism in its wake, in a gigantic bloodletting that will dwarf the agony and suffering of the war in Vietnam.

Those who urge our withdrawal from Vietnam in the name of saving human lives have the duty to consider the record of Communist terror in every country that has fallen under the sway of this merciless ideology, with its total disregard for human life.

The total number of victims of communism will probably never be known. Students who have followed the Chinese Communist press closely claim that it can be demonstrated that Chinese communism has cost the lives of at least 25 million and more, probably 50 million people, while students of Soviet communism put the overall figure for the Soviet Union at approximately the same level. They point out that, entirely apart from the purges and mass killings

at periodic intervals and the forced starvation of 5 million Ukrainian farmers, the reported death rate in the Soviet forced labor camps ran approximately 25 percent per annum in bad years, and 15 to 20 percent in good years. If one accepts the average population of the slave labor camps as 10 million over the 20 odd years of Stalin's undisputed rule, this would mean that approximately 2 million slave laborers died annually in Stalin's camps, or 40 million for the 20-year period.

According to the Polish Government in exile, in London, the Soviets deported 1½ million Poles to Siberia after they had occupied eastern Poland in the wake of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Approximately 150,000 were returned through Teheran after the Nazi invasion of Russia. Another 300,000 drifted back after the war. More than 1 million never came back. Such was the mortality in the Soviet slave labor camps.

All of this seems incredible to the Western mind.

I remember, when I was in Nuremberg, that when I first read the terrible statistics about the mass killings by the Nazis, I could not comprehend them. If I suggested to Senators that a train wreck had occurred in which 100 persons had lost their lives, or a shipwreck in which 150 had lost their lives, or some common disaster with hundreds or even thousands of lives lost, we would react, we would feel it. But if I suggested that 1 million murders had taken place, our minds would not be able to grasp the enormity of such a crime.

Perhaps that is just as well. There must be built into our intellectual mechanism some kind of governor. Unfortunately, while it does probably save us from insanity, the fact that our minds cannot comprehend the murder of 1 million people or 40 million people serves as a protective asset to the perpetrator of such an evil deed. It does not make the

crime any less horrible. It simply makes our task that much more difficult.

Even after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin confirmed all the essential charges that had been made against the Soviet regime, men of good will in the Western World refused to believe that the Communist regime could be so evil. They refused to believe, because it is difficult for them to conceive of horror and brutality on such a mass scale.

To those who refuse to believe, I would like to read the eloquent words penned by Dr. Julius Margolin, a prominent Jewish leader in prewar Lithuania, one of the scores of thousands of Lithuanians deported to Soviet slave labor camps after the Soviet occupation of his country. When he was released after 7 years in the camps, Dr. Margolin wrote:

Until the fall of 1939, I had assumed a position of benevolent neutrality toward the U.S.S.R. \* \* \* The last 7 years have made me a convinced and ardent foe of the Soviet system. I hate this system with all the strength of my heart and all the power of my mind. Everything I have seen there has filled me with horror and disgust which will last until the end of my days. I feel that the struggle against this system of slavery, terrorism, and cruelty which prevails there constitutes the primary obligation of every man in this world. Tolerance or support of such an international shame is not permissible for people who are on this side of the Soviet border and who live under normal conditions. \* \* \*

Millions of men are perishing in the camps of the Soviet Union. \* \* \* Since they came into being, the Soviet camps have swallowed more people, have executed more victims, than all the other camps—Hitler's included—together; and this lethal engine continues to operate full blast.

And those who in reply only shrug their shoulders and try to dismiss the issue with vague and meaningless generalities, I consider moral abettors and accomplices of banditry.

Let those who talk of getting out of Vietnam for the ostensible purpose of

saving human lives weigh the words of Dr. Julius Margolin—a man who, like themselves, refused to believe that communism could be so inhuman until he saw its punitive machinery at work with his own eyes.

And if the administration should ever succumb to their pressure and negotiate the surrender of Vietnam, and if the Vietnamese Communists then embark on the orgy of bloodletting which has always accompanied the establishment of Communist power, let those who are pressuring for negotiations not be heard to say, "But we didn't intend it this way." Because there is today no excuse for ignorance about communism.

(B) THE FURTHER CHOICE: COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OR MAJOR ESCALATION

Our withdrawal from Vietnam would immediately confront us with an agonizing choice.

If we decide to try to defend what is left of southeast Asia against the advance of communism, it will require far more money, far more men, and far more American blood than we are today investing in the defense of Vietnam. What is more, it would involve a far greater risk of the major escalation which we seek to avoid.

If, on the other hand, we decide to abandon the whole of southeast Asia to communism, as some of the proponents of withdrawal have frankly proposed, it would result in the early disintegration of all our alliances, and in the total eclipse of America as a great nation. Because no nation can remain great when its assurances are considered worthless even by its friends.

(C) MORE VIETNAMS

Whether we decide to abandon southeast Asia or to try to draw another line outside Vietnam, the loss of Vietnam will result in a dozen more Vietnams in different parts of the world. If we cannot cope with this type of warfare in Viet-

nam, the Chinese Communists will be encouraged in the belief that we cannot cope with it anywhere else.

In the Congo, the Chinese Communists have launched their first attempt at applying the Vietnamese strategy to Africa.

In the Philippines, the Huk guerrillas, after being decisively defeated in the early 1950's, have now staged a dramatic comeback. According to the New York Times, the Huks are now active again in considerable strength, control large areas of central Luzon, and are assassinating scores of village heads and local administrators on the Vietcong pattern.

In Thailand, Red China has already announced the formation of a patriotic front to overthrow the Government and eradicate American influence. This almost certainly presages the early launching of a Thai Communist insurrection, also patterned after the Vietcong.

An article in the Washington Post on January 16, pointed out that the Venezuelan Communists now have 5,000 men under arms in the cities and in the countryside, and that the Venezuelan Communist Party is openly committed to "the strategy of a long war, as developed in China, Cuba, Algeria, and Vietnam."

And there are at least half a dozen other Latin American countries where the Communists are fielding guerrilla forces, which may be small today, but which would be encouraged by a Communist victory in Vietnam to believe that the West has no defense against the long war.

It is interesting to note in this connection that, according to Cuban reports, a Vietcong delegation which came to Havana in 1964 signed a "mutual aid pact" with the Venezuelan guerrilla forces. In addition, Marguerite Higgins, the distinguished correspondent for the Washington Star and other papers, points out that Vietcong experts have teamed up with experts from Communist China and the Soviet Union in

training Latin Americans for guerrilla operations in the several schools maintained by Fidel Castro.

(D) WHAT NEW DEFENSE LINE?

It has been suggested that if we abandon southeast Asia, our seapower would make it possible for us to fall back on Japan and the Philippines and the other Pacific islands, and constitute a more realistic defense line there. This is nonsense. American seapower and American nuclear power have thus far proved impotent to cope with Communist political warfare. Cuba is the best proof of this.

If we abandon southeast Asia, the Philippines may prove impossible to hold against a greatly stepped-up Huk insurgency.

Japan, even if it remains non-Communist, would probably, by force of circumstances, be compelled to come to terms with Red China, adding the enormous strength of its economy to Communist strategic resources.

Okinawa, where our political position is already difficult, would become politically impossible to hold.

If we fail to draw the line in Vietnam, in short, we may find ourselves compelled to draw a defense line as far back as Seattle and Alaska, with Hawaii as a solitary outpost in mid-Pacific.

(E) THE ECLIPSE OF AMERICAN PRESTIGE

To all those who agree that we must carefully weigh the consequences of withdrawal before we commit ourselves to withdrawal, I would refer the recent words of the well-known Filipino political commentator, Vincente Villamin. The abandonment of Vietnam, wrote Mr. Villamin, "would be an indelible blemish on America's honor. It would reduce America in the estimation of mankind to a dismal third-rate power, despite her wealth, her culture and her nuclear arsenal. It would make every American ashamed of his Government and would

make every individual American distrusted everywhere on earth."

This is strong language. But from conversations with a number of Asians, I know that it is an attitude shared by many of our best friends in Asia.

VIETNAM AND MUNICH

The situation in Vietnam today bears many resemblances to the situation just before Munich.

Chamberlain wanted peace. Churchill wanted peace.

Churchill said that if the free world failed to draw the line against Hitler at an early stage, it would be compelled to draw the line under much more difficult circumstances at a later date.

Chamberlain held that a confrontation with Hitler might result in war, and that the interests of peace demanded some concessions to Hitler. Czechoslovakia, he said, was a faraway land about which we knew very little.

Chamberlain held that a durable agreement could be negotiated with Hitler that would guarantee "peace in our time."

How I remember those words.

Churchill held that the appeasement of a compulsive aggressor simply whetted his appetite for further expansion and made war more likely.

Chamberlain's policy won out, because nobody wanted war. When he came back from Munich, he was hailed not only by the Tories, but by the Liberals, and the Labor Party people, including leftwingers like James Maxton and Fenner Brockway.

Churchill remained a voice crying in the wilderness.

But who was right—Churchill or Chamberlain?

Who was the true man of peace?

In Vietnam today, we are again dealing with a faraway land, about which we know very little.

In Vietnam today, we are again confronted by an incorrigible aggressor,

fanatically committed to the destruction of the free world, whose agreements are as worthless as Hitler's. Indeed, even while the Communist propaganda apparatus is pulling out all the stops to pressure us into a diplomatic surrender in Vietnam, the Chinese Communists are openly encouraging a new Huk insurgency in the Philippines and have taken the first step in opening a Vietcong type insurgency in Thailand through the creation of their quisling Thai patriotic front.

In signing the Munich agreement, it was not Chamberlain's intention to surrender the whole of Czechoslovakia to Hitler. The agreement was limited to the transfer of the German-speaking Sudetenland to German sovereignty. And no one was more indignant than Chamberlain when Hitler, having deprived Czechoslovakia of her mountain defenses, proceeded to take over the entire country.

While there are some proponents of a diplomatic solution who are willing to face up to the fact that negotiations at this juncture mean surrender, there are others who apparently quite honestly believe that we can arrive at a settlement that will both end the war and preserve the freedom of the South Vietnamese people. If such negotiations should ever come to pass, I am certain that the story of Czechoslovakia would be repeated. Having deprived South Vietnam of the political and military capability to resist, the North Vietnamese Communists would not tarry long before they completely communized the country.

And, before very long, those who urge a diplomatic solution for the sake of preventing war, may find themselves compelled to fight the very war that they were seeking to avoid, on a bigger and bloodier scale, and from a much more difficult line of defense.

I take it for granted that no one in this Chamber and no loyal American

citizen believes that we should stand by indifferently while communism takes over the rest of the world.

I take it for granted that every intelligent person realizes that America could not long survive as a free nation in a world that was completely Communist.

I take it for granted that everyone agrees that somewhere, somehow, we must draw the line against further Communist expansion.

The question that separates us, therefore, is not whether such a line should be drawn, but where such a line should be drawn.

I believe that we have been right in drawing the line in Vietnam and that President Johnson is right in trying to hold the line in Vietnam, despite the setbacks we have suffered over the past year. Because, if this line falls, let us have no illusions about the difficulty of drawing a realistic line of defense anywhere in the western Pacific.

#### NEITHER SURRENDER NOR ESCALATION

We have been told in many statements and articles that the only alternative to withdrawal from Vietnam, with or without negotiations, is a dramatic escalation of the war against the North. And we have been warned that such an escalation might bring in both Red China and the Soviet Union and might bring about the thermonuclear holocaust that no one wants.

These are supposed to be the choices before us.

It is my belief, however, that the tide of war in Vietnam can be reversed and that this war can ultimately be won without an invasion of the North and without a significant intensification of our military effort. It is my belief that there are many measures we can take, primarily in the nonmilitary field, to strengthen our posture and the posture of South Vietnamese forces in the fight against the Vietcong insurgency.

Before outlining some of the measures which I believe can and must be taken, I wish to deal with a number of widely accepted fallacies and misconceptions about the situation in Vietnam, because one cannot intelligently approach the problem of what to do about Vietnam without first establishing the essential facts about the present situation in that country.

**THE FALLACY THAT THE VIETNAMESE WAR IS A CIVIL WAR**

The belief that the Vietnamese war is a civil war is one of the most widespread misconceptions about Vietnam. This is frequently associated with the charge that it is the United States, and not North Vietnam or Red China, which is intervening in South Vietnam.

The war in South Vietnam is not a civil war. It was instigated in the first place by the North Vietnamese Communists, with the material and moral support of both Peking and Moscow. There is overwhelming proof that Hanoi has provided the leadership for the Vietcong insurrection, that it has supplied them massively, and that it has served as the real command headquarters for the Vietcong.

The present insurrection in South Vietnam goes back to the third Communist Party Congress in Hanoi in September of 1960. At this Congress it was decided "to liberate South Vietnam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order to achieve national unity and complete independence." The Congress also called for the creation of a broad national front in South Vietnam directed against the United States-Diem clique. Several months later the formation of the front for the liberation of the south was announced.

I understand that there is an official report, according to which, the U.S. Military Assistants Command in Vietnam is in possession of reliable evidence indi-

cating that probably as many as 34,000 Vietcong infiltrators have entered South Vietnam from the north between January 1959 and August 1964.

The report indicates that the majority of hard-core Vietcong officers and the bulk of specialized personnel such as communications and heavy weapons specialists have been provided through infiltration. Infiltrators, moreover, apparently make up the major part of Vietcong regulars in the northern half of South Vietnam.

The infiltration from the north supplies the Vietcong with much of its leadership, specialist personnel, key supplies such as heavy ordnance and communications equipment, and, in some cases, elite troops.

This information is derived from the interrogation of many thousands of Vietcong captives and defectors and from captured documents.

It is this hard core that has come down from the north that has provided the leadership cadre in all major insurgent actions, including the series of sensational attacks on American installations.

The scale on which Hanoi has been supplying the Vietcong insurgency was dramatically illustrated this weekend when an attack by an American helicopter on a ship off the coast of South Vietnam resulted in the discovery of an enormous arms cache—almost enough, in the words of one American officer, to equip an entire division. The haul included a thousand Russian-made carbines, hundreds of Russian submachine guns, and light machine guns, and Chinese burp guns, and scores of tons of ammunition. There were also a variety of sophisticated land mines and ammunition for a new type of rocket launcher used against tanks. A Communist guerrilla who was captured in the action said that the ship which delivered the weapons had made

six trips to bases along the South Vietnam coast, dropping off supplies.

Finally, we would do well to consider the fact that the general offensive launched by the Communist forces in Vietnam 2 weeks ago was preceded by an open call by Hanoi radio for assaults throughout the country on Vietnamese and American positions.

The public confusion on the nature of the Vietnamese war stems in large measure from the sabotage of the Communist member of the three-man International Control Commission set up to supervise the carrying out of the Geneva agreement. By 1961, reports of 1,200 offensive incidents of Communist agents, ranging from one-man assassinations to large-scale military actions, had been presented to the Commission. The Commission, however, took no action because the Polish Communist member consistently refused to investigate reports of North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam. In this way, this entire massive body of evidence of Hanoi's intervention in South Vietnam was muted and rendered ineffective.

In order to understand the war in Vietnam, we have to get away from traditional concepts in which armies with their own insignias cross clearly marked national demarcation lines after their governments have duly declared war.

Communist guerrilla warfare is waged without any declaration of war. In the case of Vietnam, it is waged from external sanctuaries which claim immunity to attack because the state which harbors them has not formally declared war.

It blends military cadres who have infiltrated into the country with native dissidents and conscripts, in a manner which conceals the foreign instigation of the insurgency, and which enables the Communists to pretend that it is merely a civil war.

It is time that we nail the civil war lie for what it is. It is time that we recognized it as a form of aggression as

intolerable as open aggression across marked frontiers.

Why did Ho Chi Minh decide to launch the current war for the liberation of South Vietnam? The answer to this question is really very simple.

After the Geneva agreement, it had been the expectation of the Communists that South Vietnam would collapse in administrative and political chaos before many months had passed, and that it would fall into their hands like an overripe plum. Indeed, when Ngo Dinh Diem took office as Premier after the surrender of North Vietnam to the Communists, 99 percent of the Western press viewed the situation in South Vietnam as hopeless and predicted an early takeover by the Communist guerrillas.

Cut off from the mineral and industrial riches of the north; swamped by an influx of 1 million refugees; without an adequate army or administration of its own; with three major sects, each with private armies, openly challenging its authority—confronted with this combination of burdens and handicaps, it seemed that nothing could save the new born South Vietnamese Government.

But then there took place something that has properly come to be called the Diem miracle; this term was used at different times by President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara prior to Diem's overthrow, which most people, I believe, now realize was a tragic mistake.

Diem first of all moved to destroy the power of the infamous Binh Xyuen, a sect of river pirates who, under the French, were given a simultaneous monopoly on the metropolitan police force of Saigon and on the thousands of opium dens and houses of prostitution and gambling that flourished there.

So powerful was the Binh Xyuen and so weak were the Diem forces at the time that even the American Ambassador urged Diem not to attack them.

Diem, however, did attack them and drove them out of Saigon.

Having defeated the military sects and integrated them into the Armed Forces of the republic, Diem within a few years was able to resettle the 1 million refugees and to create a stable unified state where none had previously existed.

I could not help feeling indignant over articles and publications dealing with North Vietnam which have underscored what the Communists have done for their people. Among other things, they have stressed the fact that the Communists have greatly expanded their school system. What these articles did not mention was that from 1955 to 1963 President Diem has doubled the number of students in elementary schools, while at the secondary school level the increase has been fivefold.

The remarkable progress in the field of education was no exception. The entire South Vietnamese society scored remarkable advances in every field of economic and social endeavor, so that in 1963 South Vietnam for the first time had a sizable rice surplus for export. There were significant increases in all sectors of industry and agriculture, and a 20-percent rise in per capita income.

Meanwhile, in North Vietnam, things were going from bad to worse. As in every other Communist country the collectivization of the peasants resulted in a dramatic reduction of food output and in chronic food shortages throughout the country. The resentment of the peasants was compounded by the brutal and indiscriminate punishment of hundreds of thousands of peasant farmers who were haled before so-called people's courts and charged with being bourgeois elements or exploiting landlords. During the course of 1955 peasant revolts broke out in several areas. There was even a revolt in Ho Chi Minh's own village. And there was some evidence that the troops sent to suppress these revolts sometimes sympathized with the peas-

ants. Shortages increased year by year. The people became increasingly apathetic.

The contrast between the growing prosperity of the South and the growing misery in the North confronted the Vietnamese Communists with a challenge they could not tolerate. That is why they decided that they had to put an end to freedom in South Vietnam. While they have scored some sensational victories in their war of subversion against the South Vietnamese Government, I think it important to point out that this war has gravely complicated the already serious internal difficulties of the North, so that in 1963, for example, the per capita output of rice in Communist North Vietnam was 20 percent lower than in 1960.

And I also consider it important to understand the significance of the fact that the Vietcong insurgency was directed not against a government that had failed to improve the lot of its people but against a government which, over a short period of time, had scored some of the most dramatic economic and social advances recorded anywhere in Asia.

#### ESCALATION: FACT AND FALLACY

There has been a good deal of talk about the United States escalating the war in South Vietnam. Several Senators who spoke last week warned that if we escalate the war by means of air strikes against North Vietnam, the escalation may get out of hand and wind up as a war with Red China or perhaps even a world war.

But it is not we who have escalated the war; it is the Communists. Peiping and Hanoi have been busy escalating the war in South Vietnam for several years now. They have sent in tens of thousands of soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army; they have trained additional tens of thousands of dissident South Vietnamese;

they have supplied them with massive quantities of equipment; and they have stepped up the tempo of their attacks against the Vietnamese people.

