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USOM PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVES GUIDE



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TO

VIETNAM

OFFICE FOR RURAL AFFAIRS

PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S GUIDE

SAIGON, VIETNAM

JANUARY

1963

The year which has just clapsed has, as I have just said, seen its essential expression in and by the vast movement of Strategic Hamlets.

.....

This vast movement born in the heat of the war is our preemptory reply to the Communist challenge. It brings us, along with the certainty of victory, the pride to live as free men today and tomorrow.

President NGO DINH DIEM

... Our hopes for a peaceful and prosperous Viet-Nam can best be realized through the joint efforts of Americans and Vietnamese working side by side in the Hamlets, Towns and Cities, helping the people of the country to achieve their desires for Social and Economic Evolution ...

Joseph L. Brent
Director
USAID/Saigon

This guide is to familiarize USOM Provincial Representatives with their job in Vietnam. Its contents have been taken from official publications and from speeches of Vietnamese and American officials. Changes and additions may be necessary, therefore, pages have been left unnumbered and the guide placed in a loose leaf binder.

The guide is divided into seven chapters. The first six chapters provide information of a specific nature on the Counterinsurgency Program. Chapter Seven is a collection of significant reference information not included in other chapter headings.

Recommendations for future additions or changes for this guide are welcome.

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above additional chapters which may be added at later dates.

INTRODUCTION

You have the most important job in Viet-Nam. You have been selected as a Provincial Representative because you possess the necessary dedication, common sense and imagination to fulfill this difficult assignment.

Our Vietnamese friends have launched a nationwide strategic hamlet program which they wish to be a political, economic and social revolution at the grass roots. This revolution is based upon the basic right of the people to govern themselves and through this self-government to achieve progress, beginning at the hamlet level. The purpose of this program is to give the Vietnamese people something worth risking their lives to defend and in so doing to defeat communism. It will be your job to help the Vietnamese make their aspirations for a better life come true.

We have long since realized that this is a new kind of war and that a pure military solution is impossible. Unless military action is combined with social, political and economic improvements and, through these improvements, the rural people are given a stake in their community worth defending, there can be no permanent victory over communism.

In each province a joint civil-military plan for the creation of peace, security and prosperity through the establishment of strategic hamlets has been developed. These plans combine military actions with the political, social and economic improvements necessary to defeat communism. Within the flexible framework of this plan, it will be your job to help the Vietnamese civil and military agencies in carrying out the grass-roots political, economic and social improvements which are needed and which they desire. However, you must keep in mind that political, economic and social progress in a community depends upon that community having physical protection from the communists - whether by outside military units or by armed and trained militiamen from the community itself. This is why your assistance and support to the Vietnamese must be closely coordinated with the military security actions underway in your province. This is also why you must work in intimate coordination with the local MAAG advisors.

As one of our Provincial Representatives you will be working twenty-four hours a day with the Vietnamese Province Chief, his technical staff and his District, Village and Hamlet personnel as well as with the MAAG Sector Advisor, doing everything in your power to use all available resources to assist the rural population.

Your resources are many and include the full strength of the American Economic Assistance Program in all its technical fields. You will be backed up by the full USOM technical staff in Saigon. But you should rely on your own good judgment and the Provincial Government's Vietnamese technicians for carrying out project activities before calling for outside help.

The USOM/GVN Assistance Program you will be administering and co-ordinating at Provincial and lower levels, should be visualized as a two-way street. First, our major, rural-population-impact, development

projects such as strategic hamlet establishment and improvement (schools, dispensaries, etc.), montagnard resettlement and improvement, farm credit, hog and livestock production and composting, fertilizer distribution, irrigation and insect and rodent control, will come from the top down. Second, the hamlet self-help projects - worthwhile social and economic development projects developed within the hamlets by the hamlet peoples themselves for which they will donate most or all of their labor and ask for Provincial help for the materials and technical advice - will come from the bottom up.

The Province Chief, the MAAG Sector Advisor and you will have the cash and material resources for immediate allocation to the Hamlet people to carry out these Hamlet self-help projects. It is your responsibility, working with the local Vietnamese officials, to see that rapid action is taken to insure the smooth, quick flow of these hamlet self-help project requests and their prompt review, revision if necessary, and implementation, from the Provincial level. The hamlet people must and can be convinced by your quick action that their government has become responsive to their needs.

You will also have to ride hard on the impact projects coming from the top down and insure that they are effectively implemented. The best plans in the world dreamed up in Saigon or Washington, won't mean a thing unless they really reach the rural population. We look to you to extend that reach. We expect you to keep us informed of urgent requests from your province to the ministries which have not received action and we will follow-up in Saigon.

You will be kept informed from Saigon of all of our plans and activities which may apply in your area and of the supplies and equipment available for your use. Use your judgement and imagination in determining what may apply in your area. The more you know, the better equipped you will be to understand and carry out our policies and your job. Don't hesitate to ask questions because you will need all the information available to make sound, accurate decisions.

In most cases, you will be living with the MAAG Sector Advisor and his staff. This should eliminate most of your routine housekeeping and administrative problems. From personal experience I know that it is possible to live off locally available resources including the MAAG facilities. This should not pose any hardship on you nor should you be worried about being identified with our military advisors.

As pointed out earlier, they have as great concern with the need for and success of your work as you do; we are all in this together! Good day-to-day relations with the MAAG Sector Advisor will insure your own security and important help in such matters as transportation, radio communications, and even eating!

As to reports, we will give you simple standard forms or formats. Although we will want to know how you and the USOM program are doing,

we don't want you to waste too much of your time on administrative details. Whenever possible, let the Vietnamese do the work and give them our helping hand and a push where they need it.

You should think positively at all times and make the seemingl; impossible work successfully. It can be done although it may often require much patience and imagination. This is the American ideal, this is still our way of doing things and this is what is going to win here! Feel proud of yourselves as Americans and do your best to instill the "Can do" spirit in your Vietnamese allies so that their hopes for a better tomorrow will rapidly materialize.

This is your job in Viet-Nam; big, broad, full of responsibilities - and most important!

We expect big things from you in your Province! !

Rufus C. Phillips
Rufus C. Phillips
Assistant Director for Rural Affairs

PURPOSE

Accelerated Economic and Social Development in Support of the Strategic Hamlet Program must:

- involve the people of rural Vietnam more deeply in their own future by increasing their participation in the processes of government and economic development,
- assist the people of rural Vietnam to participate in self-help activities which will realize hopes for a better life for them and their children,
- make the Technical Services of the Government of Vietnam, and the US Aid Program immediately responsive to the wants and needs of the people of rural Vietnam,
- by doing all those things, give the hamlet citizen a stake in Free Vietnam worth defending.

IMPLEMENTATION

I. Establishing Security

The provincial governments, with military assistance, are helping rural people establish strategic hamlets to defend themselves against communist Viet-Cong attacks and infiltrators. The hamlet people elect their own officials and organize their own militia-type units to protect themselves and their families and to track down the communist menacing their hamlets. This is a new idea; it is positive and offensive, rather than negative and defensive. Where the strategic hamlets are well organized, the rural people no longer fear the communists. Security is beginning to be reestablished in rural areas.

II. Bringing Democratic Economic and Social Development to the Strategic Hamlet

The implementation of these phases of the Program is based upon two fundamental Vietnamese Government structures, both new in organization and concept -- the Strategic Hamlet Council and the Provincial Strategic Hamlets Committee. Strategic Hamlet Chiefs and Councils are now being elected democratically by strategic hamlet dwellers all over rural Vietnam for the first time; and, as fast as these councils are set up, they will be called upon to represent the people in their hamlets to voice their wants and needs and express them in the form of self-help, development projects. The hamlet peoples will be expected to donate their labor and other locally available resources for these projects while technical assistance and any additional material support will be provided either from existing Provincial Government Services and Budgets or from special budgets available to the Province Chief and Provincial Strategic Hamlets Committee.

Hamlet Chiefs and their Councils may also submit to the Provincial Strategic Hamlets Committee assistance requests other than self-help development projects according to the felt needs of their people. These requests will be screened and referred to the concerned services for action and immediate reply.

The Strategic Hamlets Committee now consist of representatives of the Provincial Government Technical Services, the Army and other Provincial Security Services. This committee should be used with the concurrence of the Chief of Province as a committee for provincial development with which the local USOM representative will work: The committee ideally should contain all persons at the Provincial level interested in and able to accelerate development at the Hamlet level. First priority must be given by Province Chiefs to ensure that the Provincial Strategic Hamlet Committees are dynamic and active, ready to help the hamlet peoples solve their problems and move ahead. By constructive local actions USOM and other American representatives can encourage the rapid development of these committees and can help sustain their active operation.

The Provincial Strategic Hamlet Committees should also review existing, regular GVN and USOM activities relating to the hamlets in their Province and use the Committee and its members to solve problems that may be impeding progress or to otherwise strengthen these activities. Some of these existing projects may be reoriented to intensify assistance to the Strategic Hamlets and otherwise strengthened and co-ordinated with this new effort. Special funds made available to the Provincial Strategic Hamlets Committee in support of provincial plan can be used to augment these activities locally. Programs already developed by the Provincial Technical Services, which were not previously implemented because of fund shortage or technical difficulties, should also be reviewed by the Committee for possible implementation or modification in light of the new objectives of the accelerated Strategic Hamlet Program and its resources.

Locally suggested projects or programs which are obviously too large, too complicated technically or require overall policy decisions, should be referred by the Committee to Saigon for review. The USOM representative on the Committee is also empowered to seek such technical support or material assistance from Saigon as may be unavailable locally through USOM channels to be co-ordinated with the GVN centrally. He should also request USOM/Saigon follow-up on urgent unanswered requests for assistance directed by the province to the various ministries.

USOM is in the process of making available to province chiefs special piastre funds for implementing accelerated development activities within the context of Provincial Strategic Hamlets plans. These funds will be available first for those provinces which have established viable Strategic Hamlet Committees and Strategic Hamlet plans and which are going forward with their security programs and are now ready to implement development activities. However, before special funds are used, the Committee and their American representatives should satisfy themselves that all locally available GVN resources have been utilized. This determination should not result in undue delays, and, since quick action will be a key to the success of this new program, special funds should be utilized immediately when emergencies arise.

Authority to use special funds should depend upon the concurrence of the province chief and the USOM and other American representatives in the GVN/US provincial committee which established to authorize expenditures at special funds. Wherever possible, local procurement in the provinces and local contractual services should be utilized, i.e., purchase of tools, lumber, cement, cloth, foodstuffs, etc. hiring of skilled labor and services, etc. Provincial government officials must do the procurement, but the procurement system should be kept as simple as possible, Americans should advise to insure simplicity and results. For example, if it is necessary to procure farm tools and cloth or cement for immediate local operations or projects, this might be done by visiting several shops in the town closest to the point of use, and then asking interested merchants to submit samples and acceptable bids against those samples within an hour's time. Quick action and common

sense can keep the merchants from colluding in their simple bids, and strict supervision of delivery against acceptable samples can insure quality. The buyer can reserve the right to reject any bid for unspecified reasons should he suspect any collusion or be unsatisfied with the prices or commodity offered. Upon accepting the bid and the materials delivered against it in full, cash payment should be effected immediately in full. If this system is kept simple, it will be found that goods can be procured often at prices much lower than when more formal bidding systems are employed. It is emphasized that a little common sense and good judgment can result in a simple and effective procurement system.

Where needed commodities are unavailable in the Province, requests should be forwarded by the USOM representative to Saigon for procurement, where streamline procurement will be used for earliest possible delivery. Appropriate forms will be made available for USOM representatives for these procurement requests. Desired commodities should be kept simple.

CONCLUSION

The strategic hamlet program in its accelerated development aspects envisions a two-way flow of actions and help between the rural peoples and their provincial governments. It will draw upon the ideas, wants and labor of the local people and their resources as made known through their elected hamlet leaders to the Strategic Hamlets Committee and, in turn, the Provincial Committee will bring to them the technical services and resources of the GVN and American assistance. The program will also stimulate provincial government action and the plans of government services, drawing upon presently budgeted resources plus special funds, if justified, to accelerate development in rural areas, predominantly at the hamlet level. The program represents a concentration of resources and efforts for work at local levels, and is a natural follow-up to fulfill the hopes of the population for greater prosperity, which must be realized as soon as some measure of security has returned to the hamlet.

SOLDIERS AND THE PEOPLE
By Edward G. Lansdale
Brigadier General, USAF

I.

To the man in the ranks, it seems that there is always someone figuring out a job for him to do.

The Roman legionnaire, in ancient times, as he wondered what aqueduct or road-building project the centurion was going to order him on next, is a close kin of today's man in uniform. And vice versa.

Today's man can't help wondering what you, his commander or his commander's advisor, are learning in this school -- which will mean more work for him to do. Since General Yarborough asked me to talk this morning on the topic of the "Military Support of Community Development Programs," I presume that today's man in the ranks has cause to wonder.

So, let us dedicate the talk this morning to the person who will have to go out and do what we talk about here -- the man in the ranks. We owe it to him to take a hard, practical look at the subject... to make certain that what we have in mind for him makes good military sense. We must not be ~~Mr. Smith~~ simply looking for cheap labor. We must not be fuzzy do-gooders simply satisfying a theory. And, above all, we must not become so engrossed in socio-economic activities that we ever forget that a fighting man must ever be ready for a fight... and that readiness had better include the ability to whip the enemy!

In other words, we owe it to him to help him be a good military man, with all that that implies.

II.

Let's start, then, by thinking of communities in terms of national security, to which you and your troops are pledged.

You are here studying counter-insurgency. In a Communist insurgency, the Communist goal is to win control of the people. When control of the people is gained, along with them go the land, its bounty, the independent life of the nation.

Since a community is basically a grouping of people, gaining control of it is vital to the success of the Communist guerrilla. When he wins enough communities, he wins the nation. Each community so brought under his control can help hide him from you and your troops.

can feed him, clothe him, help finance him, and give him reinforcements.

On your side, the community is every bit as vital to your success. Having its help, you can uncover the guerrilla enemy from his hiding place, start denying him his logistics base, get him moving along to exhaustion and defeat.

The Communists' task is much simpler than yours. His end goal justifies any means for him to get there. Your means must justify the end goal you seek.

The Communist goal is a nation wherein all resources, human and physical, are rigidly, undeviatingly controlled for the benefit of the state. The "state" is an euphemism meaning the Communist Party, and the Party elite in particular. Since the Communist subversive/guerrilla is going to wind up top dog in the state he is fighting to create, he uses any means to get there. He can afford to be completely ruthless in applying coercion by terror. (Incidentally, as you study the tactics expounded by Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, just stop for a moment and reflect where they and their elite got to personally -- and then what has happened to most of the poor boobs who helped them rise to power; they know now the cynicism of the earlier promises; they now know that terror does not end with Communist victory.)

The end goal you seek must be something quite different, or the people will have little to choose between you and the Communists. You are striving towards a future in which you will live, too, along with your troops, and your children, and their children, and the children's children. Therefore, the means you use in defeating Communist insurgents must be largely constructive means, on which that good future you want can be built. It requires much more than propaganda and the use of force.

