

International Voluntary Service (IVS) is a non-profit organization chartered in 1953. It is committed to the idea that American youth could make an important contribution to US foreign policy by establishing person-to-person contacts with people of another country, through a service program which the people of the host country would want and in which they would participate. The team in Vietnam is financed under contract with the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), through their USOM Division of Agriculture in Viet-Nam. It is working on a program with the Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture.

IVS/Viet-Nam is now in its fifth year of operations. Although it has altered its emphasis and scope at various times in an attempt to adjust to current demands of the country, its basic principles and ideals have remained the same. The IVS team in Viet-Nam feels that it has found a useful purpose in assisting the US economic aid program to more effectively reach the Vietnamese farmers. IVS team members rely on experienced technicians both in the Ministry of Agriculture and in the USOM Agriculture Division for technical guidance. On the other hand by coming a part of the provincial communities in which they live and by learning to know the people, their customs, their agriculture, and their language, they can apply some of the knowledge which might otherwise not be utilized.

From a six man team living and working directly with one refugee village in 1957, IVS efforts were diverted in 1958 to building an agricultural improvement station which would serve hundreds of resettled villages in a land development program. As a result of the work on this highland station, IVS was asked to assist the Ministry of Agriculture and USOM in the development of a series of Agricultural Stations located in various farming areas throughout the country. The team was gradually expanded to eight, fourteen, and finally, twenty men.

Presently the twenty man team is divided into groups of one, two, or three, living in eight general areas. Work in these areas includes two agricultural schools, six crop improvement stations and five livestock improvement stations, which serve as "centers of agriculture" where experiments are conducted, seed and stock is multiplied and distributed, information is disseminated, and agents, technicians and farmers are trained. This offers IVS team members the opportunity to apply specific skills while gaining information and material which will benefit farmers.

Although major IVS emphasis is presently directed towards improving the functions of these centers, team members are not confined to them. There is always the danger of a station becoming an end rather than a means to an end; bigger and more beautiful, rather than useful. Until the farmer has actually benefited, success cannot be claimed. IVS feels that it must take an active part in determining the farmer's needs and directing the station's activities toward fulfilling these needs. Team members are encouraged to make contacts in the community around them, find out the problems which prevail, and apply results from the station to where they are needed. In activities of this nature they have fortunately been able to work with provincial agents or station technicians

as counterparts. Thus it has been possible to couple IVS skills with the skills of technically trained people in Viet-Nam. It is a challenge to emphasize the training of personnel who will extend their services to many more villages than IVS could ever influence alone. Working in this manner enables IVS to extend its influence, and help set in motion forces that will continue long after the team members leave Viet-Nam.

IVS TEAM MEMBERS IN VIETNAM

<u>Team Member</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Field of Interest</u>
Alan S. Berlet	Can Tho: 2 Nguyen Du	General Agriculture
William F. Gerdes	Vinh Long: Truong Su Pham	English
Thomas E. Croope	My Tho: Box 22	Agricultural Engineering
James L. Kelly	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Livestock - IVS Administrative
Robert K. Plummer	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Agricultural Education
Arnold K. Dimmitt	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Agricultural Engineering
Donald C. Brewster	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Phu Tho English- Engineering College
Vaughn C. Stapleton	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Science Teacher - Team Leader
Geraldine M. Stapleton	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	English
Ann L. Jacobs	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	English
Donald S. Luce	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Agricultural Economics
Phillip E. Schreiber	Xuan Loc: 88/2 Duong Cong Hoa	Agricultural Engineering
Manfred R. Armbruster	Xuan Loc: 88/2 Duong Cong Hoa	Horticulture

<u>Team Member</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Field of Interest</u>
Mary E. Cling	Saigon: 176 Hai Ba Trung	Program Assistant, Malaria Control
Robert A. Knoernschild	Blao c/o Truong Quoc Gia Nong Lam Muc	Horticulture
Ted D. Lingren	(same as above)	General Agriculture
✓ Don F. Wadley	Da Lat 3 Nguyen Thuong Hien	Horticulture
✓ Daniel L. Leaty	(same as above)	Horticulture
Mark E. LaRue	Thap Cham 555 Doc Lap	Agricultural Engineering
Charles E. Fields	(same as above)	Livestock
✓ Dale W. Wagner	Ban Me Thuot Box 16, 62 Ton That Thuyet	General Agriculture
Robert W. DuByne	(same as above)	Agricultural Engineering
Roger R. Sweeney	(same as above)	Livestock
✓ Robert M. McNeff	Tuy Hoa c/o Toa Hanh Chanh	General Agriculture
✓ Larry L. Laverentz	Qui Khon 115 Vo Tanh	General Agriculture
John J. Witmer	(same as above)	Biological Sciences
Bette Gau	(same as above)	English
Billie Lee Langley	(same as above)	English
Thomas C. Neal	Quang Ngai Hotel Cong Hoa, Duong Vo Tanh	Agricultural Education

<u>Team Member</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Field of Interest</u>
R. Charles Stevens	Da Nang Box 53, 431 Hoang Dieu	Tech Vo-Education
Fletcher H. Poling	(same as above)	English
Jimmie C. Green	Hue Box 115, 6 Tran Thuc Nhan	Agricultural Education
✓ Danny J. Whitfield	(same as above)	Livestock
Donald C. Fortner	(same as above)	Entomology
Katherine A. Wright	(same as above)	English
Vincent P. McGeehan	(same as above)	Science
John S. Parsons	(same as above)	English
Clarence M. Shubert	My Tho Box 122	English
Marilyn M. Pallys	Can Tho 2 Nguyen Du	English
Leslie E. Small	Kien Giang	General Agriculture
Stephen A. Szadek	Language Study	General Agriculture
Herbert W. White	Language Study	forestry
Thomas L. Cooper	Language Study	Livestock

## EMERGENCY RELIEF & THE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

USOM Provincial Representatives will frequently encounter local situations which will require emergency relief and rehabilitation. Example are - natural disasters such as floods typhoons and tornados and other disasters such as fires or flights of refugees from communism, etc.

Attempts to bring quick relief for these events should first be made at the province level in consultation with the Province Chief and his staff, the MAAG Sector Advisor and church leaders since the latter often have stocks of U.S. surplus foodstuffs on hand. The Province Chiefs also usually have reserve stocks of rice which can be drawn upon to meet emerger relief needs, as well as the rehabilitation requirements of those being relieved. Requests for help should be transmitted immediately to USOM/Rural Affairs, Saigon, outlining the problem, its magnitude and the suggested plan of action for its solution.

An Emergency Relief Committee has been established in Saigon, Chairmanned by the Chief Civil Affairs Adviser of MAC/V, and consisting of representatives of concerned agencies, such as USOM the U.S. Embassy, the Government of Viet Nam and American Voluntary Agencies. This Committee has already demonstrated its ability to act quickly and deliver relief when and where needed throughout the country.

It should be pointed out that whereas quick relief in times of disaster and other emergencies is of the utmost psychological and practical value for the suffering, we are equally interested in helping them to rehabilitate themselves and become self-sufficient again as quickly as possible.

USOM/Rural Affairs is, therefore, anxious and willing to consider any type of rehabilitation plan for disaster sufferers which is within the limits of our resources, and you should guide your thinking toward developing such plans, utilizing as far as possible locally available resources and programs, when bringing assistance after disasters.

### AMERICAN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES IN VIET-NAM

There are several very active American Voluntary Agencies in Viet-Nam who, in addition to helping in times of disaster, carry on regular programs of aid and assistance to the needy and poor. Among these agencies are organizations such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and the Mennonite Central Committee, all with offices in Saigon. Catholic Relief and the Mennonites operate large relief programs which include the distribution of thousands of tons of U.S. Surplus Agricultural Commodities each year throughout Viet-Nam. They and CARE also operate extensive relief and rehabilitation activities using their own resources. They, and other American groups also operate many schools, hospitals and other socially oriented institutions.

Two.

It is definite U.S. Government Policy to work closely with our American Voluntary Agencies and to cooperate and assist them if possible in their relief, rehabilitation and social activities. They, in turn, stand ready to cooperate with us where mutual interests are involved, and like us, their interests are essentially - people. You will find their experience and capabilities most valuable resources and you should acquaint yourself with their activities in your area so as to insure that our efforts are coordinated.

## DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM\*

By President Ngo Dinh Diem

In observing the crises probing the foundations of democracy in various countries of the world today, we may well ask the question, what is the possibility of establishing a democracy in Vietnam? Do our ancient traditions and institutions contain elements that would favor the development of genuine democracy under modern form? And what pattern should that democracy follow in its relations with neighboring countries and with the West?

First let us recall that Vietnam, after having been under the dominance of China, for over a thousand years, recovered and maintained its independence for another thousand years, until the late 19th century. Profoundly molded by Chinese culture, education and institutions, Vietnam is a land of marked cohesion, unity and homogeneity, conscious of its own personality, grateful to China for what China has given it, yet tenaciously retaining its own way of life. Among other things, foreign historians have noted that the Code of the Le dynasty (15th century) is more characteristically Vietnamese and has borrowed less from Chinese Codes than that of the Gia Long dynasty (beginning of the 19th century). It does not surprise us that these characteristics should evidence themselves more in jurisprudence than elsewhere. Deriving its inspiration from equity, our jurisprudence has evolved in sensitive consideration of the social milieu and custom.

As to modern democracy, our institutions, customs and the principles underlying them are democratic facts. They have grown out of the past and are the product of an historical evolution. They have operated even under the occupation despite blurrings brought on by extraneous innovations and interferences. But they were more clearly expressed under pre-occupation conditions.

Briefly some of the basic principles universally accepted by the people of Vietnam are:

The moral norms bind the Sovereign as well as officials and the

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\*Originally written in French before the author's assumption of the Vietnamese Premiership.



common people;

The State is founded on the people;

The mandate of Heaven held by the Sovereign was revocable if he proved himself unworthy thereof;

The voice of the people was the voice of Heaven;

The magistrate in his official capacity must conduct himself as one participating in a religious rite.

These ideas were not mere formalities. They were part and parcel of the very institutions themselves.

#### INSTITUTIONS

##### The Council of Censors

This Council was made up of well known scholars and officials of unimpeachable integrity. They passed judgment on the official acts of the Ministers and other important officials. It was their duty to call the Sovereign's attention to the morality involved in public acts. Should the need arise their reminders were made to the Sovereign directly by way of remonstrance.

##### Ministers of Government ("Cabinet")

The Ministers reported to the Sovereign, sometimes simply to inform him (on affairs involving their decisions), sometimes to ask his sanction. If the Sovereign approved, the Ministers then notified the provinces or organism concerned. Should the matter require the form of Imperial Edict the Ministers submit an outline for the Imperial signature (which took the form of a Red Dot), preceded by a report of presentation, which included an expose of the question, the proposals of the organism (provincial authority, etc.) raising the question, references to the law or precedents, a resume of the pros and cons, and the conclusions of the Ministers. Should the Sovereign, instead of sanctioning, make marginal comment or recommendations, the Ministers proceed to a new study of the matter. If the Sovereign's annotations are accepted without change the Ministers submit a new outline incorporating the recommendations. This procedure exemplifies the saying: Law derives from joint action of Sovereign and Minister.

### Imperial Secretariat

The Imperial Secretariat had no powers of its own. The Secretariat presented the reports of the Ministers to the Sovereign, after previously submitting them to the Council of Censors for verification or observation. After receiving the Sovereign's annotations or sanction the reports returned to the Ministers through the same channels. The original document, signed or annotated by the Sovereign, was carefully preserved in the archives for reference.

### Standing Committee of Ministers and Censors

To guard the prestige of the Sovereign and to assure the prompt despatch of affairs, delegates of the Ministers and of the Council of Censors formed a standing group, rotating in turns, on twenty-four hour duty. They had office space in a room in the Imperial Enclosure, near the residence of the Emperor. It was their duty to give a summary review of the documents submitted to the Sovereign, check for errors and add their own signature before passing them on to the Imperial Secretariat for presentation to the Sovereign. Special chamberlains, appointed for the purpose, carried the document from Secretariat to Sovereign. On the return journey they reviewed the annotations of the Sovereign and attached their signature on a separate slip before forwarding them to the Ministers. The purpose of reviewing the Sovereign's annotations, was to eliminate obvious errors or inexactitudes or formulae contrary to the norms. It was their duty to call respectfully the Sovereign's attention to any such failing which they considered blameworthy. The Sovereign accepted urgent reports even at night. The Standing Committee was charged particularly with forwarding reports on urgent matters, reports from distant provinces, frontier reports bearing on national security, etc. The Sovereign would send back urgent documents even late at night, and if thought advisable would convoke the Standing Committee for consultation.

This reflected the commonly accepted view that the Sovereign ought always to be at the disposal of the people.

### Court Assemblies

Court Assemblies, comprising not only the Ministers but numerous civil and military officials above a certain grade, convened as a rule at least once a month. The Sovereign attended, assisted by the Imperial Secretariat and under the eyes of the Council of Censors. The agenda was prepared in advance. Questions were brought up and

discussed. Any observations by the Sovereign were noted, particularly by the Secretariat and the Censors. Should need arise the Censors intervene. On conclusion of the deliberations, the Ministers, after further study, would submit proposals according to the procedure, already described, to the Sovereign for executive action.

### The Sovereign

In general the Sovereign, in his annotations on documents or in verbal observations in Court Assemblies, intervened to call attention to the norms, to recommend clemency, scrupulous review of judicial decisions, care of the people, to comment on or rebuke negligence, failure in public administration, or other reprehensible conduct of public officials.

This illustrates the role of father, conceded to the Sovereign vis-a-vis the people, who are the object of his constant solicitude.

It is interesting to note that verbal orders of the Sovereign are limited to minor matters concerning his own residence. There was no such thing as verbal orders of the Sovereign notarized and countersigned by the Imperial Secretariat and having executive force.

### Person of the Sovereign

A sacred respect is due the person of the Sovereign. He is the mediator between the people and Heaven as he celebrates the national cult. Every three years he mounts the triple terrace of the Nam Giao (South Corner) esplanade and under a great blue tent prays to Heaven for the people. It is conceded that he enjoys the mandate of Heaven to rule the people so long as he remains worthy thereof. (Numerous dynastic changes in the course of history prove that the mandate is not irrevocable.) Everyone recognizes it as fitting that the Sovereign should enjoy spectacular pomp and honor. He personifies the grandeur, glory, and prosperity of the Empire.

### Royal Audiences

In addition to the periodic Court Assemblies there were other State audiences: at New Year's, on the National Anniversaries, on the King's birthday, the birthday of the Queen Mother, on the occasion of some extraordinary occurrence (for example, the accession to the Throne, proclamation of the Code, a great victory, etc). These gave

occasion for the proclamation of Edicts, such as the proclamation of accession to the Throne, edicts of grace, etc. Such Edicts were prepared by the Court. The style was hieratic. Quotations from the ancient books and teaching and historical allusions were abundantly interspersed.

In preparing a proclamation of accession to the Throne the Court would take its inspiration from circumstances of the time and the personality of the Sovereign, if he were of age. In which case consultation with him was obligatory. The edict then reflected the ideas or tendencies of the new Sovereign. If he were a minor, the Court emphasized what it considered to be the promise of the new era. In the case of a new dynasty, obviously, the part played by the Sovereign was preponderant. He would underscore particularly the reasons impelling him to accept the Throne - decadence of morals, abuses on the part of preceding rulers, the will of the people - in short, the justification of his action in view of traditional norms. Even in the case of normal accession, his taking of the Throne was not looked upon as automatic.

#### Executive Power

The Sovereign, by his Red Dot or equivalent remark, approved proposed Edicts, Ordinances, etc., but it was the Court and the Ministers who gave notification for Executive action. The Sovereign could not directly notify an order to the provinces, the generals, or a government organism. Should the case occur, e.g., an appeal to the provinces for armed assistance, it was considered a coup d'etat, an attempt on the part of the Sovereign to act independently of the Court, with which he then would be in conflict. This would be against constitutional procedure. Should he fail in the attempt he is deposed.

#### State and Sovereign

It is to be noted that the word 'State' often occurs in public acts while the power of the Sovereign, when it is mentioned, is in general terms and accompanied by such expressions as, "holy, august, Son of Heaven," thus linking the role of the Sovereign to traditional norms.

### Grand Council, Privy Council

There were other Councils in addition to those already mentioned. Emperor Gia Long in particular created the Grand Council (Cong Dong). It had its own seal. It deliberated on major affairs of state and appended its seal to the report of its deliberations.

The Privy Council (Co Mat), created under Ming Mang, deliberated in secret session on matters of foreign affairs, military questions and internal security. Under the Emperor Tu Duc its status was greatly expanded and reinforced. It continued in vital functioning over a long period. In time it became a sort of 'inner circle', composed of certain Ministers and picked officials. Their office quarters were located near the imperial residence. The Emperor was kept informed of their work and ordinarily consulted with them.

### Providing against Abuses

Ming Mang, despite his tendency towards personal authority, insisted on strengthening the authority of the Court Assembly. He made it a constitutional regulation that all affairs of grave importance be obligatorily submitted to the deliberations of the Court, assembled in special session (Dinh Nghi). This implied the conferring of special authority on the resolutions taken by these solemn assemblies. The Sovereign was morally obliged to give his sanction. Ming Mang also took the initiative in prescribing that the head of the Imperial Secretariat should be an official not higher than the third rank, saying in substance: "We are led to make this regulation by reason of the history of China, which shows examples of officials close to the Sovereign abusing their power. We will that it be scrupulously observed by our successors." Ming Mang also concerned himself with possible abuses on the part of the Sovereign's relatives. He abolished the title of "Empress" and for it substituted "First Spouse". "The history of China bears witness to the grave crises brought on by the Empresses and their relatives." He also decreed that collateral branches of the royal family might hold provincial office but that his own descendants might not.

### Responsibility of Subordinates

Collegial action among the Ministers was the norm. The authority of the Minister was predominant, yet the minutes of reports to the Throne, and the letters or instructions to various Councils, governmental organisms, or governors of provinces, must be initialled by the

high collaborators who had taken part in their preparation. Should an Assistant decline to sign a report to the Throne, mention thereof must be made at the end of the report, and his reservations, or the reasons for his refusal to sign be stated. Provincial governments followed the same system. The Governor was the acknowledged head. He had one Assistant for civil affairs and general administration, one particularly for judicial matters, and a commander of the military garrison.

#### Nomination to Office

Royal approval was required for nomination to any position of authority, including the educational system. The nominee was notified immediately, the official documents following in due course. All imperial warrants or commissions begin with the words: "We, Emperor by the Mandate of Heaven, ordain that..."

#### Civil Precedence over Military

Civil rank of the same grade takes precedence over the military, indicating the predominance of the civil power. In Court Assemblies the civil corps sits to the left (the position of honor), the military to the right of the Throne. Apart from very minor local positions, access to public office is reserved to those who have successfully passed the national examinations and been granted degrees. Selection therefore is based primarily on ability and merit. It is observable from history that the majority of our statesmen and generals have come from the people.

#### Nobility

There are five titles of nobility, closely approximating duke, marquis, count, viscount and baron. They are honorary titles only and do not involve fiefdom or territory. The State assigns a few acres of land in lieu of fiefdom. Titles diminish by one grade with each generation. A duke's son will be a marquis, etc. A title goes only to the eldest son and disappears after five generations. Nor does the title give any right to public office.