Now we are told that if we take any action against the territory of North Vietnam, which has mounted and directed the entire attack on South Vietnam, it will entail the risk of world war.

If the Communists are always to be permitted the privilege of escalating their attempts to take over new countries, while we shrink from retaliation for fear of further escalation, we might as well throw in the sponge now and tell the Communists the world is theirs for the taking.

I find it difficult to conceive of Red China sending in her armies in response to air strikes against carefully selected military targets. After all, if they did so, they would be risking retaliation against their highly vulnerable coastal cities, where most of Red China's industry is concentrated. They would be risking setting back their economy 10 or 20 years.

Moreover, both the Chinese Communists and the Hanoi Communists are aware that the massive introduction of Chinese troops would create serious popular resentment because of the traditional Vietnamese suspicion of Chinese imperialism.

That there will be no invasion of the North by Vietnamese and American forces can, I believe, be taken as axiomatic. Nor do I believe there will be any large-scale involvement of American troops on the Korean model. We will have to continue to provide the Vietnamese with logistical support and air support, as we are doing now. But on the ground, the fighting can most effectively be done by the Vietnamese armed forces, supported, I believe, by military contingents from the other free Asian countries.

#### THE FALLACY THAT THE ASIAN PEOPLES DO NOT KNOW THE MEANING OF FREEDOM

It has been stated by the senior Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and by other critics of our foreign policy in Vietnam that it is pointless to talk about fighting for freedom in Asia because the Asian people historically do not know the meaning of freedom. It has even been implied that, because of their ignorance of freedom and their indifference to it, communism exercises a genuine attraction for the peoples of Asia.

I am sure that most Asians would consider this analysis condescending and offensive. I myself would be disposed to agree with them. It is an analysis which, in my opinion, is false on almost every score.

We have grown accustomed to equating freedom with the full range of freedoms that we in the United States today enjoy. But, in the world in which we live, the word "freedom" has at least three separate and perhaps equally important connotations.

First, there is national freedom, or independence from foreign control.

Second, there is freedom of speech and press and the other freedoms inherent in parliamentary democracy, such as we enjoy.

And, third, there is the type of natural freedom that is enjoyed by primitive peasants and tribesmen in many backward countries, even under political autocracies.

It is true that most Asian governments are autocratic; and it is probably true that the Vietnamese people do not understand or appreciate freedom in the sense of parliamentary democracy. But they certainly understand the meaning of "freedom" when the word is used to mean independence from foreign rule. They are, in fact, a people with a long and proud history and a strong sense of national identity. Every Vietnamese

schoolboy knows that his people fought and triumphed over the hordes of Genghis Khan in defense of their freedom; and he also knows that his country was free for five centuries before the French occupation. Finally, he knows and takes pride in the fact that his people drove out the French colonialists despite their army of 400,000 men. Do not tell me that these people know nothing about freedom.

To the westernized Saigonese intellectuals, freedom of speech and freedom of the press are certainly very real issues; and even though they may have not mastered the processes, they would unquestionably like to see some kind of parliamentary democracy in their country. It is completely understandable that they should have chafed over the political controls that existed under the Diem government, and that have existed, in one degree or another, under succeeding governments.

But in the countryside, where the great mass of the people reside, the political controls that exist in the city are meaningless. The peasant is free to own his own land, to dispose of his produce, to worship according to his beliefs, to guide the upbringing of his children, and to elect his local village officials. To him, these freedoms that touch on his everyday life are the freedoms that really count, not the abstract and remote freedoms of constitutional and federal government.

And, if on top of granting him these natural freedoms, the government assists him by building schools and dispensaries and by providing seed and fertilizer, then, from the standpoint of the southeast Asian peasant, his life is full and he is prepared to fight to defend it against the Communists.

It is, in short, completely untrue that the Vietnamese people and the other peoples of Asia do not know the meaning of freedom. And it is equally untrue

that communism is acceptable to the Asian peasant because of his indifference to freedom.

Communism has never been freely accepted by any people, anywhere, no matter how primitive.

It has never been accepted for the simple reason that even primitive peoples do not enjoy being pushed around and brutalized and terrorized, and told what to do and what not to do, and having their every activity ordered and supervised by political commissars.

This is why communism must govern by means of ruthless dictatorship wherever it takes power.

This is why the primitive mountain peoples of both Laos and Vietnam have, in an overwhelming majority, sided against the Communists.

This is why there are almost 8 million refugees from Communist rule in Asia today—people who have seen the reality of the so-called People's Democracy, and who have given up everything they possessed and frequently risked their lives to escape from it.

That is why there is barbed wire and iron curtains surrounding the Communist countries. The inhabitants of the Communist countries would all leave if they could.

There is one final comment I would like to make while dealing with this subject. Too often I have heard it said that the Vietnamese people are not fighting because there is nothing to choose between communism and the kind of government they now have.

To equate an authoritarian regime like that in South Vietnam, or Taiwan, or Thailand with the totalitarian rule of communism is tantamount to losing all sense of proportion. Not only have these regimes never been guilty of the massive bloodletting and total direction of personal life which has characterized Communist rule in every country, but, carefully examined, it will turn out that these

regimes are a mixture of natural democracy at the bottom with political controls of varying rigidity at the top.

Even at their worst, the political autocracies that exist in certain free Asian countries are a thousand times better than communism from the standpoint of how they treat their own people. And at their best, some of these autocracies have combined control of the press and political parties with remarkably progressive social programs.

But perhaps more important from our standpoint is that these free autocracies, for lack of a better term, do not threaten the peace of their neighbors or of the world or threaten our own security, whereas world communism has now become a threat of terrifying dimensions.

**THE FALLACY THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE NO WILL TO RESIST COMMUNISM**

We have been told that the Vietnamese people are indifferent to communism; that they resist it only halfheartedly. Some commentators have even sought to create the impression that America is in a position of coercing the South Vietnamese to fight against communism.

This estimate of the attitude of the South Vietnamese people is totally false.

True, South Vietnam is suffering from political instability.

True, the war against the Vietcong is going badly.

But these things by themselves do not constitute proof that the Vietnamese people are indifferent to communism or that they do not have the will to resist.

The people of South Vietnam are, in fact, one of the most anti-Communist peoples in the world. Among them are more than 1 million refugees who sacrificed everything they possessed to flee from North Vietnam to South Vietnam after the country was divided by the Geneva agreement of 1954; and it is estimated that there are another 300,000 internal refugees who have fled from Communist-controlled areas in the south.

Among the present population of 14 million, in addition, there are several million peasants and workers and students who have at one time or another borne arms against the Communists, some of them in the Vietnamese Army, the majority in village self-defense units.

The overwhelming majority of the people of South Vietnam know what communism means because they have experienced it on their own backs. There are indeed very few South Vietnamese who do not have friends or relatives who have been the victims of Communist brutality and terror.

Let me tell the story of one such act of Communist terror, because statistics by themselves tend to be meaningless.

In the village of Phu Hoa, there was a teenage girl by the name of Giau, the pride of her parents and a born leader of others. As a member of the Republican Youth Organization, she organized the village youth and gave talks. On the evening of January 15, 1962, she was abducted from her village by Vietcong soldiers. The next morning her mutilated and decapitated body—I have a photograph of it—was discovered in the roadway outside the village with a note on her breast captioned “Death Sentence for Giau,” and signed by the “People’s Front of Liberation.”

For a long period of time, assassinations such as this were going on at the rate of some 500 a month, or 6,000 a year. The victims were most frequently active supporters of government, local administrators, village heads, and school-teachers. The families of village militiamen were another favorite target. The Vietcong would entice the militia away from the village—and when they returned they would find their wives and children massacred.

While the facts of these mass assassinations are not generally known in our country, they are known in Vietnam. And this is one of the reasons why the

Vietnamese people hate the Communists, and why they continue to resist them despite the chronic political instability in Saigon and despite the seeming hopelessness of their situation.

For some strange reason, the torture of one Vietcong prisoner aroused far more indignation in our country than the assassination of scores of thousands of innocent civilians by the Vietcong Communists, including the bombing of a schoolbus in which a score of children died.

But, if the Vietnamese people are anti-Communist, I have been asked: Why has the Vietnamese Army put up so poor a show?

The Vietnamese Army has been handicapped by political instability by the frequent shifts of officers, by poor staff work, by its inadequate use of scouts and security patrols, and by the many disadvantages under which counterguerrilla forces must always operate. But, it is simply not true that the Vietnamese Army has shown no willingness to fight.

They have fought bravely in thousands of engagements. They have taken heavy casualties and inflicted much heavier casualties on the enemy.

The belief that the Vietnamese people do not have the will to resist the Communists and that the Vietnamese forces have fought poorly against them, is in large measure due to the unfortunate emphasis which the press always places on disasters and defects.

It probably also springs in part from the traditional attitude of the American newspaperman that it is his duty to mercilessly expose every weakness in his city government, in his State government, in his National Government.

I do not complain about that. I suppose that is the way it has to be.

But whatever the reasons may be, the emphasis in the press has been so misleading that even knowledgeable members of the administration have been con-

fused by it. For example, a member of the administration who very recently visited Vietnam informed me that, contrary to his impressions from reading the press he was amazed to learn that in eight engagements of battalion size and larger which took place during the month of January 1965, the Vietnamese Army got the better of the engagement in every single case.

I have here the comparative figures for Vietnamese and Vietcong casualties for the 3-year period 1962-64, which I have received from an official source. I wish to read them, Mr. President, because they throw an altogether new light on the situation in Vietnam. I do not know why these figures were not released long ago. I hear people complaining that they do not know what is going on in Vietnam. The release of these figures would have helped them to understand.

In 1962 the Vietnamese Army lost 4,400 killed in action against 21,000 Vietcong killed, and 1,300 prisoners against 5,500 captives taken from the Vietcong.

Those are pretty good statistics. They ought to be read and studied by those who have been telling us that the South Vietnamese have no will to fight.

Listen to these further figures:

In 1963 the figures were 5,700 Vietnamese soldiers killed in action against 21,000 Vietcong, and 3,300 missing or captured against 4,000 Vietcong captives.

And even last year, when the fortunes of war turned against the Vietnamese government, the Vietnamese Army killed 17,000 Vietcong against a loss of 7,000 men, and took 4,200 Communists captive against 5,800 captives lost to them.

To those who say that the Vietnamese Army has not shown the will to resist, I point out that, over the 3-year period for which I have presented figures, this army suffered a total death toll of 17,000 men, which is almost as high as the total American toll in South Korea. The

enemy's casualties have been much heavier. But the Communists have continued to attack regardless of losses. And because it has not been possible to reconstitute a stable government since the overthrow of Diem, and, because no one knows where guerrillas may strike next, and because unlimited terror is a dreadfully effective instrument, the Vietcong, over the past 15 months, have been able to make most of the Vietnamese countryside insecure.

The fact that the Vietcong seem to be winning and that they have been so effective in resisting government counterattacks, has led some people to believe that the Vietcong soldier is convinced of the justice of his cause and that this is why he fights more grimly.

The Communists are masters of the art of imposing iron discipline by means of unlimited terror.

Senators will recall that during the Korean war we all marveled at the discipline of the Chinese Communist soldiers who kept on marching without breaking step while they were being bombed and strafed by American planes, or who attacked our positions, wave upon wave, apparently oblivious to casualties.

I remember people saying, "See the dedication of these Chinese Communists. See how they bear themselves against bullets and bombs. See how fanatically they believe in their cause." I did not think that was the reason, but I did not have an effective answer until after the war was over.

Senators will recall the terrible riots in the Koje prisoner-of-war camp, when the prisoners seemed so grimly united against us that for weeks on end American soldiers could not venture into the POW compound. Again, the common assumption was that the prisoners were all fanatical Communists.

But then the end of the war came—and it turned out that 20,000 out of 25,000 of the Communist prisoners in our hands

asked for refugee status rather than return to North Korea or China. And these were supposed to be the dedicated Communists who believe so fanatically in communism.

Of the 5,000 who returned home, there is reason to believe that the majority did so with heavy hearts, because of strong family ties and not because of any love for communism.

I remind the Senators—because these things tend to be forgotten—of the evidence which emerged that the Koje prisoners of war had been terrorized by a tiny minority of Communist militants who ran the camp with an iron hand, torturing political opponents, staging kangaroo courts, and executing and burying those who were sentenced.

I also remind them of the scenes that took place when the prisoners were brought before the Communist interrogators under the procedures set up by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The prisoners had to be dragged before the interrogators forcibly, their arms pinned behind their backs by Indian soldiers. When the Communist interrogators spoke to them, urging that they return to their homeland, the prisoners spat out their hatred with a vehemence that Western observers found frightening. So embarrassing were the interrogations for the Communists that after a number of sessions they decided to call off the whole show.

In the light of this conclusion, how much significance can one attach to the seemingly fanatical courage displayed by the Chinese and North Korean soldiers in attacking our positions, or to the grim unity of the Koje prisoners of war in resisting their American captors?

Before we marvel at the apparently high morale of the Vietcong forces in South Vietnam, I suggest that we recall the experience of the Korean war, because the evidence is overwhelming that the Vietcong Communists are using ter-

ror on the same scale and in the same manner that it was employed on the Korean battlefield and in the prisoner-of-war camps.

That the morale of the Vietcong forces is not 10 feet tall is demonstrated by the substantial number of Vietcong prisoners taken over the past 3 years. It is demonstrated even more dramatically by the fact that from February 1963 through the end of 1964 there were approximately 17,000 Vietcong defections. The number of defections would be far larger, I am certain, if a stable government could establish itself in Saigon.

It is interesting to note that, while most of the defectors have been young peasants who were conscripted by the Vietcong, their ranks also include North Vietnamese officers who were told that they were going south to fight the Americans and who broke when they discovered that they were fighting their own people.

Impatient constituents have sometimes asked me why the Communists have been able to plan elaborate attacks on our airfields and other installations without advance intelligence reaching us from members of the local population who must have observed the Communists.

The instrument of terror is also applicable to the control of the civilian population. Whenever the Communists take over a village or a town, they systematically massacre all known anti-Communist leaders and those who are suspected of informing. They frequently mutilate their bodies as an example to the people. If we could give the Vietnamese villagers a feeling of greater security, I am sure that more intelligence would be forthcoming. As matters now stand, the average Vietnamese peasant fears that the Communists are going to win the war, and he knows the terrible punishment that awaits those who inform on the Communists. This is why our intelligence has admittedly been inade-

quate—one of the reasons, certainly. But this is a situation that could change dramatically if we succeeded in convincing the Vietnamese people of our determination to help them retain their freedom, and if we succeeded in inflicting a number of significant defeats on the enemy.

#### THE BUDDHIST FALLACY

I now wish to discuss the Buddhist situation, about which we have heard so much over the several years.

The myth of Buddhist persecution and the parallel myth that the Buddhists are opposed to the Government, have because of the so-called militant Buddhist movement, become important political factors in Vietnam. It is, therefore, important that we should seek to understand the nature of this movement, the motivation of its leaders, and the real degree of influence it exerts over the Vietnamese people.

The campaign which resulted in the overthrow of President Diem was marked by the charge that he had subjected the Buddhist religion to inhuman persecution; and, in protest against this alleged persecution, a number of Buddhist monks went through the horrifying ritual of self-immolation.

Week after week, month after month, the American people and the people of the world were inundated with stories supporting the charge that Diem was persecuting the Buddhist religion. There were a number of experienced correspondents of national reputation who challenged the authenticity of these stories. But their voices were drowned by the torrent of charges and allegations that appeared in some of our major newspapers, and that were lent further credence because of repetition of our official information agencies.

At the invitation of President Diem, the U.N. General Assembly decided to send a factfinding mission to South Vietnam to

look into the situation. I find this rarely referred to in any discussion of the Buddhist question, but it is a fact that the United Nations did send a mission over there.

While the mission was still in the country, President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were overthrown and assassinated.

The mission decided that the overthrow of Diem made it unnecessary to come up with a formal finding. I believe that this was most regrettable. But the summary of the testimony which it had taken in Vietnam pointed strongly to the conclusion that the persecution of the Buddhists was either nonexistent or vastly exaggerated and that the agitation was essentially political. This, in essence, was what I was told in a personal conversation with Ambassador Fernando Volio Jiminez, of Costa Rica, who had introduced the motion calling for the setting up of the U.N. mission and who served as a member of it.

I went to New York and saw Ambassador Volio. I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I understand you were a member of the United Nations commission which went to Vietnam. I should like to ask you what the facts are." Ambassador Volio gave me the facts as I have given them to you here.

Ambassador Pinto, of Dahomey, another member of the U.N. mission, expressed himself in similar terms in public.

The entire tragic story suggests that the free world was made the victim of a gigantic propaganda hoax, as a result of which the legitimate government of President Diem was destroyed and a chaotic situation created which has inevitably played into the hands of the Communists.

If Senators have not yet had time to read the report of the U.N. factfinding mission to Vietnam, I urge them to do so because it throws essential light on the

current activities of the militant Buddhists. I am arranging to have copies mailed to every Senator, and I hope that all Senators will read it, because they will learn a great deal about the present Buddhist situation from it.

The first fact which needs to be established in evaluating the militant Buddhist movement is that the Buddhists do not constitute 80 or 85 percent of the population, as was widely reported at the time of the Buddhist crisis. According to Dr. Mai Tho Truyen, one of the greatest authorities on Vietnam Buddhism, the Vietnamese Buddhists number approximately 4 million people, or about 30 percent of the population.

The second point that must be made is that the militant Buddhists constitute only a small fraction of the total Buddhist population. The millions of the Buddhist peasants, in their great majority, do not approve of the militant political actions and the government-toppling intrigues of the Buddhist militants in Saigon. Their activities, indeed, run completely counter to the pacific traditions of the Buddhist religion.

It is questionable whether the Buddhist militants have been able to mobilize as many as 50,000 active supporters in all the demonstrations they have staged in Saigon and Hue and other cities. But because political power resides in the cities, the several tens of thousands of Buddhist militants, by their clamor and their persistent demonstrations and their clever propaganda, have succeeded in creating the impression that they speak for the people of the cities and for the majority of the people of Vietnam.

What do the Buddhist militants want? Before the overthrow of President Diem, Thich Tri Quang told Marguerite Higgins frankly: "We cannot get an arrangement with the north until we get rid of Diem and Nhu."

The evidence is clear that Thich Tri Quang and some of his other militants

are still bent on an agreement with the north. Indeed, only last Friday, Quang called for U.S. negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.

If there is reason to believe that Thich Tri Quang is a neutralist, there is even more reason for fearing that some of the other members of the Buddhist opposition movement are openly pro-Communist or that they have become tools of the rather substantial Communist infiltration which is known to exist in the Buddhist clergy in the various countries of Asia.

That such an infiltration should exist is not surprising because there are no barriers to it.

A man who wants to become a Buddhist monk does not have to prepare himself for his ministry by engaging in studies, nor does he have to be ordained, nor does he take any vow.

He simply shaves his head and dons the saffron robe and enters a monastery—and overnight he becomes one of the religious elite.

When he wishes to leave the monastery, he sheds his robe and leaves it; if he wishes to reenter, he dons his robe again and reenters. That is all there is to it.

I do not criticize this procedure on religious grounds.

Buddhism is one of the great religions of mankind and much can be said for an arrangement that enables every man of religious disposition to spend at least a portion of his life under the voluntary monastic discipline characteristic of Buddhism.

But, regrettably, it is a procedure that leaves the door wide open to Communist infiltration.