III.

Let us say that you are the commander, or the commander's advisor, of a zone in which Communist insurgents are active. In your zone, you have communities -- hamlets, villages, towns. Now, just because some of those communities support the Communist insurgents -- are those communities to be treated as part of the enemy or are they to be treated as part of the nation which the troops are sworn to defend? The answer should be obviously the latter, although this doesn't always happen in the bitter hatreds of a counter-insurgency campaign. However, if you and your troops start making war on the very communities which make up the nation you are defending, then to whom and to what are you loyal?

Remember how Ramon Magsaysay described the attitude of his troops, in the Huk campaign in the Philippines, as being ready to offer either "all-out friendship or all-out force." This is a good precept to keep in mind as you go to work on communities you suspect are under the secret control of the enemy. Move in with military alertness, but also with brotherly concern.

The first priority need of the community is physical protection, and it's up to you to make sure that this is given. Protection must be not only from outside attack by a guerrilla band against the community, it also must be from inside attack or individual reprisal. If a man in the community helps you, and because of this has his head cut off by the enemy later, then the community isn't being protected and remains vulnerable to Communist control. Much the same is true of the production means of the community. If you cannot protect farmers and workers in their daily tasks, the economy stagnates, and your side is weakened further. All the fine strategy, planning, training, manpower, equipment, supplies, and fiscal help are meaningless without this protection.

Let me illustrate with the case of a fishing village I noted not long ago, in an area where Communist guerrillas were active. The government army patrolled the road past the village twice daily, in vehicles. One day, they were ambushed from sand dunes near the village. In after-action security work, the village head man, a fisherman, was picked up by the army for questioning. He told all he knew about the Communist guerrillas, who rowed down to the coast from hills some miles away. The army kept questioning this fisherman for two days, at its headquarters, then turned him to his village. While away from home, being questioned by the army, this poor man couldn't provide for his family. He lost two days work -- a fact noted and remembered by the villagers. Several nights later, the Communist guerrillas visited the village, accused him of helping the army, and then murdered him, as an object lesson.

The village receives economic aid from the government, in advice of fishing methods, some supplementary rice, occasionally, a village medical kit, and even some help with boats and nets. The army patrols the road past the village and, every so often, works on it with propaganda against the Communist enemy. But, when night comes and the guerrillas are on patrol, which side do you think the villagers must help -- or else?

One solution, of course, is to provide the means for the community to protect itself, and then to back up this self-help with military force to meet a contingency larger than the community is able to handle on its own. This is the practical thought underlying the "strategic hamlet" program in Vietnam, which is reportedly starting to be so effective against the Communist Vietcong guerrillas.

As a community starts helping against the Communist guerrilla enemy, two series of activities open up. One is quite pragmatic, military. The second is of the spirit, in terms of motivation. The pragmatic consists of not only organizing the defense of the community, in earthworks, weapons, and citizen defenders, but also such things as will help the military come to the rescue: landing strips, helicopter pads, access roads, a radio receiver-sender.

The second series of initial activities come as the community start seeking answers to the question: what is worth risking a man's life to defend? Often, this too, commences in a pragmatic way, by asking to the

material things in a community: improving the water supply with a new well or pump, drainage for the streets, a generator for village power, latrines for public health, a kit of medical supplies. It is a short step from this to starting a school in the community, getting books for those who learn to read, creating an information center where news and advice from the capital is available. The community finds itself becoming linked up closely to the nation, a real part of something bigger. As it does so, the political life of the community grows also, demanding more meaning in answers to the question: what is worth risking a man's life to defend? As the community resolves these political factors at its grass-roots level, as the national government becomes responsive itself, and as the bond between the people and the soldiers grows stronger, the Communist guerrillas find themselves forced out of existence as their cause is exposed for the paltry thing it is.

Americans recently in Vietnam have told me that the "strategic hamlets" there are starting to elect their own village leaders by secret ballot, and are being encouraged in this by the national government. If this is true, democracy, starting at the grass-roots level and becoming spread throughout the country, with the government responding, then this might well mark the vital turning point in the fight for Vietnamese freedom against the Communist Vietcong.

IV.

What I have been describing is the combat area of counter-insurgency.

Now, it is quite understandable that a military man, experiencing the realities of what happens when Communist guerrillas have actually hit a country, will start doing some thinking on the subject. I know that many of the military, and others, in the free world, have given thought to how to catch insurgency early, in its infancy, and how to prevent it. From this thinking has come many of the ideas and programs for civic action by the military -- or, if you will, "military support of community development programs."

My purpose in sketching in the community in an active counter-insurgency area was two-fold. I wanted you to see the community the way you must -- if you have to apply in combat the lessons you are learning in this school. And, I wanted you to start doing your own thinking on just when it is best for the military and the community to get together -- at a tragic, late hour or early on, when opportunities abound.

In order to stimulate your thinking on the subject, let me note briefly what two other military men have done about it.

V.

Do you remember months ago, when journalists first started going into the Congo to write about the post-independence crisis there?

Many of these journalists made a point of the emphatic difference between Leopoldville and Brazzaville across the river, the difference between the two congos. The flattering remarks about the French side of the river reminded me of an unusual French soldier serving there. He is Lt. General Le Rulloch, who commanded the Group forces of what was then French Equatorial Africa, from Brazzaville.

Recruits for military service were taken straight out of tribal communities, usually knowing only their own local area and speaking only their own tribal dialect. So, as part of their basic training, they were given language instruction, taught French. General Le Rulloch added some instruction in old-fashioned "civics," on the rights and responsibilities of citizens. It resulted in not only a better military force, but in creating a whole new group of responsible citizens after their period of military duty.

Tribal chiefs, district officers, and other officials, were so struck by the results of this training in "civics," that they asked the military to start giving similar instruction in "civics" to classes of civilians in all villages. This was done, with far-reaching results.

Along these same lines are many other examples of the military helping a civilian education. The outstanding one which comes to mind for an American is the Philippines, where U. S. combat soldiers started teaching the three R's to Filipino children just before the turn of the century, and the U. S. War Department established the fine public school system of free education. Much of the noted Filipino resistance in World War II against the Japanese invader, the close comradeship with the American military, came from a shared devotion to the cause of liberty, which we mutually had learned young.

VI.

In Colombia is an unusual soldier, whom I hope to meet some day. Everything I know about him has come from others, with some fine compliments from people I respect as realists and practical doers. The soldier is Colonel Alvaro Valencia Tovar.

Colonel Valencia has been in command of Colombia Army operations at Vichada, Colombia, working towards bringing peace and stability to one of Colombia's noted areas of "violencia" or "violence," where the Communists might well have been going full-bloom by now in guerrilla operations, if it weren't for the inspired work of the Colombia military. Colonel Valencia uses his officers and men to start self-help projects in the region. They practically carry a gun in one hand and a text-book in the other. They've helped local people build bridges, construct river ferries, start schools, build villages, and establish small local industries. While he and his forces have become sort of "jacks of many trades" while helping the people of the region, they haven't forgotten that they are soldiers first. The bandits, the guerrillas of the region, have a real respect for them as top-notch fighting men.

VII.

I hope these two examples and the sketchy descriptions of the bond between the military and the community in counter-insurgency operations will serve as a take-off point for your thinking further about this subject. If our brief time together this morning has caused this, then our time has been well spent.

Just remember this. Communist guerrillas hide among the people. If you win the people over to your side, the Communist guerrillas have no place to hide. With no place to hide, you can find them. Then, as military men, fix them . . . finish them!

SUBJECT: Appointment of MAC Sector Advisors as USOM Provincial Representatives

1. The Director of USOM (US Operations Mission) to Vietnam recently requested that MAC consider the appointment of MAC Sector Advisors as Acting USOM Provincial Representatives until such time as USOM is able to assign members of its own staff to function in this capacity.

2. General markings in his re^l, to USOM (Incl 1), after discussions to determine more precisely just what would be required of MAC advisors acting in this capacity, has agreed that where USOM is unable to provide, the MAC Sector Advisors should assist in every way possible consistent with their other duties.

3. A Section Command Advisor has no requirement to assume responsibility for USOM interests until he is specifically instructed to do so. It is important, however, that he understands the nature and scope of the USOM Mission, especially in the province to which he is assigned. This will permit him to evaluate local conditions with respect to possible USOM assistance or support.

4. The following examples are given in order to clarify further the intent of designating Sector Advisors as USOM Representatives:

a. Example: In the conduct of a civil-military operation, where special funds have been provided by the U.S., some minimum control must be exercised over expenditures. In this case, the USOM Representative or designated Sector Advisor may be required to authenticate vouchers drawn against these funds. His signature would mean only that he recognizes the expenditure as valid and within the terms of the budget agreement. He would have no continuing accountability for the funds or for their use.

b. Example: Shipments of equipment or supplies provided by USOM to provincial projects may arrive in several increments. USOM may ask the representative to be alert to deliveries and report the times of arrival or condition in which received.

c. Example: An emergency situation may result in a request for USOM to provide assistance, such as rice, medical supplies or clothing. The USOM representative in the area may be asked to give an early estimate of the kind of supplies needed and the validity of the request received by USOM.

5. Most USOM programs now being carried out are executed by agencies of the GVN with funds and technical assistance provided by USOM. Many of these projects were organized and planned before the need for coordinated civil-military operations was fully recognized. Some of these programs are well into the execution phase and do not yet reflect

the increased emphasis on counter-insurgency support and recently established priorities for province rehabilitation. Increased appreciation for the immediate need to support combined civil-military operations according to a system of priorities will result in a better coordinated program, where all available resources can be concentrated in a given area for maximum effect.

6. USOM representatives have been instructed to call on Sector Command Advisors during their visits to the field and discuss USOM activities with them for better coordination and understanding of MAP and AID (USOM) program in the provinces. This should serve to alert advisors as to USOM's capabilities to meet counter-insurgency requirements which might not otherwise be known.

7. Information concerning USOM activities is also attached (Incl' 2-4). Since the 1961 Annual Report, USOM has added the following activities: (1) highlander relief program, (2) installation of village radios, (3) distribution of village health kits and (4) establishment of provincial counter-insurgency support programs. A new edition of the Annual Report is being prepared and will be forwarded as soon as it is available.

Address by Joseph L. Brent, Director, USOM, before the Saigon Lions Club
December 11, 1962

Thank you for the honor of letting me meet with you this evening, and for providing me with my first opportunity to speak publicly in Viet-Nam about USOM's work for the coming year, and particularly of our role in the Strategic Hamlet program and the ultimate victory that program is sure to bring.

You are all now familiar with the name "strategic hamlet". It is a term that has become well known throughout much of the world. However, even here in Viet-Nam where the program originated, I often find that its basic concepts are not completely understood. This is even more true in the United States. Many people imagine that the program is primarily a defensive, military effort involving forced relocation in heavily defended hamlets of millions of people, with inevitable disregard for their social and economic needs. Perhaps the reason for this lack of information is that the USOM -- despite our deep and abiding concern with the social and economic well being of the rural population -- has been so busy planning our side of the hamlet effort that we have not taken the time to explain the new program often enough, or in sufficient detail.

Now is the time to assure you, and our many interested friends elsewhere, that, though quiet, we have not been thoughtless; for the Strategic Hamlet Program as it is now developed is, as the leaders of Viet-Nam have wished from the moment of its inception, the foundation for a far-reaching social and economic revolution. As a matter of fact, only a small percentage of the population is being relocated under the program, and even then movement is usually voluntary because the people themselves desire the comparative security and the considerable new benefits the strategic hamlets afford.

It is in this atmosphere of a better way of life that the people's hopes for social and economic evolution are beginning to take shape. It is the intention of the Government of Viet-Nam and of its collaborators in the USOM, to endeavor, in 1963, to urge the rural population to experience such feelings of fulfilled expectations that they will unreservedly pledge their loyalty to the Government of this new and courageous Republic and reject, once and for all, communist tyranny with its poverty and unbearable controls.

How can we be so optimistic -- so sure that this program will succeed?

Well, gentlemen, it is a program based on the people and is of them, by them, and for them. It is the absolute antithesis of everything that communism stands for. It starts, after military clearing operations--where necessary--have been completed, with the building of the strategic hamlet. Immediately thereafter, and for the first time in the history of Viet-Nam, the people then elect their own Hamlet Chief and council members, from among their own number, and form their own militia to defend their own homes. This protection is reinforced by the Army, the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps (who either live in the hamlet or are within a few minutes of an I.A.P.M. passed by a USOM-provided radio).

Although USOM is involved in these first phases of the creation of a strategic hamlet in such ways as assisting families which may have had to be relocated in order to join the newly organized community, in administrative training for the civic action teams which first indoctrinate the villagers in the new way of life, and later for elected hamlet leaders, and in helping with radio installations, our real work is assisting the Government of Viet-Nam help its people improve their crop yields, or catch more fish, or raise better chickens, pigs and cattle, and thus have more pence in their pockets quickly. This work it should be noted, has not yet begun in earnest but is scheduled to start on a large scale early in January. Also, we are now completing final plans to start on the construction of the many new schools, markets, dispensaries, roads, wells--and all the other things the people want and need--and will have as a result of the Strategic Hamlet Program.

In addition to calling on the resources of the Government of Viet-Nam ministry and of the USOM technical divisions, with their years of experience in developing the country, the Government and USOM have jointly developed a new way of accelerating rural progress. This consists of asking the Province Chiefs and their staffs to draw up Provincial Rehabilitation and Development Plans focussed on social and economic areas which, for one reason or another have been overlooked in the past, and which represent opportunities to achieve immediate developmental and psychological impact. These plans differ from province to province, according to local need, and really constitute the heart of the Strategic Hamlet Program. They are reviewed in Saigon by the Government of Viet-Nam's Interministerial Strategic Hamlet Committee, by the American Inter-Agency Committee and by USOM technicians. Upon approval, they are implemented immediately in the countryside. Many such plans are now underway with most encouraging results, and many more are in course of formulation. Plans for 41 provinces will be completed in a few months.

To strengthen this effort USOM, at the request of the Government of Viet-Nam, is placing representatives and resources in most of the provinces to work directly with the Province Chiefs and local inhabitants. They will also work closely with the military commanders and the MAAG sector advisers, so as to achieve full coordination between military and civil operations. These men have been chosen for their ingenuity, and past experience in programs of this kind. Many of them are former military officers, and many, also, have served in Viet-Nam or South East Asia before. Needless to say, they will be backstopped by USOM technicians from Saigon and will be supported by the full strength of the American Economic Assistance Program.

Now let me say a word or two about some specific programs and what they will do for the people.

Twenty thousand tons of chemical fertilizers, sufficient to increase rice crop yields up to 250 per cent on the lands where they are applied, will be distributed to families in strategic hamlets in the poorer provinces of Central Viet-Nam in the six months of 1963. This activity will be buttressed by intensive educational support by the technicians of our Agriculture Division and by specially prepared visual material.

Hundreds of new schools will be built in strategic hamlets in 1963, and students will be provided with school books, pencils and paper. Special "crash" courses for teacher training are now being developed, and the use of radio as a teaching medium will soon be studied.