#### Privileges of Birth

Birth confers privileges of a very minor order only. Thus the son of a high dignitary will inherit an honorary title, provided he

passes certain examinations. He thereby gains in seniority within his grade at the outset of his career. However, this does not help him to any office of authority, which is predicated on success in the national examinations. Graduates, risen from the people, thus receive incontestable consideration over the sons of noble families who brilliantly pass the national examinations and are often given preference for the position of "attache" to the privy Council or to the Ministers. They become bearers of important documents or liaison officers between high organisms. They might even be appointed editors of delicate state documents, by reason of the asset they enjoy from the traditions of their families, who are familiar with affairs of state.

#### Financial Status

Decency required that officials, even the highest, remain in a mediocre station financially. The reward of the descendant consisted in the renown of the ancestor, a moral advantage which he was expected to preserve and, if possible, enhance.

#### Retirement

There was no precise rule for retirement. Custom prescribed that high officials voluntarily ask for retirement on reaching the age of fifty, fifty-five or sixty. The first or second request was generally refused, the third accepted. Such officials became "elder statesmen".

#### Judiciary

Justice was administered by the District Heads (as courts of first instance) and by the Governor's two Assistants, one for civil and the other for criminal matters (as courts of appeal). These officials also exercised administrative functions in addition to judicial. For certain matters and, according to their jurisdiction, judgments rendered in courts of the first instance or appellate courts are executory. For most matters, judgments rendered in courts of first instance must be submitted to the higher jurisdiction for verification, approbation, rejection, or revision. For some matters, and for nearly all judgments in civil matters, the tribunal of the second degree must submit its judgments to the Ministers. In general this would be the Minister of Justice for criminal, the Minister of Finance for civil cases, and, in particular instances, other Ministers in matters relevant to their competence.

To avoid delay a time limit is fixed for preliminary inquiry and verdict, the time limit varying according to the importance of the matter and the complications of the case. A judge desiring more time must request an extension, giving his reasons therefor. Too frequent delays cause judges to be black-marked. Sanctions are provided for cases of negligence, abuse or error. Appeals are received by the next higher jurisdiction. Certain judgments, e.g., those involving capital punishment or community-owned property, must be submitted for approval to the Sovereign. In the days of independence the Autumnal Assizes at times reviewed judgments comporting the death penalty. This procedure concurs with the traditional principles of respect for human life. Strictly speaking, any person could appeal a case, even to the Higher Tribunal (several organisms sitting as a Special Court,) or even to the Sovereign. However, the authors of groundless claims are liable to an increase of penalty.

Such a rigid system, designed to assure the greatest guarantee of justice, carried with it an exceedingly severe surveillance. It rendered the office of magistrate excessively onerous. However, in practice it tended to lessen litigation. The magistrate had both administrative and judicial functions. His ideal was to bring about the 'reign of harmony' (poetic and literary language often ascribed the harp to his office as emblem.) As 'father and mother' of the people he must try by his sagacity and by wise, competent, and understanding conduct of his office to raise the moral tone of the people and to effect that crime become rare and misdemeanors less frequent. The system was a challenge and an invitation to induce harmony.

In case of murder or banditry the judge of the first instance must use all diligence in the preliminary inquiry to discover the culprits and render judgment. The higher jurisdiction lends all attention to such a case. In every case involving death the magistrate is obliged personally to appear on the scene of violence and proceed with the investigation. In case of suicide, inquiry must be made to establish if the motive be imputable to any oppression.

In cases of imprisonment awaiting trial, the time limit calls the attention of superior judges thereto. Hence follows notification on such as are delayed, with a request for explanation. This occurs especially if complaint is made, and may give rise to official inquiry on the judge's conduct.

Should a magistrate be inclined to abuse short pre-trial imprison-



ment as an expeditious means to dispose of light cases, or as a means of intimidation to accelerate the course of inquiry, it behooves him to think twice on the matter. Detention is considered a great dishonor. Stain attaches to the family as well as to the individual involved. In virtue of family solidarity and by acknowledged right the family can file protest in place of the detainee.

#### Arrest

Arrest must be made according to established formalities (judge's warrant, assistance from the notables of the village).<sup>1</sup>

An individual who cannot write may have his deposition or complaint made out by one who can, who then must sign the document with him (the 'signature' of one who cannot write consists of finger outline). Magistrates prefer written declarations to oral interrogations. The interrogations of a person who cannot write must be made in the presence of a parent or near relative or the mayor of the village, or one or two notables of a neighboring locality. Such witnesses must co-sign the interrogation, to make it legal. If a literate person refuses to sign his interrogatory, a verbal process must be drawn up, signed by witnesses, e.g. village notables or other established person (the village head, for instance). A complaint of falsification or change in the interrogation brings on an inquiry into the conduct of the magistrate and his assistants which may lead to degradation or even condemnation.

#### Filial Piety

Filial piety is held in high honor. It derives from the Confucian ethic of respect for elders and ancestors. It has special provision in the law, which suspends the normal rules of procedure. A father, theoretically, can cite his son for lack of filial piety and the judge will forthwith condemn him without further ado.

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1. Under the French occupation the authorities took over indirect tax particularly the tax on alcohol, and gave to certain French companies for a considerable time a monopoly over the manufacture of alcohol. Cases of illegal distillation or sale of alcohol were tried in French courts. Arrests, however, made by French tax officials in virtue of their quality of 'sworn agents', i.e. on their individual sworn warrant aroused such opposition from people who considered this contrary to traditional guarantee of justice, that the French were forced to agree not to make arrests except in the presence of village authorities as witnesses.

has scarcely ever been known, if ever, but the provision is there. Such a father, in avowing his own failure to rear his offspring properly, dishonor himself by publishing the family's misfortune in having so unnatural a son. "Merciless father, unfilial son", a common adage would condemn him.

### The Study of the Law

Study of the Code and of the laws was widespread. It was incorporated into the examination program for the bachelor's degree. There was a common saying: "No knowledge is better than a knowledge of the Code."

### Civil Law vs. Natural Law

In a country where the postulates of the natural law are deeply respected, civil law and legal dispositions have a relative value. Not too much weight is put upon the stark act in itself, although in a very literal sense proofs and testimonials are examined in every civil process and figure essentially and integrally in the expose of the facts. The judge bases himself on the law, but with constant reference to equity.

Every penal judgment comports an expose of the facts, declarations, depositions, magistrate's inquiry, examination of the proofs, statement of the case, citation from the Code and later laws, and the verdict. In his statement of the case, and before weighing the offense in the light of positive law the judge first recalls the moral norms, cites or rather alludes to the teachings of the sages, and then indicates their relevance to the case in hand. Positive law enters in as a complement of the moral. To persuade assent to the order willed by reason and by Heaven is to perform an act of high morality. This is

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2. The sovereigns in their annotations recall that justice, in its essence is designed for the observation of the natural law, already found in the heart of man, and that this principle transcends juridic considerations. As occasion arises to modify or adapt a law the sovereigns insist that laws vary with time and place.

the aim of the magistrate's statement of the case, for he 'holds the scales between his hands.'

When pronouncing the verdict, the judge justifies an indulgent sentence by some such statement as: "With a view to giving the condemned an opportunity to amend..."; or, when he applies the full rigor of the law: "to make an example of..."; "to satisfy public indignation..."; and, for cases of odious crime: "to halt a spreading evil...".

The law must punish certain acts. It is necessary to assure the regular functioning of institutions. The threat of punishment and its application being of a nature to impede the committing or repeating these acts, the law can and ought to punish them, but only if that is conformable to justice and only within the limits of justice: not more than is necessary, not more than is just.

In public acts, ordinances, annotations of the Sovereign, the concept of justice is frequently recalled to mind: "Justice - a contribution to the work of moral improvement"; "Punish so as not to have to punish further." In certain circumstances, when several possible dispositions are envisaged: "The best fruit of the Code is to stifle evil designs in the heart."

#### Society in Action

Administrative acts (reports, instructions, decisions), disciplinary sanctions against functionaries, annotations of the Sovereign, royal ordinances, mutual cooperation between governmental organisms and the Sovereign, acts involving remission of imposts or taxes, amnesties, individual or collective requests, appeals for redress or reform made to the authorities or even to the Sovereign by the educated elements (on their own initiative or in response to the periodic invitation of the authorities, the Court, or even the Sovereign himself), successive legal dispositions modifying the Code or previous dispositions and adapting the law to circumstances—all this obviously gives a fuller and more objective idea of the workings of Vietnamese society than a

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3. The same principle holds in politics. The State does not attempt to arrogate to itself an absolute value. Politics do not outweigh morality in the order of importance and dignity. Moral development remains the end of all rational activity; politics is only a means.

cold reading of the Code, weighed down as it is with technical, often abstruse, Chinese terms and archaic dispositions, or a dry reading of the Annals.

#### Public Works

Administrative authorities were admonished to lend particular attention to the matter of obligatory service or voluntary contribution in money or labor for the erection or upkeep of public works outside the village area. (After notice or upon request of administrative authority, the village takes responsibility for its own projects.) It is always required that the District Head submit any such projects to the provincial authorities. In matters of greater importance the provincial authorities in turn must refer to the Ministers. On the administrative acts there will appear some such expression as: "Matter relating to contribution in money or labor on the part of the population." A prior condition is the desire on the part of the people for the proposed project, or at least their assent to the utility of the works contemplated.

Expropriation of property, private or communal, is indemnified by the State.

#### Women's Status

The woman's role is far from negligible. The law prescribes that inheritance goes in equal parts to all the children, girls as well as boys, though in practice the boys are favored by receiving immovable goods, the girls jewels and liquid cash. It is recognized that a will may dispose of part of the inheritance to assure the cult of ancestors (upkeep of the temple, care of the graves, expenses of the annual ceremonies), assigning this to the care of the eldest son. A widow may retain an inheritance or divide it after consultation with her grown-up children, or if the children are minors, with the brothers of her deceased husband, retaining a share for her own support. In marriage, in practice there is community of goods. In all acts relating to the acquisition, alienation, rental of property, and to loans, the wife shares title with the husband. The mother is queen of the home. Often she controls the purse. She is responsible for the education of her daughters. The husband's sphere of interest is the 'forum'.

### Public Assistance

Generally speaking, the family or the village is responsible for its own sick, handicapped, old or infirm. In ancient times the State created institutions for the care of such cases if they had no family to be responsible for them. Vagabonds without family are committed to the charge of the village. 'Difficult' cases who do not get along with their family are brought back and turned over to the family or the village.

### Village Autonomy

An element of equilibrium in the institutions of the country, much remarked by foreign authors, is Vietnam's village or community autonomy. All villages honor their founders. Villages retain their local customs, as recorded in their founding documents, without prejudice to a deep national and cultural unity. Such customs come to light in appeals to moral observances, feasts, common anniversaries, individual labor or cooperation expected in times of danger - a break in the dykes, fire - with sanctions in case of failure to respond, mutual assistance, commemorations of community benefactors whose names are inscribed in the founding documents, arbitration of disputes, sanctions for contravening established regulations, etc., etc. These customs do not contradict the laws of the country and do not prevail against them (the Code provides punishment for abuses by community authorities).

The common saying: "The King's law does not override village custom," is simply small town boastfulness, indicating local pride in their own way of doing things, and not made in a spirit of contempt for royal authority. Persons honored for services to the State have rank of precedence in the village and are highly esteemed by the inhabitants. Every inhabitant owes service to the State. The village makes an annual declaration of the names and the number of its adult able-bodied inhabitants. It is to the village that the State addresses itself when requisitioning its quota of military recruits. It is to the mayor of the village that the Administration sends its official acts. The mayor's seal is conferred by the Administration. The mayor, however, is above all the representative of the village and the spokesman of its rights. The choice of mayor is made by the village, with sanction given by the Administration. For community affairs the mayor plays rather the role of executive agent of the deliberations of the ancients, the notables, the representatives of the inhabitants (this apart and distinct from his proper competence, which is to draw up

attestations and certifications. Sale of property between individuals for example, is certified by the mayor, who stamps the document with his official seal).

The mayor and the village notables receive no pay.

### Community Land

Community land already under cultivation is inalienable. Any proposed change must be sanctioned by the Sovereign. The use of community land or important revenue thereof requires the general consent of the inhabitants.

A particular institution in Vietnam, much remarked by outsiders, is the re-division of community land every three years, in equal lots, among all the inhabitants, with an area reserved for community expenses (including education, award to outstanding students, recognition of particularly meritorious examples of filial piety or other virtues). Widows, old men, the infirm, are assigned lots of lesser importance. In this way the able-bodied, upon whom falls the weight of taxes and service to the State, are able to group their lots and rent them out in common to pay their taxes and cover their services. In many cases there still remains something for personal cultivation and income. This institution exists nearly everywhere in the country. In many villages the land under common cultivation since early times is much more important than privately owned property. In the South, which developed in more recent centuries, consequent on official encouragement to individuals who are willing and able to open new areas, it was prescribed under Ming Mang that at least one tenth of the land already privately owned revert to community ownership.

### Founding Villages

A Vietnamese dream is to become the founder of a village. This requires money and followers to join in the venture, if official sanction is to be obtained. This in turn implies moral authority and qualities of leadership on the founder's part. The pioneer aims to

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4. The predominant aim of the pioneer was the establishment of a new community for the honor it brought, rather than the opening of new country for personal gain. We speak especially of the period since Gia Long. For the South, where population was sparse and land was fertile, individuals sought to better themselves, without much thought of new communities. Taxes on newly opened land were very light at first. In general, taxes on community-owned land are higher than those on private land. They are easier to collect and the weight bears less heavily on the individual.

bring a new area under cultivation to the profit of a future community, which community, he hopes, will be officially erected into a village after bringing a minimum number of inhabitants settled in residence. If he succeeds, the founder's name will be held in perpetual memory, the State will accord him honor while alive and grant him honorary title after his death. The register containing data on the origin of the village, the signature of the founder, authorization of the Government, etc., is preserved as a precious relic by the village. It is the Liberty Bell of the village. The notable who guards it is held in higher esteem than the mayor. A copy is deposited in a special section of the Government's Pavilion of the Archives in the Capital City.

Private initiative encouraged by the State has thus been responsible for wide open spaces under cultivation, contributing to the settlement of the country and its progress. The system called for qualities of initiative, a communal sense, ability to organize, mutual assistance, discipline, recognition of merit, self-policing and defense against robbers and brigands. From this arises the sense of village personality, tracing its foundation to its own efforts, and owing its identity to no one else. The custom has also contributed to the homogeneity and binding of the country.

#### Education

Education in Vietnam is based on the humanistic teachings of Confucius. Great schools were established in the Capital and in the larger centers. Each province had its central educational establishment as did each district. Scholars of renown were much sought after as masters. State sanction was given by public examinations held in preparation for the triennial concours in the Capital, at which bachelor diplomas (two degrees) and the doctorate were awarded. In general the system of education was that of private schools supported by the family, with examinations held under public supervision and degrees awarded by public authority. For the lower grades certificates were issued by the district or provincial centers. Stress was laid on different studies in different localities. Some, as in the capital, tended to stress politics and administration, others rhetoric or poetry, still others philosophy (cf. the study of the I ching in the region between north and center). The national examinations took these tendencies into account and were more exacting in the favorite branches of the region. The choice of examiners was a delicate job. Unpopular choice might result in agitation, pamphleteering, or even boycott. Politicians had a healthy respect for student opinion.

Opposition on the part of the student class and educated opinion often led to the removal of Ministers, the fall of Cabinets, or even revolution.

In 1920 the French authorities objected to the traditional educational system and abolished the national examination. They had already subjected it to modification previously.

### Public Opinion

Periodically the Sovereign or the various government departments would ask the inhabitants of the country, without distinction, to make recommendations on public affairs. Sometimes, even without invitation, it was done by capable and energetic individuals. Recognized scholars, even though not holding public office, were accepted as confreres by government officials and were consulted on public matters.

### Needed Modern Renovation

That the traditional institutions in this and other matters were not perfect the people freely recognized. A well known adage points up their relative skepticism: "Rare indeed it is to have an enlightened Sovereign and a capable Minister at the same time." The Sovereign was expected to provide leadership in collaboration with the Court, which rose from the people by way of the national examinations and was considered to represent the elite of public opinion. The Court, however, is at the same time an organized opinion and a body of hierarchic functionaries. Admittedly the Sovereign recognized that his conduct was subject to judgment according to the opinion of the people. Should the Court, however, oppose the will of the Sovereign and find itself meeting a resolute attitude, the result is conflict. Harmony would be in jeopardy also if the Sovereign sided with one faction of the Court. Likewise, if some strong personality or powerful Court faction were to impose its will upon the Sovereign. There is also the matter of over-long tenure of office. How to secure governmental stability and make use of experience while avoiding the disadvantages of over-long tenure were not unknown (for example, in ancient times, even Sovereigns resigned, to become advisers to their successors).

It may be that heretofore conditions did not favor a more representative form of government, one that would more faithfully and more rapidly reflect the aspirations and opinions of the moment, even had



such form been contemplated. (The ancient books speak of the first sovereigns of China acceding to the supreme function by selection and not by birth, and teach that this is the best form of government.) Under present world conditions the adoption of modern democratic institutions of government appears mandatory.

The revolutionary heroes who, under the French occupation, made themselves emigres in order to fight for independence saw this clearly enough. While continuing to fight French oppression, they became convinced of the need to introduce modern reforms after the pattern of what they saw agitated for or applied in China and Japan, and incorporated them in their programs.

A further influence tending to give weight to this view was the necessity the Vietnam Government felt under the French Protectorate to win and keep the people's support in the fight to defend the country's rights.

We recall the dramatic scene preceding the signing of the French-Vietnamese Convention of November 6, 1925. Bao Dai, then a child, was about to succeed his father on the Throne. He was also destined to continue his studies in France. The French came up with the idea that the first function of the Sovereign was of a ritual order and that during the King's minority the French Representative would sign decrees having the validity of royal ordinances. The Vietnamese president of the Council of Ministers, Nguyen Huu Bai, rejected the proposal as a displacement of the national sovereignty. In the absence of the Sovereign, said he, the rights of sovereignty devolve upon the people. Therefore it would be requisite that the then functioning consultative Assembly become a chamber of representatives having deliberative power. To French opposition he replied that their demands rendered the fulfillment of his office of chief of government utterly impossible. In the end a compromise was agreed upon, according to which all important affairs were to require the opinion of the consultative Assembly (to be denominated a chamber of representatives) and that all measures before becoming executory were to be deliberated upon by the Council of Ministers and were to require the agreement of the Council. The Council thus would hold the ultimate power of decision.

In 1933 the French promoted a new 'reform'. The Council of Ministers was no longer to be a collective organism representing the Government of Vietnam vis-a-vis the French, but was to become a sort of joint committee presided over by the French Representative, with individual voting in which the French chairman would also take part.

Ironically enough, this was supposed to promote the idea that the Sovereign holds personal authority. The French Representative moreover was to render public acts executory. He thus became in fact the head of Government and the head of State.