I remember that when we were digging into the files of the Nazis at Nuremberg, we found that Hitler had under consideration a program of infiltrating the churches by inducing young people to enter seminaries, so that he could have them at his disposal.

When I first began to hear of the Buddhist situation, it occurred to me that more than likely there was a similar infiltration of religion at work.

The militant Buddhists have used the influence and prestige which accrued to them from the overthrow of Diem for the prime purpose of making stable government impossible: in this sense, whatever the intent of their leaders, they have been serving the desires of the Communist Vietcong.

They have organized demonstrations, provoked riots, inflamed passions with highly publicized fasts and self-immolations, and subjected the government to a ceaseless propaganda barrage. They overthrew the Khanh government. Then they overthrew the Huong government which succeeded it. And they seem to be intent on making things impossible for any government that may come to power.

It is, of course, difficult to deal with a political conspiracy that camouflages itself in religious robes. In any case, this is a matter for the Vietnamese Government and not for our own Government. But it would make matters immeasurably easier for the Vietnamese authorities if the true facts about Buddhism in Vietnam were given to the American people and if they could be helped to understand how little the Buddhist militants really represent, how nefarious their political activities have really been, and how much they have done to undermine the fight against Communists.

No stable government can be created in Vietnam without the participation and support of responsible Buddhist leadership. But this responsible leadership cannot be found among the handful of monks of questionable antecedents who have been misdirecting the militant Buddhist movement in the cities of Vietnam.

It is time to speak bluntly on this issue.

## THE FALLACY OF THE FRENCH ANALOGY

Over and over again in recent months I have heard it said that our position in Vietnam is impossible because the French, who knew Vietnam so much better than we do, were compelled to admit defeat after 8 years of war against the Vietminh. A recent half-page advertisement in the New York Times asked: "How can we win in Vietnam with less than 30,000 advisers, when the French could not win with an army of nearly half a million?"

Our own position is entirely different from the French position in Indochina. The French were a colonial power, exploiting and imposing their will on the Indochinese people and stubbornly denying them their freedom. The French military effort in Indochina was doomed because it had against it not only the Communists but the overwhelming majority of the Indochinese people. It was a war fought by Frenchmen against Indochinese.

The United States, however, does not seek to impose its control on Vietnam or exploit Vietnam. We are not a colonial power. We seek only to help the people of South Vietnam defend their freedom against an insurgency that is inspired and directed and aided by the North Vietnamese Communists. This is understood by the Vietnamese people. And that is why hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who fought with Ho Chi Minh against the French are today fighting for the Saigon government against the Vietcong.

That is why the war against the Vietcong can be won, while the war of French colonialism against the Indochinese independence movement was doomed from the outset.

There is no similarity in the two situations that has any meaning or validity.

## WHAT CAN BE DONE?

I believe the war in Vietnam can be won without a significant increase in our military effort. There are many things

that can be done to improve the performance of our side, and most of them lie essentially in the nonmilitary field.

Let me set forth some of the things that I believe can be done.

## THE NEED FOR IMPROVED LIAISON

One of the most obvious and most serious weaknesses of the American position in Vietnam is the lack of adequate liaison with the leaders of the various sectors of the Vietnamese community.

Because of this lack of communication, we have frequently been caught unawares by developments; we have remained without serious ability to influence them; and we have not been able to effectively assist the Vietnamese in communicating with each other and in stabilizing the political situation in Saigon.

No one person is to blame for this. It is, rather, the system which rotates military officers and AID officials and other Americans in Vietnam on an annual or 2-year basis.

As one American officer pointed out in a recent interview, "It takes about 8 months before you can really get to know the country and the people. And, just about the time you are beginning to understand something, you are rotated home and that is the end of your utility."

I believe that something can be done to improve this situation.

I have met a number of Americans, former soldiers and former AID officials, who have spent 5 years or more in Vietnam, have built up personal friendships with leaders of every sector of the Vietnamese community, enjoy the confidence of the Vietnamese because of their understanding and dedication, and who would jump at the opportunity to return to Vietnam for the purpose of helping it in this critical hour. I am told that there may be as many as 10 or 12 such people in this country.

I have proposed in a letter to the President that these Americans be constituted into a liaison group and that

they be dispatched to Saigon immediately for the purpose of helping the Embassy to establish the broadest and most effective possible liaison with the army leaders, with the Buddhists, with the intellectual community, and with the Vietnamese political leaders.

I know that there is always a tendency on the part of World War II officers to resent World War I officers, and on the part of those who are involved in a situation today to resist the assistance of those who preceded them. There is also sometimes a tendency for those who were there yesterday to believe that they understand things better than those who are there today.

But this is a situation in which I am confident every American, no matter what his rank, will seek to rise above his personal prejudices. It is a situation that demands the utilization of every ounce of experience and dedication available to us.

It is my earnest personal conviction that the dispatch of such a liaison group to Saigon would result in an early improvement in our ability to communicate with the Vietnamese and in our ability to assist them in achieving the political stability which is essential to the successful prosecution of the war.

#### THE NEED FOR A STEPPED-UP POLITICAL WARFARE EFFORT

From many conversations with Vietnamese and with Americans who have served in various capacities in Vietnam, I am convinced that another one of our major weaknesses lies in the field of political warfare.

We have, by and large, been trying to meet the Communist insurgency by traditional military methods or by traditional methods slightly tailored to meet the special requirements of guerrilla warfare. In the field of political warfare, where the Communists have scored their most spectacular triumphs, our own effort has been limited, and halting, and

amateurish, and, in fact, sadly ineffectual.

The prime goal of political warfare, as it must be waged by freemen, is to win men's minds. The prime goal of political warfare, as it is waged by the Communists, is to erode and paralyze the will to resist by means of total error.

An effective political warfare program requires three major ingredients: First, a handful of basic slogans which capsule popular desires and which are capable of striking responsive chords in the hearts of the people; second, a propaganda apparatus capable of conveying this program both to those on the Government side and those on the side of the insurgents; third, specially trained cadres to direct the effort.

But the slogans we have are inadequate. Our propaganda program is dismally weak compared with that of the Communists. And according to my information, we still have not assisted the Vietnamese to set up an intensive training program in Communist cold war methods and how to counter them.

An article in the New York Times on August 3, 1964, pointed out that in every area "the basic cutting tool of the Vietcong is a squad of about 10 armed men and women whose primary function is propaganda." The article also said that "Most of the experts in psychological warfare and propaganda here believe the Vietcong's agitprop teams have done the Saigon government more damage than even the tough Vietcong regular battalions." Finally, the article made the point that according to estimates there were 320 Vietcong "agitprop" teams working in the country, against 20 "information teams" for the government side. This gave the Vietcong an edge of 16 to 1 in the field of propaganda personnel. And the edge was probably even greater in terms of finesse and effectiveness.

Even if we help the South Vietnamese Government intensify its propaganda effort, there would still remain the problem of basic goals and slogans.

I have pointed out that the Vietnamese people have a proud history and a strong sense of national unity. All Vietnamese, whether they live in the north or south, would like to see a unified and peaceful Vietnam. But as matters now stand, only the Communists are able to hold forth the prospect of the reunification of Vietnam. To date we have not given the South Vietnamese Government the green light to set up a "Committee for the Liberation of North Vietnam," as counterpart to the "Liberation Front" which the Communists have set up in the south. This places the South Vietnamese side at a grave disadvantage.

There are any number of patriotic North Vietnamese refugees who have been itching for the opportunity to set up a Liberation Committee for the North. The establishment of such a committee could, in my opinion, have an immediate and profound impact on the conduct of the war.

But above all, the situation in Vietnam underscores the need for an effective training program in political warfare, for our own foreign service and military personnel so that they can help to communicate this knowledge to nationals of other countries who, like the South Vietnamese, are engaged in a life-and-death struggle for survival against the most cunning and most ruthless practitioners of political warfare history has ever known.

In this connection, I wish to bring to the attention of my colleagues the fact that there has been pending before Congress for some 6 years a bill calling for the establishment of a Freedom Academy. This would be an institution where Americans and citizens of other free countries could receive concentrated training in Communist tech-

niques and operations, and in tactics and methods designed to frustrate the Communists at every operational level, from elections for the control of trade unions and student organizations, to street riots, to attempted insurrections.

The Senate Judiciary Committee in reporting this measure to the floor in May of 1960, described the bill as "one of the most important measures ever introduced in the Congress." But, unfortunately, although the bill was passed by the Senate, the House took no action.

When the bill was reintroduced for the third time in early 1963, it has the sponsorship of the following Senators: MUNDT, DOUGLAS, CASE, DODD, SMATHERS, Goldwater, PROXMIRE, FONG, HICKENLOOPER, MILLER, Keating, LAUSCHE, and SCOTT.

The distinguished senior Senator from South Dakota last Friday reintroduced the measure for the fourth time, and it is now lying on the table, so that those who wish to add their names as cosponsors may do so. It is my earnest hope that the measure will have the sponsorship of an even larger bipartisan group of Senators than it did in 1963. It is my hope too that there will be no further delay, no foot dragging, in enacting this long-overdue measure. It is time, high time, that we recognize the imperative need to equip ourselves and our allies with the knowledge and the trained personnel required to meet the Communist onslaught.

#### CARRYING THE GUERRILLA WAR TO THE NORTH

First of all, I think there is a growing acceptance of the need for punishing the North with hit-and-run raids. It would be much more effective if these raids could be carried out in the name of a North Vietnamese Liberation Front than in the name of the South Vietnamese Government.

Second, I have reason for believing that increasing consideration is being given to the need for countering the Viet-

cong insurgency in the South with a guerrilla warfare effort in the North.

In May of 1961, when I returned from Laos and Vietnam, I made a statement, which I should like to repeat today:

The best way for us to stop Communist guerrilla action in Laos and in South Vietnam is to send guerrilla forces into North Vietnam; to equip and supply those patriots already in the field; to make every Communist official fear the just retribution of an outraged humanity; to make every Communist arsenal, government building, communications center and transportation facility a target for sabotage; to provide a rallying point for the great masses of oppressed people who hate communism because they have known it. Only when we give the Communists more trouble than they can handle at home, will they cease their aggression against the outposts of freedom.

I believe that every word I said in 1961 is doubly valid today. It is not too late to embark upon such a program. And if we do give the South Vietnamese Government the green light to embark upon it on an effective, hard-hitting scale, again I think it would add significantly to the psychological impact of the entire program if all guerrilla activities were carried out in the name of the "Committee for the Liberation of the North."

#### A FEW MILITARY SUGGESTIONS

I do not pretend to be a military expert. But I have discussed the situation in Vietnam with a number of military men of considerable experience in the area, and I have been encouraged to believe that the several suggestions which I have to make in this field are realistic.

I submit them for the consideration of my colleagues, because I think they make sense.

My first proposition is that we cannot regard the war in Vietnam in isolation from the rest of southeast Asia.

The Communist Party over which Ho Chi Minh presided for many years was the Communist Party of Indochina. Indeed, to this day, there is no such thing

as a Communist Party in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh's thinking and strategy are directed toward the reunification of all the former territories of French Indochina under his personal sway. This makes it imperative for us to develop a coordinated strategy for the entire area if we are to cope effectively with the Communist strategy.

Proposition No. 2 is that there are certain dramatic military actions open to us that do not involve the territory of North Vietnam.

The hub of the Ho Chi Minh trail is the town of Tchepone, inside the Laotian frontier, just south of the 17th parallel, the dividing line between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Through Tchepone pour most of the reinforcements and equipment from North Vietnam. From Tchepone the men and equipment are infiltrated into South Vietnam along hundreds of different jungle trails.

I recall that when I met with President Diem in April of 1961, he urged that the Americans assist him and the Laotian Government in preemptive action to secure three key centers in the Laotian Panhandle—Tchepone, Saravane, and Attopeu—in order to prevent the large-scale infiltration which is today taking place. I still have a copy of the marked map which he gave me in outlining his project. Had Diem's advice been followed there would have been no Ho Chi Minh trail. But this was at the time of the Laotian armistice and we were not disposed to take any actions which might provoke the Laotian Communists. So nothing was done.

The seizure of Tchepone by Laotian and Vietnamese forces, with American air support would, I have been assured, be a feasible military operation and one that could be carried out with the means available to us on the spot. It would do more to put a crimp in the Ho Chi Minh trail than any amount of bombing

we could attempt. And it would have as dramatic an impact on the situation in Laos as on the situation in Vietnam.

Finally, there is the matter of collective action by the SEATO nations.

As late as April of 1961, the SEATO nations in the immediate area of the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan—all favored common action against the Communist menace in Laos. But the British and French were opposed to such action, and we ourselves sat on the fence; and the result was that nothing was done.

The charter of SEATO will have to be modified so that one nation cannot veto collective action by all the other nations. Britain, I am inclined to believe, would now be disposed to support collective action by SEATO because of the situation in Malaysia. But, perhaps France should be invited to leave SEATO, on the grounds that she has no vital interests in the area, and her entire attitude toward Red China is one of appeasement. In view of the fact that something has to be done immediately, however, the sensible course is to encourage collective action by the free nations in the area, outside the framework of SEATO, until SEATO can be reorganized in a manner that makes it effective.

In this connection, I am most encouraged by the news that South Korea has decided to send a contingent of several thousand military engineers to South Vietnam, and the Philippines have decided to do likewise. It is infinitely better from every standpoint to have Asian troops supporting the Vietnamese forces against the Vietcong on the ground, than it is to have American troops actively involved.

**THE NEED FOR UNDERSCORING OUR  
LONG-TERM COMMITMENT**

The retaliatory strikes ordered by President Johnson against the North have had the effect of reiterating our commitment in a manner that the Com-

munists understand; and this, in the long run, is probably more important than the damage wrought by these strikes.

But if the Communists are to be discouraged from continuing this costly war, we must seek every possible means of underscoring our determination to stand by the people of South Vietnam, to pay whatever cost may be necessary, and to take whatever risk may be necessary to prevent the Communists from subjugating the Vietnamese people and other peoples in the area.

It is important to reiterate our resolve at every opportunity. And it is even more important to translate this resolve into hard political and military actions.

The American Friends of Vietnam have suggested another dramatic measure. They have suggested a commitment to a massive southeast Asian development program based on the harnessing of the Mekong River—a kind of Tennessee Valley Authority for southeast Asia. Such a plan, they point out, would offer incredible promise to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand as well as to South Vietnam, and it would offer equal promise to the people of North Vietnam, which only the continued belligerence and noncooperation of their Government could frustrate.

This, to me, sounds eminently sensible.

**FOR A COMMITMENT TO VICTORY**

If we decide to withdraw from Vietnam we can certainly find plenty of excuses to ease our path. We can blame it on the geography; or on the topography; or on local apathy; or on political instability; or on religious strife; or even on anti-Americanism. But that will fool no one but ourselves. These conditions make our success there difficult, but only our own timidity and vacillation can make it impossible.

It has become obvious that we cannot go on fighting this undeclared war under

the rules laid down by our enemies. We have reached the point where we shall have to make a great decision, a decision as to whether we are to take the hard steps necessary to turn the tide in Vietnam or whether we are to refrain from doing so and thus lose inevitably by default.

The ultimate outcome of the cold war depends upon an affirmative decision to do whatever is necessary to achieve victory in South Vietnam. The events of recent weeks demonstrate again that the administration is not lacking in resolve and that it is rapidly approaching such a decision.

Whether that means a larger commitment of forces, or continued retaliatory strikes against the North, or carrying guerrilla warfare to the enemy homeland, or completely sealing off South Vietnam from Communist aid—I say to the administration, “Give us the plan that will do the job, and we will support you.”

Whether our victory be near or far, can we, dare we, turn away or begin to turn away from the task before us, however frustrating or burdensome it may be?

Here surely is a time for us to heed Santayana’s maxim “Those who will not learn from the past are destined to repeat it.”

And so I speak today not merely to urge that we stand fast in Vietnam, but also to urge that we meet head on the new isolationism in its incipient stages, before the long months and years of discontent, frustration, and weariness that lie ahead have swelled the chorus urging disengagement and withdrawal to a deafening roar.

Let us expound a foreign policy nurtured in our constantly growing strength, not one fed by fear and disillusionment; a policy which each year is prepared to expend more, not less, in the cause of preserving our country and the decencies of man.

Let us insist upon a defense budget based upon the dangers we face abroad, not upon the benefits we seek at home.

Let us embrace a doctrine that refuses to yield to force, ever; that honors its commitments because we know that our good faith is the cement binding the free world together; a doctrine that recognizes in its foreign aid program not only that the rich are morally obligated to help the poor, but also that prosperity cannot permanently endure surrounded by poverty, and justice cannot conquer until its conquest is universal.

Let us, above all, encourage and inspire a national spirit worthy of our history, worthy of our burgeoning, bursting strength, in our arms, in our agriculture, in industry, in science, in finance, a spirit of confidence, of optimism, of willingness to accept new risks and exploit new opportunities.

And let us remember that providence has showered upon our people greater blessings than on any other, and that, great though our works have been, much greater is expected of us.

In recent days, the free world has paid tribute to its greatest champion of our age, Winston Churchill.

It is a curious thing that though Churchill is acknowledged on all sides as the preeminent figure of our time and as the highest embodiment of Western statesmanship, he was, throughout his life, and remains today, a prophet unheeded, a statesman whom men venerate but will not emulate.

It may well be that Winston Churchill’s greatest legacy will prove to be, not the legacy of his immortal deeds, but that of his example and his precepts; and that freemen of the future will pay him the homage denied by his contemporaries, the tribute of imitation and acceptance of his message.

As we ponder the passing of this heroic figure and reflect upon his career and try to draw from it lessons which

we might apply to the aggressive onslaught that we face today in a hundred ways on a hundred fronts, we might take to heart this advice which he gave in the dark days of 1941 to the boys of Harrow, his old school:

Never give in. Never, never, never. Never yield to force and the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy. Never yield in any way, great or small, large or petty, except to convictions of honor and good sense.

Let us resolve to nail this message to the masthead of our ship of state in this year of decision.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the following documents: First, a summary of Communist violations of the Laotian armistice prepared for me by the Library of Congress; second, a copy of a statement released yesterday by the American Friends of Vietnam, under the caption of "A New Policy for Vietnam"; third, a copy of a telegram to the President from the Veterans of Foreign Wars; fourth, various newspaper clippings bearing on the situation in Vietnam.

There being no objection, the sundry documents were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,  
Washington, D.C., May 28, 1964.

To: Hon. THOMAS J. DODD.

From: Foreign Affairs Division.

Subject: List of violations by the Communist Pathet Lao of the Geneva armistice of 1961-62.

July 27, 1962: Laotian cease-fire committee of the three factions (neutralists, rightists, and pro-Communist Pathet Lao) reaches an agreement on principles to implement a truce: forces of each faction will remain in their previous positions; frontline forces and military supplies are not to be increased; and troops of the three factions will not attack each other.

August 22, 1962: Several companies of pro-Communist Pathet Lao troops attack outposts of rightist forces near Sam Neua in northeastern Laos.

765-428—96923

November 27, 1962: U.S. C-123 cargo plane, flying rice and other supplies to neutralist forces, is shot down over the Plaine des Jarres. Two American airmen are killed and one wounded. Investigation shows that the plane was shot down by dissident neutralist troops tied up with Pathet Lao.

April 4, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma announces that Pathet Lao troops have attacked neutralist troops of Gen. Kong Le in the Plaine des Jarres. On April 8 the U.S. State Department accuses the Pathet Lao of a serious violation of the cease-fire.

