

Pony Berner

2.9
1.4
116
28
406

RP Notes for
The Conference

1. Inappropriate use of analogy - fetid -
inexic

2. 3 subjects - 58-65
a) What should the U.S. do. (rather than
case what can be done)
b) no intelligence failure

tools - @

@ credibility of coercion

What should we do -

Agree || We did know what was happening -

What we knew was not accurate

- Perceptions replaced reality -

Reasoning by analogy to governing analogies

1. Munich - appeasement -

No | [political dialogue w/ North] - inappropriate

2. Analogy of South Korea
invasion - tied in with cross-border
invasion.

Assumption - Munich -

Agree | Military Degrade & Doctrine - one analogy -

World War II experience - Keynote
frustration, Weakness, accommodation -

Killing - 58-65

Question not asked - What should the
U.S. do specifically in VN

Assumption - Doctrine of containment

Longhale

No

We know how to do it - G. & about
should we do - A tactical question -
what can we do

(U.S. 1966)

~~The~~ Facilitated us - but not
how - like. [context of the war]
Use Force to secure victory -
There have been who understood -

No

programs G. & were unaware of
war - Houliatt saying the
nation building!! (Can't build
a nation in the midst of war.)

Loss of stability leading a nation!
Distortion - Vietnam direct military
operations, -

No

Was NV important - [no military
or political separation] - did the
NV set the political agenda
what about 25,000 former north
& the integrated back into the
south.

Can't repeat have same direction
unabridged.

1. Intelligence agencies do their job well -
accept the intelligence [data] & the
Shannon Theng - '64

2. Imp. of understanding & ing to
American united - like, 1947 or earlier

nothing. Psychological & political
factors - we are interested
indigenous players define victory &
defeat.

Gardner

- Episodic rather than chronological -
positive analogy between economic
development in SW in 30s &
development in VN

'65 Johnson speech - steadfastness -
Mekong River project - REA
positive role for government in the
development of backward ~~regions~~ ^{regions}

'61 - hearing Johnson was going to VN
Gold Schmidt - talked about the Mekong
project. - development of lower Colorado
River

"Old Ho can't let
me know" - from the Mekong side
TV

Brian Van Der Mar

"Thinking is way far from knowing"

Beliefs, values, experiences
Lenses, projections

Incongruities - paved with good intentions.

- generational style - "moving again"
- '54 speech at Kennedy as SVN fragile equilibrium of power - domestic theory appeared real.
- "Flawed world - the Gattingspiel - ~~was~~ a world lib"
- Sought a neutralist "Lao" & the Cuba for dominance in SVN
- Reforming zeal - a two Vietnam solution possible
- Thought it a political war -

a) & war } let your Kennedy admin.

b) Lao }

c) Didn't really focus until the end of

the year.

Ad hoc approach. | Dien } Dien is Dien
but the best we've got } imposed
the military dependence of Dien. Strategic
Hemlock - allocated huge segments on
population -

1. Remember within the interrogator -
What should we ask of it all -

a) Failed to analyze & debate -
Thief Thief Thief

b) Lack of knowledge of
local realities.

Presence of Parisian assumptions.

William J. Duiker (64'65 - in FSO in VN)

Hanoi's perspective on the

war - Hanoi's strategy - approach -
1941 (Viet Minh Front) a depiction
of his earlier ideas, -

59-65 | 1941 Vietnam. pol.

strength of party & link to

people & to industrial
Victorian people. - political-military

struggle - - strategy became more

military. - After Geneva - a

political approach. - used to consolidate
party in NVN. Under pressure from
to ~~resume~~ resume war. Ho Chi Minh

conscious of U.S. - [captivity of Diem]

B, 57 & 58 - recruitment/leaders in

South (Le Dean) - amount of damage

Jan 59 - planning session at Central
Committee -

2nd point - possibility of providing U.S.
with many more than were - 1959-60

- a) Assassination in South
- b) Ho Chi Minh trail
- c) Reinterment

- a) Undeclared 'card of' (Start here left)
- b) Matter of counterinsurgency & caused
several difficulties.
- c) Increase capability of UN forces
Ap Bac []

Still thought
~~that~~ victory would be political [letter
from De Puan to Gen. - Summer 62 - used
example of ~~Laos~~ Laos negotiations - how far we
win, how far they lose will be
precisely measured.

See
~~Dec~~ a Saigon Govt. was going to continue
Dec '63 - See U.S. was going
to stay - compromise solution - integrity,
our efforts.

Taukhe Gulf Incident - ~~over~~
after Marine force units were sent south
65 -

George Fervising

64-65 "Conspiracy of Silence" -

VCS shunted aside by Kenney

VCS began to regain influence -

64-65 ~~VCS~~ VCS complained / pushing
intervention. Put Gen Wheeler in working
group. 65 winter-spring [ambiguity]
Feb 65 decision to initiate bombing.

March 65. ground troop issue is

glazed over, except for Gen Johnson -
(5 years, 500,000 troops) - 14, '65 -

[Westmoreland's] - Brady - middle way -

Johnson reject mobilization of reserves

No real discussion of issues.

"Cat & mouse game" Ambiguity continues
into 1968. *Crisis of command decided
~~1967~~ but no clear strategy developed.

John Prados

Pro 200 of escalation and
commitment in S.E. Asia.

Self-image - no relevance

Role of individuals - assumptions & perceptions

~~WW II~~ WW II - formative experience -

a) Munich

b) Domino theory