The author of this article, then Minister of the Interior, protested against this destruction of institutions as being in effect the termination of national sovereignty. He held out for a chamber of representatives having deliberative power. French refusal even to discuss this proposal determined him to resign. He had already fought with success against the incipient communist movement and saw the danger of such emasculation of the country's sovereignty, as well as the necessity for democratic reforms.

Vietnam has a right to independence. Through long centuries she has shown the will to live, has surmounted severe crises, and has demonstrated as much political maturity as her neighbors who in fact enjoy real independence. She ought not to be entrammelled in a French 'union' or 'association' that renders the functioning of government more arduous than it is in completely free countries. On the other hand, the British Commonwealth, for example, while maintaining certain definite ties on the basis of complete equality, eliminates centralized control. It respects the personality proper to each of its members. It permits moreover the free play of democratic institutions in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, which itself recommends the promotion of democratic institutions.

#### The Future of Democracy in Vietnam

To promote true democracy in Vietnam we must enhance the idea of the human dignity, and reject those false ideologies which would bring us to agnosticism, indifferentism and ultimately nihilism. Certain educated elements have already allowed themselves, perhaps unwittingly, to be impregnated with these false ideas. Alert to defend the notion of the value and dignity of the human person, we must promote the idea of the common good, and acknowledge the supreme authority of a personal God.

In education the Government should encourage the founding of free universities in various parts of the country, free to adapt themselves

to the intellectual needs and artistic tendencies of each local area.

We should seek neighborly collaboration with other countries in sharing a common culture and in solving common problems. Asiatic countries have a profound sense of the appreciation of the spiritual value. By such meeting of minds, wills and deeds, we should be able to contribute to and gain from the maintenance of the security indispensable to the existence of democracy. By such meeting we would also have opportunities to deepen the appreciation of the value of other civilizations as well as the work of our own traditional culture.

### A ROMAN GENERAL'S OPINION OF MILITARY CRITICS

LUCIUS AEMILIUS PAULUS, A Roman Consul, who had been selected to conduct the war with the Macedonians, B.C. 168, went out from the Senate-House into the assembly of the people and addressed them as follows:

In every circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people who lead armies into Macedonia; who know where the camp ought to be placed; what posts ought to be occupied by troops; when and through what pass that territory should be entered; where Magazines should be formed; how provisions should be conveyed by land and sea; and when it is proper to engage the enemy, when to lie quiet.

And they not only determine what is best to be done, but if any thing is done in any other manner than what they have pointed out, they arraign the consul, as if he were on trial before them.

These are great impediments to those who have the management of affairs; for every one cannot encounter injurious reports with the same constancy and firmness of mind as Fabius did, who chose to let his own ability be questioned through the folly of the people, rather than to mismanage the public business with a high reputation.

I am not one of those who think that commanders ought at no time to receive advice; on the contrary, I should deem that man more proud than wise, who regulated every proceeding by the standard of his own single judgment.

What then is my opinion?

That commander should be counselled, chiefly, by persons of known talent; by those who have made the art of war their particular study, whose knowledge is derived from experience; from those who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy; who see the advantages that occasions offer, and who, like people embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the danger.

If, therefore, any one thinks himself qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct, which may prove advantageous to the public, let him not refuse his assistance to the state, but let him come with me into Macedonia.

He shall be furnished with a ship, a horse, a tent, even his traveling charges shall be defrayed.

But if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the repose of a city life to the toils of war, let him not, on land, assume the office of a pilot.

The city, in itself, furnishes abundance of topics for conversation; let it confine its passion for talking within its own precincts, and rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any but such as shall be framed within our camp.

\*Titus Livius, born 59 B.C., died A.D. 17.

"A REPORT ON SOUTH VIETNAM", REMARKS BY THE HONORABLE ROGER HILSMAN,  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AT THE  
AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION MEETING, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.

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In the period when Mr. Acheson was Secretary of State and General Marshall was Secretary of Defense, it is said that the two men had a special understanding.

Whenever anyone said, "This is a purely military problem," or "This is a purely political or diplomatic problem," then whoever said it had to leave the room.

In South Vietnam we are confronted with an extraordinary example of the way military decision and action are interdependent with many other decisions and enterprises. The war there is a guerrilla war, any successful means on countering guerrilla war are as much political as military, for the long-run task is nation-building.

This guerrilla war is a form of hidden communist aggression, an internal war, if you will. As President Kennedy has said, "Their aggression is more often concealed than open. They have fired no missiles and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is required, it is usually done by others -- by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins striking alone -- assassins who have taken the lives of four thousand civil officers in the last twelve months in Vietnam alone -- by subversives and saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some cases control whole areas inside of independent nations."

This war in the shadows may well be one of the most decisive battles of our time. My subject is a report on one of these shadow wars, the one in South Vietnam, and I would like to start by giving you my outline: There is a guerrilla war in South Vietnam so I would like, first, to say something about guerrilla warfare in general -- the conditions in which it arises and a strategic concept for fighting against it. Second, I would like to tell you how these ideas are being applied in South Vietnam. And, finally, I'd like to give you a report on how things are going there in South Vietnam.

There is something about guerrilla warfare which gives rise to legends. It is part of the operation, in fact, to see that the enemy is full of rumors which keep him in the dark as to facts.

But in appraising the uses of guerrilla tactics we should certainly try to separate legends from realities.

So it seems useful to begin with the elementary observation that guerrilla warfare is possible only in two very special sets of circumstances:

The first is, when the main body of the enemy is otherwise engaged. When France was occupied by the Germans in World War II, virtually the entire population hated the Nazis. There was a well-organized and supplied guerrilla movement -- the Maquis. But so long as the German Armies had nothing else to do, the French guerrillas could not be effective. There were many individual acts of sabotage and violence, but not much else. At any time that a small guerrilla band attacked, the Germans could counter with overwhelming force.

But after D-Day, when the German Divisions were fully engaged in fighting the Allies, the Maquis became a formidable and effective force.

The second set of circumstances is now the more usual setting for guerrillas when they operated in the emerging, still developing countries of the world. In much of the world today, the different communities that make up what we think of as Nation-States are isolated from the Central Government -- isolated by lack of communications or by the terrain, as in mountains, islands, or the desert, but more importantly isolated in psychological and political sense.

The basic situation in many underdeveloped areas is that the villages are turned inward on themselves. The people are living there as they have for hundreds of years, with few ties to their Government. They appear rarely to have strong political convictions one way or another. In my personal experience in Southeast Asia during World War II where a few of us in the OSS were sent behind the enemy lines to organize bands of guerrillas against the Japanese, it seemed to us that perhaps ten percent of the people had some sympathies for our side and perhaps ten percent had some sympathies for the Japanese but eighty percent of the populace did not have much awareness of the struggle being fought out in their country. Much less did they have ideological convictions. Even with white faces we recruited a guerrilla force that was larger in numbers than the Communist guerrilla force in South Vietnam today.

My point is that in these underdeveloped, but at the same time

ancient cultures, the villagers are isolated from each other and from the Central Government in a way that we in the West are not equipped by our experience to understand. The villagers are turned inward on themselves and identify not with the Nation but often only with their family, clan, and village.

Let me illustrate my point.

Recently some friends of mine made a tour of the border areas of such a country. They visited forty villages. In ten of these villages no one had ever seen a Government Official of any kind -- neither the District Chief nor the Province Chief, much less a Representative of the National Government. They also visited a town, where one would expect the people to be better informed than those in the villages. There they talked to a shopkeeper, and one would expect a shopkeeper to be better informed than, say, a laborer. They asked the shopkeeper who the King of the Country was and he proudly named him and pointed to a picture on the wall -- which had, incidentally, been furnished by the United States Information Service. He was asked who the Prime Minister was, however, and inexplicably named not the Prime Minister of his own Country, but the Prime Minister of a nearby country. It seems that the nearby country had radio broadcasts which he could pick up on his transistor radio and he naturally assumed that since he could hear the broadcast the Country must be his own.

What happens when a village with people as isolated as these is visited by a tough band of armed marauders? The villagers are unarmed and the guerrillas are armed. It is not surprising that the villages give or sell the guerrillas rice. It is not surprising that the guerrillas can recruit a few young men to join their guerrilla band with promises of adventure and good things to come. In such circumstances the people do not have to be "against" the Government for a guerrilla unit to thrive. The people do not have to support the guerrilla for a guerrilla movement to thrive.

(Any comparison with our own world must be far fetched, but one may ask whether the citizens of Chicago supported the gangs which flourished in the twenties? The shopkeeper who was hit by "protected you" racket did not "support the gangs", but he often had no choice but to go along with them. Government protection seemed far away, and the threat from the hoodlums was close by. The same is true in the underdeveloped areas of the world, where the villages are not only isolated, but also both unarmed and unprotected.)



Against this background, I would suggest two principles as a strategic concept for countering guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped regions of the world.

The first principle is that fighting a guerrilla war in an underdeveloped nation requires as much political and civic action as it does military action. President Roosevelt once said that "Dr. New Deal had been succeeded by Dr. Win The War", but in guerrilla wars in underdeveloped Nations both Doctors are needed. Military action and a Social New Deal have to proceed together. The isolated villages must be tied into the governmental structure -- at District, Province and ultimately the national level. The goal is to create a network in which information about the needs of the villagers can flow upward and Government Services can flow downward.

This flow of services from the Government must go all the way across the board -- feeder roads so the villagers can get their products to markets; radios and radio stations so their minds can be opened up to the outside world; food from a prosperous part of the country when famine strikes in another part of the country; education for the young; books and magazines for the old so that they will not lose their literacy for lack of something to read as so often happens; and medical services.

I know that it is familiar to those of you in this audience, but it is not familiar to most Americans just how heavy some of the ancient but now controllable scourges of mankind weigh on the peoples of the world. In parts of Thailand, 80 percent of the people are infested with the liver fluke. Hookworm devilitates the populations in most of Asia. The World Health Organization, our own Aid Programs, and the efforts of many of these countries in their own behalf have made enormous strides in controlling Malaria. But countless millions of people are afflicted with controllable diseases against which no progress has really been attempted.

You in this room could list these diseases and their consequences much better than I. But let me make two points.

The first is that controlling many of these diseases is not only a question of hospitals, X-Ray equipment, and a high proportion of Doctors to total population. Much can be done by teaching the villages the elementary facts about sanitation, by Medical Technicians trained to deal with one or two particular diseases, and by an adequate supply of modern drugs.

The second point is that it is often these one or two endemic but controllable diseases that stand in the way of economic progress and development, and hence contribute greatly to Communist opportunity for subversion and aggression by guerrilla warfare.

To sum up this first principle -- that the villages must be tied into the governmental and national fabric -- let me say that it is well for us to remember that in these parts of the world it is a revolutionary idea that the people of a country can expect their Government to help them, protect them. They have never asked what their country can do for them, much less what they can do for their country. Indeed, there are millions of people who do not know what a country or Government is. If we are looking for a revolutionary appeal to excite and inspire these people, it is the simple concept that Government exists to serve and protect them.

My second principle concerns the military side of fighting guerrillas, but in a peculiarly political way. The principle is that in fighting guerrillas, military operations must be so conducted as to achieve political ends. Stated another way, the principle would be that to fight guerrillas you must adopt the tactics of the guerrilla himself.

Orthodox military tactics are aimed at taking and holding territory. Military formations designed for these purposes are large and slower moving. The guerrilla on the other hand, does not aim to take territory, but to win recruits and alienate the people from their Government. The guerrilla's purpose is well served when large military formations sweep the countryside, for this tends to make life difficult for the villagers and, hence, to make the villagers turn against their Government. Thus, for political reasons the military tactics used against guerrillas should be those of the guerrilla himself -- small roving units constantly patrolling and ambushing. Finally, these tactics should be designed to cut the lines of communication between the guerrilla and the thousands of villages to which he goes for food and recruits.

You have heard of the so-called strategic hamlets and villages that are now being built in South Vietnam. This is a concept that was developed in Malaya during the Communist Guerrilla War there, and is now being applied in South Vietnam.

You remember my earlier point that in underdeveloped areas the

villagers are not necessarily pro-guerrilla. But unless there is some way of protecting them from Maudauding Guerrilla Bands they will be obliged to give or to sell food to the guerrilla and to listen to his propaganda.

One purpose of the strategic village is to give villages this protection -- or, rather, to help the villager to protect himself. Without arms or protection the villager cannot refuse to give or sell his rice to the Communists, for fear of retaliation. Without protection, the villager is afraid to pass on information about the Communist guerrillas to the Government.

A second purpose of the strategic village is to control the movement of people and supplies. Identity cards are issued; and curfews are imposed. Thus anyone on the roads and trails at night can be assumed to be a Communist.

Through the use of Identity Cards and intelligence from the people, the small group of hard-core Communists in a village of several hundred people can be identified and arrested. The barbed wire and curfews deny the guerrillas easy access to the villages. If the guerrillas need rice, they must attack a defended village. Thus the whole war is turned around. Instead of the Government forces chasing the Communists and falling into ambush, the Communists must attack the villages and so fall into ambushes themselves.

It should be stressed that the strategic hamlets are not concentration camps. The purpose is to keep the guerrillas out of the villages, rather than keep the villagers in. Inevitably, of course, when one throws a barbed wire fence around a village there is a degree of regimentation. But this is a type of war and some form of regimentation cannot be avoided. There is a parallel in our own history. The early settlements of America had stockades around them and life went on behind the stockades for a long time. Our ancestors did not like the rule that everyone had to be inside the stockade at sundown. They did not like to bring up their children in such an atmosphere, but they built the stockades as a first step towards a way of life in which stockades were no longer necessary.

Now let us see how the South Vietnamese Government is applying these principles against the Communist guerrillas.

There are 15,000 - 20,000 hard-core, full-time Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam, and many thousands more sympathizers, part-time Communist guerrillas, and political and propaganda agents.

South Vietnam is a nation of about 14 million, so this does not represent a mass movement.

But in an underdeveloped country with poor communications, with mountains and jungles, terrorists and subversive agents in these numbers can cause much damage.

The major concentrations of the Communist guerrillas -- who are commonly called the Viet Cong -- are in the mountains near the Laotian border in the North; in the mountains extending eastward toward the coast in the central region of South Vietnam and southward toward Saigon; and in the Mekong River Delta area, including the plain of reeds, West and South of Saigon.

The Communists try to maintain the fiction that this is a civil war arising spontaneously from within South Vietnam.

This is not true. The Communists in North Vietnam are directing this guerrilla movement. For years, they have been sending in trained men to be the cadre for the Communist Viet Cong battalions. These trained men slip into South Vietnam over various overland infiltration routes that lead from North Vietnam through mountains and jungles and by junk landings along the South Vietnamese coastline. And let me make this clear -- by using these infiltration routes and conducting a guerrilla war the Communists are committing aggression. The guerrilla movement in South Vietnam is directed from outside by an enemy nation. It is interference by military force in the affairs of another nation.

What comes over these infiltration routes? The answer is -- largely trained men. These are jungle trails -- not roads -- and the men must walk. They can carry food for their journey. They can carry arms and ammunition. They can carry medical supplies. They can carry money. And they can carry specialized equipment, such as radios and perhaps some light automatic weapons.

The food for the guerrillas in South Vietnam must be obtained in South Vietnam itself. Moreover, by hitting army, security, and police units suddenly and in superior force, the guerrillas are able to assure themselves a local supply of arms and ammunition and reduce their dependence on long supply lines from the North. This is demonstrated by analyzing the equipment captured from the Communist Viet Cong. The arms captured from the Communists are old weapons left over from the

days when Vietnam was a French Colony, those that the Communists have captured from the South Vietnamese forces, or homemade guns, mines, grenades and even crossbows with poison arrows.

Thus there are two lines of supply for the Communist Viet Cong. The first is the infiltration routes which supply largely trained men -- officers, and non-commissioned officers -- and specialized equipment and supplies. The second are the hundreds of jungle trails leading into thousands of South Vietnamese villages, like spokes on a wheel. It is from these villages that the Communists get food, recruits, and the raw materials from which to manufacture arms and ammunition. As I said before, the villagers do not necessarily support the Communists, but when the Communists have access to the villages they can obtain the supplies by both intimidation and purchase.

This, then, is the enemy situation. The South Vietnamese Program for dealing with this situation has three objectives:

The first is to strengthen the regular army and security forces and increase their mobility.

Here the United States Aid is vital, and the vigorous program instituted by Secretary of Defense McNamara has been having magnificent results. As you have read in the papers, the United States has furnished arms and equipment and, most importantly, helicopters which give the regular South Vietnamese Army lightning mobility to reinforce people attacked by the Communists, and to seek out and pursue the Communists in the mountains and jungles.

The second objective of the program is to cut the infiltration routes.

The Geneva Agreements neutralizing Laos specify that the territory of Laos shall not be used for these purposes. Whether the North Vietnamese will keep their word remains to be seen. But in any case the South Vietnamese are not powerless. As you can see from a glance at the map, these infiltration routes must in some instances wind their way for long distances inside South Vietnam before reaching the areas of Viet Cong concentration, and the South Vietnamese are taking measures to cut these routes inside South Vietnam itself.

An important part of the measures to cut the infiltration routes

is the recent decision to arm the Montagnards. The Montagnards are the mountain peoples of South Vietnam -- hardy, courageous men. Recently thousands of Montagnards have fled into the lowlands to get away from the Viet Cong whose modern arms were too much for the only weapons the Montagnards had -- spears, and bows and arrows.

The South Vietnamese Government decided to equip the Montagnards with modern weapons, furnished by the United States. The Montagnards are trained in the use of these weapons, and sent back into their home territories to establish strategic villages of their own in the mountains through which the infiltration routes pass. Our special forces training officers estimate that about 23,000 square miles are already under the Montagnards' protection and that in four months the total may be 40,000 square miles. According to reports, 7,000 Montagnards have already been trained and given weapons and another 3,000 are being trained.

The third objective of the South Vietnamese is the strategic village program I have mentioned, which is designed to cut the major routes of supply and deny Communist access to thousands of unprotected villages.

This program calls for putting defenses around existing villages -- barbed wire, watchtowers, and ditches filled with bamboo spikes and booby traps. It calls for giving each village a radio which the village can use to call for reinforcements by helicopter if they are attacked by a Viet Cong force too large for them to handle. It calls for arms for the villagers to use themselves when attacked.

There is one misconception about this program I would like to correct. These plans, unlike those in Malaya, do not call for relocating villages except in rare circumstances. In general, the defenses are to be put around existing villages. Although there are one or two places in heavily penetrated regions where villages have actually had to be regrouped, these are the exception, not the rule.

The strategic villages will provide protection. At the same time, the South Vietnamese plan to use the strategic village idea as a way to tie the villagers into the governmental structure and to provide the villages with Government Services -- Health, Education, Agricultural Services, Police Protection, and good village Administration.

South Vietnamese Government Plans call for civic action teams sent by the provincial and national governments which will not only help the villagers in setting up their defenses, but will also expand the political, social, and economic base for integrating of the villages into the national fabric. For example, these teams include a medical technician, a school teacher, an agricultural credit representative, a public information representative, two or three public administration advisors, and a youth activities representative, as well as a Police Advisor, a Civil Guard Liaison Officer to man the radio that calls for reinforcements if attacked, and a squad of soldiers to issue weapons to the villagers and provide training in their use.

When this program is completed, in addition to the protection afforded, the South Vietnamese should have a much improved structure that will permit information about the needs of the villagers to go up the ladder of Government and services to meet their needs to come down.