April 15, 1963: Following brief cease-fire, fighting breaks out again on the Plaine des Jarres. The neutralist forces of Gen. Kong Le are attacked and suffer new setbacks. On April 16 U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball says that the United States does not rule out the possibility of sending troops into Laos if the situation should continue to deteriorate. Warnings are also issued by Secretary of State Dean Rusk on April 18 and President Kennedy on April 19.

May 3, 1963: Pathet Lao troops fire on two helicopters of the International Control Commission in the Plaine des Jarres, destroying one and wounding four occupants. On May 10, U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger accuses the Pathet Lao of disrupting the peace and violating the Geneva accords, and he says that the United States will never leave Laos standing alone "to face its enemies from within and abroad."

May 21, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma issues communique stating that severe fighting has been going on for 2 days in the Plaine des Jarres between Pathet Lao troops and neutralist forces. On May 23, the ICC asks Britain and the Soviet Union to issue immediate appeal for a cease-fire on the Plaine des Jarres.

June 1, 1963: Premier Souvanna Phouma charges that Pathet Lao forces are continuing their attacks, resumed on May 30, against neutralist positions near the Plaine des Jarres.

September 7, 1963: U.S. C-47 unarmed cargo plane is shot down by Pathet Lao in central Laos. The government says they carry only rice and other relief supplies.

September 9, 1963: Fighting breaks out in Vientiane between the Pathet Lao and the rightist police force under Deputy Premier Phoumi Nosavan.

November 17, 1963: Cease-fire is broken as fighting resumes in the Plaine des Jarres. Talks between neutralist and Pathet Lao military leaders subsequently break down as the Pathet Lao rejects a proposal for the ICC to police the cease-fire.

January 29, 1964: Neutralist military headquarters reports that six Pathet Lao and four North Vietnamese battalions have launched an attack in southern Laos, have defeated neutralist and rightist forces at Na Kay, and are now heading toward the the strategic post of Thakhek.

April 19, 1964: Military coup in Vientiane, organized by rightist army officers, ousts government of Premier Souvanna. Coup leaders give as reason for their action the premier's failure to establish peace in Laos.

May 15, 1964: The Laotian Government reports that Pathet Lao forces have seized Tha Thom, a key town about 90 miles northeast of Vientiane. It also reports that an attack on the defense perimeter of Paksane is imminent. On May 16, Pathet Lao forces renew attacks on neutralist position on the Plaine des Jarres. A State Department spokesman calls the new attacks a "flagrant and open violation" of the Geneva accords of 1961-62.

DAVID E. LOCKWOOD,  
*Analyst in Far Eastern Affairs.*

#### A NEW POLICY FOR VIETNAM

(Statement by the American Friends of Vietnam)

#### THE DILEMMA

If we are to identify wisely our most effective forward course in Vietnam, it is important first to understand the exact nature of our dilemma there. We know the inherent generosity, both toward free Vietnam and its neighboring countries, which has led us to involve our substance and our blood. We know that but for our commitment, free Vietnam would long since have fallen into the political darkness and physical despair which oppresses Communist North Vietnam. We know that our presence there is in response to the wish of most segments of Vietnamese leadership, however they differ among themselves on other matters. We know that our presence there is earnestly desired by most neighboring countries of southeast Asia. We know that our purpose is to assist responsible

and responsive government and to enable Vietnam and its neighbors to maintain national independence against external encroachment. We know that we have neither wished to "establish" nor "dominate" a Vietnamese government nor to seek for ourselves political, military, or economic advantage.

Our dilemma flows in part from the fact that this knowledge is not shared by all of the Vietnamese people, is not accepted by the members of the Vietcong, is not believed in parts of the less developed world still suffering the scars of recent colonial experience. Nor, in fact, is this understanding uniformly shared by our own people.

The dilemma is sharpened further by a spreading doubt among leadership elements in independent southeast Asian countries that the United States has staying power. Thailand's foreign minister, Thanat Khomjan, recently warned members of the Overseas Press Club: "The Thai Government knows much better but some people are not sure we can depend on outside help—especially when there is so much talk of quitting and going home. The Communists have never spoken that line of quitting. When they go some place they stay there."

In part, at least, this skepticism is fostered by the doubt among some Americans that any valid purpose led to our presence in Vietnam in the first place.

#### THE ALTERNATIVES

The lack of public understanding flows in part from inadequate examination of the alternatives confronting the United States now. In our opinion there are six choices:

1. Continue as now. Whether or not the Vietcong are, in fact, increasing their effectiveness there is a growing conviction in Saigon, in the United States, and in much of the rest of the world, that this is so. This alone makes continuation of our present policy undesirable. The overriding hazard of the present policy is the undeniable fact that it has not provided sufficient psychological and political potency to sustain a Vietnamese Government.

2. Withdraw. This would violate our pledge not to abandon the Vietnamese people. It would manifest throughout the world a U.S. inability to long sustain an effort designed to frustrate Communist intentions. The im-

plications would be read as eloquently in Berlin or in Cuba, as they would be in Vietnam, Indonesia, or India. There can be no question that this alternative would require the Governments of the Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, India, Japan, to reassess totally present policy and to reorient toward what would be the dominating new facts of Asian life.

("Neutralization" of Vietnam is not suggested here for a simple reason: genuine and reliable neutralization of Vietnam is not possible at the present time. What is most often talked of in this connection is merely a rhetorical euphemism designed to make withdrawal more palatable. On the other hand, the proposals discussed here are valuable to part precisely because they do hold the promise that they may generate sufficient free Vietnamese vitality to make true and assured neutralization possible at some future time.)

3. Military cordon sanitaire across Vietnam and Laos. An estimated military force of up to 100,000 would be involved in making such a cordon truly effective and enemy penetration genuinely hazardous. Its greatest contribution would be in providing hard evidence of new determination to maintain southeast Asian integrity. Although military effect of interdicting the Vietcong's transport and supply may be limited, it is nonetheless one useful alternative, especially when employed with other steps outlined here.

4. Extend military action to the north. Until last week, steps taken in this direction were, in our judgment, not sufficiently explicit, either to rekindle Vietnamese faith in our intentions or to inspire confidence in other Asian countries that we are indeed willing to accept risk as the price of our commitment to freedom. The increased external, Communist intervention in South Vietnam has made it both reasonable and essential that there be a vigorous anti-Communist military response. The limited air strikes in North Vietnam by American and Vietnamese planes constituted such an appropriate response.

There are many other forms of stronger American action and involvement and they are not mutually exclusive. They include:

(a) Formation of an open, well-publicized North Vietnam liberation movement sponsoring major psychological operations programs, including paramilitary action, against the North Vietnamese regime.

(b) Establishment of an International Voluntary Corps dedicated to the maintenance of free nations in the Mekong basin. This corps should consist primarily of volunteers from Asian countries but may also contain a liberal admixture of Americans with military experience. Operating normally in small units with sufficient air support, this force—under the sponsorship of the proposed North Vietnam Liberation Movement—would harass the enemy wherever suitable targets exist, including targets within North Vietnam.

(c) Positioning of U.S. combat forces within South Vietnam to act as a general reserve—a sizable firefighting force. Such a military contingent (perhaps as many as two brigades) should not be used for routine combat or security duties, but as an immediate-reaction fighting force intended to engage Vietcong troops in fixed positions. Desirably, combat elements from other nations will be attached to this force.

(d) Continued bombing of selected military targets in North Vietnam. In contrast to the indiscriminate terrorist activity of the Vietcong in South Vietnam, the free world's concern for the Vietnamese people in both halves of the country make it undesirable for us to conduct warfare upon cities where the innocent will be hurt. However, those military targets in North Vietnam which are vital to their aggressive capability and which can be destroyed with our assistance are, in our view, legitimate targets for stage-by-stage destruction.

What is the risk involved in such action? In our judgment the possibility of Chinese involvement in South Vietnam would be only slightly increased. The possibility of Chinese help thrust upon North Vietnam would be greater. However, this probability may be precisely what is needed to make clear to even the most Communist leaders of North Vietnam how undesirable such help is to them in the long run. A heightened awareness of this danger might, in fact, force greater restraint upon the Government in Hanoi than our present policy can achieve.

Frankly, however, the direct military damage inflicted on the Communist regime in North Vietnam is the lesser of our reasons for suggesting that these steps be undertaken. In our opinion, it is urgent that the people of free Vietnam be assured that President Johnson means what he says—that we mean to stay and help, no matter what risks we must incur. It is equally urgent that these intentions be understood also in Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, the rest of Asia, and the world. Stanch, long-term American commitment—fully communicated and understood—would provide a lift to morale in free Vietnam, inject new vitality in the Vietnamese Government and require a new assessment of the United States among neighboring countries and among Asian allies elsewhere.

There is one final reason we support this painful course of action. Basic requirements for victory in Vietnam are not primarily military. They are psychological, social, and economic. Below we address ourselves to instruments which can meet the nonmilitary aspects of the undertaking. But neither the economic nor political measures we propose will get off the ground without evidence of the seriousness of our military intention. Nor will our military commitment produce the desired results without the companion economic and psychological supports.

America's experience in relation to the instability in postwar Europe is clearly relevant. The Marshall plan did not begin to come to life until the physical security promised by NATO was added. Nor would NATO by itself have been meaningful without the human vision and economic future presented by the Marshall plan.

5. Forging a more popular or responsive government. It is clear that the difficulties confronting any Vietnamese Government under Communist attack are enormous. We can but sympathize with those who carry the burdens of government in circumstances so frustrating and continuously demanding. It is possible that 20 years of civil war, colonial war, and Communist insurrectionary war, have so debilitated the structure of government as to preclude the immediate possibility, no matter how desirable, of absolutely stable government. There are political personalities with nationalist backgrounds who are deserving of our help and encourage-

ment. We must do what we can to help them and bring them forward. At the same time, we must help to diminish the present conflict of personalities that has proved in past years to be so destructive. In any event, we believe it is futile to concentrate, as we have in the past, on personalities, rather than on purposes, ideas, and institutions.

6. Injection of new purpose. If charismatic leadership is unavailable, charismatic purpose can be found. One aspect of that purpose involves the modest extension of military effort discussed above. It involves the clear demonstration that the United States means to remain committed even at enlarged risk. And such charismatic purpose must, of necessity, accept as workable "the best available choices of Vietnamese Government personnel"—choices made by the Vietnamese not by us. But our object would be to harness our military commitment and the Vietnamese effort to an infinitely larger objective than has previously motivated our participation. It would make crystal clear that the objectives which unite us with the Vietnamese people, as with our other allies on southeast Asia, are constructive and inextricably linked to the welfare of all southeast Asian peoples.

We suggest that all of our military, political, and economic programs in Vietnam be subordinated to a massive southeast Asian development program. A Johnson plan for the full flowering of southeast Asian economic resources and independence will have as much potency and promise for success in that corner of the world as the Marshall plan did in Europe and the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States.

The Mekong Basin is one of the world's richest and least developed areas. In an area of the world already food rich there is an opportunity to harness the tributaries of the Mekong Basin toward an economic flowering offering infinite promise to Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand as well as to South Vietnam, and offering to the people and the Government of North Vietnam economic opportunity which only their blindness or non-cooperation can frustrate. To Burma, Malaysia, and even India, this would present an opportunity in both economic and political terms which, especially at this moment, could not possibly be more desirable. To the Philippines such a program would provide

the same magnetic opportunity for participation as led them generously to create and man Operation Brotherhood a decade ago. It would also offer the first possibility of really involving the wealth and energy of the Japanese Government and people. A Johnson development plan for southeast Asia would manifest to the entire world that the welfare of the people of southeast Asia is our only purpose.

The Mekong Basin development program will provide for the first time a future-oriented thrust around which a Vietnamese resurgence program can be made vital and toward which the efforts of Americans, Japanese, Lao, Thai, Cambodians, and Filipinos can hopefully be attracted.

#### THE MISSING LINK

Within the last 3 years the Communist nations have revealed their inability to meet their own most pressing economic needs. The shortcut to the future has suddenly proved to be a dead end of economic failure, recrimination, and political embarrassment. But this has not frustrated the wars of national liberation nor prevented the Communists from mounting insurrectionary warfare whether in Congo or Vietnam. National governments and native peoples assaulted by such Communist purposes have, at best, sought to sustain their own energy through defensive effort. Virtually unused has been the enormous potential for hope which can be found only in the non-Communist world, cooperatively employing the resources of the United States and nations friendly to it whether in Asia, the Pacific, or Western Europe.

We have offered to the Vietnamese people our assistance in their struggle for national independence. We have failed, however, to harness that struggle and our assistance to an all but miraculous future, a flowering of man, his capabilities, his resources, his aspirations. Ours indeed is the truly revolutionary opportunity. The Johnson plan offers to southeast Asia a genuine opportunity to harness nature, enlarge justice, extend life, eradicate the scourges of illness and illiteracy and enable long-suffering peoples to reap the fruits of their soil and the permanent benefits of national independence. Behind this large vision, men throughout the world may be led to voluntary association in Lincoln Brigades, Gandhi Brigades, Mag-

saysay, and Marti Brigades—an international volunteer corps for peace and freedom.

The Johnson plan for the development of the Mekong Basin has, in our judgment, the following potential, essentially unavailable in the present circumstances:

1. It will inject dramatic, viable, and politically potent new purpose adequate to sustain popular support of Vietnamese Government leaders.

2. It will infuse new energy into the Vietnamese already risking their lives in daily defense against the Vietcong.

3. The plan offers concrete reasons for the cooperative involvement of neighboring southeast Asian countries as well as a generous commitment able to sustain emotionally an international corps of volunteers.

4. It contains an enormous incentive to North Vietnam to turn away from its present fratricidal course.

5. Finally, the Johnson plan constitutes a pioneering laboratory of hopeful consequence to other less developed areas where Communist insurrectionary warfare presently finds soil in which to sow the seeds of destruction.

THE PRESIDENT,  
*The White House,*  
*Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Veterans of Foreign Wars wholeheartedly and without reservation supports your decision in taking retaliatory armed action against the Communist aggressors in North Vietnam. Your wise and bold decision in this matter will go far toward assuring our allies throughout all Asia that the United States stands by its commitments and will not be intimidated by Communist threats and aggressive action. U.S. action against North Vietnam is entirely consistent with the unanimously passed resolution of our 1964 VFW national convention which called for all action necessary to win in South Vietnam. The VFW, consisting of 1,300,000 overseas combat veterans fully recognizes that communism has launched a deliberate attack against all southeast Asia and, consequently, the interest of U.S. security and the cause of freedom can be protected, in the final analysis, only by the judicious and willing use of military power.

JOHN A. JENKINS,  
*Commander in Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States.*

## REMARKS OF HON. WILLIAM PROXIMIRE

(The text of the U.S. White Paper on North Vietnamese intervention in South Vietnam was inserted into the RECORD by Senator WILLIAM PROXIMIRE of Wisconsin in his remarks of March 1, 1965. The text is reproduced below.)

### AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH—THE RECORD OF NORTH VIETNAM'S CAMPAIGN TO CONQUER SOUTH VIETNAM

"Our purpose in Vietnam is to join in the defense and protection of freedom of a brave people who are under attack that is controlled and that is directed from outside their country." (President Lyndon B. Johnson, February 17, 1965.)

#### INTRODUCTION

South Vietnam is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the Communist regime in Hanoi. This flagrant aggression has been going on for years, but recently the pace has quickened and the threat has now become acute.

The war in Vietnam is a new kind of war, a fact as yet poorly understood in most parts of the world. Much of the confusion that prevails in the thinking of many people, and even many governments, stems from this basic misunderstanding. For in Vietnam a totally new brand of aggression has been loosed against an independent people who want to make their own way in peace and freedom.

Vietnam is not another Greece, where indigenous guerrilla forces used friendly neighboring territory as a sanctuary.

Vietnam is not another Malaya, where Communist guerrillas were, for the most part, physically distinguishable from the peaceful majority they sought to control.

Vietnam is not another Philippines, where Communist guerrillas were physically separated from the source of their moral and physical support.

Above all, the war in Vietnam is not a spontaneous and local rebellion against the established government.

There are elements in the Communist program of conquest directed against South Vietnam common to each of the previous areas of aggression and subversion. But there is one fundamental difference. In Vietnam a Communist government has set out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people in a neighboring state. And to achieve its end, it has used every resource of its own government to carry out its carefully planned program of concealed aggression. North Vietnam's commitment to seize control of the South is no less total than was the commitment of the regime in North Korea in 1950. But knowing the consequences of the latter's undisguised attack,

the planners in Hanoi have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They have failed and their aggression is as real as that of an invading army.

This report is a summary of the massive evidence of North Vietnamese aggression obtained by the Government of South Vietnam. This evidence has been jointly analyzed by South Vietnamese and American experts.

The evidence shows that the hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam were trained in the north and ordered into the south by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the Vietcong (VC), the officers and much of the cadre, many of the technicians, political, organizers, and propagandists have come from the north and operate under Hanoi's direction. It shows that the training of essential military personnel and their infiltration into the south is directed by the military high command in Hanoi. (See sec. I.)

The evidence shows that many of the weapons and much of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Vietcong have been sent into South Vietnam from Hanoi. In recent months new types of weapons have been introduced in the VC army, for which all ammunition must come from outside sources. Communist China and other Communist States have been the prime suppliers of these weapons and ammunition, and they have been channeled primarily through North Vietnam. (See sec. II.)

The directing force behind the effort to conquer South Vietnam is the Communist Party in the north, the Lao Dong (Workers) Party. As in every Communist State, the party is an integral part of the regime itself. North Vietnamese officials have expressed their firm determination to absorb South Vietnam into the Communist world. (See sec. III.)

Through its central committee, which controls the government of the north, the Lao Dong Party directs the total political and military effort of the Vietcong. The military high command in the north trains the military men and sends them into South Vietnam. The Central Research Agency, North Vietnam's central intelligence organization, directs the elaborate espionage and subversion effort. The extensive political-military organization in the north which directs the Vietcong war effort is described in section IV.

Under Hanoi's overall direction the Communists have established an extensive machine for carrying on the war within South Vietnam. The focal point is the Central Office for South Vietnam with its political and military subsections and other specialized agencies. A subordinate part of this Central Office is the Liberation Front for South Vietnam. The front was formed at Hanoi's order in 1960. Its principal function is to influence opinion abroad and to

create the false impression that the aggression in South Vietnam is an indigenous rebellion against the established government. (See sec. IV.)

For more than 10 years the people and the Government of South Vietnam, exercising the inherent right of self-defense, have fought back against these efforts to extend Communist power south across the 17th parallel. The United States has responded to the appeals of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam for help in this defense of the freedom and independence of its land and its people.

In 1961 the Department of State issued a report called "A Threat to the Peace." It described North Vietnam's program to seize South Vietnam. The evidence in that report had been presented by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to the International Control Commission (ICC). A special report by the ICC in June 1962 upheld the validity of that evidence. The Commission held that there was "sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that North Vietnam had sent arms and men into South Vietnam to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the legal government there. The ICC found the authorities in Hanoi in specific violation of four provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954.<sup>1</sup>

Since then, new and even more impressive evidence of Hanoi's aggression has accumulated. The Government of the United States believes that evidence should be presented to its own citizens and to the world. It is important for freemen to know what has been happening in Vietnam, and how, and why. That is the purpose of this report.

#### I. HANOI SUPPLIES THE KEY PERSONNEL FOR THE ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM

The hard core of the Communist forces attacking South Vietnam are men trained in North Vietnam. They are ordered into the south and remain under the military discipline of the military high command in Hanoi. Special training camps operated by the North Vietnamese Army gave political and military training to the infiltrators. Increasingly the forces sent into the south are native North Vietnamese who have never seen South Vietnam. A special infiltration unit, the 70th Transportation Group, is responsible for moving men from North Vietnam into the south via infiltration trails through Laos. Another special unit, the maritime infiltration group, spends weapons and supplies and agents by sea into the south.