Plant insect and rodent control will be introduced countrywide, following up the successful experiences of this autumn, in Central Viet-Nam where bumper rice crops are attributed to the killing of sixteen million or more rats. Large additional crop increases are anticipated from this project.

Poorer farmers will be assisted to raise better grades of pigs, and to make up lost in a program directed at improving the living standard of literally hundreds of thousands of families.

New crop varieties will be introduced widely. For instance, sample tests just completed have shown yields of up to 22 tons per hectare of a Taiwan variety of sweet potatoes, as compared with an average five-ton yield from local varieties.

Loans will be made to over a thousand poor fishing families to permit them to motorize their sampans, and projects for the improvement of nets and fish landing facilities will be continued and expanded. In this connection it is interesting to note that motorized sampans, by being able to go farther out to sea, can catch five times as much fish as non-motorized sampans. This represents a formidable increase in income to the fishermen.

Rural dispensaries, to be established during 1963 at selected strategic locations will service many thousand hamlets which presently don't have facilities of this kind available.

To complement the above programs, which will come from the government to the people, that is to say from the top down, the government has decided to institute a program which will originate with the people and come to the government from the bottom up, as it were. This new approach to rural development is known as the Rural Self-Help Program, and it works in the following manner: The hamlet inhabitants have an meetings to discuss their own social and economic wants, and decide by vote what the most pressing needs are in their hamlet. The majority decision may be a better well, a market, a bridge, a road project, an irrigation ditch or almost anything. The Hamlet Council sends their decision to the Province Strategic Hamlet Committee, together with a cost estimate and request for materials, tools and perhaps technical advice. If these are unavailable in the hamlet but necessary to carry out the desired project, the Province Committee, with a USOM representative sitting in, provides assistance, screening and makes available to the hamlet--from government and USOM--the materials and assistance which it determines to be necessary.

This Self-Help Program has already been started in several provinces and is receiving great local interest and enthusiasm. It not only permits the rural people to raise its voice--and for the first time in history, with confidence--on matters affecting the local welfare, but it also draws the people into the framework of self-government, and gives them a personal stake in the future of what--more than ever before--is becoming their own country--free and secure.

The Government of Viet-Nam and the USCM look these new joint programs in support of the strategic hamlets to create substantial increases in agricultural production--and thereby to increase purchasing power--to increase, also, the value and value of exports and to bring a new prosperity to the hamlets, villages and towns. We expect them to awaken a sense of civic responsibility and pride in the hearts of the people. We expect them, therefore, to give the people confidence in themselves and in their country which will effectively cause them to resist the blandishments of the Viet Cong. And, finally, we expect them to create a situation attractive to the misguided Viet Cong, themselves, that we will see an increasing number of defections from their side to ours. In expressing these optimistic views, however, I do not wish to create the impression that anyone believes that these programs alone can miraculously remove the danger of the communist threat. Only we must continue to rely on the increasingly brilliant performance of the armed forces--both military and para-military--not only for initial clearing operation to make the establishment of strategic hamlets possible in the first place, but thereafter for the maintenance of local security for as long as the Viet Cong remain willing to fight. We feel, however--as does everyone these days--that the war in Viet-Nam is engaged in less and less purely military nature than it is one of a psychological nature--the real target is plainly the hearts, minds, loyalties and motivations of the people of the country.

For these reasons we have, in conjunction with the Government of Viet-Nam, formulated the new approach, or the "new look", which our joint program is now beginning to assume--and which it will attempt to maximize in 1963. The fact that there is such a "new look", however, does not mean that all the old elements of the program--with which most of you are familiar--will be discarded or abandoned. I recognize--as you must also--that when the war is won and peace returns to Viet-Nam there will be an even greater need for strong national institutions and an adequately developed economic infrastructure. That will be the moment when the can be no faltering, or no fundamental weakness. With that fact before us, the we have reserved, in future programs, sufficient resources--both human and mate to continue our work with the Vietnamese Government in such vital fields as Public Administration, Public Works, Industrial Development, Communications and Public Security. We feel, in fact, that now for perhaps the first time in the history of US assistance to Viet-Nam, there has been developed a program that is deliberately focussed on both present and future needs. And in this connection, I must first say that credit for this re-orientation of program emphasis should go to a relatively few wise and determined officials in the Governments of Viet-Nam and the United States who saw the need for it--and created the flexibility to make it possible.

Returning for a moment to USCM support of the Strategic Hamlet Program, I like to leave the impression that, because I did not specifically mention it as we have made no provision for caring for the Montagnards. This is true. From the Special programs have been developed--and are incorporated in the Province Plans we discussed earlier--either to improve the lives of those montagnards who have remained in their home villages and hamlets, or to provide shelter, food, clothing and guidance to those who have fled the Viet Cong and taken refuge in secure areas. Similar programs have also been designed to bring help and hope to those who are refugees and have since been able to return to their traditional mountain areas.

This, in broad outline, is a preview of what we hope to accomplish in 1963, as now we will set about it. In essence, the joint program has been designed to accomplish the following fundamental objectives:

1. to render the technical services of the Government of Viet-Nam and the US Aid Program immediately responsive to the wants and needs of the people of rural Viet-Nam.
2. to assist the people of rural Viet-Nam to participate in self-help activities which will realize hopes of a better life for them and their children, and
3. to involve the people of rural Viet-Nam more deeply in their own future by increasing their participation in the processes of government and economic development and by so doing to give them the will and the faith to achieve their destiny as free, proud and prosperous citizens.

In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to say that I consider it a great pleasure to be able to work in Viet-Nam in this period of evolutionary progress and emerging victory. I am continually impressed by the whole-hearted cooperation and friendliness my staff and I are receiving from the Vietnamese people in all walks of life--from the hamlets to the Presidency--and by your unswerving determination to defeat communism for all time. We in USOM share your confidence in ultimate victory, and we shall always consider it an honor to have the opportunity to work with you and to contribute our small part.

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This discussion of the Strategic Hamlet Program is translated from the original Vietnamese Government document. It outlines the basic concepts and indicates the present status and future objectives of the program.

The Strategic Hamlet is the keystone upon which the counter-insurgency program is based.

FROM STRATEGIC HAMLETS TO SELF DEFENSE VILLAGE
FOREWORD

This document is intended to explain the procedures for implementing the strategic hamlet policy, which has been proposed recently. Since it is impossible to cover fully, in this document, all the concrete measures to be applied, these will be furnished in a number of additional documents, i.e. :

At the present time, the strategic hamlet policy has the highest priority, and therefore it is necessary to publish a document that analyzes the specific measures required for organizing the government agencies, particularly at the national level, to speed up the program. The document on this subject might be prepared by the Presidency, and then submitted to the Inter-Ministerial Council on Strategic Hamlets.

It is necessary to make a clear delineation of the regions under dispute between us and our enemy, the regions under enemy control, and the regions transformed into war zones or into combat villages. It is necessary to estimate the existing and potential forces of our enemy in each region, and to understand the strategy and tactics there. The document on this subject might be studied by the Interior and National Defense Ministries, and then submitted to the National Internal Security Council for approval.

In the regions under enemy control, we must conduct offensive military operations, assemble the people, and establish fortified hamlets, as stipulated in the Thompson report. What are the tactics for offensive military operations, and what is the method of assembling the people and establishing fortified hamlets? The document on this subject might be drafted by the Military Operations Command and the General Commissariat for Land Development.

An important phase of the strategic hamlet plan is to conduct a series of supporting military operations designed to drive our enemy out of the regions, provinces, and districts, in order to guarantee security. What military tactics will be required to drive our enemy out of each area? The document on this subject might be drafted by the Armed Forces General Staff, after an examination of information from the various military zones.

When the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team organizes a strategic hamlet, it is most important to conduct a mopping up operation and to establish a system of controls to ensure that no Vietnamese Communist agents are planted there. What techniques of investigation and control must be applied by the security team in a strategic hamlet? The document on this subject might be entrusted to the Central Vietnam Operations Team for study and drafting.

A basic action of the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team in each hamlet is to establish civic organizations, for example, associations of these groups be? The document on this subject might be drafted by

the Civic Action Ministry (Directorates General of Information and of Youth).

Another important requirement in the defense of a strategic hamlet is to organize a system of emergency alarm and speedy liaison. How should this system be organized? How should the watch towers and signals system be organized? What should the secret signals be? How should the clandestine liaison system operate? The document on this subject might be drafted by the National Police and Security Services.

Finally, our mobile forces for military operations and our Strategic Hamlet Operational Teams, may become the Victims of enemy guerrilla attacks and ambushes. What is the best way of moving our forces to avoid enemy ambushes? This document might be entrusted to the Civil Guard General Directorate for drafting.

INTRODUCTION

The strategic hamlet policy at present consists of a plan for organizing strategic hamlets to ensure security and to establish our control in rural areas.

It is necessary at first that this policy be applied only in the regions under dispute between us and the Communists. But, in their war zones (D, Duong-Minh-Chau, Dong-Thap, Ca-Mau, U-Minh), or in the regions where our enemies have established control by organizing their combat villages, we need to apply another policy, as follows:

The national military forces, combined (by the General Staff or the military operation command) with the central intelligence units, must organize destructive military operations.

A national government unit, such as the General Commissariat for Land Development or the General Commissariat for the Reconstruction of Flooded Areas, must join with the military forces to carry out a plan of reassembling the people and establishing a hamlet. We must take violent measures, moving and reassembling people in selected localities in order to establish fortified hamlets. Then we will entrust the local districts and provinces with the task of transforming these into strategic hamlets in accordance with a policy, to be explained later.

Now, how do we carry out the above-mentioned policy of establishing strategic hamlets? Up to now, one has been under the impression that the authorities in charge of carrying out this policy, have not yet clearly understood the problem, for there is a lack of unity and many provincial and district chiefs have complained as follows: "A large quantity of documents relating to strategic hamlets, is sent to us from Hanoi. We have no time to read them all. Even when we read these documents, we do not understand them. We do not know where to begin and where to stop".

To remedy this state of affairs, the leaders have to enter into a discussion to give greater clarity to their thought, and explain all problems. But, what are the subjects to be discussed?

Before starting any job, a practical man must answer the following three questions:

What do I wish to accomplish?
What means do I have?
How do I do the job?
Here, it is the same. We must answer these same questions.

P A R T I

WHAT DO WE WISH TO ACCOMPLISH?

To answer this question, we must clearly understand our purpose. This question seems to be simple, but it is really very complicated, because our desires are often numerous, and we do not know how to classify them in order of priority. For instance, we wish to ensure security in rural areas, but, upon starting our job, we act as if we wish to "collect many taxes" or to "develop economically and improve agriculture," etc. Today, a district chief receives an order to "organize strategic hamlets and self defense villages" in order to ensure security in rural areas. Tomorrow, the district chief will receive orders to recover immediately the funds loaned by the Agricultural Credit Office to farmers, to help landowners collect rent, and to organize agrovilles and land development centers. A district chief receives too many orders, i.e., too many requests from higher authorities, and, in this position he is either unable to classify these according to priority or he is not courageous enough to do it. Of course, he is forced to execute all these orders in part, so that he will not be blamed by his superiors. Like a man operating in the dark, he does not know where to begin and where to end. He works without any program or plan, which is not his fault! Even his superiors are not fully agreed on which order is of primary importance and which is of secondary importance. Every ministry thinks that its own activities are the most important. Every ministry fears being blamed. Consequently, the general representative of the government in a regional unit in direct charge of applying government policy in his locality, for fear of being blamed by his superiors, seeks some way to satisfy every ministry to a certain extent!

Of course, our primary wish at the present time, is to organize strategic hamlets to ensure the security of the people in rural areas. Those who are directly responsible for this work are the district chiefs (we will explain the reason why in Part III). Therefore, during the period of time necessary for the local district chief to carry out the plan of organizing strategic hamlets in his entire district (for instance: 6 months, 8 months, or a year), all other orders must be considered of secondary importance. We cannot reproach him during the indicated period

of time, for the fact that taxes are not collected; that funds loaned by the Agricultural Credit Office are not fully recovered; that land development centers are destroyed; that notable in scattered villages are assassinated; and that paddy cannot be harvested. The duty of higher authorities is to study, revise if necessary, and approve the plan for the establishment of strategic hamlets submitted by the district chief, and then, they must help him execute the plan within the scheduled time. After achievement of this plan, the district chief will carry out objectives of secondary importance.

The aforesaid explanation seems to be very simple and logical, but, as a matter of fact, if higher authorities lack comprehension and definite agreement, the district chiefs will not be able to work.

PART II

WHAT MEANS DO WE HAVE AVAILABLE?

To answer this question, we have to check existing facilities

rather than ideal ones. To carry out the policy of organizing strategic hamlets, we are not permitted, for instance, to think along the lines of requiring 300,000 regular soldiers, 100,000 civil guards, and 4 billion piasters from the national budget.

Suppose we now have only 150,000 regular soldiers and 50,000 civil guards. What distribution must be made of these troops? What set number should be in the eastern region of South Vietnam? What are the available weapons? Moreover, we must check the number of militiamen, youths, civic action, and information leaders, etc.

The Government representative and the commander of the military must check what is available for use directly in the military zone, leaving what has already been sent to various provinces. In the same way, the province chief must check what is available for him to employ readily, excluding what has already been sent to various districts.

The district chief must check what is available for his immediate use, leaving what has already been sent to various villages. For example, the commander of the military zone and the representative of the eastern region have on hand one regular division, two companies of commandos, and two companies of civil guards. This does not include the special forces under disposal of each province chief. The Bien-Hoa Province chief can hand one company of commandos and one company of civil guards at the disposal of each district chief in Bien-Hoa province. And so on.

After having checked our existing facilities, we must know how they are being used at present. Generally speaking, besides some changes in locality, we can now sum up the use of these forces. One part is used for the defense of government areas, such as posts, public buildings, bridges, roads, factories, workshops, barracks, etc. Another is used as a shock force, seeking our enemies and conducting military

operations on the basis of information received. After a military operation, this force returns to its base for a rest. It cannot conduct successive military operations to seek out our enemies, because the latter run away before our arrival; they habitually avoid meeting our forces, when they realize that they are weaker than we are. Our enemies appear to attack us only when they have a great hope in triumphing over us (owing to their greater strength, their geographical advantage, a surprise attack, etc.)

Finally, we also have to examine the present situation of our enemy forces. For instance, what present enemy forces are in the eastern region? Will these forces be increased or reduced? The security and intelligence units (G-2 of the Army, and security service) must discuss this matter, and answer these questions.

What are our enemies' plans for the use of their forces? The research sections of the above intelligence units must give a clear answer on guerrilla tactics, mass attacks, the means of moving troops, the means of inserting agents, means for defecting the masses, plans for organizing combat villages, etc. It is necessary to have a single document with a detailed explanation of each of these subjects.

We should know what we have available, so that we may draft a practical working plan.

P A R T III

HOW DO WE ACCOMPLISH THE TASK?

In order to achieve our purpose (as already mentioned in Part I), how do we use the data that we have on hand (mentioned in Part II) in order to have a better chance for success?