On the military side, it will provide hedgehock of defended villages, zones of defended villages which will act as a meat grinder when the Communist guerrillas venture into them. Each of the villages will have its own self-defense corps to resist attack. In the empty spaces between the villages, Civil Guard Units will patrol and lay ambush during curfew hours. If the Viet Cong come into the zone, they are very likely to run into a Civil Guard ambush. Even if the Viet Cong do not run into an ambush, sooner or later they will run out of food and be forced to attack instead of being chased. The guerrilla is ambushed rather than ambushing.

This then is the theory, and the program for putting theory into practice. The final question is now, how is it working out in South Vietnam.

So far we have grounds for guarded optimism.

Vigorous support for Secretary McNamara and the Department of Defense has given the South Vietnamese Army new confidence. It is attacking the Viet Cong and has been having gratifying success.

Over 2,000 strategic hamlets have been built, and 1,000 of these are now equipped with radios as a result of United States Aid.

Not all of these strategic villages are perfect. Some do not have enough arms and equipment. In some places, too, there has not yet been

enough money to pay the villagers for the time they have spent on building the village defenses and inevitably in some villages there is some resentment.

On the other hand, the early returns seem to indicate that the villagers' morale and their attitude toward their Government are much better than some press reports might lead us to believe.

There have been some very positive press statements that the Government of South Vietnam is unpopular with the villagers. But how can one generalize about the attitude of some 12 million villagers. There are no Gallup polls. I myself do not know the answer to this question and I doubt seriously that anyone does.

I can, however, give you a few hard facts that may be at least straws in the wind.

First, one would expect that if the villagers were anti-Government and pro-Viet Cong they would defect to the Communists when they were given arms. Of the villages that have been armed so far, I know of none that has gone over to the Communist side.

Second, if the villagers were merely indifferent to their Government they would sell their arms to the Communists -- and the Communists have offered very high prices for these arms. But of the villages that have been armed so far, I know of none where the arms have been sold to the Communists.

In fact, the villages have used their arms to fight the Communists. Of the villages that have been armed so far, only a few as yet have been attacked, but all of them have fought when attacked and fought well. Only five percent of the village radios have been lost as a result of Viet Cong action, and we really expected the rate to be much higher. More than this, in the last few weeks a high percentage of the Viet Cong killed have been killed by villagers resisting Viet Cong attack.

Let us take one week as an example. During one week in August, over 600 Viet Cong were killed as against less than 100 killed among the pro-Government forces. And of these 600 Viet Cong killed, two-thirds were killed not by the South Vietnamese regular Army, but by villagers armed through the strategic village program. This, I think, is an encouraging indication of the attitudes of the villagers.

In sum then, although the plans are just beginning to be implemented, the results are encouraging. The defection rate of the



Viet Cong has risen and the recruitment rate has gone down. Just in the last two months there are areas of South Vietnam that are now safe that only last spring could not be entered without a company of armed guards.

There is a long way to go. It took seven years to eliminate guerrillas in Malaya. It may take less than this in Vietnam or it may take more, but it stands that we have reason to feel confident that in the end the South Vietnamese -- with our help -- will win.

Item.

## THE INSURGENT BATTLEFIELD

(Talk at Air Force Academy by Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale, USAF 25 May :

### I.

This is a little talk on some "facts of life." It's not the usual one about the bees and the flowers. It concerns some hard facts you should know for your life, as an American military man, on today's Communist insurgent battlefield. You'll need your eyes wide open when you get there.

Today's battlefield is the result of a strategic flanking movement. For some time now, the Communist leaders have made it plain that they expect to conquer the world. The short road to conquest could only be taken by making full use of military power. Our own great and alert strength has served as a military deterrent, which has forced the Communists to take the long way around in trying to reach their goal.

This "long way" is conquest by subversion in all of its aspects, supported by guerrilla forces when needed. The Communist guerrilla operations increasingly have involved American military men. Our military advisors, in assisting the armed forces of free foreign nations, simply have had to learn how to give practical advice on fighting Communist guerrillas, or else. The "or else" is the penalty of seeing an ally go under.

Our military effort along these lines, in what we now call "counter-insurgency," has been greatly heartened by the personal interest of President Kennedy. The U. S. military establishment is responding with tremendous vitality. The top echelon, including Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General LeMay definitely, are dedicated to making our effort succeed. You probably have noted that they get out to the critical areas, in person, to make it count most where it's needed most. Further, in "counter-insurgency," we have new military doctrine, new staffs in the Pentagon, new command structures in the field, special units, and new courses on the subject in our military schools and colleges.

All of this splendid effort, its organization, its training, its equipment, are working towards having what it takes to win...at the point of decision...on the insurgent battlefield. It boils down to a

pretty lonely spot. At some place, on the insurgent battlefield, it comes to a unit of an allied military force, with an American military advisor, right up against the enemy. That American had better know his stuff. One day, that American might be you.

You'll be key man, on the spot.

In case it is you, let me help you get prepared for that moment. The best start I know is to get oriented to the insurgent battle and to its battlefield. When you locate your own vital part in these surroundings, all your heritage, and training, and equipment will start clicking into place.

What, then, is this battle?

What does the insurgent battlefield look like?

## II.

The battlefield is a whole country, when Communist guerrillas are active.

If we were to map it truly, to show what it really looks like as a Communist insurgent battlefield, we would have to put in all the people in the land. They are the dominant feature of this battlefield, above all else. We would see the battle for what it is: to win these people. When the people are won, along with them go the terrain, the wealth of the land, the whole existence of the nation.

The strategy and tactics which take place on this battlefield are based on winning the people. As long as they are, the battle starts getting won. When strategy and tactics are used which don't contribute to winning the people, the battle starts getting lost.

Thus, on our true map of the battlefield, we would see a nation's entire population. Among the people, from one side, we would see the Communists hard at work, attracting and coercing, to gain control of this population. Among the population, from the other side, the government side, we would see the adherents of the government at work to maintain the loyalty and support of the people. When these two polarizing forces are thus competing, it's the one that can build up and maintain the strongest attraction force that wins. If the force on the government side is weakened, by diffusing the polarization, by shutting off vital parts of it, the government loses.

On a Communist insurgent battlefield, the military man is most often the government representative who is out among the people. The armed forces usually are the largest organization in the government. When the shooting's on they're out in the countryside where the enemy is. Their uniforms tell the people plainly that these are government men.

Magsaysay gave a dynamic role to the Philippine citizens in uniform during the Huk campaign. This dynamic role was called "civic action." In it, the soldier citizen became the brotherly protector of the civilian citizen. Meaningful help to the people, a regard for the dignity of man, and true military courtesy were the essential elements. Civic action formed a bond of brotherhood between soldiers and civilians. When the soldiers and the people joined together, the Communist guerrilla could no longer hide among the people, and were defeated.

This polarizing force is not new to warfare. Those of you who crack your books will recognize it as Sun Tzu's first "constant factor" in the art of war. This practical soldier of 2,000 years ago called it the Moral Law. Mao Tse Tung put this into a code for the 8th Route Army. The code was known as the "Three Rules and the Eight Remarks." Essentially, this code implemented the concept of the people as the water where live the troops as the fish. In Communist North Vietnam, this same forceful principle is used. It is known as the "three recommendations" and is Point 9 of the Military Oath of Honor. General Giap, the Communist commander, stressed the "profound significance" of this code in the defeat of the French.

### III.

The Communists put a lot of patient long work into preparing the insurgent battlefield. They have a lot of resources in place, by the time they field a guerrilla force. Not all of these resources are surfaced when the insurgency is initiated. Significant action elements have a clandestine role, to weaken the government side, up close. Thus, the location of Communist forces would look quite different on a Communist operation map from the Communist order of battle seen on the usual government intelligence map. It's only when a massive intelligence effort is made by the government that the two maps start looking the same.

The Communist preparation of the battlefield in Vietnam began about 40 years ago. That is, it took about 20 years of preparation before the Communists started to field guerrilla forces.

The Japanese invasion and occupation gave the Communists the popular resistance cause they sought. However, the Japanese mostly behaved themselves in Vietnam, due to their deal with Vichy. So, the anti-Japanese war wasn't much of a Communist guerrilla effort, except in gaining experience which paid off after that war in organizing and leading a later guerrilla war for a more dynamic popular cause, freedom from French rule. Many non-Communist Vietnamese fought for their country's freedom from the French, under Communist leadership, without being aware that the leadership was Communist. When they caught on that they weren't fighting for freedom, but to impose Communism on their country, they quit the Communist guerrilla ranks by the thousands. Many of the hardest fighters against the Communists in Vietnam today were once on the other side. A million of them moved South, when North Vietnam was given to the Communists.

If these Vietnamese sound naive, remember that there were many people who once believed that the Chinese Communists were only "agrarian reformers." Even closer home and more recently, remember the people who thought Fidel Castro was merely a liberal reformer. The Communists run an expert confidence game.

Incidentally, in Vietnam, the preparation of the battlefield began with the entry of a tiny handful of Communist agents in the 1920's. They joined in with laborers brought from Singapore by French plantation owners, to build the railroad in Central Vietnam. The U. S. Army Special Forces now have a camp in Vietnam, close to where the first Communist cells were located. As these first Communist agents recruited local Vietnamese cadres, they picked up Ho Chi Minh, who received his higher Communist training later in Paris and Moscow.

The Communist insurgent battlefield in the Philippines got its first preparations at about the same time. The first agents were Malay-Chinese. Later, there was help not only from the Chinese Party, but considerable help from the American Communist Party. The American Communists were mostly merchant seamen in the early days. During the Huk campaign, one of the American Communists -- his name was William Pomeroy -- sneaked up into the hills to join the Communist guerrillas. They wouldn't have him as a fighting man. Instead, they assigned him to teach in one of their jungle schools, which they called "Stalin Universities." As he prepared to teach a class in local Communist history, he found that all reference to help from the American Party had been deleted in the local history given him. When he protested that there wouldn't have been a Philippine Party unless the American Party had helped so generously, he was disciplined. The enemy, the

newly independent Philippine Republic, was being smeared as the puppe of the United States. It would hardly do to have the Philippine Communist history vulnerable to the same charge! In reality, the hard driving force behind Communism in the Philippines has been Chinese right along.

#### IV.

In the years of building an organized force below the surface, the Communists use patience and masterly guile, supported by a highly effective international system. The system was originated by Lenin. It is the well-known complex of international and national "fronts," which Lenin thought of as "transmission belts," running power and resources from the international to the national.

Most people don't recognize one of the hard-core Communist cadre when they see him. Sometimes, the disguise is helped by overly enthusiastic anti-Communists, unwittingly. As part of the enthusiasm, Communists are portrayed as having a Stalin mustache, if not Krushchev's bald head. They are given the look of a crafty "mushik." Helpfully, they wear red stars on a cap or peasant blouse. Some of them are even said to eat babies for breakfast.

So, when a softly-spoken person, looking much like one of the neighbors, moves in on a social structure, as a Communist agent, it is small wonder that he is hard to recognize. He uses local issues in his persuasion, as he carefully recruits and readies others to be as he. In some countries, the Communist cadres even praise U.S. aid when it is popular to do so.

In Vietnam, some of the mountain tribes file their teeth. So, when the Communist agents were selected to work with the tribes a few years back, the first ones in had their own teeth filed.

We have noted, then, that the battlefield is prepared by the Communists over a long period. This is going on today, in nation after nation. If you are assigned to one of our 40-odd MAAGs and military missions in friendly countries, you would do well to be concerned about what your opposite number among the Communists is doing. The chances are more than good that there is such a person, quietly teaching proletarian military science to the cadre, or quietly running a secret logistics system. Will you be doing a better job for the Free World than he is for his?

V.

With the Communist apparatus in place on the battlefield -- which is a nation, remember -- the Communists then play the breaks for a chance to win that nation. They are set to use political action, or military action, or a combination of both, to win their goal. War has been declared all along, from the time the first cadres were in place.

The political action is known as "the legal struggle." It has all the legality of an Al Capone running for mayor of Chicago, plus skilled use of inflammatory local issues. Some artful murders, with the victims usually meeting "accidents," some skillful character assassinations, applied terror, loud noises from "front" organizations, and a timed coup to seize the key spots -- these are the ingredients of "the legal struggle" at its climax.

If the political action doesn't go too well, then the military action is added, to apply naked power to the campaign. Or, if a really patriotic national rebellion gets started, the Communists move in fast with their military cadres, to capture its leadership.

When the Communists surface their guerrillas on the battlefield, we come to the "counter-insurgency" phase with which our military establishment is rapidly becoming so familiar.

The practices of Communist guerrilla warfare are varied enough for days of talk. To give you a "feel" for this enemy, here are some brief comments on three topics: population control, fiscal support, and troop discipline.

Population control: Communist guerrillas control the population by using both salesmanship and intimidation. The political officers with the guerrilla units are usually younger men. They use the "hard sell," reminiscent of our brasher door-to-door salesmen. They sell the joys of Communism, including the joy of bumping off the landlord, along with the sureness that Communism is coming anyhow, so join now.

The guerrilla unit's political officer has a primary aim. He needs a secret organization within the village, to help support his unit. He usually establishes means for justice, policing, and the collection of supplies and intelligence.

In an insurgency, when it is said that the Communists rule the

village at night, it is this apparatus at work. The magistrate holds a court. Marriages are performed. Sentences are carried out. Taxes and other supplies are collected. It becomes the village secret, often totally unknown to the government.

When there isn't time for the political officer to work in the village, or when the village is hostile, terror is used. A quick, brutal lesson is given to the villagers. Senior villagers are often the victims. They are kidnapped from their homes at night. The next morning, their severed heads adorn poles on paths to the village. Next time the Communist guerrillas come around, the scared people give help. A villager who assists the government troops is sure of some punishment. If a village has a police force which is too active in patrolling the neighborhood, hunting guerrillas, it is lured out into the countryside. While the police are out of the village, the guerrillas slip in and murder the police families. Other police, in other villages get the idea, and are afraid to go out on patrol and leave their families unprotected.

Fiscal support: Although the Communist agent apparatus is supported largely by outside, or international funding, the Communist guerrilla lives off the land. At times, he grows his own food. Mostly, however, he depends on the systematic collection of food and supplies in the villages. At harvest time, a farmer is told what share of his crop must be put aside for Communist collection. Villages not only provide funds and food, but also boats, vehicles and cargadores labor.

Crime pays, for the Communist guerrillas. One method they use is kidnapping, for ransom. Another is highway robbery, although it is more normal for them to collect toll. They set up a checkpoint, stop busses, trucks, and private vehicles, and collect a head tax. If any of their victims look suspicious to them, they are apt to be taken prisoner or killed on the spot.

Bank robbery is resorted to, at times. However, it is easier to collect money for "protecting" the bankers, gangster style. In Asia, the banker or money-lender out in the countryside is usually the local Chinese merchant. Paying "protection money," for him, is just a normal way of life, a form of "squeeze."

Kidnapping, highway robbery, and squeezing the money-lender are all current practices of the Communist guerrillas in Vietnam. In the Huk campaign in the Philippines, the Communist guerrillas staged some



melodramatic train robberies, in real Jesse James style. In Vietnam, the Communist guerrillas simply blow up the tracks, wreck the train, and strip the bodies of the victims.

Troop discipline: When a village youth is recruited by Communist guerrillas, there is a romantic appeal to it. He is going to get away from daily chores and live a roaming life of fun and excitement.

The youth quickly finds that the Communist guerrilla unit is run with iron discipline, political indoctrination, and conditioning through "self-criticism." Once in, the only sure way of leaving the unit is death. If captured by government forces, he can be sure that he will have to answer for it to his Communist masters, later.

"Iron discipline" means prompt and severe punishment for any infraction of the rules. Death is as common a punishment as it was in the Middle Ages. A new recruit is often taught the rules dramatically. He is given the assignment of dealing out the punishment. I recall one case. Two village boys joined a Communist unit which was passing through. A few days later, it returned to the neighborhood of this village. One of the boys sneaked off to say hello to his parents. When this was discovered, the other boy was ordered to go to his friend's house and kill him in front of his parents. He did so. If he hadn't, he would have received the same punishment. This act, of course, cut him off from family, friends, and village. All he had left to him was his guerrilla unit and the Communist leaders. He had taken a big step forward, towards becoming one of the "hard core."

Political indoctrination is a Communist guerrilla strength. It is "troop I&E" that never stops. There is at least one formal session every day. During the day, there are quick, informal sessions. The political officer conducts these sessions, and goes right along with the troops on all operations. If you watch a Communist guerrilla unit on the march, when it stops to "take ten," you will see the political officer use the time to give a lecture.

The political officer also is responsible for the "self-criticism" sessions. The French have given the name "auto-intoxication" to the act of "self-criticism," and this is quite descriptive. It's an act in which the military man publicly confesses his weaknesses, particularly any form of selfishness.

For example, after a successful raid, the guerrillas return to their base tired but jubilant. After they've had their rest, the

political officer conducts a "self-criticism" session on the raid. The commander must state where he had a wrong or selfish thought -- in the planning and during the action. The key is, he must see himself as imperfect, state these imperfections openly in public, and vow to overcome impurity of thought or behavior next time. Each of the men goes through the same procedure, publicly. Serious deviations, of course, are punished.

The steady, day-in, day-out psychological conditioning of the "self-criticism" process makes the Communist guerrilla a fanatic. He automatically starts thinking of the group first, himself last.

## VII.

Admittedly, this "guided tour" of the Communist insurgent battlefield has been a quick one. I hope the main points will stick with you. They are:

1. The enemy's objective is to win control of the people living on the battlefield. When he wins them, he wins all else.
2. The enemy prepares the battlefield carefully, over a long time. His battle line probably looks different than the government's.
3. Although the enemy tries to give his guerrillas a local appearance, often they have international strengthening. Cut off this outside support, and they would start failing.
4. The Communist guerrilla is a tough, resourceful, and fanatic enemy. He trains long and hard. He is conditioned psychologically.

It is only natural, when describing a tough enemy, to picture him as a little larger than life size. He will picture you the same way, when you are out on the battlefield yourself and become effective.

If you recall, I pointed out earlier that all of our massive effort finally comes down to some small, lonely point on the Communist insurgent battlefield. This is where the final decision comes. This is where the American, when he is true to the spirit of his heritage, is more than a match for the fanatic Communist.

What is it, really, that you, and I, and other Americans find so precious to defend? What we defend are the principles of free men. These principles are clearly set forth in the Bill of Rights in our

Constitution, to fulfill the promise in our Declaration of Independence. So, we have man the way we see him -- an individual, born to be free, endowed by the Creator with "certain unalienable Rights." And, we have man the way the Communists see him -- a cipher, a zero man, born to be one of the mass slaves of the State.

One final story. A true one. It happened several years ago in Vietnam, before we had MAAG advisors out with the Vietnamese units. President Diem saw one of the MAAG advisors and asked him to go out and stay for some days with a Vietnamese general. The general was commanding an operation against insurgents, near the Plaine des Jones.

President Diem pointed out that the Vietnamese general was a good fighting man. He needed little advice on how to fight and win. But, said President Diem, this highly moral soldier is an aloof man. So please teach him how to love the people. You know, the way you do, as an American.