The infiltration rate has been increasing. From 1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establishing its infiltration pipeline, at least 1,800 men, and possibly 2,700 more, moved into South Vietnam from the north. The flow increased to a minimum of 3,700 in 1961 and

at least 5,400 in 1962. There was a modest decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed infiltrators, though later evidence is likely to raise this figure.

For 1964 the evidence is still incomplete. However, it already shows that a minimum of 4,400 infiltrators entered the south, and it is estimated more than 3,000 others were sent in.

There is usually a time lag between the entry of infiltrating troops and the discovery of clear evidence they have entered. This fact, plus collateral evidence of increased use of the infiltration routes, suggests strongly that 1964 was probably the year of greatest infiltration so far.

Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 VC officers, soldiers, and technicians are known to have entered South Vietnam under orders from Hanoi. Additional information indicates that an estimated 17,000 more infiltrators were dispatched to the south by the regime in Hanoi during the past 6 years. It can reasonably be assumed that still other infiltration groups have entered the south for which there is no evidence yet available.

To some the level of infiltration from the north may seem modest in comparison with the total size of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. But one-for-one calculations are totally misleading in the kind of warfare going on in Vietnam. First, a high proportion of infiltrators from the north are well-trained officers, cadres, and specialists. Second, it has long been realized that in guerrilla combat the burdens of defense are vastly heavier than those of attack. In Malaya, the Philippines, and elsewhere a ratio of at least 10 to 1 in favor of the forces of order was required to meet successfully the threat of the guerrillas hit-and-run tactics.

In the calculus of guerrilla warfare the scale of North Vietnamese infiltration into the south takes on a very different meaning. For the infiltration of 5,000 guerrilla fighters in a given year is the equivalent of marching perhaps 50,000 regular troops across the border, in terms of the burden placed on the defenders.

Above all, the number of proved and probable infiltrators from the north should be seen in relation to the size of the VC forces. It is now estimated that the Vietcong number approximately 35,000 so-called hard-core forces, and another 60,000 to 80,000 local forces. It is thus apparent that infiltrators from the north—allowing for casualties—make up the majority of the so-called hard-core Vietcong. Personnel from the north, in short, are now and have always been the backbone of the entire VC operation.

It is true that many of the lower level elements of the VC forces are recruited within South Vietnam. However, the thousands of reported cases of VC kidnapings and terrorism make it abundantly clear that threats and other pressures by the Vietcong play a major part in such recruitment.

<sup>1</sup> For the text of pertinent sections of the ICC report, see app. A.

#### *A. The infiltration process*

The infiltration routes supply hard-core units with most of their officers and non-commissioned personnel. This source helps fill the gaps left by battle casualties, illness, and defection and insures continued control by Hanoi. Also, as the nature of the conflict has changed, North Vietnam has supplied the Vietcong with technical specialists via the infiltration routes. These have included men trained in armor and ordnance, anti-aircraft, and communications as well as medical corpsmen and transport experts.

There is no single infiltration route from the north to South Vietnam. But by far the biggest percentage of infiltrators follow the same general course. The principal training center for North Vietnamese Army men assigned to join the Vietcong has been at Xuan Mai near Hanoi. Recently captured Vietcong have also reported an infiltration training camp at Thanh Hoa. After completion of their training course—which involves political and propaganda work as well as military subjects— infiltrating units are moved to Vinh on the east coast. Many have made stopovers at a staging area in Dong Hoi where additional training is conducted. From there they go by truck to the Laos border.

Then, usually after several days' rest, infiltrators move southward through Laos. Generally they move along the Laos-South Vietnam border. Responsibility for infiltration from North Vietnam through Laos belongs to the 70th Transportation Group of the North Vietnamese Army. After a time the infiltration groups turn eastward, entering South Vietnam in Quang Nam, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Kontum, or another of the border provinces.

The Communists have established regular lanes for infiltration with way stations established about 1 day's march apart. The way stations are equipped to quarter and feed the Vietcong passing through. Infiltrators who suffer from malaria or other illnesses stay at the stations until they recover sufficiently to join another passing group moving south.

The map on page 4 [not shown in RECORD] shows the infiltration route from North Vietnam to the south followed by VC Sgt. Huynh Van Tay and a group of North Vietnamese Army officers and men in September 1963. Tay was captured during an engagement in Chuong Thien Province in April 1964.

Local guides lead the infiltration groups along the secret trails. Generally they direct the infiltrators from halfway between two stations, through their own base station, and on halfway to the next supply base. Thus the guides are kept in ignorance of all but their own way stations. Only group leaders are permitted to talk with the guides in order to preserve maximum security. The

men are discouraged from asking where they are or where they are going.<sup>2</sup>

The same system of trails and guides used along the Lao infiltration routes is used within South Vietnam itself. Vietcong infiltrators may report directly to a reassignment center in the highlands as soon as they enter South Vietnam. But in the past year or more some groups have moved down trails in South Vietnam to provinces along the Cambodian border and near Saigon before receiving their unit assignment. Within South Vietnam infiltration and supplies are handled by VC units such as the Nam Son Transportation Group.

At the Laos border crossing point infiltrators are reequipped. Their North Vietnamese Army uniforms must be turned in. They must give up all personal papers, letters, notebooks, and photographs that might be incriminating. Document control over the infiltrators has been tightened considerably over the past 2 years. A number of Vietnamese infiltrators have told of being fitted out with Lao neutralist uniforms for their passage through Laos.

Infiltration groups are usually issued a set of black civilian pajama-like clothes, two unmarked uniforms, rubber sandals, a sweater, a hammock, mosquito netting, and waterproof sheeting. They carry a 3- to 5-day supply of food. A packet of medicines and bandages is usually provided.

The size of infiltration groups varies widely. Prisoners have mentioned units as small as 5 men and as large as 500. Generally the groups number 40 to 50. When they arrive in South Vietnam these groups are usually split up and assigned to various VC units as replacements, although some have remained intact.

#### *B. Military personnel*

The following are individual case histories of North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the Hanoi regime into South Vietnam. They are only an illustrative group. They show that the leadership and specialized personnel for the guerrilla war in South Vietnam consists in large part of members of the North Vietnam armed forces, trained in the North and subject to the command and discipline of Hanoi.

##### 1. Tran Quoc Dan

Dan was a VC major, commander of the 60th Battalion (sometimes known as the 34th Group of the Thon-Kim Battalion). Disillusioned with fighting his own countrymen and with communism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he surrendered to the authorities in South Vietnam on February 11, 1963.

<sup>2</sup> For additional maps of the routes taken by VC infiltrators into South Vietnam, see app. B.

At the age of 15 he joined the revolutionary army (Viet Minh) and fought against the French forces until 1954 when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina war. As a regular in the Viet Minh forces, he was moved to North Vietnam. He became an officer in the so-called people's army.

In March 1962 Major Dan received orders to prepare to move to South Vietnam. He had been exposed to massive propaganda in the north which told of the destitution of the peasants in the south and said that the Americans had taken over the French role of colonialists. He said later that an important reason for his decision to surrender was that he discovered these propaganda themes were lies. He found the peasants more prosperous than the people in the north. And he recognized quickly that he was not fighting the Americans but his own people.

With the 600 men of his unit, Major Dan left Hanoi on March 23, 1962. They traveled through the Laos corridor. His group joined up with the Vietcong 1st Regiment in central Vietnam.

The 35-year-old major took part in 45 actions and was wounded once in an unsuccessful VC attack on an outpost. As time passed he became increasingly discouraged by his experience as a VC troop commander. Most of all, he said, he was tired of killing other Vietnamese. After several months of soul-searching he decided to surrender to the authorities of the Republic of Vietnam. He has volunteered to do "anything to serve the national cause" of South Vietnam.

## 2. Vo Thoi

Sgt. Vo Thoi (Communist Party alias Vo Bien) was an assistant squad leader in the VC Tay Son 22d Battalion. On the night of October 7, 1963, his unit attacked An Tuong village in Binh Dinh Province. After overrunning the village, Vo's company was assigned to set up an ambush against Republic of Vietnam troops rushing to defend the village. In the ensuing fight Vo was seriously wounded. He was picked up by local farmers and turned over to the authorities.

Vo's life and experiences were similar to those of thousands of Vietcong. Born in Quang Ngai Province in 1932, he went through 5 years of school and then worked on his parents' small farm. During the war against the French he joined the Viet Minh forces. When the fighting ended, he was transferred to North Vietnam with his unit, the 210th Regiment. He remained in the North Vietnamese Army until 1960 when he was sent to work on a state farm in Nghe An Province. Vo said 3,000 men and women worked on the farm, of whom 400 were soldiers. In September 1962 Vo was told he must join the newly activated 22d Battalion. All the members of the battalion came from provinces in South Vietnam, from Quang Tri to Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary battalion; two-thirds of its members were cadre with ranks up to senior capitain.

The group was put through an advanced training course that lasted 6 months. The training program included combat tactics for units from squad to company and the techniques of guerrilla and counterguerrilla fighting. There were heavy doses of political indoctrination.

On March 5, 1963, the 22d Battalion received orders to move south. They were transported in trucks from Nghe An Province to Dong Hoi in Quang Binh, just north of the 17th parallel. From there the unit was moved westward to the Lao border. Then the more than 300 men began walking to the south following mountain trails in Laos and the Vietnam border area. They marched by day, rested at night. Every fifth day they stopped at a way station for a full day's rest. One company dropped off at Thua Thien Province. Vo and the remainder of the group marched on to Pleiku Province. Two fully armed companies from a neighboring province were assigned to the battalion. The assignment given to the battalion was to harass strategic hamlets in the Hoai An district of Binh Dinh, to round up cattle and rice, to kill or kidnap cadre of the Government forces, and to recruit local youth for service with the Vietcong.

## 3. Nguyen Thao

Nguyen Thao was a VC weapons technician. A native of Khanh Hao Province in South Vietnam, he joined the Viet Minh in 1950. He worked at a secret arsenal manufacturing weapons for use by the guerrilla forces. He went to North Vietnam after the Geneva accords were signed in 1954. In North Vietnam he attended a technical school specializing in arms and manufacture. He received special training in foreign small arms and artillery.

At the end of 1962 he was ordered to Ha Dong to attend a special course of political training in preparation for infiltrating into South Vietnam. On completion of the training course he was assigned to a group of 14 men who would move to the south together. Nguyen Thao said the group was composed of four armament specialists, two chemical engineers, and eight middle-level technical cadre.

They left Ha Dong in March 1963, crossed into Laos, and reached their destination in the northern part of South Vietnam in May. Nguyen Thao went to work at a secret VC arsenal near the Quang Ngai border. Fifty men, some local workers, manned the arsenal weapons section. The group manufactured mines and grenades for the VC units in the area and repaired weapons.

Nguyen Thao said he soon realized from talking with the local workers at the arsenal that most of what he had heard in the North about conditions in South Vietnam was wrong. He said the Communists had deceived him. Two months after his arrival at the arsenal he decided to defect. He asked permission to rejoin his family and to work

in a national defense factory and continue his studies.

#### 4. Nguyen Viet Le

This VC soldier was born in Quang Nam Province in South Vietnam. He served with the 305th Division of the Viet Minh and moved to North Vietnam in 1954. In April 1961, Nguyen Viet Le and his unit, the 50th Battalion, moved into Laos. He said the unit remained in Laos for 2 months, during which it fought in four battles alongside the Pathet Lao. During these engagements one of the battalion's four companies was badly mauled and had to be returned to North Vietnam.

The other three companies were assigned to South Vietnam. They arrived in Quang Ngai Province in the summer of 1961. For a month they rested and waited for orders. They took part in a major action against an outpost of the Government of South Vietnam in September. Nguyen Viet Le was captured during a battle in Quang Ngai Province in April 1962.

#### 5. Nguyen Truc

Corp. Nguyen Truc was born in 1933, the son of a farmer in Phu Yen Province in South Vietnam. From 1949 to 1954 he served as a courier and then as a guerrilla fighter with the Viet Minh. In early 1955 he boarded a Soviet ship and moved with his unit, the 40th Battalion, to North Vietnam. He remained in the army, but in 1959, bothered by illness, he went to work on a state farm.

In August 1962 Nguyen Truc was notified that he was back in the army and that he was being sent to South Vietnam. He reported to the Xuan Mai training center and underwent 6 months of military and political re-education. His unit was the newly activated 22d Battalion. The training course was completed in February 1963, but departure for South Vietnam was delayed until April.

For infiltration purposes the battalion was divided into two groups. On April 27, Nguyen Truc and his group boarded trucks at Xuan Mai. They went first to Vinh, then on to Dong Hoi, and finally to the Laos-North Vietnam border. There they doffed their North Vietnamese army uniforms and put on black peasants' clothing. The march to the south began, sometimes in Lao territory, sometimes in Vietnam. They passed through Thua Thien Province, then Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai, and finally to their destination, Pleiku. Each day they had a new guide, generally one of the mountain people of the area.

Nguyen said that he and most of the troops who were sent north after the Indochina war wanted to return to their homes and rejoin their families. In August 1963 Nguyen Truc was sent out on a foraging expedition to find food for his unit. He took the opportunity to defect to Government forces at An Tuc in Binh Dinh Province.

#### 6. Nguyen Cam

Cam is the son of a farmer in Quang Tin Province. Born in 1929, he joined the Vietminh youth group in his home village in 1946. In 1 year he became a guerrilla fighter. In 1954, as the Indochina war was drawing to a close, he was serving with the Vietminh 20th Battalion. In May 1955 he went to North Vietnam with his unit.

Ill health caused his transfer to an agricultural camp in 1958. By 1960 he was back in uniform, serving in the 210th Regiment. In May of that year he was assigned to a small group that was to set up a metallurgical workshop. Early in 1961 he was sent to a metallurgical class in Nghe An Province. They were taught a simple form of cast iron production, simple blast furnace construction, and similar skills. Their instructor was an engineer from the Hanoi industrial department.

Their special course completed, Cam and his group of 35 men prepared to go to South Vietnam. They went by truck from their training center at Nghe An to the Lao border. After 19 days marching through Laos, they arrived in the vicinity of Tchepone. There they waited for 3 days until food supplies could be airdropped by a North Vietnamese plane. Nineteen days of walking took them to the Laos-South Vietnam border.

Delayed en route by illness, Cam finally reached his destination in November 1961. It was a secret VC iron foundry in Kontum Province. Several iron ore deposits were nearby, and the hill people had long used the iron to make knives and simple tools. Cam's job was building kilns to smelt the ore. The Vietcong hoped to use the iron for mines and grenades.

On August 4, 1963, Sergeant Cam went to a nearby village to buy salt for his group. On his return he found his comrades had gone to one of their cultivated fields to gather corn, and he joined them. The group was interrupted at their work by a Vietnamese ranger company. After a brief fight Cam was taken prisoner.

#### 7. Nguyen Hong Thai

Thai, 32 years old, was born and grew up in Quang Nkai Province in South Vietnam. After service with the Vietminh we was moved to North Vietnam in 1954. After 3 years of military service he was assigned to a military farm. In December 1961 he was recalled to his former unit, the 305th Division, and went to the special training camp at Xuan Mai in preparation for fighting with the Vietcong in South Vietnam.

Training began in January 1962 and lasted for 4 months. The training group, designated the 32d Battalion, was composed of 650 men who came from various branches of the North Vietnamese Army—engineers, artillery, airborne, transport, marines, and some factory workers and students. Three-

fourths of the training was military (guerilla tactics, ambushes, sabotage, etc.) and one-fourth was political. In the latter, heavy emphasis was laid on the necessity for armed seizure of power in the south.

Group 32 was divided into sections and began infiltrating to the south on July 14, 1962. It moved in three groups. Thai said it took his group more than 55 days to travel from North Vietnam through Laos to Quang Ngai Province in the south. He reported that all the communications and liaison stations on the route to South Vietnam are now operated by the Army of North Vietnam. Soon after his arrival in South Vietnam, Thai was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. He was made a platoon leader in the 20th Vietcong Highland Battalion. In February 1963 the unit moved from Quang Nam to Kontum Province.

Combat conditions and the rigors of guerilla life began to depress Thai. He said he wanted only to rejoin his family and live in peace. In September he asked and received permission to visit his family in Quang Ngai. When he got home, he surrendered to a South Vietnamese Army post.

#### 8. Dao Kien Lap

Lap is a civilian radio technician. He has been a member of the Communist Party in North Vietnam since 1955. In February 1963 he was selected for assignment to South Vietnam where he was to work with the Liberation Front. He infiltrated into South Vietnam with a group of about 70 civilian specialists. They included doctors, pharmacists, union organizers, radio specialists, propagandists, and youth organizers. One of the infiltrators in Dao's group was a man named Binh, publisher of the newspaper Labor of the Lao Dong Party. Another was a member of the city soviet of Hanoi.

The specialists in Dao's group received 3 months of basic military training at Son Tay, and then departed for the south in mid-June. Their orders were to report to the central office of the Vietcong in South Vietnam where they would be assigned according to their individual specialties. Dao and Binh were to help run a radio station of the Liberation Front.

They traveled through Laos and along the Vietnam border. They had to stop for several weeks in Quang Nam Province to recuperate from their travels. On October 1 they were directed by guides to a VC station in Ban Me Thuot.

Dao said he had by then decided to defect to the government authorities in the south. He set off with one companion, but they were separated as they crossed a swiftly flowing river. Dao gave himself up at a government post in Ban Me Thuot on October 13, 1963.

#### 9. Tran Ngoc Linh

Linh was a Vietcong senior sergeant, leader of a reconnaissance platoon. He is the son of a middle-class farm family in Tay

Ninh Province. He served with the Viet Minh against the French and moved to North Vietnam in 1954. He spent the next 7 years in the North Vietnamese Army. In September 1962 Linh was assigned to the Xuan Mai training center at Ha Dong to prepare for duty in South Vietnam. His group was given a 4-month refresher course in infantry tactics with emphasis on guerilla fighting. Then he received 6 months of special training in the use of machineguns against aircraft. Antiaircraft training has become an increasingly important part of the preparation of North Vietnamese troops assigned to the Vietcong.

Linh and about 120 others made up the 406th Infiltration Group commander by Senior Capt. Nguyen Van Do. They were divided into four platoons. During the final 2 weeks of preparation each member of the group was issued new equipment—black, pajama-like uniforms, a khaki uniform, a hammock, mosquito netting, rubber sandals, and other supplies, including two packets of medicine.

In the early morning hours of July 4, 1963, his group started its journey from the Xuan Mai training center outside Hanoi. The convoy of six Molotov trucks moved south along Highway 21 to Nghe An Province and then on to Quang Binh. On July 7 they arrived at the final processing station near the Laos-North Vietnam border. There they turned in their North Vietnamese Army uniforms as well as all personal papers and anything else that might identify them as coming from the north. But their departure for the south was delayed for several weeks. In August they set off through Laos.

Twice along the way Linh had to stop at liaison stations because of illness. When the infiltrators recovered from their illnesses, they were formed into special groups to continue their penetration into South Vietnam. Linh reported being delayed once for 8 days, and the second time for 10 days.

Finally, in the first week of November 1963, Linh was sufficiently recovered to begin the final leg of his journey to a VC center where he was to be assigned to a combat unit. He and three others who had been similarly delayed by attacks of malaria and other sickness made up a group. They moved through the jungles of Quang Duc Province near the Cambodian border. On the morning of November 9 they crossed the Srepok River. There they ran into a unit of the South Vietnamese Army. One of the infiltrators was killed. Linh was taken prisoner, and the other two Vietcong escaped.