It is deemed necessary that we apply the following working methods:

4. At the national level. The central committee taking charge of the strategic hamlet project should:

1. Within the scope of Part I,

Work out an agreed-upon document, stipulating the basic policy of the strategic hamlet project, which different levels are to use as a basis for solving various contradictions that may arise due to differences of opinion among the ministries or to various separate orders dispatched to the localities from a number of central agencies; and solve different practical contradictions between central agencies during the period devoted to carrying out the strategic hamlet project. For example, the Civic Action Ministry wants to use its personnel to achieve its own anti-Communist propaganda program separately while the Civil Guard Directorate General wants to use the civil guards to garrison a number of military posts it considers necessary, etc.

2. Within the scope of Part II,

Determine in which regions the strategic hamlet project must be introduced initially, and the areas where such a project cannot be carried out so that we can destroy the enemy and then assemble the people and establish strategic hamlets.

Check various facilities available throughout the country (personnel, weapons, budgets, etc.) that can be used for the strategic hamlet project (and to provide oneself with additional means under any circumstances such as foreign aid, etc.) Then, those facilities must be distributed to each region according to its request as already mentioned above. For example, if region A is safe and does not need to establish strategic hamlets immediately, it should transfer part of its facilities to region B which needs to set up strategic hamlets right away.

Study different basic documents on the strengths and weaknesses of our present use of forces as well as on how the enemies use theirs (guerrilla tactics, organizational system, etc.)

3. Within the scope of Part III,

Study basic documents on the organization of a strategic hamlet and a self defense village (this will be explained later).

Study documents on how the deployment of our forces at the zonal, provincial and district levels can fit in with the strategic hamlet project (this will be explained later).

Inspect, urge, and control the proper execution of the strategic hamlet project by different lower levels.

B. At the Regional level. Apart from being well aware of the policy through the study of various basic documents dispatched from the central government, and from helping to solve different interpretations, as well as by inspecting the execution of the project by various lower echelons, the Committee for the Establishment of Strategic Hamlets at the regional level (that is to say the commander in chief and the government representative) must assume the most important task which is as follows.

There exists in each region a certain amount of strength under the direct command of the commander in chief. This strength is almost entirely military: for example, the 5th Division in the eastern region, the 7th Division in the Tien-Giang zone and the 21st Division in the Mau Qiang Zone. (Please observe that there are almost no political figures at this level. Therefore, if a few civilian political leaders are available, such as able National Assembly-men, let them accompany the army units during different military operations).

Now, how does the commander in chief use this military force which is on hand in executing the strategic hamlet project?

The problem set for the regional commander is as follows:

"With his available force (the national level will provide him with more force according to the situation, but this is not sure) can the commander map out a military operation plan to assure different provinces in his region that: thanks to the successive military operations he launched throughout the period of time necessary for the execution of the strategic hamlet project in the entire military region, the enemy would definitely not be able to concentrate a strength of more than two companies (for example) to harass different provinces under his command?"

Before giving a clear-cut answer to the chiefs of different provinces, the commander must carefully:

1. Review the existing strength on hand.

2. Exclude the minimum force which is reserved for the protection of the government base (quarters, public buildings, military posts, factories, etc.) which the commander is directly responsible for (because there are some bases which are placed under the responsibility of the province).

3. Determine the size of the force remaining that the commander can permanently use to launch a long-range military operation. The answer to this question is very important; the commander must study carefully before giving it. With his remaining strength, can the commander preserve security in different provinces within his military region (as already mentioned above)? If security cannot be maintained in all the provinces (for example, each region has seven provinces), the commander may divide the region into two sectors in which he undertake to secure order one after the other, according to the local need for the organization of strategic hamlets. For instance, in the eastern region, if the commander in chief thinks that he has not enough strength to conduct a military operation throughout the region in an effort to keep all the provinces there from being subjected to different enemy concentrations of as much as two companies (or a battalion) during a six months period, for example, during which time various provinces in the region can set up strategic hamlets, he may maintain security and order first in the provinces of Binh-Duong, Bien-Hoa and Tay-Ninh, thus enabling these three provinces to carry out their strategic hamlet project while the other provinces continue to contain the enemy temporarily.

Once the commander in chief has completed his review and has reached a decision, he begins a series of military operations according to a new strategy which may be called driving out the enemy rather than looking for the enemy.

Up to the present time, the objective of many military operations has been to hunt for the enemy. Based on a specific piece of information, the commander guesses the position of the enemy in a certain locality or war zone. He then sends his troops to fight with the enemy. What is the result?

The result is sometimes negative because the enemy has already fled away (our troops are burdened while the enemy can assemble and disperse quickly), with some guerrillas killed and a maximum of a dozen rifles seized (of little significance as compared with the number of weapons captured by the enemy when they occupied our posts). When this happens, the troops are physically tired out, because they had to carry out the operation on schedule, and spiritually fed up, because they did not see any enemy when they were ordered to hunt for them, and returned empty-handed. On other occasions we have fought with the enemy and defeated them. Let us say that about 100 of the enemy are killed and many weapons seized. With regard to the enemy's tactics and strategy, such a loss does not affect him very much. Generally speaking, the enemy troops killed are not the regular ones or perhaps only a few of them are regular troops. Therefore, his units can be easily re-formed. The number of weapons seized by us is also insignificant, because he will capture our weapons during ambushes or attacks on our posts. After the victory, our troops withdraw, and although they are tired, their morale improves for the time being, but the territory is still actually controlled by the enemy. Sometimes, unfortunately, we have been defeated by the enemy, and this is disastrous.

Therefore, it is thought that the operational plan of seeking out the enemy should be assigned to the General staff or to the Operational command. When it is supplied with a confirmed source of information on an enemy concentration at a certain locality or war zone, the general staff or the operational command will immediately use different national forces such as paratroops, marines, naval and air forces to attack the enemy. The more the enemy can be killed, and their weapons and food captured, the better. But, such an operation is not designed to occupy areas or to organize the masses.

As for the commander in chief of the region, he ought to study a new plan for using his regional forces by conducting a long-range campaign to drive out the enemy in order to assure different provinces within the region (or a number of provinces with the consent of their respective chiefs) that in the course of such a campaign, there would not be any enemy concentration of more than two companies or a battalion.

The goal is to drive out the enemy. Thus, in order to prevent the enemy from concentrating more than two companies, different operational units of the region (the regular division which comprises several regiments, ranger units, and supporting units such as artillery and armored units) must be constantly on the move throughout the area to make surprise attacks. Of course, while moving about like that, the said units would fight the enemy whenever the latter were seen, but their main aim still is not to seek out the enemy.

These military operations would not exhaust the soldiers physically, because whenever the commanding officer noticed that the soldiers needed a temporary rest he could order them to stop at some locality, village (provided that wireless communication was still available with the commander of the operation). On the other hand, the soldiers also

would not get mentally tired for they would be aware that the operation was not designed to hunt for the enemy.

During their movement as already mentioned above, different army units could stop at some area where strategic hamlets are being set up to help the organization teams and people there for a few days. Thus, the troops would be carrying out the job of winning over the people in a practical way, and the people would feel sympathetic towards them.

Some people might think that such continual military operations are expensive. It is believed that the extra expenses for fuel, vehicles, etc., would be offset by the consumption of a smaller amount of ammunition.

Again, people might fear that the enemy would concentrate larger forces than ours to defeat our various operational units. Let us remember that we still have the national intervention forces (paratroops, marines, rangers and naval and air forces) placed under the direct command of the general staff or of the operational command. If the enemy dares to concentrate large forces it means he risks fighting a "position warfare" with us, and the national forces comprising the Army, Navy, and Air Force would interfere in time to defeat these forces.

C. At the provincial level. Since the region has assured, as already mentioned above, that the province does not have to cope with an enemy strength of more than two companies (or a battalion), what does the province do during this period of time? This refers only to the provinces that are to implement the strategic hamlet project.)

Above all, the province chief must check his forces to see what he has on hand. Generally, each province has a number of regular troops, some civil guards, and some rangers. The province chief must divide the strength into two parts, one passive and one active.

The passive portion, of minimum size, is designed to protect different government bases under the control of the province (besides the bases placed under the responsibility of the region mentioned above, and those of the district which will be discussed later) such as, public buildings, factories, billets, bridges, etc.).

The other portion, of maximum size, is organized into mobile operational forces. For example, the province chief has about one regular battalion and one company of civil guards or rangers left. Apart from this military force, the province chief also has a number of civic and administrative personnel such as civic action, information, youth, security agents, police, etc., besides the administrative personnel already sent to the districts for operations. By the way, it is proposed that a number of persons working in national agencies, ministries, directorates, and services be dispatched in rotation to the provinces for operational purposes. Each ministry, directorate, and agency would sponsor a province

by sending a number of its personnel to help this province. For instance, the Youth Directorate General would sponsor the province of Vinh-Long by sending some of its employees (about 30 persons) in rotation to help this province while the latter is establishing strategic hamlets. The Information Directorate General would sponsor the province of Bien-Hoa, etc.).

After checking the strength of his forces, the province chief must determine how to distribute and use the forces. Up to now, the province chief generally has used different civic and administrative personnel to organize receptions in honor of distinguished visitors, for ceremonies in the province, for propaganda, etc. During the period in which the province has been implementing the strategic hamlet project, such operations are considered of less importance and upper levels also must be aware of this. Consequently, the province chief needs only to maintain at the provincial chief town a small number of personnel to help the Provincial Committee for the Establishment of Strategic Hamlets conduct liaison with the upper echelons, cooperate with and inspect different districts, and find and distribute necessities to the districts. Thus, the province chief would dispatch the rest of his personnel to different districts, to be placed at the disposal of the district chiefs who would use them to help establish strategic hamlets. Therefore, the province chief could manage to send about 30 - 50 more persons to the districts.

The province chief will divide his military strength into two portions, one, the minimum force, to be considered as the provincial strength designed to protect different bases and one, a maximum force to be used as the mobile operational units (as already mentioned above).

The problem of the province chief is as follows:

"With such a mobile military strength (for instance, a battalion and a company of rangers), placed under his direct command (or that of the deputy province chief in charge of internal security), can the province chief assure different district chiefs in the province of the fact that they would not have to cope with an enemy strength of more than a platoon?".

He must study carefully before giving such an answer. If he cannot assure all the districts in the province, can he ensure security in half of them? This means, while the commander of the region is conducting military operations to deter the enemy from concentrating more than two companies (or a battalion) within the region, the province chief must launch military operations to prevent the enemy from massing more than a platoon within his province.

In so doing, the province chief must use the military strength on hand to carry out the tactics of driving the enemy out of the province (like the tactics adopted by the regional commander, the province chief should not send his troops to hunt for the enemy within the province, but with the help of speedy movement of his military forces, he would prevent the enemy from concentrating as much as a platoon to harass the districts.

Some people may be afraid of the fact that the enemy will face the situation by concentrating a stronger force (for instance, more than a battalion) to clash with the mobile force of the province chief or to attack a certain locality or agency in the province. Let him remember that the commander of the region has assured the province against such an event. In fact, it is necessary to establish close liaison between different units of the province chief and those of the commander of the region as well as close liaison between the tactical intelligence unit of the province and that of the region. These points are entirely technical, so the commander of the region and the province chief must study them before reaching a joint decision.

D. At the District level. We all understand that at the regional level, the passive force in charge of protecting different bases is of less importance and the agency directly responsible for the strategic hamlet project is also merely a committee, while the main force most necessary for the implementation of the strategic hamlet project (though it is an indirect factor) is the mobile operational force. At the provincial level, the unit directly in charge of the strategic hamlet project is made up of a single committee, too. However, the passive force responsible for protecting the various bases is more important (because there are in the province many more bases which need to be protected); nevertheless, the main force designed to implement the strategic hamlet project (though indirect) is still the mobile operational force.

Now, at the district level, we shall find that the proportions of the three elements will change. This proves that the key role in setting up strategic hamlets is that of the District chief. To solve the problem, let us review the position of a district chief to see what he should do.

1. Preparatory Period

Above all, the district chief must contact the province chief and the committee for the establishment of strategic hamlets of the province directly. He may bring with him his assistant or a few top collaborators such as the civil guard company chief, etc.; these people will participate in a conference on the strategic hamlets policy and on how to carry it out (already mentioned above and to be explained later). This does not mean that the province chief and the Provincial Committee for the Establishment of Strategic Hamlets must organize a training course for district chiefs. Actually, the province chief may confer personally with some district chiefs for a few hours and explain the policy to them. This will save time and money and will be more efficient. District chiefs may present their own problems to be discussed and settled on the spot.

Afterwards, the district chief returns home to check his existing forces: civil guard, militia, security agents, police, civic action and information personnel, rural youth, his own personnel,

weapons and means of communications and liaison, etc. For example, the district chief has under his command an average force of 300 men, of whom about 200 are armed. He must determine which bases need to be protected within his district, as well as studying the enemy situation in other villages of the district. Then, he will divide the above mentioned forces into three elements as follows:

Part I, of minimum strength, will be the passive force, in charge of protecting various bases within the district (barracks, district chief town, post, bridges, etc.) about 70 armed men and 10 civic administrative personnel. Only the most important positions need be protected; scattered posts and small outposts of less significance which are garrisoned by a few civil guards each need not be included. The administrative personnel should be in charge of the permanent government activities, so that the administrative machinery operates smoothly. This task may be assigned to the district chief's assistant.

Part II, comprises about 70 armed men and some five political action personnel and public relations personnel. This will be the mobile force that conducts continuing and surprise military operations according to an established plan. Such military operations also are designed to drive out the enemy and discourage the concentration at any village in the district of a strength of more than a squad. During the military operations, this strength also will be in charge of conducting operations designed to win over the people. Naturally, we must maintain vigilance and study the situation carefully or we will be ambushed during our military operations. But this belongs to the military phase and the commander of this unit must be responsible for it. This mobile shock force may be placed under the command of the civil guard company chief.

Part III, comprises all the remaining troops and personnel, about 60 or 70 armed civil guards, 10 security agents, police and provost marshals, 30 civic action, information, administrative, agricultural credit service, public health personnel, rural reform youth, etc. This force will be organized into a strategic hamlet operational team and set up strategic hamlets in various areas. This team must be under the district chief (or under his assistant when he is absent). The civil guard forming part of this team may be placed under the command of the civil guard company subchief.

After having organized these three forces, the district chief must call a conference of various leaders for discussion and assignment of tasks. Then they are trained immediately in working methods and liaison techniques for the three forces both during peacetime and in response to an alarm. For instance, when the alarm is given and the district chief is out with the operational team, how does the district chief's assistant use the passive force to cope with the situation, or how does he manage to contain the enemy, or to disperse and preserve his force, and try to contact the mobile force which is conducting a military operation? All details must be studied and compiled into a special top-secret document of the district, applicable to the local

situation. Then the said three segments must be trained so that the machine operates smoothly. (Of course, we also must prevent the activities of spies and maintain troop morale, etc. But, these points are always necessary and need not be mentioned here.)

Finally, the district chief must draft plans for the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team that he will head. First, he must organize a mobile office. He will have his seal, a portable typewriter, and necessary papers brought along during his survey trip in order to solve on the spot any problem that might arise in any village, thus saving the trouble of sending papers back and forth to the district office. The dismissal or the assignment of a member of a village council could be a problem to be solved on the spot.