I appreciate that this sounds highly idealistic and, perhaps an unusual chore for a military man. However, even President Diem's enemies admit that he is a tough and practical realist. He was right on the vital dynamic bean of successful counter-insurgency, when he asked this American's help.

Similar stories are being lived every day in Southeast Asia, by Americans who are giving of themselves, not just doing another tour of duty. Each place these Americans are, the cause of freedom grows. One of them is worth a hundred others who don't live up to the American spirit.

When your turn comes, be like them. Serve in the spirit of American principles. As you do so, you will be right in the forefront of giving the Communists a memorable licking -- of helping the cause of freedom, everywhere!

## MOUNTAIN TRIBES OF SOUTH VIET NAM

### Languages and Dialects

Linguistically, Southeast Asia does not form any sort of a natural entity. This is also true in the case of the mountaineer dialects. Although there is some difference of opinion among linguists as to proper grouping of the languages, most authorities classify mountaineer dialects into three broad divisions according to the degree in which they have been modified by the tongues spoken by neighboring peoples who have advanced to a higher stage of civilization. The three are:

Dialects of the Malayo-Polynesian origin, one of the most widespread linguistic families in the world, spoken in the Indochinese peninsula, in the Malayan Peninsula and the Philippines. They are polysyllabic, non-tonal.

Dialects of Mon Khmer origin, sometimes grouped under the term Austro-Asiatic. This family is represented in parts of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia and Malaya, as well as in Viet Nam. These dialects are monosyllabic and tonal.

Dialects of Tibeto-Chinese origin, which include Burmese and Thai. They also are monosyllabic and tonal.

However, in many cases there is a transfer of words from one language to another, making neat, firm classifications impossible. Vietnamese, for example, is pre-dominately a Thai language but contains so many Non-Khmer elements that some linguists place it in that group; in addition, Vietnamese has been enriched by a vocabulary of Chinese administrative, military, literary and philosophical terms.

In the Highlands, language is the greatest distinction that can be made between tribes. For the most part, each dialect is mutually unintelligible to members of other tribes. Since the development of a language follows its people's cultural evolution it is only through contacts with foreigners that these dialects expand. Most of the mountaineer languages belong either to the Mon-Khmer or the Malayo-Polynesian families. Mountaineer speaking Tibeto-Chinese dialects are represented by refugees from the North speaking Tai, Muong, Miao-Yao and Kadai. The Mon-Khmer languages of the Highlands have been divided into three groups:

The southern area: Koho, Chrao, Mnong.

The Kontum area: Halang, Bahnar, Sedang, Rongao, Bonom, Hrey, Jesh.

The central area: Katu, Pokoh, Tauoi, Bru.

Since the dialects are innumerable, there is virtually only one method, employed by all the groups, of communicating ideas or transmitting thought among them. It consists of the use of certain conventional signs. The more common of these are triangular or hexagonal figures of bamboo or rattan, measuring one foot eight inches in their greater dimension and hung in some conspicuous place. These geometrical forms warn the traveler of impending danger or notify a prohibition against crossing the boundary of a "taboo" village.

Another method of communication is by means of a string with a series of knots. This practice recalls the quipos which were in use among the Peruvians and Mexicans to record important events and as a medium for the transmission of thought. Suppose two friends want to arrange an appointment to meet in several day's time. They present each other with threads which have the same number of knots, as many knots as there are days to elapse before the meeting. Every day at sunrise each of them unties one of the knots. When at last there are no knots left, they know that the appointed day has arrived.

#### Chief Tribes

Bahnar (Subgroups: Tolo, Golar, Alakong) - Est. pop. 75,000.

Found mainly in Kontum and Ankhe; some in Pleiku and Binh Dinh provinces. Are located South of the Rongao, and Bunom, northeast of the Jarai, east of the Song (in the Phuong Long area) in Binh Dinh province... The Bahnar have a bilateral kinship system, the type of family found in the United States. Apparently they do not have a clan organization, the village being the social unit with elders (kha) exercising great authority and responsible for electing a head man as administrator. Their language is of Mon-Khmer stock, but many understand Jarai, Sedang, Vietnamese and French. Import tribe.

BIH - Estimated pop. 20,000. Found south of Ban Me Thuot, bet. the Rhade and the Huong. Language is Malayo-Polynesian, similar to Rhade; many understand Rhade.

BONG MIEU - A small group of villages (est. pop. 500) in Bong

Mieu district in southern Quang Nam. Located between the Katu and Cua. Language family unknown.

BONOM (subgroups: Monom, Menam) - A fairly small group (4,000) in Kontum province (Plateau G. Vilum, Pomplong and Konbrait areas). Located between the Bahnar, Sedang and Hrey. Sometimes are called Bahnar, but appear to be a separate group.

BRU (subgroups: Brou, Baroo, Muong, Leong, Leung, Kalo, Leu V Kiu) - A fairly large group (40,000) in Quang Tri province with main centers around Khe Sanh (Huong Hoa: 20,000) and Cam Phu (10,000) along the Quang Tri-Savannakhet highway. Group is also found on northern side of 17th parallel and west into Laos. Language is of Mon-Khmer family.

BUDIP - Moang Diep - The so-called feather people in Budang (Phuoc Tam area of Phuoc Long province). Located south of the Mnongs. Their language is similar to Mnong, but is not mutually intelligible.

BULACH - A small (5,000) and little known group in Phuoc Long province. Located north of the Budip. The group is accessible only via a single dirt road in poor condition. Language is similar to Mnong and Budip.

CHAM - Remnants of a highly civilized nation that once dominated the entire Indochinese peninsula, group was conquered by the Vietnamese and almost disappeared. They are not mountaineers. Present population estimated at between 20,000 and 80,000. Located between Phan Rang and Phan Ri with some down the coast near Binh Tuy (Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces). Have a matriarchal tribal organization; civilization is in a state of decline. About 6,000 Cham in Viet Nam are Moslem; the rest practice a degenerate form of Brahmanism. Language is Malayo-Polynesian but most speak Vietnamese well.

CHRAO - Estimated pop. 15,000. Located in southern Long Khanh and southwestern Binh Tuy, probably some in northern Phuoc Tuy. They live south of the Lagna River and east of the Tay Linh road; south of the Koho group.

CHRAO (subgroups: Ro, Bagiang) - Fairly small group found in Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces. Little information available about them.

CHURU - A fairly small (18,000) group in southeastern Tuyen Duc Province (in the Dran east of Dalat). They are closely related to the Cham and sometimes call themselves Cham. Language is Malayo-Polynesian, similar to Roglai: most speak Vietnamese.

GAR (subgroups: Mhong Gar, Pnom Gar) - A group estimated at 10,000 found in the La Thiet district in southeastern Darlac province and in the Dakao area of Tuyen Duc province. Similar to, yet apparently distinct from, the Mnongs.

HALANG - A group estimated at 4,000 living in the very rugged, roadless mountain area west of Dakto in Kontum province. Located west of the Sedang, south of the Jeh and north of the Jarai. Many speak Jarai.

HREY (subgroups: Hre, Dvak, Bavak, Kare, Tava) - a large (120,000) group in Quang Ngai province and parts of Kontum (extending from west of Quang Ngai to west of Bong Son). Language is of the Mon-Khmer family; many speak Bahnar and Vietnamese.

HROY (Bahnar Cham) A fairly small group in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces. Sometimes regarded as Bahnar, but language appears to be Malayo-Polynesian rather than the Mon-Khmer of the Bahnar.

JARAI (sometimes spelled Jorai, Djarai or Djirai subgroups: Puan, Hodrung, Hrue) - Estimated population 150,000. A powerful and bellicose group, considered very important mountaineer tribe. Found mainly in Pleiku province; smaller groups in Kontum and Darlac provinces; others in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa. Located south of the Bahnar and north of the Rhade; centered around Pleiku and Cheo Reo. Language is of the Malayo-Polynesian family similar to Rhade. The Jarai do not have a clan system, but a matrilineal kinship system.

JEH (subgroups: Die, Yeh, Jeh Perak, Jeh Brilar) A fairly large (15,000) group living in southwestern Quang Nam province, between the Sedang and Katu groups. Mon-Khmer stock.

KATU (subgroups: Attouat, Kao, Khat, Thap, Ngung Ta, Ngung Huu) A large (30,000) group found in Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces centered in the An Diem region. Located in a 100 by 100km. area south of the Polo, north of the Jeh. Area very inaccessible. Mon-Khmer language family.

KOHO (subgroups: Chil, Lat, Tring, Sre, Maa, Rion, Nop) An estimated 100,000, found mostly in Tuyen Duc and Lam Dong provinces, but also in Binh Tuy, Quang Duc and Long Khanh provinces. Main centers are around Dalat (20,000), Djiring (30,000), Fyan (10,000) and Blao (40,000) with a few at Song Pha and Dran. The Maa live near Blao; the Rion near Fyan; the Sre near Djiring; the Tring, Lat, Chil near Dalat and the Song Pha, Dran and Nop between Djiring and Phan Thiet. Their language is of the Mon-Khmer family; many of them understand Vietnamese. The Education Ministry has published a Koho dictionary as well as texts in Koho. Increasingly important tribe.

KUA (Kor, Traw) A fairly small (20,000) group known chiefly as suppliers of cinnamon. Found in the Trabong area of Quang Ngai province and the Bong Mieu area of Quang Nam province, located between the Jeh and Hrey groups; some speak Vietnamese.

LANGYA - Population estimated at 9,000. Live in some 60 villages (with one long house per village) near Phuoc Son in Quang Nam province. May be related to the Jeh. Language is Mon-Khmer.

MAN (subgroup Yao) - A very large (2-4 million) group, found for the most part in northern North Viet Nam and in China. Some came south as refugees and are now located 20km north of Ban Me Thuot. Most speak Chinese and some speak Vietnamese. They have a totem religion and they have a strong family system. In the north they are nomads who live by themselves in distant mountain reaches.

MNONG (subgroups Nong, Rolam, Preh, Biet) - An estimated 20,000 in the Highlands, spread over a large area. Largest centers are in the Ban Don area west of Ban Me Thuot and in the Dak Song area of the Binh. Generally located south of the Rhade. Language is Mon-Khmer, most closely related to Koho. Some understand Rhade and Vietnamese.

MUONG - Another large tribe found mainly in the North, with an estimated population of 211,000. Some 5,000 Muong refugees live a few miles from the leprosarium near Ban Me Thuot; another group, estimated at 3,000 live near the Pleiku airport. Their language is related to Vietnamese and almost all of them speak Vietnamese; they have a Quoc-Ngu script. The Muongs share almost all the basic religious concepts of the early primitive Vietnamese; their social organization has often been described as a replica of Vietnamese society before the advent of Chinese influence in Viet Nam.

NUNG - A tribal group found in North Viet Nam. About 1,000 came south as refugees and are now located in Tung Nghia, near Pleiku and



Song Mao. Their language belongs to the Thai family, closely related to Tho. Most of them speak Vietnamese.

POKOH - An estimated 10,000 living in Thua Thien province near the source of the Mekong river; located north of the Katu. A distinctive group that plucks eye-brows and tattoos dots on the body. Often live in villages immediately adjacent to the Tau-oi groups.

RANGAO - A group estimated at 10,000 living in northeastern Kontum province, between the Bahnar and the Sedang. Sometimes classed as Bahnar or Sedang, but appear to be a separate group.

RHADE (sometimes spelled Rade or Thode; subgroups; Mdhur, Adham, Elo, Kodrao, Krung) - Most influential mountaineer tribe in the Highlands. Estimated population 100,000. Found throughout Darlac province and part of Khanh Hoa province; also southward along Cambodian border. Located south of the Jarai, north of the Bih and Muong, centered around Ban Me Thuot. The Rhade have a matrilineal kinship system, i.e. the females own the house, tools, gongs, jars and other important family items. After marriage the husband goes to live in the wife's home. Children take the mother's family name; daughters inherit the mother's possessions. Lineages form into clans and it is forbidden to marry within the same clan. Land is owned by the clan; land administration is handled by a representative called the Po Lan whose duties are specifically prescribed by Rhade custom.

ROGLAI (apparently often spelled Raglai; subgroups; Rai Seyu) - A large (40,000) group found north of Nha Trang and south of Binh Tuy in the Ban Gai district of Khanh Hoa province; also found in Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Lam Dong, closely related to the Cham and the Chru. Language is Malayo-Polynesian apparently with southern and northern dialects; some dialects mutually intelligible with Cham. Many speak Vietnamese.

SEDANG - A large (40,000) group found in the northern half of Kontum province also Quang Nam and Binh Dinh. Considered to be mainly significant Highland group live in independent villages. Social organization similar to Bahnar, but, more individualistic. Are similar to the Steng, located south of the Jeh, east of the Hrey, centered around Dak Gle and Dak Sut. Language is Mon-Khmer family; many understand Bahnar, Vietnamese and French.

STIENG - a fairly large (23,000 in Viet Nam) group, fairly significant. Very numerous in Cambodia. Live in some 650 villages centered in Phuoc Long and Quang Duc provinces; found west of the Koho, south of the Mnong. Bulos are a subgrouping. Are individualistic and independent minded. Some speak Vietnamese.

TAU-OI - a fairly small (5,000) group in Quang Tri and Thua Thi Provinces; centered around Cho Fuan and along the upper Sekong River northwest of the Pokoh group. Language is Mon-Khmer; some understand Vietnamese.

THAI (White and Black) - Montagnards of North Viet Nam. Some 6,000 have come south as refugees and settled in Tung Nghia; an estimated 500 are in the Ban Me Thuot area. The Thai are the most important Montagnard group in North Vietnam. The name however is hardly more than a linguistic classification so heterogeneous is the group. Language is related to the Lao-Thai-Shan family; most of them understand Vietnamese.

THO (sometimes called Thoma, subgroup: Embree) - Originally from northern North Viet Nam along the China border. An estimated 5,000 came south as refugees and settled near Bangoi and Song Mao in Phan Ri province; a few are near Tung Nghia. Their language is of the Thai family, closely related to Nung. Most of them speak Chinese and Vietnamese.

Mountaineers in North Vietnam: Among the northern tribes whose names may be encountered are: the Kelao or Kalao, the Laqua, the Lati, the Lolo (sub-group Ho), the Meo (including the Black, White and Striped Meo - so-called for the design on their clothing) and the Nhan or Nyung.

(USIS)

# PROVINCES OF VIETNAM

(Alphabetical listing with names of subordinate districts and cantons and numbers of villages in each)

USOM/Public Admin. Div.

Unofficial as of Feb. 1, 1962

Province (Tinh) (Chief town in parentheses)	District (Quan) (District Hq. in parens.)	Canton (Tong)	No. Vill.	Reg. #	Pop. & Area (est.)
AN GIANG (Long Xuyen)	An Phu (Phuoc Hung)		11	SVN-W	812,737 3,833 sq. kms.
	Chau Phu (Chau Phu)	Chau Phu An Luong	6 9		
	Chau Thanh (Phuoc Duc)	Dinh Phuoc Dinh Thanh	6 7		
	Cho Moi (Long Dien)	An Binh Dinh Hoa	5 7		
	Hue Duc (Ba The)	Dinh Phu	5		
	Tan Chau (Long Phu)	An Thanh An Lac	4 4		
	Thot Not (Thanh Hoa)	Dinh My	8		
	Tinh Bien (An Phu)	Qui Duc Thanh Tin	5 3		
	Tri Ton (Tri Ton)	Thanh Le Thanh Y Thanh Ngai	4 5 3		

# CVN-H Central Vietnam Highlands, CVN-L Central Vietnam Lowlands,  
SVN-E South Vietnam East, SVN-W South Vietnam West

For further information, call Mr. Lien, USOM/PAD, Ext. 425

Province -----	District -----	Canton -----	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
AN XUYEN (Quan Long)	Cai Nuoc (Cai Nuoc Ngon)		6	SVN-W	275,001 4,952 sq kms.
	Dam Doi (Tan Duyet)		4		
	Nam Can (Nam Can)		2		
	(Quan Long) (Quan Long)		4		
	Song Ong Doc (Cua Song Ong Doc)		3		
	Thoi Binh (Thoi Binh)		4		
BA XUYEN (Khanh Hung)	Gia Rai (Phong Thanh)	Long Thuy	6	SVN-W	581,400 5,571 sq kms.
	Ke Sach (Ke An)	Dinh Tuong Dinh Khanh	4 7		
	Long Phu (Long Phu)	Dinh My Dinh Phuoc Dinh Hoa	5 3 7		
	My Xuyen (Bai Xau)	Nhieu Khanh Nhieu Hoa	5 5		
	Thanh Tri (Cho Nga Nam)	Thanh An Thanh Loc	5 5		
	Thuan Hoa (Nga Tu Cho) My Tu)	Thuan My Thuan Phy	3 4		
	Vinh Chau (Binh Chau)	Thanh Hung	5		
	Vinh Loi (Vinh Loi)	Thanh Hoa	5		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
BIEN HOA (Bien Hoa)	Can Gio (Can Thanh)		5	SVN-E	242,397 1,403 sq. kms.
	Chau Thanh (Binh Truoc)	Phuoc Vinh Thuong	9		
		Phuoc Vinh Trung	5		
		Long Vinh Thuong	4		
	Di An (An Binh Xa)	Chanh My Thuong	4		
		An Thuy	4		
	Long Thanh (Phuoc Loc Xa)	Thanh Tuy Thuong	8		
	Nhon Trach (Phu Thanh)	Thanh Tuy Trung	7		
		Thanh Tuy Ha	6		
	Quang Xuyen (An Thit)	An Thit	4		
BINH DUONG (Phai Cuong)	Ben Cat (My Phuoc)	Binh Hung Binh An	6 4	SVN-E	297,842 1,672 s kms.
	Chau Thanh (Phu Cuong)	Binh Dien	7		
		Binh Phu	5		
		Binh Thien	2		
	Cu Chi (Tan An Hoi)	Long Tuy Ha	7		
		Long Tuy Trung	7		
	Dau Tieng (Dinh Thanh)	Binh ThanhThuong	8		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region Pop. & Area
BINH DUONG (cont'd)	Lai Thieu (Tan Thoi)	Binh Chanh	10	
BINH DINH (Qui Nhon)	An Lao (An Hoa)		20	CVN-L 809,345
	An Nhon (Nhon Hung)		13	
	An Tuc (An Khe)		32	
	Binh Khe (Binh Phu)		9	
	Hoai An (An Duc)		7	
	Hoai Nhon (Bong Son)		11	
	Phu Cat (Cat Trinh)		11	
	Phu My (My Quang)		15	
	Van Canh (Canh Thinh)		10	
	Vinh Thanh (Vinh Quang)		20	
	Tuy Phuoc (Phuoc Nghia)		18	

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & area
BINH LONG (An Loc)	An Loc (Tan Lap Phu)		21	SVN-E	65,422 2,334 sq. kms.
	Loc Ninh (Loc Ninh)		10		
BINH THUAN (Phan Thiet)	Hai Long (Knahh Thien)		7	CVN-L	259,611 4,404 sq.
	Hai Ninh (Song Mao)		8		
	Ham Thuan (Phan Thiet)		10		
	Hoa Da (Phan Ri Thanh)		6		
	Phan Ly Cham (Huu An)		10		
	Thien Giae (Hoa An)		7		
	Tuy Phong (Lien Huong)		6	SVN-E	36,596 4,030 kms.
	Ham Tan (Tan Tan)		6		
	Hoai Duc (Kiem Duc)		6		
	Tanh Linh (Lac Tanh)		7	SVN-W	304,21
CHUONG THIEN (Vi Thanh)	Duc Long (Vi Thanh)	An Ninh			