These are typical Vietcong. There are many other officers like Tran Quoc Dan, technicians like Nguyen Thao, and simple soldiers like Nguyen Truc. They were born in South Vietnam, fought against the French, and then went north and served in the army of North Vietnam. They were ordered by the Communist rulers in Hanoi to reenter South Vietnam. Violating the Geneva accords of

1954 and 1962, they used the territory of neighboring Laos to infiltrate into the South. They are the means by which Communist North Vietnam is carrying out its program of conquest in South Vietnam.<sup>3</sup>

#### C. Infiltration of native North Vietnamese

The Communist authorities in Hanoi are now assigning native North Vietnamese in increasing numbers to join the VC forces in South Vietnam. Heretofore, those in charge of the infiltration effort have sought to fill their quotas with soldiers and others born in the south. The 90,000 troops that moved from South Vietnam to the north when the Geneva accords ended the Indochina War have provided an invaluable reservoir for this purpose. Now, apparently, that source is running dry. The casualty rate has been high, and obviously many of those who were in fighting trim 10 years ago are no longer up to the rigors of guerrilla war.

In any case, reports of infiltration by native North Vietnamese in significant numbers have been received in Saigon for several months. It is estimated that as many as 75 percent of the more than 4,400 Vietcong who are known to have entered the south in the first 8 months of 1964 were natives of North Vietnam.

Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Province in North Vietnam in 1936. He was captured by South Vietnamese forces on May 5, 1964. He described himself as a military security officer. He infiltrated into South Vietnam in April 1964 with a group of 34 police and security officers from the north.

Another native North Vietnamese captured in the south was VC Pfc. Vo Quyen. His home was in Nam Dinh Province. He was a member of the 2d Battalion of the North Vietnamese Army's 9th Regiment. He said the entire battalion had infiltrated into South Vietnam between February and May last year. He was captured in an action in Quang Tri Province on July 4. He told interrogators that the bulk of his unit was composed of young draftees from North Vietnam.

Le Pham Hung, also a private, first class, was captured on July 7 in Thua Thien Province. He is a native of Nam Dinh in North Vietnam. Drafted for military service in May 1963, he was in the 324th Division. His group, consisting solely of 90 North Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into South Vietnam in May 1964. He reported that another company of the North Vietnamese entered the south at the same time as his unit.

A former member of the 90th VC Battalion reported that his unit had been reinforced by native North Vietnamese troops earlier this year. Le Thua Phuong, an in-

formation cadre and a native of Quang Ngai Province in the south, surrendered to Government forces on April 23, 1964. He said that the 90th Battalion had received 80 North Vietnamese replacements in February.

A medical technician named Hoang Thung was captured in Thua Thien Province on July 4, 1964. He said he had infiltrated into the south in late 1963 with a group of 200 Vietcong, the majority of whom were ethnic northerners, 120 of them draftees.

These reports destroy one more fiction which the authorities in Hanoi have sought so long to promote—that the fighting in the south was a matter for the South Vietnamese. They underline Hanoi's determination to press its campaign of conquest with every available resource.

#### D. Infiltration of Vietcong agents

No effort to subvert another nation as elaborate as that being conducted by the Ho Chi Minh regime against South Vietnam can succeed without an intelligence-gathering organization. Recognizing this, the authorities in Hanoi have developed an extensive espionage effort. An essential part of that effort is the regular assignment of secret agents from the north to South Vietnam.

The heart of the VC intelligence organization is the Central Research Agency in Hanoi. (See sec. IV, C.) Communist agents are regularly dispatched from North Vietnam, sometimes for brief assignments but often for long periods. Many of these agents move into South Vietnam along the infiltration trails through Laos; others are carried by boats along the coasts and landed at pre-arranged sites. A special maritime infiltration group has been developed in North Vietnam, with its operations centered in Ha Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces just north of the 17th parallel.

##### 1. Maritime Infiltration

The following case illustrates the methods of maritime infiltration of secret agents used by the Communist regime of North Vietnam.

In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelligence agent named Nguyen Viet Duong began training to infiltrate South Vietnam. A native southerner, he had fought against the French and had gone to North Vietnam after the war ended. Selected for intelligence work, he was assigned to the Central Research Agency in 1959.

After a period of intensive instruction in radio transmission, coding and decoding, and other skills of the intelligence trade, he was given false identity papers and other supplies and was transported to the south. His principal task was to set up a cell of agents to collect military information. He flew from Hanoi to Dong Hoi, and from there the Maritime infiltration group took him by boat to South Vietnam. That was in August 1962.

In January 1963 Duong reported to Hanoi that he had run into difficulties. His money

<sup>3</sup> See app. C for additional details on military infiltrators.

and papers had been lost, and he had been forced to take refuge with VC contacts in another province. Another agent was selected to go to South Vietnam. One of his assignments was to contact Duong, find out details of what happened to him, and help Duong reestablish himself as a VC agent. The man selected for the task was Senor Captain Tran Van Tan of the Central Research Agency.

Tan had already been picked to go to the South to establish a clandestine VC communications center. Making contact with Duong was one of his secondary assignments. After intensive preparations Tan was ready to move to South Vietnam in March. He was transferred to an embarkation base of the maritime infiltration group just north of the 17th parallel.

He was joined by three other VC agents and the captain and three crewmen of the boat that would take them south. All were given false identity papers to conform to their false names. They also were provided with fishermen's permits, South Vietnamese voting cards, and draft cards or military discharge papers. The boat captain received a boat registration book, crew lists, and several South Vietnamese permits to conduct business.

The agents and boatmen were given cover stories to tell if captured. Each man had to memorize not only the details of his own story but the names and some details about each of the others. The agents had to become familiar with simple boat procedures so they could pass as legitimate fishermen.

The expedition left the embarkation port on April 4. In addition to the four agents the boat carried six carefully sealed boxes containing a generator, several radios, some weapons, and a large supply of South Vietnamese currency. They also carried some chemicals and materials for making false identification papers. Their destination was a landing site on the coast of Phuoc Tuy Province.

Soon after leaving North Vietnam the VC boat encountered high winds and rough seas. On April 7 the storm became violent. The boat tossed and threatened to capsize. Strong northeasterly winds forced it ever closer to shore. Finally the boat captain, Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be thrown overboard. This was done, and the boat then was beached. The eight men decided to split up into pairs and try to make contact with VC forces. They buried their false papers and set out. Six of the eight were captured almost immediately by authorities in Thua Thien Province, and the other two were taken several days later.

## 2. Student Propaganda Agents

The student population of South Vietnam is an important target group for VC propagandists. These agents seek to win adherents for the Communist cause among young

workers, students in high schools and universities, and the younger officers and enlisted men in the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

Typical of the agents sent into South Vietnam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy, a 19-year-old VC propagandist. He is a native of the Vinh Linh District in North Vietnam, just north of the demilitarized zone. He was a member of a Communist Party youth group in his native village. He was recruited for propaganda work in the south in the fall of 1962. He was one of 40 young persons enrolled in a special political training course given by the Communist Party in his district.

The first phase of the training consisted of political indoctrination covering such subjects as the advance of communism, the North Vietnamese plan for winning control of the country, the responsibility of youth in furthering this plan, the war in the south, and the need for propaganda supporting the Liberation Front.

Those who successfully completed the first phase were selected for the second level of training, the so-called technical training phase. In this the trainees were given their mission in the south. Vy was told he should infiltrate into South Vietnam and there surrender to the authorities, describing himself as a defector who was "tired of the miserable life in the north." He was to say he wanted to complete his schooling, which was impossible in the north. He was told to ask to live with relatives in the south so he could go to school. Once his story was accepted and he was enrolled in a school, he was to begin his work of propagandizing other students. He was to wait for 3 or 4 months, however, until he was no longer the subject of local suspicion. He was assigned to work under an older agent to whom he had to report regularly.

A third member of the team was a younger man who was to assist Vy. The three were to infiltrate into South Vietnam separately and to meet there at a rendezvous point.

At first Vy was to do no more than to observe his fellow students carefully, collecting biographical data on them and studying their personalities, capabilities, and aspirations. He was then to select those he thought might be most influenced by Communist propaganda and try to make friends with them.

Once he had selected targets, he was to begin to influence them favorably toward the north and to implant Communist propaganda. He was responsible then for bringing into his organization those he had influenced effectively. These individuals were to be given their own propaganda assignments to work on other students.

Students who wanted to evade military service in the Government forces were considered prime targets. Where possible, Vy was to help them get to North Vietnam. He

was also told to make contact with any students who had been picked up by the authorities for suspected Communist activities. These, too, were to be helped to escape to North Vietnam. Any useful information concerning developments in the south or military activities were to be reported through his superior, Nguyen Van Phong.

In case he became suspect, he was either to make his own way back to North Vietnam or to go into the jungle and try to contact a VC unit.

Vy entered South Vietnam on January 2, 1963, by swimming across the Ben Hai River. He encountered an elderly farmer who led him to the local authorities in Hai Gu. There he told his story but it was not believed. He then admitted his true mission.

### 3. Other Agents

The Communist authorities in North Vietnam send their agents into South Vietnam by a wide variety of means. A few like Nguyen Van Vy cross the demilitarized zone, more infiltrate by sea, and still more along the infiltration routes through Laos. But there are other methods for entering South Vietnam. VC espionage agent Tran Van Bui attempted one such method.

Bui was a graduate of the espionage training school in Haiphong, North Vietnam. He completed a special 6-month course in July 1962. The training included political indoctrination, but most of the time was spent on such things as use of weapons, preparing booby traps, and methods of sabotage. He was also given instruction in methods for enlisting help from hoodlums, draft dodgers, and VC sympathizers. Once in South Vietnam, he was to organize a small unit for sabotage and the collection of information. On specific assignment by his superiors he was to be ready to sabotage ships in Saigon harbor and to blow up gasoline and oil storage points and Vietnamese Army installations. He was told to be prepared to assassinate Vietnamese officials and American personnel.

In September 1962 Bui was given his mission assignment. He was to hide aboard a foreign ship. When discovered, he was to claim to be a refugee who wanted to escape to South Vietnam. He was given an automatic pistol with silencer, some explosive devices, and a small knife that could inject poison into the body of a victim.

Bui stole aboard a foreign ship in Haiphong harbor. After 3 days at sea—when he was sure the ship would not turn around—Bui surrendered to the ship's captain. When the ship arrived in Bangkok, Bui was turned over to the Thal authorities. They in turn released him to the South Vietnamese as he had requested. But in Saigon his true mission was disclosed and he made a full confession.

## II. HANOI SUPPLIES WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL TO ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH

When Hanoi launched the VC campaign of terror, violence, and subversion in earnest in 1959, the Communist forces relied mainly on stocks of weapons and ammunition left over from the war against the French. Supplies sent in from North Vietnam came largely from the same source. As the military campaign progressed, the Vietcong depended heavily on weapons captured from the Armed Forces in South Vietnam. This remains an important source of weapons and ammunitions for the Vietcong. But as the pace of the war has quickened, requirements for up-to-date arms and special types of weapons have risen to a point where the Vietcong cannot rely on captured stocks. Hanoi has undertaken a program to reequip its forces in the south with Communist-produced weapons.

Large and increasing quantities of military supplies are entering South Vietnam from outside the country. The principal supply point is North Vietnam, which provides a convenient channel for materiel that originates in Communist China and other Communist countries.

An increasing number of weapons from external Communist sources have been seized in the south. These include such weapons as 57-millimeter and 75-millimeter recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket launchers, large mortars, and antitank mines.

A new group of Chinese Communist-manufactured weapons has recently appeared in VC hands. These include the 7.62 semiautomatic carbine, 7.62 light machinegun, and the 7.62 assault rifle. These weapons and ammunition for them, manufactured in Communist China in 1962, were first captured in December 1964 in Chuong Thien Province. Similar weapons have since been seized in each of the four corps areas of South Vietnam. Also captured have been Chinese Communist antitank grenade launchers and ammunition made in China in 1963.

One captured Vietcong told his captors that his entire company had been supplied recently with modern Chinese weapons. The reequipping of VC units with a type of weapons that require ammunition and parts from outside South Vietnam indicates the growing confidence of the authorities in Hanoi in the effectiveness of their supply lines into the south.

Incontrovertible evidence of Hanoi's elaborate program to supply its forces in the south with weapons, ammunition, and other supplies has accumulated over the years. Dramatic new proof was exposed just as this report was being completed.

On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter pilot flying along the South Viet-

namese coast sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully camouflaged and moored just offshore along the coast of Phu Yen Province. Fighter planes that approached the vessel met machinegun fire from guns on the deck of the ship and from the shore as well. A Vietnamese Air Force strike was launched against the vessel, and Vietnamese Government troops moved into the area. They seized the ship after a bitter fight with the Vietcong.

The ship, which had been sunk in shallow water, had discharged a huge cargo of arms, ammunition, and other supplies. Documents found on the ship and on the bodies of several Vietcong aboard identified the vessel as having come from North Vietnam. A newspaper in the cabin was from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965. The supplies delivered by the ship—thousands of weapons and more than a million rounds of ammunition—were almost all of Communist origin, largely from Communist China and Czechoslovakia, as well as North Vietnam. At least 100 tons of military supplies were discovered near the ship.

A preliminary survey of the cache near the sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the following supplies and weapons:

Approximately 1 million rounds of small-arms ammunition; more than 1,000 stick grenades; 500 pounds of TNT in prepared charges; 2,000 rounds of 82-millimeter mortar ammunition; 500 antitank grenades; 500 rounds of 57-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition; more than 1,000 rounds of 75-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition; one 57-millimeter recoilless rifle; 2 heavy machineguns; 2,000 7.95 Mauser rifles; more than 100, 7.62 carbines; 1,000 submachineguns; 15 light machineguns; 500 rifles; 500 pounds of medical supplies (with labels from North Vietnam, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union, and other sources).

The ship was fairly new and had been made in Communist China. Documents aboard the ship included three North Vietnamese nautical charts (one of the Haiphong area and one of Hong Gay, both in North Vietnam, and one of the Tra Vinh area of South Vietnam). The military health records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found. One man had a political history sheet showing he was a member of the 338th Division of the North Vietnamese Army. (See app. E.)

Also abroad the North Vietnamese ship were: an instruction book for a Chinese Communist navigational device; postcards and letters to addresses in North Vietnam; snapshots, including one of a group of men in North Vietnamese Army uniforms under a flag of the Hanoi government.

Members of the ICC and representatives of the free press visited the sunken North Vietnamese ship and viewed its cargo. The

incident itself underlined in the most dramatic form that Hanoi is behind the continuing campaign of aggression aimed at conquering South Vietnam. It made unmistakably clear that what is happening in South Vietnam is not an internal affair but part of a large-scale carefully directed and supported program of armed attack on a sovereign state and a free people.

There have been previous seizures of large stocks of ammunition and weapons and other military supplies that could only have come from Communist sources outside South Vietnam. In December 1963, a Republic of Vietnam force attacked a VC stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province southwest of Saigon. A large cache of VC equipment was seized. Included in the captured stocks were the following weapons and ammunition, all of Chinese Communist manufacture:

One 90-millimeter rocket launcher; 2 carbines (type 53); 120 rounds of 75-millimeter recoilless rifle ammunition; 120 detonating fuses for recoilless rifle ammunition; 14,000 rounds of 7.62 (type P) ammunition; 160,000 rounds of 7.62 carbine ammunition; 150 fuses for mortar shells; 100,000 rounds of 7.92 Mauser-type ammunition; 110 pounds (approximate) of TNT; two 60-millimeter mortars.

These weapons and ammunition are the same as those used in the North Vietnamese Army. Some of the 7.62-millimeter ammunition was manufactured as recently as 1962.<sup>4</sup>

Materiel is sent into South Vietnam from the North by a variety of methods—overland, by river and canal, and by sea. In one instance Vietnamese troops discovered a cache in which the 75-millimeter ammunition alone weighed approximately 1½ tons. It has been estimated that it would require more than 150 porters to carry this quantity of ammunition over rough terrain. However, a few sampans, each manned by a few men, could transport it with little difficulty. It is worth noting, in this connection, that the delta where the cache of materiel was seized has 460 miles of seacoast as well as 2,500 miles of canals navigable by large watercraft and another 2,200 miles of canals over which sampans can move easily. Much of the transport of large stocks of ammunition is undoubtedly waterborne for at least much of its travel into South Vietnam.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> On Jan. 29, 1964, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam supplied the International Control Commission with a list of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment of Communist origin captured in South Vietnam since June 1962. The list is summarized in app. D.

<sup>5</sup> Photographs of additional Vietcong weapons and ammunition of Communist origin are contained in app. E.

Large quantities of chemical components for explosives have been sent into South Vietnam for the Vietcong. During 1963 there were at least 15 incidents in which boats, junks, or sampans were seized with explosives aboard. More than 20 tons of potassium chlorate or nitrate were captured. All these cases were in the delta area, and the majority were on or near the Mekong River. Red phosphorus made in Communist China has been among the chemicals captured from the Vietcong.

The Communists have shown extreme sensitivity to exposure of the fact that war material is going to the Vietcong from North Vietnam, Communist China, and other Communist countries. A secret document captured from a VC agent last year reflected this sensitivity. The document was sent from VC military headquarters in Bien Hoa Province to subordinate units. It ordered them to "pay special attention to the removal of all the markings and letters on weapons of all types currently employed by units and agencies and manufactured by friendly East European democratic countries or by China." It said incriminating marking should be chiseled off "so that the enemy cannot use it as a propaganda theme every time he captures these weapons."

### III. NORTH VIETNAM: BASE FOR CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH

The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960 set forth two tasks for its members: "to carry out the socialist revolution in North Vietnam" and "to liberate South Vietnam."

The resolutions of the congress described the effort to destroy the legal Government in South Vietnam as follows: "The revolution in the South is a protracted, hard, and complex process of struggle, combining many forms of struggle of great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower to higher, and taking as its basis the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary power of the masses."

At the September meeting the Communist leaders in the north called for formation of "a broad national united front." Three months later Hanoi announced creation of the "Front for Liberation of the South." This is the organization that Communist propaganda now credits with guiding the forces of subversion in the south; it is pictured as an organization established and run by the people in the south themselves. At the 1960 Lao Dong Party Congress the tone was different. Then, even before the front existed, the Communist leaders were issuing orders for the group that was being organized behind the scenes in Hanoi. "This front must rally"; "The aims of its struggle are"; "The front must carry out"—this is the way Hanoi and the Communist Party addressed the Liberation Front even before its founding.

The Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation; it is neither independent nor southern, and what it seeks is not liberation but subjugation of the south.

In his address to the Third Lao Dong Party Congress, party and government leader Ho Chi Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up the Socialist revolution in the north and, at the same time, to step up the national democratic people's revolution in the south."

The year before, writing for Red Flag, the Communist Party newspaper of Belgium, Ho had said much the same thing: "We are building socialism in Vietnam, but we are building it in only one part of the country, while in the other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the middle-class democratic and antiimperialist revolution."

In the same vein, the commander in chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo Nguyen Giap, spoke at the 1960 party congress of the need to "step up the national democratic people's revolution in the south." Earlier in the year, writing for the Communist Party journal Hoc Tap in Hanoi, General Giap described the north as "the revolutionary base for the whole country."