Next, he must assign priorities to various villages within the district where the operational team will work. To do this, the district chief must study the map of the district to see which villages are of greater strategic military importance. For example, a district is composed of 12 villages. Among them, seven or eight can be considered as being more strategically important because they can be used to secure the main line of communication and prevent Communist penetration of the district. The district chief then selects seven villages, for instance, and plans that, within a period of a month or a month and a half, the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team will fulfill its task in one of these villages. Consequently, seven villages will be well organized after about seven to ten months and after about one year the district chief will have complete control over the whole district. The other districts will follow the same pattern and the plan for establishing strategic hamlets will soon be fulfilled throughout the country. Only by following the above pattern can the district chief know where to begin his task and where to end it.

The district chief must then define the tasks and responsibilities of the civil guards, security and police force, and other personnel in setting up strategic hamlets. As soon as the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team reaches a specified village, the civil guards of the team, well aware of their responsibilities, will start their work immediately. These men will be deployed, as necessary, to defend the village. Their task will vary according to local circumstance and they must be ready for action and not have to wait for orders until after the operational team arrives at the target village.

The members of the security and police force within the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team must know what they will do when the team reaches a target village. They must know how to take a census of the local population for the purpose of eliminating clandestine Communist agents, and how to prepare documents. They must study local reports and have biographical information cards, family registers, etc., already prepared.

The youth, information, civic action and sanitation personnel must know what to do in order to draw the local people into their

respective organization, and how to train the local people to carry out activities peculiar to these organizations.

2. Operational Period

After reading the above explanation, it is easy to see why the district chief plays a decisive role in the plan for establishing strategic hamlets. At the national, zonal and provincial levels, the unit in charge of strategic hamlets is only a reduced committee charged with studying, coordinating, controlling, reaching decisions and distributing facilities. At the district level, however, the unit dealing with strategic hamlets is a most important force, more important than the provincial force for defending bases or the mobile force conducting military operations against the enemy.

The Strategic Hamlet Cooperative Team, under the command of the district chief, actually occupies one of the selected villages. A district includes, on an average, 12 villages, from which the district chief selects eight villages. He occupies the first village, Binh-Minh, example, which has, on an average 6,000 inhabitants (a large village has nine or ten thousand inhabitants, (a large village has nine or ten thousand inhabitants, but a small village has two or three thousand) and is divided into four hamlets (a large village includes seven or eight hamlets, but a small village includes about two hamlets). As it is a medium sized village, the district chief estimates that the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team will allow a month to organize it. For a large village, this period of time may be increased to a month and a half, or two months, if necessary.

After occupation of the village, the civil guard team, well briefed on the operation beforehand, immediately undertakes the defense of the village (according to the local terrain). The civil guards will cooperate with the village militiamen to take turns on patrol, set up guard posts, build gun pits, dig shelter pits, and establish a system of alarm and liaison, so that our enemies may not penetrate any of the hamlets of the entire village while the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team is staying there. If facilities are available and adequate (bamboo and barbed wire), they will expedite the erection of a fence around each hamlet. Let us remember and understand that this fence is not intended to help the village offer resistance to our enemy's violent attack, but it is merely aimed at protecting the village from infiltration by our enemy. Provided with this fence, each hamlet has only a few known entrances and exits, all under constant control. What is said above does not mean that the barbed wire fence is not necessary. It only means that we should not consider the barbed wire fence as a decisive factor, while neglecting to perform the more important task, which is the internal organization of the village.

While the civil guard team is undertaking defense of the village, the security team cooperates with the village police commission, village council and the hamlet chief for the following purposes:

To eliminate the remaining planted Communists. The genuine Communists must be liquidated. Suspected persons must be arrested, and sent to the provincial security service, as the method of unmasking them is a technical job and is not to be handled at the district level. (We may entrust a technical unit with the task of drafting a document setting forth this technique.)

To take a census of the population in each hamlet. It is necessary to complete a biographic background, to set up a household booklet for each family, and to take a photograph of each family, including men and women, and old young people. This file must be set up in three copies, one copy for the district chief, one for the family concerned, and one for the village council.

To control at the same time the quantity of paddy, rice, land, and cattle of each family in each hamlet. This must be clearly indicated in the household booklet of each family.

To expedite the immediate delivery of plastic identity cards to the people, if the facilities are available.

According to the opinion of some district chiefs, if the work is organized as set forth above, the purging and the control in a medium-sized village of four hamlets including from five to six thousand inhabitants, may be achieved within three weeks.

While the civil guards are ensuring village defense, and the security agents are establishing controls, the civic action, information, youth and public health teams are busy organizing the masses in each hamlet.

It is necessary to say first that organization of the masses does not consist of gathering the inhabitants to pass out anti-communist propaganda, laud our regime and our President, or give theatrical performances for entertainment. Later, when security is already ensured in the village, an information commissioner will have enough time to do these things. If these things are done now, people will become tired of them, and will say to themselves, "We see, so why repeat this constantly!"

Organization of the masses also does not consist in organizing the National Revolutionary Movement, or the Farmers Association, etc. It consists in organizing all the inhabitants of each hamlet into groups. For instance, each hamlet has a section for oldsters from 45 to 60 years old, a section for youths from 18 to 45 years old, a section for women from 18 to 45 years old, and a section for children from 14 to 18 years old. Each section is divided into platoons, squads, and small subcells (according to neighborhoods, lands, and groups of households). The sections of the village form a group for instance, the Youth Group of Binh-Minh village, the Women's Groups of Binh-Minh village, etc. These organizations will conduct strictly democratic elections for the selection of leaders. (If civic action, youth, and information leaders are

prudent enough, the elections will have no unexpected or disastrous consequences, and people will elect the persons selected by us) All the files relative to the organization of groups are set up in three copies (one for the group concerned, one for the village council, and one for the district chief). This organization into groups may be achieved within two or three weeks.

After the organizational phase, we have to entrust the work to the groups concerned, and guide them as to what needs to be done. If the work consists only in holding frequent meetings to study vain theories, such as the international and local situations, Communism, Personalism, etc., it will be useless and the groups concerned will dissolve quickly. The training and guidance concerning the work to be done may be summed up as what must be done in peacetime, and what must be done in case of emergency. For example, in peacetime, the oldster's section is in charge of locking after houses, gardens, family sanitation, and children; the women's section, besides housekeeping, is in charge of collective actions, such as visiting and consoling families, organizing day-nurseries, etc.; the youth's section is in charge of guard and patrol duties; the children's section is in charge of spying, on the way to school, guarding buffaloes, catching fish, etc. In case of an alarm announcing a small attack, i.e., the Communists are few in number and may be resisted and beaten, where must the youths fight, how are women to handle liaison and supply, etc.? In case of an alarm announcing a violent attack, in what trenches must the youths take refuge, and by what gates must they go out? By what gate must the women flee? In what secret depots are rice and paddy to be stored? The organizers have to draft, for each hamlet of the village, a document concerning necessary work for the organization, including all the details. In this paragraph, according to the situation in each locality; all groups are to follow the guidelines set forth in this document when accomplishing necessary work. This guidance and this effort will not promote dissatisfaction among the hamlet inhabitants who will realize that those actions are necessary for themselves and their families.

During this phase, the organizers must mobilize the groups of oldsters, youths, women and children to establish a defense and combat system in each hamlet of the part in building gun pits, digging shelter pits, and laying spiked boards in important areas. In peacetime, at the places where spiked boards and grenades are placed, it is necessary to put up signboards indicating the danger. Before the arrival of the Communists, the inhabitants of each quarter and each lane must remove ~~unseen~~ neighbours.

Each house must be provided with a secret trench, so that, in case of emergency, people may take refuge there, and go out by another way. Rice, paddy, and poultry can be hidden there temporarily. The inhabitants can establish all this internal defense system. This requires a good ~~large~~ amount of labor, but not a large sum of money. People can set up this system within a few weeks. The inhabitants will not be discontented because they understand the utility of their jobs, and besides

they can work in their own houses, lanes, and quarters. Concerning this internal defense system, the organizers have to draw a detailed map for each hamlet of the village. This secret map must be drawn in one copy, to be kept on file by the district chief.

Finally, the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team must secretly organize for each village two small special operation subcells (each including about three persons. (One small subcell is in charge of sabotage. It may be composed of women or oldsters who must be courageous and particularly trustworthy. It is necessary to train them in handling grenades discretely and quickly. We have to turn over to them some grenades to be buried or hidden in a secret place. These women or oldsters will act only in case our enemies should arrive in large numbers and occupy the hamlet or the village as we will stipulate later. Another small subcell is in charge of liaison. It may be composed of women, youths, or youngsters who must be courageous, agile, particularly trustworthy, and well aware of all the trails and tracks of the hamlet, of the village, and even of the whole zone. The above persons will act only in case the hamlet or the village should be occupied by the Communists as we will stipulate later.

Moreover, each hamlet has to establish some guard towers (on high trees, if possible), and some signal towers outside the fence of the hamlet, on the roads by which our enemies may advance towards the hamlet. (For instance, these signal towers are looked after by day by boys who watch the cattle, and at night by fishermen). The watchers in the guard and signal towers must know how to use the alarms and secret signals to be devised for each locality (for example, a torch-lamp, whistle, tocsin, drum, etc.) Some secret signals indicate the presence of strangers in the village; others indicate the arrival of the enemy numbering about a squad; and others indicate the arrival of the enemy, numbering about a platoon.

3. Final Week of operations

After having completed the above security systems, the district chief may decide to carry out the following political and social activities

The hamlet managing committee and a village council must be elected. If a democratic election is organized immediately upon the occupation of the village by the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team, it will be extremely dangerous, because the Communists never fail to infiltrate easily into hamlet managing committees and the village councils, to turn our hamlets and villages into their "combat villages". Three weeks after such detailed organizational procedures, however, it is not difficult to set up a democratic election. If the district chief is prudent enough the inhabitants will elect the persons selected by him. This type of election is very advantageous in the psychological field. Since these people will be different from the persons designated by the district chief (as in the case of the former village councils), those who are elected will not be influenced by the district chief to be dictatorial towards the inhabitants, and consequently the latter will like the village

authorities better. Moreover, people prefer, of course, to protect the persons they have elected rather than those who have been designated by the district chief, and who leave the village and the hamlet and go to the civil guard post or the district capital after office hours. This election is not absolutely free from danger. In certain cases, the Communists can also infiltrate the hamlet managing committee or the village council, but the district chief must not avoid organizing this election, merely because of its possible failure. At any rate, the district chief may use his right of veto by refusing to approve an elected person, and organizing another election (this is a rare case, and it is better to be careful beforehand). Report concerning these elections must be prepared in three copies (one for the village, one for the district chief, and one to be sent to the province). Provided with his seal and letter-head notepaper, the district chief can immediately take action to approve the election with legal documents.

Next, the district chief convenes the hamlet chiefs, the leaders of various groups and the village council to discuss the establishment of a communal regulation. This communal regulation may be changed according to each village, and need not necessarily be identical in all villages. Communal regulations should include the following points:

A legal and democratic rule must be conducted. This means that the village council (the police commissioner) is not allowed to arrest village inhabitants without reason. The village council may arrest ~~strangers~~ who enter the hamlet or the village illegally (without papers and guarantee), but the village council will have no right to arrest inhabitants who are in the village after the controls have been established, unless they are caught outright, or unless their arrest is authorized by the district chief. If these inhabitants are arrested on suspicion, a report must be made and the subjects must report to the district headquarters within 24 hours. With respect to land, it is necessary to apply government regulations, i.e., lands which were wrongly distributed by the Communists must be given back to landowners, etc.

A community collective system must be established. The village inhabitants, according to age, must take turns working on the public projects of the hamlet or the village (road embankments, market repairs, schools, construction etc.). This means that duties and interests must be equal in organizations such as cooperatives, farmers associations, and village-managed lands (such as those lands whose cultivation is entrusted to the village by land owners living in the towns; tenants may no ~~poly~~ on the communists' illegal distribution to take possession of these lands).

A system of social justice must be established. This means that it is necessary to set up a new system of values for the hamlet or the village. The public facilities of the hamlet or the village (market, school, first aid station, maternity hospital, public rice fields and public laundry) must be granted according to the following order of priority:

First, to those who fight our enemies with weapons and their families (those who resist Communism);

Second, to those elected by the people (village council, hamlet managing committee, and leaders of various groups) to assume public office (those who help unify the people); and

Third, to the productive elements of the hamlet or the village, i.e., to poor farmers and workers, etc., who struggle against under-development (those who try to improve the development of the area).

This system of values must be applied strictly in order to put an end to the traditional privileges of powerful officials of the hamlet or the village. The communal regulation, drafted according to the above principles, must be signed by the hamlet chiefs, the leaders of various groups, and the village council. It must also be approved to propose modifications, if necessary. The file on this communal regulation must be made in three copies (one for the village, one for the district chief, and one to be sent by the district chief to the province).

Finally, the assignment of tasks must be accompanied by definite instructions. The district chief holds a meeting of the hamlet chiefs, the leaders of various groups, and the village council to entrust them solemnly with the task of defending and administrating the hamlet or the village, and to give them the following definite instructions:

If a few squads of the enemy come to terrorize, assassinate, etc., the armed forces of the hamlet or the village (village defense youths and militiamen equipped with about 20 rifles, daggers, scimitars, etc.) can defeat them. According to their operational regulations, the enemy is no better armed than we are: they have no machine guns or other automatic weapons. If some of them infiltrate as strangers into the hamlet or the village, it will be easy to unmask them immediately. We must arrest them, send them to higher authorities, or eliminate them.

If the enemy comes in large numbers, over a platoon for instance (this eventuality may be gradually removed by systematic military operations to drive out the enemy conducted by the region, the province, and the district as explained above), the village defense force should oppose them. Another tactic must be used: as soon as those in the signal towers and the guard towers give the alarm, the village armed forces prepare to delay the progress of the enemy so that we may have enough time to preserve and disperse our forces in order to evade the attack. At that moment, in accordance with a schedule plan, all provisions, partly, and rice of each house must be hidden in a cache; youths must flee by one secret way, and women must escape by another. Only the old people and the children should remain in the hamlet (certainly, the Communists do not hate and kill them).

Thus, when the hamlet or the village is occupied by the Communists, it is almost deserted. The enemy must be very cautious while staying there, because he doesn't know where spike boards and traps are located, etc. The enemy might take the following two measures:

First, the village might be turned and destroyed. Ordinarily the enemy does not adopt this measure, for fear of losing ground from a psychological standpoint because of the rancour of the people. An agroville or a land development center might be burned and destroyed, however, because it can be claimed afterwards that this was destroying the work of the Americans and Diem. In other cases, only the village council office, if it exists and is magnificent enough, might be destroyed. (For that reason, during the present stage, we should not waste money on the construction of a magnificent office for the village council).