Province	District	Canton	No. Region Vill.	Pop. & area
	Kien Hung (Go Cuao)	Kien Dinh	10	
	KienLong (Vinh Thuan)		6	
	Long My (Long Tri)	Thanh Tuyen	9	
	Phuoc Long (Phuoc Long)	Thanh Binh Thanh Yen	4 4	
CON SON Island (Con son)				SVN-W 1,231 64 sq. kms.
DARLAC (Ban Me Thuot)	Ban Me Thuot	Ea Tam Cu Kek Cu ewi Drai Sap (No canton)	10 4 6 5 2	CVN-H 146,949 12,808 kms.
	Buon Ho	Cu Kuk Cu Kti Cu Dlieya	3 5 4	
	Lac Thieu	Dak Lieng Yang Lak Krong Ana Krong Bong Dak Phoi Dak Rohhyo Nam Ka	3 3 4 4 2 2 2	
DINH TUONG ( My Tho)	Ben Tranh (Duong Hoa Lac)	Hung Khon Thanh Quon	8 7	SVN-W 674,773 2,220 sq kms.
	Cho Gao (Binh Phan)	Thanh Phong Hoa Hao	6 7	



Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
GIA DINH (Gia Dinh)	Giao Duc (An Huu)	Phong Phu	5		
		An Phu	5		
	Go Cong (Long Thuan)	Hoa Lac Thuong	8		
		Hoa Lac Ha	7		
	Hoa Dong (Dong Son)	Hoa Dong Thuong	9		
		Hoa Dong Ha	7		
	Khien Ich (Thanh Hoa)	Loi Trinh	11		
		Loi Hoa	9		
	Long Dinh (Long Dinh)	Thuan Tri	13		
		Thuan Binh	13		
	Sung Hieu (Dong Hoa Hiep)	Phong Hoa	5		
		Loi Thuan	6		
	Binh Chanh (Binh Chanh)	Long Hung	6	SVN-E	654,202
		Trung	6		706 sq.
		Long Hung Thuong	5		kms.
		Tan Phong Ha	4		
	Go Vap (Hanh Thong)	Binh Tri Thuong	7		
	Hoc Mon (Thoi Tam Thon)	Binh Thanh Trung	6		
		Long Binh	6		
	Nha Be (Phu Xuan Hoi)	Binh Tri Ha	7		
	Tan Binh (Phu Nhuan)	Duong Hoa	6		
		Thuong	6		
KHANH HOA (Nha Trang)	Thu Duc (Linh Dong)	An Dien	6		
		Long Vinh Ha	4		
		An Dinh	5		
	Cam Lam (Cam Loc)		15	CVN-L	271,74
			15		5,536
	Dien Khanh (Dien Thanh)		29		kms.

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
KIEN GIANG (Rach Gia)	Khanh Duong (Ea Ksung)	Krong Jing Krong Hing	2 3	SVN-W	345,944 6,828 sq. kms.
	Ninh Hoa (My Hiep)		20		
	Van Ninh (Van Gia)		9		
	Vinh Xuong		12		
	HaTien (My Duc)	Ha Thanh Binh An Thanh	2 3		
	Kien An (Dong Yen)	Thanh An Thanh Bien	5 4		
	Kien Binh (Thanh Hoa)	Thanh Tan Ngoc Hung	3 5		
	Kien Luong (An Binh)		5		
	Kien Tan (Tan Hiep)		5		
	Kien Thanh (Vinh Thanh Van)	Kien Hoa Kien Tuong	4 4		
Phu Quoc (Duong Dong)		2	SVN-W	551,055 2,155 sq. kms.	
KIEN HOA (Truc Giang)	Ba Tri (An Duc)	Bao An Bao Thuan Bao Tri			4 6 5
	Binh Dai (Binh Dai)	Hoa Quoi Hoa Thinh			6 7
	Giang Tron (Binh Hoa)	Bao Loc Bao Phuoc Bao Thanh			5 6 7

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
KIEN PHONG (Cao Lanh)	Ham Long (Tien Thuy)	Bao Duc Bao Ngai	6 7	SVN-W	267,13 2,615 kms.
	Huong My (Huong My)	Minh Hue Minh Quoi Minh Phu	4 5 4		
	Mo Cay (Da Phuoc Hoi)	Minh Dat Minh Dao Minh Ly Minh Thien Minh Thuan	5 3 4 4 4		
	Thanh Phu (Thanh Phu)	Minh Tri	7		
	Truc Giang (An Hoi)	Bao Huu An Hoa	8 8		
	Cao Lanh (My Tra)	An Tinh Phong Thanh	4 8		
	Kien Van (Binh Hang Trung)	Phong Nam	7		
	Hong Ngu (An Binh)	Hong An Hong Phuoc Hong Quang	3 2 6		
	My An (My An)	My Duc My Phuoc	3 2		
	Thanh Binh (Tan Phu)	Thanh Liem Thanh Khiet	5 3		
	Chau Thanh (Tuyen Thanh)	Moc Hoa Ha Moc Hoa Thuong	2 3		SVN-W 54,9 2,29 kms.
	Kien Binh (Tan Hoa)	Kien Binh Dong Kien Binh Tay	3 2		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
KONTUM (Kontum)	Tuyen Nhon (Thuy Dong)	My Binh Ha	3	CVN-H	83,731 11,231 sq. kms.
		My Binh Thuong	3		
	Tuyen Binh (Binh Thanh Thon)	Tuyen Binh Ha	4		
		Tuyen Binh Thuong	3		
		Tuyen Binh Trung	2		
	Dak Sut	Dak Rolong	4		
		Halong	5		
		Die Sud	4		
		Dak Pek	1		
		Die Nork	4		
		Bong Tul	5		
	Dak To	Dak To	4		
		Dak Brong	3		
		Kou Hring	6		
		Dak Mot	3		
	Kontum (Plei Mang La)	Kong Tum	4		
		Ya Ty	4		
		Plei Krong	5		
		Halang	4		
		Kon Sotin	4		
		Kon Monay	7		
Ha Mong		14			
Tou Mrong	Tou Morong	8			
	Vir-Ngieo	2			
	Mang Buk	1			
	Kou Kleang	2			
LAM DONG (Bao Loc)	Bao Loc (Bao Loc)	Dai Hoa	4	CVN-H	58,634 4,726 sq. kms.
		Dai Thuan	3		
		Tan Ma	4		
		(No canton)	1		
Di Linh (Di Linh)	Di Linh (Di Linh)	Chau Thuan	2		
		Dan Tuc	3		
		Thuong Hiep	2		
		Thuong Lien	4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
LONG AN (Tan An)	Ben Luc (Long Phu)	Long Hung Ha	8	SVN-W	493,191 2,332 sq. kms.
		An Ninh Trung	4		
	Binh Phuoc (Duong Xuan Hoi)	Tan Thanh	6		
		Thanh MucThuong	5		
		Thanh Muc Ha	4		
	Can Duoc (Tan An)	Loc ThanhThuong	5		
		Loc Thanh Trung	4		
		Loc Thanh Ha	5		
	Can Giuoc (Truong Binh)	Phuoc Dien Trung	9		
		Phuoc Dien Ha	6		
		Duong Hoa Ha	5		
	Duc Hoa (Duc Hoa)	Duc An Thuong	6		
		Duc An Ha	4		
	Duc Hue (My Qui)		3		
	Tan Tru (Tan Tru)	An Ninh Ha	6		
Chu Cu Ha		6			
Thu Thua (Binh Phong Thanh)	An NinhThuong	5			
	Cuu Cu Thuong	4			
LONG KHANH (Xuan Loc)	Dinh Quan (Dinh Quan)		3	SVN-E	86,683 2,971 sq. kms
	Xuan Loc (Xuan Loc)	Binh Lam Thuong	7		
NINH THUAN (Phan Rang)		Binh Lam Ha	7		
	An Phuoc (Hau Phuoc)		4	CVN-L	137,238 3,498 sq. kms.
	Buu Son (An Son)		8		
	Du Long (Cam Ly)		4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Thanh Hai (Khanh Hai)		12		
PHONG DINH (Can Tho)	Chau Thanh (Truong Thanh)	Dinh Bao Dinh An	8 7	SVN-W	378,507 2,500 sq. kms.
	Phong Phu (Thoi Thanh)	Thoi Bao Dinh Thoi	7 5		
	Khac Trung (Co Do)	Phong Thuan	4		
	Khac Nhon (Bay Ngan)	Phong Da	6 4		
	Phung Hiep (Phung Hiep)	Dinh Phuoc Dinh Hoa	4		
PHU BON (Hau Bon)	Phu Thien (Plei Mang)	Chutse Ia Sol Ia Hiao Ia Piao Tolo Tonia	3 3 5 2 3		
	Phu Tuc (B. Ban La)	Duc Binh Phu My	8 5		
	Thuan Man	Trung Ia Robol	4 3		
	Dong Xuan (La Hai)		7		
	Phu Doc (Tuy Binh)	Phu Hoa Phu Trung Phu My (No canton)	3 4 5 1		
PHU YEN (Tuy Hoa)	Hieu Xuong (Hoa Phong)		7	CVN-L	346,348 7,169 sq. kms.
	Son Hoa (Cung Son)		13		
	Song Cau (Song Cau)		5		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
			14		
	Tuy An (Chi Thanh)				
	Tuy Hoa (Tuy Hoa)		17		
PHUOC LONG (Phuoc Binh)	Bo Duc (Phuoc Le)	Phuoc Le	1	SVN-E	32,308 4,764 sq. kms.
		Dag-Huyt	1		
		Bu Yam Phut	1		
		Bu Yu	1		
		Bu Prang	1		
	Don Luan (Doan Duc)	Bu Yum	1		
		N'Dreng	1		
		Tan Thuan	1		
		Thuan Loi	2		
	Duc Phong (Bu Dang)	Bu Dang	2		
		Bu R'Lap	1		
PHUOC THANH (Phuoc Vinh)	Phuoc Binh (Son Giang)	Khun-Narr	2		
		Xor-Nuk	1		
		Khun Klenh	1		
	Hieu Liem (Song Be)		2	SVN-E	65,255 2,947 sq. kms.
	Phu Giao (Bo La)	Chanh My Ha	5		
	Tan Uyen (Tan Uyen)	Chanh My			
		Trung (No canton)	11 3		
PHUOC TUY (Phuoc Le)	Long Le (Hoa Long)	An Phu Ha	3	SVN-E	143,108 2,784 sq. kms.
		An Phu Tan	4		
	Dat Do (Phuoc Tho)	Phuoc HungThuong	3		
		Phuoc Hung Trung	2		
		Phuoc Hung Ha	3		
	Duc Thanh (Ngai Giao)	Co Trach	4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region Pop. & Area
	Long Dien (Long Dien)	An PhuThuong	6	
	Xuyen Moc (Xuyen Moc)		5	
	Vung Tau (Bung Tau)		5	
PLEIKU (Pleiku)	Bon Huong*	Trung	4	
	Le Trung (Le Can)	Dak Doa	4	
		Lac	4	
		Plei Bong	3	
		Plei Brel Dor	4	
		Plei Ngo	4	
		Plei Pion	3	
		Plei Roh	5	
		(No canton)	10	
	Degroi*	Dak Bot	2	
		Degroi	2	
		Mang Yang	2	
		(No canton)	2	
	My Thanh*	Plei Dolim	3	
	Phu Nhon (Don Hoa)	Plei Kly	3	
		Phu Tai	3	
		Plei Potau	3	
		Cu Dre	2	
		Plei You	2	
		Prong	4	
		(No canton)	2	
	Plei Grut*	Plei Tell	8	
	Le Thanh (Duc Hung)	Plei Del	6	
		Plei Pomuk	5	
		(No canton)	2	

\*These are "Administrative Offices" under the jurisdiction of a large district to supervise a certain number of cantons administratively.



Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Plei Donao*	Plei Donao No canton	6 2		
QUANG DUC (Gia Nghia)	Duc Lap (Tu Minh)		8	CVN-H	29,598 5,743 sq. kms.
	Khiem Duc (Ta monng)	Son Khe	5		
	Kien Duc (Sung Duc)	Kien Minh Kien Dao	5 2		
QUANG NAM (Hoi An)	Dai Loc (Xa Loc Xuan)		9	CVN-L	601,450 9,902 s kms.
	Dien Ban (Binh Dien)		31		
	Duy Xuyen (Xuyen Chau)		17		
	Hieu Duc (Giao Tri)		14		
	Hoa Vang (Thuan Nam)		21		
	Thuong Duc (Kim Xuyen)		21		
	Que Son (Son Thanh)		17		
QUANG TI (Tam Ky)	Hau Duc (Tien Tra)		14		335,400 1,405 kms.
	Hiep Duc (Dong An)		6		
	Tam Ky (Tam Ky)		27		
	Thang Binh (Binh Nguyen)		20		

\* See preceding page

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Tien Phuoc (Phuoc My)		14		
QUANG NGAI (Quang Ngai)	Ba To (Ban Thuan)		24	CVN-L	658,348 4,359 sq. kms.
	Binh Son (Binh Van)		24		
	Chuong Nghia (Thuong Uyen)		10		
	Duc Pho (Pho Dai)		15		
	Ming Long (Minh Tam)		14		
	Mo Duc (Duc Vinh)		12		
	Nghia Hanh (Nghia Chanh)		8		
	Son Ha (Ha Trung)		14		
	Son Tinh (Son Long)		20		
	Tra Bong (Tra Khuong)		13		
	Tu Nghia (Tu An)		14		
QUANG TRI (Quang Tri)	Ba Long (Ba Luong)		7	CVN-L	276,551 4,741 sq. km
	Cam Lo (Cam Nghia)		13		
	Gio Linh (Gio Le)		6		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
	Hai Lang (Hai Tho)		23		
	Huong Hoa (Huong Van)		14		
	Trieu Phong (Trieu Thanh)		18		
	Trung Luong (Trung Giang)		3		
TAY NINH (Tay Ninh)	Hieu Thien (Thanh Phuoc)	Giai Hoa	6	SVN-E	287,373 4,064 sq. kms.
		My Ninh	6		
		Triem Hoa	3		
	Khiem Hanh (Bau Don)	Thanh Binh	5		
	Phu Duc (Gia Loc)	Ham Ninh Ha	5		
	Phu Khuong (Phuoc Hoi)	Ham Ninh Thuong Loc An	8 3		
	Phuoc Ninh (Ninh Dieu)	Hoa Ninh Phuoc Hung	8 6		
THUA THIEN (Hue)	Huong Dien (Dien Hai)		8	CVN-L	452,598 4,876 sq. kms.
	Huong Thuy (Thuy Chau)		14		
	Huong Tra (Huong Son)		2		
	Nam Hoa (Thuong Bang)		13		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region	Pop. & Area
TUYEN DUC (Dalat)	Phong Dien (Phong Nguyen)		7		
	Phu Loc (Loc Tri)		8		
	Phu Vang (Phu Duong)		15		
	Quang Dien (Quang Phuoc)		7		
	Vinh Loc (Vinh Hung)		11		
	Don Duong (Don Duong)	Xuan Lac	2	CVN-H	56,109 4,773 sq. kms.
		Lac My	2		
		Linh Nhan	2		
		Tu Trang	3		
	Duc Trong (Tung Nghia)	Ninh Thanh	3		
VINH BINH (Phu Vinh)		Son Binh	2		
		My Le	3		
		Dinh Tan	3		
	Lac Duong (Binh Ninh)	Phuoc Tho	2		
		Da Tan	3		
		Nha Lac	2		
	Cang Long (Binh Phu)	Binh Khanh	3	SVN-W	535,378 2,880 sq. kms.
		Binh KhanhThuong	4		
		Binh Phuoc	2		
	Cau Ke (Hoa An)	Tuan Gia	8		
	Cau Ngang (My Hoa)	Binh Tri	4		
		Vinh Loi	4		
	Chau Thanh (Phu Vinh)	Tra Nhieu	3		
		Tra Binh	3		
		Tra Phu	4		

Province	District	Canton	No. Vill.	Region Pop. & Area
	Long Toan (Long Toan)	Vinh Tri	5	
	Tieu Cau (Tieu Cau)	Ngai Thanh	5	
	Tra Cu (Ngai Xuyen)	Ngai HoaThuong Ngai Hoa Trung Thanh HoaThuong	4 3 2	
	Tra On (Tan My)	Binh Le Thanh Tri Binh Thoi	3 5 3	
	Vung Liem (Trung Thanh)	Binh Hieu Binh Trung Binh Quoi	3 3 3	
VINH LONG (Vinh Long)	Binh Minh (My Thuan)	An Truong An Ninh	3 4	SVN-W 550,540 1,900 sq. kms.
	Chau Thanh (Long Chau)	Binh Long Binh An Long An Phuoc An	4 3 4 3	
	Duc Tan (Cai Tan Ha)	An My Dong An My Tay	4 4	
	Cho Lack (Son Dinh)	Binh Hung Binh Xuong Minh Ngai	3 3 3	
	Duc Thanh (Hoa Long)	An Khuong	2	
		Ti Thieu Tien Nghia		
	Lap Vo (Binh Thanh Dong)	Phu Thuong Phong Thoi	5 2	SVN-W
	Minh Duc (Chan Hoi)	Thanh Thieng Binh Thieng	4 4	

Province	District	Canton	No. of Vill.	Region Pop. & Area
	Sa Dec	An Thanh	6	
	(Tan Vinh Hoa)	An Trung	5	
		An Thoi	2	
	Tam Binh	Binh Thuan	3	
	(Tuong Loc)	Binh Phu	2	
		Binh Dinh	3	

41 Provinces 229 Districts 322 Cantons 2,542 Vill. 12,359,136\*

\*Excludes the populations of the following autonomous cities:

Saigon Prefecture	1,400,000
Da Nang (Tourane)	104,797
Hue	103,367
Da Lat (Dalat)	<u>48,843</u>

Grand total of population of the Republic of Vietnam 14,016,643

Source of information: - Official Journal of the R.V.N.  
- National Institute of Statistics (for pop.)