Le Duan, a member of the Politburo and first secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even more explicit when he talked at the party congress about the struggle in the south and the party's role. After noting the difficulties involved in overthrowing the existing order in South Vietnam, Le Duan said: "Hence the southern people's revolutionary struggle will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple process but a complicated one, combining many varied forms of struggle—from elementary to advanced, legal and illegal—and based on the building, consolidation, and development of the revolutionary force of the masses. In this process, we must constantly intensify our solidarity and the organization and education of the people of the south."

Another high official of the Hanoi regime, Truong Chinh, writing in the party organ Hoc Tap in April 1961, expressed confidence in the success of the struggle to remove the legal government in South Vietnam because: "North Vietnam is being rapidly consolidated and strengthened, is providing good support to the South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as a strong base for the struggle for national reunification."

He outlined the steps by which the Communists expect to achieve control over all Vietnam as follows: The Liberation Front would destroy the present Government in the south; a coalition government would be established; this government would agree with the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi regarding national reunification under one form or another. It takes little imagination to understand the form that is intended.

"Thus," wrote Truong Chinh, "though South Vietnam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means, the party policy of achieving

peaceful national reunification is still correct."

The official government radio in Hanoi is used both overtly and covertly to support the Vietcong effort in South Vietnam. Captured agents have testified that the broadcasts are used sometimes to send instructions in veiled code to Vietcong representatives in the south.

Hoc Tap stated frankly in March 1963: "They [the authorities in South Vietnam] are well aware that North Vietnam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution."

In April 1964 the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party issued a directive to all party echelons. It stated: "When the forces of the enemy and the plots of the enemy are considered, it is realized that the cadres, party members, and people in North Vietnam must \* \* \* increase their sense of responsibility in regard to the South Vietnam revolution by giving positive and practical support to South Vietnam in every field."

Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in a Hanoi newspaper in May 1963, underlined the importance of the role of the North Vietnamese Army in Hanoi's plans to unify Vietnam under Communist rule: "Our party set forth two strategic tasks to be carried out at the same time: to transform and build socialism in the north and to struggle to unify the country. Our army is an instrument of the class struggle in carrying out these two strategic tasks."

#### IV. ORGANIZATION, DIRECTION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL OF THE ATTACK ON SOUTH VIETNAM ARE CENTERED IN HANOI

The VC military and political apparatus in South Vietnam is an extension of an elaborate military and political structure in North Vietnam which directs and supplies it with the tools for conquest. The Ho Chi Minh regime has shown that it is ready to allocate every resource that can be spared—whether it be personnel, funds, or equipment—to the cause of overthrowing the legitimate Government in South Vietnam and of bringing all Vietnam under Communist rule.

##### A. Political organization

Political direction and control of the Vietcong is supplied by the Lao Dong Party, i.e. the Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh. Party agents are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment, political training, propaganda, anti-Government demonstrations, and other activities of a political nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering facilities of the party are also at the disposal of the Vietcong.

Overall direction of the VC movement is the responsibility of the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party. Within the central

committee a special reunification department has been established. This has replaced the committee for supervision of the south mentioned in intelligence reports 2 years ago. It lays down broad strategy for the movement to conquer South Vietnam.

Until March 1962 there were two principal administrative divisions in the VC structure in the south. One was the interzone of South-Central Vietnam (sometimes called interzone 5); the other was the Nambo region. In a 1962 reorganization these were merged into one, called the central office for South Vietnam. The central committee, through its reunification department, issues directives to the central office, which translates them into specific orders for the appropriate subordinate command.

Under the central office are six regional units (V through IX) plus the special zone of Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh. A regional committee responsible to the central office directs VC activities in each region. Each regional committee has specialized units responsible for liaison, propaganda, training, personnel, subversive activities, espionage, military bases, and the like.

Below each regional committee are similarly structured units at the province and district levels. At the base of the Communist pyramid are the individual party cells, which may be organized on a geographic base or within social or occupational groups. The elaborateness of the party unit and the extent to which it operates openly or underground is determined mainly by the extent of VC control over the area concerned.

1. The Liberation Front: The National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam is the screen behind which the Communists carry out their program of conquest. It is the creature of the Communist Government in Hanoi. As noted above the Communist Party in the North demanded establishment of such a front 3 months before its formation was actually announced in December 1960. It was designed to create the illusion that the Vietcong campaign of subversion was truly indigenous to South Vietnam rather than an externally directed Communist plan.

The front has won support primarily from the Communist world. Its radio faithfully repeats the propaganda themes of Hanoi and Peiping. When its representatives travel abroad, they do so with North Vietnamese passports and sponsorship.<sup>6</sup> The front's program copies that of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam.

In late 1961, in still another effort to conceal the extent of Communist domination of the front, the Communists announced formation of a new Marxist political unit, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP).

<sup>6</sup> Pictures of North Vietnamese passports and travel documents used by front officials are in app. F. [Not printed in RECORD.]

This mechanism provided a way to explain the Communist presence in the front while at the same time making it appear that the Communist voice was only one of several affiliated organizations in the front. The PRP itself claimed direct descent from the original Indochinese Communist Party and from the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi.<sup>7</sup>

#### *B. Military organization*

Military affairs of the Vietcong are the responsibility of high command of the People's Army of North Vietnam and the Ministry of Defense, under close supervision from the Lao Dong Party. These responsibilities include operational plans, assignments of individuals and regular units, training programs, infiltration of military personnel and supplies, military communications, tactical intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six military regions are the same as those of the VC political organization.

The military structure of the Vietcong is an integral part of the political machinery that controls every facet of VC activity in South Vietnam under Hanoi's overall direction. Each political headquarters from the central office down to the village has a military component which controls day-to-day military operations. Similarly, each military headquarters has a political element, an individual or a small staff. This meshing of political and military activity is designed to insure the closest cooperation in support of the total Communist mission. It also gives assurance of political control over the military.

Associated with the central office, believed to be located in Tay Ninh Province, is a military headquarters. Through this headquarters, as well as through other channels, Hanoi maintains direct contact with its principal military units in the south.

In addition to its supervision of the general military effort of the VC, the military section of the central office is believed to have direct command of two regimental headquarters and a number of security companies.

The hard core of the VC military organization is the full-time regular unit usually based on a province or region. These are well-trained and highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. They follow a rigid training schedule that is roughly two-thirds military and one-third political in content. This compares with the 50-50 proportion for district units and the 70 percent political and 30 percent military content of the village guerrilla's training.

The size of the Vietcong regular forces has grown steadily in recent years. For exam-

ple, the Vietcong have five regimental headquarters compared with two in 1961. And the main VC force is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies. Hardcore VC strength now is estimated at about 35,000, whereas it was less than 20,000 in 1961.

The main force battalions are well armed with a variety of effective weapons including 75-millimeter recoilless rifles and 81-82-millimeter mortars. The companies and smaller units are equally well equipped and have 57-millimeter recoilless rifles and 60-millimeter mortars in their inventory. It is estimated that the Vietcong have at least 130 81-millimeter mortars and 300 60-millimeter mortars. There is no precise estimate for the number of recoilless rifles in their hands, but it is believed that most main force units are equipped with them. In at least one recent action the Vietcong employed a 75-millimeter pack howitzer. This mobile weapon, which has a range of 8,500 yards, will increase the Vietcong capabilities to launch long-range attacks against many stationary targets in the country.

Supporting the main force units of the Vietcong are an estimated 60,000-80,000 part-time guerrillas. They are generally organized at the district level where there are likely to be several companies of 50 or more men each. These troops receive only half pay, which means they must work at least part of the time to eke out a living.

Below the irregular guerrilla forces of the district are the part-time, village-based guerrillas.

They are available for assignment by higher headquarters and are used for harassment and sabotage. They are expected to warn nearby VC units of the approach of any force of the legal government. They provide a pool for recruitment into the VC district forces.

The record shows that many of the village guerrillas are dragooned into service with the Vietcong. Some are kidnapped; others are threatened; still others join to prevent their families from being harmed. Once in the Vietcong net, many are reluctant to leave for fear of punishment by the authorities or reprisal by the Communists.

Lam Van Chuoi is a typical example. He was a member of the village civil defense force in his home village in Kien Giang province. In March 1960, he was kidnapped by the Vietcong and kept a prisoner in the highlands for 1 month. There he was subjected to intense propaganda and indoctrination. He was returned to his village but kept under close observation and steady pressure. Finally, he was convinced he must join the VC. Later, he was transferred to a Communist military unit in another province. After learning of the Government's open arms program, he decided to defect from the VC. In May 1964, he walked into

<sup>7</sup> For evidence that the People's Revolutionary Party in the south and the Communist Lao Dong Party in the north are one party, see app. G.

a Government outpost and asked for protection.

Money to pay the regular VC units comes from a variety of sources. Funds are sent from Hanoi. "Taxes" are extorted from the local population. Landowners and plantation operators often must pay a tribute to the VC as the price for not having their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation companies have been forced to pay the VC or face the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged. Officials and wealthy people have been kidnaped for ransom. The VC have often stopped buses and taken the money and valuables of all on board.

For the most part, the VC have concentrated their attention on individuals, isolated or poorly defended outposts, and small centers of population. They have mercilessly killed or kidnaped thousand of village chiefs and other local officials. But over the past year the VC have moved into larger unit operations. Their ability to operate on a battalion level or larger has substantially increased.

#### *C. Intelligence organization*

A key element in the Vietcong effort is an elaborate organization in Hanoi called the Central Research Agency (CRA) (Cuc Nghi-en-Cuu Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelligence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus of its operation is on South Vietnam. This agency is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities of both the Lao Dong Party and the North Vietnamese armed forces for information, personnel, and facilities.

The CRA reportedly operates under the close personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some of the top officials in the Hanoi government reportedly sit on its directing committee, including Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap.

Considerable information on the organization of the CRA has become available from captured Vietcong agents and from the work of intelligence agents of the Republic of Vietnam. Much of this information cannot be made public for security reasons, but it is possible to describe the CRA organization and its operations in broad outline.

The headquarters of the CRA in Hanoi is divided into six main sections, not including a special code unit. The six sections are responsible for administration, cadres, communications, espionage, research, and training. Each section has units to handle the specialized activities of its particular area of responsibility. The research section, for example, has subsections that handle political, economic, and military affairs respectively.

CRA headquarters directs a number of special centers for oversea operations. One such center maintains intelligence channels to oversea areas. It operates through special units at Haiphong and at Hongay.

A second special center is responsible for VC intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos. A third center handles activities along the "demarcation line," the border with South Vietnam. This unit, based in Vinh Linh in southeast North Vietnam, is responsible for sending agents and supplies to the south by sea. It also cooperates with the North Vietnamese army in planning and carrying out infiltration. The CRA maintains intelligence bases in Laos and other countries.

Inside South Vietnam the Vietcong have a large intelligence network. Some of its units are responsible for receiving and sending on agents arriving from the North. They feed and give instructions to groups infiltrating into South Vietnam. They take delivery of equipment and supplies received from the North and relay them to Vietcong units in the south.

Many Vietcong agents have been captured in Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by the CRA to penetrate all Republic of Vietnam Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other specialized organizations. Party and military intelligence units and agents work closely with the CRA.

Each of the main centers operating under CRA headquarters has its own sections and units designed to carry out its main functions. The center at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main infiltration effort of the Vietcong, has separate sections for radio communications, coding, documentation and training, and liaison. It also has specialized units for infiltration through the mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action" in the mountain area.

The CRA maintains a large and expanding radio communications network. Agents also are used to carry messages, usually in secret writing or memorized.

Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelligence operation in support of the Vietcong is one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.<sup>8</sup>

#### **V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HANOI'S CAMPAIGN OF AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM**

While negotiating an end to the Indochina war at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all former French territory in southeast Asia. When Vietnam was partitioned, thousands of carefully selected party members were ordered to remain in place in the south and keep their secret apparatus intact to help promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were stored away for future use. Guerrilla fighters rejoined their families to await the party's call. Others withdrew to remote jungle and mountain hideouts. The majority, an estimated 90,000, were moved to North Vietnam.

<sup>8</sup> Charts of the VC organizational structure are in appendix H.

Hanoi's original calculation was that all of Vietnam would fall under its control without resort to force. For this purpose, Communist cadres were ordered to penetrate official and nonofficial agencies, to propagandize and sow confusion, and generally to use all means short of open violence to aggravate war-torn conditions and to weaken South Vietnam's government and social fabric.

South Vietnam's refusal to fall in with Hanoi's scheme for peaceful takeover came as a heavy blow to the Communists. Meantime, the Government had stepped up efforts to blunt Vietcong subversion and to expose Communist agents. Morale in the Communist organization in the south dropped sharply. Defections were numerous.

Among South Vietnamese, hope rose that their nation could have a peaceful and independent future, free of Communist domination. The country went to work. The years after 1955 were a period of steady progress and growing prosperity.

Food production levels of the prewar years were reached and surpassed. While per capita food output was dropping 10 percent in the north from 1956 to 1960, it rose 20 percent in the south. By 1963 it had risen 30 percent, despite the disruption in the countryside caused by intensified Vietcong military attacks and terrorism. The authorities in the north admitted openly to continuing annual failures to achieve food production goals.

Production of textiles increased in the south more than 20 percent in 1 year (1958). In the same year, South Vietnam's sugar crop increased more than 100 percent. Despite North Vietnam's vastly larger industrial complex, South Vietnam's per capita gross national product in 1960 was estimated at \$110 a person while it was only \$70 in the North.

More than 900,000 refugees who had fled from Communist rule in the North were successfully settled in South Vietnam. An agrarian reform program was instituted. The elementary school population nearly quadrupled between 1956 and 1960. And so it went—a record of steady improvement in the lives of the people. It was intolerable for the rulers in Hanoi; under peaceful conditions, the south was outstripping the north. They were losing the battle of peaceful competition and decided to use violence and terror to gain their ends.

After 1956 Hanoi rebuilt, reorganized, and expanded its covert political and military machinery in the South. Defectors were replaced by trained personnel from party ranks in the north. Military units and political cells were enlarged and were given new leaders, equipment, and intensified training. Recruitment was pushed. In short, Hanoi and its forces in the South prepared to take by force and violence what they had failed to achieve by other means.

By 1958 the use of terror by the Vietcong increased appreciably. It was used both to win prestige and to back up demands for support from the people, support that political and propaganda appeals had failed to produce. It was also designed to embarrass the Government in Saigon and raise doubts about its ability to maintain internal order and to assure the personal security of its people. From 1959 through 1961, the pace of Vietcong terrorism and armed attacks accelerated substantially.

The situation at the end of 1961 was so grave that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam asked the United States for increased military assistance. That request was met. Meantime, the program of strategic hamlets, designed to improve the peasant's livelihood and give him some protection against Vietcong harassment and pressure, was pushed energetically.

But the Vietcong did not stand still. To meet the changing situation, they tightened their organization and adopted new tactics, with increasing emphasis on terrorism, sabotage, and armed attacks by small groups. They also introduced from the North technicians in fields such as armor and anti-aircraft. Heavier weapons were sent in to the regular guerrilla forces.

The military and insurgency situation was complicated by a quite separate internal political struggle in South Vietnam, which led in November 1963 to the removal of the Diem government and its replacement with a new one. Effective power was placed in the hands of a Military Revolutionary Council. There have been a number of changes in the leadership and composition of the Government in Saigon in the ensuing period.

These internal developments and distractions gave the Vietcong an invaluable opportunity, and they took advantage of it. Vietcong agents did what they could to encourage disaffection and to exploit demonstrations in Saigon and elsewhere. In the countryside the Communists consolidated their hold over some areas and enlarged their military and political apparatus by increased infiltration. Increasingly they struck at remote outposts and the most vulnerable of the new strategic hamlets and expanded their campaign of aggressive attacks, sabotage, and terror.

Any official, worker, or establishment that represents a service to the people by the Government in Saigon is fair game for the Vietcong. Schools have been among their favorite targets. Through harassment, the murder of teachers, and sabotage of buildings, the Vietcong succeeded in closing hundreds of schools and interrupting the education of tens of thousands of youngsters.

Hospitals and medical clinics have often been attacked as part of the anti-Government campaign and also because such attacks provide the Vietcong with needed med-

In its report the ICC noted the following finding of the Commission's Legal Committee:

"Having examined the complaints and the supporting material sent by the South Vietnamese mission, the committee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the zone in the north to the zone in the south with the object of supporting, organizing, and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and administration of the zone in the south. These acts are in violation of articles 10, 19, 24, and 27 of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

"In examining the complaints and the supporting material in particular documentary material sent by the South Vietnamese mission, the Committee has come to the further conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN (people's army of Vietnam) has allowed the zone in the north to be used for inciting, encouraging and supporting the hostile activities in the zone in the south, aimed at the overthrow of the administration in the south. The use of the zone in the north for such activities is in violation of articles 19, 24, and 27 of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

The ICC report then stated:

"The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt that the PAVN has violated articles 10, 19, 24, and 27 in specific instances. The Polish delegation dissents from these conclusions. On the basis of the fuller report, that is being prepared by the Legal Committee covering all the allegations and incidents, the Commission will take action as appropriate in each individual case."

The full text of the ICC reports is contained in a publication, "Special Reports to the Cochairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina" issued by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State on July 2, 1962.

#### APPENDIX B

##### INFILTRATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIETNAM INTO SOUTH VIETNAM

(See sec. I, B.)  
(Maps showing infiltration routes not printed in the RECORD.)

#### APPENDIX C

##### DETAIL ON MILITARY INFILTRATION WITH CASE STUDIES

(See sec. I, B, and C.)

The following table shows the scale of infiltration of military personnel from North Vietnam into the South since 1959. The confirmed list is based on information on

infiltration groups from at least two independent sources.

Year	Confirmed	Estimated additional	Total
1959-60	1,800	2,700	4,500
1961	3,750	1,650	5,400
1962	5,400	7,000	12,400
1963	4,200	3,200	7,400
1964	4,400	3,000	7,400
Total	19,550	17,550	37,100

Brief case histories of typical Vietcong who were sent into South Vietnam by the authorities in Hanoi follow:

Name: Le Van Thanh.

Alias: Huu Tam.

Date and place of birth: July 12, 1936, Hoa Hao hamlet, Cat Tai village, Phu Cat district (Binh Dinh).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Lieutenant, formerly platoon leader of signal platoon of 3d Battalion, 90th Regiment, 324th Division.

VC position in South Vietnam: Platoon leader of signal platoon of 95th Battalion, 2d Regiment, 5th Inter-Region.

Date entered South Vietnam: Departed November 27, 1961, arrived Do Xa station early February 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied to government at Nhon Loc post, Nghia Hanh district (Quang Ngai), May 24, 1962.

Name: La Thanh.

Alias: Nguyen Ba Tong—La Giau.

Date and place of birth: 1928, Can Tho city (Phong Dinh).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Senior sergeant, formerly squad leader in charge of construction of barracks for 338th Division.

VC position in South Vietnam: Squad leader, 8th Squad, 3d Platoon, 3d Company, 218B Battalion (War Zone D).

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed April 4, 1962, arrived War Zone D early August 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection: Rallied to Cau Song Be (bridge) post September 8, 1962, with 1 MAS 36.

Name: Le Van Quyen.

Alias: Ho Hai, Hong Thanh.

Date and place of birth: 1929, Tan Binh Than village, Cho Gao district (My Tho).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Lieutenant, formerly assigned to 388th Brigade as instructor on heavy weapons such as 57 mm. recoilless rifle and machinegun.

VC position in South Vietnam: Platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 2d Company, Infiltration Group 15.

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompanied Infiltration Group 15; departed April 3, 1962, arrived Suoi Da (War Zone D) September 10, 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection:  
Rallied at Hieu Liem district (Phuoc Thanh)  
October 7, 1962.