Second, the inhabitants remaining in the hamlet in accordance with our plan might be assembled and threatened or given propaganda insulting the American imperialists and Diem, etc. In this case, the remaining inhabitants, including the old people, should obey, assemble, and make a political struggle against them (by saying, for instance, "We have to obey all your orders now, but after your departure, we will have to obey the government's orders. We are nothing but honest citizens who expect to earn their livelihood quietly, etc.") However, while the enemy is assembling the people, the special operations subcell for sabotage must infiltrate amongst the inhabitants to throw a grenade. It doesn't matter whether any of our enemies are killed, provided that the explosion of the grenade gives the people an opportunity to run away and forces the Communists to flee. At the same time, in the shelter pits, the youths, equipped with guns, fire from different places, not to kill the enemy but to create an unsafe situation for his troops. At that very moment, the special operations subcell in charge of liaison makes a quick preliminary investigation of enemy forces (strength, weapons, etc.), and submits an urgent report to the nearest of our units, for instance, to a regional or provincial unit which is carrying out a military operation nearby, or to a district mobile unit which is conducting a military operation in a neighboring village. (If the enemy is too strong for the friendly local unit to resist, this unit sends signals to the provincial, zonal or national levels to ask reinforcements, and specifically request air support.) When the friendly forces come to attack the enemy from outside of the village, village armed forces (militiamen and youths) should furnish support fire from the inside.

Thus, enemy forces can occupy a village for 24 hours at most, then must withdraw. Consequently, they do not have enough time to search for and take party and rice, or to terrorize and seize youths. After their departure, the hamlet or the village functions again as usual and does not suffer heavy material and spiritual losses. (At this time the village council office is burned, and some guard towers are destroyed, but the village inhabitants can set them up again quickly.) Moreover, when the enemy forces withdraw they cannot leave their spies behind them, because of our organization of the hamlet or the village. We can refer to our file and check the inhabitants, and so it is easy to unmask their spies for arrest or elimination. Therefore, the hamlet or the village always belongs to us. The enemy only occupies it temporarily and without safety. Their forces are on the defensive and

we take the offensive, whereas formerly enemy forces took the offensive and we were on the 'defensive-when our troops came, the village concerned belonged to us and, upon the withdrawal of our troops, the village was under the control of the enemy.

PART IV

WHAT ARE OUR PROBLEMS?

The accomplishments of the strategic hamlet project will not always be as simple as it has been explained here. We shall be faced with a number of difficulties such as the following:

a. Problems created by the enemy

The enemy will strive to plant agents in the various hamlets and villages we have established. Knowing that he can no longer penetrate the hamlets and villages which have already been organized by us, he will strive to infiltrate agents into our ranks and these agents will become the leaders of the hamlet or village, such as the leaders of different civic groups, managing board members, and village councilmen. If they succeed in taking such vital positions, our strategic hamlets and self defense villages will be gradually turned into enemy "combat villages". Consequently, the enemy gains a victory without any risk of battle and our efforts come to naught. In case the number of spies is small, the latter are assigned to draw sketches and collect detailed information on the internal defense system of the hamlet, as well as to detect the various anti-communist elements in the hamlet, who will be denounced to the enemy when the latter occupies the village. In order to prevent this danger, it must be realized that a large scale purge and control by the security group attached to the Strategic Hamlet Operational Team is of great importance. The security agents must study a technical investigation guide on eliminating spies. The Police and Security Directorate General or the Duong-van Hieu group may study this matter and write the guide.

The enemy may concentrate his forces in order to attack different hamlets and villages organized by us. If security is ensured by a series of military operations conducted by the regional, provincial, and district levels in order to drive out the enemy, such a danger will rarely occur. Should the enemy venture to attack and occupy our hamlets and villages with a large force, we also do not suffer heavy losses (because evasive tactics have been applied in the hamlets and villages). On the other hand, the enemy may sustain a great defeat like the recent battle of Mo Lang (Vinh Binh Province) due to our intervention force. However, in the event that the enemy succeeds in occupying and destroying a certain village, we must plan different measures to meet the situation. Such measures are called the pairing system. This means that we shall pair each village organized in the country-side under the strategic hamlet project with a strategic subquarter in a town (The strategic street and subquarter project in towns differs from the strategic hamlet project

in the countryside, and it needs to be spelled out in a separate document). In peacetime, each strategic subquarter in a town will give a helping hand to its twin strategic hamlet in the countryside by sending people and facilities to it. When some event occurs and a certain hamlet or village in the countryside is destroyed, however, the positive anti-Communist elements should flee and take refuge in the urban area, and the strategic subquarter in the town will receive and care for them.

The enemy might concentrate his forces in order to attack our various Strategic Hamlet Operational Teams. This danger will rarely happen, as security is ensured by systematic military operations conducted at the same time on the regional, provincial and district levels, as previously indicated. However, the national level must contemplate making every effort to provide itself immediately with more facilities (personnel, weapons, transportation and communication facilities, such as vehicles and radio sets) to be supplied to different Strategic Hamlet Operational Team and the mobile forces in various districts. These facilities are not dispatched to different hamlet and villages as many a locality has mistakenly believed. Rather they are designed to strengthen the district forces (especially the Strategic Hamlet Operational Teams and the mobile force). With regard to a village, initially it would only use its existing fire power (an average of 20 to 30 rifles of the Self Defense Corps), but afterwards, it would use as many weapons as it could capture from the enemy.

The enemy might concentrate his forces to conduct an attack on different important bases with a view to creating confusion and causing us to alter our operational plan immediately, for instance; the enemy may assemble his troops to attack the capital of a certain province. After that attack is over, we may become upset and try to place the ~~blame~~ on either the national, regional, or provincial levels. As a result, the region and province would not dare to continue their military operations to drive out the enemy by a joint plan, as previously stipulated, and would withdraw their forces to garrison the chief towns. Thus, the strategic hamlet project of the region and province would be frustrated. Strategic Hamlet Operational Teams in the various districts would be attacked everywhere by the enemy, and the situation would become disastrous. Actually, the higher levels must realize that the protection of important bases is assumed by the passive force of the province and region. When enemy is too strong, this protective force must quickly dispatch a signal to the national forces (paratroop or marines) asking ~~them~~ to come to the rescue. Therefore, each large base must establish a signal system with the national level. In case the counter-offensive ~~one~~ in failure, it is the national forces and the passive forces of the province and region that are responsible. In the face of such a situation, we must not cause the active forces of the region and province to alter their plans by giving up their existing operations of driving out the enemy.

The enemy can organize political struggles and demonstrations,

can pass motions, and use a press campaign to spread lies to the effect that we use violence to force the people to do as we wish, setting fire to their houses, demolishing hamlet and assembling them behind the barbed wire fences of various camps. This certainly will happen. But, we need not worry about such a campaign provided we keep our basic policy in mind and can carry it out properly.

"Within the framework of the strategic hamlet project, it is absolutely forbidden to force the people to leave their houses and lands behind and go to establish new hamlets villages." The people can stay in their respective hamlets and villages and set up their own strategic hamlets and villages as already mentioned above. There may be a few minor exceptions such as an isolated house in a deserted area, when we should try to persuade the owners to move and settle in hamlets or villages, if we do not need them to stay at their former places and turn their houses into signal towers for the hamlets or villages.

B. Problems created by Government authorities

Different executive echelons are not aware of the policy of strategic hamlets and do not know how to carry out this policy. For this reason they mistakenly assume that the strategic subquarters in towns and the strategic hamlets in the countryside are the same. Therefore, the Central Committee for the Establishment of Strategic Hamlets and the Interministry Council must positively establish their respective characteristics:

In towns, the policy is aimed at setting up subquarters and strategic streets, and the organizational methods should be studied by means of a particular document. The deputy mayor lieutenant colonel in charge of internal security for Saigon might study this problem and write this document on the basis of experiences in Saigon. The persons responsible for executing this policy are mayors and district chief.

With reference to Communist war zones, military zones and controlled regions (combat hamlets and villages) the policy is to conduct military operations to destroy those zones and assemble the people to set up new fortified hamlets. The document on this problem may be worked out by the Land development Commissariate General. Those who are in charge of carrying out this policy in different areas already stipulated are the national military forces (the general staff or the operation command with its paratroops, naval and air forces, marines and rangers) and a responsible agency such as the Land Development Commissariate General (or the Commissariate General for the Reconstruction of Flooded Areas).

Furthermore, and for the remaining territory in the countryside over which we and the enemy are fighting, the policy is to set up strategic hamlets according to the methods already mentioned in this document. The responsible units are the Ministry of the Interior, the Central Committee for the Establishment of Strategic Hamlets, different government representatives, commanders of military regions and the strategic hamlet

regional committees, different chiefs of province and the strategic hamlet, regional committees, different chiefs of provinces, provincial committees, and most particularly the different district chiefs and the strategic hamlet operational teams of the district as already described.

Our different executive echelons all have complained that they are lacking in trained personnel, but actually these would not be lacking if different units, especially at the national level, knew how to distribute personnel more rationally. During this period of time, inasmuch as the strategic hamlet program is national policy, different national units that are directly responsible for implementing it must reduce their personnel, give up a number unnecessary operations and send some of their employees and trained personnel to the strategic hamlet committee which in turn will send them to various districts. After all, what can the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Agency, the Land Reform office, the Land Development Office, etc., do when the countryside has no security?

They also complain that our personnel are of lower ability. This is not entirely true either. Actually, our personnel at the district level are relatively able, but they used to be seriously lacking in guidance. For instance, a certain chief of province would only order a district chief to step up the establishment of strategic hamlets in order to maintain security in the villages; when the establishment of strategic hamlets was under way, he would order that the youths and militiamen be trained to ensure village defense and to oppose terrorism; but he would also state the need to apply a new system of values by carrying out personalism and social justice. But, how was this to be done? Where did it begin and where did it end? This would not be explained. Truly speaking, the chief of province is not entirely responsible for this. His subordinates have also not had a clear concept of the policy nor of the guiding principles which should be explained to the province chief. In order to avoid such a state of affairs, we must train our personnel. This does not mean we must organize a large training course. We know through experience that such training courses are both inefficient and expensive, partly because the instructors habitually give vague lectures on doctrines, politics, and a number of principles, and partly because the trainees are not psychologically attuned to the instructors, so that they become bored by what the latter try to teach them. Our training is a direct method which saves time and money. For instance, the Secretary of State for the Interior or of Civic Action, after having carefully studied the strategic hamlet project policy document must hold an intimate talk with a few province chiefs to explain the policy minutely them and to discuss with them the ways in which to solve their different problems. The province chiefs after having been well briefed, will explain the policy to their collaborators and to their district chiefs. The district chiefs also will do the same with regard to their immediate subordinates, about five or six persons. Such a direct and intimate approach takes only a few hours. If the speaker is enthusiastic and decisive, his listeners can easily understand and remember what he says.

On the surface, this training is unobtrusive, but it is actually efficient.

Our different executive agencies also have complained that they are lacking in money. To meet this situation, the provincial and district levels formerly used a very simple method obliging the people to pay contributions of, for example 10 piasters per capita. Let us remember that the people have already made too many petty contributions without reference to the illegal ones they have paid to the Communists and the village bullies. To the people, 10 piasters is a large sum. If they are required to contribute, they will become more dissatisfied because they do not yet know what the final results of the policy will be, and so we had better ask them to furnish labor rather than money, especially to accomplish different projects of basic necessity such as the digging of shelter pits in their houses, the building of gun pits and the laying of spiked boards in their respective lanes and yards. In addition, different committees for the establishment of strategic hamlets at the provincial, regional, and especially at the national level, must look for more facilities (finances, weapons, transportation and communications facilities such as vehicles, and radio sets, construction materials such as iron, cement, barbed wire, bamboo, timber, etc.) to be dispatched to different districts and readjust the allocation of the existing facilities of different units according to a new criterion, to wit, that the strategic hamlets have precedence, and to get additional facilities by asking for more foreign aid.

Our various existing civic groups, such as the National Revolutionary Movement, may complain that they are not permitted to participate in the strategic hamlet program under the terms of the policy described above. This really is a misunderstanding. These civic groups could lend an efficient helping hand if they would select and send volunteers to participate in different strategic hamlet committees at the national, regional, provincial, and especially at the district level, as members of strategic hamlet operational teams. Furthermore, different civic groups, such as the National Revolutionary Movement, should introduce their trained personnel into various village organizations so as to make them more vigorous: the village council, the hamlet managing committee, the committees of the aged, the youth's, the women's and the children's groups of the village. If the National Revolutionary Movement, for instance, can assume this task, it will obviously lessen the burden of the strategic hamlet committee.

Some military units do not know how to conduct military operations or refuse to assume the military operational task mentioned above. This can be solved by the National Internal Security Council only and a conference is necessary to discuss and spell out the tasks in writing on the basis of a new operational plan.

At the national level, the armed forces general staff (or the operational command can use a powerful shock force made up of paratroops, marines, and the naval and air forces and that part of the artillery

and armored vehicles not yet placed under the command of different regions. If the general staff (or the operational command) finds that this force is inadequate to carry out its task, it must seek ways in which to acquire more troops by, for example, withdrawing part of the infantry troops stationed in a certain area which is relatively safe or by establishing another ranger regiment, to be assigned to the national forces. This national force should be assigned the following tasks. A primary task is the protection of various national government bases. Its main task is to launch mopping up operations, looking for the enemy in enemy war zones and controlled regions (which have been clearly delineated) so as to enable the unit in charge of assembling the people to set up new hamlets. Its auxiliary task is to support and rescue different bases or units at the regional, provincial, and district levels when they send cables to the national level asking for help in case of heavy enemy attacks. (The paratroops and air force in particular would assume this task.)

At the regional level, the regional command generally has an infantry division and a few ranger units. Under certain circumstances, it may ask for permission to organize some more ranger units. The regional strength is assigned to protect different bases placed under the control of region. Its main task is to conduct military operations to break up enemy concentrations in the region (except those in enemy war zones and controlled regions as already mentioned above). Its auxiliary and extra-military task is to launch military operations in support of the national forces, in case of necessity, when the latter are conducting an attack in an enemy war zone.

At the provincial level, the province chief has available, for example, a ranger unit and a few civil guard companies. Apart from protecting various bases, the task of the provincial force is to conduct military operations designed to break up enemy concentrations within the province (except enemy war zones and controlled regions as stipulated above).

Only by carrying out a clear division of responsibilities can contradictions, save time, and ensure systematic security, so that the districts may organize their strategic hamlets with ease.

While accomplishing our mission, we may be faced with extra-military difficulties which cannot be foreseen. The essential requirement is that different executive echelons must draw upon experiences, analyze them in detail and send timely reports to the national level. This is aimed at exchanging experiences and learning lessons that may be of interest to other localities.

CONCLUSION

From the beginning, this document has dealt with the organization of ~~strategic~~ strategic hamlets. However, the part concerning the execution of the ~~strategic~~ ~~explain that~~ strategic hamlets in the villages (defense, control,

election, the communal regulations, and organization of the masses). There may be some confusion between the strategic hamlet and the strategic village.

At present, the term "strategic hamlet" is the most popularized one. However, we must not think of the organization of strategic hamlets as outside the village and beyond the village council system. The province chief or the district chief cannot send his strategic hamlet operational teams to occupy a number of hamlets to be turned into strategic hamlets while at the same time ignoring the village system or the village council. Such a procedure would create confusion and the organization would not actually score any good achievements.