# LOCAL GOVERNMENT

## Provinces

<u>Names</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>Chief Towns</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Province Chiefs</u>
1. An Giang	SVN-W	Long Xuyen	812,737	Major Nguyen Van Minh
2. An Xuyen	SVN-W	Quan Long	275,001	Lt.Col. Pham Van Ut
3. Ba Xuyen	SVN-W	Khanh Hung	581,400	Lt.Col. Nguyen Linh Chieu
4. Bien Hoa	SVN-E	Bien Hoa	242,397	Major Tran Van Dinh
5. Binh Duong	SVN-E	Phu Cuong	297,842	Major Tran Van Minh
6. Binh Dinh	CVN-L	Qui Nhon	809,345	Mr. Bui Thuc Duyen
7. Binh Long	SVN-E	An Loc	65,422	Major Nguyen Duc Mai
8. Binh Thuan	CVN-L	Phan Thiet	259,611	Lt.Col. Nguyen Quoc Hoang
9. Binh Tuy	SVN-E	Ham Tan	36,596	Major Le Duc Dat
10. Chuong Thien	SVN-W	Vi Thanh	304,283	Major Nguyen Hien Diem
11. Con Son	SVN-E	Con Son	1,231	Major Le Van The
12. Darlac	CVN-H	Ban Me Thuot	146,949	Major Hoang Thong
13. Dinh Tuong	SVN-W	My Tho	674,773	Major Lam Quang Tho
14. Gia Dinh	SVN-E	Gia Dinh	654,202	Major Nguyen Duc Xich
15. Khanh Hoa	CVN-L	Nha Trang	271,749	Major Le Tap
16. Kien Giang	SVN-W	Rach Gia	345,944	Major Nguyen Van Que
17. Kien Hoa	SVN-W	Truc Giang	551,055	Lt.Col. Tran Ngoc Chau
18. Kien Phong	SVN-W	Cao Lanh	267,137	Lt.Col. Dinh Van Phat
19. Kien Tuong	SVN-W	Moc Hoa	54,968	Major Le Thanh Nhat
20. Kontum	CVN-H	Kontum	83,731	Capt. Hoang Van Dinh
21. Lam Dong	CVN-H	Bao Loc	58,634	Major Nguyen Van Tai
22. Long An	SVN-W	Tan An	493,191	Major Nguyen Viet Thanh
23. Long Khanh	SVN-W	Xuan Loc	86,683	Major (Nhuyen Huynh) Huynh Van Du (actg)
24. Ninh Thuan	CVN-L	Phan Rang	137,238	Lt.Col. Nguyen Kim Khanh
25. Phong Dinh	SVN-W	Can Tho	378,507	Major Le Van Tu
26. Phu Yen	CVN-L	Tuy Hoa	346,348	Major Duong Thai Dong
27. Phuoc Long	SVN-E	Phuoc Binh	32,308	Major Do Van Dien
28. Phuoc Thanh	SVN-E	Phuoc Vinh	65,255	Major Ho Trung Hau
29. Phuoc Tuy	SVN-E	Phuoc Me	143,108	Major Le Qui Do
30. Pleiku	CVN-H	Pleiku	124,508	Mr. Ton That Chu
31. Quang Duc	CVN-H	Gia Nghia	29,598	Col. Ho Nghia
32. Quang Nam	CVN-L	Hoi An	201,450	Major Vo Huu Thu
33. Quang Ngai	CVN-L	Quang Ngai	658,343	Mr. Nguyen Van Tat
34. Quang Tri	CVN-L	Quang Tri	276,551	Mr. Nguyen Ngoc Quynh
35. Tay Ninh	SVN-E	Tay Ninh	287,373	Major Vu Duc Nhuan
36. Thua Thien	CVN-L	Hue	452,598	Mr. Nguyen Van Dang
37. Tuyen Duc	CVN-H	Dalat	56,107	Major Ngo Nhu Bich
38. Vinh Binh	SVN-W	Phu Vinh	535,378	Major Le Hoang Thao
39. Vinh Long	SVN-W	Vinh Long	550,540	Major Le Van Huoc
40. Quang Tin	CVN-L	Tam Ky	335,400	Major Than Ninh
41. Phu Bon	CVN-H	Hau Bon (Cheo Reo)	325,000	Major Pham Dinh Chi

Total population: 14,016,643

## PLANT PROTECTION IN VIETNAM

The Plant Protection Service of the Government of Vietnam (Directorate of Rural affairs) is composed of Five Divisions as follows:

1. Entomology Laboratory.
2. Plant Pathology Laboratory.
3. Domestic and Foreign Plant Quarantine.
4. Regulatory.
5. Field Control.

The Field Control Division is by far the largest Division and has received much more emphasis than the other four Divisions.

This Service was newly created this year from existing small fragmented units of two Directorates. Additional personnel have been hired and trained during the current year. The total personnel employed is 120 people, the larger number being Provincial Plant Protection Agents. There are 40 of these agents, one in each province. (USOM Provincial Representatives should contact these agents locally and discuss their programs and problems).

Due to the urgent need at the farmer level for insect, rodent and plant disease control facilities and work, the major objective of this project is to reduce the existing crop losses caused by these pests by at least 50% by the end of 1963.

Other objectives are the normal type of development of the remaining four Divisions. This development will be slow due to the heavy emphasis on the field control operations.

The following information on rat control operations in Central Vietnam will suffice to illustrate the type of field operations planned and the rural population reaction that is anticipated.

### Field Rat Control

Field rats are a major problem all over Vietnam. The rat population in the ten lowland provinces of Central Vietnam has been increasing at a rapid rate for the past two years. By June of this year the problem was so serious that widespread appeals were being made for help by the rural population. The Government at Provincial level was in turn appealing to the National Government who was urging USOM for assistance. It is estimated that 35 - 40% of all agricultural production in these ten provinces was being lost due to the action of the rats. At least one province reported a total crop loss of 70 - 80%. The situation was such that in some districts the farmers were refusing to plant new crops as they felt it was useless in face of the heavy rat population.

These ten provinces are the poorest in Vietnam. The food situation



was acute even before the large rat build-up. As a result, following the rat population explosion, widespread hunger and near famine conditions were quite widespread.

The Vice President of Vietnam considered the situation serious enough to call and preside at a high-level meeting to consider what could be done. The Director of USOM along with others were invited to this meeting. A course of action was agreed to by both sides.

USOM was to purchase 30 S.T. of rodenticide, of which 10 S.T. was to be air shipped. The GVN was to negotiate with the French Air Mission in an attempt to obtain an additional 18 M.T. of rodenticide.

The ten tons of rodenticide from the USA arrived by air in May. This was quickly repackaged locally in 100 gram plastic bags. Farmers leaflets were printed giving precautions in using, mixing and baiting instructions etc. Posters were prepared, printed and distributed throughout the control area. Training classes were held for villagers throughout the ten provinces. Widespread newspaper and radio coverage was also given to the coming control campaign.

It was decided to conduct the control operations in three phases. Each phase to follow the preceding one by roughly three months. All agencies of Government at Provincial level were mobilized to assist in the campaign.

The first phase was to use the ten tons of zinc phosphide rat poison airlifted from the USA. The second phase would use the 20 tons coming by surface from the USA. The third phase is to use the 18 tons coming from French Air.

In June the repackaged ten tons were distributed to farmers in the control area. The baiting period covered a ten day period. All ten provinces started baiting on the same day. Spectacular results were immediately obtained. Huge numbers of rats were piled up throughout the area. Large pits were dug to bury the dead rats. Tails were cut from all rats and saved for counting purposes.

Prizes were to be awarded to those killing the most rats. The prizes awarded at provincial level were quite valuable, the most common being a mature buffalo.

During the ten days of baiting between 12 and 15 million rats were killed. The population participated in the campaign wholeheartedly with the result that tremendous goodwill was generated due to the Government help. All rat poison was distributed free with the farmers themselves providing the materials to be mixed with the poison.

Each package of poison was labeled as a free gift to the farmers from the Government of Vietnam and USOM. During an extensive field while the baiting was in progress it was noted that the rural population was highly appreciative and pleased.

At this time the second phase of the program is now in operation. It is being conducted exactly as the first phase except that 20 short tons of poison is being used instead of ten. The number of rats killed will probably be smaller this time due to the great reduction of the rat population following the first phase. The third phase will follow in a few months. At the completion of the third phase the rat population in these ten provinces is expected to be at an all time low.

Many such campaigns as this one will be carried out in the future against rats, insects, plant diseases in all sections of the country.

LIST OF SAAG RADIO STATIONS

AN KHE  
AN LOC  
BAC LIEU  
DAD LOC  
BAN ME THUOT  
BARIA  
BA TU  
BEN CAT  
BEN TRE  
BIEN HOA  
BINH DINH  
BINH TUY  
CAN THO  
CAO LANG  
CAO LANH  
CAU MAN  
CA MAU  
CHAN PHU  
CHED REO  
DAK ROTAH  
DALAT  
DA NANG  
DA NINH  
DI LINH  
DONG HA  
DRAN  
DUC MY  
GIANGHIA  
GIA RAY  
GIAENGIA  
GO CONG  
HA TAN  
HA THANH  
HAI TAN  
HIEP KHANH  
HOI AN  
HUE  
KHAM DUC  
KHANH HOA  
KHANH HUNG  
KIEN HOA  
KON BRAI

MOC HOA  
MY HO  
NHA TRANG  
O MON  
PHAN RANG  
PHAN THIET  
PHU BAI  
PHU CAT  
PHU CUONG  
PHUOC LE  
PHUOC TUY  
PHUOC DIEN  
PHUOC THANH  
PHUOC VINH  
PHUOC LONG  
PLEIKU  
QUANG NGAI  
QUANG TRI  
QUANG TRUNG  
QUAN LONG  
QUI NHON  
RACH GIA  
SADEC  
SOC TRANG  
SONG BE  
SONG MAO  
TAN AN  
TAN CANH  
TAN CHAU  
T.M.L.  
TAM KY  
TAY NINH  
THU DAU MOT  
THU DUC  
TIEP KHANH  
TRA VINH  
TRUC GIANG  
TRUNG LAP  
TUY HOA  
UI THANH  
VINH LONG  
VI THANH  
VUNG TAU

INFORMATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT FOR  
RURAL PROGRAMS

The Government of Vietnam's new Rural Programs which are centered on Strategic Hamlet concept offer an excellent opportunity for psychological exploitation and at the same time require a great amount of informational support.

Informational support for the Programs is being developed centrally by the concerned GVN Ministries assisted by their USOM counterparts and especially our Agriculture Information Officer. The USOM Commedia Division and USIS are also assisting in preparing these materials which take the form of pamphlets, posters, labels, films, radio-tapes, newstories, etc. Existing GVN and US distribution channels will be used for getting these centrally prepared materials to the countryside.

You should also familiarize yourself with all information activity in your province and the personnel responsible for them to insure that you get good local back up for Rural Programs. Please keep us advised of any additional support you may require for this work.

The psychological aspect is lost if not properly done. Since our Rural Programs are aimed at improving the lot of village people and providing them the basic necessities to rapidly enhance their social and economic conditions, the informational materials should always indicate this and that it is the GVN which is worried about them and doing something for them.

The Strategic Hamlet Symbol which appears on the front of this guide connotes "building a new society and a better life"; it should appear on everything reaching the people and should be with us everywhere!

It is expected that you, working at local levels, will develop with your Vietnamese associates ideas and methods for getting them across to support the psychological aspects of the rural effort you are making. We ask you to share these ideas with us since they may be something which can be used elsewhere in the country.

For instance, pamphlets can be printed locally, local newspapers can carry the message, prizes and awards can be given, lotteries can be held; the opportunities are endless if you will explore them. The MAAG Psywar advisers can help you too and will be interested in the chances for intelligent exploitation provided by the Rural Programs.

We consider this work of vital importance and will help you whenever you ask...

cc: Carroll Wilson, Agriculture Div.  
Stuart Hannon, Commedia Div.  
Eberhart, USIS

## Civic Action and Counter-Insurgency

What should an American military man or civilian do when stationed in a rural area during a counter-insurgency campaign?

John T. Little, Lt-Col Inf., came up with an impressive answer last year when he was in Laos. He commanded a Mobile Training Team of Army Special Forces, whose officers and men were stationed with Laos military units throughout the country. Taking a number of standing instructions and the lessons learned in Laos, the Philippines, and Vietnam, he compiled a set of instructions on Civic Action for his officers and men in simple, every day language.

Although these instructions are tailored to conditions in Laos, they contain many points worth heeding elsewhere. With Lt-Col Little's permission these instructions are being passed along. They are to be found on the following pages and deserve wide reading and understanding by all Americans concerned with counter-insurgency.

HEADQUARTERS  
WHITE STAR MOBILE TRAINING TEAM  
Vientiane, Laos

22 September 1961

SUBJECT: Civil Assistance

TO: Commanders  
All Field Training Teams  
White Star Mobile Training Team  
Military Assistance Advisory Group to Laos

1. In an insurgency condition, the guerrilla is dependent on a sympathetic population. Counter-guerrilla operations must, therefore, have as one objective winning the population's cooperation and denying the enemy their sympathy. This can be done by psychological operations in many forms.

2. An imaginative program of village assistance properly backed in the military and civil authorities is one form of psychological operation which will contribute significantly toward this objective and achievement of U.S. goals in Laos.

3. The attached outline for a civil assistance program which can realistically be applied by operational detachments is forwarded for term use in establishing a positive civil relations program. The ideas expressed have been field tested and are practical. Use them as a guide for your actions in this field. Start at once.

4. You are not in competition with other U.S. agencies; USIS and USOM; you are the spearhead of these activities and a focal point for inhection of these activities until Laos civil assistance teams are trained and in use. Your primary mission is training and operations with Pak; this is secondary to that mission but has an important impact on it.

5. Those teams operating from villages in which USIS and USOM representatives are not permanently represented are expected to initiate action in this field and keep this headquarters informed of progress

s/ John P. Little

JOHN P. LITTLE  
Lt. Col., Inf.  
Commanding

1 Incl  
Outline of a Civil Assistance  
Program

Copies furnished:  
Chief Each Military Region  
American Embassy

## OUTLINE OF A CIVIL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

1. Actions prior to commencement of civil assistance program in Lao villages.

a. Become acquainted with key members of the district.

These include:

- (1) The Chao Muong - political boss of the district (has absolute authority over villagers).
- (2) The High District Judge and his staff - this official is second in authority to Chao Muong.
- (3) The Chief Buddhist (Bonze) of the district
- (4) The Police Captain and his staff.
- (5) The Village Headmen.
- (6) The Schoolmaster and School Teachers.
- (7) Leading business men including shop owners and restaurant owners.

b. Gather background data on key personnel of district to include:

- (1) Nationality.
- (2) Date and place of birth.
- (3) Education and Religion.
- (4) Knowledge of foreign languages.
- (5) Special skills or abilities.
- (6) Military service.
- (7) Travel background.
- (8) Past activities in government.
- (9) Present job and salary.
- (10) Details of family - how many wives and children.
- (11) Character and personality - is he honest, is he loyal, is he a doer and not just a talker, does he have initiative drive, imagination?
- (12) Is he pro-F.R., pro-American, pro-French?

c. Gathering this information will be a continuing process. Record it and pass it on to the succeeding team.

2. Recommend activities for civil assistance program.

a. Medical Support: Have team medic assist village doctor in sick call. If there is no doctor, team medic should run sick call himself. Team medic will visit all villages in area and make occasional visits to remote villages out of the area. From among the more intelligent of the villagers the team medic should choose an assistant aidman with the object of training him to eventually become the village doctor. The Village should be persuaded to build a hospital with the theme, "this will be for your village and your people. If the people want continued team medical support tell them to build a hospital." Note:

Doctors are paid by government so team need not worry about depriving village doctor of livelihood.

b. Aid to Education: By the team encouraging and helping the children the parents can be made aware of the importance of education. School supplies to be furnished include blackboards, chalk, erasers, pencils pencil sharpeners, writing paper, tablets, multiplication tables, rulers, books, globes, atlases, charts on anatomy, chemistry, physics and biology and nature subjects. Get the material in front of the children. Teach the schoolmaster to be responsible and accountable for the equipment - to take the books up at the end of the semester and reissue them at the beginning of the term. Use the school aid program as a lever to get the village to repair and expand the school. Require the village to send all their children to school. This can be done through the Chao Muong. The children must be taught the world is not flat, that Laos is not the only country, that America is a powerful friend and what the Communists are.

c. Sanitation: This field offers the greatest possibilities for achievement and improvement. Persuade the people to police the streets, cut the grass, burn and bury the rubbish, rake under the houses. Encourage village authorities to destroy homeless, vicious and unwanted dogs. Start a DDT program. Teach the natives how to use the sprayers and mix the solution. Put rat poison in village placing it high enough to be unreachable by children and chickens. Start a war on bed bugs. Use oil to stamp out mosquito breeding areas. Put the villagers on chlo roquin. In the dry season have family latrines dug. Instruct natives on covering waste. Get villagers to dig wells for drinking water. Instruct families on fly control - distribute swatters. Action should be taken to prevent livestock from over running living areas. Work all projects through the Chao Muong. When he issues the order the people will take action.

d. Aid to Agriculture: Get assistance from USOM. To start program persuade a few farmers to try crop rotation, proper spacing, fertilizing and spraying. This is a long-range project taking patience, time and skillful persuasion. A Lao farmer puts all his earnings into his crop and he is very hesitant about making experiments. But once he has been shown the results of this new method of rice growing he will be an eager participant. In many areas the irrigation system could be improved, small streams could be dammed, etc.

e. Transportation Improvement: All roads in Laos need improvement. Get villagers to build bridges, repair washouts, fill holes, make detours. Use whatever labor is available whether it is three men or three hundred men. Have village construct an airfield. Sell Chao Muong on the advantages in trade and business. Have villagers construct flat-bottom boats to haul goods on the rivers.

f. Children's Playground: This represents an opportunity to influence, educate, and take part in raising children for a better Laos. Stock the playground with swings, teeter-totters, sliding boards,



monkey bars, parallel bars. Set up volley ball, basket ball, soccer, baseball and just plain ordinary tag ball. Set up relay races, obstacle races and jumping contests. Teach them sportsmanship, teamwork, how to win and how to lose. Teach them fair play and get them in top physical condition. To help all this the team captain could write to his favorite town in the United States informing them that the Lao village where the team is stationed wants to be a sister city with them and learn about the American way of life. Through civic organizations in the US town many items for the children could be obtained such as clothes, candy, toys and educational games.

g. Special Tools: Through USOM try to borrow, lease or directly obtain a circular saw. All lumber is cut by hand. This takes hours of time and delays the building program. In addition to the saw, obtain fuel, lubricant, extra blades and maintenance instructions. Also a chain saw is ideal for clearing land.

h. Market Place: If the market place is in a typically rotten condition, interest the Chao Muong in building a new one. Get it centrally located for the people. If you furnish tin for the roof you can demand that they clean the market up after each day's use.

i. Movies: You can obtain a generator and projector from USIS and show Lao and American movies. There are many excellent propaganda movies in the USIS warehouses. Show American films also-- particularly those with a simple direct theme showing us at our best. (e.g., war pictures, cowboy pictures, adventure pictures and light comedies.) Avoid films which degrade us or are extremely sophisticated and complex.) The villagers love to watch American films even when they cannot understand a word. A portable FM speaker which would enable the interpreter to give the general plot line would be a big asset when showing US films.

j. Electric lights: Interest the Chao Muong in trying to start a light plant if one is not in operation. Possibly the better-off citizens can be persuaded to pool their money to finance the operation particularly if they can see how they can make a profit in the future. Get USOM help on this one.

k. Local Restaurants and Markets: Try to get the local bars and restaurants to clean up their kitchens and their premises and dispose of their food waste in sanitary fashion. This can be handled through the Chao Muong. Do not patronize below-standard places. If it is a small town try to interest the local people in building new buildings and attracting more people and more business.

l. As a final word on these recommended activities remember that any program you undertake will be secondary to your mission of training F.R. The time for project planning and team participation is at night and during off duty time. Before starting any work see the people at USOM and USIS and find out what kind of support they can

actually give you. These civic projects will take up many hours but they will be hours well spent in the achievement of the United States objectives of building a greater and stronger free Laos.