Name: Nguyen Van Do.

Party name: Thanh Minh.

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Thuan.

Date and place of birth: 1923, Thuan Giao  
village, Lai Thieu district (Binh Duong).

Rank and position in North Vietnam:  
Senior captain (battalion commander) 1st  
Battalion, 338th Brigade.

VC position in South Vietnam: Subject  
was to be appointed commander of Phuoc  
Tuy Province Main Force Battalion.

Date entered South Vietnam: Commander  
of Infiltration Group H. 26; departed Xuan  
Mai, Ha Dong (North Vietnam) July 4, 1963;  
arrived Ban Me Thuot October 23, 1963.

Date, place, and circumstance of defection:  
Rallied at Ban Don post, Ban Me Thuot,  
October 23, 1963, while guiding Group H. 26  
to Hai Yen Zone.

Name: Nguyen Thanh Phi.

Party name: Hung Phuong.

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Tu.

Date and place of birth: November 16,  
1926, Thanh Van village, Thanh Chuong  
district (Nghe An).

Rank and position in North Vietnam:  
Doctor, chief of internal disease section, Tiep  
Viet Hospital.

VC position in South Vietnam: Doctor,  
health team leader, 5th Region base con-  
struction group (Do Xa).

Date entered South Vietnam: March 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture:  
Captured by South Vietnamese armed forces  
May 4, 1963, with one 12-millimeter Colt  
pistol and five rounds.

Name: Le Van Net.

Party name: Le Hung Tien.

Infiltration alias: Le Na.

Date and place of birth: 1924, Tan Hiep  
village, Go Cong, Dinh Tuong.

Rank and position in North Vietnam:  
Discharged lieutenant, served in Co Dinh  
chromite mine (Thanh Hoa) with grade of  
senior sergeant.

VC position in South Vietnam: Senior ser-  
geant, 6th Squad, 2d Platoon, Infiltration  
Group H. 26.

Date entered South Vietnam: Late June  
1963 with Infiltration Group H. 26.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture:  
Captured November 16, 1963, by inhabitants  
in strategic hamlet in Ban Me Thuot (Dar-  
lac) with one Communist Chinese rifle and 70  
rounds.

Name: Van Cong Khanh.

Party name: Pham Tien.

Date and place of birth: 1924, An Hoi vil-  
lage, Chau Thanh district (Kien Hoa).

Rank and position in North Vietnam:  
Discharged and reassigned to Co Dinh chrom-  
ite mine (Thanh Hoa) as senior sergeant.

VC position in South Vietnam: Aspirant,  
leader of 7th Squad, 3d Platoon, 608th Engi-  
neer Company subordinate to Headquarters  
Region 7.

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompan-  
ied Group 49, infiltrated into South Vietnam,  
March 18, 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture:  
captured November 23, 1962, in Bung Dia  
hamlet.

Name: Nguyen Thanh Hoa.

Party name: Quoc.

Infiltration alias: Nguyen Quoc Trung.

Date and place of birth: 1917, Phong Coc  
village, Ha Nam canton (Quang Yen).

Rank and position in North Vietnam: Cap-  
tain, discharged and reassigned to Chi Ne  
agricultural camp May 1957.

VC position in South Vietnam: Com-  
mander, 4th Main Force Battalion.

Date entered South Vietnam: Accom-  
panied Infiltration Group 52; departed Xuan  
Mai, April 13, 1961, arrived about August  
1961.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture:  
Captured by South Vietnamese Armed  
Forces with 1 PA 38 (pistol) in Quon Long  
(Dinh Tuong) August 1962.

Name: Tran van Khoa.

Alias: Tran Hong Hai.

Date and place of birth: 1935, Giang Gach  
hamlet, An Hiep village, Ba Tri district,  
Ben Tre Province (Kien Hoa).

Rank and position in North Vietnam:  
Sergeant, formerly driver of Transportation  
Group 3 of (Hanoi) Logistical Bureau.

VC position in South Vietnam: Member of  
46th Infiltration Company; cover designation  
V. 2 (infiltrated unit).

Date entered South Vietnam: Accompa-  
nied the 46th Infiltration Company; de-  
parted for South Vietnam, April 17, 1962.

Date, place, and circumstance of capture:  
Captured by South Vietnamese Rangers in  
ambush (after being wounded) along with  
one MAS 36, July 7, 1962, in Phuoc Long  
Province.

#### APPENDIX D

#### LIST OF COMMUNIST WEAPONS CAPTURED IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(See sec. II.)

On January 29, 1964, the Government of  
Vietnam submitted to the International  
Control Commission a list of weapons and  
other military equipment which had been  
captured from the Vietcong. The weapons  
and equipment came from Communist  
sources outside South Vietnam and obvi-  
ously had been introduced clandestinely into  
the country in support of the Vietcong cam-  
paign of conquest directed by Hanoi.

*I. Chinese Communist origin*

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
75-millimeter recoilless rifle			
Do	1	Sept. 10, 1963	
Do	1	Dec. 2-6, 1963	
Do	1	Dec. 22, 1963	
Total	3		
57-millimeter recoilless gun			
Do	1	Nov. 25, 1962	
Do	2	Dec. 5, 1962	
Do	2	Aug. 31, 1963	
Total	3		
Shells for 75-millimeter gun (shells bear markings in Chinese characters. On some shells, markings were scratched out and replaced by "American" markings.)			
Do	8	Nov. 24, 1963	Province of An Xuyen.
Total	120	Dec. 22, 1963	Operation Due Thang at Dinh Tuong.
Shells for 57-millimeter gun			
Do	49	Nov. 25, 1962	Phuoc Chau, Province of Quang Tin.
Do	8	Feb. 20, 1963	Vietcong attack on the post of Ben Heo (Tay Ninh).
Do	33	May 24, 1963	On a Vietcong vessel on the Bassac River.
Do	6	Aug. 31, 1963	Quang Ngai.
Do	1	Oct. 8, 1963	Province of Binh Dinh.
Do	58	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	155		
80-millimeter mortar			
Do	1	Mar. 25, 1963	Province of Tay Ninh.
60-millimeter mortar			
Do	1	Jan. 7, 1963	Phuoc Thanh.
Total	2	Dcc. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
	3		

Shells for 60-millimeter mortar	18	Sept. 10, 1963	Province of An Xuyen.
Do	165	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	183		
90-millimeter bazooka	1	Dec. 22, 1963	Do.
Caliber 27-millimeter rocket launcher	2	June 10, 1962	Provinces of Quang Ngai and Quang Duc.
Total	3		
Caliber 7.92-millimeter model 08 Maxim machinegun	2	Sept. 10, 1963	Province of An Xuyen.
Do	4	Dec. 21, 1963	Chuong Thien.
Total	6		
MP-82 rocket	142	Apr. 24, 1963	Quang Ngai.
TNT explosives (charges)	365	June 13, 1962	Quang Duc.
Do	43	Nov. 25, 1962	Phuoc Chau (Quang Tin).
Do	29	May 7, 1963	Can Tho.
Do	140	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	577		
Red phosphorous (kilograms)	5	Apr. 10, 1963	Province of Kien Phong.
Potassium chlorate (tons)	17	September 1962	On a Vietcong vessel at Phu Quoc.
Do	2	Apr. 10, 1963	Province of Kien Phong.
Potassium chlorate (kilograms)	150	July 10-15, 1963	Phu Quoc.
Total:			
Tons	19		
Kilograms	155		
Cartridges for 7.92-millimeter machinegun	100,000	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Detonating fuses for 60-millimeter mortar shell	150	do	Do.

<sup>1</sup> Guns plus 8 gun carriages.

*II. Soviet origin*

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
MP-82 rifle		May 10, 1962	Binh Dinh.
Launching cartridges		do	Do.
Mosin Nagant carbine (with automatic bayonet)	1	June 13, 1963	Kien Phong.
Do	2	July 13, 1963	Long An.
Do	5	July 20, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Do	7	Sept. 8, 1963	Do.
Total	15		
Rifles	6	Oct. 6, 1963	Long An.
Do	1	Oct. 18, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Do	11	Nov. 6, 1963	Vinh Binh.
Do	1	Nov. 17, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Do	1	Nov. 25, 1963	Hau Nghia.
Do	1	Dec. 6, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Do	8	Dec. 7, 1963	Phong Dinh.
Do	1	Dec. 12, 1963	Kien Tuong.
Do	1	Dec. 13, 1963	An Xuyen.
Do	1	Dec. 16, 1963	Kien Giang.
Do	1	do	Ba Xuyen.
Do	3	do	An Xuyen.
Do	1	Dec. 17, 1963	Phong Dinh.
Do	1	Dec. 20, 1963	Kien Hoa.
Do	6	Dec. 21, 1963	Chuong Thien.
Do	2	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Total	46		
Automatic pistol	1	Oct. 19, 1963	Phan Thiet.
Grenades	5		Long An.
Rifle cartridges	160,000	Dec. 22, 1963	Dinh Tuong.
Submachinegun (machine pistol)	2	Sept. 23, 1963	Long Xuyen.

*III. Czech origin*

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
7.65-millimeter automatic pistol.....	1	Jan. 2, 1963.....	On person of Vietcong leader arrested at Phu Yen.
K-50 submachinegun.....	2	Nov. 25, 1962.....	Quang Tin.
Do.....	1	Nov. 29, 1962.....	Phuoc Long.
Do.....	7	Apr. 24, 1963.....	Quang Ngai.
Do.....	5	May 9, 1963.....	Quang Tin.
Do.....	2	July 11, 1963.....	Operation Hau Giang.
Do.....	3	Aug. 31, 1963.....	Quang Ngai.
Do.....	1	Sept. 8, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Do.....	1	Sept. 16, 1963.....	Long An.
Do.....	1	Oct. 17, 1963.....	Quang Nam.
Do.....	2	Nov. 13, 1963.....	Phu Yen.
Do.....	1	do.....	At Hué.
Do.....	9	Oct. 8, 1963.....	Binh Dinh.
Do.....	1	Dec. 30, 1963.....	Operation Phuoc Binh Thang.
Do.....	1	Dec. 26, 1963.....	Kien Hoa.
Do.....	1	Dec. 17, 1963.....	Chuong Thien.
Total.....	40		Long Xuyen.
Rifles.....	9	Sept. 10, 1963.....	An Xuyen.
Do.....	1	Oct. 19, 1963.....	Chuong Thien.
Do.....	1	Nov. 6, 1963.....	Ba Xuyen.
Do.....	2	Nov. 9, 1963.....	Chuong Thien.
Do.....	3	Nov. 13, 1963.....	Kien Giang.
Do.....	1	Nov. 17, 1963.....	Ba Xuyen.
Do.....	2	Nov. 26, 1963.....	Hau Nghia.
Do.....	1	Dec. 2, 1963.....	Phong Dinh.
Total.....	26		Chuong Thien.
Machinegun cartridges.....	14,000	Dec. 22, 1963.....	Dinh Tuong.
Grenade launcher.....	1	July 14, 1963.....	Long An.
3.5 antitank bazooka.....	1	Dec. 22, 1963.....	Din Tuong.

## IV. (a) Weapons and ammunition modified by the Regular Army of North Vietnam

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Modified MAT-49.....	16	Nov. 25, 1962.....	Quang Tin.
Do.....	2	Dec. 5, 1963.....	Phu Bon.
Do.....	6	Nov. 13, 1963.....	
Total.....	24	Nov. 24, 1963.....	Operation at Duc Hoa.
12.7-millimeter machinegun.....	2		

## IV. (b) Material and equipment of North Vietnamese manufacture

Type	Quantity	Date of capture	Place
Uniform.....			
Helmets.....	16	Dec. 21, 1962.....	Phuoc Thanh.
Socks.....	(1)	Oct. 8-10, 1963.....	Kien Hoa.
Sweaters (made in Ha Dong).....	(1)	Dec. 21, 1962.....	Phuoc Thanh.
Belts (made in Hanoi).....	(1)		Do.
Mess Kits (made in Haiphong).....	(1)		Do.

<sup>1</sup> No number given.

## APPENDIX E

## PHOTOS OF CAPTURED VIETCONG WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FROM EXTERNAL COMMUNIST SOURCES

(See sec. II.)

The following are photographs of some of the many weapons and the large stocks of ammunition supplied to the Vietcong in South Vietnam from external Communist sources (not printed in the RECORD).

## APPENDIX F

## NORTH VIETNAMESE PASSPORTS AND TRAVEL DOCUMENTS USED BY LIBERATION FRONT OFFICIALS

(See sec. IV, A. 1.)

Huynh Van Nghia and Nguyen Van Tien are officials of the "National Liberation Front of South Vietnam." Though they profess to be citizens of South Vietnam, their ties are with and their support comes from North Vietnam and the Communist regime in Hanoi. In 1963, when the two men traveled abroad on front business, they traveled as North Vietnamese with passports and other documents issued by the Hanoi regime.

Photographs of these documents follow (not printed in the RECORD).

## APPENDIX G

## THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (SOUTH) AND THE LAO DONG PARTY (NORTH) ARE ONE COMMUNIST PARTY

(See sec. IV, A.)

In May 1962 a military force of the Government of Vietnam captured a number of Vietcong documents in Ba Xuyen Province. One of these documents contained instructions from the provincial committee of the Lao Dong Party (Communist Party) in Ba Xuyen to the party's district committees concerning formation of the new People's Revolutionary Party (PRP).

Pertinent sections of the instruction, dated December 7, 1961, follow:

"To D2 and K:

"In regard to the foundation of the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam, the creation of this party is only a matter of strategy; it needs to be explained within the party; and, to deceive the enemy, it is necessary that the new party be given the outward appearance corresponding to a division of the party (Lao Dong) into two and the foundation of a new party, so that the enemy cannot use it in his propaganda.

"Within the party, it is necessary to explain that the founding of the People's Revolutionary Party has the purpose of isolating the Americans and the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, and to counter their accusations of an invasion of the South by the North. It is means of supporting our sabotage of the Geneva agreement, of advancing the plan of invasion of the South, and at the same time

permitting the Front for Liberation of the South to recruit new adherents, and to gain the sympathy of nonaligned countries in southeast Asia.

"The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam (Vietminh Communist Party), unified from North to South, under the direction of the central executive committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho. \* \* \*

"During these explanations, take care to keep this strictly secret, especially in South Vietnam, so that the enemy does not perceive our purpose. \* \* \*

"Do not put these explanations in party bulletins."

Another party circular of the same date said:

"The reasons for the change in the party's name must be kept strictly secret. According to instructions of the Central Committee, one must not tell the people or party sympathizers that the People's Revolutionary Party and the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam are one. One must not say that it is only a tactic, because it would not be good for the enemy to know."

A third party circular, dated December 8, 1961, said:

"Study the instructions so that you will be able to execute them. In passing them to D2V, D2, and K, be very careful that the documents do not fall into enemy hands. After D2N/C has passed to the sections, destroy the written documents immediately."

The originals and translations of the above documents were submitted to the International Control Commission by the Government of Vietnam on May 30, 1962.<sup>1</sup>

In 1964 new rules and regulations were promulgated for the People's Revolutionary Party. A copy of the new rules was captured from the Vietcong in Chuong Thien Province in November 1964. A photograph of the captured document appears on the next page. Key portions of the instructions said that new rules and regulations had been approved for the PRP, "but the real nature of those rules and regulations is that they still are the rules and regulations of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party (in North Vietnam)."

The instructions added: " \* \* \* we should realize that our country is one country, that the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party and the Vietnam Lao Dong Party are one party. \* \* \* There is nothing different between the two parties."

<sup>1</sup> For picture of captured documents and text, see the white paper "Communist Vietminh Aggressive Policy," published by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, Saigon, July 1962.

## APPENDIX H

CHARTS OF THE VIETCONG ORGANIZATION,  
NORTH AND SOUTH

(See sec. IV.)

Lines of control, political and military, from the Hanoi regime to the Vietcong in South Vietnam (charts not printed in the RECORD).

*Village, district, and other Government officials*

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Killed.....	47	34	49	30	25	31	45	36	46	48	21	24
Wounded.....	14	16	24	9	8	9	14	15	13	10	22	7
Kidnaped.....	93	113	91	67	74	132	93	103	144	69	52	100
Total.....	154	163	164	106	107	172	152	154	203	127	95	131

*Other civilians*

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Killed.....	111	110	138	115	105	110	181	103	132	100	66	88
Wounded.....	146	174	239	218	163	173	194	122	203	90	94	154
Kidnaped.....	694	590	1,531	647	727	483	964	834	778	477	200	498
Total.....	951	874	1,908	980	995	766	1,339	1,059	1,113	667	360	740

The following table shows the number of incidents of Vietcong terrorism, sabotage, forced propaganda sessions, and armed attacks during 1964:

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
Attacks.....	223	217	203	220	175	140	184	113	118	83	60	96
Terrorism.....	1,244	1,389	1,632	1,738	1,418	1,390	2,123	1,775	1,938	1,790	1,391	1,719
Sabotage.....	129	201	158	169	217	176	286	315	482	480	247	318
Propaganda.....	174	271	167	157	140	162	224	173	178	197	109	128

Some of the consequences of Vietcong terrorism are shown in the accompanying photographs (not printed in the RECORD).

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.N.  
SECURITY COUNCIL

(Signed by A. Stevenson)

(Circular No. 1589, dated February 27.)

For the information of members of the Security Council, I am transmitting a special report entitled "Aggression from the North, the Record of North Vietnam's Campaign To Conquer South Vietnam," which my Government is making public today. It presents evidence from which the following conclusions are inescapable:

First, the subjugation by forces of the Republic of Vietnam by the regime in northern Vietnam is the formal, official policy of that regime; this has been stated and confirmed publicly over the past 5 years.

Second, the war in Vietnam is directed by the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party (Communist) which controls the government in northern Vietnam.

Third, the so-called Peoples Revolutionary Party in the Republic of Vietnam is an integral part of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam.

Fourth, the so-called Liberation Front for South Vietnam is a subordinate unit of the Central Office for South Vietnam, an integral part of the governmental machinery in Hanoi.

Fifth, the key leadership of the Vietcong—officers, specialists, technicians, intelligence agents, political organizers and propagandists—has been trained, equipped and supplied in the north and sent into the Republic of Vietnam under Hanoi's military orders.

Sixth, most of the weapons, including new types recently introduced, and most of the ammunition and other supplies used by the Vietcong, have been sent from North to South Vietnam.

Seventh, the scale of infiltration of men and arms, including regular units of the Armed Forces of North Vietnam, has increased appreciably in recent months.

Eighth, this entire pattern of activity by the regime in Hanoi is in violation of general principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and is in direct violation of the Geneva accord of 1954. Such a pattern of violation of the treaty obligations undertaken at Geneva was confirmed by a special report of the International Control Commission in 1962 and it has been greatly intensified since then.

These facts about the situation in Vietnam make it unmistakably clear that the character of that conflict is an aggressive war of conquest waged against a neighbor—and makes nonsense of the cynical allegation that this is simply an indigenous insurrection.

I request that you circulate copies of the report, together with copies of this letter,

765-428-96923

to the delegations of all member states as a Security Council document.

In making this information available to the Security Council, my Government wishes to say once more that peace can be restored quickly to Vietnam by a prompt and assured cessation of aggression by Hanoi against the Republic of Vietnam. In that event, my Government—as it has said many times before, would be happy to withdraw its military forces from the Republic of Vietnam and turn promptly to an international effort to assist the economic and social development of southeast Asia.

In the meantime, my Government awaits the first indication of any intent by the Government in Hanoi to return to the ways of peace and peaceful resolution of this international conflict.