Therefore, it is considered an absolute necessity to occupy each village and organize all the hamlets within a village; the organized hamlets called strategic hamlets constitute self-supporting units may be called self defense villages. Thus, the various strategic hamlets must be set up within the framework of the self defense village, and then we shall understand why it is called a "strategic hamlet".

First, because it has a strategic value relative to military security. After being organized, different hamlets are no longer a charge of the army and the civil guard, whereby the latter must garrison and ensure their defense. On the contrary, they become strong points for the army and civil guard when the latter are conducting military operations, because they are bases that can efficiently provide camouflage facilities, supplies, and information for our troops.

Second, because it has a strategic value relative to the political domain. Up to now, we have known only about what constitutes democracy through the press and parliament. At present, in different hamlets already organized, the government is presenting true democracy and the people enjoy different democratic rights directly by participating in the election of their representatives who look after public interest in the hamlets and villages.

Third, because it has a strategic value relative to economic and social spheres. We are still putting out slogans such as "Collect ofress of the Community" and "Social Justice". Through the strategic hamlet organization, the people can clearly see that these principles being carried out in the countryside under communal sanction, they can see too the development of a new system of values concerning the duties, rights, and interests of the citizens living in the hamlets and villages.

However, by setting up strategic hamlets, we have not yet completely solved all the problems of security and national defense. The Vietnamese Communist may continue to lay mines, carry out assassinations, rob passenger cars, sabotage railroads and destroy trains. The establishment of strategic hamlets is merely an appropriate first step towards the solution of different security problems related to national defense. If the policy is correctly carried out in conjuncti

with the plan for attacking different enemy war zones and the assembly
of the people therein in the newly established strategic hamlets we can
hope that the country will be pacified within a period of two to three
years.

The attached "Mission of Strategic Hamlet Construction Cadres" is a translation of a speech given at the Saigon Training Center for Civic Action Cadres as a part of the orientation course on the Strategic Hamlet Program. It is provided for information and a better understanding of the ultimate objectives of the Strategic Hamlet Program and its relationship to the overall counterinsurgency effort.

MISSION OF STRATEGIC HAMLET
CONSTRUCTION CADRES

History reveals that little interest was paid to techniques of instructions of the people. Present day's techniques are the main subject being taught and this is a proper attitude. However, we should not think that techniques can solve all problems. Consequently, while paying attention to techniques, we should not neglect other national activities.

Vietnam is an under-developed country. When the sovereignty was recovered, we inherited a corrupt regime. The mission of cadre as well as of all citizens is to destroy that corruption. Consequently, cadre must not only be public servants but also teachers who are assigned an important historic mission. To become teachers, all cadre of the under developed countries must first achieve a personal revolution.

The strategic hamlet is a good setting for the personal revolution

This is so because the "Strategic Hamlet" national policy is actual a political, social and military revolution. The strategic hamlet must be considered as a change in the three above fields. The reason why our regime has been ineffective in facing the Communists is that in the rural communities, many unfair acts have been committed every day against citizens in the political, social and military fields.

Let us ask how does the strategic hamlet achieve the revolution?

answer:

1. Political revolution:

The strategic hamlet council will be elected by the citizens themselves have the right to select cadre to assume the administration of the hamlet and protect the rights and privileges of the Hamlet:

Thus, the government must conduct an election at any price.

2. Social revolution:

In the old days in rural communities, the citizens could not have justice because they could not do anything except submit to "convenience" of power and money.

From now on in all strategic hamlets, we must adopt the following:

Democratic government: no illegal apprehension is authorized

- collective development: The strategic hamlet from now on will serve the general profit of the people of the hamlet. Everybody has equal rights and privileges, thus equal opportunities.

- justice: preponderence is reserved for those who contribute the greatest manpower and resources to their hamlet in the fight against the Communists, disunity and under-development, that is the new value.

3. military revolution:

The strategic hamlet is established to destroy the tactics of the communists.

We should remember that the present world is in the claws of the ~~communists~~:

a. The tactic of the communists is to use a few individuals with rudimentary weapons but with enough capabilities to defeat a unit with larger strength and more modern weapons.

b. This tactic is a tactic of fighting without a battlefield.

Because the enemy adopts such tactics, we do not know who are our friends and who are our enemies. Consequently, our authorities, many times, made improper and illegal apprehension. Many friendly nations of the Free World sometimes criticized the Government of the Republic of VIETNAM because of this.

We must break the grip of the Communists or we must create a war with a battlefield so that we know who are our friends and who are our enemies.

That battlefield is the strategic hamlet.

Distinguishing our friends from our enemies is the mission of the strategic hamlet construction cadre.

x
x x

We just said that VIETNAM is an under-developed country and the strategic hamlet will solve that problem. Following are some more detailed explanations.

VIETNAM is not the only under-developed country, there are many other under-developed countries in the world.

Under-development is characterise' by three factors:

1. State of poverty of the citizens:

The citizens are poor and lack everything. Because all citizens are in this state, they feel ashamed in front of citizens of more developed countries. This shame blinds them and many under-developed countries do not know which policies are most suited to the rights and privileges of their people.

2. Separation:

Moreover these under-developed countries are not united-almost all under-developed countries which were dominated for hundreds of years cannot know which is the right cause upon recovery of their sovereignty. Some of them think that the right cause is in Paris, others in Moscow, some others in Washington and some others do not know where it is and are hurrying to "embrace" Neutral policy.

In our country, during the present period our mission is to "concretize" our policy.

How should we "concretize" it?

The right cause is right in the heart of our citizens i.e. in the Strategic Hamlets. Building up the strategic hamlets is our way of concretizing our policy.

3. Influence of Communists in under-developed countries.

The population of under-developed countries from Asia to Africa and from Africa to South America includes two thirds of the world population. If the Communists hold this two thirds of mankind in their grip, they will be the master of the world. The objective of the Communists is to control and conquer these under-developed countries.

What is the technique adopted by the Communists?

Answer: The Communist technique include "Upper" policy, "Middle" policy and "Lower" policy.

- "Upper" policy is to win the sympathy of the enemy.
- "Middle" policy is to neutralize the enemy.
- "Lower" policy is to annihilate the enemy.

Winning the enemy's sympathy (under-developed countries are usually considered the Communist's enemy) is to transform the enemy into Communist cadre. Neutralizing the enemy is to make the under-developed countries become indifferent and abandon their hostility against the Communists therefore forcing them to focus their attention on another problem thus destroying their alertness and helping Communist cadre establish their bases in these countries for their activities. Annihilating the enemy is the end of the neutralization. At the same time the Communist can annihilate the under-developed countries by means of war and domination i.e. they attack and conquer the under-developed countries.

The Communist policy to win the sympathy, neutralize and annihilate the under-developed countries as mentioned above is not only directed at the government but also at the people of these under-developed countries. If the policy of winning the sympathy and neutralization does not succeed, the Communists will adopt the policy of annihilation. Such is the case of Tibet.

To face the communists some under-developed countries have taken preventive measures. These measures vary from one country to the other but they do not prove to be effective in any country.

The policy of strategic hamlets adopted by Vietnam will be most effective. We say most effective because it is within our range and consistent with the situation of under-developed countries. Remember that the political social and military revolution we are conducting is only the revolution of an under-developed country facing the Communist danger. This revolution cannot take place in the developed countries such as the United States of America or Great Britain. But strategic hamlets are good for other under-developed countries and this national solution is capable of becoming an international one. This is the honour for Vietnam.

To succeed, do not rely too much on foreign aid but on our own means. At first we must look for self improvement but what does self improvement mean? Self improvement means revolution of our behaviour. Our national revolution will fail without the revolution of the cadre's behaviour and the cadre will become reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries.

The Cadre who knows how to improve himself is aware of his own mission. Perform your duties with a sense of responsibility. Do not drink too much. Try to improve your virtues and behaviour. Do not carry out an order from higher levels without thinking. Know how to think and take initiative. To comply with a policy we must know thoroughly this policy. As a result the purpose of the strategic hamlet course is to acquaint the cadre with the technique for better service.

The strategic hamlet cadre must know that the policy of strategic hamlets is the policy of an under-developed country. But we do not have enough facilities and time. Lack of facilities requires us to make more and more efforts. Because of the lack of time, we must begin our mission in time to achieve quick success, if not we will be subject to slavery forever.

In the construction of strategic hamlets as mentioned above the cadre must know that the revolution in Vietnam is the revolution of the government, cadre and also of the people. There will be no revolution without the people. To succeed, the people must cooperate with the government and the cadre in the revolution. Consequently the cadre must know how to take advantage of the people.

Never say that fighting the Communists is "fighting the bandits' This is an erroneous concert. Fighting the bandit is not enough for us to launch a revolution. We must launch a revolution with the support of all the people. There will be no revolution without the people and the revolution is always in need of the people.

As a result, propaganda among the people is the cadre's main duty. The cadre must keep the people informed that democracy, freedom, and prosperity cannot be acquired easily. The people must struggle to acquire them. "Success without fighting" is an erroneous and dangerous policy, the cadre must destroy this policy. The strategic hamlet courses purpose is to teach students the techniques of propaganda for application in their unit.

Effective date: 1 October 1962

PROVINCES AND CITIES	Number of hamlets to be built	Hamlets complete	Hamlets under construction	Total population	Population in hamlets
Southern Area:					
Vinh Binh	570	364	15	537,677	369,328
Vinh Long	247	155	20	536,671	332,235
Kien Tuong	67	59	7	57,940	29,934
Kien Phong	189	73	55	274,711	123,049
Dinh Tuong	259	65	65	668,409	293,049
Phuoc Thanh	111	8	11	19,414	6,669
Binh Tuy	47	20	26	45,728	17,045
Binh Duong	319	46	29	303,654	94,094
Ba Xuyen	646	162	154	659,242	198,719
An Giang	533	181	168	812,027	242,944
Phong Dinh	324	34	32	348,000	92,200
Tay Ninh	336	37	83	289,489	77,504
Binh Long	65	9	24	57,560	14,538
Gia Dinh	291	87	92	687,943	157,718
An Xuyen	48	15	22	276,650	51,316
Bien Hoa	120	26	63	263,600	32,620
Phuoc Long	69	14	54	44,324	5,443
Phuoc Tuy	162	24	64	143,100	17,389
Kien Giang	246	35	87	354,476	42,159
Long An	691	47	38	494,012	51,128
Chuong Thien	54	17	15	284,500	19,243
Kien Hoa	854	27	24	537,343	28,804
Saigon	433	105	115	1,275,000	261,470
Long Khanh	95	20	55	95,118	
Central Area:					
Ninh Thuan	125	105	10	136,739	106,283
Quang Tri	498	357	46	274,690	203,710
Quang Ngai	400	263	85	651,016	383,395
Phu Yen	351	153	81	345,622	221,889
Khanh Hoa	281	202	3	271,753	169,808
Binh Dinh	675	180	52	822,746	228,153
Binh Thuan	230	64	76	281,541	62,005
Quang Nam	537	89	140	572,975	118,134
Quang Tin	134	48	60	348,724	43,703
Thua Thien	350	27	117	456,021	115,100
Hue	22	0	7	106,102	
Da Nang	27	2	4	110,630	2,180
High Plateau . Central Area:					
Quang Duc	82	8	1	30,158	9,682
Lam Dong	268	26	44	62,290	18,769
Darlac	314	12	70	180,792	42,713
Kontum	105	23	30	94,849	10,076
Pleiku	86	13	39	174,059	18,454
Tuyen Duc	33	10	14	57,463	2,962
Phu Bon	147	5	76	332,545	
Dalat	42	8	5	55,885	5,580

PROGRAM OFFICE

Liaison with GVN Directorate for Budget and Foreign Aid. Coordination of USOM activities relating to Development Loan Fund and other non-AID aid programs. Advice to Director and Country Team on General economic matters.

Program Development Section

Review and analysis of financial and economic implications of the proposed annual GVN military budgets.

Liaison with MAAG.

Development and preparation of the project aid and other sections of the annual MSP Country Program Book as directed by the Chief, Program Office.

Review on continuing basis of implementation of the project aid program.

Advice and assistance of substantive nature to project technicians in the preparation of project agreements.

Review of USOM technicians' end of tour reports.

Program Operations Section

Advice and assistance of procedural nature to project technicians in the preparation of E-1's, project agreements and PIO/Ts.

Statistics and Reports Section

Review and evaluation of surplus food distribution programs of U.S. voluntary agencies.

USOM ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAMS

AGRICULTURE

Extension Service

Provides and/or is the primary channel for direct technical financial guidance, assistance and support necessary to the improvement and strengthening of a technically effective, administrative strong and financially sound agricultural extension service to rural people. Included within the scope of this service are the farmer education, home improvement, rural youth training and information activities.

Education and Research

Provides and/or is the primary channel for direct technical financial guidance, assistance and support necessary to the improvement and strengthening of:

1. crop and livestock experimental field stations, testing centers and laboratories;
2. soils and soil fertility research;
3. plant and animal introductions, testing, multiplication distribution;
4. plant and animal disease control;
5. agricultural education including the National College of Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Husbandry, the Vocation Agriculture Schools at Hue and Can Tho;
6. crop and livestock reporting and the agricultural statistics services.

Credit and Cooperatives

Provides and/or is the primary channel for direct technical financial guidance, assistance and support necessary to the improvement and strengthening of agricultural production credit services farmers' cooperative organizations including training for technicians and participating members.

Agricultural and Fisheries Resources

Provides and/or is the primary channel for direct technical and financial guidance, assistance and support to government, private organizations and rural people for the better and more effective development and sustained production of land, water, fisheries and forest resources.

COMMEDIA

Directs all communication media operations and maintains liaison with all other American Agencies for the purpose of coordinating communications activities with the host government.

Provides assistance to the host government in the dissemination of all communications media materials.

Advises and assists the GVN in the development of a National Radio Network consisting of 6 medium-wave stations located strategically throughout Viet Nam to provide the population with broadcast facilities. This network is tied in with a short wave network and serves a dual purpose in the overall radio communication project.

Assists the National Film Production Center of the GVN Directorate General of Information in the development and production of 16mm motion picture materials for use in Viet Nam.

Assists in the development of the National Printing Plant in its function of serving all elements of the GVN in matters pertaining to printed materials.

Assists in the development of a Centralized News Service, under the auspices of the GVN, for the purpose of providing national and international news service to all press facilities in Viet Nam.

Provides a complete graphics, printing and reproduction service to the operational needs of the USOM. Also provides printing and photography advisory services to the GVN.

Services USOM and USIS in support of their individual mission graphic requirements.

DISTRIBUTION OF SONY RADIOS

The Communications Media Division of USOM, as a part of its overall effort to provide listening radios for rural population, accomplished the procurement of 1,693 Sony TR-903 community listening center radio receivers. Following our usual procedure, we entered into discussions with the Directorate General of Information to determine the best pattern of distribution to the provinces and districts of the country. About 1,000 of these new radios were immediately assigned for distribution to strategic hamlets, and the remainder for special projects like relocation centers, Montagnard refugee centers, etc. By official letter from the Directorate General of Information on August 8, we received a detailed distribution list.