3. Tips on conduct of a civil assistance program.

a. Upon arrival in the village pay a courtesy call on the Chao Muong. Do not talk shop on the first meeting, just make friends.

b. Deal directly with the Chao Muong. Do not work through his subordinates. Always work through one man - the chief.

c. Make a statement on graft. Let the Chao Muong know that under no circumstances will you tolerate graft and if you detect it all aid will stop. If corruption starts the villagers will tell you. You do not need to search for it.

d. Do not stockpile supplies - get them distributed promptly. You must have a system of control. Make the Chao Muong sign for everything you give him and see that he signs out the equipment to his subordinate since it is impossible for everyone to have a pick, shovel, grub hoe or an axe, the tools should be issued from a central point on a loan basis. When a farmer finishes with a piece of equipment he returns it to the village chief. The chief must be taught how to run this system.

e. Always make the villagers share the work load. Let them know that all these projects are village projects not US help for the helpless. Once you do one project all by yourself the villagers will forever after expect this from your team. Do not give them something for nothing. For example a good approach could be "I will try to get a tin roof for this school house if you will build the school and furnish all the other materials and labor."

f. Try to present your ideas to the Chao Muong in such a fashion as to make him think it was his idea in the first place. Let him win full credit for the completion of any project. Do not issue orders to him or demand an instant decision. When you approach him with an idea let him have a night to think about it. But the next day be sure to gently push him toward a decision.

g. Do not start anything you cannot fully support. Never promise anything. Remember you can be moved out at a moment's notice. Have all the material on hand before you start any project. Check it out with your superiors before you begin.

h. Initially your weapon is talk. It must be interesting, arousing, intelligent. You are a master salesman for the United States. Some pitfalls for newcomers; drinking too much at social functions (keep your mind clear for business), getting involved with the native women (creates jealousy and hate and makes you a set up for anti-US propaganda), being arrogant, sarcastic or belittling in your conversation (these

people are hypersensitive and proud and you will come to a dead end if they dislike you). Some positive tips are: avoid anything that reminds the people of French control. For example the French required that every man in the village contribute one day's work or a couple of pieces of lumber to each building project. The Lao do not even like to talk about it. Maintain the proper team attitude of good natured willingness and endless patience in the face of resentment to change and complete apathy. Be tactful, be tolerant. Show exceptional kindness to the children and the very old. Be courteous, be relaxed and do not be in a hurry.

i. Do not worry if they do things differently from what you propose. If they achieve the end result that is all that counts.

j. For success on this mission observe the native customs. For example when you are visiting a different village inform the villagers that you are coming so that the people can assemble. The district headman (the Cha Muang) always makes a political speech on these occasions. Never force your way into a village where the broken branches across the trail indicate a closed celebration. Follow the native custom of removing your footgear when going into a village house. Learn the customs of your region.

k. Make sure the United States gets credit for all U.S. items distributed. If possible equipment should be stamped with a U.S. flag. When the Cha Muang makes a speech to the citizenry about the tools and supplies they are to receive make sure he tells the villagers that the equipment comes from America.

l. Do not give away U.S. items for nothing. For example if you give picks demand they dig a well or ditch the streets. If you give school supplies, make them either build a school or repair the old one.

4. In conclusion: The sky is the limit in what you can achieve. You cannot make a new Laos in one day but it only takes one day to start. Now is the time to start beating the enemy at his own game - the winning of men's minds, emotions and loyalty to the concept of freedom, justice, individual human rights, equality of opportunity and a higher living standard.

Interdepartmental Course on Counterinsurgency  
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## LESSONS LEARNED

THE PHILIPPINES: 1946 - 1953

By

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### I.

A Communist insurgency, like a civil war, can seem to be a most intimate, family matter for a nation. As in other family quarrels, the outsider -- even a well-meaning friend of the family -- had better stay out of it, unless he can move in to help with great skill and understanding.

This "family quarrel" aspect, of a Communist insurgency in a foreign country, poses the thorniest challenge ever faced by free Americans. We cannot look on, aloof, while a people are enslaved or murdered, and still have our own freedom bright and clear. Yet, if we move in on a foreign people to help them, and see this only as a pragmatic exercise, equating full bellies with man's liberty, or compromise our principles in the name of expediency, or let the eggs of some turn Americans into big frogs in little ponds, then we can stifle that very precious spark of true national life we seek to help protect and guide towards strength.

The Communists' task is the easier one of tearing down, of employing fear, so that they can impose their will on the weak. Our task is the harder one of building up, of employing wisdom, so that we can be brothers to a world family of free people.

During the long campaign against the Huk in the Philippines, we found a way as a nation to give true help to the Filipinos. Among the 22 million people living on the seven thousand islands which are the Philippines, there were Filipinos who had the courage to stand up -- to pledge their lives, their fortunes, their sacred honor -- to the cause of man's liberty. As we recognized these Filipinos and concentrated on helping them grow strong, within the spirit of our own heritage, we then found the vital, determining basis upon which the victory was constructed.

It wasn't the number of dead Huks. It wasn't even money or hardware. It was the ever increasing number of Filipinos dedicated to making their democracy live.

There were Americans who believed in these dedicated Filipinos and acted upon that belief. As they did, such Americans were accepted as brothers, not outsiders.

## II.

As I noted, the Huk rebellion was a long one. Its genesis was back in the 1920's. Its postlude is still in the air.

The so-called "armed struggle" ... the open attempt to overthrow the Constitutional Government of the Philippines by armed force ... lasted from 1946 until 1953, or about 8 years. It reached a peak in mid-1950, when the Communists had some 15,000 organized guerrillas in the field, and about a million supporters and sympathizers in the population. Against them were the Philippine Armed Forces, which totalled about 50,000.

The Communist strategy was run by a Politburo, composed mostly of Filipino intellectuals. Politically, the insurgency was shaped to appear as a fight between landless peasants and wealthy landlords. The landlords, of course, were seen as being helped by the Yankee "imperialists," who supplied weapons to the Filipino "lackeys" in uniform who did the bidding of a government controlled by landlords. The 1949 Philippine Presidential campaign, with its bitter charges of ballot box stuffing and intimidation of voters by the incumbent Administration, led the Politburo to broaden its political attack. The Filipino masses were told they were being cheated out of their franchise, the Constitution had turned out to be merely a scrap of paper, so the masses could only have their own government if they imposed their will by force. Thus, the slogans of the Huks: "Bullets Not Ballots" and "Land for the Landless."

The military arm, the Huk guerrilla force, was organized in squadrons and led by a Supremo, Luis Taruc. The military, including the Supremo, was under the tight control of the Politburo. Political indoctrination was carried on at schools hidden in the jungles and hills, the so-called "Stalin Universities," in troop units by political commissars, and through the use of "Self Criticism." This continual political indoctrination, coupled with "iron discipline," turned a movement which had started out with an old-time Robin Hood and Agrarian Socialist flavor into a tough, ruthless force that had hope and intent -- by mid-1950 -- of winning the Philippines by 1952.

Against these Communist forces was a government much like our own, with Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary branches. Initially, the responsibility for coping with the Huk rebellion was largely left up to the Secretary of the Interior, whose militant arm was the national police force, the Philippine Constabulary. Local control of the Constabulary was mostly the political prerogative of the Governor of the Province where the troops were assigned. All too often, the provincial capitol, the governor's residence, and the property of the governor's major political supporters could be recognized by the number of Constabulary troops mounting guard there. The Philippine Army, Navy, and Air Force, under the Secretary of National Defense, and assisted by MDAP and the U.S. military advisors of JUSMAG, devoted almost full-time in readying themselves to resist an invasion by external forces, and paid scant attention to the internal threat of the Huk rebellion.

In 1950, this was changed. The Armed Forces were reorganized, to include the Constabulary as part of the military establishment under the Secretary of National Defense. Defense took over the main responsibility of the fight against the Huks. The Constabulary force of company-size units was replaced by battalion combat teams. A former guerrilla leader, Ramon Magsaysay, gave up his seat in the House of Representatives to become Secretary of National Defense. He brought with him a deep understanding of guerrilla life from personal experience, an impatience with the status quo, and a devotion to the principles of democracy.

Little more than a year later, in November 1951, the Huks had lost the initiative and were on the run. In that period, the Armed Forces had become the protectors of the people and had started restoring the people's faith in the Constitution, in the Electoral Code, in the real meaning of democracy. The critical changes took place in fourteen action-filled months. What happened in those months holds many a lesson for those whose freedom is threatened, and for Americans in a position to help. I will sketch in some of the events and lessons for you.

### III.

The first lesson is rather basic: there is no substitute for first-hand knowledge. Let me illustrate.

In 1950, when I returned to the Philippines, for duty with JUSMAG I did what any of you would have done -- I made myself as current on the situation as I could, by reading reports and having talks with

officials "in the know." I did this, both in Washington and Manila. From this quick study, the Huks and the Filipinos among whom the Huks were based emerged in a conventional two-dimensional picture. It had no depth -- yet it was the best there was, for decision-making, in both Washington and Manila.

The "Makabulos Massacre" had just happened. The reports and the Manila press said that there was a strong tide of popular revulsion against the Huks for the wanton savagery of the massacre. The story of the Huk action seemed proof enough that decent Filipinos would be revolted. The Huks had attacked the small station hospital at Makabulos, killed the staff of administrators, doctors, and nurses, and the patients, including helpless ones in bed. Ammunition was precious, so bolos and bayonets had been used. It was butchery.

Shortly after arrival in the Philippines, I visited Makabulos, which is on the outskirts of Tarlac town. My old friends in Tarlac explained their feelings. Yes, they regretted the killing, but this was war. The soldiers had been on the government side, not the people's. Their most vivid memory was of how polite and thoughtful the Huk guerrillas had been! The Huks had started filtering into town in the early afternoon. Some had even gone to the movies to await H-hour. Then, at first dark, the Huks had quietly taken over the streets, asking the people to please remain indoors so they wouldn't get hurt when the government troops started firing. They explained that they were going to destroy the military fort on the outskirts of town, to demonstrate how strong the people's army was becoming. The words of these armed Huks, many of them relatives of local folks, are what the people remembered -- not the words of politicians or editorial writers or officials in the safe remoteness of Manila.

The conclusion was a stark one. The Philippine government had lost the people, at least in Tarlac. Rapid visits elsewhere confirmed this same finding, in other towns, other provinces. Later, captured documents gave even further proof of how much had been lost. Yet, only exceptional individuals in the Philippine government, among the U.S. officials in the Philippines, seemed to have any inkling of the real truth in the provinces.

One of the exceptions was Magsaysay, who had just become Secretary of National Defense. As a friend from my past service in the Philippines, I was assigned as liaison with him for JUSMAG and we shared much of the next 18 months together. Let me sketch in a few scenes from that time, to let you glimpse some of the depth factors that went into the decisions

There were the charcoal cooking fires, in the nipa huts up in the provinces, where the meals for farmers' families were being prepared. Magsaysay would wander away from where the troops were deployed, to the neighboring huts and their cooking fires. Invited in, he would ask question after question, about the family, the crops, their income, the debts to money lenders. It would wind up with him peering into the pot on the fire, to see what they had for dinner. A deep anger would take him as he saw the scanty food, the poverty. Then, his eyes would moisten, sadden -- an arm go around shoulders in mute reassurance -- and he would leave.

There was the day in Aglao, his home barrio, just after a Huk raid, as he looked at the bodies of women and children he had known -- murdered to intimidate him into resigning as Secretary. It was the first time that the real savagery of the Huk guerrillas came home to him, and gave his later compassion for prisoners a poignant humanity that was deeply, movingly, real.

There were his constant surprise visits to the troops. The soles of shoes worn through on boots, a medium tank breaking down in combat due to faulty spark plugs (with the Secretary, under fire, trying to fix it), officers at their CP's sleeping off a night of poker or mah-jongg. First-hand evidence of any army not on its toes -- and quickly followed by actions to remedy. As he went from the combat areas to his office, to Cabinet meetings, to Congressional hearings, to staff councils, he commenced to think and speak and decide with more sureness, with the authority of someone who knows whereof he speaks, of someone who has been there.

#### IV.

Another lesson from those days is that some of the most significant help came, not from the U.S., but when Filipinos started helping themselves. I will mention just two examples.

The first was the so-called Peace Fund. About a million dollars worth of pesos were raised by a fund-collecting drive, much as in a Community Chest or United Givers Fund drive, under the chairmanship of Vice President Lopez. These became Magsaysay's contingency or confidential funds -- used for rewards for actions against Huk leaders, for purchasing firearms in the provinces to prevent them falling into the hands of the Huks, for operational intelligence. These Peace Funds put a weapon of great practicality into the hands of a man who knew how to use it well.



The second example was a series of informal war councils, in which the real do-ers among the Philippine military participated. By "do-ers," I mean combat commanders of all ranks and some staff officers, men who had been in the thick of the fight, men of imagination and energy, men who wanted to win and who were not content to merely go through the motions just because the book said so. We, as American advisors, only used our "good offices" as interested friends to bring these men together in an informal atmosphere, provided plenty of coffee -- and then let them alone to do a "re-think" on their campaign. These sessions sparked many of the ideas which were later developed into the winning tactics which became famous. Magsaysay attended many of these sessions, as did some civilians who wanted to help -- such as leaders of the Philippine Veterans Legion and the Jaycees. It was a bit rough on some of the lieutenants and junior captains who would jeep in from combat for the sessions, but they spoke up and were listened to in this atmosphere. I commend this method as a prized way of getting ideas on how to win.

#### V.

Another lesson from those days also is a rather basic one: since the objective in a counterinsurgency is to win over the people to our side, the political-psychological appeal is a most vital element in winning. In this, the old truism that "actions speak louder than words" must be heeded.

When Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense in September 1950, he recognized the need for psychological action by appointing an assistant, Colonel Mike Barbero, for psychological warfare. Later, Barbero was succeeded by Major Joe Crisol. The function was given the name of "Civil Affairs," and "Civil Affairs Officers" were put in the chain of command down to include the battalion combat teams. They handled psychological warfare, troop information, and relations between the military and the people. However, psychological operations were stressed as a command function, and the whole Philippine Armed Forces adopted them as a weapon in this combat.

Let me list some of the actions that "spoke louder than words":

- When Huk prisoners were taken to the compound for interrogation and processing, the Army would notify the closest relatives, suggesting a visit. If the family was poor, as was often the case, bus fare would be provided and rice and other help given to the family. This was the first step towards the policy which became known later as offering the Huk enemy either "all-out friendship or all-out force."

- Huk prisoners who sincerely desired to "turn over a new leaf" were given the opportunity, through EDCOR - a project run by Defense. This started originally as a carpenter shop, where selected prisoners were set up in business to make barracks furniture, which was purchased by Defense. Later, farm projects were started in Mindanao where Army veterans and Huk prisoners pioneered new farm communities clearing out the virgin jungle to get the land. The former Huks earned title to their own land, through their labor. This was a powerful action to counter the Communist cry of "land for the landless." The word-of-mouth "bamboo telegraph" not only carried word of this up into the Huk camps in the hills, but also all over Asia. The British in Malaya told me that people being relocated there asked for electric lights in the new villages, because they had heard there were electric lights at EDCOR. The Burmese Army set up similar farm communities for their Communist guerrilla prisoners. I ran into word of EDCOR, time after time, out in the boondocks of Asia. It was a smash hit!

- As a means of bringing the people and the Armed Forces closer together, arrangements were made so that anyone who wanted to could send a telegram to the Secretary of National Defense for 10-centavos. Information about the Huk enemy, misbehavior of the military, exemplary actions noted by civilians, gripes, praise, and suggestions all came flooding in as hundreds of telegrams daily. A staff section in the Secretary's office was established to handle these. Each telegram was checked out quickly for accuracy, and was acted upon. The people started feeling that the military was really their own.

- In an insurgency, where the guerrillas hide in among the people, there are often casualties of civilians caught in the cross-fire between troops and guerrillas. Prior to 1950 in the Philippines, these civilian casualties were mostly left to shift for themselves. Under Magsaysay, who believed that the military must act as the brothers and protectors of the people, these civilian casualties were given the same prompt treatment as military casualties -- at military aid stations, in military hospitals. The people started feeling that the Army really cared. And, you know, the Army found that it really did care. As its heart grew -- so did its will, to win.

- Most of the Communist Huk recruits came from families of tenant farmers. To these families, the government had seemed something pretty remote, usually an entity wanting tax money or sending in soldiers who always were ready to shoot. When they had an argument with the landlord, the case would be settled in an Agrarian Court -- with a government judge presiding, with lawyers representing the landlord, and with the tenant farmer pleading his own case, usually to his loss. As a means to end this inequity, Magsaysay asked for volunteers among the Judge Advocate lawyers, and sent them to the provinces -- out of uniform -- to act as attorneys for deserving tenant farmers in the Agrarian Courts, gratis.

- As noted earlier, the Communist Politburo had made effective use of charges of fraud in the 1949 Philippine Presidential Election; the publicity gave vitality to the Huk slogan of "Bullets Not Ballots" as the means the people should use in changing their government. Thus, when the next national election, of November 1951, for certain Senate and House seats, for Provincial Governors, came around, the Armed Forces were asked by the Commission on Elections to help make the provisions of the enlightened Philippine Electoral Code come true. The Armed Forces, using ROTC students mostly, but backing them with troops when necessary, protected the right of free speech for candidates, policed the polling booths to ensure secret balloting, kept the political goons from intimidating the electorate, and helped supervise an honest count. This public service by the Armed Forces quite openly gave the government back to the people, and earned their full trust. The Huk Supremo, Luis Taruc, later said . . . after he came in and surrendered . . . that this electoral service by the Armed Forces broke the back of the Huk rebellion. Since the troops represented the government, and the government belonged to the people, the Communist Huks suddenly found the entire nation against them.

## VI.

There is room for one more lesson, suggested by the 1951 Philippine election. This lesson might be expressed as: Americans, when we are true to our heritage, have a real duty to speak up for our belief in liberty.

In the Philippine Election of 1951, the United States officially reiterated its dedication to the sanctity of a free election. This was done both in Washington and in Manila. These strong statements, timed just before the November elections in the Philippines and noting the guarantees to the electorate in the Philippine Constitution and Electoral Code, did much to hearten those fighting to maintain their freedom. As a final touch, the U.S. Ambassador, Myron Cowen, talked openly and staunchly on the subject at a mass meeting of Filipino voters right in the heart of the Communist dominated province of Pampanga. He received standing cheers.

Later, in the 1953 Philippine Presidential campaign, another U.S. Administration and another U.S. Ambassador, Raymond Spruance, came out just as strongly for the same political principles. These statements were warmly welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the Filipino people.

## VIII.

In the days to come, in other critical areas of insurgency, you will be facing problems which will be pressing for solution. Perhaps then, some of these lessons from the Philippines will come to mind and will suggest actions to fit your own needs. I hope so.

At such a time, also, I hope you realize that we Americans aren't sitting up in the grandstand, in choice seats on the 50-yard line. We are right down there on the playing field as far as the rest of the world is concerned. The stakes are for a people's freedom. Those are big stakes, worthy of the biggest and best we have and do as a people, as a nation.