In the attached resume the provinces of the nation are divided into 3 regions, and the provinces within those regions are individually listed. Following the name of each province is the number of radios assigned effective September 1962.

REPORT ON COMMUNITY RADIO LISTENING CENTERS

(1) Province	(2) Old Listening Centers (AWA & Hallicrafter radios with loudspeakers)	(3) New Sony Community radio Listening Centers	(4) Total
<u>MONTAGNARD AREA</u>			
Phu Bon			
Darlac	15	30	2
Fleiku	12	9	45
Kontum	23	10	21
			33

CENTRAL VIETNAM AREA

Quang Tri	19	121	140
Phuoc Thien	22	15	37
Quang Nam	29	52	81
Quang Ngai	22	96	118
Binh Dinh	21	70	91
Phu Yen	23	38	61
Khanh Hoa	19	76	95
Ninh Thuan	17	39	56
Binh Thuan	20	27	47
Tuyen Duc	23	7	30
Canh Dong	15	12	27
Quang Duc	10	6	16

SOUTH VIETNAM AREA

Binh Tuy	20	11	31
Phuoc Tuy	26	12	38
Quang Khanh	19	11	30
Phuoc Long	16	9	25
Binh Long	22	7	29
Binh Duong	19	22	41
Tay Ninh	20	15	35
Bien Hoa	22	12	34
Long An	28	20	48
Bien Tuong	25	23	48
Binh Tuong	36	30	66
Bien Hoa	20	18	38
Bien Phong	22	29	51
Vinh Long	35	62	97
Vinh Binh	29	120	149
Can Giang	31	61	92
Phuoc Dinh	33	14	47
Bien Ninh	30	17	47
Bien Iayen	32	47	79
Bien Iayen	25	12	37
Phuoc	3	2	5

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVISION

Statement of Functions

To provide stimulation, technical advice and assistance to various ministries and agencies of the Government of Vietnam for the purpose of improving governmental operations by recommending appropriate training and changes in organizational structure, operating procedures and administrative practices.

To support and assist technical divisions of USOM on administrative problems in their counterpart ministries and agencies, particularly where these problems are impeding progress of substantive programs or projects.

Training. To improve the competence and efficiency of the civil servants through the development of pre-service and in-service training programs and of research, reference and library activities for the benefit of both civil servants and student-civil servants by:

- Advising the faculty and staff of the National Institute of Administration in the following areas:

Review, evaluation and reform of public administration courses and the improvement of teaching and examination methods in the classroom and in in-service training courses.

Improvement and extension of research activities in the field of public administration in Vietnam, and internationally, especially in connection with the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration.

Effective utilization of the library insofar as both the student body and the civil service are concerned.

Maintenance of standards and the extension of education to higher levels into the graduate level.

Improvement of administrative procedures and practices in the Institute.

- Advising the Department of Interior on a program of:

Establishing Provincial Training Centers in each of the provinces

Establishing and developing training programs for provincial, district, village and hamlet administrative personnel.

Cooperating with other Government of Vietnam agencies in the coordination and utilization of provincial training programs and facilities.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DIVISION

Statement of Functions

To provide stimulation, technical advice and assistance to various ministries and agencies of the Government of Vietnam for the purpose of improving governmental operations by recommending appropriate training and changes in organizational structure, operating procedures and administrative practices.

To support and assist technical divisions of USOM on administrative problems in their counterpart ministries and agencies, particularly where these problems are impeding progress of substantive programs or projects.

Training. To improve the competence and efficiency of the civil servants through the development of pre-service and in-service training programs and of research, reference and library activities for the benefit of both civil servants and student-civil servants by:

- Advising the faculty and staff of the National Institute of Administration in the following areas:

Review, evaluation and reform of public administration courses and the improvement of teaching and examination methods in the classroom and in in-service training courses.

Improvement and extension of research activities in the field of public administration in Vietnam, and internationally, especially in connection with the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration.

Effective utilization of the library insofar as both the student body and the civil service are concerned.

Maintenance of standards and the extension of education to higher levels into the graduate level.

Improvement of administrative procedures and practices in the Institute.

- Advising the Department of Interior on a program of:

Establishing Provincial Training Centers in each of the provinces.

Establishing and developing training programs for provincial, district, village and hamlet administrative personnel.

Cooperating with other Government of Vietnam agencies in the co-ordination and utilization of provincial training programs and facilities.

Local Administration. To advise and assist in the development and strengthening of local administration by:

Research in the area of local administration, especially in the area of strategic hamlet development and administration and their relationships to existing administrative patterns.

Advising on the development of appropriate formulation of statutory bases and procedures for implementing new concepts of hamlet administration, assuring proper integration and coordination into the broad sphere of local administration.

Statistics and Censuses. To assist the National Institute of Statistics and other statistical agencies in the development of a professional staff and work program by:

Aiding in the development of a coherent series of censuses, surveys and other programs on which can be built a permanent and continuous set of statistical series as required by international agencies, the government itself and the private sector.

Setting up modern statistical standards which will insure the accuracy and completeness of government statistics at minimum cost.

Aiding in the coordination of statistical programs so as to eliminate overlapping and omissions.

Advising in the development of statistical training facilities in the country and in the proper utilization of statistical educational opportunities abroad.

Taxation. To advise and assist in the planning and development of a tax system which will enable Vietnam to obtain higher revenues on a more equitable basis.

To advise and assist in the drafting of tax legislation, in the development of internal tax accounting methods and tax reporting forms, the organization of a division for the collection of taxes.

Accounting, Auditing and Budgeting. To advise and assist the GVN and General of Budget and Foreign Aid and other agencies in the organization of its accounting, auditing and budgeting functions and the conduct of organization and management surveys.

Participant Training. To assist in the selection of participants coming in the United States and third countries for the purpose of developing a corps of trained personnel in the following public administration areas: pre-service and in-service training, personnel management, organizations and methods, auditing, accounting, budgeting and

Local Administration. To advise and assist in the development and strengthening of local administration by:

Research in the area of local administration, especially in the area of strategic hamlet development and administration and their relationships to existing administrative patterns.

Advising on the development of appropriate formulation of statutory bases and procedures for implementing new concepts of hamlet administration, assuring proper integration and coordination into the broad scope of local administration.

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Taxation. To advise and assist in the planning and development of a sound tax system which will enable Vietnam to obtain higher revenues on a more equitable basis.

To advise and assist in the drafting of tax legislation, in the development of internal tax accounting methods and tax reporting forms, in the organization of a division for the collection of taxes.

Accounting, Auditing and Budgeting. To advise and assist the GVN State General of Budget and Foreign Aid and other agencies in modernization of its accounting, auditing and budgeting functions and the conduct of organization and management surveys.

Personnel Training. To assist in the selection of participants training in the United States and third countries for the purpose developing a corps of trained personnel in the following public function areas: pre-service and in-service training, personnel management, organizations and methods, auditing, accounting, budgeting and taxation.

EDUCATION

Higher Education & Teacher Training

Advise the Department of National Education on matters pertaining to the preservice and inservice education of teachers, and in the field of University education. Advisory service, participant training commodities and equipment are provided for:

Normal schools and other one year elementary teacher education centers,

Inservice education centers and workshops at the elementary and secondary levels,

The Universities of Saigon and Hue in general, with major assistance to the Faculties of Pedagogy and Science, and specific assistance in the education of teachers of English.

General Education Division

Provide technical and financial assistance to the public elements and secondary school departments of the Department of National Education through the construction of classrooms, elementary; construction of classrooms (Science) - secondary; instructional materials development - elementary textbooks and supplementary and secondary materials for all public schools of Viet Nam.

Trade & Industrial Teacher Training

Advise and assist the Department of National Education on all details in connection with the pre-service and in-service vocational teacher training programs. Advisory service on curriculum development, course construction and preparation of instructional materials, participant training, securing of commodities and equipment.

Provide funds for the completion of the construction of the three (3) Rural Polytechnic schools and securing commodities of various types to improve the physical facilities of laboratories, the scientific & professional supplies, and miscellaneous educational materials.

CONTRIBUTION OF THE USOM EDUCATION DIVISION
TO PROVINCIAL REHABILITATION

Educational Programs for Provincial Rehabilitation

Existent Programs

During the past five years projects sponsored jointly by the USOM Education Division and the Department of National Education, GVN, have made valuable contributions to the current counter-insurgency program. Under the Elementary Education Project, classroom facilities for rural children have been expanded with the construction of and the provision of furnishings for over 3,000 classrooms. Under the Instructional Materials Project over three million textbooks for schools have been printed under the auspices of the Textbook Publication Center of the Department of National Education. New series of textbooks have been inaugurated in the elementary schools in Civics and in Health. Under the Teacher Training Project the technical assistance to provincial teacher in-service training workshops and the holding of annual summer workshops for elementary school teachers, have re-oriented and re-trained existent staff in modern elementary practices. The pre-service training of elementary school teachers is being strengthened with the services of the Southern Illinois University Contract which provides ~~more~~ specialists who devote full time to the improvement of normal school instruction. The recent opening of two modern rural schools for the training of rural primary teachers is expected to play a significant part in supplying qualified instructors for the village and rural schools throughout Vietnam. Attention has also been given to the improvement of the training of teachers for the Montagnards. The ~~more~~ programs have had a limited impact on the rural population on account of the lack of finances for classroom construction and inadequate allocation to rural areas.

Education Program Proposed for CY 1963

The fundamental purpose of this program is to win over the rural population in the provinces to an active support of the war against the Communists by means of establishing, expanding, and/or improving the "new" services furnished by local and national governments in the rural areas. It capitalizes on a major psychological drive of parents, ~~and~~, who desire for a better life through education for their children.

The program is to be launched in fifteen provinces and have a direct impact on the education of 300,000 children, or one-third of the pupils in rural schools. Priorities for assistance to strategic hamlets have

been established for rural schools. Priorities for assistance to strategic hamlet operations have been established for several provinces and this program will be implemented in those provinces first. Implementation of this program in the remaining provinces will await their designation.

It should be noted that the program under discussion is wholly outside of USOM-financed education programs.

The program is divided into several parts, all of which supplement each other and are vital for the establishment of a basic and continuing system of primary education for rural youth.

Although there is a need for a large-scale program of primary school construction in all provinces due to the constant increase in the number of children of primary school age and a reported large number of this age not in school, this program is geared essentially to the number of teachers who can be adequately trained in a calendar year. This number has been set at one hundred and twenty per province, since existent facilities and available personnel for training are such that it is possible to train only forty teachers during each of the three months' sessions to be held in the provincial capitals. It is expected to hold three of such sessions during a calendar year. The program proposes, therefore, the construction of 1,800 classrooms and the furnishings therefor. At the average rate of 80 pupils per classroom, these facilities will accommodate approximately 144,000 pupils.

Since all the local resources of the hamlet inhabitants have been expended in various community enterprises connected with hamlet security, no funds remain for any co-operative effort in providing funds for the construction and furnishing of hamlet classrooms. It will be necessary, therefore, for this program to provide VN \$40,000 per classroom for construction and for furnishings, with the labor for construction to be contributed by the hamlet. This construction will be coordinated with the hamlet self-help projects at the provincial level.

The impact of this program in the rural areas will be far-reaching. The 144,000 pupils represent an approximate total of 48,000 households which in turn represent about 300,000 persons.

PUBLIC WORKS

Office of Chief

Overall direction and coordination of the following Projects: Highways; Railroads; Telecommunication; Electric Power; Water Supply; Inland Waterways.

Highway Division

Advise on all highway problems. Liaison with the GVN Minister of Public Works, the Contract groups.

Railroad Division

Guidance and advice on all matters pertaining to railroad equipment maintenance & administration. Selection of participants for training in the U.S.

Telecommunications Division

Technical assistance on rehabilitation of Telephone system. Overall guidance to GVN on the installation of new micro-wave and VHF systems. Technical review of specifications and the procurement of electric equipment.

Water Division

Overall advice to GVN on ports, canals and inland waterways. Technical assistance in preparing specifications and the procurement of new dredges.

Power Division

Overall advice on all phases of the host country Power Program. Advice on procurement of generating equipment.

Architectural Engineering Division

Review of all plans and specifications for new building construction including schools, hospitals, office buildings, etc.

Water Supply Division

Guidance and advice to GVN on all matters pertaining to potable water supply. Preparation & review of all specifications for commodity and equipment procurement.

Civil Aviation

Guidance and technical advice to the office of the Director of Air Bases, Director of Meteorology and the Director of Civil Aviation on the following operations: Air Traffic Control; Air Operations; Communications; Airport Construction; Meteorology; Electronics (general).

Detailed explanations of specific programs of particular significance to the Provincial Representative are discussed in some detail in the following pages.

VIETNAM RAILWAY SYSTEM

The railroad is narrow gauge - 1 meter - and varies from 25 kilograms to 30 kilograms per meter.

Present Help to the Railroad

For the past two years the railroad has been operating under war-like conditions with Viet-Cong sabotage and this is continuing to the present time.

It is necessary to devote all efforts to supporting continued important railroad transportation by overcoming damage to tracks, bridges, locomotives and rolling stock.

The Vietnamese Armed forces (NVA) have assigned a battalion to protect the railroad from sabotage. MuG has assigned several officers to advise and cooperate with the military. Regardless of the efforts to secure the railroad sabotage continues.

The railroad officers and personnel operating trains and maintaining the tracks and bridges have exhibited outstanding courage and devotion in carrying out their duties while harassed by derailments, mines, gunfire, and kidnapping of train and engine crews.

We have thru counterinsurgency funds FY 62 purchased additional commodities which include rail, ties, fastenings, motor inspection cars to patrol the tracks and transport workers and material, metal products to be used in repairs, couplers, buffers and draft gear parts, wheels and axles etc to enable the maintenance forces to repair locomotives and cars damaged by the Viet-Cong actions.

Future Plans to help the Railroad

The Chief Engineer of Tracks and Bridges has been provided through MuG under the original \$4.4 million grant 1 modern ballast cleaning machine and 2 mechanical tie tampers which can upgrade 1 kilometer of rail track per day but it is not possible to utilize this equipment because of the Viet-Cong activities. The machines cost about \$250,000. This equipment will be invaluable to the maintenance of track when it can be utilized with security.

We have provided funds to purchase two 75 ton Railroad Wrecker Cranes which will provide expeditious clearing of wrecks (caused by sabotage) and rerailing of locomotives and rolling stock.

The purchase of repair parts for rolling stock in the amount of about \$125,000 (contract will be let at once) by CPN will give the Mechanical Department the necessary parts to enable equipment to be repaired.

The Railroad **Advisor** returned from Home leave October 13 and will be in daily contact with Railroad Officers including the President, Chief Engineer, Chief of Exploitation and the Purchases and Stores Agents for consultation and advice.

It is expected purchase of 23 Diesel Electric Locomotives will be consummated as it remains only for decision to award to General Motors or General Electric with advice from AID/W in pouch enroute. These under come DLF Loan 129 financing.

200 Freight cars are also to be acquired, knocked down for erection in Saigon, awaiting AID/W approval or disapproval, and this is also under DLF Loan 129.

